C00267737D FORRELEASE L DATE:16-Jul-2011

HR70-14

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRA1‘vRELEASE AS SANMZED

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATENUMBER 11-8-61

(Supersedes NIE 11-8-60)

—3e.easeArg-mNIE 11-8-617 June 1961

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FORLONG RANGE ATTACK

ANNEX C

3THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

Submitted by theDIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in thepreparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agencyand the intelligence organizations of the Departments ofState, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by theUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 7 June 1961.* Concurring were The Director of Intelligenceand Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief ofStaff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the AssistantChief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of theNavy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; theDirector for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Com-mission Representative to the USIB; the Assistant to theSecretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Directorof the National Security Agency. The Assistant Director,Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being

outside of his jurisdiction.

*This estimate was approved by the 13S113 on 7 June 1961 subject tocertain further action by USIS representatives, consulting as necessarywith their respective principals (03113414$8 . Itent 13 )• This tatter &aim.was completed on 13 June 1961.

Copy No. 72

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copyis for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction ona need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by thefollowing officials within their respective departments.

a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of Stateb. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Armyc. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the

Navyd. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Forcee. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for The Joint Stafff. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commissiong. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigationh. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for the Department

of DefenseI. Director of NSA for the National Security Agencyj. Assistant Director for Communications Intelligence, CIA, for any other De-

partment or Agency

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3. When an estimate is disseminated -overseas, the overseas recipients may retainit for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimateshould either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission shouldbe requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC—D-69/2,22 June 1953.

4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified:etwarba

G

This • o contains classified information affecti e nationalsecurity of the I States within the of the espionagelaws, US Code Title 18, Se 79 and 798. The law prohibitsits transmission or the r tents in any manner toan unauthorize , as well as its use in a prejudicialto th interest of the United States or for the benefit of anyforeign government to the detriment of the United States.

DISTRIBUTION:White HouseNational Security CouncilDepartment of StateDepartment of DefenseAtomic Energy CommissionFederal Bureau of Investigation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageBACKGROUND ON THE ICBM SYSTEM 2

RECENT TEST RANGE ACTIVITIES 2

New Launch Facilities 3Recent Test Firings 3Interpretations of Test Range Activity 4

ICBM PRODUCTION EVIDENCE 5

ICBM DEPLOYMENT EVIDENCE • 6

Suitable Regions 6Suspected Areas 7Masking Addresses 8Launchers Per Site 8Site Activation Time 9Interpretation of Deployment Evidence 9

SOVIET PROGRAMMING DECISIONS 10

Pertinent Soviet Statements 10Strategic Planning Factors 11Effects of Technological Change 13

PROBABLE RANGE OF SOVIET FORCE LEVELS 14

Force Levels in Mid-1961 15Force Levels in 1963-1964 15Trends in 1965-1966 16

POSITION ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR OFINTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 16

POSITION ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THE ACSI, DEPT OFTHE ARMY, AND THE ACNO (INTELL) DEPT OF THE NAVY. 18

POSITION ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THE ACSI, USAF. . 19

CHART AND MAP following page 20

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ANNEX C

THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM-EVIDENCE

AND ANALYSIS

1. During the course of the past year or more,US intelligence has acquired a considerablebody of additional information pertaining toSoviet programs for ICBMs and other ballisticmissiles. This information, derived from awide variety of intelligence sources, has pro-vided new insights into the general character-istics and performance of the Soviet ICBM, thefacilities required for its deployment as aweapon _system, and the timing of some of theSoviet activities critical to the progress of thisweapon system through research and develop-ment into the deployment phase of the pro-gram.

2. A major purpose of this Annex is to setforth the direct evidence bearing on SovietICBM development and deployment, togetherwith the alternative interpretations which webelieve can reasonably be assigned to variousaspects of this evidence. From this we seekto arrive at a general estimate of the ICBMforce likely to exist in the USSR at present andto set forth clearly the uncertainties attachedto any such estimate. The problem is moredifficult than that of estimating current So-viet strength inmany other forms of mili-tary power. Estimates of current bomberstrengths, for example, are based primarilyon production and order-of-battle informationof good quantity and quality, which narrowsthe area of uncertainty. Indirect evidenceand insights drawn from Soviet militarythinking and weapon systems programmingpractices play a much larger role in esti-mates of current Soviet missile strength.

3. Future estimates of many Soviet weaponprograms are projected from a reasonably firmcurrent base; it is far more difficult to estab-lish such a base for Soviet ballistic missile pro-gram. Moreover, the trends are at best onlydimly seen. The second major purpose of thisAnnex, therefore, is to set forth the method-ology for making an estimate of the likelyfuture range of Soviet ICBM capabilities,using the evidence as well as insights derivedfrom general considerations.4. There are several reasons why considerableuncertainty should exist in present US esti-mates of the Soviet ICBM program, and whythere should be a number of elements in theevidence which permit differing judgments.Large ballistic missile systems are new to boththe US and the USSR, and it is natural thatthere should be uncertainty as to the preciseproblems and lead-times involved in quantitydeployment. Ballistic missile systems requirethe development of new operational concepts,which are not necessarily the same in the twocountries; this limits the direct applicabilityof analogies from US experience. Moreover,these weapon systems are being developed anddeployed in a period of vastly accelerated tech-nological change.

5. Another factor in the estimative problem,worthy of special attention, is the effect ofSoviet security measures. The USSR has al-ways regarded secrecy as a major military as-set in itself, and there is evidence that ballisticmissile programs have been cloaked with avery high degree of security. This secrecygoes considerably beyond the dispersal and

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concealment of launching sites, a practicewhich the Soviet leaders have stated is a partof their missile deployment concept. Evenroutine aspects of the missile and space pro-grams have been assiduously concealed—placenames like Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam con-tinue to be withheld, despite the common useof these place names in the Western press.Khrushchev once publicly apologized for with-holding the names of Soviet missile and spaceexperts who received awards, allegedly becausesuch recognition would make them the targetsof Western provocateurs. There is much evi-dence that the Soviets attempt to prevent theobservation of missile equipment in transit,by moving it at night, harassing or reroutingWestern observers, and other means. Finally,we have recently discovered a special maskingaddress system, apparently designed to pre-vent the disclosure in personal telegraphiccommunications of the places where missilepersonnel Are stationed.

BACKGROUND ON THE ICBM SYSTEM

6. In NIE 11-5-61 1 we summarized the gen-eral characteristics of the Soviet ICBM systemand reviewed the pattern of test range ac-tivities at Tyuratam, concentrating on theperiod up until about 1 January 1960, the ap-proximate time when the majority of the in-telligence community estimates that the So-viets achieved an initial operational capability(IOC) with an ICBM system of about 5,000n.m. maximum range.' In that estimate, wereached full agreement, based on very exten-sive data, as to the following basic character-istics of the Soviet ICBM system which wouldsignificantly affect its production and deploy-ment:

a. The missile itself is of relatively heavy con-struction and is extremely large. Depending

Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missilesand Space Vehicles, dated 25 April 1961. (TOPSECRET)

See NIE 11-5-61, paragraph 17. The AssistantChief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army,and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelli-gence), Department of the Navy, believe that theIOC date did not occur this early. For their posi-tion, see paragraphs 77-80.

upon its exact configuration, it can best bedescribed either as twice as bulky as a USAtlas or half as large as a US Saturn.b. It employs radio-inertial guidance, requir-ing ground guidance equipment at the launcharea.c. It uses nonstorable liquid propellants, re-quiring extensive transfer facilities at launchsites and storage capacity for the equivalentof at least five large rail tank cars of propel-lants for each missile.d. It is probably transportable over long dis-tances only by rail, although very short-haultransport over well surfaced, wide radius roadsmay be feasible.

e. A certain amount of missile assembly andcheckout must be accomplished at permanenton-site facilities, which must also includeheavy equipment for handling and erectingthe missile.f. The most suitable deployment areas for thevery heavy nosecone ICBMs which had beentest fired prior to about 1 January 1960 wouldbe in northwestern USSR or the Soviet FarEast, the only areas from which 5,000 n.m.missiles could achieve extensive coverage ofthe US.

7. From the foregoing, it is clear that thepresent Soviet ICBM system is heavily depend-ent on the Soviet rail network, and thatlaunch sites would necessarily be served byrail spurs. The system is extremely bulky andmust be fairly cumbersome to handle. It doesnot readily lend itself to deployment inhardened sites. The most suitable ICBM de-ployment site would be a large, fixed facilitywith considerable ground support equipment.

RECENT TEST RANGE ACTIVITIES

8. Because we lack conclusive evidence on ac-tual deployment, an estimate of the size ofthe Soviet ICBM force depends heavily uponwhat can be learned concerning the phaseswhich must precede or accompany deploy-ment—development and testing of the missileand associated equipment, its production, andthe training of troops to use it. Our best in-formation relates to activities at the test

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range, C

9. Three major developments are known tohave occurred at the test range in the past18 months. First, in January and July 1960,the Soviets test-fired ICBMs with somewhatlighter nosecones to ranges of approximately7,000 n.m., sufficient to reach targets any-where in the US from launching points vir-tually anywhere in the USSR. Second, in theperiod between mid-1960 and early 1961, theycompleted the construction of at least threenew launch pads at the Tyuratam rangehead,marking the first major expansion in testrange facilities since construction of the singlelaunch pad which was used for all ICBM andspace shots prior to 1960. Third, in early1961, the Soviets began a very intensive newseries of ICBM and space launchings at Tyura-tam, which included a higher rate of ICBMshots than ever before. The chronology ofconstruction activities and ICBM and spacefirings at Tyuratam is summarized on theattached chart. (See Chart)

New Launch Facilities

10. Of the new facilities at Tyuratam, one isessentially a duplicate of the original massivepad and pit. (See NIE 11-5-61, Figure 28.)The original pad and its near-duplicate,known as lautch areas "A" and "B", wereprobably designed for both actual launchingsand static firings of ICBM and space boosters.Missiles destined for these launch areas aredelivered by rail to nearby rail drive-throughbuildings, where extensive checkout and pre-launch assembly operations are performedWith the missile in a horizontal position. Mis-siles are then transported directly to the

launch pad by rail. Some of the ground sup-port equipment, including instrumentationand control facilities, is permanently locatedin the launching area, but propellants andmuch ground support equipment are broughtto the site on one of the several rail linesleading directly onto it. Construction timesfor launch areas "A" and "B" were about twoyears each—area "B" was begun in 1958 andwas probably ready for use in about mid-1960.

11. In the second half of 1959, the Sovietsbegan work on a pair of simplified pads with-out pits, known as launch area "C". (See NIE11-5-61, Figure 29.) This launch area wasphotographed while under construction andits final configuration is not definitely known.Like "A" and "B", it has rail-served missilecheckout and assembly buildings nearby. Asingle rail spur enters the pad area and someground support equipment is apparently to belocated permanently in that area, but missilesand some of the necessary ground equipmentare probably to be transported from checkoutbuildings to the pads by road. At least someof the ground equipment serving launch area"C" is therefore significantly different fromthat designed for use at the other two launchareas—it probably comprises a number ofunits which can fairly readily be transported,checked out, and replaced when necessary.Area "C" probably represents the approximateconfiguration of an operational launch facility.The time required to construct this more sim-plified launch area was probably about 12 to18 months—it was probably ready for use inlate 1960 or early 1961.

Recent Test Firings12.The number and pattern of test firingsindicates that the USSR has been conductinga careful and generally successful ICBM de-velopment program, at a deliberate pacerather than on a "crash" basis. A majorpfiase of Soviet ICBM testing was apparentlycompleted in July 1960 when the lighter nose-cone, 7,000 n.m. missile was proof-tested to itsapproximate full range into the Pacific. Upuntil that time, the firing program was nota-ble for the high rate of reliability achieved

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by the missiles once they were launched: in-flight reliability averaged about 80 percent forthe entire three-year period from mid-1957 tomid-1960.

13. ICBM firings resumed in January 1961,after a period of nearly six months duringwhich only space vehicles were launched fromTyuratam. The current series of firings in-cluded 10 ICBM shots in the first four monthsof the year, in addition to five space launch-ings. This rate of activity coincides with theavailability of additional launching facilities.It is a higher rate than the Soviets had pre-viously attempted in either the ICBM or thespace category. For ICBMs, the total numberof launchings in the first four months of 1961was greater than that of the entire precedingyear.

14.The intensive new phase of ICBM firings• has been marked by a sharp drop in the in-flight reliability of the missiles. Only six ofthe 10 missiles launched in the first fourmonths of 1961 succeeded in reaching the Kam-chatka Peninsula. E

15. It is almost certain that the current firingseries com rises more than one type of testingactivity. L :a sharp drop intest ranff performance .

suggests the introduction of rede-signed components in the missile system, ortraining firings by inexperienced personnel,or both. There is also a possibility that the

activity included initial firings of a new,liquid-fueled ICBM.

Interpretations of Test Range Activity16. From the evidence relating to test rangeactivities we have developed three alternativehypotheses concerning the Soviet program fordeployment of a complete ICBM weapon sys-tem. Subsequently, we consider these hy-potheses in conjunction with the informationavailable on production and deployment, aswell as what we have learned of the strategicconcepts underlying the Soviet program.

17. One hypothesis is that the activity atTyuratam indicates a program in which,broadly speaking, the development of the mis-sile itself, and the development of the ectuip-ment and procedure for operational deploy-ment, were phased sequentially. In this hy-pothesis, launch area "A" would be designedfor R&D on missiles and space boosters, andthe ICBM firings up until mid-1960 wouldhave represented development of only the mis-sile itself. Launch area "C" would be theprototype of the first operational deploymentconcept,C

3 Such a pattern resemblesthe sequence followed in Soviet development ofsecond generation surface-to-air missiles andof short range ballistic missiles. On the basisof this hypothesis, little if any operational de-ployment would have occurred through 1960.Although construction of deployment sitescould have been concurrent with the construc-tion of launch area "C", a fairly steady build-up in operational capabilities would not havebegun before early 1961.18. A second hypothesis is that the basicICBM vehicle and the associated equipmentnecessary to a fully rail-served operational de-ployment site were developed concurrent/y, atTyuretam launch area "A", with initial de-ployment in early 1960. This would have re-quired the construction of initial deploymentsites during the R&D phase, a practice whichthe Soviets followed in the high priority pro-gram to deploy their first surface-to-air missilesystem around Moscow. It would have per-

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mitted a fairly steady buildup in operationalcapabilities, first with 5,000 n.m. and laterwith 7,000 n.m. missiles. Consistent with thishypothesis, the simplified ground support in-stallation at launch area "C" would be inter-preted as either a second type of deploymentconfiguration for the current system or a siteto be used with a new missile system. C

On this basis,the 1961 firings at Tyuratam would represent• esting of modifications to the current systemor R&D on a new missile system.

19. A third hypothesis is that the activitiesat Tyuratam indicate two deployment pro-grams, successively phased but using the samebasic missile. On this basis, an initial opera-tional capability would have been achievedin early 1960 with a 5,000 n.m. missile in afully rail-served deployment site. c

The resulting deployment would havebeen fairly limited. The second phase of theoperational buildup would have been begunin early 1961, based on the simplified area "C"deployment conceptC

3 Such a pattern bearssome resemblance to the Soviet program for700 n.m. ballistic missiles, which appears tohave resulted in some early capabilitiesfollowed a year or so later by a larger, secondphase buildup. This hypothesis allows forthe deployment of some 7,000 n.m. ICBMs infully rail-served sites, and does not rule outthe interpretation that some of the 1961 firingsare for furtheri'R&D.

20. The first of the foregoing interpretationsis consistent with the view that a completeweapon system, including deployed opera-tional launchers and trained crews, was prob-ably not available until early 1961. Thesecond and third of these interpretations areconsistent with the view that the USSR hashad at least some operational ICBM capabilityat deployment sites since about 1 January

1960. Interpretation of the test range dataitself does not resolve the problem of the scaleand pace of deployment. It does indicate,however, that at least until very recently theSoviets were experiencing no particular diffi-culties or serious setbacks in their ICBM de-velopment work.

ICBM PRODUCTION EVIDENCE21. In NIE 11-5-61 we indicated that in early1959 the USSR probably began to manufac-ture production ICBMs—that is, completemissiles of an operational type which couldalso be modified for use as space boosters.The information available on factory activitiesis sufficient only to point to a research insti-tute near Moscow as the probable developer ofICBM prototypes, to identify the city ofKuybyshev as the most likely site for manu-facture of production ICBMs, and to providesome notion of the way in which normal Sovietpractices would affect the manufacture of amilitary item with the size and bulk of thecurrent missile.22.E

we have concluded th4 proto-type ICB s and space vehicles were manu-factured at a research institute and experi-mental plant, No. 88, in Kaliningrad nearMoscow. This facility has done the principaldesign and development work on all Sovietballistic missiles and continues to do so. Inthe past the practice has been, once the So-viets had decided to initiate standardized pro-duction of a missile, for Plant No. 88 to assistsome other facility in undertaking productionand to limit its own manufacturing activitiesto the further production of R&D items.Plant No. 88 has been considerably expandedin the past several years, and we believe thatthe additional capacity is probably being usedfa R&D on a variety of missiles, in keepingwith previous practice. We cannot rule outthe possibility, however, that some produc-tion ICBMs are being manufactured at PlantNo. 88.23.c 3 Kuybyshev[

3became

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involved in the program shortly before Khru-shchev's announcement, in January 1959, that"series production" of ICBMs had begun. De-

ete intensive efforts, we have been unable

3to pinpoint the plant or plants manu-facturing production ICBMs, although wehave succeeded in narrowing the possibilitiesdown to a few large factories.

24. Considering the size and possible configu-rations of the Soviet ICBM and the relativelysmall amount of subcontracting normal to So-viet practice, ICBMs could be produced effi-ciently in a single, large factory at a peak rateof some 10-15 per month. Such a rate couldprobably have been achieved after a buildupperiod of about 18 months, i.e., by about mid-1960. If major interruptions were avoidedthereafter, such a factory would have turnedout some 200 to 300 production ICBMs by mid-1961. Some of these would presumably havebeen used for static testing and for ICBM andspace launchings. Considering the number oflaunchings to date, and probable allocations toother nonoperational purposes, such a pro-duction facility would have provided some 125to 200 ICBMs for operational inventory bymid-1961.25. Actual monthly peak production rates atany single facility could be somewhat higheror lower than this, and more than one fa-cility could be engaged in ICBM production.Our evidence on production is insufficient tosupport a firm estimate on these questions.However, total Soviet capabilities to producemissiles—as deduced from available produc-tion facilities, materials, and manpower—arevery large. Therefore, the actual number ofICBMs available at present could be largeror smaller than the figures in the foregoingexample, depervling upon the peak rate ac-tually achieved at a single plant and thepossible involvement of more than one fa-cility. Thus, we believe that once a produc-tion line has been set up and the learningperiod has passed, the manufacture of missilesceases to be a pace-setting factor in a deploy-ment program. This has probably been trueof the Soviet ICBM program for at least ayear.

ICBM DEPLOYMENT EVIDENCE

26.We are still unable to identify positivelyany ICBM launching facilities other thanthose at the test range. Nevertheless, overthe past year or so we have acquired consider-able knowledge of the basic requirements foroperational sites. Moreover, some pattern isbeginning to emerge from the examination offragmentary data on suspected ICBM deploy-ment areas. In general, the available evi-dence confirms that in the USSR as in theUS, the major pace-setting factor in the de-ployment of an ICBM weapon system is theestablishment of operational launching siteswith their associated ground support facilities,communications and control, and logistic sup-port.

27.Through intensive collection efforts by allavailable means, US intelligence has achievedpartial coverage of the regions best suited tothe deployment of Soviet ICBMs. However,there are large portions of Soviet territorywhere launching sites could have been estab-lished without detection. The inadequacy ofconfirming evidence regarding deploymentmay be attributable either to the limitations ofour coverage, combined with the success ofSoviet security measures, or to the fact thatdeployment has been on a relatively smallscale to date. At present, we cannot be surewhich is the case, but certain deductions canbe drawn from the pattern of the availableevidence and the way it relates to our collec-tion capabilities.

Suitable Regions

28. In planning for ICBM deployment, theSoviets have had to take into account a num-ber of logistical, geographic, and other factors.As we have already noted, the physical charac-teristics of the current ICBM system requirethat deployment sites be near rail lines, and5,000 n.m. missiles would probably have beendefiloyed in northwestern USSR or the SovietFar East. These areas, however, have certaindisadvantages in that (a) they are relativelyvulnerable to attack by Western delivery sys-tems; and (b) climatic conditions in the north-west would probably create severe construc-

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tion, maintenance, and operational problems.For deployment of 7,000 n.m. missiles, theSoviets would probably seek rail-served loca-tions in interior regions with moderate climateand terrain, low population density, and highsecurity from Western observation and attack.

29. The attached map shows that the regionbest suited to deployment of 7,000 n.m. missilesis very large (see Map). It includes much ofthe USSR from Moscow to Lake Baikal. Ex-cept for major cities, we cannot exclude anyrail-served locations in this region from con-sideration, but the most favorable areas areeast of the Urals and the Caspian and westof Lake Baikal. We believe that in general,the Soviets would greatly prefer to deployICBMs some distance from their borders, inorder to obtain maximum security from West-ern observation and attack.

Suspected Areas30. The intelligence community has analyzedthe available evidence on approximately 100specific areas where the possibility of ICBMdeployment was suggested by information ordeduction. As a result of this analysis, wehave determined that most of these areasprobably do not contain ICBM sites. How-ever, there are about a dozen areas underactive consideration by US intelligence whereone or more ICBM complexes may now be op-erational or under construction. 3 None ofthese areas has been confirmed or finally re-jected.4

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,does not concur in this sentence. He believes thatthere are six areas on which there is reasonablygood evidence of ICBM operational deployment. Hehas under activg consideration more than 20 addi-tional areas where the evidence indicates the possi-bility that construction of ICBM launch sites isunderway.

' For a detailed description of the evidence onthese areas, see the report by the Deployment Work-ing Group of the Guided Missiles and AstronauticsIntelligence Committee, "Soviet Surface-to-SurfaceMissile Deployment," dated 1 September 1960 (TOPSECRET ). The re-evaluation and up-dating or evidence contained in that report is acontinuing project, and changes will be incorporatedinto the basic, looseleaf document.

There have also been a few reliable reporof unusual installations, occasional observa-tion of suspicious rolling stock, and miscel-laneous other fragmentary data of varyingdegrees of credibility.

31. Some of the suspected areas are in regionsbest suited to the deployment of 5,000 ii.m.ICBMs. Two of these are at Plesetsk andPolyarnyy Ural in northwestern USSR,C

There is considerably more information onthese two locations than on any of the othersuspected sites. It includes, among otherthings, a reliable report of a large rail-servedinstallation at Plesetsk, consisting of severalgroups of buildings and rail spurs. Whilethere is some evidence to suggest alternativeexplanations for the construction at Plesetskand Polyarnyy Ural, its timing was concur-rent with the development of the 5,000 n.m.missile. We believe that these activities pro-vide mutual cross-confirmation, and there-fore estimate that Plesetsk and Polyarnyy Uralare ICBM sites which were operational as ofabout 1 January 1960.5

32.On the basis of much less information,there is a possibility that sites were con-structed during the same time period in theKola Peninsula area of the northwest and, onthe basis of even more tenuous evidence, atSvobodny on the Trans-Siberian railroad inthe Far East. Finally, the evidence regarding

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, De-partment of the Army, and the Assistant Chief ofNaval Operations (Intelligence), Department of theNb.vy, would point out that the majority opinionof the Deployment Working Group of the GuidedMissiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committeeis that Plesetsk and Polyarnyy Ural can be classedas possible ICBM sites. In their view of the wholeSoviet ICBM effort, however, they estimate thatthese two sites were probably not operational inJanuary 1960. For a full statement of their posi-tion, see paragraphs 77-80.

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medium range missiles in the Carpathian areaincludes some information which can be in-terpreted as pointing to the deployment inthat area of ICBMs as well. We believe thatICBM deployment in the Carpathian is un-likely, but we cannot entirely exclude it.G33. Other suspected areas are in regions bestsuited to the deployment of a 7,000 n.m. ICBM,and our evidence on them is more recent. E

3Yur'ya, farther tothe south Thereis also some information pointing to Ufa,Sara toy, Kirensk, Kandagach, and the regionsaround Akmolinsk, Dolon, and Alma Ata inKazakhstan as places where ICBM-related ac-tivity might be under way, but the indicationsare extremely tenuous. Furthermore, we canfind no consistent pattern of timing or asso-ciations in the information on these and othervarious locations which we have examined forevidence of 7,000 n.m. missile deployment sites.

Masking Addresses34.f

This system is used bypersonnel at missile test ranges and at otherplaces which may be associated with the de-ployment of long range ballistic missiles.0

'The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,does not concur in the judgment that ICBM deploy-ment in the Carpathian area is unlikely or that theindications of ICBM related activity in the areas'cited in paragraph 33 are "extremely tenuous."Moreover, in addition to the 13 ICBM suspect de-ployment areas cited in paragraphs 31-33 inclusive,he has under active consideration 'the following 13areas for which evidence is available indicating thepossibility of ICBM site construction: Kamyshin,Ust Ukhta, Kiev, Taurage, Tashkent, Aralsk, Ya-kutsk, Chukotsk, Chkalov, Makat, Nizhnyaya Tura,Vologda, and Novosibirsk areas.

3Launchers Per Site35. A key factor in assessing the significanceof a suspected deployment location is thenumber of launching pads likely to be groupedtogether. On the basis of test range siteconfigurations for large ballistic missiles atboth Tyuratam and Kapustin Yar, we believethat operational launchers are paired. Eachlauncher probably has its own fuel transferand handling equipment, but fuel storage,guidance, and checkout facilities are probablyshared by the two launchers in each pair.More than one pair of launchers probablycomprise a site, i.e., a launching complex in-cluding a base providing central support,maintenance, and communications and con-trol facilities. Such a site-complex is prob-ably the basic ICBM pnit capable of operatingindependently. The individual pairs are prob-ably separated by several miles and an entiresite-complex may thus cover many squaremiles.

36.The grouping of pairs of launchers intosuch complexes is consistent with the charac-teristics of the current Soviet ICBM systemand also with evidence available on Soviet de-

oyment of medium range ballistic missiles.tl

dour to six launchers are assigned to thebasic operating units equipped with mediumrange ballistic missiles—each of these regi-mental units is apparently capable of operat-ing independently. The greater size and com-plexity of the Soviet ICBM impose additionalproblems of logistics and maintenance, whichcould argue for the grouping of a larger num-ber of ICBM launchers in a complex. In plan-ning their deployment sites, however, the So-viets would have had to weigh convenienceof logistics and maintenance against the re-quirement for maximum security, which

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would dictate considerable dispersal of pairsof ICBM launchers, and probably of site-com-plexes as well, particularly in view of theirfixed configuration.

37. Taking these factors into account, we be-lieve it unlikely that the typical number oflaunchers per ICBM site differs greatly fromthe number for medium range missiles. How-ever, the number of launchers at each ICBMsite is likely to vary, depending on terrain,proximity to existing supply and logisticalcenters, and other factors. On this basis, atypical number of four or six would appearreasonable, but a number even twice as largewould be feasible. We believe that a typicalnumber of four or six is more probable thana number between eight and 12, but there is nofirm evidence on this question and we cannotexpect to resolve it until deployment sites aredefinitely identified and their configurationsare established.

Site Activation Time38. We have examined the tasks and problemsinvolved in the construction and activationof ICBM launching complexes. When com-pleted, these complexes must include the fol-lowing: (a) the launchers themselves; (b)ground guidance and missile handling fa-cilities; (c) test, checkout, and maintenanceequipment; (d) fueling and storage facilities;(e) communications; (f) logistic support; and(g) housing and general purpose equipment.From the available evidence, we have con-cluded that a soft, rail-supported launchingcomplex could probably be brought to opera-tional readiness in some 18 to 24 months.

39. During this period, the site would be laidout and constructed, components would be in-stalled and ctlecked out, operating personnelwould be assigned, and, finally, missiles wouldbe brought to the site to complete the inte-grated weapon system. The period itselfcould vary depending on local weather andconstruction conditions, the distance fromexisting rail lines and supply centers, theexact number of launchers and theft dispersal,and the details of the deployment concept.During much of the period, special military

and railroad construction teams, involvinghundreds of men and considerable specializedequipment, would be at work on each complex.Normal Soviet practice is to employ suchteams rather than workers from the local laborforce—they move from place to place as newassignments are given them.

Interpretation of Deployment Evidence

40. A review of other major Soviet militaryconstruction and deployment programs (e.g.,airfield construction and surface-to-air missiledeployment), shows that there is often a timelag of a year and sometimes as much as twoyears between the start of a program and ouracquisition of sufficient information to de-termine its scale and pace. Some compensa-tion for this time lag is provided by the prob-ability that work must begin at Soviet ICBMsites some 18 months to two years before theybecome an operational threat.

41. Considering the available evidence, ourtotal collection capabilities, and the time lagsto be expected, a minimum of two to fourICBM sites were probably under constructionin 1957-1959 in areas suitable to deploymentof 5,000 n.m. missiles (see paragraphs 31-32).We believe that such sites are operational atthe present time. 7 In addition, 7,000 n.m.missiles can reach targets in the US from theTyuratam rangehead, and it must be recog-nized that in the event of war the USSR couldemploy the launchers there operationally.With respect to the other suspected locationsin areas suitable to deployment of 7,000 n.m.missiles, some or all of these locations maynot be ICBM sites; on the other hand, theremay be such sites at locations which are un-suspected at present. There has been insuffi-cient time to establish a pattern, the areas

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, De-lArtment of the Army, and the Assistant Chief ofNaval Operations (Intelligence), Department of theNavy, do not believe that a minimum number of twoto four ICBM sites were probably under construc-tion in 1957-1959 in areas suitable to deploymentof 5,000 n.m. missiles, nor do they believe that suchsites are operational at the present time. For a fullstatement of their position, see paragraphs 77-80.

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are poorly covered, and the security likely tobe imposed by the Soviets is stringent.42. From the foregoing examination of thedirect evidence, it is possible to derive a mini-mum number of operational ICBM complexeswhich can be supported on reasonably goodevidence. In addition, the results of oursearch for operational deployment sites, takentogether with the other elements of direct evi-dence, contribute to sense of the currenttempo of the Soviet program. The relativelysmall number of suspected areas and theidentification of only a few masking addresseswhich might be associated with ICBM deploy-ment are consistent with the deliberate paceof activities at the test range. Further, theUSSR has a greater capacity to produce anddeploy ICBMs than we believe it has exercised.In sum, while the direct evidence remains in-sufficient to establish with certainty the pres-ent Soviet ICBM strength, it leads us to be-lieve that the deployment program thus farhas proceeded at a deliberate rather than anextremely urgent pace.

SOVIET PROGRAMMING DECISIONS

43. The year 1959 was probably a time ofmajor Soviet decisions on military policy. Inseveral private conversations with Westernofficials in the summer and fall of 1959, Khru-shchev referred to studies to determine whatit would cost the USSR to build ballisticmissile forces sufficient to destroy the "vitalcenters" of the US and Europe. 8 His ref-erences were ambiguous and are not subjectto precise numerical definition—they indicate,however, that Khrushchev had recently beenengaged in the planning of production anddeployment programs. This was almost cer-tainly related to the planning for major re-organizatitiin of the Soviet military establish-ment, announced in January 1960. Planningconsiderations in 1959 would have includedthe expectation of deployment with a 7,000n.m. missile and a simplified deployment con-

'The figure quoted by Khrushchev was 30 billionrubles. This amount is not inconsistent with pro-grams for several hundred long range ballisticmissile launchers and associated missiles.

cept, for which Tyuratam launch area "C"may have been the prototype.

44. The operational deployment programwhich we believe is now under way will prob-ably continue over the next two or three years.The scale and pace of this program will prob-ably be determined largely by: (a) the viewof the Soviet leaders regarding the ICBM forcethey require in this time period; (b) factorsof efficiency in the scheduling and expenditureof resources on the present weapon systemin relation to other military and economicprograms; and (c) the Soviet judgment oflikely trends in their own and Western offen-sive and defensive weapon systems. Given therapidity of technological change and the heavyemphasis on research and development inboth the missile and antimissile fields in theUSSR, it is likely that Soviet ICBM deploy-ment programming beyond the 1963-1964period is highly tentative.

Pertinent Soviet Statements45. In persuading their own followers to ac-cept the military reorganization announced inJanuary 1960, and in debating the ChineseCommunists on strategy and policy, the So-viet leaders have in the past year or so re-vealed much of their thinking about modernweapon systems. The most pertinent of thesestatements have been of three types. First,there have been Soviet statements that theleadership seeks to achieve and maintain a su-periority over the West in weapon systems,but the Soviets appear to be stressing theirclaim to a qualitative superiority in advancedweapon systems as much as to a numericaladvantage. Second, there have been a num-ber of public and private references to thepotential employment of ballistic missilesagainst what are termed "strategic" targets.or "vital centers," in contexts which seem toinclude both military bases and other elementsof national strength such as industry, govern-

,' ment, and population. Khrushchev andother Soviet leaders have spoken of the de-sirability of achieving sufficient missilestrength to attack these objectives. Finally,in late 1960, Khrushchev privately told im-portant Bloc officials that 300 missiles were

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sufficient to "destroy" the US, while 200 weresufficient for Europe.

46. The foregoing statements about target-ing are quite general, but they parallel muchprevious Soviet commentary on the need todestroy an enemy's power base as well as itsstriking forces in war. Military, industrial,and population targets in Japan and the USwere included in mock exercises by Sovietmissile and bomber units in the Far East in1959 and 1960. Khrushchev's reference to300 missiles is open to various interpreta-tions—the figure may refer to operational mis-sile inventory or ready missiles in the USSR,or to missiles detonating in the vicinity of se-lected US targets. Nevertheless, it confirmsour previous assumption that the Sovietleaders had explored the question of numericalrequirements for ICBMs, and it indicates thatKhrushchev himself speaks of 300 ICBMs asa formidable capability.°

Strategic Planning Factors47. The Soviets appear to have decided, for thepresent and short-term future at least, tomaintain a mixed long range attack force andnot to rely exclusively on the ICBM for inter-continental striking power. Bomber forcescapable of delivering large megatonnages arebeing maintained, and the USSR is acquiringsubmarine-launched missile capabilities. Thepresent combined striking force has certainadvantages in providing greater flexibility inSoviet tactics and in complicating Western de-fensive problems. In the light of these ad-vantages, we consider it probable that theUSSR will for.11.e foreseeable future retain

• According to vo information recently receivedthrough clandestine channels which have providedreliable military information in the past, severalsenior Soviet officers associated with missile activityhave commented on the ICBM program along thefollowing lines: The Soviets are spending "millions"of rubles on the program. If one success is,achieved,it. is magnified to support a pretense that the USSRhas "hundreds" of ICBMs, in order to impress theWest. The implication that there are hundreds isonly "idle talk" at present, but such a force will beachieved since the USSR's economy and policy are"geared" for developing such a force.

other intercontinental weapon systems to sup-plement their ICBM forces.

48. In planning the present and future size oftheir ICBM force, the Soviet leaders have toweigh the advantages of an ICBM weapon sys-tem as compared with bombers, missile launch-ing submarines, and other advanced weaponsystems. They have to consider the superiorcapabilities of the ICBM for launching a large-scale attack, in particular its suitability forsurprise attack on US strategic bomber bases,fixed missile sites, communication centers, andother fixed installations related to the US re-taliatory capability. They have to weighthese advantages against such considerationsas the ability of the heavy bomber to deliververy heavy megatonnages against difficult tar-gets and targets of uncertain location, andthe ability of the missile submarine to survivean initial Western strike and deliver a subse-quent retaliatory attack. Finally, they haveto consider the entire target system whichtheir planners have developed for attackingthe US under the whole range of possible cir-cumstances, and determine' what role oughtto be allocated to the ICBM.

49. As our own approach to an appreciation ofthe military capabilities that the Soviets mightexpect to achieve by building up their opera-tional ICBM capabilities, we have computedthe number of ICBM launchers the Sovietswould theoretically require for a single salvodesigned to inflict severe damage on variousUS targets. We have considered the followingtarget systems: fixed bomber and missile basesof the US nuclear striking forces; commandcenters associated with control and communi-cations for these and other elements of USmilitary strength; air defense bases whose re-duction by missile attack would improve thechances of successful Soviet bomber missions;urbh.n areas containing a large proportion ofUS industry, population, and other resourcesof national strength. We believe these arethe sorts of target systems the Soviets wouldhave considered in evaluating their own ICBMrequirements for potential use in a broadvariety of circumstances and kinds of attack.,

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50. Theoretical computations of this sort areextremely sensitive to varying assumptions re-garding the Soviet view of the precise targetsworth attacking, the necessary or desirableamounts of damage to be inflicted, and thedegree of assurance of inflicting such damageto be sought. We have had to use US criteriafor these factors. Such computations are alsosensitive to variations in the accuracy and re-liability of the Soviet ICBM system, .aboutwhich there is a margin of uncertainty in ourestimates. In addition, computations involv-ing an assumed attack against fast-reactionretaliatory :.:ystems (i.e., the bomber andmissile bases) apply only to hypothetical cir-cumstances in which the Soviet force hasachieved near-perfect surprise and simultane-ity of attack. The Soviets are capable of mak-ing more valid computations about their ownweapon system than we, but they too mustbe cautious about assessing in advance theresults of the first ICBM salvo in humanhistory.51. While computations of theoretical nu-merical requirements do not provide any firmbasis for estimating Soviet ICBM force goals,they do provide a sense of proportion withrespect to the suitability of current and im-proved Soviet ICBMs for attacking varioustarget systems. In very general terms, wefind that Soviet ICBMs are well suited to at-tacking cities and relatively unprotected mili-tary targets, including air and naval bases,soft and semihardened ICBM sites, and softand semihardened command centers. Evenwith the improved performance projected for1963-1965, however, Soviet ICBMs do notappear to be well suited to attacking an ICBMforce deployed in very hard sites.52.Applying these same computations tovarious hypothetical Soviet force levels, wefind—though with considerably less cer-tainty—that under favorable circumstancesfrom their point of view, Soviet planners mightexpect to achieve the following theoreticalcapabilities in a single ICBM salvo:

a. With roughly 50 launchers in 1961 or anytime thereafter, high assurance of being able

to detonate an ICBM warhead over each of the25 principal US metropolitan areas.

b. With roughly 100 launchers, moderate as-surance in 1961 and increasing assurancethereafter of being able to inflict severedamage on the operational air bases of the USStrategic Air Command (SAC).c. With roughly 200 launchers in 1961-1962,moderate assurance of being able to inflictsevere damage on SAC air bases and on softand semihardened ICBM sites as well.

d. With roughly 300 to 500 launchers in1962-1963, moderate to high assurance ofbeing able to inflict severe damage, not onlyon SAC air bases and soft and semihardenedICBM sites, but also on other fixed soft andsemihardened targets associated with USstriking and defensive capabilities.53. As the period advances, the Soviets couldexpect to achieve higher levels of assuranceagainst the foregoing types of targets withfewer missiles, because Soviet ICBM perform-ance will probably improve while the numberof such targets will remain relatively un-changed. For example, in 1964-1965 andpossibly as early as 1963, the capabilities de-scribed in d above might be achieved withas few as 200-400 launchers. However,studies show that several thousand ICBMlaunchers would be required to provide theSoviets with reasonable assurance of an abilityto engage in counterbattery fire against thecombined total of hard ICBM sites plannedby the US for the period beginning in 1963.

54. In evaluating the significance of varioushypothetical numbers of ICBMs, Soviet plan-ners would take into account the likelihoodthat, for at least the next few years, the greatpreponderance of US megatonnage would bebomber-borne. They would almost certainlyseek an ICBM force large enough to blunt orat least disrupt the US bomber capability be-

" fore launch so that their air defenses wouldhave a reasonable chance of preventing large-scale penetrations to Soviet— target areas.However, they would also know that the USis rapidly acquiring significant capabilitieswith mobile and hardened missile forces, and

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that even at present the SAC airborne alertand dispersal capability tends to offset a Sovietability to destroy air bases. Thus, the ad-vance in US techniques for the protection andsecurity of its own striking forces obliges theSoviets to recognize that—even should theybuild a very large ICBM force—they are con-fronted with a growing segment of US re-taliatory power which could not be eliminatedin a first strike by ICBMs, even under the mostfavorable circumstances.

55. The foregoing considerations do not, inthemselves, define any particular ICBM forcelevels which the Soviets think appropriate totheir needs. They do, however, support ajudgment that the USSR has strong incentivesto build up a substantial ICBM force, andthat, at least for present planning purposes,the Soviets would probably look upon severalhundred operational ICBM launchers as a sub-stantial force.

Effects of Technological Change

56. The Soviets probably desire an ICBMforce with a high salvo capability and highsurvivability, in order to have a capabilityeither to launch an initital attack or to re-taliate against a Western attack. The formercan be approached by maintaining a highratio of launchers to missiles, although thiswill not fully overcome the problems of fuel-ing and missile hold-times inherent in thepresent Soviet ICBM system. The latter canbest be achieved for the present system by dis-persing and concealing operational launchers.Even with their very tight security practices,however, the Soviets probably view the pro-tection afforded by concealment and dispersalas susceptible to deterioration with time, espe-cially in view of the reconnaissance satellitecapabilities'''. they would expect the US toachieve in the next few years.57. Many of the developments referred to inour other estimates, especially the missile ad-vances projected in NIE 11-5-61, point to theperiod beginning around 1963 or 1964 as atime of major technological cha:nge in Sovietweapon systems. Principal among the ad-vances which we can now foresee are initial

operational capabilities with a new ICBM sys-tem, in about 1963 or after, and at least limiteddeployment of an antimissile system designedfor use against IRBMs and ICBMs, in theperiod 1963-1966. There is a possibility thattest firings of a new ICBM have already begunat Tyuratam. Intensive R&D in antimissiledefenses has been under way in the USSR forseveral years.

58. The new ICBM system will probably be de-signed to overcome disadvantages in the pres-ent system. It will probably use either stor-able liquid or solid fuels and include com-patible elements to increase flexibility anddecrease vulnerability in deployment. It willprobably be easier to deploy than the presentsystem. Moreover, at that time the oldestof the current Soviet heavy bombers will beapproaching 10 years in operational service.Although the USSR has developed air-to-sur-face missiles for heavy bombers and could bedeveloping new bombers for intercontinentaluse to supplement its missile capabilities, thereis little evidence that the Soviets have madethe amount of progress necessary to avertobsolescence in this field. We estimate thatby 1963 the Soviets could also achieve a sub-merged-launching capability with ballisticmissiles in nuclear powered submarines. Inthe same time period, the USSR could alsohave a long range, ground-launched un-manned aerodynamic vehicle for reconnais-sance or weapon delivery. These and otherdevelopments could effectively supplement theICBM force.

59. In 1963-1964, however, US forces will be-gin to include numerous hard ICBM sites.We cannot exclude the possibility that a newSoviet ICBM could achieve accuracies andreliabilities excellent enough to permit theUSSR to contemplate counterbattery fire, butit is extremely unlikely that such improvedperformance could be attained before latein the decade. Even so, the fast reactiontimes of US systems and increasing USstrength in mobile missiles would probablypreclude effective counterbattery fire. TheSoviets would probably decide that, in thesecircumstances, it would be desirable to adopt

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additional measures such as hardening for theprotection of their own ICBM forces, and alsoto develop more advanced offensive techniques.Moreover, they would probably regard theachievement of effective antimissile defensesas an important element in solving theirproblem.60. The potential effectiveness of Soviet anti-missile defenses will therefore be an extremelysignificant factor in their ICBM programming.Their antimissile R&D is receiving very heavyemphasis, but we do not know with any cer-tainty when in the 1963-1966 period therwillfirst deploy antimissile defenses, nor do weknow how effective the initial capability willbe. If the initial system has only a limited,interim capability, its significance would beprimarily political and psychological. How-ever, if the Soviets conclude that their anti-missile system could provide reasonable assur-ance of coping with some substantial portionof the Western ballistic missile capability, theywould be strongly motivated to commit exten-sive resources to its deployment, even, we be-lieve, to the extent of diverting resourceswhich would otherwise be allocated to offen-sive systems. This conclusion rests partly onthe high priority accorded to military defensein the USSR over the years, but also on ourbelief that in Soviet eyes the early deploymentof antimissile defenses would constitute a ma-jor technological victory over the US.

preciation of our own ability to acquire suchevidence. We again emphasize that the di-rect evidence is insufficient to establish withcertainty the scale and pace of the presentSoviet ICBM deployment program. Our esti-mate therefore also rests on the indirect evi-dence and other considerations discussed inpreceding sections, including the strategicideas which we believe govern Soviet militarypolicy, the approximate levels of ICBMstrength which the Soviet leadership appearsto be seeking, our general knowledge of Sovietmilitary programming practices, and oursense of the tempo at which the present pro-gram is being conducted. For these reasons,our estimates of current and future SovietICBM capabilities are expressed as ranges.

62. From the direct and indirect evidence athand, we judge that the USSR is building to-ward several hundred operational ICBMlaunchers, to be acquired as soon as prac-ticable within the next few years. The com-mitment of resources is probably quite large,but thus far the programming has apparentlybeen deliberate in pace. It is probably af-fected by a desire for efficiency in schedulingthe construction and activation of a numberof launching complexes dispersed over a widegeographic area. The production of missilesand training of troops could be scheduled tofit into whatever site activation schedule wasdeemed practicable.

63. In order to achieve such a goal, a continu-ing and well-coordinated program of launcheractivation would be required over a period ofseveral years. In determining the activationrates which the USSR could achieve after abuildup of a year or two, we have taken intoaccount the grouping of several pairs oflaunchers into complexes, the tasks and prob-lems involved in the preparation of these com-plexes, and the time required to construct andactivate them. We believe that launcher ac-tivation rates of 50 to 100 per_y.ear would beconsistent with the sense of the current tempoof the ICBM program which we have derivedfrom the direct and indirect evidence avail-

PROBABLE RANGE OF SOVIET FORCE LEVELS''

61. In this concluding section of the Annexwe present an estimate of probable current andfuture Soviet ICBM strength, based on theseveral interpretations we believe can validlyDe drawn from the evidence and from an ap-

"The Director of Intelligence and Research, De-)artment of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff for:ntelligence, Department of the Army, the Assistant*.;hief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Depart-nent of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff,.ntelligence, USAF, do not concur in the range of:urrent and future ICBM force ,levels estimatedierein. For their positions, see their statements)eginning respectively at paragraphs 69, 77, and 81.

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able. 11 Because it is impossible to pinpointthe threshold of activity which our intelli-gence collection resources would detect, wecannot exclude a present rate somewhathigher than 100 per year.

64. Since it would require 18 to 24 months forlaunching complexes to be brought to opera-tional readiness, our judgment regarding pres-ent activation rates bears most directly onICBM deployment at present and through thenext year or two. Such activation rates arenot likely to remain constant; they are likelyto vary considerably within this approximaterange from year to year, depending on theconfiguration of the ICBM sites and areasof their deployment. Although we believethat the Soviets have substantially passedthrough the learning period of the activationprogram, as they gain additional experienceit will be easier for them to increase the rate.At the same time, other considerations such asa new ICBM, developments in their antimissileprogram, and alternative uses of the resourcesinvolved will influence their decisions as tothe rate of ICBM activation. Taking thesefactors into account, we believe it reasonableto project an average launcher activation rateof approximately 50 to 100 per year duringthe period to 1963-1964.

Force Levels in Mid-196165. We believe that the probable Soviet forcelevel in mid-1961 is in the range of 50-100operational ICBM launchers, together withthe necessary operational missile inventoriesand trained crews. This would probably in-volve the present existent of 10 to 15 opera-tional ICBM site-complexes. This estimateShould be regarded as a general approxima-tion. The major bases for it are our sense

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, De-partment of the Army , and the Assistant Chief ofNaval Operations (Intelligence) , Department of theNavy, do not concur that a launcher activation ratef 50 to 100 a year can be supported "by the senseI the current tempo of the ICBM program." They

would, in the light of the direct and indirect evi-dence available, be able to say only that such ablailuinticehser activation rate is within Soviet gross capa-

of the tempo of the program and our judg-ment as to the relationship between what ourevidence supports and what our coverage islikely to have missed. Such a force level couldhave been acquired through either the smoothor phased deployment programs which can bederived from interpretation of the test rangedata.

Force Levels to 1963-196466. While deployment to date has probablybeen deliberate in scale and pace, we believethat the USSR is now building a substantialICBM capability. Soviet planning for thenext few years probably anticipates the adventin about 1963 or after of a new ICBM system,and deployment of the present system willprobably taper off and then cease as a buildupwith the new system begins. This transi-tion might affect the overall rate at whichdeployment occurs; for example, the Sovietsmight decrease this rate for the present sys-tem before the new one comes in, and thenaccelerate it thereafter when the new systembecomes ready for deployment. Over the nextfew years, however, we believe that thelauncher activation rate will probably averagesome 50-100 per year, which would result inforce levels about as follows: 100-200 Opera-tional launchers in mid-1962,150-300 in mid-1963, and 200-400 in mid-1964.'2

The inventory of operational missiles associatedwith these numbers of launchers would of coursebe higher, and the cumulative production totalhigher still. We have little evidence on the rela-tionships actually obtaining in the Soviet program.In general, however, we believe that the followingassumptions are reasonable: (a) to achieve a highsalvo capability, to simplify maintenance and logis-tics, and to have a modest reserve of missiles forpossible subsequent use, the Soviet operational ICBMinventory would include some three missiles for eachpair of operational launchers; (b) the operationalICBM inventory would also include missiles allocatedto operational units but not yet integrated into the

s, complete weapon system at deployment sites, in apipeline equivalent to about two months' produc-tion; (c) the cumulative total of production missileswould be about 50 percent larger than-that requifedfor the foregoing operational purposes, with theremaining production missiles allocated to such pur-poses as R&D, training, static testing, space pro-gram, etc.

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67. Soviet planning for this period probablyanticipates the attainment in about 1963 orafter of a new ICBM system which will permitgreater flexibility and less vulnerability in de-ployment. Deployment of the present sys-tem will probably taper off and then cease asa buildup with the new system begins. Somelaunchers for the new ICBM system may beoperational in mid-1963, and 100 or more maybe operational a year later. If so, deploymentrates for the present system would almost cer-tainly have begun to phase down before 1963.We therefore consider that 200-400 opera-tional launchers remains the best present esti-mate of the Soviet force in mid-1964.

Trends in 1965-196668. The deployment program for this periodmay be significantly affected by such develop-ments as US acquisition of numeroushardened and mobile missiles and other im-proved capabilities, and by Soviet developmentof antimissile defenses. Soviet ICBM forcegoals for 1965-1966 could be enlarged con-siderably over the 1964 level in view of theseanticipated developments. On the otherhand, these anticipated changes in the attack-defense relationship may appear to the Sovietleaders to warrant no increase in force goalsor, more likely, only a moderate increase. Weare unable to predict what the Soviet judg-ment will be regarding. the interplay of thesemilitary factors, and there is a .good chancethat the Soviet leaders themselves have notyet come to a definite decision.

POSITION ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THEDIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RE-SEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

69. The Director of Intelligence and Research,Department, of State, does not concur in thisestimate. He believes (a) that NIE 11-8-61should include an estimate of the largestICBM force which the USSR could have inmid-1961 and that such a force could be aslarge as 200 operational launchers, and (b)that the probable Soviet force level in mid-1961 is in the range of 75-125 operational

launchers and will increase to 150-300 in mid-1962 and to 200-450 in mid-1963.

70. Possible force levels. In his opinion, anNIE on Soviet long range attack capabilitiesshould provide policymakers with an estimateof the largest ICBM force which the USSRcould have deployed to date, based on an IOCof 1 January 1960 and assuming a vigorous de-ployment program. He regards such an esti-mate of the possible mid-1961 force level as justas important as the estimate of the probablecurrent force level. Indeed, by making no ex-plicit judgment abQut the possible currentforce level, the Estimate renders a disservice tothe policymaker by encouraging him to con-sider only force levels within the probable rangeand, at the same time, advising him (para-graph 42) that "the USSR has a greater ca-pacity to produce and deploy ICBMs than webelieve it has exercised." The policyrnakerwould not know, on the basis of the NIE,whether he can exclude all force levels formid-1961 beyond those slightly above the prob-able range or whether he cannot exclude aforce level substantially higher than the prob-able range. Yet it is precisely this possibleSoviet ICBM strength which he needs to takeinto account in making decisions bearing di-rectly on US national security.71. The Director of Intelligence and Research,Department of State, realizes that an estimateof possible Soviet strength in any weapon sys-tem is less essential when there is sufficientevidence to narrow the range of our quantita-tive judgments. However, in the case ofthe ICBM, the available evidence is not suf-ficient to establish current Soviet strengthwithin reasonably narrow limits. The NIEdiscussion and annexes acknowledge that theevidence relating to ICBM deployment can beinterpreted in a variety of ways, that there aremany uncertainties in the analyses of such fac-tors as Soviet force goals and programmingdecisions, and that vast areas of the USSR arenot covered or only poorly covered by US col-

' lection efforts. Under such circumstances, itis essential to estimate the highest force 'levelthat can be reconciled with the evidence andthereby indicate the range of possibilitieswhich cannot be excluded.

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72. The view of the Director of Intelligenceand Research, Department of State, is thatthe USSR could have as many as 200 opera-tional launchers in mid-1961. He emphasizesthat an ICBM force of this size is definitely lesslikely than one half as large, but he believesthat the chances are sufficiently good to in-clude this estimate of possible current strengthin an NIE on Soviet long range attack capa-bilities. By the same token, he would ex-clude mid-1961 force levels exceeding 200 op-erational launchers. He bases his estimate onthe following considerations:

a. The available evidence on the Soviet ICBMdevelopment program can be interpreted toallow for a steady buildup of operational sitesconcurrent with ICBM testing activities.While the inferred tempo of the Soviet pro-gram suggests that the probable size of themid-1961 ICBM force is substantially less than200 operational launchers, it does not precludea possible force level of about 200 launchers.b. Missile production is not a limiting fac-tor. Site activation rates in excess of 100launchers per year are within Soviet technicaland economic capabilities. In order to have200 operational launchers by mid-1961, it isnot necessary to begin construction of opera-tional sites for the 5,000 n.m. missile beforelate 1957 or construction of sites with moresimplified launch pads before early 1960:Moreover, construction times need not beshorter than 18-24 months and site activa-tion rates in excess of 100 launchers per yeardo not have to be achieved in less than thetime allowed for the initial buildup period.In short, a deployment program resulting in200 operational launchers in mid-1961 can becarried out within the limits set by the factorsjudged to bt most critical.c. Because of the limitations of our intelli-gence coverage, together with the high degreeof Soviet security, substantial ICBM deploy-ment could have occurred without being de-tected by US collection efforts. In any case,the chances of detecting Soviet deployment ac-tivity depend on the number of sites under

construction or completed. There is suffi-cient uncertainty in the number of launchersper site to allow for a considerable increase inaggregate ICBM strength without a corre-sponding increase in the number of sites.

d. On the other hand, it is very unlikely thatconstruction of the first operational sitesbegan before initiation of test firing or thathigh rates of site activation were achievedearly in the deployment program. A rateof site construction in excess of that requiredto reach a force level of about 200 launchersin mid-1961 probably would have createdsevere organizational problems and, possiblywould have strained Soviet resources. Con-sequently, an ICBM force of about 200 opera-tional launchers is believed to be the maxi-mum practicable level which the USSR couldhave achieved by mid-1961.

73. During the next year or so the USSRcould increase its ICBM force much morerapidly than in the past, since more simplifiedlaunch pads would be constructed at newsites. With several years experience behindthem, the Soviets could achieve an activationrate of about 200 launchers per year by early1962 and an operational force of roughly 400ICBMs might be deployed by mid-1962.Thereafter deployment could be acceleratedif Soviet planners decide on a high ICBMforce goal.

74. Probable force levels. The Director ofIntelligence and Research, Department ofState, believes that the probable size of thecurrent Soviet ICBM force is in the 75-125range and that this force is likely to be 150—300 operational launchers in mid-1962 and200-450 in mid-1963. The higher figures forcurrent strength reflect his judgment thatthe pace of the Soviet ICBM program is infact more rapid than the NIE implies; thehigher figures for future strength are basedon his judgment that a site activation rateof 150-175 launchers per year should be usedin projecting the upper limit oJ- the probableprogram. Underlying both judgments is his

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estimate that Soviet leaders seek to acquirea force of several hundred operational ICBMlaunchers before the US has a large numberof hardened sites and mobile long rangemissiles. The Soviet deployment program,consequently, is likely to be pursued at afairly rapid pace in the next year or two.

75. It is recognized that the additional ICBMsestimated for mid-1961 would not materiallyincrease current Soviet long range attackcapabilities. However, a force of about 300ICBMs around mid-1962 would enable theUSSR to bring all SAC operational air basesand soft ICBM sites under attack by missilesalone or, alternatively, to have moderate as-surance of inflicting severe damage to com-mand-control centers, air defense bases, andmissile-launching submarine bases, as well asSAC operational installations. This capa-bility would be achieved approximately oneyear sooner than is possible with the maxi-mum ICBM force as estimated in the NIE text.In particular, it would be achieved before thenumber of hard ICBM sites planned by theUS begins to increase sharply.

76. Whether deployment thereafter will con-tinue at a rapid rate or level off depends onsuch factors as Soviet success in developinga new ICBM system and antimissile defenses,their assessment of US retaliatory capabilitiesin the post-1963 period, and the extent towhich Soviet leaders become convinced thatvery high ICBM force goals are necessary ordesirable. If Soviet leaders decide to buildtoward an effective ICBM capability againstlarge numbers of US missiles in hardened sitesor to achieve a substantial ICBM retaliatorycapability by the middle of the decade, thenthe Soviet deifloyment program would be ac-celerated. However, there is at least an equalchance that ICBM deployment will taper offsometime in 1963 since Soviet planners mightconsider it more advantageous to acceleratetheir antimissile defense program. In thatcase, an ICBM force of 300-500 operationallaunchers would be maintained in the 1964-1966 period.

POSITION ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THEASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLI-GENCE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ANDTHE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERA-TIONS (INTELLIGENCE), DEPARTMENT OFTHE NAVY

77.The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli-gence, Department of the Army, and the As-sistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelli-gence), Department of the Navy, have enteredseveral specific footnotes in the body of thisestimate expressing their differing opinion.The basis for these footnotes, and the onlyfundamental difference with judgments in theestimate, is their estimate of current forcelevels of Soviet operational ICBM launchers.A basic difference affecting current force levelsis their judgment concerning the date whenthe Soviets first achieved an operational capa-bility with deployed ICBMs. They do not be-lieve that this occurred in January of 1960.The following factors, well supported by evi-dence, weigh heavily in their judgmentagainst the Soviets having attained or evensought a deployed operational capability bythat time with their existing ICBM:

a. The size of the exiting Soviet ICBM(450,000-500,000 pounds and about twice thesize of ATLAS), the difficulties involved in theuse of nonstorable liquid fuel, and heavy de-pendence on a rail network are factors whichcombine to make launcher construction amajor undertaking which they believe wouldhave been detected by US Intelligence if anysubstantial program had been undertaken.

b. Despite large and representative collectionsof evidence, our intensive search has failedto identify even probable operational ICBMsite-complexes.

c:

d. It has been characteristic of other Sovietmissile programs that prototype or triallaunch sites were constructed at the testrange before or, at the latest, concurrently

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with the construction of an operational facil-ity. Indications of construction of such aprototype site for the ICBM did not appearat the test range until 1960 and it was prob-ably not completed until late 1960 or early1961.

e. Recent test firings of ICBMs, in which re-liability has dropped sharply [

3 suggest theintroduction of redesigned system compo-nents, C inexperienced per-sonnel, or both.

f.

3 analysis of which indicates thatthe Soviets did not have a large scale de-ployment effort under way before mid-1960.Considering 18 months construction time,this would indicate no large operational ca-pability prior to late 1961.

3g- c

78. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli-gence, Department of the Army, and the As-sistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelli-gence), Department of the Navy, believe thatthe appearance of the probable prototypelaunching site, the increased pace of firings,and supportthe view that the Soviets may now be about todeploy some ICBMs of the existing cumber-some type and clearly strengthen their judg-ment that the Soviets did not have a deployedICBM capability by 1 January 1960. Thisjudgment, in turn, influences their view ofthe possibilit'y of ICBM deployment in the in-hospitable northwest portion of the USSR.While information is not yet firm enough torule out the possibility of ICBM deploymentat Plesetsk and Polyarnyy Ural, as well asat two other locations, they believe it unlikelythat sites for ICBMs of the typt describedabove were constructed in those areas in thetime period 1957-1959, which would have re-

quired site design and decision to deploy priorto the first Soviet firing of an ICBM.

79. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli-gence, Department of the Army and the As-sistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelli-gence) , Department of the Navy, believe thatthe evidence available on the Soviet ICBM de-velopment program is sufficiently completeand valid to support the conclusion that little,if any, ICBM deployment has occurred, andthat the near absence of evidence of deploy-ment strengthens that conclusion.80. On the basis of all the evidence and thereasoning outlined above, the Assistant Chiefof Staff for Intelligence, Department of theArmy, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera-tions (Intelligence), Department of the Navy,estimate "a few" operational Soviet ICBMlaunchers for mid-1961. Although they donot consider the evidence sufficient to projecta precise estimate of the Soviet planning forfuture ICBM strength, they accept the reason-ing in the text as a generally valid measure ofthe scale and pace of a build-up. Therefore,on the basis of making a prudent and reason-able projection of Soviet deployed ICBMlauncher strength they estimate as follows:

Mild-1962 50-100Mid-1963 100-200Mild-1964 150-300

POSITION ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THEASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLI-GENCE, USAF

81. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,USAF, does not concur with the judgmentsreached herein on the nature of the currentand future Soviet force goals or the strategicconsiderations which determine their magni-tude. In his view the estimate of currentforce levels does not accurately represent thescope of deployment indicated by the nature,and quality of the evidence thus far accumu-lated, but reflects instead the impact of theextreme security measures which have ob-scured the broad scope of the Soviet ICBM pro-gram from its inception. In addition, he be-lieves that proper allowance has not beenmade in the estimate for the lack of intelli-

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gence coverage of the many areas in the USSRin which ICBM deployment may have beencarried out.

and a half, to mid-1961, brought to opera-tional readiness at least 120 and possibly aneven greater number of operational ICBMlaunchers.82. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,

USAF, believes that the Soviet determina-tion to achieve world domination has fosteredrecognition of the fact that the ultimateelimination of the US, as the chief obstacleto the achievement of their objective, can-not be accomplished without a clear pre-ponderance of military capability. Moreover,Soviet doctrine and deeds suggest to him thatthe Soviet hierarchy are mindful of the factthat few, if any, lasting major political vic-tories in history have been achieved withoutthe supporting bulwark of superior militarypower.

83. The history of their ballistic missile pro-gram testifies to an early recognition by theSoviets of the unprecedented potential offeredby such weapons and reflects their determina-tion to exploit that potential by making bal-listic missiles the dominant system in theirstrategic strike force. Their highly successfulICBM testing record reflects the qualitativeachievement of their well-planned, well-organ-ized program which would facilitate the reali-zation of predetermined force goals of anyreasonable magnitude. Soviet efforts to masktheir program in secrecy indicate the impor-tance which they attach to their growing mis-sile capability. Moreover, evidence developedin spite of their security measures reveals pr■grarnming forEdeployment concurrent with the testing phaseof their program. This concurrency is a fur-ther indication of Soviet determination tomaximize their operational capability at theearliest practicable time. In this connection,the evidence on denloyment is consistent withthe estimate/ghat the Soviets achieved theirinitial operational capability by 1 January1960, and in the intervening period of a year

84. Considering the emphasis which the So-viets place on secrecy, and the absence of otherthan partial intelligence coverage on most ofthe areas most suitable for ICBM deployment,we could not expect to identify more than asmall portion of the Soviet ICBM deploymentprogram. Nevertheless the Assistant Chief ofStaff, Intelligence, USAF, has identified atleast six areas on which there is reasonablygood evidence of ICBM deployment. Withinthese areas he believes there are between 10and 15 operational ICBM site-complexes.Further, he has about 20 additional areasunder active consideration on which evidenceindicates the possibility of ICBM launch siteconstruction. Considering the economics oflogistic support and specialized maintenanceand control problems, the siting of several sitecomplexes in a deployment area is highly prob-able and should be expected. Therefore, de-ployment—whether actual or planned—rep-resented by the 20 additional areas—reflectsthe existence of a program of consider-able magnitude. Even though identificationof some of the suspect areas should later proveerroneous, undoubtedly others will be identi-fied to replace them as the delay in intelli-gence reporting catches up with the actual sit-uation.

85. In view of the above, the Assistant Chiefof Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates the op-erational ICBM launcher availability as fol-lows:

Mid-1961 at least 120

Mid-1962 300

Mid-1963 550

Mid-1964 850

Mid-1965 1,150

Mid-1966 1,450

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1955 45

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