human rights - donelly - international human rights_a regime analysis
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8/11/2019 Human Rights - Donelly - International Human Rights_A Regime Analysis
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International Human Rights: A Regime AnalysisAuthor(s): Jack DonnellySource: International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer, 1986), pp. 599-642Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706821.
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International uman rights:
regime nalysis
Jack onnelly
Internationalegimes
s the urrenthot" topic
n the tudy f nternational
relations,speciallynternationalrganizationnd political conomy.'Al-
thoughmost iscussions estrictegime nalysis
o economic ssues,
shall
examine he ssue of
internationaluman ights
n
order o illustrate
he
utilityfthe oncept f nternationalegimes
n noneconomicontexts.2
n
addition, shall urvey
nd present preliminary
nalysis fthecreation,
evolution,nd current
tate f nternationaluman ights egimes.
1. International egimes
"Internationalegimes
re defineds principles,orms, ules nd
decision-
making rocedures
roundwhich ctorexpectations
onverge na given
I
thank raigMurphy,
lenn
Hayslett,
ohn
incent,
ave
Forsythe,
eter
Katzenstein,
and two nonymouseferees or ommentsn earlier
rafts.Work n
portions
f
this
rticle
was partiallyupportedy a grant rom heUniversity
esearch ouncil ftheUniversity
f
North arolina t ChapelHill.
1. This tatuswas attested o and spurred y the
Spring 982 pecial ssueof nternational
Organization36.
2. This s not, owever,he irstublishedpplicationf he oncept f nternationalegimes
to the rea of human ights. hatdistinction,believe,
oes to John erard uggie, Human
Rights
nd
theFuture nternationalommunity,"
aedalus
112
Fall 1983), p. 93-110.See
also
NicholasG. Onuf
nd
V.
SpikePeterson,
HumanRights romn Internationalegimes
Perspective," ournal f nternationalffairs8 Winter984), p. 329-42, or n nteresting,
if
extremelydiosyncratic,iscussion. or perhaps
heearliest pplicationf theconcept f
regimes o human ights, ee David
P.
Forsythe,
A New HumanRightsRegime:What
Significance?"Paper resentedt theAnnual onferencef he nternationaltudies ssocia-
tion,March1981).For a recent nalysis argely omplementary
o theone developed n the
following
wo
sections, hough
without he
explicit
ocus
on
regimes,
ee
Forsythe,The
UnitedNations ndHumanRights, 945-1985," olitical cience Quarterly
00
Summer
1985), p. 249-70.
InternationalOrganization
40,
3, Summer 1986
C 1986 y theMassachusettsnstitutefTechnologynd theWorld eace Foundation
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600 Internationalrganization
issue-area."3 his
"standard" efinition,fferedy
Stephen
.
Krasner,s
wellgroundedn more stablishedsage.
In politics, ses of regime-"a manner,method r system f rule or
government;system
r
institution
avingwidespread
nfluencer
preva-
lence" (OxfordEnglish Dictionary)-are common
n
English, as
well as
in
French,where heEnglish
word riginated.hey lso preserve
he entral
sense
of
heLatin
root,
egimen,rule,guidance, overnment,
ommand."
The French re'gime"lso refers o a system f egal
rules r regulations
(most ommonly, ut notexclusively, elatingo conjugal
roperty). his
usagehas becomewellestablished
n nternationalaw.For example, n the
Trail melter ase
(3
U.N.R.I.A.A.
1905,1938 1949]), ubmittedor rbi-
tration y Canada andtheUnited tateshalf centurygo,a centralssue
was establishing "regime," system fprinciples,ules,
nd procedures,
for
egulating
he
discharge
f noxious umes y
the
offending
melter.n
the ecentlyoncluded egotiationsver he aw of he ea,
the onceptwas
regularlysed.
And n the
HostagesCase (I.C.J.
3
[1980])
he nternational
Court fJustice eld hat
the
rules f
diplomaticaw,
n
short,
onstitute
self-contained
egime."
he newly opular
dea
of
nternationalegimes
an
be seen as an
extension
f suchuses.4
In contemporarynglish, owever, regime" ends o be used pejora-
tively
nd
to refer o
national especially oreign) overnmentsr social
systems. lthough
he
arityfpejorativeonnotations
n
nternational
ela-
tions as ed at
eastone critico suggest
hat he erm as beenmisapplied,5
such
usage merely eflects ell-known
tructuralifferencesetween
a-
tional nd nternationalolitics.
Because
national olitical
rder sually an be taken
or ranted, oral r
ideological
valuations f particular ational ystems
recommon
nd
per-
haps
even
salutary. Regime"
refers o theentire ocial
and political ys-
3.
Stephen . Krasner,
Structuralauses
nd
Regime onsequences:
egimess Interven-
ing
Variables,"
nternational
rganization
6 (Spring
982),p. 185.
CompareRobert
.
Keohane and Joseph
S. Nye,
Power and Interdependence:
World
Politics in Transition
Bos-
ton:
Little,
rown, 977),
. 19,where
egimesre
defined
s "governing
rrangements
hat
affectelationships
f nterdependence,"
r, more
recisely,
networks
frules,
orms,nd
procedures
hat egularize
ehavior
nd control
tseffects"
n an
issue-area.
4. As a
matterfhistorical
act,
owever,olitical
conomy
eems obe
the rincipal
ource
of
the
ntroduction
f
the concept
nto
American)
olitical
cience.We can also
note
that
"regime"
has become standard
erm neconomics
n
the astfifteen
ears,
specially
n
reference
o foreign-exchange
nd
foreign-trade
olicies.
he first
mportantse
n thefield
f
internationalrganizationas John erard uggie,Internationalesponses oTechnology:
Concepts
and
Trends,"
International
Organization 29
(Summer
1975), pp. 557-84,
while
Keohane nd
Nye,Power
nd ndependence,
re
most esponsible
or
ringinghe erm
nto
the
mainstream
fthe iterature.
n the neglect
f the egal bases
of
theconcept
n recent
discussions,
ompare
riedrichratochwil,
On theRelevance
f nternational
aw,"
Journal
of nternational
Affairs 7
(Winter
1984),p. 344.
5.
Susan Strange, "Cave
hic
dragones:
A Critique
of
Regime
Analysis,"
International
Organization
6
Spring
982), .
486.
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Human
ights egimes
601
tem,whichmakes ts use in such contexts eem natural.
And sincemost
wholesale ppraisals end o be negative-one's own faults,
nd thoseof
friendsnd allies, end o be presenteds subject o ncrementalemedy-
pejorative ses predominate.ven at thenationalevel,however,
regime"
maybe used in positive valuations,
s in praiseof a new"revolutionary
regime."
In
internationalolitics,
y contrast, narchy s the rule.
nternational
regimes-principles,orms,
ules, nddecision-makingrocedures
overn-
ing n issue-area-are oneway to provide lements f "order,"
tructured
regularityespite narchy. uch slands forder n the ea
ofanarchy end
to be relativelyare nd highly alued-whichexplains he
generally eu-
tral, r even positive, onnotationsf "regime" n nternationalettings.
What orms f nternationalrdermerit onsiderations
regimes?
ras-
ner distinguishesmong hree.6
Structuralists"e.g., realists nd some
neo-Marxists)ee power as the only consistentlymportant
undamental
cause of nternationalehavior,making egimes erhaps
eal, butat best
epiphenomenal.tthe ther
xtreme,Grotians" eeregimesverywhere:7
"for very olitical ystem.. there s a correspondingegime";
a
regime
exists
n
every ubstantive
ssue-areawhere here
s discerniblyatterned
behavior."8 "Modified structuralists,"r neorealists,
dopt
an inter-
mediate-butnot compromise-position.9
For neorealists, egimes
re importantspects
of contemporary
nterna-
tional
olitics,
ut
not
all regularitiesrisefrom egimes.
nternational
e-
gimes xist only)when tates,
norder o avoidthe ostsofuncoordinated
national ction, re able to
agree moreor less explicitly)
n norms
r
6. Krasner,
Structuralauses,"
pp. 189-94.
7.
The position rasner
alls
"Grotian"nfact
as ittle
pparentonnection ith hework
of HugoGrotius. s Krasner oes not xplain, r evencite source or, he abel, nemust
assume hat e has adopted
t,with onsiderable
odification,
romMartin
Wight,Western
Values
n nternational
elations"
ndHedley
Bull, The
Grotianonception
f
nternational
Society," n
Herbert
utterfieldnd
MartinWight,
ds., Diplomatic
nvestigationsCam-
bridge: arvard niversity
ress,
1966). ven
Bull,however,ecognizes
he mbiguous
ela-
tionof his much
better
rounded)abel
"Grotian" o
the views
of Grotius. ee Bull,The
Anarchical
ocietyNew
York:
Columbia niversity
ress, 977),
hap.
2, n.3, nd "Grotian
Conception,". 51.
By the ime
we reachKrasner's
sage,
t shard o see much
fGrotius
t
all.
ForGrotius'wn
naturalaw
views f nternational
aw
nd ociety,ee
hisDeJure elli
c
Pacis,
trans.
rancisW. Kelsey
Oxford:
larendon,925),
specially
he Prolegomena."
8. DonaldJ. Puchala
and
Raymond . Hopkins,
Internationalegimes:
essonsfrom
Inductivenalysis,"nternationalrganization6 Spring982), p. 246, 47.Compare ran
R. Young, Regime
Dynamics:
heRise and
Fall of
nternationalegimes,"
nternational
Organization
6 Spring 982),
p. 277-97;
ndOran
R. Young, International
egimes:rob-
lems fConcept
ormation,"
World
olitics 2
April 980), p.
331-56.
9.
See especially
rthur
. Stein, Coordination
ndCollaborationegimes
n
an Anarchic
World,"
nternational
rganization6
Spring
982), p. 299-324,
nd
Robert
.
Keohane,
"The Demand
or nternational
egimes,"
nternational
rganization
6 (Spring
982),
p.
325-55.
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602 International
rganization
procedures o regulateheir nteractions.
uch agreements
re especially
likelyn an environmentfcomplex nterdependence,
haracterized
ymul-
tiple hannels f nteraction,he bsenceof clearhierarchyf ssues, nd
the nfrequentse of force y the trong
n most ssue-areas.
0
The structuralist
ismissal f regimes
aises argely mpiricaluestions
that re well beyond
he
scope of
this rticle, lthough
emonstratinghe
heuristic r explanatorytility
f
regime
nalysis
or
human
ightsand
other oneconomic
ssue-areas)would ount tronglygainst
he tructural-
istperspective.he differencesetween
Grotian" nd neorealist
erspec-
tives,however,re of considerableonceptual
mportance.
Because the
mere xistence f an identifiablessue s
almost ertain o
guarantee discernibly atterned ehavior," "regime" forthe Grotian
means ittlemore
han issue-area"or"political ubsystem."
t best, his
wastes useful ermndpointlesslydds
to our lready verstocked
tore f
jargon. More serious, ince
the "rules" of
a
Grotian regime"
need be
nothing ore han n outside bserver's
escriptionfapparent
ehavioral
regularities,hey
have no necessary xplanatoryalue.
Neorealist egimes,
y contrast,
nvolve
egularities
hat
rise
only
when
actors at east
n
part)
onform
heir onduct o
norms nd
procedureshey
accept as legitimate. estricted o issue-areaswherebehaviors at least
partiallyoverned
yregime ormsndprocedures,egimes
ecome ausal
variables, t minimum,
ntervening
ariables etween tatebehavior
nd
deeper
tructuralorces uch s
power
r
nterest.
Therefore,shall
define internationalegime"
s "norms
nd
decision-
making rocedurescceptedby international
ctorsto regulate
n issue
area.
1
States andother elevantctors)
ccept ertain ormative
r pro-
cedural onstraintss legitimate,hereby artiallyeplacing
original"
a-
tional
overeignty
ith
nternational
uthority. lthoughovereignty
hus
remains he central rdering rinciplef the society f states, egimes e-
quire imited enunciations
f overeignationaluthority
n n ssue-area
n
order o reduce he
costs
of nternational
narchy.
10. Keohane nd
Nye,Power nd ndependence,p.
19-29
nd
passim.
ompare
rnst
.
Haas, "WhyCollaborate?
ssue-Linkage
nd nternational
egimes,"
World
olitics 2 April
1980), p. 357-405,
ndHaas,
"Turbulent
ieldsand the
Theory f Regional
ntegration,"
International
Organization30 (Spring 1976), pp.
173-212.
11. Cf. Haas,
"WhyCollaborate?"
.
358.Thisdefinition
s consistent
ith, ut omewhat
narrower
han,Krasner's,
which ermits
"Grotian"
eading.
should lso
note
that
my
definitionxcludes,mplicitlyor, fnecessary,y tipulation),laimshat regimexistsn he
presence
f "norms"
uch s "outcomes
re the
result fad hoc
bargains
ased onrelative
power."
Such ituations
re
ikely o nvolve elatively
redictable
egularities
ndthus ould
be classified
s regimes y Grotians.)
hus
in the case of
international
uman ights,or
example, here
was no
regimen1914;
no nternationally
ccepted
orms rprocedures
imited
state
overeignty
n this ssue-area.
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Human
ights egimes 603
National
Promotion or Information Policy
International
International
Decisions Assistance
Exchange Coordination Monitoring Decisions
International Strong
Strong Strong Strong
Norms Declaratory Promotional Implementation Enforcement
International
Standards with
National Exemptions
Weak
Implementation
International
Guidelines
Weak
Weak Weak
Declaratory
Promotional
Enforcement
National
Standards
No
Regime
Declaratory Promotional
Implementation
Enforcement
Regime Regime
Regime Regime
FIGURE 1. Types of international egimes
2. Types of nternational egimes
Internationalegimes re not n all or
nothing atter, owever; he ransfer
of
authority ay take
a
variety fforms, nd its significance ay be of
varying egrees. igure1provides rough ypologyf regime ypes.
Regimenorms, tandards, r rules
may runfrom ully nternationalo
entirely ational; here re roughly our
rincipalypes.12
*
Authoritative
nternationalorms:
inding
nternational
tandards,
generallyccepted
s such
by
states.
*
Internationaltandards
ith
elf-selected
ational
xemptions: ener-
allybinding
ules
hat
nonetheless
ermit
ndividualtates o
"opt
out,"
in
part. For example,
tates
may
hoosenot o
ratify treaty
or toratify ith eservations.)
*
Internationaluidelines:nternational
tandards
hat
re not
binding
but re
nonetheless idely ommended y
states.Guidelines
may
12. Althoughuse these ermsmore r ess nterchangeably,rasner,
Structural
auses,"
p. 186,distinguishesprinciples" rom norms"-"beliefs ffact, ausation,nd rectitude"
from standardsfbehavior efinednterms frightsndobligations"-and reats
rules" s
"specific rescriptionsr proscriptionsor ction,"which e considerss more kin
o
proce-
dures han principles" r "norms."Although rasner uts his istinctiono gooduse
n
his
discussion f regime hange, t seems to me rather rbitrary,speciallyn distinguishing
"norms" rom rules" argely y hegreaterpecificityf rules." n ordinarysage, rules"
hasat east s wide range s norms; onsider ot nly ftenoose "rules f he ame"
but
lso
"moral ules"
a
la Kant.
n
the nterestfclarity, owever,
shall t
least npart efer o
Krasner's uthoritynd use therelativelyeutralerm norms" o refer o thefull ange
f
regime's ormativerinciplesin ontrasto tsdecision-makingrocedures).ormy urposes,
however, rasner's istinctionetween rinciples,orms,nd
rules s of
no
nterest
r
mpor-
tance.
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604
International
rganization
range rom
trong,xplicit, etailed ules ovague tatements
f
amorphous
ollective
spirations.
* National tandards:he bsenceof substantiventernational
orms.13
Three
principal
ypes f nternational
ecision-makingctivitiesin
addi-
tion
o normreation) an be
distinguished-enforcingnternational
orms,
implementingnternationalorms,
nd promoting
heir cceptance ren-
forcement-andt eastsix mportant
ypes fregimeecision-making
ro-
cedures hould e
distinguished.
*
Authoritative
nternationalecision
making:
nstitutionalized,
inding
decision
making,ncludingenerally
ffectivenforcement
owers.
*
International
onitoring:
ormal
nternationaleview f
state
ractice
butno
authoritativenforcement
rocedures.
Monitoring
ctivities
can be further
ategorized
n terms
f
the
powers
llowed
o
monitors
to
carry
ut
ndependentnvestigations
nd make
udgments
f
com-
pliancewith
nternational
orms.
*
International
olicy
oordination:
egular
nd
expected
se
of
an
in-
ternationalorum o achieve
greater
oordinationf
national
olicies
but
no
significant
nternationaleview f state
practice.
* Internationalnformationxchange: bligatoryr
stronglyxpected
use of nternationalhannels
o
nform
ther
tates f one's
practice
with
espect o
regime orms.14
*
Internationalromotionr assistance: nstitutionalized
nternational
promotionf or
assistance
n the
nationalmplementationf
nterna-
tional
norms.
*
National ecision
making:
ull
tate overeignty
n
decision
making
for he
ssue-area.
International
nforcementctivities
nvolventernationalecision
making
and the
trongerorms f
nternationalonitoring.
nternationalmplemen-
tation
ctivitiesnclude
weakermonitoringrocedures,
olicy
oordination,
and
someforms f
information
xchange. romotionalctivitiesmay
n-
volve international
nformationxchange, romotion,
r assistance,
nd
perhaps
ven
weak
monitoringf nternational
uidelines.
These
categoriespplyas well to
regimes,which
may be classifieds
13.An nternationalegime ith urely ationaltandardss logicallyonceivable,lthough
rather nlikely;ignificantnternationalecisionmakingould esultn collective ecision
o
permitully ationaltandardetting.uch "proceduralegime,"
n
ts trongestorm, ould
occupy hebottom ight orner f Figure .
14.
Clearly, higher" ypes fdecisionmakingnvolve
nformation
xchange
s well.
n
fact,
each "higher" ype enerallyncompasseshe owers vailable
n
he lower" ypes, lthough
therelative trengthsf policy oordination,romotion,nd nformationxchangemayvary
withssue-area. or similarategorizationf ormsf nternationalecisionmakingee Haas,
"Turbulentields," p. 201, nd Ruggie, Responses o Technology," p. 570-74.
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Human ights egimes 605
promotional,
mplementational,
nd enforcement
each categoryan
be fur-
ther escribed
s relativelystrong"
r
"weak"). Finally, eclaratory
e-
gimes nvolve nternationalormsbut no internationalecisionmaking
(except
n
thecreation
f norms).
A
regime's
strength"an besaidto
ncrease, oughly,
ith tsnormative
andproceduralscope";
that s,as we move
utfrom
hebottom
eft
orner
(no regime)n Figure
1. But paper
formalities
re far ess important
o a
regime'strengthhan
hepractical
ealitiesf ts cceptance
y states
nd
itscoherence,15
hat
s, the xtento which tates
n fact bideby nd
make
use of
thenorms nd
procedureso which
hey
ave committedhemselves
and theextent o
whichthe partsof the
regime perate
ogethers
a
smoothlyunctioninghole.
Although
henotionf cceptance
s
simple
nd
obvious, oherence
as
at
least three
mportant
imensions. ormative
ncoherencemayarise
from
inconsistencies
etween
ndividualormseither
utright
ncompatibilityr
vagueness
hat llowsfor nconsistent
nterpretation)
r from ignificant
"logical"
gaps n
theoverall tructuref
norms, specially
oopholes hat
effectively
ancel other
norms.Procedural
ncoherence
may arisefrom
eithernconsistentr
ncomplete
ecision-makingrocedures
r structures.
Finally,ncoherence,
na somewhatxtended
ense,may
rise rom "mis-
match"
between ormsndprocedures hich llows heuse ofestablished
decision-makingrocedures
o undermine
ubstantiveorms.
Incoherence ay
be inadvertent,ut
t
s much
more
ikely
o be
planned,
a
diplomaticodification
f
unresolvedonflicts.
nd ack
of
acceptance
f
formallygreed-to
orms r
procedures
s
a standard
trategy
f
states
hat
feel a need or desire o participate
n a
regime,
ut
only
weak
regime.
Therefore,
henature
nd
strength
f regime
annot
e understoodrom
n
analysis
f egal exts
ndconstitutionaltructures
lone
but
equires
xam-
ininghow states and otherrelevant ctors)use and operatewithin he
formally
pecified orms
nd
procedures;
he
eal
norms
nd
procedures
f
regimerise rom he
practice f
tsparticipants,
hich arelys unrelated
o
but
often s notexactly
what
s specified
n
the egaltexts.
3. The
international
umanrights egime
Human
ights
re regularlyddressed oday
n
bilateral
oreignolicy
nd n
a varietyf multilateralchemes. n this ection nd thatwhich ollows,
shall onsider
nly
he "universal"
r
UN-centered
egime,
hich or on-
venience shall
refer o as "the"
international
uman
ights egime.
e-
gional nd
single-issueegimes
re discussed
n section . Bilateral
olicy
and human
rights olicy
n nonhumanights
orums
e.g., development
15.
Compare
rnst
B. Haas,
"RegimeDecay:
Conflict anagementnd
nternational
r-
ganizations,
1945-1981,"
International
Organization37 (Spring 1983), p.
193.
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606
International
rganization
General
Assembly
PrNormCrotion
Third
Committee
HumanRightsCommittee
Norm
Creation
Promotion
Promotion/
NormCreation
Monitoring
-'
\ |
ECOSOC
Sessional
Working
Group
Individual . Ad Hoc Concilialion
Promotion/Monitoring
Inter-
Individual
a
d Hoc
ConciliationCovenant on Economic
Communications
Commissions
Articles
1,421
Soal andeCultu Rights)
Prmoio/M niorn
Social and Cultural
Rights)
Promotion/onitoring-
Commission
on Human
Rights
Norm Creation
000
Promotion/Monitoring
res
1 503,
Ad Hoc Bodies
res.
1 2
3
5)
Norm
Creation
Promotion
I________________________
W
orking
Group
on
Communications
1
Promotion/Monitoring
A BSub-Commission
(res.
1
503)
Ad
Poc
Boties
Promotion/Monitoring
res
1503)
Promotioni
I
Norm
Creation
Monitoring Promotion
-o
Working
Group
on
Individual
-
Communications
Communications Promotion/Monitoring
(res 1503)
FIGURE
2.
Major bodies in the nternational
UN) human rights egime
Note.
All the
major odiesreferredo n this ection,nd their rimaryunctions,
re
presented
n
this igure, ominallyrranged
ccordingo "constitutional"elationshipsf
authoritynd subordination.hemost mportantoint o note s the izeoftherectangle
allotted o each body,which epresentsjudgment
f tsoverall mportancen theregime.
Italicized unctionsndicate particularlymportantolefor hebody n that rea.
banks)
re
subjects eyondmy cope
here.
Figure presents schematic
diagram
f
the
UN's
major
human
ights
odiesand their
unctions,sing
the
ypology eveloped
bove.
Regime norms
The
most mportanttatementsf
the
norms f
the
nternational
uman
rights egime
re theUniversal
eclaration
fHuman
Rights,dopted
n
10
December
948
y
the
UN
General
Assembly,
nd
the
nternational
uman
Rights ovenants, hichwereopenedfor ignature
nd ratification
n
1966
and came nto
orce
n
1976.16
The
rights
roclaimed
n the
Universal
ecla-
ration-the
best-known,
ost
eneral,
nd most
widely ccepted
tatement
of
he
regime's
orms-are
usually
ivided nto ivil
nd
political ights
nd
economic, ocial,
and
cultural
ights,
ut
a more useful
and
precise
classifications possible.
16. UN resolutions17A III),
2200 XXI).
They
re
widelyeprinted,or xample,nLouis
B. Sohn and
Thomas Buergentahl, ds., Basic
Documents on International rotection
f Hu-
manRightsIndianapolis:
obbs-Merrill,973);
Walter aquer ndBarry . Rubin,
ds., The
Human Rights
Reader (New
York: New AmericanLibrary,1979);
Human Rights:
A
Compila-
tion of
nternational nstrumentsNew York:
UN, 1978); and
Ian
Brownlie, d.,
Basic
Docu-
ments n
HumanRiahts, d ed.
(New York:Oxford niversity
ress,1981).
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Human
ights
egimes
607
(1) Personal
ights,ncludingightso ife;nationality;ecognition
efore
the aw;
protectiongainst ruel, egrading,r nhumanereatmentr
pun-
ishment;ndprotectiongainst acial, thnic, exual, r religiousiscrimi-
nation.
Articles -7, 15)
(2) Legal
rights, ncluding ccess to remedies or violations
f
basic
rights; he
presumptionf innocence; he
guarantee f fair nd impartial
public rials;
rohibitiongainst x post
facto aws; and protectiongainst
arbitrary
rrest, etention,r exile, andarbitrarynterference
ith
ne's
family, ome, r reputation.Articles
-12)
(3)
Civil
iberties,specially ights
o
freedom
f
hought,onscience,nd
religion;
pinion nd expression;movementnd residence; nd peaceful
assembly ndassociation. Articles 3,18-20)
(4) Subsistence
ights, articularly
he
rights o
food nd a standard f
living dequate
for he health nd
well-beingf oneself nd one's family.
(Article 5)
(5) Economic
rights,ncluding
rincipallyhe rights o work,
est
and
leisure, nd
social security.Articles2-24)
(6)
Social and cultural
ights,specially
ights
o education
nd
to
partici-
pate nthe
culturalife f thecommunity.Articles 6, 27)
(7) Political
ights, rincipallyhe ightso
take
part
n
government
ndto
periodic ndgenuine lections ith niversalndequal suffrageArticle1),
plusthe
political spectsof many ivil iberties.
This ist
s
furtherlaboratedn two nternationalumanRights
ove-
nants nd a
variety f single-issuereaties
nd declarations
n
topics
uch
as
genocide,
olitical ights f women,
acialdiscrimination,
nd
torture.
Although hese
aterdocumentsccasionally eviatefrom he Universal
Declaration-for xample, he Covenants
rominentlydd
a
right
o self-
determinationnddelete he ighto
property-for
hemost
art hey
labo-
rate r extend ights roclaimedntheUniversal eclaration.herefore,e
can
saythat he egime's ormsrequite oherent.
urthermore,
t s
gener-
ally greed hat
heserights orm n interdependentnd
synergistically
n-
teractive ystem
f guarantees, ather
han menufromwhich nemay
freely ick nd
choose.17
17.
Forone ratherimple emonstrationf
hedeeper hilosophicalasis
of
his
oherence,
in theformof n argumenthat nternational
uman ights orms risefrom heprinciples
f
personal utonomynd
equality,
ee RhodaHoward nd JackDonnelly, Human
Rights,
Human ignityndPolitical egimes,American olitical cienceReviewforthcoming).he
only ignificantxceptionso the laim hat llclassesofhuman ightsre nterdependent
re
(1) argumentshat re still ccasionallymade
that conomic nd social rightsre nottruly
human ightsMaurice ranston as made
omething
f
a second areer ut
of
rehashinghis
argumentor wenty ears
now;
forhis atest
ersion,
ee "AreThereAnyHumanRights?"
Daedalus 112 Fall 1983], p.
1-17);
and
2)
a tendencymongmany hirdWorld nd
Soviet-
bloccommentatorso undercutheir
rofessionsfthe nterdependencef ll human ights
y
claims
f
thepriorityfeconomic nd social
rights. examine nd criticizehese wo almost
mirror-image)eviationsn Jack
Donnelly,
he
Concept f HumanRightsLondon:
Croom
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608
International
rganization
The standard ractice f states s to speakof,
nd
thus n a certainense
treat,
he
norms f
the
Universal
eclaration
nd
the
Covenants
s interna-
tional ormswith imited,elf-selectedational xemptions);rofessionsf
adherence o these norms nd
charges
ffailure o live
up
to them re
regular eatures fcontemporary
nternational
olitics.
Although
omestic
practice egularlyalls ar hort f
nternational
rofession,
hese
ights
re
widely iewed s more r ess
bindingnternationaltandards.ach state,
however, etains lmost omplete
utonomy
n
mplementing
hesenorms
t
the
national evel; regime
orms re fully nternationalized,
ut decision
making emainsargely ational.
Decision-making rocedures
The
central rocedural rinciple
f he ontemporarynternational
uman
rights egimes nationalurisdiction
verhuman ightsuestions.
he Uni-
versalDeclaration, hough
widely ccepted s authoritative,
s explicitly
(only)
a
standard f achievement,'"18
nd each
state etains
ull
overeign
authorityo determine
he
dequacy
f ts
chievements.
he
Covenants
o
impose trict egal obligations
ut on onlythose states-currently
bout
one-half-that
oluntarily
ccept
hem
y becoming arties
o
the reaties.
Furthermore,s we shall see, nationalperformances subjectto only
minimalnternationalupervision.
The regime, owever, oesverge n authoritativenternational
tandard
settingr norm reation. tates hownotmerely willingness
uteven a
desireto use the
UnitedNations,
specially
he
Commission
n Human
Rights, o create nd elaborate
uman ights orms, ndtheresultingecla-
rations
nd conventionssually
re widely ccepted. hese norms
o allow
self-selected
ational xemptions-declarations
re not strictly
inding,
while reaty bligations otonlymust e voluntarilyccepted ut lso may
be
acceptedwith eservations-and
onsensual egotiating,
hich llows
Helm, 1985), chap. 6, and
"Recent Trends in UN Human Rights
Activity:Description
and
Polemic," InternationalOrganization 5 (Autumn
1981),pp. 633-55.On
the nterdependence
f
all human rights,
onsidered from more
practical point of view, see Rhoda Howard,
"The
'Full-Belly' Thesis: Should
Economic Rights
Take Priority ver Civil and Political Rights?"
Human RightsQuarterly
(November 1983), nd,morebriefly, ack
Donnelly, Human Rights
and
Development:Complementary r Competing
oncerns?" World olitics
36 (January
984),
pp.
279-82. One reason
that prefer he sevenfolddivision of rights
resented bove-aside
fromts greater ccuracyand specificity-is that he conventional ivision nto civil and polit-
ical
rights nd economic
and social rights oo easily lends itself o
misguided r partisan rgu-
mentsforpriority f one set or the other.
18.
The UniversalDeclaration may plausiblybe
arguedto
have attained he statusofcustom-
ary
nternational
aw.
Any egal force
t
has,
however,
rests
on
state
practice
which
s
discussed
below) and is entirely
ndependent f
the fact that
t
is a UN resolution.
Furthermore,
s
I
illustrate n considerable detail below, this
normative orcehas not been translated nto
strong
procedures.
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Human ightsegimes 609
any majorgroup f states n effective
eto,has limited he
output fnew
instruments.onetheless,
orm reation
as been argelynternationalized,
and the extent, pecificity,nd acceptance f internationaluman ights
norms ontinueo increase.
Therehas evenbeen significantcceptance
y states fan international
role n
promoting
ational mplementationf nternational
orms. or
ex-
ample,
heGeneralAssembly egularlyncourages
tates o ratify
he
Cov-
enants nd adhere o other nternational
nstruments,he
UnitedNations
Center
orHuman
Rights
nd otherbodies
regularly
ndertake
variety
of
nformational,
ducational, nd publicityctivities,
s
well
as
advisory
services, uch
s seminars, ellowships,nd consultations.
s
we
shall
ee
below, muchofthe most mportantorkof the Commissionn Human
Rightss promotionals well. And national
oreign olicies,
othbilateral
and multilateral,
n the First,Second,
and ThirdWorlds like, regularly
involve ffortso
promote henationalmplementationf nternational
u-
manrightstandards.
But widespread,
ociferous,nd usually ffectivelaims
f national ov-
ereignty eet ll
effortso movefrom
eneral xhortations
ven
o observa-
tions nd recommendations
ddressed
o the practice fmostparticular
states, evealingheultimate eakness f heregime. ecause tsnormsre
strong-thats,
both oherentnd widely ccepted-the
overall
trength
f
the
nternationaluman ights egime
ests n its decision-making
roce-
dures.But
procedures eyond
norm reation, romotion,
nd nformation
exchange re largely
bsent.TheUniversal eclaration stablished
rela-
tively trong eclaratory
egime, ut n
the
nearly orty ears
ince
then,
although he regime
as grown
n strength,nlyrudimentary,rincipally
promotionalrocedures
ave been created.
TheHumanRights ommittee.hepartiesothe1966nternationalov-
enanton Civil and PoliticalRights
undertake o submit
eports n the
measures
hey
have
adopted
which
give
effect
o the
rights ecognized
herein
nd on the
progressmade n the
njoymentfthose ights"Article
40
[1]).
These
reports
re
reviewed
y
he
Human
Rights
ommittee,body
of
eighteenndependentxperts.
The
Committee's
ractice n
reviewingeports
eflects
narrow
eading
of ts
powers:
9
t
does not
make
ormal
valuationsfor
even omments
n
the
compliance rnoncompliance
f ndividualtates,
nd its"study"
of
reports as been restrictedo ndividualeview yeach membernd,most
19.
On the general
practice
of
the Committee
ee
Farrokh
Jhabvala,
"The
Practice
of
the
Covenant's
Human
Rights
Committee,
1976-82:
Review of
State
Party Reports,"
Human
Rights
Quarterly
(February
1984),
pp. 81-106;
and Dana
D.
Fischer, "Reporting
under
the
Covenant
on
Civil
and
Political
Rights:
The
FirstFive
Years of
the
Human
Rights
Committee,"
American
Journal
of
International
aw 76 (January
982), pp.
142-53.
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610
International
rganization
important, ublic questioning f state
representatives.
his rather
haphazard rocedure as worked etter hanmight
e
expected
ecauseof
thegenuinendependencefmany fthe xpertsndquestioningased on
informationbtained fromnongovernmental
rganizations
nd
other
unofficial
ources.The Committee's
eports,
owever, avebeen imitedo
factual
nnual eportsplusgeneral romotionalomments
oncerned rin-
cipally
with
mprovinghe
quality
f
reports).
The
resultingcrutinyf state
practice houldnot be excessively eni-
grated.
Questioning,n open
sessions, s often enetrating;heCommittee
is, for a
UN body, remarkablyevoid of ideological
artisanship;tate
representativesften re fairly esponsive; nd the
questioning,y diplo-
matic tandardst least, s neitherxcessively eferentialormerely ro
forma. he
procedure as
even
provoked ccasionalminor
hanges
n na-
tional
aw,
and at
least
a few
parties
have appearedwilling o use their
dealings
with
heCommittees an
occasionfor genuine eview
nd
reex-
aminationf
nationalaws,
policies, nd practices.
The
reportingrocedure,herefore,asprovided
fairly idely ccepted
promotional
echanism.
ut
t nvolves t most nly
nformationxchange
and the
weakestof
monitoring echanisms.
nd even the
information-
exchange roceduresresignificantlylawed.The reports f many ountries re thoroughndrevealing. thers re
farcical:
or
xample,many oviet-bloc ountries
ave
simply eported
hat
all the
numerated
ights
ere
ullymplemented
efore he
Covenants
ere
ratified;
any eports onsist
rincipallyf
extracts
rom ational onstitu-
tions
nd
statutes;
nd a
significantumberre
simply
vasive.20
he
Com-
mittee
as
tried, ometimes
uccessfully,
o obtain etter
nformation,
ut n
the
final
nalysis t s powerlesso compelmore han ro
forma ompliance
with
ven his
eryweak
reportingystem-andnot ven
hat an always e
assured, s thereport f Zaire,duein 1978but tillnot ubmittedn 1985,
despite
evenreminders,llustrates.inally,his eporting
rocedurepplies
only
o the
parties
o
the
Covenant,whichnumbered
ighty
n
mid-1985.
Thus
about half the
countries
f the world re exempt rom ven this
minimalnternational
crutiny.
The
one area where
uarded ptimism
ay
be
appropriates theCommit-
tee's
considerationf ndividual
etitions
nder he
Optional rotocol
f
he
Covenant,
the best
procedure ithinheU.N.
system or he
xamination
of
petitions.",2'
articularecisions f
compliance
r
noncompliance
an
be
20. For
xample,
he eportf
Guinea laimed
hat citizens
fGuinea
elt o
need o nvoke
theCovenantecause
national
egislation
asat a more
dvanced
tage" A/39140,
ara.
139).
Bulgaria eported
hat all
the ights
nd
freedomstipulated
n theCovenant
ere overed
n
the appropriate
ational
aws"
before
atificationA134140,
ara.
112). Andthe
Mongolian
representative,
n responseo
a
question
y member
f heCommittee,roudly
laimed
hat
there ad
never een a
complaintbout
torturercruel r inhuman
reatment
ade n
his
countryA/35/40,
ara.
108).
21. Ton
J.
Zuijdwijk,
etitioning
heUnited ations Aldershot,
ngland: ower, 982),
.
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Human ights egimes
611
made n individualases,
giving heCommittee
t leastmoderatelytrong
international
onitoringowers, lthough
nternational
nforcementtill s
impossible.
In
its first
even years
of operation,hroughmid-1984,
he Committee
received174
communications,ithrespect
o 17 parties
o the Optional
Protocol. lthough5
weredeclared nadmissible,
iscontinued,uspended,
orwithdrawn,nd44 were
till nder
eview,
n
nearly
ne-third
f
ts
cases
the
Committee
ad expressedts
views-that s,
made substantive
eter-
mination
n
the merits f
the case.
Even
though 9
of these55 decisions
involved
single ountry, ruguay,22
heprocedure eems
o berelatively
openand highlyndependent,
nd
relativelytrong
s
well.
The Optional
Protocol rovides genuine,f imited,nstancef nternationalonitoring,
which n at
least a few ases has altered
tatepractice.
Butonly hirty-fiveountries
ad accepted
heOptional rotocol
ymid-
1985; hat
s, only ne-fifthf he ountries
f he
world recovered yeven
this mall
lement f nternationalonitoring
f personal,
egal, ivil, nd
political
ights. ot surprisingly,
lmost
none of thosecovered re
major
humanrights
iolators.As a result, elatively
trong
rocedurespply
primarily
here
hey
re least needed. Unfortunately,
his s
only
to
be
expected, iven hat articipations entirelyoluntary.23
The
Commission
on Human Rights.
The
Commission
n
Human
Rights,
whose entral
ole n norm
reation
e have
already
oted, lso
has mpor-
tantpromotional
nd monitoringunctions.
ts strongest owers
rest on
Economic
nd Social Council
ECOSOC)
resolution
503
XLVIII)
(1970),
which uthorizes he
Commission
o
investigate
ommunications
com-
plaints) hat appear
to reveal
a
consistentattern
f
gross
nd
reliably
361. tshould enoted hat heCovenantlso containsptional rovisionsArticles1-42)for
interstate
omplaints,
ccepted
yeighteen
tates s
of
mid-1985,
ut hesehavenot
been
nd
are not
ikely obe used.
22.
See
annexes o
the nnual
eports
f he
HumanRights ommittee,
980-84,
N docu-
ments
135/40,136/40,
137/40,/38140,
139/40.
ecisions
ave lso
been aken
with
egard
to communications
oncerning anada,
Colombia,Zaire, Finland,
taly,
Madagascar,
Mauritius,
nd Sweden.
23.
The nternational
ovenant
n Economic, ocial
and Cultural ights
lso
requires
e-
riodic
eports,
hich
re reviewed
otby a separate ody
of
experts
ut
by
the
Sessional
Working
roup
n the mplementation
f he
nternational
ovenant
nEconomic,
ocial
nd
Cultural ights
ftheEconomic
ndSocial
Council.
A similar
uestioningrocedure
s
used,
but t
s somewhat
ess
rigorous,
nd
thefact hat
heCovenant
s
explicitly
ntended
o
be
implementedrogressivelyatherhanmmediatelyArticle) effectivelyrecludesny erious
attemptt international
onitoring.
urthermore,
here s no complaint
rocedurearallel
o
that
f he
Optional rotocol
o
theCivil
nd
Political
ovenant.
ittle econdary
iterature
s
available n
the
ctivities
ftheWorking
roup, ut
ee Kamleshwar
as, "United
Nations
Institutions
nd
Procedures
ounded
n Conventions
n
Human
ights
ndFundamental
ree-
doms,"
in
Karel Vasak
and Philip
Alston,
eds.,
The
International
Dimensions of
Human
RightsWestport,
onn.:
Greenwood,
982), p.
333-34,
ndDana
D.
Fischer,
International
Reporting
rocedures,"
in
Hurst
Hannum,
ed.,
Guide
to nternational
uman Rights
Practice
(Philadelphia:
niversity
f Pennsylvania
ress,
1984), p.
173-76.
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612 Internationalrganization
attested iolations fhuman ights."24he Commission,owever,
s a
body
of staterepresentatives,ot ndependentxperts; lthoughmostCommis-
sionmembers re relatively onideologicalwhen ompared o, say,their
counterparts
n
the
Third
ommittee
f heGeneral
Assembly),hey
re
still
instructedoliticaldelegates.Stringentriteria f admissibilityimit he
cases
consideredalthoughertain
econdhandnformation
nd
communica-
tions
from ongovernmentalrganizationsNGOs]
are
admissible).25nd
althoughndividualsommunicaterievances,
he1503
rocedure ealsonly
with
ituations
of gross, ystematiciolations; here reno procedures or
investigating,et alone attemptingo remedy, articulariolations.
Anothermajor rawbacks that he ntire roceduresconfidentialntilt
has been oncluded. lthoughonfidentialityay ncourage ooperationy
states,
t
maygreatly elay
he
process
nd
argely recludes
n
activist ole
for heCommissionnthe uncoveringnd spotlightingfviolations. he
Commission as circumventedome of the strictures
f
confidentialityy
publicly nnouncing blacklist f countries eing tudied; hepractices f
some
wenty-eightountries ere
xamined
etween 978
nd
1984.26
lthough
the
resulting
nternational
otoriety,
owever
light,may
not
be entirely
negligible,houldwe commenduch ngenuityr bemoan heneed o resort
to it?
Finally, lthoughheCommission ay,with he onsentndcooperation
of the state
n
question, ppoint
committee
o
investigate situation,
o
such
nvestigation
as everoccurred.
n the
case
of
Equatorial
Guinea
he
Commission
n
1979
nstead hose
to
pursue public nvestigationhrough
specialrapporteur, process
ess restricted
y procedural
onstraints.n
1980
the
Commission
oncluded
ts
consideration
f the treatment
f
Jehovah'sWitnesses
n
Malawi,
which
had
been frustrated
y
official on-
cooperation,
ith resolution
hat
merelyxpressed
he
hope
hat
ll
human
24. For an excellent,horoughiscussion ftheprocedure,ee Howard
olley,
The
Con-
cealed
Crack n theCitadel: heUnitedNations ommissionn HumanRights'
esponse o
Confidentialommunications,"
umanRights uarterly(November 984),
p. 420-62. ol-
ley's forthcoming ook, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, is certain
to
become he tandardource nthat ody. ee also DinahL. Shelton,
Individual omplaint
Machinerynder heUnited
Nations 503 rocedurendtheOptional rotocolothenterna-
tional ovenant n Civil ndPolitical ights,"n Hannum, umanRights
ractice. t should
benoted hat heCommission ad
been uthorizedince1948
o
"receive"communications.
However,
s
they ould not be discussed r acted on, this "power" was of no
practical
significancentil he1503
rocedure as established.
25. See Antonio assese, TheAdmissibilityfCommunicationsn Human
ights," evue
des Droitsde l'HommelHumanRightsJournal5 (1972), pp. 375-93; andZuijdwijk,Petitioning
the
United ations, p. 30-39.
The Secretariatnitiallycreens he ommunications.efore
they ven reachthe Commission,
hosethat re deemedworthy
f substantive
eview
re
examined y workingroup f
he ubcommission,
hen hewhole
ubcommission,
nd
hen
a
workingroup f theCommission.ee
Tolley,
The Concealed
rack,"pp.
432-47.For
a
petitiono reach heCommission,herefore,
t
must resent very trongrimaacie
ase,
and
referral
o theCommissionis often
nterpreted
s
at eastdemonstratinghat
he
llegations
n
a
communicationave somemerit."
helton, Individual omplaint achinery,".
65.
26.
Tolley,
The
Concealed
Crack,"
Table
2.
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Human ights egimes
613
rights ere
being espected
nMalawi. n
1984 public
esolutionalledfor
continued
onsultations
etween he
secretary eneral
nd Haiti. And n
1985, hedocumentationn Uruguaywas,with he greementftheUru-
guayan overnment,
pened opublic crutiny.27
utother han hese
very
limited
chievements,hepublic
ortions
f he1503 rocedure
avehad
no
apparentmpact, lthough
onfidential
ctions lmost
ertainly
ave
had
at
leasta
marginalnfluence
n policyn some
cases.
The 1503
rocedure,
herefore,s npractice
argely
promotionalevice,
involving
omevery
poradic nd imited
monitoring.
iven he ensitivity
ofhuman ights uestions,
venthismay
be of
real
practical
alue.
Never-
theless,
tsweakness
s evident.
Much he ame strue ftheCommission'stherctivities.or example,
annual iscussionsn
publicmeetings
f he ub-Commission
n the
Preven-
tion f
Discrimination
nd Protectionf
Minorities,heCommission's
wn
public iscussions,
nder he uthority
f
ECOSOC resolution235
XLII),
and varietyf d
hocprocedures
ave ncreased eneral
warenessfhuman
rightsssues
and helped o focus
nternational
ublic pinion n
particular
violationse.g., racial
discrimination,
orture)nd
the
ituation
n at east
few
ountries
e.g.,Chile).The
Commission,
longwith he
ecretariat,
lso
undertakes variety f public nformationctivitiesnd coordinatesnd
encourages
heuse of advisory
ervices
n thefield f
human ights.28
ut
virtually
othing as
been chieved
n
the
reasof nternational
mplementa-
tion ndenforcement.
The
Commission's
ne real dvantage
s
that t
may
ook
nto ituations-
insofars
it
s able
to ookanywhere-in
ll countries,
ot
nly
hose arty
to a particular
reaty.
herefore,t s
in manywaystheprocedural
ore of
the nternationaluman
ights
egime.
4. Politicalfoundations f
the nternational
human
rights egime
The
international
uman ights egime s
a relativelytrong romotional
regime, omposed
of widely
cceptedsubstantive
orms,
argely
nter-
nationalizedtandard-setting
rocedures,ome general
romotional
ctiv-
27. For
a
brief
eview
f
the
Equitorial
uinea
ase
see
Randall
egley,
The
UN
Human
Rights ommission:heEquatorial uinea ase,"HumanRights uarterlyFebruary981),
pp.34-47.
An on-site
isit
idtake
place,
butnot
under
he1503
rocedure
ndonly
ecause
theoffending
aciasNguema
egime
ad
beenoverthrown.
Therapporteur's
eport
s
avail-
able
as UN document
/CN.4/1371
f 12
February
980.)On Malawi,
Haiti,
ndUruguay
ee
Commission
ecisions
0(XXXVI),
984/109
nd 1985/107
ndE/1980/13,
/1984/14
ndE/1985/
22.
28. Fora summary
frecent
N
public
nformation
ctivityndadvisory
ervices
ee
UN
documents
/CN.4/1984/23;
/CN.4/1985/9,
6, 30,31, 32, 36;
and
Commission
esolutions
1985/27, 0,
34.
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614
International
rganization
ity, utvery imitednternationalmplementation,hich arely
oesbeyond
informationxchange nd voluntarilyccepted nternationalssistance or
thenationalmplementationf nternationalorms. heresno nternational
enforcement.uch normativetrength
nd
procedural eakness,
owever,
is theresult f conscious olitical ecisions.
Regimes re political reations o overcome erceived
roblems rising
from nadequately egulated r insufficientlyoordinated ational
ction.
Robert
.
Keohane offers useful
market
nalogy: egimes rise when
sufficientnternationaldemand"
is
met
by
a state
or group
f
states)
willing nd able to "supply" nternationalorms nddecision-makingro-
cedures.29
he
shape
and
strength
f
an international
egime
eflect
ho
wants t, who opposes it, and why-and how the conflictingbjectives,
interests,
nd
capabilitiesf
he
parties
ave
beenresolved. s
Krasner uts
it,
n
each issue-area here re makers, reakers, nd takers f potential)
internationalegimes
30
understandinghe structuref
a
regimeor ts ab-
sence)requires hat
we
knowwho has played
which
oles,
when nd
why,
and what
greementshey
eached.
n
this ection
shall xamine he n-
teraction
f
supply
nd
demandwhichhas
led
to
the
nternationaluman
rights egime escribed bove.
Prior o WorldWar , human ights ere lmost niversallyiewed s the
exclusive reserve fthestate;despite ccasional eferenceso minimum
standards
f
ivilized
ehavior,
herewas not ven
weak
declaratory
nter-
nationalhuman
rights egime.
n
the
interwar
eriod,
he International
Labour
OrganizationILO) undertook ome
minor
fforts
n the
area of
workers' ights, ut t was functionallyestrictedo this ne class
ofrights
and
its work was of interest
rimarily
o
developed, apitalist,
iberal-
democratic
tates.
The
League of Nations'
Minorities
ystem,31
he
only
other
ignificant
nternationaluman
ightsctivity
n
this
period,
was not
only estrictedoa single lass ofrightsutfor hemost art overed nly
those
states
defeated
uring r created
n
the aftermathf WorldWar
.
With
hese
very
ew
xceptions,
s
recently
s
fiftyears go
human
ights
were
not
even
considered o be a legitimatenternationaloncern.
World
War I marks decisive reak;32he
defeat f
Germany
sheredn
29. Keohane, Demandfor
nternational
egimes."
30. Stephen
. Krasner,United tatesCommercial
ndMonetaryolicy:Unravelling
he
Paradox fExternal trength
nd nternal
Weakness," n PeterJ. Katzenstein,
d., Beyond
Power nd Plenty
Madison:Universityf Wisconsin
ress,
1978), . 52.
31. See C.
A. Macartney,National States and
National Minorities
London: OxfordUniver-
sity ress, 1934), t. 2; LucyP. Mair,TheProtectionf MinoritiesLondon:Christophers,
1928);
nis
L. Claude, Jr.,National
Minorities:
An International roblem Cambridge:
Harvard
University
ress, 1955); and JuliusStone, International
Guarantees
ofMinority ights Lon-
don: Oxford niversityress,
1932).
32. John . Humphrey, n
his recentmemoir
Human Rights nd
the UnitedNations:
A Great
AdventureDobbs
Ferry, .Y.: Transnational,
984), ppositely
itles is econd hapterThe
Catalyst
f the Second WorldWar." Compare
ouis
Henkin, Introduction,"
he nterna-
tionalBill of Human Rights:
The
Covenant
on Civil and
Political
Rights New
York: Columbia
Universityress,1981), . 3.
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Human
ights egimes
615
the
ontemporarynternational
uman ights egime.
evulsion t the rray
of
human ights buses that
ame to
be
summarized
n
the
term
Nazi"
engenderedbrief eriod f nthusiasticnternationalction, ulminatingn
the
passage n 1948 f the
Universal eclaration.
Although itler'sactionsshocked he conscience
f the nternational
community,hey idnot learlyontravenexplicit
nternationalorms; or
example,
t Nurembergheessential harge f
crimes gainsthumanity
palpably
ackedan authoritative
nternationalegalfoundation.n suchan
environment,t was relativelyasy to reachgeneral
greementn a set of
internationalrinciplesgainst
ross nd persistent
ystematiciolations f
basic
rights-namely,he
Universal eclarationfollowed henextyearby
theConventionn Genocide,whichwas even more learly direct egacy
from itler).
It
is
perhaps urprising
hat
hismoral demand"
shouldhaveproduced
even such declaratoryegime
n a world n whichmorematerial ational
interestssually revail. n the
years mmediately
ollowinghewar,how-
ever, therewere willing nd
able makers,
numerous akers,and no
significantreakers fan
internationaluman ights egime. he
moral
nd
emotionalemands or n
internationaluman ights
egime eemto
have
run
relatively eep, even n
some mportantationaleaders-strong up-
port amefrom everal ountries,ncludinghe United tates, nd none
seriously
pposed
ither
heDeclaration
r, ater,
he
Covenants-while
o
countervailingoncerns r nterestsadyet merged.
A
cynicmight uggest,with
ome basis,
that hese
postwar
achieve-
ments"
imply
eflect
he minimal
nternational
onstraintsnd
very
ow
costs
of
declaratoryegime; ecisionmaking
nder
heUniversal eclara-
tion
emainedntirelyational,
nd twould e more han wenty ears
ntil
resolution 503 nd nearly hirtyears efore venthe
rudimentaryromo-
tion ndmonitoringroceduresf heCovenants ame nto ffect. et prior
to the
wareven a declaratory
egime ad rarely eencontemplated.
n the
late 1940s,human ights
ecame,for he first ime,
recognizednterna-
tionalssue-area.
Moving
much
eyond
declaratoryegime, owever,
as
proved
ifficult.
As we have
seen,proceduralnnovationsavebeenmodest. ven
the
egal
elaborationfsubstantiveorms
as been slow nd aborious: or
xample,
it
tooknine
years
o
movefrom declarationo
a
conventionn
torture;
work nstronger, ore recise
norms n religiousibertys now n tsthird
decade. tis in this elativeonstancy ftheregime-criticsndfrustrated
optimists
re
ikely o saystagnation-that
he
weakness f
thedemand
s
most vident.
To the
extent-probably onsiderable-that
he
international
uman
rightsegimerosefrom ostwar
rustration,uilt,
r
unease,
he
very roc-
lamation"supply")
of
the
Declaration, long
with
he
adoption
f
the
Genocide onvention,eems o have satisfied
he
demand. o
the xtent-
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616 Internationalrganization
againprobablyonsiderable-that
t
rested n anemotional eaction
o
the
horrors f
Hitler nd thewar,time
adlybutpredictably
luntedhe mo-
tion.Time lso revealed oth he uperficial, erely erbal ommitmentf
many tates nd substantive
isagreements
verparticularights,
ausing
enthusiasmo wanefurther.
ndwith
he oldwarheating p,not
nlywas
the desire
o move on to other ssues
strong, ut
East-West ivalrytself
soon came to infect
nd
distort he
discussion f
human ights.
The most
mportant
roblem, owever,was and
remains he
fact hat
stronger
nternationaluman
ightsegime oes
notrest n anyperceived
material
nterestf
a
state
r coalitionwilling nd
able
to supply
t. n the
absenceofa power apable
of compellingompliance,
tates articipate
n
or ncreaseheir ommitmento nternationalegimesmore r essvoluntar-
ily. Barring
xtraordinaryircumstances,
tates
participaten an interna-
tionalregime nly to
achieve
national
objectives n an environment
f
perceived
nternational
nterdependence,o address
national
problems
caused
by
the
existing
nternationaltate f
affairs.
Both heorynd practice
uggest hat
tateswillrelinquishuthority
nly
to
obtain significantenefiteyond
he each f eparate ational
ction r
to avoid
bearing major
urden. urthermore,
elinquishingovereign
u-
thority ust ppear "safe"
to states
who are notoriouslyealous
of their
sovereignrerogatives. strongernternationaluman ightsegime im-
ply does not present
safe prospect
f obtainingtherwise
nattainable
national enefits.
Moral nterestsuch
s human ightsmay
be no ess
"real" than
material
interests.
hey re, however,ess
tangible,
nd
policy,
or etter
r
worse,
tends
o
be
made
n
response
orelativelyangible
ational
bjectives.
Moral
interests,
hich refaress ikely o
be a major olitical
oncern
f
powerful
national ctors, lso are
muchmore
asily ost n the hufflef
the
policy-
making rocess.Theyare more ubject opoliticalmanipulation,ecause
they
sually re vaguely
xpressed
nd the
riteria
or etermining
uccess
in
realizing oral nterests
reparticularly
lusive.
Andhuman ights
laims
usually re met,ustifiably
r not,
with he
politicallyotent
harge
fmis-
guidedmoralism.
Furthermore,he
xtreme
ensitivity
fhuman ights ractices
makes he
very ubject
ntensely
hreateningo most states.
National
human
ights
practices ftenwould
be a matter or onsiderable
mbarrassment
hould
they
e
subject o
full
nternational
crutiny,
nd
compliance
ith nterna-
tionalhuman ightstandardsnnumerous ountries ouldmeanthere-
moval f
those
n
power.
In
addition, nd perhapsmost
mportant,
uman
ights
re
ultimately
profoundlyational-not
international-issue.
tates
are the
principal
violators fhuman ights
nd the
principal
ctors
overned y
the
regime's
norms;
nternational
uman ights
re
concerned rimarily
ith
owa
gov-
ernment
reats
nhabitantsf tsown
country.
hissituationrises
rom
he
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Human
ights egimes
617
basic structure
f contemporary
nternational
olitics:
n an international
system here
overnment
s nationalather
han
lobal, uman
ightsreby
definitionrincipallynationalmatter,s reflectedn the purely ational
implementation
fregime
ormsndthus
he bsence f
policy oordination
procedures
nd
evenrudimentary
echanisms
f nternational
nforcement.
Human
ights
re also a national
matter rom
he
perspective
fpractical
political ction.
Respecting
uman ights
s
extremelynconvenient
or
government,
ven
n
thebest
of circumstances.
nd the
ess pure
he
mo-
tives
f those
n power, hemore
rksome
uman ights
ppear.Who s to
prevent
government
rom uccumbing
o the emptations
ndarrogance
f
position
nd power?
Who
can force
a
government
orespect
uman ights?
Theonlyplausible andidatesre thepeoplewhoserightsre at stake.
Foreign ctors
mayoverthrow
repressive
overnment.
ith
uck and
skill,
oreign
ctorsmay venbe
able to
placegoodpeople
ncharge ffinely
craftednstitutions
ased
on thebestof
principles.
heymayprovide
ute-
lage,
supervision,
ndmonitoring;
oral nd
materialupport;
nd protec-
tion
againstenemies.
This
scenario,however,
s extremely
nlikely,
especially
fwe do not mpute
nrealisticallyure
motives
ndunbelievable
skill
nd dedication
oexternal
owers,
orwhom humanitarian
nterven-
tion"usually mounts o littlemore han convenientoverforpartisan
politics.
And n any
case, a
regime's ltimate
uccess-its
persistence
n
respecting,
mplementing,nd
enforcing
uman ights-depends
n
nternal
political
actors.
A
government
hat
espects
uman
ightss almost
lways
he
egacy
f
persistentational
olitical
trugglesgainst
uman ights
iolations.
Most
governments
hat espect
uman
ights
ave been
created otfrom
he
op
down,but
from he
bottom p. Domestically,
aternalisticolutions,
n
whichhuman
ights regiven
ather han
aken, re
likely obe unstable.
Internationally,aternalisms no more ikely obe successful.
But f
nternational
egimesriseprimarily
ecause
of nternational
nter-
dependence-the
nability
o achieve
erceived
ational
bjectives y nde-
pendent
ational ction-how
can
we
account
for he
creation
nd even
modest rowthf he
nternational
uman ights
egime?
irst ndforemost,
the "moral"
concerns hatbrought
he
regimentobeing
n the
first lace
persist.
utchers uch
s Pol Pot and
di
Amin
till hock
he
onscience
f
mankindnd
provoke
desire o reject
hem
s
notmerely eprehensible
ut
prohibited
yclear and
public,
uthoritative
nternational
orms;
ven
re-
gimeswithdismalhuman ights ecords eemto feel mpelled o oin in
condemning
he buses of suchrulers,
nd esser
despots
s
well.
Although
ynics
mightnterpret
uchuses
of
he
anguage
f
human
ights
as
merely
raven buse
oftherhetoric
f
human
ights,
t can
ust
as
easily
be
seen as
an
implicit,
ubmerged,
r
deflected xpression
f a
sense
of
moral
interdependence.lthough
tates-not onlygovernments
utoften
the
public
as well-often
are
unwilling
o translate
his
perceived
moral
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618 International
rganization
interdependencento ction
r
nto
n
nternational
egime
ith
trong eci-
sion-making
owers, hey
lso are
unwillingor
at east
politicallynable)
c
returno treating ational uman ights ractices s properly eyond ll
internationalorms
nd
procedures.
A weak
nternationaluman ights egime lso
may ontribute,
n
a way
acceptable o
states, o mproved ational ractice.
or example,
ew
gov-
ernments
ith
commitment
o
human
ights ay
indt
helpful
o
be
able
tc
draw n andpoint
o the onstraintsf uthoritative
nternationaltandards:
we can
see this,
erhaps,
n
thecase oftheAlfonsinovernment
n
Argen-
tina.
Likewise, stablishedegimesmayfind he dditional
heckprovided
by
an
internationalegime salutary upplement
o national fforts;his
seemstobe thecase formany mallerWestern owers.And most tates,
even f
only or
onsiderationsf mage nd
prestige,re ikely o be willing
to
accept regime orms nd
procedures-especially orms-thatdo not
appear
mmediatelyhreatening.
States
also maymiscalculate
r
get carried
way by
the
moment,
nd
proceduresmay
evolve beyondwhatthe regime's
articipantsriginally
intended. orexample, COSOC resolution 235,
which rovides
he
prin-
cipal basis for heCommissionn
Human
Rights'
ublic tudy
nd discus-
sions of humanrights ituationsn individual ountries,was explicitly
establishedn 1967 o
focusprincipallyn
the
pariah egimes
n
Southern
Africa, ut t has
evolved nto procedure ith
niversalpplicationor at
least,
one
that
may
be
applied o any countryhat majorityf members
decide
o
consider).
lthough rocedureseldom xpand o such
n
extent,
the
possibilityhould
not
be
overlooked.
The
currentnternationaluman ightsegime
hus epresentspolitically
acceptablenternational echanism or he collective
esolution
f
princi-
pally
national
roblems. ecause
perception
f
he
problem
ests
n a
politi-
callyweaksenseof
moral
interdependence,owever,heres nopowerful
demand
or
strongeregime; venpolicy oordinationeems oo demand-
ing,
nd
there s little
eason or tates o accept nternationalonitoring,et
alone
authoritativenternationalecisionmaking.
In
any nternational
egime, ven strongecision-makingrocedures
re
largelyupervisory echanisms;enforcement"
ust
e
theexception
f
institutionalverload nd a corrosive veruse f
oercion
re
to
be avoided.
Even
where
regime
ncludes inding
nternationalecision
making,
he
great
ulk
of the work
f mplementing
nd
enforcing
nternationalorms
lies with tates.
In
conditions f
material
nterdependence,good
faith"
ompliance
an
be
largely educed o
calculations
f
long-run
ational nterest.
Material
interdependencemplies hat ach side has more r
ess unilateralower o
prevent
he
enjoyment
f
mutualor
reciprocal
enefits vailable
only
throughooperation.elf-help etaliation,
herefore,
s
likely
o
be
readily
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Human ights egimes
619
available nd relativelyffective,nd goo