hvorfor er det så vanskelig å få til en klimaavtale som monner?
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Hvorfor er det så vanskelig å få til en klimaavtale som monner?. Steinar Andresen (FNI) Bjart Holtsmark (SSB) Ole Røgeberg (Frisch). Hvordan ligger vi an?. Necessary factors for a functioning climate treaty. Reduced global warming. Necessary factors for a functioning climate treaty. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Hvorfor er det så vanskelig å få til en klimaavtale som monner?
Steinar Andresen (FNI)Bjart Holtsmark (SSB)Ole Røgeberg (Frisch)
Hvordan ligger vi an?
Necessary factors for a functioning climate treaty
Common understanding of what and how much
needs to be done
Incentives to join and accept treaty targets
Incentives to comply with
treaty targets
Incentives to enforce treaty
compliance
Reduced global
warming
Necessary factors for a functioning climate treaty
Common understanding of what and how much
needs to be done
Incentives to join and accept treaty targets
Incentives to comply with
treaty targets
Incentives to enforce treaty
compliance
Reduced global
warming
• Cognitive flaws de-dramatize the problem• Possible future technological advances induce
procrastination• Decades-long lag of actions on climate system favors
adaptation over mitigation
Klimaproblemet er ”et badekar”
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100
1950 2000 2050 2100 2150
Global CO2-emissions w ith business-as-usual
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1 000
1950 2000 2050 2100 2150
ppm
CO2-concentration w ith business-as-usual
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1.0
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1950 2000 2050 2100 2150°C
Temperature w ith business-as-usual
Stabilized emission level
Stabilized emission level
Stabilized emission level
Future progress ”may” solve or make it cheaper to solve the problem
• Technology/cost– Second generation biofuel (cellulosic)– Third generation biofuel (algae)– Geoengineering– Fusion– Electric cars (esp. battery technology)– Carbon capture and storage– Solar– Wind
• Better treaties– Globally traded carbon quotas – Quotas for ”emerging economies”
Politiske insentiver er rettet mot tilpasning/geo-engineering
• Tilpasning/geoengineering– Bedrer dagens problemer på kort sikt
• Klimakutt– Har kostnader i dag, men forhindrer ”bare”
ytterligere problemer om flere tiår
Ingen land er store nok til at de kan løse problemet på egen hånd
The effect of a single country’s emission reductions. The case of China, India and USA*
Emission reductions from BAU
Reduced temperature from BAU. Degrees Celsius
China India USA
2025 -20 % -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
2050 -60 % -0.07 -0.03 -0.06
2100 -95 % -0.23 -0.12 -0.17
* The table shows the result of three different model simulations, where each model simulation measures the effect of a single country’s emission reduction, , , and the , respectively.
Necessary factors for a functioning climate treaty
Common understanding of what and how much
needs to be done
Incentives to join and accept treaty targets
Incentives to comply with
treaty targets
Incentives to enforce treaty
compliance
Reduced global
warming
• Free-rider problem: No nations with incentives for unilateral abatement
• Cost allocation problem: Most future emissions expected from today’s poor
70% of ”business as usual” emissions need to be cut
Total CO2-emissions
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1950 2000 2050 2100
Gig
a to
nnes
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Industrialized countries
Developing countries
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Global CO2 emissions in developing and industrialized countries in the IPCC reference scenario A1 MESSAGE (grey curves), and in a scenario consistent with a target (colored curves).
With emission ”cost” of $50 – the total burden to be allocated is ~4 x current global GDP
With emission ”cost” at $50 per ton CO2, total burden to be
allocated equals ~4 x current global GDP
Most emission reductions need to come from emerging economies
Global CO2 emissions in developing and industrialized countries in the IPCC reference scenario A1 MESSAGE (grey curves), and in a scenario consistent with a target (colored curves).
Total CO2-emissions
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10
20
30
40
50
60
1950 2000 2050 2100
Gig
a to
nnes
CO
2
Industrialized countries
Developing countries
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Global CO2 emissions in developing and industrialized countries in the IPCC reference scenario A1 MESSAGE (grey curves), and in a scenario consistent with a target (colored curves).
Total CO2-emissions
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10
20
30
40
50
60
1950 2000 2050 2100
Gig
a to
nnes
CO
2
Industrialized countries
Developing countries
|
Necessary factors for a functioning climate treaty
Common understanding of what and how much
needs to be done
Incentives to join and accept treaty targets
Incentives to comply with
treaty targets
Incentives to enforce treaty
compliance
Reduced global
warming
• Treaty needs to permanently alter national incentives
• Enforcement must be in the interest of the enforcers
Konsekvent gjennomført klimapolitikk på sikt krever at land er ”låst fast” av permanent endrede insentiver
• Avtaleverk med tilstrekkelig straff for utslipp utover det avtalte
• Medlemsland som godtar å binde seg til strafferegime
• Medlemsland som velger å straffe land som bryter avtalen
Men hva med Kyoto.... ?
Kyoto: Utslippskuttene skyldes ikke avtalen – men østblokkens kollaps
Spain
New Zealand
Ireland
Canada
Austria
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Switzerland
France
Sweden
Great Britain
Czech Republic
Hungary
Russia
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Estonia
-80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60
Actual emission changes from 1990 to 2006 (in %)
Break up of Soviet Republic + reunification of Germany
Land utenfor østblokken slipper ut mer enn målet (før kvotekjøp osv)
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60
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Emission targets
Emission change(1990-2006)
France, Sweden, Monaco and Great
Britain
Kyoto ”straffe-mekanismen” er uten betydning
• Slipper du ut for mye blir dette +33% lagt til i neste periodes mål
• MEN! – Neste periodes mål avtales med det enkelte land…– Du kan hoppe av avtalen og unngå straffen (jamfør
Canada)
Backup
People’s ”intuition” makes the climate problem seem less severe
Typical response: pattern matching
GDP catch-up and demographics major part of climate problem
Figure 3. Population in developing and industrialized countries 1950 – 2100. UN population database and projections, medium scenario. Billions.
Figure 4. GDP (PPP) in IPCC’s scenario A1 Message. Trillion USD (1990-prices).
Population
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1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100
Billi
ons
Industrialized countries
Developing countries
GDP
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Developing countries
Industrializedcountries