Holy Wars? Temple Desecrations in Medieval India*

Sriya Iyer*† Anand Shrivastava†‡ Rohit Ticku‡§

This draft: August 2017

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between authoritarian rule and religious authority

during regime transitions in medieval India. Existing models of such relationships suggest

that the victorious Muslim regime would have dismantled existing Hindu religious institu-

tions to delegitimize the previous regime. We formally test this by constructing a unique

geocoded dataset and show that a Muslim State’s battle victory against a Hindu State in-

creased the likely desecration of a Hindu temple by over 30 percentage points. To address

the potential endogeneity of the battle outcome variable we use a novel instrument of Mus-

lim ruler assassination. We argue that the political uncertainty following a ruler’s assassina-

tion would have hampered a Muslim State’s battle performance against a rival Hindu State.

These assassinations were motivated by an intra-dynasty succession tussle among the Muslim

States, and were arguably unrelated to factors that determined a temple desecration.

Keywords: Conflict, religion, iconoclasm, politics, assassination.

JEL Classification: D74; N35; N45.

*We thank Nicolas Berman, Lore Vandewalle, Jared Rubin, Larry Iannaccone, Carolyn Warner, Rahul Mukherjeeand the participants at the Association for the Study of Economics Religion and Culture (ASREC) conference, Institutefor the Study of Religion, Economics and Society (IRES) graduate workshop, and Graduate Institute Brown BagSeminar for their useful suggestions. Any errors are attributable to the authors.

†University of Cambridge Faculty of Economics, Sidgwick Ave, Cambridge, CB3 9DD.‡School of Liberal Studies, Azim Premji University, Bengaluru, 560100.§Corresponding Author. Department of International Economics, The Graduate Institute. Maison de la Paix,

Chemin Eugene-Rigot 2, 1202 Geneva (CH). e-mail: rohit.ticku@graduateinstitute.ch.

1 Introduction

Economists have been interested in the relationship between religion and politics since the time

of Adam Smith (Smith, 1778). Recent studies have shown the use of religion as a nation-

building tool (Aldashev and Platteau, 2014), as a solution to collective action problems and as a

driver of conflict (Iyer, 2016). The relationship is of particular interest in authoritarian regimes

where the role of the religious elite in lending legitimacy to the ruler has been highlighted

by various studies (Aldashev, Platteau, and Sekeris, 2013; Chaney, 2013; Auriol and Platteau,

2016). The ruler offers economic incentives to the religious elite to co-opt them and maintain

his legitimacy. In the absence of such patronage, the clerics may lead mass uprisings against the

ruler, as happened during Shah Pahlavi’s rule in Iran.

The situation changes when the ruler is of a different religion to that of the prevailing reli-

gious elite. In that situation, the autocratic ruler may want to delegitimize the existing religious

elite as co-opting them may not be viable due to the religious difference. Such delegitimization

may take the form of desecration of religious places especially in those cases where the incum-

bent religion had sacred places that were used as sources of political power (Heitzman, 1991;

Hassner, 2003; Iannaccone, Haight, and Rubin, 2011). Examples of such places include “sacred

capitals” in ancient Egypt, biblical Jerusalem, ancient Rome and Constantinople, early medieval

India and 19th-century Salt Lake City. Desecrations of religious sites have been observed at

various times in history including during the Reformation in various European nations (Becker,

Pfaff, and Rubin, 2016).

In most such cases it becomes difficult to separate the purely political motive outlined above,

from the religious zeal of the ruler or indeed of the newly converted masses. In this paper, we

look at one particular case in history and attempt to distinguish between these two possible

motivations. We look at medieval India, focussing on the emergence of Islamic dynasties that

fought against Hindu rulers (and each other). This period is known for desecration of Hindu

1

temples by Muslim rulers. Some historians have advanced hypotheses analogous to the political

motivations described earlier to explain these desecrations (Eaton, 2000; Moin, 2015). Accord-

ing to them royal temples were the symbols of political authority of their patron rulers, and

were systematically destroyed by Muslim States during the course of battle to delegitimize their

Hindu rivals.

But the practice of ‘iconoclasm’ or image-breaking has a significant place in Islam as it is

often connected to the removal of idols from Ka’ba in Mecca. Recent incidents ranging from the

desecration of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban in 2001, to the ravaging of several religious

and cultural sites by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, have highlighted this connection. Thus,

distinguishing between political and religious motivations behind the desecration of Hindu tem-

ples in medieval India can give us some insight into the complex questions surrounding violence

carried out in the name of Islam today.

To enable our empirical exercise investigating the determinants of temple desecrations in

medieval India we constructed a composite geo-coded panel dataset with temple locations, tem-

ple desecrations, battles, and territorial boundaries over five and a half centuries. We began

with the temple desecrations dataset assembled by Eaton (2000) from year 1192 to 1720 AD.

The next step was to identify existing temple locations over that period. We located the sites of

medieval temples using maps of key religious and cultural sites by Schwartzberg, Bajpai, and

Mathur (1992). We also demarcated the territorial bounds of ruling States utilizing the maps on

medieval states by Schwartzberg, Bajpai, and Mathur (1992). This was supplemented with other

regime characteristics, specifically the cause of a Muslim ruler’s death. Finally we compiled data

on medieval battles in India using two different chronological sources.

Our results show that Hindu and Muslim battle outcome is the main determinant of temple

desecration. Specifically, the likelihood of temple desecration increases by over 30 percentage

points when a Muslim State won against a Hindu State. Whether a temple was already present

within a Muslim State’s territory does not affect the likelihood of its desecration. These results

2

substantiate the political mechanism behind temple desecrations and provide no evidence for

indiscriminate desecration of Hindu temples that would allude to a policy of religious icono-

clasm.

Straightforward estimates are likely to be biased because of the potential endogeneity of

the battle outcome variable. One reason for this could be reverse causality. Desecration of a

temple belonging to their common royal deity could lead Hindu States into aligning to attack

the Muslim State. The resulting coalition could have impacted the battle outcome. Or, the

wealth from ravaging Hindu temples could have enabled Muslim states to improve military

capacity and the likelihood of battle victory against the Hindu States. We may also be dealing

with some confounding omitted variables. In absence of an organized tax-collection system

younger Muslim States were likelier to ravage Hindu temples for wealth, and were plausibly

weaker in military capacity than mature Muslim States (Olson, 1993).

We propose a novel instrument of Muslim ruler’s assassination to address the plausible en-

dogeneity of battle outcome. Our intuition is based on the absence of fixed rules of succession

among the medieval Muslim States worldwide (Hurewitz, 1968). Consequently, Muslim States

were rife with violent succession tussles, manifesting at their most extreme in the form of ruler

assassinations. The Indo-Muslim States that experienced a ruler assassination would have been

less likely to successfully defend against opportunist attacks by their rival Hindu States, or to

carry out successful attacks. Since these assassinations were driven by succession conflict, we ar-

gue they were exogenous to local time varying unobservables that could have jointly determined

a temple desecration.

We also test for alternative explanation of our results. Religious ideology could still be a

determining factor if Muslim States desecrated Hindu temples as soon as they took control of a

new territory through battle victory against the Hindu States. We show that peaceful transition

of power, unlike violent transition through battles, does not impact the likelihood of desecration.

This rules out the “first opportunity” explanation of our results. Temple desecrations could also

3

have been an unintended consequence of Hindu and Muslim battles. If this was the case then

battle incidence, and not outcome, would drive temple desecrations. We test for this conjecture

and rule out that collateral damage could be explaining the results.

One may question whether an analogous relationship, i.e. the desecration of mosque, is

also observed when a Hindu State was victorious against a Muslim State? Historical evidence

suggests to the contrary, because the mosque did not perform the symbolic act of associating the

Muslim ruler with the divine (Eaton, 2000). For the Indo-Muslim ruler, especially in the early

medieval period, the function of divine legitimacy was performed through his association with

the Caliph (Moin, 2015).

The study contributes to different strands of literature. Our main contribution is to the lit-

erature on the relationship between authoritarian regime and religious authority (Iannaccone,

Haight, and Rubin, 2011; Aldashev, Platteau, and Sekeris, 2013; Chaney, 2013; Auriol and Plat-

teau, 2016). This literature predicts the authoritarian regime to co-opt the religious authority

for regime stability. We show an antagonistic relationship between the authoritarian regime and

the religious authority is plausible under regime transition and difference in religious beliefs of

the actors involved.

We add to the scholarship on ethno-religious conflict, which has primarily been studied

in a modern day context (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Bohlken and

Sergenti, 2010). This literature emphasizes the instrumental aspect of such schisms (Varshney,

2003). Religious underpinning, for them, mask deeper core of interests that are either economic

(Mitra and Ray, 2014; Blattman and Miguel, 2010) or political (Wilkinson, 2006; Jha, 2014).

Our results support the instrumental view in that political motives lie at the core of temple

desecrations, which are by nature the most blatant form of religious schism.

We add to a nascent but upcoming body of literature that studies religion, politics and

conflict in a historical setting (Iyer, 2016). These studies provide a conceptual framework to

understand the salience of religion across different time periods (Iyigun, 2008; Becker and

4

Woessmann, 2009; Michalopoulos, Naghavi, and Prarolo, 2012). Finally, we contribute to the

literature on the economic and political history of India, which has mainly focused on the in-

stitutional aspects of the colonial era (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Chaudhary et al., 2009; Kuran

and Singh, 2013; Broadberry, Custodis, and Gupta, 2015; Chaudhary, Gupta, Roy, and Swamy,

2015; Roy, 2016). This is primarily because pre-colonial history suffers from a relative dearth of

systematic event records (Bayly, 1985). Our study uses a newly constructed dataset to address

the question of inter-religious competition in pre-colonial South Asia, following in the vein of

Jha (2013). To that end, our work is also a contribution to the economics of religion in medieval

South Asia.

A key implication of this paper is its contribution to the debate on past temple desecrations

in India. The spectre of these desecrations continue to loom large over modern day India. Tussle

over disputed sites of desecration such as the famous disputed mosque at Ayodhya have precip-

itated Hindu-Muslim riots leading to significant loss of life and property (Bacchetta, 2000). The

frequency and rationale for medieval temple desecrations has also been a bone of contention

among the scholars of medieval Indian history (Goel, 1998; Eaton, 2000). Through our research

we also hope to contribute to the discourse on medieval temple desecrations.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the historical background in

Section 2, focusing on the political economy of medieval India and the religious organization of

Hindu States in this period. We also examine the narratives of medieval temple desecrations by

scholars of South Asian history. We discuss the dataset in Section 3 followed by the empirical

specification and results in Section 4. We address the causal explanation of our results and

perform a battery of robustness checks in Section 5. We discuss the implications and conclude

in Section 6.

5

2 Historical Backround

2.1 Islam’s eminence as a political force majeure in medieval India

Islam was introduced to India by the Arab traders in the early eight century, forging small Muslim

communities by the southern seacoasts (Metcalf, 2009). These traders performed key economic

roles and were patronized by local non-Muslim kings. For three centuries thereafter the political

influence of Islam stayed limited to the North-West of Indian subcontinent, where the Muslim

armies annexed a small region now known as Sindh (Metcalf, 2009).

The process of Islamic expansion in India began in earnest in the eleventh century with

the onslaught of Central Asian raiders into the subcontinent (Gommans, 1998). These forays,

devoid of territorial aims, were initially restricted to the looting expeditions.1 The landscape

changed by the end of the twelfth century when a wave of fresh conquests by the Persianised

Turks established the first Muslim State in North India.2 With its base in Delhi, the earliest

State of Turkic slaves rapidly extended its control over the entire North India. By the time of its

collapse at the end of fourteenth century the Turkic slave dynasty had extended its control over

the South-West India and had made forays even deep into South India.

The fall of the Turkic Slave dynasty was followed by a fractured regional polity where

smaller Muslim Sultanates competed for territorial sway in the North and North-West of India

(Metcalf, 2009). The South-West region, that had seceded from the Delhi based Sultans, also

split into smaller Muslim kingdoms. The southern most part of India remained the last bastion of

prominent Hindu kingship under the Vijaynagara empire. Political arithmetic seem to override

any religious differences in this period (Talbot, 1995). The Muslim kingdoms in the South-West

fought against each other and clashed, as well as sometime aligned, with the Vijaynagara empire

for regional supremacy (Metcalf, 2009).

1Mahmud of Ghazni, pivotal among these raiders, is famous for carrying out multiple looting expeditions intoIndia.

2The Persianized Turks under the leadership of Muhammad of Ghor began the conquests in Punjab, annexedDelhi, and subsequently the two eminent Hindu kingdoms of that time, Ajmer and Kannauj.

6

The period of regional attrition came to an end after the establishment of the Mughal dy-

nasty in early sixteenth century. For the next two centuries the Mughals held sway over an

empire which, at its pinnacle, exceeded in wealth and might any contemporaneous State in the

Islamic world (Metcalf, 2009). Under a unified rule, Mughal India experienced unprecedented

expansion of agricultural frontier, growth of trading networks and incremental technological

innovation.

The Mughal power started to wane by the beginning of the eighteenth century, ceding

space to many regional States. The most prominent among these regional polities were the

Rajputs in the North-West, the Marathas in the South-West, the Sikhs in the Punjab and Jats

to the south east of Delhi (Metcalf, 2009). The political motives of these non-Muslim States

were seemingly, once again, not dictated by any religious narrative. Their dynasts engaged in

strategic cooperation with Muslim rulers, as well as fought against each other (Metcalf, 2009).

Three stylized facts emerge from the above discussion. First, barring intermittent periods of

regional attrition, medieval India experienced a hegemony and expansion of Muslim States. The

authority of dynasts occupying the seat of power in Delhi was almost absolute in North India,

whereas they faced more resistance in the South-West and in Southern parts of India. Finally,

political ambition rather than religious zeal seems to have determined inter-State feuds as well

as their potential for cooperation.

2.2 Religious Organization of Medieval Hindu States

The building of monumental temples in stone for congregational worship had become a charac-

teristic feature across Indian subcontinent by the beginning of the eleventh century (Eck, 2012).

The monumental temples provided the setting for elaborate royal cults- especially of Shiva and

Vishnu.3 The buildings themselves came about mainly as a result of royal patronage.

In competition with rivals, Hindu kings sought to erect the most splendid structures, the

3The primary royal deities of this period.

7

dimensions of which would reflect their political ambitions. In other words, the temples were an

integral part of regional polity, because of their embeddedness in the authority structure. Kings,

great and small, shared their sovereignty with the deities installed in the temple, the community

of worship overlapping with the political community. The key attribute of the kingship in relation

to the temple was a combination of generous endowment and protection (Appadurai, 1977).

While temples in the medieval period received donations from a cross-section of the society, the

status of the kingship was distinguished by its ability to “protect” the deity.

The royal temples in addition to bestowing honor on the king, also became a center of

redistributive activities for the sovereign. The royal endowments to the temple played a key role

in funneling back resources into the agrarian development, as well as helped fund an elaborate

network of temple staff (Heitzman, 1991). Furthermore, the royal temple conferred honor

and material resources to the local leaders and thus become a source of patronage relationship

between the king and the local elite (Appadurai, 1977).

It is plausible that a failure to protect the royal temple would not only have denigrated

the status of the kingship, but also broken the patronage relationship that existed between the

Hindu king, the local elite and the agrarian masses.

2.3 Narratives of Temple Desecrations

With this system of religious organization and patronage in the background, the Muslim raiders

arrived in India and changed the landscape of worship in the country. The intimate relationship

between the ruler, divinity and construction of grand temple complexes was shattered in the

areas that were conquered. According to Wink, “if the temples were not destroyed, patronage

dried up, and few great temples were built in North India after thirteenth century.” The difference

in temple landscape is evident between North and South of India. In South India, untouched

by early Islamic conquests, large temple structures continued to flourish until late sixteenth

century. Even without large scale conversion of people local sacred geography was uprooted by

8

these conquests. Islamic conquests thus sabotaged the role of idols as collective symbols.

As per Wink, Islamic iconoclasm in Indian subcontinent became intertwined with political

and military expansion. It accompanied the Islamic conquest, but once the conquest was consoli-

dated desecrations became relatively rare. Wink associates the desecration of temples, especially

during the early Islamic conquests in the eleventh century, to Islam’s iconoclastic theology. The

Arabic literature on Sind and Hind from that time stands out for its obsession with idol worship

and polytheism of the Indians (Friedmann, 1975). Iconoclastic motives are interwoven in the

life stories of Sakbuktigin and Mahmud, the earliest Islamic invaders in India.

The pattern of early invasions suggest the Islamic invaders were familiar with Hindu sacred

geography (Eck, 2012). The main religious sites: Mathura, Banaras, Somnath and Ujjain, were

easily identified and sequentially targeted in the eleventh century. However, Wink is careful to

point the difficulty in separating iconoclastic motives from political and economic incentives.

Iconoclasm escalated in part because Indian temple cities contained vast amounts of immobi-

lized treasure (Wink, 2002).

Eaton argues that temple desecrations on the whole were outcomes of a political purpose

aimed to “delegitimize and extirpate defeated Indian ruling houses.” It was the relationship be-

tween the local king and the temple complex that made the temple a target. The destruction

of temples and the images were undertaken not to undermine the sanctity of the idol, but to

emasculate the political authority of their patrons. The relationship between the king and the

royal temple is illustrated in the following passage from Brhatsamita, a sixth century Hindu text:

“If a Siva linga, image or temple breaks apart, moves, sweats, cries, speaks or otherwise

acts with no apparent cause, this warns of the destruction of the king and his territory.”

(Shulman, 2014)

Albeit less frequent, even early medieval Hindu kings are recorded to have desecrated the

royal temples of their antagonists (Thapar, Mukhia, and Chandra, 1969). In that sense the

9

medieval Islamic invaders were only following the established practice of extirpating the po-

litical legitimacy of their rivals through temple desecrations. According to Eaton this explains

why temple desecrations mainly occurred during military conflicts. Once the Muslim State was

established the existing temples were left alone.

Eaton suggests that desecrations happened predominantly when Indo-Muslim States ex-

panded into the territory of non-Muslim States. This explains the absence of temple desecrations

in North India, in contrast to the South-Western region, during the Mughal rule. The main dif-

ference was that in the South-West the Mughals expanded at the expense of non-Muslim States

whereas in the North the empire grew at the cost of the defeated Afghans. The political utility of

temple desecration became irrelevant in the North as the Afghans did not share their legitimacy

with deities housed in royal temples. The theory of political stratagem is further supported by

evidence that temples of lesser significance or those formerly important but forsaken by their

patrons were also left unscathed.

The historical theses suggest that the earliest temple desecrations that accompanied looting

expeditions by Central Asian raiders could have been motivated by a religious ideology. How-

ever, as Muslim States began to established a territorial sway in India the desecrations became

strategic. Temple desecrations came to be used as a political instrument when Muslim States

expanded into the territory of Hindu States. Once the rule was established, the existing temples

were left alone.

These narratives rely on anecdotal evidence to substantiate their claims. We propose an

econometric strategy to systematically test the effect of regime transitions on medieval tem-

ple desecrations. In the following sections we investigate if the data is consistent with these

hypotheses.

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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

This section elaborates on the data collection and the main variables used in the analysis. The

descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.4

Temple Desecrations. We use the dataset on temple desecrations compiled by Eaton (2000).

Relying on contemporary or near-contemporary epigraphic and literary sources Eaton (2000)

identifies eighty incidents of desecrations “whose historicity is reasonably certain”. The dataset

provides information on the location and year of the desecration, as well as the characteristics

of the perpetrator. Our sample of temple desecrations should be a lower bound of the actual

number of desecrations. Eaton (2000) strictly relies on evidence recorded in contemporary or

near-contemporary epigraphic and literary evidence. Desecration instances codified at a later

date are thus excluded. It is also plausible that some acts of desecrations were never recorded

or their records did not survive (Eaton, 2000).

Battles. Battles dataset is compiled from two different sources. Our primary source is Jaques

(2007) which provides description of about 8,500 battles across the world from antiquity till the

21st century. Jaques (2007) covers battles ranging from epic engagement that lasted weeks

to skirmishes with few dozen men to the side. In that sense the source is not biased towards

big battles and wars. From their descriptions we teased out information such as the year and

location of the battle, and identity of the battle participants. We supplemented this information

by collecting data on the religion of each participant. To crosscheck our data we relied on

another resource, Narvane (1996), which lists key battles in medieval India, especially between

15th and 18th century.

Overall, we identified 240 battles during the given period. Around 200 of these battles were

identified in our primary, or primary as well as the second source. The remaining battle events

were identified only in the secondary source. Out of these 77 battles involved a Hindu State

fighting a Muslim State, out of which 40 battles were won by a Muslim State. The second most

4A snapshot of the variable definitions are presented in Table A-1.

11

frequent combination, with 67 incidents, was a Muslim State fighting against another Muslim

State. Clearly, the medieval period was an exemplar of Muslim State expansion.

Temple Locations. Temple locations were obtained from maps on key religious sites by

Schwartzberg, Bajpai, and Mathur (1992). We had two maps for reference for the given period.

The first map cites key religious and cultural sites for a period between 1200 and 1525 AD. The

second map cites key religious and cultural sites, from 1526 to 1707 AD. Superimposing these

maps on the territorial maps of modern day India we were able to identify the temple locations

and their coordinates.

Overall, we were able to identify 140 temple locations for the first period and 75 for the

second. We were able to match half of the desecrated temples with our sample of historical tem-

ple locations. This is likely because Schwartzberg, Bajpai, and Mathur (1992)’s maps only show

the main religious sites in each period. To avoid losing observations we added the remaining

half of the desecrated temples to the dataset of temple locations. We are thus able to have a

more complete set of temples that were desecrated. But we can not complete the set of temples

that were not desecrated, which could bias our results. To address this concern we will exclude

the subset of temple desecrations that were not matched with the temple locations data in one

of the robustness checks.

Dynasties. Dynasties data was obtained from eleven maps on medieval States, covering dif-

ferent time periods and regions from Schwartzberg, Bajpai, and Mathur (1992). We identified

51 dynasties which ruled at some point of time in medieval India. The State maps were superim-

posed on the modern territorial map of India to identify their approximate territorial control. By

merging the geo-coded maps of dynasties and temple locations we were able to approximately

identify the State where a temple was located in a given decade.

We could not identify the corresponding State for every temple location in a given period.

This is partially due to the approximate matching of medieval maps with the modern day ter-

ritorial map of India. Second, some of temple locations could have been within the confines of

12

small States that were not identified by Schwartzberg, Bajpai, and Mathur (1992). Finally, some

Hindu temples were also located in remote locations such as mountain tops which could have

been outside the territorial control of any State (Eck, 2012).

Finally, we also collected supplementary information such as the religion of the State,

the capital location, characteristic of the rulers as well as the year when the State collapsed.

Amongst ruler characteristics the cause of Muslim rulers’ death will be key for our identification

strategy.

Figures 1-3 compare the geographical and temporal distribution of temple desecrations

with Muslim battle victories against the Hindu States. Till 1300 AD Muslim battle victories and

temple desecrations were primarily confined to the Northern part of India. Between 1300 and

1500 AD, the Hindu Muslim military battles were fought mainly in the Western and Southern

part of India, as the conquest of Northern India by Muslim States was almost complete. We

also observe temple desecrations in Southern India in this period. From 1500 AD onwards

most of the Muslim military campaigns against Hindu States were concentrated in the Western

and the South-Western regions of India. This was the period when the Mughals fought against

prominent non-Muslim regional powers such the Rajputs in the North-West, the Marathas in the

South-West, and the Sikhs in the Western region of Punjab. Most of the temple desecrations in

this period were also concentrated in these regions.

< Figure 1, 2 & 3 about here >

13

4 Empirical Specification

4.1 Baseline Specification

To estimate the effect of Muslim battle victories against the Hindu States on the likelihood of a

temple desecration, we use the following specification:

Dikt = bMWHikt +mMikt + sjXjikt + γi + κk + δt + eikt (4.1)

Dikt is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a desecration event was recorded at temple

location i that was within the territory of medieval State k during decade t. MWHikt measures

the number of battles won by a Muslim State against a Hindu State within 200 kilometer radius

of temple location i in decade t.5 We use battle outcome, instead of battle incidence, as our main

explanatory variable. Based on the political logic of temple desecration we expect that a Muslim

State could only desecrate the royal temples once it annexed the Hindu State. b is the coefficient

of interest which measures the effect of a Muslim State’s battle victory on the likelihood of a

temple desecration.

Mikt is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if location i was already under a Muslim

State’s rule in decade t. It is set to 0 if we could not identify the concurrent State for location

i. This is based on the assumption that the unidentified dynasties would correspond to very

small non-Muslim States.6 Moreover, some Hindu temples were based in remote locations and

were likely to be outside the frontiers of any State. We relax these assumptions later on as a

robustness check.

Xikt is the vector of other variables which capture the socio-political relevance of temple

location i in decade t. Particularly, we use the distance of temple location i from the nearest cap-

ital (either own or of other State) in decade t as a proxy for its political and economic relevance.

5We also test for distance thresholds between 100 and 500 kms as a robustness check. See Table A-4.6According to Iyigun Shirqi dynasty was the smallest Muslim State in medieval India and their presence is

recorded in our reference historical maps.

14

This is based on the intuition that geographical proximity allowed centers of religious authority

to extend influence over the political leadership (Iannaccone, Haight, and Rubin, 2011). In re-

turn for supernatural mandate these centers received quid pro quo from the political authority

in the form of material benefits (Iannaccone, Haight, and Rubin, 2011). Therefore, temples that

were in proximity to the capital city of a medieval State k were likely to be both economically

and politically more salient.

We also include temple location (γi), decade (δt) and State (κk) fixed effects in our es-

timation. γi controls for any influence of temple location characteristics on the likelihood of

desecration. For example, proximity to trading ports or royal mints would have increased the

economic salience of certain temples and made them likely candidates for plunder (Jha, 2013).

Including δt fixed effects control for the possibility that temples desecrations may have been

more rampant in certain decades. Wink (2002) states that desecrations were more common dur-

ing early Islamic invasions. Moreover, economic shocks could also have impacted the likelihood

of temple desecrations.7 δt controls for these possibilities. Finally, κk fixed effects control for the

unobservable State level characterisitics, for example the Islamic tradition followed by a Muslim

State, that could have influenced the likelihood of desecration.8

Our baseline model is estimated at the decade level. This is because both desecrations and

battles, as shown in Figure 4, are rare events and it is viable to observe them contemporaneously

by decade. Setting up our estimation at the decade level should also attenuate the measurement

error if event years were not recorded accurately. The flip side is that we do not identify the

order of the events i.e. whether the temple desecration always happened during or after the

battle. We address the chronology concern in two ways. First, the instrumental variable design

should account for the reverse causality. Second, we conduct a robustness check where we drop

the desecration events that were recorded prior to the battle year from our sample.

< Figure 4 about here >7Temples were repositories of wealth and plausibly susceptible to plunder during economic downturns.8For example, traditions of Sunni jurisprudence differ in their prescribed treatment of religious minorities.

15

We estimate equation 4.1 using a linear probability model (LPM). LPM has an advantage

over an ordinary logit model in that its statistical properties are invariant to the rare event

bias. The susceptibility of logit model to relative frequency of events in the sample leads to

underestimating the likelihood of the event probability (King and Zeng, 2001).9

The results are presented in Table 2. Columns (1)-(3) report the basic estimates. An addi-

tional battle won by a Muslim State against a Hindu State increases the probability of temple

desecration by 1.6 percentage points. But there is no significant effect of a temple being within

the territory of a Muslim State on the likelihood of its desecration. This suggests that Muslim

States were not indiscriminate in desecrating Hindu temples, but used them strategically for

state formation. In Columns (4)-(6) we present the results with the inclusion of fixed effects.

The number of observations are reduced in Column (6) due to the inclusion of State fixed ef-

fects. This is because we could not match every temple location with a concurrent State. The

magnitude of the battle outcome and the Muslim rule variable is similar to the ones reported

in the first three columns, although we lose the statistical significance on the battle outcome

variable in Columns (5) and (6).

To sum up, our baseline estimates show that the number of battles won by a Muslim State

against a Hindu State increased the probability of temple desecration, whereas the presence of

a temple in the territory of Muslim State did not affect the likelihood of its desecration. This

suggests that Muslim States did not desecrate temples indiscriminately but likely during the

course of war with Hindu States to extirpate their political legitimacy. In what follows we will

discuss the identification challenges in our empirical setup and propose an instrumental variable

design to alleviate these concerns. Furthermore, we will discuss the causal interpretation of our

results and the address alternative explanations.

9 We also estimate our empirical framework in a logit model. The results are shown in the online appendix.

16

4.2 Endogeneity Issue

Our baseline estimates may be biased due to endogeneity of the Hindu Muslim battle outcome

variable. A plausible bias is due to reverse causality. Most medieval Hindu dynasties worshipped

Shiva or Vishnu as their royal deity (Wink, 2002). Temple desecration of one of these deities

could have united the observant Hindu States to jointly wage a war against the responsible

Muslim State. The resulting alliance could have affected the likelihood of the battle outcome.

The reverse causality in this case would lead to a downward bias in the coefficient of the battle

outcome variable. It is also plausible that the the wealth from ravaging temples could have

enabled Muslim States to mount a stronger offense in battles, which would lead to an upward

bias in the estimate of the battle outcome variable.

There may also be State level omitted variables that vary over time (kt) which could jointly

determine both the incidence of temple desecration and the Hindu Muslim battle outcome. For

example young Muslim States were likely to resort to looting, including ravaging Hindu temples

for wealth, in absence of well-organized taxation systems (Olson, 1993). Young Muslim States

were also plausibly weaker in military capacity than the mature Muslim States. The omitted

variable in such instance would also lead to underestimating the coefficient of the battle outcome

variable.

Finally, there could be a measurement error in battle records, which would bias the coef-

ficient of battle outcome variable towards zero in the linear probability model. One can also

speculate that the recording of desecration events were driven by the battle outcome. For ex-

ample, Hindu court chroniclers could have systematically excluded desecrations that happened

during their battle victories. This seems unlikely because there are records of temple desecra-

tions which were carried out by Hindu States in the early medieval period.

17

4.3 Identification Strategy

We propose a novel instrument of Muslim ruler assassination to overcome the endogeneity con-

cern in our structural estimation. The idea is based on the feature of political instability that

continued to plague the medieval Muslim States (Blaydes and Chaney, 2013). The literature

offers different explanations for the phenomena. The absence of feudal elite as a form of execu-

tive constraint, resulting in more uprisings, is offered as one explanation (Blaydes and Chaney,

2013). Another explanation is the absence of fixed rules of succession which often led to violent

succession tussles among the royal family (Hurewitz, 1968).

Our intuition is derived from succession politics in medieval Muslim States which was often

disorderly and inured with violence. According to some scholars (Anderson, 1991; Campbell,

2008; Black, 2011) the precedence for contested succession was established at the time of death

of Muhammad, who did not leave any successor nor any formal rules of succession. Unlike

the European or Indic dynasties, where the principle of primogeniture was almost uniformally

applied, the medieval Muslim polities continued to grapple between hereditary and elective

succession norms.

In practice, any male member of the extended royal family could be a candidate for the

throne. The problem was amplified by the presence of an “electoral college” consisting of the

wives and concubines in the harem as well as the imperial staff and the princes, all organizing

themselves in rival groups (Hurewitz, 1968). Each of these groups allied with top military

commanders and the ultimate ascension was often decided by the strongest group militarily

purging the rest. Military intrusion was thus at the heart of succession politics among medieval

Muslim dynasties.

The phenomena of violent succession is observed across medieval Muslim dynasties around

the world. For example, between 16th and the 19th century over twenty Sultans ruled the

Ottoman empire, and the crown passed hand horizontally from brother to brother during this

period. Out of these, eight of the Sultans were deposed in coup d’etat and half of them were

18

assassinated. Similarly, among the Alawi Morocco, fourteen different incumbents sat on the

throne over a thirty year period between 1727 and 1757. The disorderly rotation was facilitated

by the tribal commanders (Hurewitz, 1968).

In case of the Mughals in India, the turmoil of 1657-58 stands out. The war of succession

among the four Mughal princes, instigated by the imperial king Shah Jahan nominating his

first born as the successor, lasted for more than a year. The war of succession culminated with

the youngest prince Aurangzeb defeating and murdering his three brothers and imprisoning his

father for rest of his life.

The phenomena of violent succession is also evident from our data. Figure 5 shows that

among the Muslim kings, whose cause of death we could establish, almost a quarter were as-

sassinated. In fact, after natural causes, assassination is the most frequent cause of Muslim

rulers’ death in our sample. Succession politics lay at the heart of these assassinations. In al-

most all the cases the ruler was assassinated by someone proximate- brother, son, relative or

court officials- and was followed by imposing a new heir to the throne. Furthermore, succession

dilemma seems to have plagued Muslim States irrespective of their strength, as shown by the

succession war during the lifetime of the Mughal king Shah Jahan, who was the regent of the

most powerful Indian State of his time.

< Figure 5 about here >

We hypothesize that the instability following the royal assassination would negatively af-

fect a Muslim State’s battle competence. Importantly, the turmoil would also hamper a Muslim

State’s ability to defend against opportunistic attacks by the rival Hindu States, quell rebellion

by formerly subordinate Hindu principalities or carry out successful expansion. The association

between ruler assassination and the Muslim State’s capacity to win battles against external foes

makes our instrument relevant. Since these assassinations were motivated by intra-State suc-

cession feud, we argue they were exogenous to local unobservables that could jointly determine

19

a temple desecration.

4.4 IV Estimation

Our first stage regression takes the following form:

MWHikt = αAssassinatedkt + µMikt + σjXjikt + γi + κk + δt + εikt (4.2)

where Assassinatedkt is a binary variable which takes the value 1 if the ruling Muslim State

k observed at least one ruler assassination in decade t. To ensure exogeneity any battle related

death is excluded, even if the battle itself could have been fought over a succession dispute.

According to our hypothesis its coefficient will be smaller than zero i.e. a ruler assassination

would make a Muslim State politically vulnerable to external threats and negatively affect its

likelihood of winning a battle against a Hindu State.

The results are presented in Table 3. The negative coefficient of the Assassinatedkt variable

confirms our hypothesis. Importantly, the high Kleibergen-Paap F stat rules out weak instrumen-

tation concerns.

< Table 3 about here >

We can now estimate the second stage using the following equation.

Dikt = bMWH ikt +mMikt + sjXjikt + γi + κk + δt + eikt (4.3)

Where b estimates the causal effect of battle outcome on temple desecrations. The results

are presented in Table 4.10 The results are qualitatively similar to our baseline estimates i.e.

the battle outcome has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of temple

desecration. The effect of Muslim rule continues to be statistically not significant. The coef-

ficient of the battle outcome variable is also larger in magnitude than the one in our baseline10We also estimate the 2SLS model using an IV probit. Results are available on request.

20

model. Specifically, an additional battle won by a Muslim State against a Hindu State increases

the probability of temple desecration by about 33 percentage points in our most conservative

specification in Column (3). These are quantitatively large figures, given that desecration are

rare events (their unconditional probability in our sample is 1%)

< Table 4 about here >

In what follows we discuss the plausible mechanisms underlying our results, and implement

a battery of robustness checks. For brevity we will present the rest of the analysis in our most

conservative IV specification.11

5 Causal Mechanism and Robustness Checks

5.1 Causal Mechanism

Religious Authority and Regime Transitions. The results from the previous section are in line

with the historical theses that Muslim States did not desecrate Hindu temples indiscriminately.

Instead, temple desecrations were used selectively when Muslim State won in a battle against

a Hindu State and plausibly extended its domain over a new territory. Furthermore, where

Muslim States had already established their authority we do not find a greater likelihood of

temple desecration.

Our results can also be explained through the religious seduction framework (Aldashev,

Platteau, and Sekeris, 2013; Auriol and Platteau, 2016). According to this model the auto-

cratic regime co-opts the religious authority for regime stability. The co-optation is necessitated

because the religious authority is capable of influencing popular rebellion against the autocrat.

We focus on the case of regime transition that occurred through military battle between

a Muslim and a Hindu State. Once the victorious Muslim State brought a new territory under

11Except in Table A-3 where the comparable specification of interest is where we do not include the dynasty fixedeffects.

21

its control, it also inherited Hindu religious institutions and a predominantly Hindu population.

We expect the Muslim State to have desecrated the royal temple to dishonor the Hindu regime

who failed to “protect” the royal deity, as well as break the patronage relationship that existed

between the Hindu kingship, local elite and the agrarian masses. This way the new regime

would have not only delegitimized the previous regime but also prevented the possible use of

incumbent religious order and patronage network for future rebellion.

What does the religious seduction model predict about temple desecration when the Muslim

State was already in control of a territory? According to the model, the Muslim ruler would act

more puritanical if he entered into a religious bidding war with an increasingly radical Muslim

religious elite. In this scenario we would expect more desecrations in a territory that was already

in control of a Muslim State. The ruler’s response would however be conditional on the Muslim

clerics’s capacity to instigate mass rebellion.

The medieval Indo-Muslim States ruled over vastly Hindu majority populations (Benthall,

2005). The capacity of the Muslim clerics to have instigated mass rebellion against the Muslim

ruler was very low. The Muslim ruler was therefore unlikely to enter into a religious bidding

war with the Muslim religious elite. The Muslim religious elite in medieval India predominantly

followed the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, which encouraged a conciliatory approach

towards the Hindu subjects. Thus the conditions that would have encouraged temple desecra-

tions when the Muslim State was already in control of a territory were largely missing in the

case of medieval India.

First Opportunity. Our results do not completely rule out religious ideology as the main stim-

ulus of temple desecrations by medieval Muslim States. One explanation could be that Muslim

States would desecrate temples as soon as they took control of a new territory. Moreover, the

only way to gain control of a new territory was through winning a battle. In this scenario the

positive effect of the battle outcome variable on the likelihood of desecrations could still have

22

been driven by a religious ideology.

If controlling the territory for the first time was the primary mechanism for desecration,

then any peaceful transition of power would also be accompanied by a higher likelihood of

temple desecration. A peaceful transition would take place when a Hindu State, anticipating

lopsidedness in military capacity, pledged allegiance to a Muslim State. The Hindu State paid a

share of its annual taxes as a tribute, and pledged support for future military expeditions of the

Muslim State. In return, the Hindu king continued as the de-facto ruler of his territory.

If the “first opportunity” hypothesis holds we should also expect an increase in the likely

temple desecration under peaceful transfer of power. To address this concern, we modify the

construction of Muslim rule dummy, where the variable is set to 1 if the territory was ruled by a

Muslim State in decade (t) but ruled by a non-Muslim State in decade (t − 1). Since number of

Hindu Muslim battles account for any violent transition of power, the modified dummy variable

should proxy a peaceful transition.

Results are reported in Column 1 of Table 5. The proxy for peace transfer of power does

not have any effect on the likelihood of temple desecration. Hence, we rule out the “first oppor-

tunity” explanation of our results.

Collateral Damage. Temple desecrations could have been an unintended consequence of the

Hindu Muslim battles. If this was the case battle outcome would be irrelevant as we have argued

so far. To test this conjecture we include an additional control variable that measures the number

of Hindu Muslim battles that were recorded within 200 km of temple location i in decade t. We

instrument the number of battles fought by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if at least

one Muslim ruler died of natural circumstances in decade t. The idea being that regime change

without a major succession turmoil would have increased the likelihood of an external attack

without determining the battle outcome.12 The results are reported in Column 2 of Table 5. The

12Muslim ruler deaths under natural circumstances is not a strong predictor of battle incidence, which furtheremphasizes the key role of assassinations in medieval Muslim polity.

23

coefficient of the Hindu Muslim battle variable is not different from zero. In other words, the

Hindu Muslim battles affects the likelihood of a temple desecration only when the battle is won

by a Muslim State. We rule out that temple desecrations were an unintended consequence of

the Hindu Muslim battles.

< Table 5 about here >

5.2 Robustness Checks

Excluding desecrations before battles. Our identification relies on the assumption that tem-

ple desecration occurred once a Muslim State won a battle against a Hindu State. However, it

is plausible that some desecrations events occurred prior to a battle. To address this concern we

exclude temple desecrations that occurred prior to the battle year. Out of the seven desecrations

that are excluded, three happened only a year prior to the battle, and could plausibly just be

due a measurement error. The results are reported in Column 1 of Table A-2. Our results are

robust to excluding the temple desecrations that occurred prior to the Hindu Muslim battle(s).

Standard errors correction for grouped IV. A potential problem inherent in instrumental

variables is that if the instrument varies at a higher level of aggregation than the dependent

variable the resulting estimation will yield underestimated standard errors (Shore-Sheppard

et al., 1996). This is indeed our case where the instrument varies at the (kt) level whereas the

dependent variable changes at the (ikt) level. To address this we use a two way clustering in our

instrumental variable regression following Cameron, Miller, et al. (2010). The resulting stan-

dard errors (Column 2) are similar to our preferred 2SLS regression and therefore the statistical

significance of the explanatory variables is unaffected.

Excluding temples not in maps. As discussed earlier in the data section about half of temple

desecrations were matched with the temple locations given in the historical maps. We note that

six of the temple desecrations occurred at the end of 12th century, while three more desecrations

24

occurred in the first couple of years of the 13th century. The earliest map of historical temple

locations only reports it for a period between 13th and 16th century. It is plausible that some of

the temples which had already been desecrated were not included in this map. Nevertheless, to

avoid any selection bias we drop those desecration events where the underlying temple could not

be traced on the maps of historical temple sites. The coefficient on the battle outcome variable

continues to be positively and statistically significant (Column 3), although the magnitude is

slightly smaller compared to the preferred 2SLS regression. The effect of Muslim rule is still

statistically insignificant.

Impact of iconoclastic rulers. So far we have devoted our analysis to medieval Muslim State

and the practice of temple desecration. Our results suggest that on average Muslim states did

not desecrate temples which were present within their territorial bounds, but only during the

course of battle with a rival Hindu State. This suggests that the political motive is a much better

explanation of temple desecrations than iconoclastic agenda. However, some Muslim rulers

were known for their iconoclastic beliefs. For example, Mughal king Aurangzeb was known for

his puritanical approach towards practice of Islam (Sarkar, 1912). Similarly Sultan Sikander, a

14th century ruler of Kashmir, was renowned for serially desecrating temple and was famouly

known as Sikander The Iconoclast (Kaw, 2004).

These two rulers also stand out when we look at the perpeterators of temple desecrations

in our dataset. Aurangzeb and his commanders alone were responsible for 10 out of 80 dese-

crations in our sample, while Sikander is shown to be responsible for desecrating 3 temples. To

ensure that our results are not driven by the reign of these iconoclastic rulers, we exclude the

periods when Aurangzeb and Sultan Sikander were in power. The results reported in Column 4

are uncompromised by excluding the reign of these iconoclasts.

Muslim dynasty duration. The duration of a Muslim State in power could be determining

both the desecration and the battle outcome. For example, young Muslim States were likely to

25

resort to looting, including ravaging temples that were the repositories of wealth, in absence

of an organized tax collection system (Olson, 1993). Young Muslim States were also plausibly

weaker in military capacity than mature Muslim States. To address this concern we include an

additional control variable that measures the duration for which a Muslim dynasty had been in

existence till decade t. The results reported in Column 5 of Table A-2 are robust to inclusion of

the Muslim dynasty duration variable.

< Table A-2 about here >

Alternate construction of Muslim Rule variable. We set the Muslim rule variable as equal

to 0 if we couldn’t identify the corresponding State for temple location i. This is based on the

assumption that the unidentified dynasties would correspond to very small States and would

generally not have been Muslim to begin with. We now relax the assumption and altogether

drop those observations where the corresponding State could not be identified. The results

are reported in Table A-3. Column 1 is the column of interest (without including State fixed

effects) and should be compared to Column 1 of Table 4. Dropping these observations makes

the battle outcome variable statistically significant and slightly larger in magnitude compared to

our preferred 2SLS specification. The improvement is however offset by weakening of the KP F

stat in the first stage.

< Table A-3 about here >

Varying the distance for matching battles to temples. In our preferred specification, we have

constructed the explanatory variable Muslim Win against Hindu using battles that occur within

a 200 km radius of the temple in a given decade. The choice of this distance is arbitrary, so here

we vary this distance to see if it affects the result. Table A-4 shows the coefficient estimates of

the explanatory variable and for Muslim Rule Binary for our preferred 2SLS specification with

the distances varying from 100 km to 500 km in steps of 50 km. The coefficient of the battle

26

outcome variable remains positive and statistically significant. The magnitude decreases as we

increase the distance, but this is to be expected. As we are including battles that are further

away from the temple, the probability of one of these, where the Muslim ruler won, resulting

in a desecration becomes smaller. The coefficient estimates for the Muslim Rule variable remain

statistically insignificant throughout. Hence, we find that changing the distance for matching

battles to temples does not change our main result.

< Table A-4 about here >

Alternative dataset of temple desecrations. We compiled another dataset on desecrations us-

ing Goel (1998). The data is highly contested by medieval Indian historians due to an exclusive

reliance on Persian historiographic sources, and the data is not verifiable by other contempo-

raneous sources (Eaton, 2000; Thapar, 2005). According to these scholars the Persian histo-

riographic sources were prone to exaggerate the iconoclastic behaviour of Indo-Muslim kings,

so as to glorify their religious zeal. We compiled references to about 2000 temple desecrations

cited by Goel (1998). However, we could only use about one-third of the data for which the

location was identified. Using this dataset we find weak evidence for Muslim rule explaining

the likelihood of a temple desecration. The effect of battle outcome variable is statistically not

significant.

< Table A-5 about here >

6 Conclusion

Our study addresses the relationship between authoritarian ruler and religious authority during

regime transitions. The events of temple desecration in medieval India are the center piece of

our analysis. Using a novel dataset on medieval temples, dynasties and battles that we con-

structed we show that a Muslim State’s battle victory against a Hindu State is a significant

27

predictor of temple desecrations. Whether the temple was already located within the territory

of a Muslim State does not affect the likelihood of its desecration. Together these results sug-

gest that Muslim States were not indiscriminate in desecrating Hindu temples, but used them

strategically for state formation.

This does not dismiss the iconoclastic tendencies of certain medieval Muslim rulers in India.

Instead, religious zeal on average does not appear to have driven the Muslim State’s agenda. The

medieval history literature offers some plausible explanations for our results. The Hanafi school

of law, the most prominent school of Islamic jurisprudence in India, adopted a conciliatory ap-

proach towards the religious practices of Indic religions. It advocated concession of religious

freedom for Hindus in lieu of a religious tax. In that sense Muslim States in India were mainly

guided by a conciliatory interpretation of Islamic law. Another explanation is that the concilia-

tory approach could have been politically most expedient as Muslims were vastly outnumbered

by the Hindu subjects. A strict imposition of Islamic law could have come at the cost of more

frequent rebellions.

This type of study is vital in the current political milieu. The rise of modern fundamentalist

Muslim quasi-States such as the Taliban or the Islamic State, and their association with icono-

clastic events, have led some to conflate the primacy of religious extremism amongst the Islamic

societies. Our findings tell a cautionary tale- that actions driven by seemingly religious motives

could mask the political processes at play. Same caution needs to be extended when it comes

to the discourse on past temple desecrations in India, which have been responsible for severe

Hindu-Muslim riots in the recent past, causing great deal of harm to life and property. We hope

this study will better inform the narrative on medieval temple desecrations going forward.

The study also has implications for future research. An interesting topic of research would

be the relationship between memories of past temple desecrations and religious riots in India.

Somewhat related, and building on the social trust theory, future research could also look at

the association between past temple desecrations and economic development. Our dataset will

28

hopefully help advance the empirical literature in this direction.

29

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Wink, A., 2002, Al-Hind: The Slavic Kings and the Islamic conquest, 11th-13th centuries . , vol. 2,

Brill.

34

Tables and Figures

35

Figure 1: Temple Desecrations and Battle Victories, till 1300 AD

(a) Temple Desecrations (b) Muslim Win Against Hindu

36

Figure 2: Temple Desecrations and Battle Victories, 1300-1500 AD

(a) Temple Desecrations (b) Muslim Win Against Hindu

37

Figure 3: Temple Desecrations and Battle Victories, 1500 AD onwards

(a) Temple Desecrations (b) Muslim Win Against Hindu

38

Figure 4: Hindu-Muslim Battle Outcome vs Desecrations

01

23

4

1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700Decade

Desecration Muslim Win Against Hindu

Figure 5: Muslim Ruler Deaths in Medieval India

010

2030

4050

% o

f Mus

lim R

uler

Dea

ths

Assassinated Battle Related Natural Other

39

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample)

Variable Mean Std. Dev 10p 25p Median 75p Min Max N

Temple Desecration 0.01 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 1 11502Muslim Win Against Hindu 0.02 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 4 11502Muslim Hindu Battle 0.03 0.23 0 0 0 0 0 6 11502Muslim Rule 0.34 0.47 0 0 0 1 0 1 11502Peaceful Transition 0.01 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 1 11502Distance to Nearest Capital (Log) 5.22 1.19 4.07 4.89 5.41 5.87 0 7.17 11502Muslim Ruler Death, Assassinated 0.03 0.21 0 0 0 0 0 2 11502Muslim Ruler Death, Natural 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 0 2 11502

Table 2: Baseline Results in LPM

Dependent variable: Desecration

VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Desecration Desecration Desecration Desecration Desecration Desecration

Muslim Win Against Hindu 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016* 0.013 0.002(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)

Muslim Rule 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.043*(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025)

Nearest Capital Distance -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)

Model LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM LPMObservations 11,502 11,502 11,502 11,502 11,502 6,980Temple Fixed Effects N N N Y Y YDecadal Fixed Effects N N N N Y YDynasty Fixed Effects N N N N N Y

Notes:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Desecration is a binary variable which equals 1 if a desecration event wasrecorded in temple location (i) in decade (t). Muslim win against Hindu identifies the number of battles won byMuslim State against Hindu State within 200 km radius of the temple location. Muslim Rule is a binary which takesthe value of 1 if temple location i was within the territory of a Muslim State k in decade t. Nearest Capital Distanceis the distance of temple location i to the nearest capital city in decade t and is recorded in logs.

40

Table 3: First Stage Estimation

Dependent variable: Muslim Win Against Hindu

VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)

Assassination -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.041***(0.006) (0.005) (0.008)

Muslim Rule -0.003 -0.013 -0.012(0.006) (0.074) (0.070)

Nearest Capital Distance -0.007*** -0.005** -0.010***(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)

Model OLS OLS OLSObservations 11,502 6,978 6,978Kleibergen Paap F stat 28.08 37.31 24.64Temple Fixed Effects Y Y YDecadal Fixed Effects Y N YDynasty Fixed Effects N Y Y

Notes:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at temple location level in parentheses in allcolumns. Muslim win against Hindu identifies the number of battles won by Muslim State against Hindu Statewithin 200 km radius of the temple location i. Assassination is a binary variable equal to 1 if a Muslim State kobserved at least one ruler assassination in decade (t). Muslim Rule is a binary which takes the value of 1 if templelocation i was within the territory of a Muslim State k in decade t. Nearest Capital Distance is the distance of templelocation i to the nearest capital city in decade t and is recorded in logs. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value for10% maximal IV relative bias was equal to 16.38.

41

Table 4: Second Stage Estimation

Dependent variable: Desecration

VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)

Muslim Win Against Hindu 0.248 0.245* 0.329**(0.173) (0.146) (0.147)

Muslim Rule 0.002 -0.033 -0.022(0.003) (0.028) (0.035)

Nearest Capital Distance 0.001 -0.001 0.002(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)

Model 2SLS 2SLS 2SLSObservations 11,502 6,978 6,978Kleibergen Paap F stat 28.08 37.31 24.64Temple Fixed Effects Y Y YDecadal Fixed Effects Y N YDynasty Fixed Effects N Y Y

Notes:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Desecration is a binary variable which equals 1 if a desecration event wasrecorded in temple location (i) in decade (t). Muslim win against Hindu identifies the number of battles won byMuslim State against Hindu State within 200 km radius of the temple location. Muslim Rule is a binary which takesthe value of 1 if temple location i was within the territory of a Muslim State k in decade t. Nearest Capital Distanceis the distance of temple location i to the nearest capital city in decade t and is recorded in logs.

Table 5: Alternative Hypotheses

Dependent variable: Desecration

“First Opportunity” hypothesis “Collateral Damage” hypothesis

VARIABLES (1) (2)

Muslim Win Against Hindu 0.308** 0.349***(0.122) (0.135)

Muslim Rule -0.017(0.040)

Peaceful Transition -0.008(0.017)

Nearest Capital Distance 0.002 0.002(0.002) (0.002)

Muslim Hindu Battle -0.034(0.101)

Model 2SLS 2SLSObservations 6,978 6,978Kleibergen Paap F stat 28.32 11.11Temple Fixed Effects Y YDecadal Fixed Effects Y YDynasty Fixed Effects Y Y

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at temple location level in parentheses in allcolumns. Desecration is a binary variable which equals 1 if a desecration event was recorded in temple location (i)in decade (t). Muslim win against Hindu identifies the number of battles won by Muslim State against Hindu Statewithin 200 km radius of the temple location. Muslim Rule is a binary which takes the value of 1 if temple location iwas within the territory of a Muslim State k in decade t. Peaceful transition is a binary and is equal to 1 if location(i) in period (t) was ruled by a Muslim State but by a non-Muslim one in (t-1). Muslim Hindu Battle measures thenumber of Hindu Muslim battle that were recorded within 200 kms of the temple location in period (t). NearestCapital Distance is the distance of temple location i to the nearest capital city in decade t and is recorded in logs.

42

Table A-1: Variable Definitions

Variable Description Data source

ikt variables

Temple Desecration Dummy equal to 1 if a desecrationevent was recorded at temple locationi within the territory ruled by State kin decade t

Eaton (2000)

Muslim Win Against Hindu Number of battles won by a MuslimState against a Hindu State within 200km radius of temple location i indecade t

Jaques (2007) & Narvane (1996)

Muslim Hindu Battle Number of Muslim Hindu battlesfought within 200 km radius of templelocation i in decade t

– ''–

Muslim Rule Dummy equal to 1 if temple location iwas located in the territory ruled by aMuslim State k

Schwartzberg, Bajpai, and Mathur (1992)

Peaceful Transition Dummy equal to 1 if temple location iwas located in the territory ruled by aMuslim State k in decade t and anon-Muslim State k in decade t − 1

– ''–

Distance to Nearest Capital Log of the distance of temple location ito the nearest capital of any State k

– ''–

kt variables

Assassinated Dummy equal to 1 if at least one rulerof Muslim State k was assassinated indecade t

Various Sources

Natural Death Dummy equal to 1 if at least one rulerof Muslim State k died of naturalcauses in decade t

– ''–

43

Tabl

eA

-2:

Rob

ustn

ess

Che

cks

Dep

ende

ntva

riab

le:

Des

ecra

tion

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Excl

udin

gde

secr

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nsbe

fore

batt

les

Std.

Erro

rsC

orre

ctio

nEx

clud

ing

tem

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not

inm

aps

Excl

udin

gru

leof

icon

ocla

sts

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atio

nM

uslim

Win

Aga

inst

Hin

du0.

298*

*0.

329*

*0.

251*

0.31

2**

0.28

8**

(0.1

44)

(0.1

43)

(0.1

47)

(0.1

35)

(0.1

29)

Mus

limR

ule

-0.0

22-0

.022

-0.0

040.

018

0.01

9(0

.033

)(0

.026

)(0

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eare

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apit

alD

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002

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1(0

.002

)(0

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)(0

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)(0

.002

)(0

.002

)M

uslim

Dyn

asty

Leng

th0.

002

0.00

20.

001

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1(0

.002

)(0

.002

)(0

.002

)(0

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)M

odel

2SLS

2SLS

2SLS

2SLS

2SLS

Obs

erva

tion

s6,

975

6,97

85,

482

5,95

65,

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at24

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8.99

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Not

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01,*

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Mus

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byM

uslim

Stat

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Stat

ew

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n20

0km

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usof

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)w

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olum

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).St

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dat

tem

ple

loca

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leve

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ddy

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ith

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sty

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44

Additonal Robustness Checks

Table A-3: Alternative Construction of Muslim Rule Variable

Dependent variable: Desecration

VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)

Muslim Win Against Hindu 0.326* 0.245** 0.329**(0.177) (0.096) (0.143)

Muslim Rule 0.004 -0.033* -0.022(0.006) (0.019) (0.026)

Nearest Capital Distance 0.003 -0.001 0.002(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)

Model 2SLS 2SLS 2SLSObservations 6,978 6,978 6,978Kleibergen Paap F stat 8.31 26.46 8.99Temple Fixed Effects Y Y YDecadal Fixed Effects Y N YDynasty Fixed Effects N Y Y

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at temple location level in parentheses in allcolumns. Desecration is a binary variable which equals 1 if a desecration event was recorded in temple location (i)in decade (t). Muslim win against Hindu identifies the number of battles won by Muslim State against Hindu Statewithin 200 km radius of the temple location. Muslim Rule is a binary which takes the value of 1 if temple locationi was within the territory of a Muslim State k in decade t. Muslim rule variable set to “missing” if the State was notidentified. Nearest Capital Distance is the distance of temple location i to the nearest capital city in decade t and isrecorded in logs.

Table A-4: Varying the Distance of Battles from Temples

Dependent variable: Desecration

VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Distances 100 km 150 km 200 km 250 km 300 km 350 km 400 km 450 km 500 km

Muslim Win Against Hindu 1.854* 0.900** 0.333** 0.194** 0.172** 0.155** 0.148** 0.149** 0.136**(1.047) (0.437) (0.149) (0.088) (0.078) (0.071) (0.068) (0.070) (0.065)

Muslim Rule -0.193 0.020 -0.024 -0.019 -0.036 -0.027 -0.014 -0.013 -0.019(0.122) (0.074) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)

Model 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at temple location level in parentheses in allcolumns. We do not report the coefficient on nearest capital distance here.

45

Table A-5: Alternative Desecrations Dataset

Dependent variable: Desecration

VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Muslim Win Against Hindu 0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.371 -0.425 -0.423(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.320) (0.386) (0.366)

Muslim Rule Binary 0.018*** 0.010*** -0.022 0.004 -0.062 -0.123(0.003) (0.003) (0.034) (0.006) (0.078) (0.100)

Nearest Capital Distance -0.003 -0.005** -0.011*** -0.008** -0.012*** -0.017***(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)

Model OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLSObservations 24,232 24,232 14,357 24,232 14,357 14,357Kleibergen Paap F Stat 80.18 37.66 28.41Temple Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y YDecadal Fixed Effects N N Y N N YDynasty Fixed Effects N Y Y N Y Y

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at temple location level in parentheses in allcolumns. Desecration is a binary variable which equals 1 if a desecration event was recorded in temple location (i)in decade (t). Muslim win against Hindu identifies the number of battles won by Muslim State against Hindu Statewithin 200 km radius of the temple location. Nearest Capital Distance is the distance of temple location i to thenearest capital city in decade t and is recorded in logs.

46

Online Appendix

Table B-1: Baseline Results in Logit

Dependent variable: Desecration

VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Desecration Desecration Desecration Desecration Desecration

Muslim Win Against Hindu 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.221*** 0.092(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.081) (0.074)

Muslim Rule 0.002 0.002 0.033 0.003(0.002) (0.002) (0.068) (0.033)

Nearest Capital Distance -0.000 -0.024 -0.009(0.000) (0.031) (0.012)

Model Logit Logit Logit Conditional Logit Conditional LogitObservations 11,502 11,502 11,502 3,564 3,564Temple Fixed Effects N N N Y YDecadal Fixed Effects N N N N YDynasty Fixed Effects N N N N N

Notes:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Desecration is a binary variable which equals 1 if a desecration event wasrecorded in temple location (i) in decade (t). Muslim win against Hindu identifies the number of battles won byMuslim State against Hindu State within 200 km radius of the temple location. Muslim Rule is a binary which takesthe value of 1 if temple location i was within the territory of a Muslim State k in decade t. Nearest Capital Distance isthe distance of temple location i to the nearest capital city in decade t and is recorded in logs. The conditional logitmodel does not converge when we include the dynasty fixed effects.

47

Table B-2: Second Stage Estimation in IV Probit

Dependent variable: Desecration

VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)Desecration Desecration Desecration

Muslim Win Against Hindu 0.399 0.227 0.808**(0.337) (0.262) (0.401)

Muslim Rule 0.003 -0.115** -0.241***(0.004) (0.051) (0.072)

Nearest Capital Distance 0.002 -0.001 0.005(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)

Model IV Probit IV Probit IV ProbitObservations 7,029 5,463 3,284Temple Fixed Effects Y Y YDecadal Fixed Effects Y N YDynasty Fixed Effects N Y Y

Notes:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Desecration is a binary variable which equals 1 if a desecration event wasrecorded in temple location (i) in decade (t). Muslim win against Hindu identifies the number of battles won byMuslim State against Hindu State within 200 km radius of the temple location. Muslim Rule is a binary which takesthe value of 1 if temple location i was within the territory of a Muslim State k in decade t. Nearest Capital Distanceis the distance of temple location i to the nearest capital city in decade t and is recorded in logs.

48