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Operations of the 757th Tank Battalion,Italian Campaign, Nov 4-Jun 45, by Lt ColR. C. Erickson, Inf. Command & Staff Col-lege. 1946-47.

This DocumentIS A HOLDING OF THEARCHIVES SECTION

LIBRARY SERVICESFORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO. N-5.60 COPY NO. 1SCGCorm 16013 Mar 51 ArmyY-CGSC-P2-17i98-7 Mar 52-5M

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COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH

KANSAS

School of Combined ArmsRegular Course

1946-1947

The Operations of the 757th Tank BattalionpItalian Campaign2November 1943-June 1945

(Personal Experience of a Battalion Commander)

Type of Operation Described: Coordinated Tank-Infantry Attack

Lt. Col. R. C. Erickson, Infantry

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Index 1

Bibliography 2Introduction ' 3757th Tank Bn. Operations 4-10Conclusions 11-14Lessons Learned 15

Map: ITALY 1:50,000 Sheet 160 II Cassino(S. Andrea-S.Ambrogio-S.Apollinare)

Chart: S. Andrea-S.Ambrogio-S. Apollinare triangle.


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Bibliography

S-11116 Armored Section, Fifth Army, Observer ReportFifth Army History, 1 April - 4 June 1944Fifth Army History, 16 August - 15 December 1944"19 Days from the Apennines to the Alps" - The Story of the Po ValleyCampaign. Author: Fifth Army U. S.

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INTRODUCTION

I am presenting this monograph for two reasons. First , I want verymuch to graduate from this institution and become one of those 'futurecommanders and high level staff officers' which we hear so much about, andsecond,,to give you an idea of how one separate tank battalion operatedin Italy in the past war, and to present for your consideration some of th eproblems and difficulties a unit of this type encounters.

Having seen several maps of Italy here in the classroom, I believe youwill agree that it is a very mountainous country and that it has often beensaid one in which tanks could not be effectively used. This rather ties inwith our problems here at the school in which we often found our attachedtank battalion trailing along in reserve behind some infantry division,being held until terrain permitted its use as a battalion striking force.This is the doctrine laid down in Field Manuals on the employment of armor.

However,. tre must be exceptions to all good books and the terrain inItaly dictated an un-orthodox method of employment which violates everyprinciple in the book.

This type of terrain wasn't that over which battalions made massbreakthroughs and exploited all over the front pages of the newspapers, butI'd like to remind you that there were several tank battalions in Italy,they were there a long time, and did a lo t of fighting. The tank battalionswere greatly outnumbered by the infantry divisions, and in spite of thefact that units of this type weren't making history, it seemed that none ofthe infantry divisions could or rather would get along without a battalionor any part of one that they could get.

Now with this brief background, I'd like to tell my story of the 757thTank Battalion in Italy, and to carry you through one operation with th eCorps Expeditionary French, in which we were used as a battalion, and which,by the way, is the only time in our twenty-three months in Italy.

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THE 757th TANK BATTALION OPERATIONS

After training in the California Desert for between five and six months,we landed at Casablanca, North Africa, on th e 18th of March, 1943, with th eidea of and feeling fully capable of going up into Tunisia and either reliev-ing the 1st Armored Division to give them a much needed rest, or joining themand getting th e African Campaign over in a hurry. At this time we were a lighttank battalion, composed of a Headquarters Company, three light tank companies,a service company, and a small medical detachment.

Two days after landing we were amazed and disappointed when we foundourselves operating as a battalion of stevedores, unloading ships by day anddoing guard duty around the dock area at night. None of us could recall havingread in a field manual that tank battalions were so employed. However, therewas a perfectly good reason for it. On the way to Africa several ships hadbeen torpedoed and a goodly portion of our equipment had been lost. Ourservices were utilized at the docks only until new equipment arrived for us.It was only a matter of a couple of weeks when with full T/O equipment wewere moved north two hundred miles to a place near the Spanish Moroccan borderknown as Port Layutey. Here we ran into another means of employing a tankbattalion and found ourselves doing MP duty in the city. By now we were quiteresigned to the fact that we weren't going to win the African war.

Shortly after our arrival in the area, the 2nd Moroccan French InfantryDivision moved into an area adjacent to us. Upon their arrival we received atraining directive from Seventh Army outlining an extensive tank-infantrytraining program to be carried on with the French troops. Whether it was aperfect example of prior planning or a coincidence, I do no t know, but justnine months later we were fighting with this same division in Italy.

To get along with my little war, we went into Italy in the fall of 1943.Our ftst bit of excitement happened with an American task force along the high-way a few miles south of Cassino. After getting settled in a bivouac area, thebattalion commander was called to this higher headquarters and given the missionof capturing a small mountain down the road a few miles. He was instructedthat th e attack was to be made immediately. He remarked that he would like timeto make a reconnaissance, make a plan, and inform his battalion of the operation,

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whereupon he was informed that there was no time for that. He was furtherinstructed to use the radio in his vehicle, call his battalion and get themstarted down the highway, prepare a plan where he was, meet his battalion onthe road, give them their instructions enroute, and make the attack. Aboutthe time this was happening, a higher commander walked into the CP, and whenadvised of th e plan, he immediately called it off.

The point I wish to make here is that a commander who Should have beenfamiliar with the capabilities and limitations of the units under his command,ordered such an attack without time for even a hasty reconnaissance, with nomention of a combined tank-infantry action, and no consideration to the factthat he was ordering a l ight tank battalion, with 37 mm guns, to seize a hillmass which was nothing less that a huge rock formation protruding up from thevall r floor.

Shortly after this the battalion was ordered back to a rear area to bere-organized into what we know as a tank battalion. In other words, therewere to be no more l ight and medium battalions, but all battalions to be astandard organization, composed of a headquarters company, three medium tankcompanies, one l ight tank company, a service company, and a medical detachmentof twenty-five men.

About this time th e Corps Expeditionary French was in the process ofrelieving the American VI Corps which held a sector farther to the east. We,along with another tank battalion, were attached to these people and moved totheir sector. As I recall, we closed in bivouac at 1400 hours and by 1600 oneof our medium companies was attached to one division, and the battalion minusto another division.

Time does not permit covering our operations in detail, but I believe itcan be summarized by saying that we moved tanks up in the mountains, did somedirect firing for the infantry, established road blocks, located fairly strongforces on or near critical terrain features, fired as arti l lery, and spent thewinter being miserable in the cold and snow like everyone else.

Our greatest problems here, as were true throughout the entire campaign,were supply and maintenance-trying to keep these widely scattered unitssupplied with gasoline, ammunition, and rations, and keeping the vehiclsoperational.

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Before going on, I might mention the difficulty experienced by bothunits when a group of non-French speaking Americans were put to work with agroup of non-English speaking Frenchmen. However, with the assistance ofinterpreters and liaison officers supplied by the French, and effort on thepart of each, we were able to get along without too much difficulty.

After the winter campaign, which had produced half successes in somesectors, a major regrouping of all Allied Forces in Italy took plae. Thistook British units out of Fifth Army and gave them back to the British EighthArmy, put all the American units together in the II Corps and put the FrenchCorps in and on the right flank of the Fifth Army.

PLANS FOR MAY 11th OPERATIONThe plans for the May 11th operation were such as to deal the enemy a

decisive blow and carry the Fifth Army to Rome. Because of the fact thatthree of the four divisions in the French Corps were made up of native

mountain fighters, this unit was to make the main Army effort. The 1st FreeFrench Division, to which we were attached for the operation, was to operateon the right flank of the Corps.

For further orientation, I have here a chart of the particular sector inwhich we are interested. (Appendix A).

With the 2nd and 3d French Divisions attacking abreast at 2400 hours andthe mission of securing a huge feature known as Mt. MAJO, the 1st Free FrenchDivision was to attack at H$3, secure the high ground in the vicinity of S.ANDREA, continue on to capture LA GUARDIA HILL, an d clean out the S. ANDREA-S. AMBROGIO-S. APOLLINARE triangle.

Our tank battalion was to cross TIGER BRIDGE with the artillery fire at2300 hrs, move to attack position shown on chart, and at daylight to cross ananti-tank ditch, get on the road and proceed to S. APOLLINARE to cut off anddestroy th e enemy between and in S. APOLLINARE A D S. SMBROGIO. "A" Companywas to lead the attack, "B " company to support their movement by fire from thehigh ground just east of the anti-tank ditch, then to follow "A" Company andcut south along th e ridge line to S. AMBROGIO. "C" Company was to be initiallyin reserve, prepared to pass through "A" Company at S. APOLLINARE.


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PRIOR PLANNINGBefore going farther, I'd like to take a minute to mention the prior

planning of this operation. Cub planes had been made available to us by theFrench and every officer in the battalion had flown over the area in whichwe were to operate. We were well supplied with air photos and maps of thearea. Then for ten days, th e operation had been rehearsed with the Frenchinfantry, putting our companies with the Infantry battalions with whichthey would later be working.

Here I have a chance to get in a plug fo r Lt. Col. Duncan's trainingaids. Our battalion operations sergeant was a very capable and ambitiouslad. After spending two full days on an OP which overlooked the area of the

attack, he built a sand table 12' in \length by 6' in depth. It was a finepiece of work and on it was placed every piece of G-2 information available.Over a period of a week, in which daily conferences were held, almost theentire plan for the operation, not only our plan but the French Division

Commander' s as,well, was made at the sand table. Every man in our Battalionwas oriented and explained the complete plan.

MAY 11th ATTACKTo get back to the attack, on the night of 10th May the battalion moved

to a forward assembly area a mile from the river. Under cover of the noiseof the artillery preparation at 2300, on 11th May, the combat elements ofthe battalion, less the assault gun platoon which had been attached to theFrench artillery, moved to the attack position.

By daylight the infantry had secured the high ground behind S. ANDREAand had started up the slopes of LA GUARDIA HILL. The anti-tank ditch hadbeen filled sufficiently to permit a crossing. "A" company had just crossedthe ditch and had two platoons of tanks up on th e road, when the infantry washit with a strong counterattack only a few hundred yards in front of him andapparently directed at the road junction which he was about to pass. Whenthe company commander saw what was happening, he called his third platoon onthe radio and told them not to get on the road, but to deploy where they wereand direct their fire well up on the hill. Being in column on the road with

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the other two platoons, only the company commander's tank and the one followinghim were in a position to fire. T his quick action rather upset the enemy plans,

and permitted th e French infantry to withdraw to a positiai along the road at

the base of the hill. After a short conference between our "A" companycommander and the infantry battalion commander, five more tanks were moved offthe road into firing positions just east of th e road, giving 12 tanks whichcould direct fire on the ill to th e immediate front. All 12 tanks startedfiring when the infantry was ready to go, and laid a rolling barrage about 50yards ahead of the infantry up the hill. It was taken with comparative ease.

However, this unforeseen delay had consumed time, two tanks had hit mines,two had been damaged by mortar fire in the suspension system, one had had

the bow gun put out of commission, and twelve of the tanks had used a goodportion of their ammunition load. This left "A" Company in no shape to goon tbh S. APOLLINARE, and we were about to commit the reserve company before

th e attack had gotten started. "C" company was moved up and passed thru "A"

company to continue the attack to S. APOLLINARE. They had moved just abouta thousand yards and were at a very narrow spot in the road with very steepbanks on either side when the first tank was h it by an anti-tank gun fromthe ridge extending south to S. AMBROGIO.

Here the weather had a damaging effect on our plans. On this particular

morning there was a heavy fog over the GARIGLIANO RIVER. You will remember

that 'B" company had moved to a position just east of the anti-tank ditch to

support the movement of "A" company, and which was now "C" company, along the

road. The fog had extended to their position and visibility was practicallynil.

As the first "C" company tank was hit, we, like everyone else in trouble

called for artillery fire. However, it seemed other people were also having

trouble and no fire was available to us for fifteen minutes. In the meantime,the second "C" compac tank had been hit, and it began to look like we

wouldn't need any artillery fire in fifteen minutes. The only thing left totry was our mortar platoon, which was ordered to move into a position and

fire n. the ridge from which the AT guns were firing. Two of the threemortar half-tracks were hit by enemy mortar fire before they could fire a round.

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The remaining one did get a few round, including some smoke, on the enemyposition, purely by guess and Kentucky windage. Maybe I haven't made itclear that the anti-tank guns were firing from a position higher and fartherfrom the river and were not harassed by the fog. "A" Compare had beenadvised of th e happenings and they too being out of the fog had fairvisibility. In a short time the company commander was directing the fireof his tanks along the ridge line where the fire was coming from. Thenthings began to brighten and 'B" company was able to also fire on the target.With this fire on the AT guns, "C" company was able to pull the disabledtanks back to a wider portion of the road, by-pass them and proceed to S.APOLLINARE. "B" company immediately followed as planned and directed theirattack toward S. AMBROGIO. In spite of the delay, when "B" company begantheir close in fire at S. A BROGIO, several enemy vehicles and foot troopsleft the town and withdrew toward S. APOLLINARE where "C" company was waitingfor them and had them cut off. Also "C" company had shot up or captured anestimated compaiy of infantry in S. APOLLINARE and had destroyed two anti-tankguns. Without delay the attack was continued by "C" company to S. GIGRGIO,a road center to the north.

I have presented this particular action fo r several reasons. First ,to emphasize the prior planning, reconnaissance, fire and movement, tank-infantry coordination, use of reserves, and flexibility of plans necessaryin 'a tank-infantry action. Second, to show that with effective tank supportinfantry can be most successful with a minimum of casualties and effort.Third, to show that when the guns of several tanks can be brought to bear onpoint targets, it permits the movement of other forces with ease. And last,this was presented because it was the only time until we reached thePo Valleyjust twelve months later that we had a chance to use the battalion togetheras one unit, or rather the greater part of the battalion as a unit.

After this operation we were soon in the hills and mountains again andfound our companies attached out to th e various regiments, some companiesbroken do wn into platoons, they in turn attached to battalions and companiesof infantry. The tanks worked with the front line infantry, going ahead when-

ever possible. The chief concern again was supply and maintenance. It was anextremely difficult problem keeping the vehicles supplied with gasoline and

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ammunition when they were passing over terrain which could often not benegotiated by wheeled vehicles. In each company th e company executivewas charged with supplying his company. During the day he followed as besthe could, keeping track of all his company units, finding out where eachstopped for the night, and then getting the supply vehicles to the tanksbefore daylight. Tw o service company trucks were attached to each companyas well as a platoon of l ight tanks, to be used where wheeled vehicles couldnot go.

PO VALLEY OPERATIONS

Now, just a word about operations in the flat PO VALIEY. Until wereached the PO RIVERl "C" company worked with th e 88th Inf1airy Division,and the battalion (-) was attached to the 91st Inf. Division. We workedin task forces normally consisting of a medium tank company with a battalionof infantry following, or at times riding on the tanks. The attack wascarried on on parallel roads, but often the units were not mutually support-ing. Too, we were never permitted to by-pass strong points as is true withArmored Divisions. Each time we ran into a strong point or opposition inforce, it necessitated a fight unti l the opposition was overcome. Most of

wethe strong resistance encountered was in the towns and in these towns/werematerially assi ded by the Partisan Forces.

In this movement across the PO VALLEY, it seemed that everyone had tohave tanks. Even the Division CP called for tanks fo r protection. Therejust weren't that many tanks in the battalion, and it was a constant struggleto keep the companies together as units.

The PO VALLEY Campaign was most successful and resulted in the captureand destruction of thousands of the enemy.

The operations of the 757th Tank Battalion were climaxed in Italy by beingpart of a task force of th e 91st Division which made contact with the AmericanSeventh Army coming south through BRENNER PASS from Germany.

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CONCLUSIONS

Now let me briefly run over some of the difficult problems we. encountered,

my own ideas of what can be done to lessen them, and to leave with you severalthings which need further consi ration.

1. Artillry Support.. One of the principles taught here at the schoolis that tank attacks should always be supported by artillery. This is borneout by the fact that in our school problems there are always several additionalartillery battalions attached to the armored divisions. When separate unitsare working with infantry divisions, this artillery support is easy to talkabout, but extremely hard to get. The division artillery was there to supportthe division infantry, and it was difficult to convince many commanders thattanks needed artillery support. Operating as small units, artillery wasn'tneeded often, but when it could have saved men and equipment, it wasn'tavailable to us.

2. Attachment vs. support. In my experience, it seemed to be SOPthat when an infaitry division received a Corps order attaching a tankbattalion to them, they immediately published an order attaching a mediumtank company to each of their regiments and our assault gun platoon to thedivision artillery.

It has been stated from the platform here at th e school, that attach-ments are normally made so that the necessary coordination can be effected in acombined tank-infantry action. In my opinion, regardless of whether a unit isplaced in support of or attached to , when a combined operation is planned,exactly the same amount of coordination is necessary to make it successful andworkable.

When attached to a unit , if they were to be entirely responsible fo rand take care of all necessary supply and other administrative matters of theunit, then I can see whereman attachment might be desirous. With a tank battalion,I don't believe any infantry division can supply itself properly and keep amoving tank battalion in gasoline alone. By this I mean keeping gasoline,ammunition, and rations available to the tank companies when it is neededand where it is needed. So, in my opinion, when an attachment is made it hasa tendency to take the commadd away from the battalion commander and place it

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with three or four infantry commanders, who usually all have entirelydifferent ideas about how to use tanks. I am not one to campaign fortanks to be used only in the role of break-throughs and pursuits. Ifirmly believe that whenever they can assist the infantry to move theyshould be used. But my point here is, that I'firmly believe that thedecisions as to where and how many, should be left to the commander who istrained in the use of and knows the capabilities and limitations of hisvehicles, and knows whether two tanks can do the job or whether a companyis necessary.

3. Morale. Next let's take a look at the morale problems a unit ofthis type encounters. First, there is the subject of decorations. Onedamaging morale fact is that many divisions are awarded quotas of DSCs,Silver Stars, etc., but too often these don't seem to get down to includethe attachments which may be there for only a few weeks or a month. It ismuch easier to get a man decorated when people are available to write glowingtales of heroism. In a separate tank battalion of only 39 officers it israther hard to find such a journalist. If there is such a character, he isusually one of your good tank platoon leaders or someone else who can't bereplaced to become an expert on decorations.

Chaplains and dentists were never plentiful in the army and separatebattalions had neither. It is true that originally tank battalions were placedunder a Group Headquarters which was provided with a Chaplain and two dentists.However, in Italy, the Group Headquarters under which we operated, neverfunctioned as a Group Headquarters because all the tank battalions were attachedour separately to the divisions. Later this same Group Headquarters was madeinto an Infantry Regimental Headquarters and functioned as a composite infantryregiment. The infantry divi si ons had Chaplains, but they didn't reach thepersonnel who needed th e spiritual relief. In our rear area, Sunday serviceswere often available to our personnel of Service and Headquarters company.As fo r dentists in the divisions, they were extremely busy with their own people.As an example, when a division dentist offers to handle ten patients a weekfor a tank battalion, it is a matter of about fourteen months before th ebattalion is completely gone over.

4. Lack of understanding and questionabl-: t judgment. I am familiar with

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two cases where a regimental commander ordered an officer to send two tanksdown a highway to reach . certain point in so many minutes. In both cases,it was positively known that enemy AT guns were covering the road, and thatthe tanks were absolutely restricted to the roads. The tanks were sent, allknocked out, and the crews killed or captured. The principle that infantryalways attacks and destroys anti-tank guns for the armor is often forgottenin tank-infantry action. If there is a chance that such a maneuver will dosome good, it may be justified, however, when such orders are issued in astate of excitement and merely as an excuse to use tanks, it cannot bejustified. This did not happen to my unit, but to one with vich I am wellacquainted.

To go fur1ter into the lack of understanding of some commanders,one particular example may bring out the point. On a certain attack my "A"company was working with an infantry regiment. The objective was a large,rather bare hill, one vich tanks could climb. The hill was well defendedand covered by several bunkers which could not be identified from a distance.The plan called for our tanks to lead the assault, to be followed closelyby the infantry. The attack jumped off as scheduled. The first hundred yardsor so the infantry stayed close behind the tanks. However, as the attackprogressed, the infantry troope received flanking fire and were pinned down.Being busily engaged, the tanks drew away and were a good distance ahead ofthe infantry when the tank commander noticed the infantry people behind himin trouble. He called his platoon leaders over the'radio, told them to turnaround, go back down the hill, let the infantry soldiers get behind andunder their tanks until he could locate and destroy the flaking fire whichhad held them up. He then proceeded to move his reserve platoon to the flankto offer protection against the small arms fire. Then the advance startedagain. After another advance of about 300 yards, the tanks again slowlypulled away from the infantry. For the second time, the company commanderturned his tanks around and went back to pick up his infantry. Throughthis officers previous experience with infatry and his commendable judgment,the infantry was put on top of the objective with very light losses.

The disturbing part of this story comes when a telephone call wasreceived by the battalion commaser demanding to know why the taks were turningaround and coming back down the hill when they had gained so much ground, and

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furer demanding that immediate action be taken to see that it didn' t happenagain. What this officer did not know, was that smart infantry dug-in onth e forward slope of a hill, and I believe the Germans must be given creditfor being well trained soldiers, normally don't climb out of their holes toknock out tanks coming directly at them and which are firing on everythingthat moves. Further, that very often tanks will be allowed to pass throughand all fire will be concentrated on the infantry following behind them, thenth e tanks will be destroyed from the rear.

This lack of understanding did not occur between the battalion andcompany commaders who were on the spot and engaged in th e operation. Thosepeople worked well together, understood each others problems, and worked outtheir difficulties as they arose. The people who did not understand werethose who were not there, but were watching the operation from a distance.

In my opinion, the only people qualified to make decisions oncean attack has started, are those small unit commanders actually engaged, andwho have had day to day experience in operations of this type.

5. Replacement problems. During a good portion of the Italian Campaign,trained tank replacem ets were not available to us. This meant that eachtime a group of replacements were received, it was necessary to conduct aschool over a period of approximately two weeks, to acquaint th e replacementswith maintenance, driving, and gunnery. When our l ight tank company was nototherwise engaged, the training personnel came from these people. Ofteninsufficient vehicles and areas were available to train these people.

During certain stages of the campaign, no replacements were availableover long periods of time. Tank crews were trying to operate with four, andsometimes three men to a tank. At one time in our operations it was necessaryto take a complete platoon of l ight tank crews and use them as replacements ina medium company, to keep our medium tanks working with the infantry.

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LESSONS, LEANED

1. Tanks can be used effectively in mountainous terrain, but not inaccordance with the principles and doctrine prescribed in field manuals.

2. To gain th e maxhm degree of effectiveness from a tank-infantryteam, everyone concerned must have a thorough understanding of the operation,of the capabilities and limitations of each type unit, and after an attackhas started the decisions must be left with the small unit commanders engaged.

3. That the five hundred series radio, with which this tank battalionwas equipped, was not sufficient to maintain control and contact, when th eunit was broken down into small, widely separated units.

4. Morale problems of separate units are great and must be givenconsideration by the larger units to which they are attached.

5. That the reconnaissance platoon, of four 1/4 ton trucks and onehalf track, was ineffective and found to be of very little use in mountainousterrain.

6. That five-man assault gun crews were not sufficient to carry on theextensive fire programs prescribed by division artillery when th e platoon wasso attached.

7. That some provision must be made for additional liaison officers whenthe unit is to be broken down and attached to various other units, eachrequiring a liaison officer. The T/O provided for one liaison officer perbattalion.

However, with th e present T/0 giving tanks to the infantry regiments,and each division having its organic tank battalion, most of these difficulties

experienced in the last.war should be alleviated.

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