i i b i b - unt digital library › ark: › 67531 › metadc704591 › m2 › 1 › h… ·...

1.'" 1 8 9 8 6 7 ENGINEERING C H A N G E N O T I C E .... . . ......... . . ... ................ .

of 2 ECN

2. ECN ICategory trnarlk one)

supplemental [I Direl:t Revision [I Chan!)e ECN [I Temporary [I Standby I1 Supei-sedure [I CanceI/Void [I

l l a . Modification Work

3. Originator's Name, Organization, HSIN, 3a. US0 Required? 4 . Date

RS Popiel arczyk, TWRS [I Yes [XI NO 07/25/96 Engineering, A2-34, 373-5751 5. Project Title/No./Work Order No.

and Telephone No.

6. Eldg./Sys./Fac. No. 7. Approval Designator

TWRS Safety Management Plan N/A SQ

(includes sheet no. and rev.) 8. Docunent Nunbers Changed by t h i s ECN 9. Related ECN No(s). 10. Related Po No.

WHC-SD-WM-PLN-114, Rev. 0 N/A N/A l l b . Uork Package l l c . Modification Work Complete l l d . Restored t o Original Condi-

t i o n (Temp. or standby ECN only) NO.

N /A N/A N/A

I I Cog. Engineer Signature B Date I Cog. Engineer Signature B Date

[] Yes ( f i l L out Elk.

[XI No (NA Elks. l l b ,

12. Description of Change

l l b )

l l c , l l d )

Movement, f o r a n a l y t i c a l purposes, o f t he ME1 from the s i t e boundary t o t h e near bank o f t h e Columbia River ,

Change i n t h e r i s k eva lua t i on gu ide l i nes ,

Implementation of a r e v i s e d BIO p lan i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e changes noted above,

I n c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e development o f a ISB-to-BIO t r a n s i t i o n p lan , and

1 Approval o f t h e Mul t i -Year Program Plan f i s c a l guidance.

3a. Just i f icat ion (mark one)

r i t e r i a Change [XI Design lnprovement [] Enviromental [] F a c i l i t y Deactivation [] s-Found [] Fac i l i ta te Const [] Const. Error/hnission [] Design Error/Rnission [ ] 3b. Jus t i f i ca t ion Detai 1s . e t t e r , J . E . K inzer , RL, t o A. L. Trego, WHC, " D i r e c t i o n f o r R isk Eva lua t i on i u i d e l i n e s and O f f s i t e Maximum Exposed I n d i v i d u a l ( M E I ) Locat ion," dated May 31, 1996.

. e t t e r , J . E. K inze r , RL, t o A. L. Trego, WHC, "Approval o f t h e Westinghouse Hanford :ompany (WHC) Sa fe ty Management Plan," 96-MSD-070, dated A p r i l 22, 1996.

e e a t

- 4 . Dist

A-7900.013

A-7900-01 3-1 (06/9?'

ENGINEERING CHANGE NOTICE of 2

1. ECN (use no. f r m pg. 1)

189867

'0. Approvals

-INS AND ENGINEERING Signature

0% Eng. sa-.= q P b c / a r J og. Mgr. A

afety

nviron.

R. S. Popielarcryk flw

15. Design 16. Cost Impact ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION Ver i f i ca t ion

Remired

Date

17. Schedule Inpact (days)

7/9</ 96

. ->- ~~

Additional [ I $ Additional [ I $ Savings

[ I Yes

[XI No [ I $ Savings [ I $

Signature ARCHITECT-ENGINEER

PE

PA

Safety Design

Environ. Other

[ I [ I

Improvement Delay

Date

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Signature or a Control Nunber that tracks the Approval Signature

ADDIT IONAL

A-7900-013-3 (11/94) GEFO96

WHC-SD-WM-PLN-114, Rev. 1

TWRS Safety Management Plan

R. S. Popielarczyk Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA 99352 U.S. Department o f Energy Contract DE-AC06-87RL10930

EDT/ECN: 189867 UC: 510 Org Code: 74E00 Charge Code: N1F38 B&R Code: EW3120071 To ta l Pages: 56

Key Words: Safety Management Plan, 810, FSAR, A u t h o r i z a t i o n Basis

Abs t rac t : The Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Safety Management Program Plan f o r development, implementation and maintenance o f t h e t a n k farm a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s i s described. The p lan i nc ludes a c t i v i t i e s and procedures f o r :

a)

b) Development, implementation and maintenance o f a Basis f o r

Updating t h e c u r r e n t I n t e r i m Safety Basis,

I n t e r i m Operations,

c ) Development, implementation and maintenance o f t h e F i n a l

d)

Safety Analyses Report,

Development and implementation o f a TWRS i n f o r m a t i o n Management System f o r mon i to r i ng the a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s .

TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER. Reference herein t o any specific c m r c i a l product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or othernise, does not necessarily consti tute or imply i t s endorsement, recomnendation, o r favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof or i t s contractors or subcontractors.

Printed i n the United States of America. To obtain copies of t h i s document, contact: UHC/BCS Docunent Control Services, P.O. Box 1970, Hailstop H6-08, Richland UA 99352, Phone (509) 372-2420; Fax (509) 376-4989.

Approved for Public Release A-6400-073 (10 /95) CEF321

I I

I 1 I I I

A-7320-005 ( 0 8 / 9 1 ) UEF168

WHC-SO-WM-PLN-I 14 REV. 1

TANK WASTE REMEDIATION SYSTEM

SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM PLAN

Approved By:

Tank Waste Remediation System


7-3/- 949 Date

WHC-SD-WM-PLN-114 REV. 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Safety Management Program Plan outlines actions that Tank Waste

Remediation System (TWRS) is undertaking to address ”lessons learned” and

Findings of a series of assessments o f the TWRS authorization basis and safety

management system.

component of the current tank farm authorization basis, the Interim Safety

Basis ( I S B ) , is cumbersome and not technically integrated. In particular,

controls to mitigate or prevent hazards were not derived from a comprehensive

analysis of TWRS hazards, and the I S B does not support effective

determinations on whether new activities or issues require authorization basis

changes (i.e., the USQ process).

significant weaknesses in the management and control of the authorization

basis. Although there is generally good field compliance with technical

procedures, there is limited confidence that authorization basis controls have

been systematically developed and reflected in the technical procedures. A

principal concern is weak configuration control throughout the safety

management system.

These assessments have identified that the central

These assessments have also pointed to

As a result of these assessments, TWRS is taking the following corrective

actions :

Implementing safety management system components necessary to ensure

consistency, clarity, formality and rigor in the development and in

maintenance of the TWRS authorization basis, safety basis documents, and

the technical baseline;

i


Upgrading the TWRS authorization basis to ensure there is a strong link

between tank farm hazards and the corresponding controls that prevent or

mitigate those hazards;

Upgrading the process for identifying and tracking hazards and evaluating

impacts of new activities or new issues (i.e., the USQ process) on the

authorization basis: and

Aligning organizational responsibilities with safety management

responsibilities to ensure better safety performance.

In addition to addressing shortcomings in the tank farms authorization

basis and associated safety management system components, TWRS has several

near-term projects and activities that are important to carrying out the TWRS

mission objectives, support implementation of the Tri-Party Agreement, and

s8upport implementation of DOE commitments to the Defense Nuclear Facilities

Lafety Board (DNFSB). This plan identifies the actions being undertaken to

provide the tank farm authorization basis modifications needed to implement

these near term projects.

The current authorization basis weaknesses and the need for near-term

authorization basis modifications will be addressed using a phased and

integrated approach. A Basis for Interim Operations (BIO) is being prepared

using the guidance of DOE Standard 3011, Appendix A.

the ISB and provide needed controls (Interim Operational Safety Requirements

[IOSR]) in an expedited manner that are derived from a comprehensive

assessment of TWRS hazards.

This 610 will replace

The 610 will also serve as a key transition to

i i


implementation of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) that is under

development, and provide a basis upon which an early demonstration of upgraded

components of a safety management system (SMS) can be conducted.

plans will be prepared to guide the implementation of the 610 and the FSAR.

These plans wi 11 a1 so describe any near-term compensatory measures needed as

well as reconcile the requirements of the TWRS safety management system with

the 610 and FSAR.

Transition

The FSAR, Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and DOE’S safety

evaluation report (SER) will form the cornerstone of the ultimate TWRS

authorization basis, replacing the TWRS B I D when approved. However, since

neither the TWRS 610 or FSAR will be completed in time to support near-term

project commitments, “stand alone” authorization basis packages will be

prepared where practical to meet the format and content requirements of DOE

Standard 3009. If a particular element o f authorization basis ( e . g . hazard

analysis) is changed by the project, the analysis will be conducted to the

level of detail required by DOE-STD-3009. If the authorization basis element

is unchanged by the project (e.g. programmatic chapters), and if the existing

authorization basis i s adequate, it will be referenced.

authorization basis is inadequate, then a level of detail of analysis

consistent with the DOE- STD-3011 will be conducted.

initegrated program, technical consistency between the stand alone projects,

810 and FSAR authorization package will be assured.

I f the existing

Through use of an

Upgrading the safety management system in parallel with preparing

authorization basis modifications is necessary to ensure that sound

authorization basis documents are prepared, and that once in place, they

’ i i i


remain current. The TWRS safety management system will be upgraded by

adapting functions and requirements associated with the preparation and

maintenance of the B I O , FSAR and supporting documents from Savannah River

Site’s integrated safety management system.

documents that were in preparation before the availahil ity of the new safety

management system procedures, will be assessed and appropriate corrective

actions imp1 emented.

Those authorization basis

These improvements in the TWRS safety management system will be the

c:ornerstone for the development of an integrated safety management system

hrithin TWRS. In particular, the changes underway will ensure that procedures

implement key standards and requirements associated with the development and

niaintenance of the B I O , FSAR and their supporting documents. Moreover, these

changes will be a significant step forward in the implementation of DNFSB

Recommendation 95-2 within TWRS.

To ensure the efficacy of the safety management system, TWRS

organizational responsibilities are being aligned with the functions and

requirements of the upgraded safety management system. A “Chief Engineer”

organization has been established and charged with the responsibility for the

operation of the TWRS safety management system.

Chief Engineer organization, are a safety and licensing group and a

centralized design authority group.

responsible to assure implementation of corrective actions resulting from the

authorization basis assessments described above.

to a responsible manager and tracked t o verify that resolution is achieved.

Key functions within the

The Chief Engineer organization is

Each action will be assigned

iv


This revision to this plan has been prepared to reflect:

._ - Movement, for analytical purposes, of the maximum exposed individual

(MEI) location from the site boundary to the near bank of the Columbia

River (Ref. 20) ;

.. - Change in the risk evaluation guidelines (REG) (Ref. 20)';

_. - Implementation of a revised BIO plan incorporating the changes noted

above:

_ - Incorporation of the development of a ISB-to-BIO transition plan; and

_ - Approval of the Multi-Year Program Plan fiscal guidance.

'The DOE-HQ memorandum only applies t o radiological risk evaluation guidelines. evaluation guidelines of WHC-CM-4-46, Section 7 . 0 , Revision 4.0.

WHC will continue to apply the more conservative toxilogical risk

V


LIST OF TERMS

AB A C ADS B I O C I P DNFSB DOE DOE-HQ DOE-RL o r RL DST f.CN f &R F OS F SAR

GIs t lA HLAN I O S R I S B JCO LANL M Y PP NRC OS0 PNNL PRC PUREX RMACS RML RMS SAR SE SEAC

Au tho r i za t i on Basis A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Contro ls A c t i v i t y Data Sheet Basis f o r I n t e r i m Operations Compliance Implementation Plan Defense Nuclear F a c i l i t y Safety Board U.S. Department o f Energy U.S. Department o f Energy-Headquarters DOE-Richland F i e l d O f f i c e Double-Shell Tank Engineer ing Change No t i ce Functions and Requirements F inanc ia l Data System F i n a l Safety Ana lys i s Report Geographical I n fo rma t ion System Hazard Analys is Hanford Local Area Network I n t e r i m Operat ional Safety Requirements I n t e r i m Safety Basis J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r Continued Operat ion Los Alamos Nat ional Laboratory Mul t i -Year Program Plan U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operat ing S p e c i f i c a t i o n Document P a c i f i c Northwest Nat ional Laboratory P lan t Review Committee Plutonium-Uranium E x t r a c t i o n F a c i l i t y Requirements Management and Assured Compliance System Risk Management L i s t Risk Management System Safety Analys is Report Systems Engineering Safety and Environmental Advisory Counci l

v i

!jER

!;IMS !;MS SMP :;/RID SRP ssc SST Tri-Party Agreement TSR TWRS lISQ bIBS klHC klSRC


Safety Evaluation Report Safety Information Management System Safety Management System Safety Management Program Standards/Requirements Identification Document Safety Requirements Project Structures, Systems, and Components Single-Shell Tank Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Technical Safety Requirement Tank Waste Remediation System Unreviewed Safety Question Work Breakdown Structure Westinghouse Hanford Company Westinghouse Savannah River Company

vi i

WHC-SD-WM-PLN-114 REV . 1

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 . 2 SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM MISSION AND OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . 2 1.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM PLAN PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2.0 TWRS SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 . 1 DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROCEDURES . . . 7 2 .2 PREPARE B I O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 . 3 AUTHORIZATION t 2 . 4 ISB /B IO/FSAR T I 2 . 5 AUTHORIZAl 2 . 6 F I E L D VERIF ICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3ASIS MODIFICATION AND INTEGRATION OF PROJECTS . . 8 {ANSIT ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -9

-ION BASIS MAINTENANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3 .0 ROLES AND RESPONSIB IL IT IES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 .. 3.1 DOE-HEADQUARTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2 DOE RICHLAND OPERATIONS OFFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 . 3 WESTINGHOUSE HANFORD COMPANY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

3 . 3 . 1 T a n k W a s t e R e m e d i a t i o n S y s t e m D i v i s i o n . . . . . . . . . 11 3 . 3 . 1 . 1 TWRS E n g i n e e r i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 3 . 3 . 1 . 2 T a n k F a r m T r a n s i t i o n P r o j e c t s . . . . . . . . . . 13 3 . 3 . 1 . 3 TWRS C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n P r o j e c t . . . . . . . . . . 13 3 . 3 . 1 . 4 TWRS D i s p o s a l P r o g r a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

3 . 3 . 2 S a f e t y a n d E n v i r o n m e n t a l A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l . . . . . . . . 1 4

4 . 0 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 4 . 1 BASELINE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4 . 1 . 1 Scope , C o s t , a n d S c h e d u l e C o n t r o l . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 4 . 1 . 2 P r o g r a m F i l e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 4 . 1 . 3 R e p o r t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 4 . 1 . 4 A g r e e m e n t a n d C o m m i t m e n t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4 . 2 PROGRAM R I S K MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5

5 .. 0 QUALITY ASSURANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7

6 . 0 COST AND SCHEDULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6 . 1 COST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6 . 2 INTEGRATED SCHEDULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

7.0 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0

APPENDIX A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS . . . . . A-1

APPENDIX B SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION FOR A PROJECT . . . . 6 - 1

AFPENOIX C BASIS FOR INTERIM OPERATION

APPENDIX D R I S K MANAGEMENT . . . . . . APPENDIX E COST AND SCHEDULE SUMMARIES

v i i

ASK PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . C - 1

. . . . . . . . . D-1

. . . . . E-1


TANK WASTE REMEDIATION SYSTEM SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM PLAN

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Recent assessments and "lessons learned" have identified shortcomings in the TWRS safety management system and the TWRS authorization basis. weaknesses include:

*

These

The existing authorization basis is unclear, and the process for evaluating the impact of new activities or new issues (i.e. USQ process) i s cumbersome. implemented over the technical baseline and TWRS safety documents to maintain them current.

Tank farm controls are not linked to a comprehensive hazards analysis.

Current safety management procedures lack sufficient formality and rigor to track hazards and requirements to structures systems, and components (SSCS).

TWRS organizational responsibilities are not aligned to assure safety management system performance.

Several on-going TWRS projects and major activities will be completed and need to become operational before the BIO or FSAR is approved. Therefore, these projects must have their authorization basis appended to the current TWRS Authorization Basis, the I S B , via change request before they can be authorized to begin operation. Similarly, the authorization basis for these projects and activities must also be appended to the BIO and the FSAR as they are approved. Accordingly, the authorization basis documents for these projects have been assessed for compatibility with the I S B , BIO, and FSAR.

Those projects and activities which are currently identified in the TWRS Multi-Year Program Plan to be completed in Fiscal Year 1996 or early 1997 include:

Flammable gas justification for continued operation (JCO); Saltwell pumping of flammable gas single-shell tanks (SSTs); Rotary mode core sampling of flammable gas tanks; Project W-030 for aging waste tank ventilation upgrades; Project W-151 for Tank AZ-101 waste retrieval demonstration system; and Project W-320 for retrieval of waste from high heat Tank C-106.

Effective configuration management has not been

rn

*

1

WHC-SO-WM-PLN-114 REV. 1

:I. 2 SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

Using a systems engineer ing approach, a miss ion ana lys i s was conducted f o r t he Safety Management Program. Safety Management Program miss ion i s t o e s t a b l i s h and ma in ta in t h e TWRS a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s . TWRS B I O , FSAR, and suppor t ing documents, a TWRS s a f e t y management system w i l l be developed and implemented w i t h i n t h e TWRS Safety Management Program. These procedures w i l l implement key p rov i s ions o f t he TWRS S / R I D rega rd ing the development and maintenance o f t h e TWRS a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s . These near- term e f f o r t s , which focus on B I O , FSAR, and t h e i r suppor t ing documents, w i l l a l s o serve as a s i g n i f i c a n t s tep forward i n the implementation o f an i n t e g r a t e d s,afety management system w i t h i n TWRS t h a t i s responsive t o DNFSB Recommendation 95-2.

l h e program w i l l be c a r r i e d ou t i n th ree major phases:

a ) Provide amendments t o t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s t o accommodate ongoing p r o j e c t s and a c t i v i t i e s .

b) Develop, implement and ma in ta in the TWRS Basis f o r I n t e r i m Operations (BIO), t o cover a l l i d e n t i f i e d hazards.

c ) Develop, implement and ma in ta in the TWRS F i n a l Safety Ana lys i s Report (FSAR) . I n p a r a l l e l , develop and implement the components o f t h e s a f e t y

This process i d e n t i f i e d t h a t t h e TWRS

To enable e f f e c t i v e development and maintenance o f t h e

management system necessary t o develop and ma in ta in t h e BIO, FSAR and t h e i r suppor t i ng documents.

1.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM PLAN PURPOSE

The purpose o f t h i s program p lan i s t o def ine the work scope, approach, schedule, management systems, and r o l e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r develop ing and implementing the TWRS Safety Management Program. i d e n t i f i e d addresses the lessons learned from t h e assessments o f t h e TWRS a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s and sa fe ty management system.

The work scope

2


2.0 TWRS SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

The mission of the TWRS Safety Management Program is to establish and maintain the TWRS authorization basis. The current authorization basis for TWRS is primarily captured in Chapter 6 of the Hanford Tank Farm Facilities Interim Safety Basis (ISB), WHC-SD-WM-ISB-001, which is not fully compliant with current DOE Orders. Furthermore, the TWRS Safety Management Program includes responsibility for the development of the TWRS safety management !system described in this plan.

applicable DOE Orders 5480.22 and 5480.23, that enables the following: A well defined authorization basis is one that is compliant with

DOE approval of all authorization basis documents as specified in DOE Order 5480.23;

Identification of allowable and restricted activities and/or the basis on which to evaluate said activities;

Hazards analyses which provide the base for controls, limits and restrictions;

Safety Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) consistent with the hazards and accident analyses;

Current facility descriptions sufficient to support the safety SSCs and controls established in the authorization basis under configuration control; and

Capability of trained USQ evaluators to successfully deal with the complexity of the authorization basis documentation.

The first step to upgrade the TWRS authorization basis is amending the current authorization basis to accommodate near-term projects and activities. The second step includes the development of a TWRS BIO, with the corresponding Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR). The BIO will be compliant with DOE Standard 3011, Appendix A and derive controls from a comprehensive hazard analysis. The third step is the development and full implementation and maintenance of the TWRS Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and fully implemented Technical Safety Requirements (TSR). The FSAR and TSR are being developed under the Tank Waste Remediation System Final Safety Analysis Report Project Plan, WHC-WM-PLN-113. In parallel, WHC will develop and implement the components of a safety management system necessary to develop and maintain the BIO, FSAR and their supporting documents.

To support these activities, components of a safety management system will be developed and implemented. The system will include the following:

A formal Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) process for the development, approval, maintenance and control of the authorization basis documents, including DOE approval.

3


A w e l l def ined process t o ma in ta in the a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas is , i n c l u d i n g an improved USQ process.

A d i s c i p l i n e d process t o assure necessary changes t o procedures and des ign documentation are made t o r e f l e c t changes made t o t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s .

The near-term s a f e t y management system development e f f o r t s w i l l cover a l l necessary procedures and t r a i n i n g f o r systemat ic implementation o f t h e TWRS B I O , FSAR and t h e i r suppor t ing documents. of t he TWRS safety management system func t i ons and requirements c u r r e n t l y be ing developed.

has been d i v i d e d i n t o several p ieces. breakdown s t r u c t u r e . k r i t h i n t h e scope o f t h i s p lan i s :

Prepare B I O A u t h o r i z a t i o n Basis M o d i f i c a t i o n and I n t e g r a t i o n o f P ro jec ts ISB/BIO/FSAR T r a n s i t i o n s A u t h o r i z a t i o n Basis Maintenance F i e l d V e r i f i c a t i o n

t h e Sa fe ty Management Program, bu t t h e i r f i e l d implementation w i l l be addressed i n o t h e r TWRS plans.

Sel f Assessments/Corrective Act ions IOSR, OSD, & Procedures Implementation P l a n t Review Committee USQ Process Con t ro l E s t a b l i s h and Implement Technical Basel ine FSAR Prepara t i on

F igu re 2.2 descr ibes the o v e r a l l l o g i c f o r t he phased and i n t e g r a t e d approach being undertaken w i t h i n the Safety Management Program.

To f a c i l i t a t e t h e implementation o f t h i s p lan and achieve the l onger - term o b j e c t i v e s of t he Safety Management Program, a TWRS Ch ie f Engineer, a Sdfety and L i cens ing o rgan iza t i on , and a Design A u t h o r i t y o rgan iza t i on have been es tab l i shed . These o rgan iza t i ons and i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l be accountable f o r t he TWRS Sa fe ty Management Program and cha r te red w i t h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h and ma in ta in t h e TWRS a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s and s a f e t y bas i s .

0

Appendix A p rov ides a d e s c r i p t i o n

The scope o f work under the cognizance o f t he Safety Management Program Figure 2 . 1 descr ibes t h e o v e r a l l work

The subset o f t h i s work t h a t i s be ing funded and managed

Develop and implement Safety Management System/Procedures

A d d i t i o n a l scope o f work under WBS elements as l i s t e d below, are under

A u t h o r i z a t i o n Basis Basel ine Development and Management

4

Figure 2.1 Safety Management Program 'Work Breakdown Structure

Safety Mgmt SydProcedures

3.16.1

ISBIBIOIIFSAR Transitions

3.16.4

Management Program

Prepare

3.16.2

I in Scope of Plan I

Authorization Basis Mod. &

Integ. of Projects

3.16.3

Authorization

Maintenance

3.16.5 3.1 6.6

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

- - _ _ - _I_ _ _ - _ , ; Self ; 1 Assessment/ I ; Corrective ; 1 Actions I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - 1

3.16.9

I _ - _ _ _ _ I _ _ _ _ _ I

; USQ ; I Process ; ; Control I

I I 1 1

I Establish & I ; Prepare j I Imp.Technical ; I FSAR i Baseline ; ; I - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ L I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ L

3.16.13 3.1 6.1 7 _ _ _ _ .ation ; seline

- _ _ _ _ ; Authc I Basis ; Development 8,; I Mgmt. I I - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ 1

3.16.30 BTF070096.13 (7/29/96)

Figure 2.2 Safety Management Program Logic Diagram

AB sen

! 1

BTF03W96 13 1 (7130196)


2 .1 DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROCEDURES (WBS 3 .16 .1 )

The TWRS s a f e t y management system w i l l be implemented through procedures f o r a c t i v i t i e s requ i red t o develop, implement, and ma in ta in t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s documents, s a f e t y bas i s documents, and techn ica l base1 i n e documents. The procedures w i l l s p e c i f y content , format, and approval requirements f o r base l i ne documents. A change c o n t r o l process w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d t o ensure t h a t any proposed changes w i l l be p roper l y reviewed and approved p r i o r t o implementation. Th is rev iew w i l l i nc lude a requirement t o i d e n t i f y and address a l l impacts t o o the r documents and a c t i v i t i e s .

T r a i n i n g needs associated w i t h these procedures w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d and i ; ra in ing packages w i l l be issued. T r a i n i n g o f t he TWRS personnel w i l l be prov ided by those o rgan iza t i ons respons ib le f o r implementing t h e s a f e t y management system.

E x i s t i n g WHC and Westinghouse Savannah R ive r Company (WSRC) procedures w i l l be assessed t o determine t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o s a t i s f y the f u n c t i o n s and requirements o f t he Safety Management System. procedures w i l l be reviewed, and changes implemented as needed. Procedures se lec ted from WSRC w i l l be r e v i s e d and i n t e g r a t e d as approp r ia te i n t o t h e TWRS procedure system. procedure does n o t meet t h e needs o f t he TWRS s a f e t y management system.

TWRS S/RID. Future e f f o r t s i n t h e development o f t h e TWRS i n t e g r a t e d s a f e t y management system i n con junc t i on w i t h the completion o f t h e TWRS Phase I and Phase I 1 S / R I D assessment w i l l ensure complete implementation o f t h e TWRS S / R I D i n procedures.

Del i verabl e s :

E x i s t i n g WHC and TWRS

New procedures w i l l on l y be developed when an e x i s t i n g

The procedures w i l l i nco rpo ra te and implement r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s o f t h e

Issued Safety Management Program procedures - Complete. Issued T r a i n i n g Packages.

2 . 2 PREPARE B I O (WBS 3 .16 .2 )

A Basis f o r I n t e r i m Operations (BIO) and associated I n t e r i m Operat ional Safety Requirements ( I O S R ) w i l l be developed based on t h e hazard analyses and t o the e x t e n t poss ib le the acc ident ana lys i s performed under t h e FSAR P r o j e c t Plan. The B I O w i l l p rov ide a s u f f i c i e n t l y formal a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s t o enable e a r l y implementation o f t he s a f e t y management system. a l so enable e a r l y implementation of a f u l l se t o f c o n t r o l s based on a comprehensive hazard ana lys i s . Moreover, t he BIO w i l l be a key t r a n s i t i o n a l s tep from the I S B t o the r i g o r o f t he FSAR. The TWRS B I O w i l l be developed us ing t h e r i s k eva lua t i on gu ide l i nes i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e A p r i l 4 , 1996, memorandum from R. Guimond, HQ, t o Manager, RL, " I n t e r i m R a d i o l f g i c a l Dose Acceptance C r i t e r i a For The Hanford Tank Farms Safety Analys is , (Ref 22) . The TWRS B I O w i l l use the near-bank o f t he Columbia R ive r as the p o t e n t i a l l y nearest p o i n t o f uncon t ro l l ed p u b l i c access and r i s k e v a l u a t i o n g u i d e l i n e s as d i r e c t e d i n Reference 20.

The B I O w i l l

Appendix C prov ides a p lan f o r t h e B I O development.


Del iverables:

Basis for Interim Operation - for DOE approval. Interim Operational Safety Requirements - for DOE approval.

Note: Other deliverables related to the development of the BIO are provided in the Validation WBS element, Section 2.8.

2.3 AUTHORIZATION BASIS MODIFICATION AND INTEGRATION OF PROJECTS (WBS 3.16.3)

A number of ongoing TWRS projects and activities are critical to the success of the TWRS mission and are scheduled to be completed and operational before the BIO or FSAR are approved and implemented. -incorporated into future FSAR revisions; therefore, their authorization basis documents must be developed to allow for that incorporation. If a particular element of authorization basis (e.9. and accident hazard analysis) is changed by the project, the analysis will be conducted to the level o f detail required by DOE-STD-3009. project (e .g . programmatic chapters), and if the existing authorization basis i s adequate, it will be referenced. If the existing authorization basis is inadequate, then a level of detail of analysis consistent with the DOE-STD- 3011 will be conducted. These documents will be added to the current authorization basis, and will remain in effect when the BIO and FSAR are i ssued.

These projects will be

If the authorization basis element is unchanged by the

The safety documentation for these projects have been reviewed for consistency with the BIO and FSAR analyses, with each other, and with the s,afety management system content requirements. documents will be performed as necessary.

Upgrades to these safety

TWRS projects have also been reviewed to ensure consistency with revised DOE guidance on the ME1 location and risk evaluation guidelines. letter, "Direction For Risk Evaluation Guidelines And Offsite Maximum Exposed Individual (MEI) Location," (Ref 20)2 directs TWRS safety analyses initiated for projects prior to April 4, 1996, to use the risk evaluation guidelines contained in DOE-RL letter of June 14, 1995, "Risk Acceptance Criteria For Tank Farm Operation" (Ref 21). TWRS safety analyses that start after April 4, 1996, WHC are to use the risk evaluation guidelines in DOE-HQ memorandum of April 4, 1996, from R. Guimond to the Manager, RL, "Interim Radiological Dose Acceptance Criteria For The Hanford Tank Farms Safety Analysis," (Ref 22).

DOE-RL

DOE-RL (Ref 20) also directed that the near bank o f the Columbia River must be considered as potentially the nearest point of uncontrolled public access. TWRS safety analyses initiated prior to March 5, 1996, are to continue using the Hanford Reservation Boundary for the location of the MEI. Where required, project safety analyses will be revised to move the ME1 to the

'The DOE-HQ memorandum only applies to radiological risk evaluation guidelines. evaluation guidelines of WHC-CM-4-46, Section 7.0, Revision 4.0.

WHC will continue to apply the more conservative toxilogical risk

8


near-bank of the Columbia River during the first annual update or when incorporated into the TWRS BIO and FSAR. initiated after March 5, 1996, the location of the ME1 will be defined as the near-bank of the Columbia River.

For project safety analyses

Project safety analyses will have parametric studies completed to provide early indication of any significant control requirement changes that may be forthcoming as a result of the change in ME1 location or risk evaluation guideline.

activity or project. Prior to project turnover, change requests will be processed to incorporate these activities into the current TWRS Authorization Elasis. This plan includes validation of the incorporation of any identified- c:hanges to the project documentation.

Authorization basis document requirements for new projects will be identified during project development by the Safety and Licensing Group. Appendix B provides a sample process for implementing the authorization basis amendment process on a project.

Del iverables:

It is assumed that changes to the documentation will be funded by the

Project assessments -- Complete.

2 .4 ISB/BIO/FSAR TRANSITIONS (WBS 3 . 1 6 . 4 )

The TWRS BIO is being developed in parallel with the development of the Safety Management System. Furthermore, because the BIO will be based upon a comprehensive hazard analysis, significant differences in the application of controls or SSC classification may result. The BIO will be reconciled against the requirements of the safety management system. As they are developed, the hlazard analysis and control suite (IOSR) of the BIO will be compared with the current IOSR. deficiencies, immediate compensatory measures will be implemented to ensure protection of the workers, public and the environment. In addition, a transition plan will be prepared to guide the implementation of the BIO and to document compensatory measures in effect until the BIO controls are imp1 emented.

the safety management system procedures. management system, a reconciliation of the FSAR and TSR with the safety management system will be conducted.

of the controls will be conducted under this plan. This will include the development of implementing documents for the controls, provision of compensatory measures for those controls that can not be immediately implemented, and the issuance of a transition plan for those controls and compensatory measures.

If the comparison of the new IOSR identifies significant

The FSAR and TSR are being developed in parallel with the development of After development of the safety

Following development of the FSAR and associated TSR, the implementation

9


Future revisions of this plan will address specific strategies for .incorporating currently stand-alone safety analysis (e.g., 242-A) into the future revisions of the FSAR.

Del iverables:

ISB/BIO Transition Plan. BIO/FSAR Transition Plan.

2 . 5 AUTHORIZATION BASIS MAINTENANCE (WBS 3.16.5)

support the following: (a) assurance of technical quality and consistency of - USQ evaluations, (b) definition of the authorization basis, (c) change control and revision of authorization basis documents, and (d) implementation of the authorization basis.

Maintenance of the TWRS authorization basis includes activities which

A list of the current TWRS Authorization Basis documents will be developed and issued.

identified in the authorization basis documents. A cross-reference will be developed and implemented to link authorization basis requirements with the documents credited for implementing them.

Del iverables:

An assessment will be performed to verify the implementation of controls

List o f authorization basis documents - Complete. List providing cross-reference from requirements to implementing documents - Complete.

2.6 FIELD ‘VERIFICATION (wes 3.16.8) In conjunction with the FSAR hazards analysis, a field validation will be

performed to confirm the input information and assumptions used in the analysis. This validation process, including both field walkdowns and documentation reviews, will document the hazardous material inventories (form, location, type and amount), potential accident initiators with frequencies, arid potential SSCs to be used for controls. All work is being conducted under an approved task plan until the Safety Management System procedures are developed under Section 2.1 of this plan. configuration control in accordance with those procedures.

The Hazards Analysis will be revised, if required, based on the results o f the validation.

Del iverables:

All documents will be placed under

Revised hazards analysis for the BIO and FSAR Configuration controlled wal kdown results

10


3.0 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The r o l e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r developing and implementing t h e TWRS Safety Management Program are o u t l i n e d i n the f o l l o w i n g sec t i ons .

3.1 DOE-HEADQUARTERS

DOE-HQ w i l l mon i to r t he development and implementation o f t h e TWRS B I O iind FSAR i n accordance w i t h the memorandum o f agreement w i t h RL. itpprove t h e FSAR.

DOE-HQ w i l l

3.2 DOE RICHLAND OPERATIONS OFFICE

RL i s respons ib le f o r t h e approval of t he TWRS Safety Management Program Plan and f o r ensur ing s i t e c o n t r a c t o r execut ion o f t h e p lan . RL w i l l a l s o rev iew and approve changes t o the TWRS Au tho r i za t i on Basis, i n c l u d i n g rev iew and approval o f t he B I O p r i o r t o implementation by WHC. RL w i l l mon i to r t h e iimplementation o f t he Safety Management Program through s t a t u s meetings and clay-to-day i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h the WHC management s t a f f , i n c l u d i n g updates o f any RL s a f e t y management p lans o u t l i n e d i n Waqbner, 1996.3

3.3 WESTINGHOUSE HANFORD COMPANY

WHC w i l l develop and implement the TWRS Safety Management Program i n c l u d i n g development, implementation, upgrade, and maintenance o f t he TWRS A u t h o r i z a t i o n Basis . Th is process w i l l use e x i s t i n g WHC management c o n t r o l systems t h a t implement the Q u a l i t y Assurance (QA) Program requirements o f 10 C.FR 830.120, and the WHC requirements fo r development o f s a f e t y analyses.

3.3.1 Tank Waste Remediation System D i v i s i o n

The TWRS D i v i s i o n i s responsib le f o r developing, implementing, and managing t h e TWRS Safety Management Program, Technical Basel ine, and A u t h o r i z a t i o n Basis and f o r ope ra t i ng t h e tank farms. the departments discussed i n f o l l o w i n g subsections.

t h i s p l a n i s shown i n F igure 3-1. s t r u c t u r e are descr ibed i n the f o l l o w i n g subsections.

The d i v i s i o n i nc ludes

The TWRS o rgan iza t i ona l s t r u c t u r e f o r managing the a c t i v i t i e s d e f i n e d i n Major elements o f t h e o rgan iza t i ona l

3Wagoner, J.D. "DOE, R ich land Operations O f f i c e (RL), Plan f o r Improved A u t h o r i z a t i o n Basis and Procedure Compliance a t Hanford." Memorandum t o T. P . Grumbly February 17, 1996, DOE-RL, Richland, Washington.

11

Figure 3.1 TWRS Safety and Licensing

Tank Farm Transition Projects

Organization

TWRS Disposal Program

TWRS Engineering TWRS Characterization

Chief Engineer Project


- - - - - -

I

- I I

- - - - - - -

I I I

Safety and Erlvironmental Advisory Council i --------- t

TWRS Design Authority

TWRS Safety and TWRS Engineering Process TWRS Technical Licensing Management Systems Engineering Integration

I Safety Program Authorization

E I n 0

VI 0 1

E

V 7G96030375.2 W r

Sb L 3/28/96 7 7

. l - A + - e

I


3.3.1.1 TWRS Engineering

responsible for developing the TWRS Safety Management Program, Authorization Elasis, and safety basis. c:onsistency in the implementation of the Safety Management System and maintenance of the TWRS Authorization Basis.

The TWRS Chief Engineer, the Director of the TWRS Engineering, is

This organization also has responsibility to achieve

The Safety and Licensing Group has been established to direct the TWRS S8afety Management Program, establish safety and licensing policy, prepare and issue the TWRS Safety Analysis documentation including BIO and IOSR documents, and the FSAR and TSR documents. responsibility for integrating activities to resolve the safety issues related to the Hanford lank Farms with those being undertaken to upgrade the authorization basis. The Safety and Licensing manager reports to the Director of Engineering and will ensure that all work delineated in this plan is completed within established cost and schedule baselines and that the documents produced are in compliance with applicable requirements.

and approving changes to, TWRS structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and its technical baseline.

The WHC TWRS Safety and Quality Assurance representatives are responsible for conduct of independent reviews of safety, health, and quality affecting functions. The nuclear safety representative will coordinate safety basis reviews conducted in the following subject areas: (1) nuclear safety, (2 ) fire protection, (3) radiological control, and ( 4 ) industrial safety and industrial h.ygiene. Environmental compliance reviews will be conducted through the assigned environmental compliance officers. TWRS Quality Assurance will conduct QA reviews.

3.3.1.2 Tank Farm Transition Projects

Tank Farm Transition Projects are responsible for operating the tank farms and evaporator in compliance with the approved TWRS authorization basis. Tank Farm Transition Projects staff members will fill key leadership positions on the FSAR Project and Authorization Basis teams to establish the technical bases of the tank farm facilities. Tank Farm Transition Project staff members Will1 also be integrally involved in the development, review and approval of changes to the Authorization Basis for any activity associated with the Tank Farm facilities and project activities.

3.3.1.3 TWRS Characterization Project

The TWRS Characterization Project is responsible for operating the tank waste characterization systems and equipment in compliance with the approved ThlRS authorization basis for the purpose of characterizing the tank waste contents. Key individuals from the Project will participate in the development, review and approval of changes to the Authorization Basis associated with waste characterization activities.

The Safety and Licensing Group also has

The TWRS design authorities are responsible for final acceptability of,

13


3 . 3 . 1 . 4 TWRS Disposal Program

The TWRS Disposal Program is responsible for definition, development and design of disposal alternatives in support of privatization. At present, the Program is responsible for design and approval of the C-106 and AZ-101 ret r i eval act i vi ti es

3.3.2 Safety and Environmental Advisory Council

The Safety and Environmental Advisory Council, through the Tank Waste Remediation Subcouncil, is responsible for conduct of final integrated reviews of safety and environmental affecting documentation, such as the FSAR, 610, JCOs and any changes thereto, to provide company-level assurance that all iimportant factors have been adequately addressed. The subcouncil's findings or concerns are reported to TWRS senior management for resolution of any iissues prior to the release of such documents.

14


4.0 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROLS

4.1 BASELINE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

Baseline management and control of the Safety Management Program have been implemented in accordance with WHC-CM-2-5, Management Control System. lhis plan defines the scope, schedule, and cost baseline for the TWRS Safety Management Program. request package to the TWRS Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP). this plan will be implemented using appropriate change control procedures.

The baseline will be established in a formal change Modifications to

4.1.1 Scope, Cost, and Schedule Control

Schedules identify the activities upon which the budget is based. These s,chedules identify the logical relationships among program activities that are developed t o define the critical path and establish baseline commitments. These schedules will aid managers in tracking document status and in identifying issues for early resolution.

Managers track and control their costs by using the Financial Data System (FDS). weekly.

4.1.2 Program Files

correspondence, and related administrative records.

Cost account information will be reviewed by the project managers

Official program files are maintained for documentation, plans,

4.1.3 Reports

The Safety and Licensing manager prepares bi-weekly status reports addressing major accomplishments and critical issues. These reports are provided to RL. The Safety and Licensing Manager provides monthly cost/schedule performance analysis reports to RL and the WHC staff.

4.1.4 Agreement and Commitments

Any changes to the program baselines will be documented, approved, and funded via the change control process prior to implementation.

4.2 PROGRAM RISK MANAGEMEN1

Program risk management techniques are applied by means of systematic identification, assessment or analysis, and handling of risks to the program technical, cost, and schedule bases. The risk management list that has been developed identifies critical risks and mitigating actions, and is used to track risk mitigation actions regularly and systematically. Risks (e.g., assumptions, external events, major uncertainties) that the program faces are identified in the risk management list. impact the program, what the potential impacts would be, and the severity of

The likelihood that the risks will

15


the consequences a r e i d e n t i f i e d , and management ac t ions and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a r e s p e c i f i e d .

The r isk management l i s t wi l l be modified as work proceeds. Program management reviews t h e l i s t a t l e a s t biweekly. changes t o t h e r isk management l i s t , risks f o r which dec is ions regarding risk management a c t i o n s a r e requi red , and any risks with " c r i t i c a l " s t a t u s (major o r immediate t h r e a t t o t h e program). with RL a t t h e biweekly meetings.

The r i s k management l i s t in Appendix 0 provides a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e

These reviews wi l l focus on

The r i s k management l i s t i s reviewed

programmatic r i s k process and a sample r i s k management l i s t t h a t provides an assessment o f r i s k s c u r r e n t l y being t racked and managed, including those r e l a t i n g t o t h e development of t h i s plan.

16


5.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE

The major portion of work to be accomplished as described in this program

Together the TWRS QA plan and this program plan constitute the QA plan for

plan will be performed in compliance with the TWRS quality assurance program, with a few program specific requirements in sections 2.0 and 3 . 0 and appendix A . the TWRS Safety System Program. The TWRS QA plan is documented in WHC-SP- '1131, Westinghouse Hanford Company Quality Assurance Program and [mplementation P1 an.

the Safety Management Program activities affecting quality. The TWRS Vice President has issued WHC-CM-6-34, TWRS Quality Management Plan which describes how TWRS is organized and managed to accomplish its mission. WHC-CM-4-2, Quality Assurance Manual, describes the WHC site quality assurance program which TWRS must implement. WHC-CM-6-50, TWRS Quality Assurance, provides facility specific supplemental information. Figure 5.1 illustrates the manual and procedure structure.

The following documents describe the TWRS Quality Assurance program for

The Safety Management Program Plan contains additional details of organization and responsibilities which supplement the WHC-CM-6-34, Quality Management P1 an.

There exist implementing manuals and procedures for the design work, document controls, records management, etc. including SAR, PSAR, and FSAR preparation and issue. Therefore, most of the System Management Program activities will be performed in accordance with existing implementing procedures described in the manuals discussed above. assurance activities are integrated into this program management plan as described above, especially in sections 2.0 and 3 . 0 and appendix A.

The incorporation of the Safety Management Program quality assurance plan into the Safety Management Program Plan makes the quality assurance requirements more visible to the program performers and promotes compliance with the requirements.

Program unique quality

17


Figure 5.1 TWRS Quality Assurance Requirements/Manual Structure

1 OCFR830.120 DOE 5700.6C

Implementing Documents

Various Implementing Manuals and Procedures

18


3.16.1

3.16.2

3.16.3

3.16.4

3.16.5

3.16.8

6.0 COST AND SCHEDULE

Develop and Implement Safety Management $650 System/ Procedures

Prepare BIO 620

Authorization Basis Modification & Integration of 360 Projects

ISB/BIO/FSAR Transition 110

Authorization Basis Maintenance 570

Field Verification 320

6.1 COST

Safety Management Program Plan Total

The summary cost estimate at the DOE WBS controlled level is shown in Table 6-1. Detailed costs are presented at Appendix E.

$2,740

G.2 INTEGRATED SCHEDULE

The DOE controlled milestones are provided below. The integrated schedule for tracking progress against the baseline is provided in Appendix E for information only.

Key project deliverables:

Provide List of Current Authorization Basis Documents

Complete Hazard ID and Configuration Verification

Implement Operational TWRS, AB Tracking System

Issue Interim OSR's for RL Approval

Issue Basis for Interim Operation for RL Approval

Implement Operational TWRS Safety Management System

April 15, 1996

June 7 , 1996

June 28, 1996

August 30, 1996

September 30, 1996

September 30, 1996

19


7.0 REFERENCES

I.

4.

!i .

6.

7 .

8.

9 .

10.

11.

12.

13.

14

U.S. Department of Energy, "Technical Safety Requirements," DOE Order 5480.22, Washington D.C., February 25, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, "Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports," DOE Order 5480.23, Washington D.C., April 10, 1992.

U . S . Department of Energy, "Guidance for Preparation o f DOE Orders 5480.22 (TSR) and 5480.23 (SAR) Implementation Plans," DOE-STD-3011-94, Washington D.C., November 1994.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Hanford Site Tank Farm Facilities Interim Safety Basis," WHC-SD-WM-ISB-001, Rev. 0, Richland, Washington, August, 1993.

U.S. Department of Energy, "Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports," DOE-STD-1027-92, Washington D.C., December 1992.

Westinghouse Savannah River Company, "Functional Classification of Safety Class and Safety Significant Structures, Systems, and Components," Manual E7, Procedure 2.25, Aiken, South Carolina, February 1, 1995.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Single-Shell Tank Interim Operational Safety Requirements," WHC-SD-WM-OSR-005, Rev. 08, Richland, Washington, April 3 , 1995.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Double-Shell Tank Interim Operational Safety Requirements," WHC-SD-WM-OSR-016, Rev. 08, Richland, Washington, April 3, 1995.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Aging Waste Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements," WHC-SD-WM-OSR-004, Rev. 08, Richland, Washington, April 3, 1995.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Quality Assurance Manual," WHC-CM-4-2, Release 83, Richland, Washington, February 15, 1996.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Implementation Plan for DOE Orders 5480.21, 5480.22, and 5480.23," Correspondence No. 9257875, Richland, Washington, October 28, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, "Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports," DOE-STD- 3009-94, July 1994.

Westinghouse Savannah River Company, "Safety Document Integrated Work Process Guideline and Methods (U)," WSRC-RP-95-001, Rev. 0, Aiken, South Carolina, November 30, 1995.

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulation 830.120, "Quality Assurance".

20

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.


U.S. Department o f Energy, " Q u a l i t y Assurance", DOE 5700.6, Rev. C.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Westinghouse Hanford Company Q u a l i t y Assurance Program and Implementation Plan" , WHC-SP-1131, Rev. 0, Richland, Washington, dated March 1995.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, " Q u a l i t y Assurance Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and I n s t r u c t i o n s " , WHC-CM-4-5.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "TWRS Q u a l i t y Management Plan", WHC-CM-6-34, Rev. 0, dated August 1995.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "TWRS Q u a l i t y Assurance", WHC-CM-6-50.

L e t t e r f rom J. Kinzer , RL, t o Pres ident , WHC, " D i r e c t i o n For R isk Eva lua t i on Guidel ines And O f f s i t e Maximum Exposed I n d i v i d u a l ( M E I ) Location," 96-WSD-062, dated May 31, 1996.

L e t t e r from A . Sidpara, RL, t o Pres ident , WHC, "Risk Acceptance C r i t e r i a For Tank Farm Operation," #9502999, dated June 14, 1995.

Memorandum from R.Guimond, HQ, t o Manager, RL, " I n t e r i m Rad io log i ca l Dose Acceptance C r i t e r i a For The Hanford Tank (arms Safety Analys is , " dated A p r i l 4, 1996.

21


APPENDIX A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

F igu re A-1 i s a f u n c t i o n a l diagram o f t he Safety Management System. The f o u r subsystems are t h e Technical Base1 i n e Management System, t h e R isk Management System, the Au tho r i za t i on Basis Management System, and t h e S i t e Safety Management Programs. Each o f these subsystems i s discussed below.

1.0 TECHNICAL BASELINE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

The Technical Basel ine Management System i s requ i red t o manage and m a i n t a i n c u r r e n t t h e documents r e l a t e d t o : (1) the c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f t h e f a c i l i t y s t r u c t u r e s , systems, and components (SSCs); (2 ) t h e s i t e d e s c r i p t i o n and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; ( 3 ) t he i nven to ry o f hazardous m a t e r i a l s present w i t h i n t h e f a c i l i t y ; (4) t h e f a c i l i t y requirements; and ( 5 ) t h e s a f e t y bas i s documents t h a t support t he a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s o f t he f a c i l i t y .

1.1 TWRS SSC Management

The SSC c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s de f i ned i n terms o f engineer ing documents i p c l u d i n g drawings, design analyses, design requirements and c r i t e r i a , equipment l i s t s , and vendor i n fo rma t ion . The SSC Management f u n c t i o n must i d e n t i f y SSCs impor tant t o sa fe ty , ma in ta in the documents d e s c r i b i n g t h e c o n f i g u r a t i o n , p rov ide i n fo rma t ion about the s ta tus o f i tems under c o n f i g u r a t i o n c o n t r o l , and p rov ide a process t o evaluate and implement proposed changes t o the SSCs and t h e i r r e l a t e d documents. i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e d t o t h e SSC c o n f i g u r a t i o n must be communicated t o t h e f o l 1 owing func t i ons : Risk I d e n t i f i c a t i o n , E s t a b l i s h P reven t ion /M i t i ga t i on , A u t h o r i z a t i o n Basis Con t ro l , and S i t e Safety Management Programs.

Changes i n t h e

1.2 SITE DESCRIPTION MANAGEMENT

S i t e d e s c r i p t i o n i n fo rma t ion inc ludes me teo ro log i ca l , se ismic, l i g h t n i n g , f l o o d , vo l can ic , and geophysical data. The S i t e D e s c r i p t i o n Management f u n c t i o n must i nc lude a process t o i d e n t i f y which data are impor tant t o t h e Safety Management System, spec i f y app rop r ia te media f o r t he documentation and r e t r i e v a l o f t he data, and spec i f y the processes t o c o n t r o l changes t o t h e s i t e d e s c r i p t i o n data accepted i n t o the Technical Basel ine Management System. Changes i n t h e s i t e d e s c r i p t i o n must be communicated t o t h e f o l l o w i n g func t i ons : R isk I d e n t i f i c a t i o n , A u t h o r i z a t i o n Basis Con t ro l , and S i t e Sa fe ty Management Programs.

1.3 HAZARDOUS MATERIAL INVENTORY TRACKING

The Hazardous M a t e r i a l I nven to ry Track ing f u n c t i o n must p rov ide a process t o i d e n t i f y and document impor tant a t t r i b u t e s ( type, q u a n t i t y , form, process o r s torage cond i t i on , l o c a t i o n ) o f t he hazardous m a t e r i a l s assoc iated w i t h t h e TWRS f a c i l i t i e s . Th i s i n fo rma t ion w i l l be used t o determine t h e f a c i l i t y hazard category and r e s u l t i n g a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s documentation requi rements. Changes i n the hazards i n fo rma t ion must be communicated t o t h e

A- 1

F igu re A - 1

TWRS Safety Management System Functions

P N

Baseline

System

L I 2. Risk

Management I System

----I - -__ 14. Sitesafety I I Management I I Programs 1 2 ~

Basis

Numbers correspond to the subsection descriptions I--- I - - I Outside Program Plan Scope

0 , T


Risk Identification and Authorization Basis Control functions. Inventory Tracking will also ensure that any changes to tank farm hazards will be identified and evaluated before adding new wastes to the tanks.

1.4 REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT

The Requirements Management function must provide a documented process to identify and allocate requirements (i . e . , S/RID and systems engineering functions and requirements) important to the TWRS Safety Management Program. Changes in requirements must be assessed and communicated to affected subsystems. been prepared, reviewed, and approved, and systems engineering functions and requirements will be used. Relevant portions of the TWRS S / R I D will be iimplemented by the safety management system procedures.

1.5 SAFETY BASIS DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT

For the Safety Management Program, the WHC-TWRS S/RID that has

The Safety Basis Document Management function identifies and manages safety basis documents and develops an appropriate document tracking system. Revisions to the list o f documents must be forwarded to the Authorization Basis Control function.

2.0 RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

The Risk Management System is required to: (1) identify potential accidents and accident initiators; ( 2 ) analyze the identified hazards and accidents to determine the associated risks; ( 3 ) evaluate the risks relative to established guidelines; and (4) determine the appropriate controls to reduce the risk to an acceptable level including defense-in-depth.

2.1 RISK IDENTIFICATION

The Risk Identification function must identify accident initiators and establish the processes for performing hazards analyses and accident analyses to determine the frequency and consequence associated with various postulated events. This function must be alerted to actual or proposed changes in the hazards identification (type, quantity, form, process or storage condition, an'd location) and site characteristics. Changes in frequency or consequence must be communicated to the following functions: Risk Evaluation, Establish Prevention/Mitigation, and Authorization Basis Control. Risks originating outside the scope of TWRS that may affect the functioning of TWRS safety class or safety significant SSCs, or that may initiate accidents within TWRS will be similarly considered.

2.2 RISK EVALUATION

The Risk Evaluation function must provide a process to evaluate identified risks against approved risk evaluation guidelines to determine whether any controls are necessary or prudent to reduce the overall risk. Changes in frequency or consequences of the hazards analysis (or accident analysis) or changes in the approved risk evaluation guidelines must be

A-3


communicated to this function. c:ommunicated to the Establish Prevention/Mitigation and the Authorization Basis Control functions.

2 .3 ESTABLISH PREVENTION/MITIGATION

Changes in the level of risk must be

The Establish Prevention/Mitigation function must provide a process to determine the appropriate set of SSCs and Administrative Controls required to reduce identified risks making use of the risk evaluation guidelines and implementing appropriate defense-in-depth. Changes in the level of risk associated with identified accidents, and proposed changes to the SSCs and Administrative Controls credited in the analyses must be communicated to this function. niust be input to the TWRS SSC Management and the Authorization Basis Control functions.

Changes in the list of required SSCs and Administrative Controls

3.0 AUTHORIZATION BASIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

The Authorization Basis Management System is required to develop authorization basis document evaluate and control changes, and implement the authorization basis.

3 . 1 AUTHORIZATION BASIS DOCUMENT DEVELOPMENT

The Authorization Basis Document Development function must provide a process to develop and revise authorization basis documents. authorization basis documents must be input to the Authorization Basis Control and the Authorization Basis Implementation functions. This function must maintain a list of authorization basis documents.

3.2 AUTHORIZATION BASIS CONTROL

Changes to the

The Authorization Basis Control function must provide a process to screen, evaluate, document, track, and resolve authorization basis changes. A kiey component of this function i s the USQ process. Actual changes as well as proposed changes in the facility SSCs, site description, facility hazards, facility risks, safety basis documents, authorization basis documents, and operating and maintenance procedures must be input to this function. This function must also be alerted to discoveries and occurrences. authorization basis must be input to the Authorization Basis Implementation, Authorization Basis Document Development, and the Safety Basis Document Management functions.

Changes to the

3 . .3 AUTHORIZATION BASIS IMPLEMENTATION

The Authorization Basis Implementation function must provide a process to implement t h e authorization basis in the appropriate documents and procedures and to develop the requisite training. documents and classification of SSCs must be input to this function. function must track the implementation documents and provide a list of these

Changes in the authorization basis This

A-4


documents to the Authorization Basis Control and the Safety Basis Document Management functions.

4 . 0 SITE SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

Numerous other site management programs interface with the Safety Management System. Examples of these programs include prevention of inadvertent criticality; radiation protection; hazardous material protection; radioactive and hazardous waste management; quality assurance; emergency preparedness program; testing, surveillance, and maintenance; operational safety; procedures and training; human factors; provisions for decontamination and decommissioning; management, organization, and institutional safety - provisions. Each of these programs must be evaluated to determine its impact on the Safety Management System and to determine when changes to these programs must be communicated to the Safety Management System.

Chapters 6 through 17 of the FSAR) are an integral part of the overall safety management system. WHC policies and procedures which will be reviewed to ensure proper interface with the safety management system procedures developed under this plan.

The Site Safety Management Programs (e.g., those programs discussed in

Those programs are already in place and are governed by

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APPENDIX B SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION FOR A PROJECT

A key function of the Safety Management System is to control the acceptance of safety documents into the TWRS authorization basis. c:ontrol is established through issuing procedures which identify prescribed requirements for the documents and through a review process to assure compliance to those requirements. direct interface with TWRS plant modifications and projects to ensure that procedural requirements are met and that strategies unique to each modification or project are aimed at successful regulatory approval and change a'f the authorization basis.

representative plant modification as depicted in Figure B-1.

This

The Safety Management System must provide

The steps on the following pages discuss the development process for a

A desired change to the facility or its operation is identified and the functional requirements and scope are documented.

Tools Required: Procedure to identify and document the requirements and scope of a proposed modification.

The boundary of the authorization basis modification must be developed and documented. and may include some of the existing TWRS configuration. The configuration of the SSCs within the scope of the upgrade will be documented.

Tool s Required: Procedure to identify and document boundary of modification

Change control procedure for SSC configuration documents.

Change control procedure for the above.

Based on the scope and requirements o f the proposed change, an evaluation of the impact on the existing authorization basis is made through the USQ process. continues at step C , otherwise, the negative results are documented and this process stops.

Tools Required: USQ Procedure.

Based on the boundary of the authorization basis modification, the hazardous material within the scope will be identified and documented.

Tool s Required: Procedure to document and track hazardous material inventory. Change Control procedure for the hazardous material inventory

The boundary will be based on the scope of the project

Procedure to document configuration of SSCs.

Tracking system for SSC configuration documents.

If the results of the evaluation are positive, the process

document.

B-1

Figure B.l

Identify Develop Identify Controls, Limits, Authorization

m I Iu

-

Authorization Basis Modification Development for Project

(Sample Process)

and Restrictions Basis in lOSR/TSR Documents, Controls Submit to DOE

I I

Define Boundary of Authorization Basis

Identify Need for Project Li Modification

I

Evaluate Impact on Existing Material Inventory Authorization and Perform

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

Screening/ Evaluation Category

Provide Information to Project Designers to Identify Design Criteria

Perform Hazard Analysis and Accident Analysis to Unmitigated Determini Risks (E) (F) 1 Compare Risks to Risk Evaluation Guidelines Ch 7 (Rev 4) of WHC-CM-4-46, and Identify SC/SS Sscs

Provide Information to Project Designers

Project Design Documents

I

v)

s

V W l -

0 t

0 I

H 7696030375.1 rnz

S&L-WHC 3/29/96 ' k r +


I:. The site characteristics and hazardous material inventory will be used to identify the unmitigated risks (i.e., consequences associated with the release of the hazardous material assuming no SSCs and a release probability of 1) . The unmitigated risks will be reviewed against the risk evaluation guidelines to determine the need for preventive/mitigative controls to reduce the risk. The results will be provided to the SSC designer to determine overall project functional cl assi f ications.

Tools Required:

0 Change control procedure for the hazard assessment document.

The resulting frequency/consequences of the unmitigated accident analysis are compared to the risk evaluation guidelines. If they exceed the risk evaluation guide1 ines, preventive/mitigative measures will be developed. The resulting identification of Safety Class and Safety Significant SSCs will be identified in a design document, engineering calculation notes, and a preliminary hazards analysis (PHA) table. This will initiate a change to the as-built configuration control documents to add the identification of the newly classified SSCs as well as the functions and requirements associated with those SSCs.

Tools Required: Procedure to identify and document mitigators and preventers. Procedure to conduct safety analyses. Procedure to prepare engineering calculation. Procedure to compare risks to the risk evaluation guidelines.

Based on the selection of the preventers and mitigators, the specification of the controls, limits, and restrictions are identified and documented in IOSR/TSR.

Tools Required: Procedure for development and documentation of controls, limits, and

Change Control procedures for IOSR/TSR.

The results of the preceding steps will be used to develop authorization basis document revisions. The revisions will be submitted to DOE for approval.

Tools Required: Procedure for revisions to the authorization basis (e.g., Interim

Procedure to prepare a hazard assessment document. Procedure to analyze accident sequences to determine resulting risk.

F.

G.

restrictions.

H .

Safety Basis document). Procedure for developing and revising Cbmpliance Implementation P1 ans. Procedure for the development and preparation of Authorization Basis documents.

I . Based on the authorization basis documents, requirements will be identified for the implementation of the controls in the facility.

8-3


Tools Required: Procedure for issuing and revising Operating and Maintenance procedures. Procedure for conducting Surveillance and In-Service Inspections. Procedure for developing training.

The result of the selection of the mitigators and preventers will be a list of SSCs that provide safety class and safety significant functions. Based on the allocation of S/RID and systems engineering requirements to the project, the design requirements will be allocated to those SSCs. The results will be issued in project design documents.

Tools Required: Requirements Allocation Procedure(s)

To support the preceding activities, procedures for the identification of Authorization Basis documents and Safety Basis documents must be available. Additionally, tracking systems for Authorization Basis documents, Safety Basis Support documents, Safety Class and Safety Significant SSCs, and As-Built documents must be available. the USQ process. Furthermore, a procedure will be implemented that will provide for tracking and statusing all of these steps.

;I.

These tracking systems will be used t o support

B-4


APPENDIX C BASIS FOR INTERIM OPERATION TASK PLAN

1.0 INTRODUCTION

U.S. Department o f Energy (DOE) Order 5480.22, "Technica l Sa fe ty Requirements," (Reference I ) , and DOE Order 5480.23, "Nuclear Safety Ana lys i s Repor ts , " (Reference 2), r e q u i r e t h e submi t ta l o f Implementation Plans ( I P S ) t o achieve compliance w i t h these orders. A Basis f o r I n t e r i m Operat ion (BIO) must be prepared t o e s t a b l i s h the i n t e r i m s a f e t y bas i s f o r t h e f a c i l i t y u n t i l t h e Sa fe ty Ana lys i s Report (SAR) and Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) documents can be completed which meet the requirements o f DOE Order 5480.23 and 5480.22. An I n t e r i m Safety Basis ( I S B ) document (Reference 10) was - prepared t o s a t i s f y t h i s requirement as proposed i n the I P (Reference 12 ) . Guidance f o r t h e development o f a B I O i s prov ided i n DOE-STD-3011-94, "Guidance f o r Preparat ion o f DOE Order 5480.22 (TSR) and 5480.23, (SAR) Implementation Plans," (Reference 3 ) . S,ystem (TWRS) F a c i l i t y was prepared and submi t ted t o t h e DOE f o r approval p r i o r t o issuance o f DOE-STD-3011-94 and does n o t conform t o a l l o f t h e guidance i n t h i s standard. I n add i t i on , t he TWRS I S B has n o t been adequately mainta ined as t h e c u r r e n t a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s f o r t he f a c i l i t y , and t h e I n t e r i m Operat ional Safety Requirements (IOSRs) (References 7, 8, 9, 10) have n o t been r i g o r o u s l y de r i ved from a comprehensive hazard ana lys i s .

Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) approved B I O f o r t h e TWRS f a c i l i t y t o comply w i t h the requirements o f DOE Orders 5480.22 and 5480.23 and DOE Standard DOE-STD-3011-94. Plan guidance and t h e changed d e f i n i t i o n of t he l o c a t i o n o f t he maximum exposed i n d i v i d u a l and r i s k eva lua t i on gu ide l i nes (Ref 15, 16, and 17) .

The 810 and i t s a t tendant IOSRs w i l l supersede the I n t e r i m Safety Basis and become the a u t h o r i z a t i o n bas i s f o r t he TWRS F a c i l i t y u n t i l superseded by t h e FSAR.

1.1 TASK DEFINITION

The I S B f o r t h e Tank Waste Remediation

Th is t a s k p l a n addresses t h e work t o be performed t o prepare a

Th is p l a n r e f l e c t s t h e approved M u l t i - y e a r Program

The purpose o f t h i s t a s k i s t o develop a B I O f o r t h e TWRS t h a t w i l l meet the requirements of DOE Order 5480.22 and 5480.23 and DOE Standard DOE-STD- 3011-94.

S p e c i f i c a l l y , t he format o f t he TWRS B I O w i l l f o l l o w t h e o u t l i n e below:

Execut ive Summary

The Execut ive Summary w i l l p resent a summary o f t h e r e s u l t s o f t he s a f e t y analyses i n c l u d i n g the hazard c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f t he f a c i l i t y , s a f e t y assurance programs, i d e n t i f i e d v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s , compensatory measures, r e s t r i c t i o n s on i n t e r i m operat ions, ope ra t i ona l h i s t o r y , and t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r why the f a c i l i t y i s safe f o r i n t e r i m opera t i on .

c- 1


1.0 Introduction

The introduction will provide the reasons for the E10 and give a brief background about the facility, its current mission, its contribution to the site mission, its past operating history, and scope of the document. The status of the existing authorization basis and associated documentation will also be discussed.

2.0 Facility Description

This section will provide a description o f the facility; its mission; its processes; and the primary structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are important to safety. The Facility Description will be the FSAR Chapter 2 . The site description will be provided by including Chapter 1- of the FSAR.

3.0 Relevant Operational History

This section will provide a description of any significant abnormal occurrences and/or accidents along with the compensatory measures that have been implemented or planned. Safety changes to the facility condition subsequent to issuance of the Interim Safety Basis will be summarized. A brief description of any safety related findings from recent Operational Readiness Reviews and/or Inspection Audits will also be discussed. of the supporting documentation that has been developed for the TWRS phenomena currently being studied as open Unresolved Safety Question (USQ) issues, and will also contain a discussion of the facility's corrective action plan involving improvements for USQ evaluations.

4.0 Safety Management

This section will briefly define the facility's programmatic approach to safety management for workers and the general public. Discussions will include management policies; organizational structure and management responsibilities; radioactive and hazardous material waste management; critical i ty protection; radiation protection; hazardous material protection; training; testing; surveillance; equipment maintenance; conduct of operations; configuration management; quality assurance; provisions for decontamination and decommissioning; experimental review; emergency preparedness; occurrence reporting; work control; performance indicators; and the Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) I

5.0 Safety Analysis

This section will describe the approach f o r the hazard classification of the facility as defined in DOE-STD-1027-92 (Reference 5). The Hazards Analysis (HA) method and results will be described. Discussion will include the impact of both normal operations and postulated accident conditions on workers, the general public, and the environment. The dominant accident scenarios will be identified and evaluated quantitatively.

This section of the BIO will include a summary discussion

Any potential design, procedure, or equipment

c-2


vulnerabilities related to the presented scenarios will be identified and descriptions of the administrative controls, compensatory measures, or restrictions on interim operations implemented as a result of the identified vulnerabilities will be summarized. In addition, this section will describe the methodology and results used to identify those engineered and administrative controls required for safe operation of the facility. their attendant safety functions, will be presented.

6.0 Operational Controls

This section will discuss the operating envelope of the facility including Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs), restriction on operations, and administrative controls. presenting the controls for dominant scenarios. Additionally, safeguards that are considered significant contributors to facility safety from a defense-in-depth perspective will be identified. The IOSRs will be discussed in summary in this section of the BIO and provided in their totality as a separate document.

7.0 Conclusion

This section will state the conclusion of the BIO in a short, summary statement.

A list of safety class and safety significant equipment, and

Discussion will focus on

1.2 CUSTOMER AND USER IDENTIFICATION

1.2.1 Primary Customers

The customers are the DOE, Richland Operations Office (RL), the TWRS Tank Farm Transitions Projects (TFTP), TWRS Characterization Project and TWRS Disposal Program organizations.

1..2.2 Users

The primary user of the B I O documentation, including IOSRs, will be the TWRS TFTP, the TWRS Design Authority organization, and the TWRS Safety and Licensing organization.

1.3 TASK DELIVERABLES

The task deliverable is a WHC approved TWRS BIO issued to DOE by September 30, 1996 for approval. Supporting documentation will include a calmpleted Hazards Analysis Report, the Interim Operational Safety Requirements, and an interim classification of Safety Class and Safety Significant SSCs.

c-3


2.0 TASK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The task acceptance criteria for the B I O are that it must conform with t.he requirements of DOE Order 5480.22 and 5480.23, meet the guidelines of DOE 5;tandard DOE-STD-3011-94, and receive WHC approval by the organizations listed bel ow.

Westinghouse Hanford Company - TWRS Safety and Licensing - TWRS Design Authority - Tank Farm Transition Projects - TWRS Chief Engineer - TWRS Safety and Quality Assurance - WHC Safety and Environmental Advisory Council (SEAC) - TWRS Vice President and Manager (Final Approval)

3.0 METHODOLOGY

3.1 HAZARD ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

Specific information on the hazard analysis methodology is provided in the Tank Waste Remediation System Final Safety Analysis Report Project Plan, WHC-SD-WM-PLN-113, Rev. 0. To minimize programmatic costs, the TWRS BIO HA team will utilize information generated for TWRS FSAR Chapter 3 analysis as input. completion of FSAR Chapter 3 analysis. Any changes in the FSAR Chapter 3 analysis schedule will cause subsequent delays in the BIO schedule. FSAR Chapter 3 analysis input to the BIO will include the following:

Accordingly, the schedule for the BIO is highly dependent upon the

Facility Inventory - Provide an inventory of radioactive and hazardous materials (location, type, form, quantity) for TWRS facilities.

Hazard Identification Tables - Provide a hazard identification table for TWRS facilities and operations.

Estimate of Frequency, Consequence, and Risk - Provide an estimate of the frequency, consequence, and risk for all receptors (off-site public, co-located, facility worker) and the environment without controls.

Identify Preventers and Mitigators - Provide a complete listing of the administrative and engineering controls used as preventers (reduce the frequency) and mitigators (reduce the consequence) for each event.

Estimate of Frequency, Consequence, and Risk - Provide an estimate o f the frequency, the consequence, and the risk for all receptors (offsite public, co-located, facility worker) and the environment with controls.

c-4


Output from the hazard ana lys i s w i l l i nc lude t h e f o l l o w i n g :

Hazard I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Tables - a comprehensive l i s t o f hazards associated w i t h TWRS f a c i l i t i e s and operat ions. The t a b l e s w i l l be cons is ten t w i t h t h e Hazard I d e n t i f i c a t i o n t a b l e s from the FSAR HA e f f o r t .

Hazard Eva lua t i on Table - an event d e s c r i p t i o n , cause, frequency, consequence, p reven t i ve and m i t i g a t i v e features, and r i s k r e s u l t s f o r hazard events associated w i t h TWRS f a c i l i t i e s and opera t i ons .

Hazard Eva lua t i on Scenario Discuss ion - a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e acc iden t scenario, d iscuss ion o f frequency w i t h and w i thou t c o n t r o l s ( i n c l u d i n g the bas i s f o r f i n a l determinat ion) , d i scuss ion o f consequences t o each recep to r w i t h and w i t h o u t c o n t r o l s ( i n c l u d i n g the bas i s f o r f i n a l de te rm ina t ion ) , d i scuss ion o f t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r contaminat ion o f t he environment ( i n c l u d i n g t h e bas i s f o r f i n a l de te rm ina t ion ) , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c a l l y c r e d i t e d engineered fea tu res and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s used t o a r r i v e a t t h e frequency and consequence w i t h c o n t r o l va lues.

3 .2 INTERIM OSR METHODOLOGY

The I n t e r i m OSRs w i l l be produced f o l l o w i n g t h e methodology descr ibed i n DOE Order 5480.22 and i n the WSRC In teg ra ted Work Process Manual (Reference 1 4 ) .

3 .3 FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY

The methodology de f i ned i n WHC-IP-0842 and the r i s k eva lua t i on g u i d e l i n e s approved f o r FSAR w i l l be used i n the Hazard Assessment process i n s e l e c t i o n o f s a f e t y i tems.

4 . 0 TASK ACTIVITIES

Major t a s k a c t i v i t i e s f o r t he TWRS 610 inc lude :

Completion o f t he 810, meeting the requirements i n Sect ion 1.1, pe r t h e schedule i n Sect ion 5.0.

Completion o f t he TWRS Funct ional C l a s s i f i c a t i o n pe r t h e schedule i n Sect ion 5.0.

Completion o f IOSRs per the schedule i n Sect ion 5.0.

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5.0 TASK SCHEDULE

The reference schedule for the TWRS BIO is: Activitv DescriDtion Perform interim functional classification of Safety C1 ass/Safety Significant SSCs. Prepare IOSRs. Prepare balance of BIO sections. Compile HA, interim functional classification, IOSR, and balance of BIO sections into BIO document. Issue completed BIO document.

DOE Review Mi 1 estones Begin review of IOSRs. Begin review of completed BIO

Start Finish 05/30/96 08/02/96

05/15/96 08/30/96 05/13/96 OB/30/96 08/16/96 09/30/96

09/30/96 Mi

08/19/96 Mi 08/30/96 Mi

estoni

estone

estone

6 . 0 TASK QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN

Applicable department quality assurance requirements for task deliverables will be implemented consistent with appropriate parts of the WHC Quality Assurance Manual (Reference 11). Quality is ensured by (1) selection of qualified personnel, (2) quality assurance during document preparation, and (3) quality assurance during the document review process.

7.0 TASK ASSUMPTIONS

The scope of the BIO will be,based on the following assumptions: . Hazards will be identified, evaluated, and categorized as part of the FSAR task.

Selection of Safety ClasslSafety Significant SSCs is to be performed in accordance with WHC-IP-0842.

TSR developed as part of the FSAR are t o be used as available. IOSRs are required, they will be revised in accordance with DOE Order 5480.22 to address the BIO documentation.

Utilize existing safety documentation to the extent possible.

Any projects which add to or modify TWRS Facilities will require preparation of amendment packages to the BIO.

If new

C-6


8.0 REFERENCES

4 .

5.

6.

7

8.

9.

10.

11

12.

1 3 .

U.S. Department of Energy, "Technical Safety Requirements," DOE Order 5480.22, Washington D.C., February 25, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, "Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports," DOE Order 5480.23, Washington D.C., April 10, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, "Guidance for Preparation of DOE Orders 5480.22 (TSR) and 5480.23 (SAR) Implementation Plans," DOE-STD-3011-94, Washington D.C., November 1994.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Hanford Site lank Farm Facilities Interim Safety Basis," WHC-SD-WM-ISB-001, Rev. 0, Richland, Washington, August, 1993.

U.S. Department of Energy, "Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports," DOE-STD-1027-92, Washington D.C., December 1992.

Westinghouse Savannah River Company, "Functional Classification of Safety Class and Safety Significant Structures, Systems, and Components," Manual E7, Procedure 2.25, Aiken, South Carolina, February 1, 1995.

West i nghouse Hanford Company, "Si ngl e-She1 1 Tank Interim Operational Safety Requirements, I ' WHC-SD-WM-OSR-005, Rev. 08, Richl and, Washington, April 3 , 1995.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Double-She1 1 Tank Interim Operational Safety Requirements," WHC-SD-WM-OSR-016, Rev. 08, Richland, Washington, April 3, 1995.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Aging Waste Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements, " WHC-SD-WM-OSR-004, Rev. 08, Richl and, Washington, April 3, 1995.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Hanford Site Tank Farm Facilities Interim Safety Basis Volume 1 and Volume 2," WHC-SD-WM-1%-001, Rev. 0, Richland, Washington, August 1993.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Quality Assurance Manual," WHC-CM-4-2, Release 83, Richland, Washington, February 15,1996.

Westinghouse Hanford Company, "Implementation Plan for DOE Orders 5480.21, 5480.22, and 5480.23," Correspondence No. 9257875, Richland, Washington, October 28, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, "Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports," DOE-STD- 3009-94, July 1994.

c-7

WHC-SD-WM-PLN- 114 REV. 1

14. Westinghouse Savannah River Company, “Safety Document lntegrated Work Process Guideline and Methods ( U ) , ” WSRC-RP-95-001, Rev. 0, Aiken, South Carolina, November 30, 1995.

15. Letter from J. Kinzer, RL, to President, WHC, ”Direction For Risk Evaluation Guidelines And Offsite Maximum Exposed Individual (MEI) Location,” 96-WSD-062, dated May 31, 1996.

For Tank Farm Operation,” #9502999, dated June 14, 1995.

Acceptance Criteria For The Hanford Tank Farms Safety Analysis,” dated April 4, 1996.

16. Letter from A. Sidpara, RL, to President, WHC, ”Risk Acceptance Criteria

17. Memorandum from R.Guimond, HQ, to Manager, RL, “Interim Radiological Dose

C-8


APPENDIX D RISK MANAGEMENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The r i s k management l i s t (RML) descr ibes scenarios t h a t cou ld l e a d t o program f a i l u r e o r s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s o f q u a l i t y i n the f i n a l program product . For each scenario, t h e r i s k and ac t i ons t h a t must be taken t o c o n t r o l t h e r i s k are i d e n t i f i e d .

i n t e n s i v e management o r r e g u l a r v i s i b i l i t y w i t h sen io r management. cons idered more impor tant i f any o f t he f o l l o w i n g cond i t i ons e x i s t :

Consequences are very ser ious Immediate a c t i o n i s requ i red

Senior management dec i s ion i s requ i red .

mon i to r and t r a c k s i g n i f i c a n t r i s k s t o the program. b r i n g issues r e l a t e d t o t h e i r tasks t o management a t t e n t i o n so t h a t app rop r ia te a c t i o n can be taken. o the rs t h e s t a t u s o f t he r i s k s l i s t e d i n the RML a t l e a s t b iweekly . I n t h e case o f t h e Safety Management System, the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Engineer ing Department w i l l rev iew those RML i tems which are r e d and c r i t i c a l weekly. In add i t i on , t h e Vice Pres ident , TWRS, i s appra ised o f impor tant i tems. Energy (DOE).

The i n t e n t of t he RML i s t o focus on those areas o f r i s k t h a t r e q u i r e Risks are

Issue has h igh v i s i b i l i t y from stakeholders o r f ede ra l government Required ac t i ons are d i f f i c u l t t o coord inate

The RML i s used by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) management t o Task leads use t h e RML t o

Management reviews w i t h the t a s k leads and

The RML i s a l so used t o rev iew r i s k s w i t h the U.S. Department o f Attached i s a sample RML f o r t he Safety Management Program.

2.0 SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM RISKS

I n t h e development o f t h i s p lan , severa l steps have been undertaken t o m i t i g a t e r i s k s i d e n t i f i e d . Current key r i s k s i nc lude the f o l l o w i n g .

Risk:

E f f o r t s t o complete T r i - P a r t y Agreement p r o j e c t s (e.g., W-030), a Basis For I n t e r i m Operations ( B I O ) and a F ina l Safety Ana lys i s Report (FSAR) i n p a r a l l e l may r e s u l t i n i n c o n s i s t e n t Au tho r i za t i on Basis documents.

M i t i g a t i n g S t ra tegy :

The p r o j e c t team and B I O team w i l l i n t e r f a c e w i t h t h e SAR team t o ensure consis tency i n t h e f o l l o w i n g :

Hazardous ma te r ia l i nven to ry S i t e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s Hazards/Accident analyses and r e s u l t s

0- 1


Permanent controls identified with associated availability and

The safety documentation for these projects has been reviewed for consistency with the BIO, FSAR analyses and Safety Management System content requirements. Upgrades to these safety documents will be performed as necessary. These projects will utilize the Safety Management System document format to the extent practical depending on the stage of development of each project.

reduction factors

Risk:

The B I O and FSAR approval dates will not meet the authorization basis modification requirements of the projects.

Mitigating Strategy:

The authorization basis for the projects will not be incorporated into the FSAR until after Revision 0 is submitted. The project authorization basis documents will be issued as ”stand alone,” project and/or activity specific authorization basis upgrades satisfying the format guidance of DOE Standard 3009, as described in Section 2 . 3 .

Risk:

The IS6 will need to be modified to support plant projects implementing Tri-Party Agreement milestones and DNFSB commitments.


The authorization basis modification documents for each project will define the boundary of the required authorization basis revision. modification will cover all activities associated with the project so that reliance on the current I S B will be eliminated or at least minimized relative to the operations being added or modified.

Risk:

The projects are creating authorization basis documents that are inconsistent in terms o f content and format. party review criteria.


The safety documentation for these projects has been reviewed for consistency with the FSAR analyses and safety management system content requirements. Upgrades to these safety documents will be performed as necessary. These projects will utilize the Safety Management System document format to the extent practical depending on the stage of development of each project.

The

This may not meet third

D-2


Risk:

Some TWRS project safety analyses are being developed using different definitions for the location of the ME1 and risk evaluation guidelines than the TWRS B I O and FSAR per DOE guidance provided in reference 15 of Appendix C. These differences have the potential to generate different functional classifications and differing control requirements within TWRS.


WHC will implement the more conservative control requirements for a particular SSC or administrative control should a case arise that differing control requirements are generated by these differences in ME1 and REG. and REG is being performed to identify any areas of significant impact arising from these changes.

In addition, a parametric study of the impacts of changed ME1

0-3


APPENDIX E COST AND SCHEDULE SUMMARIES

The provis ional base l ine c o s t and schedule d a t a provided in Revision 0 have been modified t o r e f l e c t approval of t h e Multi-Year Program Plan guidance. The c o s t d e t a i l s by work breakdown s t r u c t u r e (WBS) element and f o r Fiscal Year 1996 a r e shown in Table 6-1.

E- 1

Set Up Teams 0

Dran Procedures. Support AB Mods 6 Maintenance 0

Phase I Procedures - Phase ii Procedures P

Review Programs 6 Generate Revlsion - Process Revisions (Ongoing) -

CREATE ORG 6 CHARTER - TWRS AB MGMT GROUP 0

LETTER INSTRUCTIONS ON SAFETY DOC HIERARCHY 0

COMPUTERIZED X-REF DATABASE:AB 6 IMPLE PROC - 6 Maintaln Relational Database

WHC Review 6 Approve Relational Database 0

AB MANAGEMENT SELFASSESSMENTS -

Tler I Revlew -Chapters 3 6 4 0

Tier II Revlew - Chapters 3 6 4 0

Tler II Revlew -Integrated El0 E 3

0 SEAC Review

Incorporate Comments 6 Issue 0

Chapter 1 -,Intmductlon

B 2 - Faclllty Descrlptlon

,Chapter 3, ~ Relevant Operatlonal Hlstory

e r 4 -Safety Management

Chapter 5 ~ Syfety Anaiysls

Tler II Revlew -Chapter 5 0

m 6 - Operatlonai Controls

Tler II Review -Chapter 6 0

Complete Executive Summary

Integrated E10 Review 0

0

z I 0 I

v) 0

=z

V W l -

< I

r *

p a r d Analysis

Review a Approve - El0 HA 0 I

P

Functional Ciasslflcatlon Document +J

Tler II Review - E l0 Hazard Analysls 0

rnz . _ I

Tier ii Review - ISOR 0

Chemical Mlxlng Report 1

ISBlBiO implementation Pian

pnqer - te rp Major Project Status Assessment

Other ProiectslActivities Status Assessment

FLAMMABLE GAS USQ JCO - Near-tenn Major Project Status Assessment :

Develop 6 Malntain AB interface Controls - =are initial AB Training Updates

Planned Interface WNh TSRs P

I 0 I

v, 0 I

WHC Review 6 Approve TSRs - Provide IP for FSAR 6 TSRs P E

f FSAR TRANSITION PLAN < I

V W r - WHC Review 6 Approve IP 1

I

prepare FSAR Transition Pian

m z

. _ c r e

(,ID 1 ES 1 EF

ABMSOS 26FEB%* 03JUN%

? CHoo31326 17MAY% 23MAY%

CHoo31327 24MAY% 07JUN%

CHW3132A 07JUN96

CHW31328 07JUN96

? CHoo31326 17MAY% 23MAY%

CHoo31327 24MAY% 07JUN%

CHW3132A 07JUN96

CHW31328 07JUN96

Report ot CY95 US@ Evaluatlon Revlews

'JVHC Revlew USP Eva1 Report 0

Incorporate Comments 6 Approve USP Eva1 Reporl 0

Sub& Report to Mrector lW Tranlst lon Project

identilv h Track Corrective Actions

ISB UPDATE 6 USER FRIENDLY IMPROVEMENTS - =re Rev to ISB Chapters 1.2.5 6 Appendices

WHC Revlew 6 Approval 01 ISB Revlsion a %CAPPROVED AB DOCUMENT LIST

221-96-950 List Current AB Documents

Develop Adrnln Programs lor IOSR AC Reqmts

WHC Review 6 Approve Program Development 0

ANNUAL AB UPDATES P

Provide ISB Annual Revlsion - WHC Review 6 Approve ISB Revlsion -

Hazard ID 6 ConRguratlon Verttkatlon

0 Scoping 6 Plannlng

TWRS Document identincation 6 Revlew 0

identillcation 01 Information Needs 0

=z 1 n I

VI 0 I

=z

V W r -

< I

r a

Visual inspection-TWRS Hazards, Stmct, Systems 0

Doc Visual inspect 6 Prep Final Us tapen items 0

Resolve (Uor Close Open items P 0

Prepare Final Document - Facility Walkdowns 0 m z

Hazard ID Database to DOE GIs

T21-96.920 Cornpi Haz id 6 Conflguration Verlflca

. C r

To D i s t r i b u t i o n

R. F. Bacon R. J. Cash M. L. Cowen G . L. Dunford S. J. E b e r l e i n L. F. Ermold R. W. Foley G . R. Franz J. W . Hagan A. H. Hansen J . 0. Honeyman J . J . Klos E. J. K r e j c i C . E . Leach E . J. Lipke G. A . Meyer R. S. Popielarczyk '

J . G. Propson D. A. Raap A. L. Ramble D. P. Reber ti. E. Rew W . E. Ross 0. M. Serrano J . P. Sloughter C . L. Sohn F. 0. Strankman J . D. Thomson J . E . Truax A . M. Umek T . C . V a r l j e n J . H . Wicks R. D. Wojtasek P r o j e c t F i l e s Central IFiles ( O r i g i n a l +2) Ex t ra (20)

From Page 1 of 1 TWRS Safety & L icens ing Date 07/31/96

s7-a5 S7-14 A2-34 A2-34 R2-12 S8-84 A2-34 S2-42 R3-01 A2-34 63-21 R2-54 81-10 R1-49 A2-34 S2-48 A2-34 R2-36 A2-26 A3-38 T4-07 T4-15 S5-07 R2-54 R2-54 S7-51 R2-50 H6-35 R2-50 S7-81 S7-81 R2-50

A2-26 A3-88 A2-34

s7-a4

Project Title/Work Order

TWRS Safe ty Management Program Plan, WHC-SD-WM-PLN-114, Rev. 1

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

EDT No.

ECN NO. 189867

A-6000-135 (01/93) VEF067

Name Text Text Only Attach./ EDT/ECN

MSlN With All Appendix Only Attach. Only