Elmonairy 48

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

Learning from Lightning

Lessons from the German Blitzkrieg in France

MS489: ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL STUDY- MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

SECTION D8

MAJ BEAULIEU

By

CADET ELMONAIRY 11

WEST POINT, NEW YORK

25 APRIL 2011

____ MY DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFIES ALL SOURCES USED AND

ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN COMPLETING THIS ASSIGNMENT.

____ NO SOURCES WERE USED OR ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN

COMPLETING THIS ASSGNMENT.

SIGNATURE:

ContentsI: Introduction3Methodology6Literature Review8Road Map13II: Definitions13Blitzkrieg14Operations16Success17Excellence18III: Fall Gelb19An Operational Throw of the Dice19Race to the Meuse20Lightning at Sedan20The Drive to the Channel21Why Victory?21IV: Doctrinal Roots of Victory24The Lineage of Truppenfhrung25Operational Concept25Command Principles28Technology31V: Institutional Roots of Victory34Recruitment35Training35Replacements36The Effect of This System37VI: The American Experience38Desert Storm38Iraqi Freedom40American Personnel Management41VII: Policy Implications41Doctrinal Lessons of 194043Institutional Lessons of 194046Technological Lessons of 194047VIII: Conclusions48Bibliography51

I: Introduction

The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected

Sun Tzu[footnoteRef:1] [1: Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. (New York: Barnes and Nobles Books, 2003) 1.]

The U.S. Army today faces a set of present and potential challenges of ever increasing complexity. Even as the Global War on Terror (Global Overseas Contingency Operations?) continues, new threats to national security menace just over the time horizon. The world is currently witnessing several geo-political trends that promise to drastically alter the strategic environment in the near to midterm.[footnoteRef:2] The disproportionate population growth in the developing world and associated youth bulges, the increasing scarcity of such essential resources as water and oil, and the explosive urbanization and growth of Third World metropolises, are just a sampling of the processes that have the potential to create serious and complex security dilemmas. [footnoteRef:3] These challenges face the nation at large but hold special significance for the nations army. The Army must come to grips with a future in which it is likely to face greater and more uncertain demands. [2: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. "Quarterly Operational Environment Review." West Point, September 22, 2010. The G-6 for TRADOC briefed the QOER at West Point and detailed the Armys official projections for what challenges the service faces in the next 15 years. ] [3: COL Wilson, Isaiah. "Past as Prologue: Compound Security in the 21st Century and Implicatoins for American Global Leadership." West Point, November 20, 2009. Colonel Isaiah Wilson, an associate professor at the United States Military Academy delivered this lecture conerning Compound Security to the annual SCUSA conference. The lecture stressed a more holistic uncerstanding of security. This reconceptualization of what it means to be secure naturally requires a corresponding alteration of how security threats are viewed. More information is available at http://www.thinkbeyondwar.com]

Further complicating the situation is the fact that the Army will face resource constraints in the future that are much more serious than anything experienced within the last decade. The nations burgeoning debt and the rapid expansion of entitlements will exert strong downward pressures on defense spending in the future. If the latest budget projections released by the White House hold true, defense spending will fall to a historically low three percent of the gross domestic product before the close of the current decade.[footnoteRef:4] This contraction of overall defense spending will affect the Army particularly hard as the fastest growing part of defense budget is personnel related expenditures. [footnoteRef:5] While the American tradition has always been to reduce military spending in times of relative security to reap a peace dividend, the near future promises to present the U.S. Army with a dilemma unprecedented in its history. Unless there is either a significant change in the trajectory of strategic trends or projected spending levels, the Army is facing a future in which it will need to be prepared to accomplish significantly more with significantly less. As First Sea Lord John Fisher said when faced with declining funding for the Royal Navy on the eve of the First World War, Gentlemen, the money is gone. Now we must think.[footnoteRef:6] The present situation certainly calls for a good deal of thought on the part of the Army, but where should the Armys attention be turned? [4: The Heritage Foundation. June 23, 2009. http://www.heritage.org/Multimedia/InfoGraphic/Obama-plan-cuts-defense-spending-to-pre-9-11-levels (accessed March 15, 2011).] [5: The Heritage Foundation. March 3, 2011. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/03/Assessing-the-Strategic-Readiness-of-the-US-Armed-Forces (accessed March 15, 2011).] [6: This story was related to the author during a lecture given by NATO commander Admiral Stavridis. ]

History is replete with examples of militaries that were able to stretch the resources at hand further than their contemporaries in order to achieve their operational and strategic goals. Even the most casual student of military history knows of the brave stand of the Spartans at Thermopile, the exploits of Frederick the Greats grenadiers in Prussian blue, or the excellence of Swiss pike men. However, upon deeper consideration it is difficult to think of a more effective fighting force, man for man, than the German Wehrmacht that fought World War II. During the wars early years, the Wehrmacht racked up a string of victories that are truly impressive. In the space of 2 years, German troops marched triumphant through Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, France, the Balkans, Greece, and much of the Soviet Union. The later stages of the war represent a different matter entirely. 1942 and 1943 witnessed a series of major German reversals in North Africa and the Eastern Front. In 1944, the Wehrmacht was steadily pushed back on the Eastern Front, in Italy to the south, and in France to west.[footnoteRef:7] All the while, shortages of ever increasing intensity in weapons, ammunition, fuel, transport, and manpower constrained the German ability to respond to Allied and Soviet attacks.[footnoteRef:8] What is truly remarkable is that the Wehrmacht continued to fight on and continued to outperform their opponents even in the extreme conditions they faced towards the end of the war.[footnoteRef:9] It is based on this outstanding performance, that the Wehrmacht, and the German Heer or German Army in particular, serves as the case for this study. [7: For an detailed account of the reversal of German fortunes during World War II, see Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995.] [8: U.S. War Department. War Department Technical Manual TM-E30-451: Hand on German Military Forces.( Washington D.C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 1-2.] [9: This point is the subject of much debate. Several historians have dedicated entire works to demonstrating that the German reputation for tactical and qualitative superiority in the Second World War has been greatly exaggerated. Books in this vein include M. Cooper, The German Army 1933- 1945 (London , 1978) and Bonn, Keith, When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944- January 1945 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994). However, the issue of the qualitative superiority of the Wehrmacht was subjected to statistical analysis by Col. (Ret.) Trevor Dupuy. His research of 78 engagements revealed that, on average, the German soldier of WWII was between 20% and 30% more effective than his American and British opposite numbers after accounting for material factors. See Dupuy, T.N. Numbers, Predictions, and War. (New York: Quill, 1979)]

While the Wehrmacht consistently outperformed its opponents throughout World War II, the gap in comparative performance was obviously wider during certain phases of the conflict than others. By almost any reckoning, the gap between the Wehrmacht and its opponents reached its pinnacle during Fall Gelb, the first and decisive phase of the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940. The feats of the Wehrmacht and Panzergruppe Kleist, German 12th Army in particular, are unparalleled in military history.[footnoteRef:10] Fully 72% of all Allied personnel involved in the defense of France, no less than some 1.2 million soldiers, were either killed or captured during the course of the campaign. [footnoteRef:11] But while the magnitude of this success is beyond question, the reasons for this success are hotly debated. It is the secret of this success that is the theme of this study. Mainly, the paper seeks to answer the question, What are the underlying causes of the Wehrmachts success during Fall Gelb and what are the lasting lessons that would serve the American Army today? [10: Panzergruppe Kleist, an armored formation composed of 5 Panzer divisions and a motorized infantry division, was an unprecedented operational experiment. The Panzergruppe served as the spearhead of the decisive German breakthrough at Sedan and lead the subsequent drive to the English Channel that resulted in the largest encirclement in history. The role this formation played in the success of Fall Gelb cannot be overstated. ] [11: Doughty, Robert. The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. (New York: Archon Books, 1990), 5.]

Methodology

Ability of the Wehrmacht to achieve and maintain tactical and operational excellence within its combat formations throughout World War II was truly remarkable. The persistently high levels of excellence maintain throughout the war make material explanations of excellence, such as the technological superiority of certain German weapons over their Allied counterparts, unsatisfying at best. The primary hypothesis of this study is that the excellence of the German Army, especially when faced with significant resource shortages and overwhelming odds, was the result of those intellectual and organizational factors that comprise a military organizations fighting power. [footnoteRef:12] More specifically, the German Armys excellence came from two primary factors which comprise this studys sub-hypothesis. First, the German Army derived a significant advantage, especially in the 1940 invasion of France, from a superior doctrine and conceptualization of war. Second, the German Armys very structure and personnel management were all arranged so as to foster the unit cohesion and trust that are the building blocks of fighting power. [12: Creveld explains that an armys worth as a military instrument equals the quality and quantity of its equipment multiplied by.. Fighting Power van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982), 3 .]

In order to test this hypothesis and its two subcomponents it was necessary to closely examine the official expression of German doctrine during this period, Truppenfrhrung. [footnoteRef:13] In addition to official doctrine, this papers analysis took advantage of doctrinal writings by personalities involved in the campaign such as Guderians Achtung- Panzer!, written in 1937. The structure of the German Army and its personnel management system also presents evidence of practices that fostered tighter unit cohesion and organizational trust. After examining the German expression of doctrine and the structure of the German Army, a detailed review of the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in 1940 presents evidence of German doctrine in action. This step serves as a check to ensure that the German Army practiced what it demanded on paper and that its personnel management system had the desired effect. [13: Truppenfrhrung, literally meaning unit command, was released in two parts. The first was printed in 1933 and the second in 1934. This manual was written strictly for the German Army and finds its American counterpart in FM 3-0. While work had begun on a manual, Kriegsfhrung, that would have incorporated the other services in January 1938, the work was brought to a halt with the outbreak of hostilities the following year. Truppenfrhrung would remain the definitive German operations manual throughout World War II. See On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung.( Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009)]

The method of comparing the doctrine of the German Army with its conduct on campaign was chosen precisely because it establishes the most direct link between the historical case in question and the organizational and doctrinal factors that form the core of the hypothesis. Naturally, it is nearly impossible to determine if a given action that is in agreement with doctrine was done out a conscious application of doctrinal principles or simply in accordance with them. However, if a pattern of actions in line with doctrine should emerge in the course of examining the campaign in France, it is fair to say that doctrine exerted an influence on the course of events. Also, if evidence of the qualities sought in the German personnel management system presents itself in a consistent manner, it is safe to say that those practices also had a strong hand in the outcome of the campaign. In short, if evidence of a strong doctrinal and organizational influence can be found in the course of an examination of the German invasion, this would demonstrate that these factors were primary contributors to success of Fall Gelb and the overall excellence of the Wehrmacht.

Literature Review

There is no shortage of theories as to how the Wehrmacht decisively achieved its operational goals during Fall Gelb. One early explanation, largely devoid of factual analysis, was the popular myth of Blitzkrieg.[footnoteRef:14] The fiction of the myth lies in the mischaracterization of Blitzkrieg as the cult of the tank. This myth conjures up images of hordes of invincible Nazi tanks rolling across the plains of Europe and deserts of Africa in unstoppable and unending waves.[footnoteRef:15] In fact, despite years of secretive preparations in violation of the Versailles Treaty, only 10% of the German Army was motorized at the commencement of Fall Gelb.[footnoteRef:16] This explanation owes its rapid and widespread acceptance to films by Nazi propaganda minister Goebbels and Allied governments eager to conjure a palatable excuse for their failures.[footnoteRef:17] While this explanation does little to advance any understanding of the conflict, it is not wholly without its merits. This explanation is historically noteworthy for the wide currency it held in the immediate aftermath of German victories in France and the Low Countries.[footnoteRef:18] The fact that something so far from the truth was widely believed can be seen as further evidence of the shocking nature of German victories in the spring and summer of 1940. Also, this mischaracterization of the German Army as an armored juggernaut had very real material consequences.[footnoteRef:19] President Roosevelt specified overly ambitious production targets for the Victory Program in response to a faulty appraisal of the level of mechanization in the German Army. [footnoteRef:20] [14: Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 10; Cook, Samuel. "The German Breaktrhough at Sedan."( Armor, 2004) ,9 Interestingly, the term cannot be found in German doctrinal writings of the period. ] [15: Ibid.] [16: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend.( Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 33. Of a total of more than 160 divisions assembled for the invasion of France, German possessed only 10 Panzer divisions and 6 motorized infantry divisions. ] [17: Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 11.] [18: Ibid., 91.] [19: Ibid., 192] [20: Ibid.]

The explanation most widely accepted in German military circles in 1940 was that the victories of the Panzergruppe in France were the product of much organizational experimentation and theoretical work that occurred during the interwar period.[footnoteRef:21] The application of Strosstruppen , or storm trooper, tactics to armor formations is one of the most important intellectual developments of the period.[footnoteRef:22] The of James S. Corum treats this period in detail and explores the work German General Hans von Seeckt in exploring the use of technology to revive operational principles buried under the mud of Flanders in WWI. Guderians writings, in both Achtung- Panzer! and Panzer Leader are represent clear evidence of German theoretical work on armor centric combined arms warfare well ahead of such thought in the militaries of the other principal combatants.[footnoteRef:23] Also, the fact that Germanys Panzer divisions, large armor centric combined arms formations first formed in 1935, were unique in the militaries of the world until the eve of the war supports this line of reasoning.[footnoteRef:24] The various Panzer Corps and the Panzergruppe employed by the Germans during Fall Gelb were operational experiments without precedent and without parallel until the 1942.[footnoteRef:25] [21: Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) First published in 1937, 1-16; Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) First published in 1954, 18-30; Corum, James. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Wichita: University Press of Kansas, 1992),25-36.] [22: Corum, James. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Wichita: University Press of Kansas, 1992),122-5] [23: While there was significant theoretical work done on the subject of armored warfare done in countries like Britain and France, there were significant problems with the conclusions reached as a result of interwar experimentation. British experiments with mechanized task forces in the thirties highlighted the difficulties of coordinating tanks with other combat. As where Guderian had sought a solution to this problem by motorizing the tanks supporting arms, British doctrine would hold that tanks could operate independently. French experiments would lead to the retention of operationally and tactically useless horse cavalry divisions. While the French, pressured by De Gaulle would develop 4 armored division in time for the battle of France, French doctrine would fail to place the emphasis on tank/aircraft cooperation we find ] [24: Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) First published in 1954, 32-36.] [25: Ibid., 276-80.]

In many ways, German doctrinal superiority extended to the fundamental issues of the nature of war and command principles. In what may be a direct result of their experiences in World War I, the western allies and the Wehrmacht developed strikingly different outlooks on these issues. German doctrine stressed a strictly Clausewitzian view of warfare. [footnoteRef:26] This firm grounding in Clausewitz resulted in a doctrine that stressed the difficulties posed by uncertainty and friction. This image of war had several profound consequences. The German Army developed doctrine stressing decentralized command using mission type orders. The Allies relied on a modernized version of the tightly controlled methods of command that had typified operations on the Western Front.[footnoteRef:27] This reliance on firm control, combined with an engineering approach to war would leave the Allies soundly outpaced in the face of more fluid German command principles.[footnoteRef:28] [26: The several lines from the introductory paragraph of Truppenfhrung could have been taken directly from On War. War is an art, a free and creative activityOnes will is pitted against the independent will of the enemey On the German Art of War Truppenfrhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 17.] [27: van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982.) 37.] [28: Ibid., 165]

Another explanation of German excellence finds its source in the way German Army created and maintained its combat formations. Structure of the German Army in World War II, from recruitment through replacement sought to instill in its combat formations a sense of trust and unit cohesion.[footnoteRef:29] Because of a well thought out method of personnel management that was first and foremost oriented towards generating fighting power, the Germans experienced the unit cohesion their doctrine demanded. [29: Ibid. ]

Some literature on the topic takes issue with the underlying assumption that the Wehrmacht enjoyed any sort of qualitative advantage over its principal opponents in World War II. A recent addition to this line of argumentation is Keith Bonns When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944- January 1945. This books premise is that in a situation where the German Army and American Army faced each other with roughly similar numbers of men, artillery and armor, the result was an American victory. Bonnes argument, in its general outline, is typical of this school of thought denying that the Wehrmacht possessed a qualitative edge. A number of issues exist with the accuracy of Bonnes analysis. One, his appraisal of the comparative quality of the American Army and the German Army in a single campaign is inherently anecdotal. This is very problematic in so much as Bonns findings are contrary to those findings arrived at by other scholars who examined a broader range of cases.[footnoteRef:30] Additionally, Bonnes decision to focus on the immediate situation of the American and German armies in the Vosges Mountains campaign draws an artificially narrow boundary around the comparison. In choosing a single campaign in the late stages of the war, Bonne excludes several key factors from meaningful consideration. Among those factors are the marked inferiority of the Luftwaffe in this late stage of the war, German supply shortages, the scarcity of reserves, and the fact that the training available to German replacements in this late stage of the war was not representative of the training practices the German Army maintained in most circumstances. [30: Dupuy, T.N.Numbers, Predictions, and War. New York: Quill, 1979. 234-5. Dupuys analysis, based on an examinatoin of some 78 different engagements including German victories and losses, inflicted casualties at a 50% higher rate than they incurred in their fighting with the Allies. ]

As demonstrated above, the topic of the excellence of the German Army in World War II has received much examination. Where this study looks to add something novel to the existing body of literature is in demonstrating the instrumentality of German doctrine and institutions to their success during Fall Gelb. This study will also add to the existing by determining what lessons of the invasion of France and the Low Countries are applicable to the U.S. Army today. By systematically establishing the principle causes of German success in Fall Gelb and comparing the conduct of the German Army in that campaign with the conduct of the American Army in major combat operations in operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, this study will offer policy recommendations aimed at increasing the fighting effectiveness of Americas combat formations, and putting it in a better position to face the strategic and resource challenges of the future.

Road Map

Having established the problem and the basic premise of this paper, it is fitting that a detailed outline as to how this paper will proceed should be added. First, there will be a preliminary definition of terms that will be used frequently in the paper but have become vague in their general usage. After that will follow a brief synopsis of the course of Fall Gelb. This synopsis will be divided into two phases; the planning and preparation phase, and the operation itself, from the crossing of the German border until the British evacuation of Dunkirk. Following this synopsis will be the analysis. This will be subdivided into two broad subheadings, one dealing with German doctrine as it stood on the eve of battle on 10 May 1940 and the other dealing with the German institutions that created and sustained the combat units that fought Fall Gelb to a successful conclusion. After settling on the causes of German combat excellence as rooted in their doctrine and institutions, a brief comparison between the operational conduct of the German Army in Fall Gelb and the American Army in operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom will serve to show which lessons remain to be learned from the German experience. Finally, the policy implications of the study will be laid out, providing both a platform for continued study and concrete action. The policy implications will cover doctrinal, institutional, and technological recommendations for the U.S. Army as it moves into the future.

II: Definitions

But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.

George Orwell[footnoteRef:31] [31: Orwell, George Politics and the English Language ( Horizon,1946)]

In order to address the question of Germany excellence during Fall Gelb, it is necessary to deal with words that have become over laden with various meanings and that are open to broad range of interpretations. Words like blitzkrieg and operations have been endowed with so many meanings that they have, in a sense, lost their power to describe and express. Additionally, words like excellence and success are also devoid of meaning when not placed in a particular context. Faced with this linguistic Gordian knot, this section seeks to cut through the tangle and provide a common basis of understanding.

Blitzkrieg

Few words in the military lexicon are as open to interpretation and controversy as blitzkrieg. Literally meaning lightning war, the term has adopted various meanings within military circles. The term was first used in a German periodical in 1935 and was described as a strategic expedient by which weaker or economically inferior nations might hope to defeat a strategically superior opponent by trying, to finish a war quickly and suddenly by trying to force a decision right at the very beginning through the ruthless employment of their total fighting strength.[footnoteRef:32]Alternatively, blitzkrieg was taken by some to constitute a grand strategy formulated by Hitler with an ultimate goal of world conquest. [footnoteRef:33] According to this understanding, blitzkrieg was an all encompassing national strategy with economic, foreign policy, domestic, and military dimensions all aimed at maximizing the striking potential of the nation in the short term relative to an isolated opponent.[footnoteRef:34] The issue is further complicated by the widespread use of the word blitzkrieg and its many variation in the common vernacular. The bombing of London during the Battle of Britain was referred to as the Blitz. Sportscasters use the word liberally, especially in football, to describe any rapid victory or score. [32: Von Schwichow. "The Food Economy as a National Defense Problem." (Duetsche Wehr, 1935: 275), 275.] [33: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 7-9.] [34: Ibid., 7-8.]

Within this paper, the term blitzkrieg is used as a tactical-operational term. Specifically, it means the use of concentrated air power and armor centric combined arms formations to achieve tactical and operational surprise, breakthrough, encirclement, and defeat of the enemy in operations designed for decisive results.[footnoteRef:35] This interpretation is most fitting for several reasons. First, the evolution of the term along strictly military lines is quite evident in pre-war German military literature[footnoteRef:36]. Evolving from the Strotrupp-taktik, or storm trooper tactics of World War I, blitzkrieg was envisioned by German officers as means of restoring movement to warfare by scaling up the infiltration tactics of storm trooper units to operational proportions[footnoteRef:37] General Heinz Guderian refined the idea into the application of Strotrupp-taktik to large armored formations utilizing air power for support.[footnoteRef:38] Second, this interpretation of the term blitzkrieg is the most soundly supported through historical sources.[footnoteRef:39] The competing strategic thesis is heavily reliant on sources affected by the propaganda efforts of the Nazi regime to give their improvised foreign policy the appearance of forethought and genius while it is in fact difficult to apply any systematic explanation to such actions. [footnoteRef:40] Finally, this interpretation is borne out by the ground truth of history. The campaigns of the German Army that are synonymous with the term blitzkrieg, like the ones undertaken in France, the deserts of North Africa, and the plains of the western Soviet Union, were all characterized by the concentrated used of air power and armor to achieve successive encirclements. [35: In Blitzkrieg Legend, Karl-Heinz Frieser defines blitzkrieg as, the concentrated employment of armor and air forces to confuse the enemy with surprise and speed, and to encircle him, after a successful breakthrough, by means of far reaching thrusts.] [36: Von Schwichow. "The Food Economy as a National Defense Problem." (Duetsche Wehr, 1935: 275),] [37: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 7.] [38: Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002.) 178-84. 188-98.] [39: Von Schwichow. "The Food Economy as a National Defense Problem." (Duetsche Wehr, 1935: 275),] [40: Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct of War. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983) 163]

Operations

Although operational thought has been developing since the time of Napoleon, the term is still the subject of some ambiguity. This ambiguity largely arises from the fact that the term is meant to describe a concept principally defined by what it is not rather than what it is.[footnoteRef:41] Operations define the space between the tactical and the strategic. Operations lies in the gap between the command of tactical units and national policy. Its defining characteristic is the sequential of tactical engagements whose cumulative effect is to achieve strategic aims. [footnoteRef:42] When the phrase operational concept is used, it refers to the manner in which one intends to use and sequence engagements to achieve their strategic aims. While these boundaries cannot be and never should be wholly inflexible, in the context of the German Army in World War II, the operational level of warfare begins at the level of army, (although in the case of Fall Gelb it also clearly applies to Panzergruppe Kleist) while when discussing modern conflicts, the operational level of war begins at the corps level.[footnoteRef:43] [41: While Clausewitz never explicitly defines an operational level of war, it is clear especially in chapter 11 of book four of On War entitled The Use of the Battle, that he had conceived of something distinct between the purely tactical and strategic levels of warfare. ] [42: In On War, book four, chapter eleven, Clausewitz discusses the preparation and use of battle in sequence to achieve strategic goal and states that, the greatest strategic skill will be displayed in creating the right conditions for it [battle], choosing the right place, time and line of advance, and making the fullest use of its results. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (Princeton: Princeton Univiersity Press, 1989) 261] [43: Frieser, Karl Heinz. (Blitzkrieg Legend. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 6.]

Success

While not nearly as ambiguous as the preceding two terms, success is devoid of meaning unless it is given context. When discussed here success is meant to denote the achievement of objectives, the realization of desired ends. On the tactical level, this usually entails the destruction of a particular enemy unit or the seizure of a particular piece of terrain within such constraints of time and method that would render the action operationally useful. Operational success is defined in much the same sense, except of course the objectives in view take on a larger scope and their achievement is aimed at subordinate or overarching strategic aims. When dealing with success on a strategic level, it is important to remember that war is not something autonomous but an instrument of policy whose original motive is a political objective.[footnoteRef:44] In light of this fact, so succinctly put in the oft quoted phrase, War is the continuation of politics by other means, strategic success is defined as the achievement of a nations motivating political object in such a manner that its achievement is not rendered meaningless by excessive destruction or waste. Naturally, at any level of warfare, what constitutes excessive waste, time, destruction, or expenditure of any resource whatsoever is highly dependent on the nature and import of the object to be gained. The important thing to remember is that the achievement of an aim cannot be said to signify success if the cost of its achievement is out of all proportion to its utility.[footnoteRef:45] [44: Clausewitz explains that The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (Princeton: Princeton Univiersity Press, 1989) 87.] [45: In discussing the effort to be made in the pursuit of wars political object, Clausewitz statesThe smaller the penalty you demand from your oppent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, and the less you need make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (Princeton: Princeton Univiersity Press, 1989) 81.]

Excellence

In discussing excellence, it is important to clearly delineate it from, and explain its relationship to success. Success, as shown above is a results oriented method of evaluation. Excellence is concerned with something less apparent and more fundamental. Excellence refers to the conduct of the fighting forces, their relative condition, the difficulties under which they labored, and the manner in which they fought.[footnoteRef:46] The Wehrmacht lost World War II and the lives of millions of their countrymen. In the course of the conflict however, they struggled for years against overwhelming numerical and material odds. They scored impressive victories in the earlier parts of the war. The German Army consistently inflicted casualties at a much higher rate than it sustained, even in the midst of the long retreat to Berlin. German units reduced to less than 20% of combat strength would continue to offer stiff resistance, even to the point of annihilation.[footnoteRef:47] These high marks of performance, even in defeat, constitute the excellence that is the object of this study. [46: van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982) ,5.] [47: The cases of the Panzer Lehr division in Normandy and the Grodeutschland division on the Eastern front at Pilau are two notable examples of German outfits fighting well beyond a level of casualties that mark a unit combat ineffective. ]

III: Fall Gelb

Their horses are swifter than leopards, more fierce than the evening wolves, their horsemen press proudly on, Yea their horsemen come from afar; they shall fly like an eagle swift to devour

Habakkuk 1:8

The German invasion of France and the Low Countries in 1940 stands out as one of the most successful operations of World War II. In this campaign more than in any other the Germans embarked upon, success across the three levels of warfare was achieved in the teeth of considerable odds. For that reason, this campaign is selected as the model for this study.

An Operational Throw of the Dice

When first contemplating how to proceed in the West after the Allied declaration of war, the German General Staff developed an operational plan that bore a striking resemblance to the famous Schlieffen Plan of World War I.[footnoteRef:48] Realizing that this plan lacked any hope of surprise the Sickle Cut operational template, forwarded first by General Manstien, was finally agreed upon.[footnoteRef:49] Combining a massive feint in the Low Countries with a decisive thrust across the River Meuse at Sedan by massed panzer division, the plan sought to encircle the bulk of Allied armies and pin them to the Channel Coast.[footnoteRef:50] Despite the significant risk involved, the plan was adopted because, in the words of the Chief of the German General Staff, Even if it had only 10% chance of successIt alone will lead to the enemys annihilation.[footnoteRef:51] The Sickle Cut plan, now officially called Fall Gelb, was put into motion on 10 May 1940. [footnoteRef:52] [48: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 60.] [49: Ibid., 65.] [50: Ibid.] [51: Heusinger, Adolf. Conflicting Orders: The Fateful Hours of the Germany Army, 1923-1945. (Tubingen: Rainer Wunderlich, 1957) 86.] [52: Ibid.]

Race to the Meuse

The success of the Sickle Cut maneuver relied almost entirely on the ability of the massive mechanized force collected in Panzergruppe Kleist, achieving a river crossing at Sedan before the Allies caught on to operational deception. General Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIX Panzer Corps which spearheaded the offensive drummed into his soldiers the slogan, In three days to the Meuse, on the fourth day, across the Meuse![footnoteRef:53] As the main effort was simulated with dramatic fashion in the Low Countries, Panzergruppe Kleist raced headlong towards Sedan. The Panzergruppe attacked through four countries in the span of 3 days [53: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 114 .]

Lightning at Sedan

On the afternoon of the 13th, the attack of the XIX Panzer Corps on the French defenses at Sedan commenced.[footnoteRef:54] Under extensive air cover from the Luftwaffe which suppressed French artillery, all elements of Guderians command forced successful crossings of the Meuse and expanded their toeholds throughout the evening. [footnoteRef:55] Despite sustained Allied air attacks on the 14th, German bridges constructed over the Meuse remained intact and reserves poured through the bridgehead.[footnoteRef:56] [54: Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 104.] [55: Ibid., 105.] [56: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 183]

The Drive to the Channel

Realizing an opportunity to overrun oncoming French units before they could mount a coordinated defense, Guderian ordered the 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions west during the 14th and 15th of May in spite of orders to remain at the Sedan bridgehead.[footnoteRef:57] Guderians XIX Panzer Corps and the rest of Panzergruppe Kleist exploited success and continued the attack until they reached the Channel coast and completed the encirclement of the 1.7 million Allied soldiers in the Low Countries and northern France. Guderian argued many times with the High Command that he be allowed to continue, and at one point was even temporarily relieved of his command. However, he largely maintained his operational freedom.[footnoteRef:58] Only a halt order from Hitler himself on 24 May prevented the Panzers from attacking, and in likelihood seizing Dunkirk ahead of the retreating Allies.[footnoteRef:59] Despite the resulting escape of the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force, the German Army had sealed one of the greatest victories in military history. [57: Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 108] [58: Ibid., 110.] [59: Ibid., 117.]

Why Victory?

In seeking to explain why the Wehrmacht was able achieve such an impressive victory over the Allies, certain options fall flat immediately. One of these is the notion that the German victory in France and the Low Countries had any basis in material factors. At this stage in war, the western allies held considerable advantages in almost every major category of weapons. Taking the Wehrmacht on the one hand and the French, British, Dutch and Belgians on the other, the numerical gap between the combatants is rather astonishing. [footnoteRef:60] Whats more, the Allies were also able to maintain a rather impressive qualitative edge over the Germans during the campaign. While German weapons like the Tiger and Panther tanks dominate the popular conception of World War II, these and other German heavy tanks were exclusively products of the wars later years.[footnoteRef:61] As things stood on 10 May 1940, Allied tanks were vastly superior. Fully one fifth, of German tanks were Panzer Is, mounting only machine guns and very lightly armored.[footnoteRef:62] The bulk of German Panzers were Panzer IIs which were only slightly heavier than the Panzer Is. The Panzer IIsmounted a 20mm cannon wholly inadequate for dealing with Allied tanks.[footnoteRef:63] The heavier Panzer IIIs and IVs were available only in small numbers and would still experience great difficulty in handling their opposite numbers.[footnoteRef:64] Allied tanks, on the other hand, were almost universally equipped with cannon of 37mm or greater.[footnoteRef:65] The extreme disparity between the technical capabilities of the opposing tanks is rather vividly illustrated in an episode that took place in the fighting around the German town of Mont Dieu. One captured French Char B tank was found to have been hit 140 times with German anti- tank rounds without a single penetration of its armor.[footnoteRef:66] The Allies qualitative edge also extended to the realm of aircraft. [footnoteRef:67]Although the Germans had a unique and undoubtedly useful aircraft in the Ju-87 Stuka dive bomber, Allied aircraft generally had superior range and payload than their counterparts in the Luftwaffe.[footnoteRef:68] [60: The Allies, largely as a result of the Versailles Treaty, still held incredible quantitative advantages over the Germans in every major category of weapon. For example, in term of artillery, the Allies held a nearly two to one advantage, amassing 14,000 tubes against roughly 7,000 for the Germans! This numerical gap is rather neatly laid out in Annex A. ] [61: For an excellent account of German armor developments during the second half of World War II, see Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995) ] [62: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 37 ] [63: Ibid. ] [64: Ibid.] [65: Ibid. ,41] [66: Giuliano, Gerard. The Fighting at Mont Dieu. (Charleville-Mezieres: Terres Ardennaises, 1990) 51.] [67: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 50-53.] [68: Ibid.]

Another possible explanation for the success of the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in 1940 is that Guderians individual ability and force of character was the deciding factor. Certainly, it is difficult to overstate the role that Guderian played in conduct of Fall Gelb. However, the claim that Guderians ability overrides doctrinal and institutional factors in importance is problematic for several reasons. First, while Guderians successful breakthrough and exploitation at Sedan essentially decided the campaign, similar crossings of the Meuse forced by the XV Panzer Corps at Dinant would likely have had a similar affect. Second, the conduct of other German officers throughout the campaign suggests that Guderians boldness and initiative are more doctrinally than individually based. Echoes of Guderians boldness and adaptability can be found in the actions of countless German officers. General Erwin Rommels handling of the 7th Panzer Division and Colonel Hermann Balcks command of the 1st Infantry Regiment, 1st Panzer Division demonstrate the very same sense of initiative that we find in Guderians leadership of XIX Panzer Corps. The ability of the largely infantry based German officer corps to plan and conduct an armored centric campaign also speaks to the fact that Guderian did not have a monopoly on adaptability.

Given the numerical and qualitative inferiority of the equipment of the Wehrmacht, its victory over the Allies in 1940 cannot have its roots in material factors. Also, while Guderians efforts were important to the success of Fall Gelb, the near universal presence of initiative and boldness within the German officer corps suggests that the very tendencies that lead Guderian to excel have doctrinal roots. The answer must therefore lie in the other factors that determine the worth of fighting forces. This paper will demonstrate that it was Germanys superior doctrine, and the effect of this doctrine on the German Heers methods of personnel management and attitude towards technology that would provided the margin of excellence necessary in Fall Gelb.

IV: Doctrinal Roots of Victory

Pity the soldier who is supposed to crawl among these scraps of rules not good enough for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh at. No; what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case.

Carl von Clausewitz[footnoteRef:69] [69: Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (Princeton: Princeton Univiersity Press, 1989) 136.]

Doctrine is the intellectual framework upon which armies are properly built. Without a sound concept of what war is and how it should be fought, it is impossible to answer the questions of how a nations fighting forces should be organized, how they should be trained, and with what they should be equipped. It is for these reasons that the German Army derived significant advantages from having a sound and superior doctrine. German doctrine in 1940, specifically its capstone manual, Truppenfhrung, as well as professional writings of certain German officers, provides insight into the Germans operational success during Fall Gelb. Examining these writings against the backdrop of the invasion of France and the Low Countries serves two purposes.. The comparison between German doctrine and their actions on campaign will determine whether or not the German army derived the qualities from its combat formations that its doctrine demanded. Second, the evaluation will bring to the fore the advantages that doctrine provided the Wehrmacht in defeating the Allies.

The Lineage of Truppenfhrung

Despite it profound effect on the course of World War II, Truppenfhrung is a document that is evolutionary in its nature and representative of a process of continual refinement in the German art of war. From the very first paragraphs of the introduction, Clausewitz influence is clear. In characterizing war as a free activity in which, Ones own will is pitted against the independent will of the enemy,[footnoteRef:70] and subject to friction, Truppenfhrung lifts several key concepts directly out of On War. Truppenfhrung places emphasis on the Clausewitzian principles of the uncertainty of war and the importance of decision making in ambiguous circumstances. The lessons of World War I, distilled during the tenure of General Hans Von Seeckt as Chief of Staff, are also apparent. In its rejection of trench warfare (the phrase is not even mentioned) for maneuver, and its emphasis on the offensive as the only means towards achieving decisive results, Truppenfhrung marks the revival of traditional principles of war in the modern setting.[footnoteRef:71] [70: On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 17.] [71: In the chapters concerning the attack and command, the echoes of traditional German military thought are clear. Truppenfhrungs identification as the offense as the only means of achieving positive aims is a Clausewitzian notion. Additionally, the overall emphasis on movement instead of firepower marks the revival of operational thought. ]

Operational Concept

In Truppenfhrung, a series of operational principles are espoused that, when taken together, can be called the operational concept of the German Heer.[footnoteRef:72] Most important among these, is the consideration of the operational level of war in the first place. World War I had witnessed the elevation of fire over movement as the dominating characteristic of warfare. This tactical development led many armies to develop doctrine dominated by static warfare and the application of firepower.[footnoteRef:73] This is especially evident in French doctrine which states, The attack is bringing fire forward. The defense is fire that stops.[footnoteRef:74] On the other hand, in keeping with traditions of German operational thought, shaped by their central and inherently vulnerable position on the continent of Europe, Truppenfhrung stresses decision through movement.[footnoteRef:75] The consequences of such a contrast are clear in the 1940 campaign. The Dyle-Breda Plane developed by the Allies which sought maintain a linear defense. The Sickle Cut of Germanys Fall Gelb which aimed at operational decision through concentration and movement. It is difficult to conceive of an instance when two more different ideas of warfare clashed on the field of battle. [72: In selecting the what portions of Truppenfhrung to examine, the author selected those chapters that bore most relevance to the conduct of Fall Gelb. The chapters on attack, command, and armor operations, and air operations received special attention for this reason. ] [73: While this may be said of all the Allied armies to varying degrees it is particularly true of the French during this period. Translation of French Operational Manual. (Berlin, 1921), 80-91.] [74: Ibid., 87] [75: On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 88]

Another operational principle found in Truppenfhrung is that of the Schwerpunkt or point of main effort. More specifically, in paragraph 358, Truppenfhrung describes the Schwerpunkt as being the decision point.[footnoteRef:76] In paragraph 323, Truppenfhrung maintains that every attack must have a Schwerpunkt and that piecemeal attacks across a broad front must be avoided at all cost.[footnoteRef:77] This operational principle is witnessed in Fall Gelb. The concentration of half the German Panzer and motorized divisions in Panzergruppe Kleist, and the use of this formation against a narrow frontage of the enemy line at Sedan represents a definite selection of a Schwerpunkt. Conversely, the Allies more equitable distribution of combat power and armor along the whole of their line left them unable to respond in any meaningful fashion to the mass of tanks exploding out of Sedan. One almost hears the echoes of Guderian exhorting his troops, Klotzen! Nicht kleckern! Hit with the fist! Dont feel with the fingers![footnoteRef:78] [76: Ibid., 101.] [77: Ibid., 90] [78: Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 105.]

An operational principle of tremendous import is the rejection of linear operations in order to achieve operational level penetrations.[footnoteRef:79] Paragraph 319 on penetration attacks and paragraph 339 on armor in the attack, stress the necessity of deep penetrations into the enemys rear zone to neutralize artillery and upset lines of supply and communication.[footnoteRef:80] A practical blueprint for such non linear operations can be found in Guderians book Achtung-Panzer!. In the chapter detailing the employment of the Panzer forces, Guderian advocated bringing the entire depth of the enemy position attack simultaneously, followed by a vigorous exploitation of the resulting breakthrough.[footnoteRef:81] The acceptance of this doctrinal departure from linear warfare is clear in the headlong dash Panzergruppe Kleist to Channel coast. This independent maneuver was conducted without regard for the Panzergruppes lengthening southern flank, an open flank that would stretch some 200 miles at its longest.[footnoteRef:82] The Allies, tied to a more linear model of fighting that stressed the continuous front, found themselves unable to mass sufficient fighting power where it mattered most, on the flanks of the German penetration. [footnoteRef:83] [79: On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009). 88, 94-5.] [80: Ibid. ] [81: Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) 180.] [82: The acceptance of non linear operations was by no means complete or without controversy. The debates surrounding the adoption of Manstiens Sickle Cut plan as the template for the campaign are clear evidence of uneasiness within the German High Command regarding such maneuvers. The various episodes of flank fright, culminating with Hitlers momentous stop order on 23 May, are further evidence of this anxiety and are, in the authors view, responsible for the escape of the bulk of the British expeditionary force. ] [83: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 336.]

Command Principles

German command principles as expressed in Truppenfhrung were radical when they were written and are still considered forward thinking to this day[footnoteRef:84]. Although the manual never uses the term, the command principles laid down in Truppenfhrung are often collectively referred to as Auftragstaktik, or mission type tactics.[footnoteRef:85] The crux of this method of command is allowing the ultimate degree of freedom possible to subordinate units consistent with achieving the mission they are assigned.[footnoteRef:86] Far from being a recipe for disobedience, Auftragstaktik was seen as crucial to coping with the high tempo of mobile warfare, where events often overtake directives.[footnoteRef:87] The rationale for Auftragstaktik is expressed in the philosophical paragraphs of the introduction to Truppenfhrung. [footnoteRef:88] Here, the nature of warfare as uncertain and ever-changing is singled out as the reason for the diffusion of responsibility that characterizes Auftragstaktik. [footnoteRef:89] [84: James S. Corum notes in a foreword to the most recent English translation of Truppenfuhrung that the principles of dectralized command embodied in Auftragstaktik would not be practicable or accepted in many of the worlds militaries. The authors admittedely limited experience in the American Army and interactions with the Egyptian Army seem to suggest that these principles are more easily preached than practice. ] [85: The principles of decentralized authority and broad mission type orders are clearly stated in paragraphs 6, 9, 10, 15, 36, 37, 73, 74, 75, and 76 of Truppenfuhrung.] [86: Paragraphs 73-76 are very clear on this point. On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 30] [87: Ibid., 23] [88: Ibid., 17-19] [89: Ibid., 18-19]

Far from being a recipe for disobedience, the German leadership viewed Auftragstaktik as crucial to coping with the high tempo of mobile warfare, where events often overtook directives.[footnoteRef:90] Paragraph 36 explains that the mission should dictate the objective given to subordinates.[footnoteRef:91] Paragraph 37 expands on this by emphasizing the necessity of subordinates being able to act in line with the commanders intent even if the original mission has been rendered obsolete by events.[footnoteRef:92] When faced with a conflict between reality and the order at hand, the responsible commander always works within the framework of the situation.[footnoteRef:93] The freedom this framework provides places immense responsibility upon subordinates as they are held accountable for the outcome of all tactical actions.. [90: Ibid., 30.] [91: Ibid.,23.] [92: Ibid.] [93: Ibid.]

The effect of this decentralized method of authority was clearly decisive in determining the outcome of Fall Gelb. In the rapid movement of XIX Panzer Corps from the German border to its successful breakthrough at Sedan, Guderian repeatedly acted on his own imitative to exploit opportunities in the face of orders that had outlived their usefulness.[footnoteRef:94]One of the most momentous of these intastances was Guderians decision to drive west with the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions immediately following the breakthrough at Sedan leaving only the 10th Panzer and the Grodeutschland Infantry Regiment to defend the bridgehead over the Meuse.[footnoteRef:95] This risky command decision allowed the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions to overtake secondary French defensive positions before they could be occupied. [footnoteRef:96] This type of initiative and ability to accept responsibility in the face of rapidly changing events could also be seen in the actions of General Erwin Rommel and his 7th Panzer division at Houx, Flavion, and Arras, in the actions of Hermann Balck and 1st Infantry Regiment at Sedan, and countless other German units on their bold drive to the Channel coast. The French system of command, what might be called order type tactics, compares quite poorly. The example of General Lafontaine at Sedan illustrates this quite well. Responsible for counterattacking the German bridgehead at Sedan, General Lafontaine ignored several requests for immediate assistance on the basis that he had received no orders to move his command.[footnoteRef:97] More pointedly, the French general had received his mission as early as 2000 hours on 13 May but, as French doctrine dictated, he waited for an order. [footnoteRef:98] As a result, by the time Lafontaine finally launched his attack 0445 the next day, German panzers were already in place on the heights overlooking the military bridge at Sedan.[footnoteRef:99] [94: Ibid. ,30] [95: Guderian, .Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 105.] [96: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 194.] [97: Ibid,. 184.] [98: Ibid., 184-5.] [99: Ibid. ,185.]

Truppenfhrung also stressed command from the front. In paragraph 109 it states that, The personal influence of the commander on his troops is vitally important. He must position himself close to the combat units.[footnoteRef:100] Paragraph 111 puts matter more explicitly when it says, The division commanders place is with his troops.[footnoteRef:101] Guderian spelled out what this meant for the commander of a Panzer formation. Enabled by radios to keep in touch with the far flung elements of his command, the Panzer commander was to lead from the front, at the decisive point.[footnoteRef:102] During Fall Gelb, Guderian put this principle into action, often making use a of mobile command station.[footnoteRef:103] On 13 May, Guderian crossed the River Meuse in one of the first waves, and was playfully reprimanded by a subordinate who called out, Joy riding in canoes on the Meuse is forbidden![footnoteRef:104] Rommel, famous for driving his staff crazy for leading from the front in North Africa, was no less cavalier in France. During the 7th Panzer divisions crossing of the Meuse, he took personal command of an infantry battalion on the opposite bank.[footnoteRef:105] Again the French compare rather poorly to this energetic style of leadership. While German division, corps, and occasionally even army commanders were seen at the front, orders from French commanders often took up to 48 hours to reach the concerned unit.[footnoteRef:106] [100: On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 36.] [101: Ibid. ,37.] [102: Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) 197-8.] [103: Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 96.] [104: Ibid., 102] [105: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 231.] [106: Ibid., 326.]

Technology

As already discussed, the very same tools that the Germans used to achieve astonishing success in France and the Low Countries were at the disposal of the Allies in greater quantities and often superior quality. The decisive difference lay in the employment of those tools. Truppenfhrung states in paragraph 2 that, New weapons dictate ever changing forms. Their appearance must be anticipated and their influence evaluated. Then they must be placed into service.[footnoteRef:107] Where the Allies turned to technology to replace traditional principles of war, German doctrine emphasized the utilization of technology to enable and amplify the traditional principles of warfare in a modern context. [107: On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 17]

The German Army made more extensive use of radios than any other major combatant in 1940. In stark contrast to the French and British who supplied only command tanks with radios, every single German tank was equipped with at least a radio receiver.[footnoteRef:108] This had a very telling effect on the tank on tank clash between French 1st Armored division and the German Armys 5th Panzer division at Flavion on 15 May. French tanks, unable to communicate with each other fought essentially individual actions while the German tank formation executed concerted feints, enveloping movements and attacks. [footnoteRef:109] The end result of the clash between these two units and two methods of warfare was a resounding vindication of the German emphasis on flexible command enhanced by modern technology. [108: Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) 197-8.] [109: Pallud, Jean Paul. (The Road ends at Denee. Paris, 1986) 47.]

Given the decisive role played by Panzergruppe Kleist during the course of the campaign, it is necessary to discuss the doctrinal innovation represented by the Panzer division. The organization of German men and machines into combined arms Panzer divisions, first done in 1935,[footnoteRef:110] was truly novel. Guderian, instrumental in the formation of the Panzer divisions in his role as Inspector of Motorized Troops, insisted on motorizing the tanks supporting arms so that they could keep pace with armored formations on operational maneuvers.[footnoteRef:111] of the organization of the 1st Panzer division as it stood on 10 May 1940, largely representative of panzer divisions overall, is a helpful example. In the 1st Panzer division one finds engineers, self propelled artillery, motorized infantry, and all other supporting arms , rendering the division a highly mobile and self contained combined arms team capable of independent operational maneuver.[footnoteRef:112] The effectiveness of Panzergruppe Kleist in penetrating French lines at Sedan and then conducting an operational level maneuver far to the rear of the bulk of Allied forces are proof positive of the Panzer divisions ability to operate independently and with operational significance. Allied armor formations on the other hand were much less diverse and did not train with organic support elements.[footnoteRef:113] Additionally, only a portion of the Allies armor was even notionally organized for operational employment. [footnoteRef:114]The bulk of allied tanks were parceled out piecemeal to the infantry units,[footnoteRef:115] robbing them of the kind of striking power possessed by units like Panzergruppe Kleist and Panzers corps Hoth and Hoepner.[footnoteRef:116] As a result, the Allies were unable to mount any operationally significant armor thrust throughout the campaign. Additionally, what armor the Allies had organized for operational employment was thrown into battle against the Germans in penny packets. This organization resulted in the disastrous defeat of the French 1st Armored division at Flavion[footnoteRef:117] and the inconsequential raid of De Gaulles 4th Armored division at Montcornet.[footnoteRef:118] [110: Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 36] [111: Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) 188-196] [112: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 120 ] [113: Ibid., 128] [114: Bauer, Eddy. The Panzer War. The Most Important Panzer Operations of the Second World War in Europe and Africa. Vol.1, Attack and Retreat of the German Panzer Units. (Bonn: Verlag Offene Worte, 1965) 80.] [115: Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 96.] [116: Bauer, Eddy. The Panzer War. The Most Important Panzer Operations of the Second World War in Europe and Africa. Vol.1, Attack and Retreat of the German Panzer Units. (Bonn: Verlag Offene Worte, 1965) 80.] [117: Ibid,. 238] [118: Ibid.]

Equally critical to the success of the Wehrmacht in Fall Gelb was the ability of the ground forces to cooperate effectively with the Luftwaffe.[footnoteRef:119] Cooperation between air and ground elements is stressed in paragraph 759 of Truppenfhrung.[footnoteRef:120] However, as Guderian pointed out in Achtung-Panzer!, if the support of airpower is important to the army in general, it was essential to the Panzers.[footnoteRef:121] With the emphasis in Panzer operations placed on speed, it was very likely that the Panzers would outrun their heavy artillery support. In this case it was essential that the Luftwaffe function as vertical artillery for the armored formations. [footnoteRef:122] The close cooperation between the panzers and the Luftwaffe is most evident in the breaktrhough at Sedan where a rolling air barrage drawn up to Guderians specifications was instrumental in suppressing French artillery and ensuring the success of the Meuse River crossings.[footnoteRef:123] The French system of providing air support is nearly laughable in comparison. As where the Luftwaffe and Heer had drilled cooperation repeatedly and to great effect, the French Air Force was plagued by a lack of a central command or any set procedure for providing air support.[footnoteRef:124] The result was that, despite numerical inferiority, the Luftwaffe would generate sorties at nearly twelve times the rate of the French Air Force during the course of the campaign. [footnoteRef:125] [119: The Luftwaffes support was critical to the success of outgunned German armor formations in various engagements during Fall Gelb. Airpower was used to destroy dangerous Allied armored attacks in much the manner described by Guderian in Achtung Panzer! It was also essential to the success of the river crossings at Sedan. Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 436..] [120: On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 197.] [121: Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) 194-196.] [122: Ibid., 188-9.] [123: Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 102, 484.] [124: Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 344.] [125: Ibid. ]

V: Institutional Roots of Victory

For the Romans do not begin to use their weapons first in time of war, nor do they then put their hands first into motion, having been idle in times of peace: but as if their weapons were part of of themselves, they never have any truce from warlike exercisesnor would he be mistaken that would call their exercises unbloody battles and their battles bloody exercises.

Flavius Josephus[footnoteRef:126] [126: Josephus, Flavius. The Great Roman-Jewish War(First century A.D.)]

The doctrine of the German Heer was very clear on the demands the modern battlefield would place on the soldier.

10. The decisive factor, despite technology and weaponry is the value of the individual soldier.. The emptiness of the battlefield requires soldiers who can think and act independently, who can make calculated, decisive and daring use of every situation, and who understand that victory depends on each individual.[footnoteRef:127] [127: On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 18.]

In order to fully benefit from their doctrine, the Germans found it necessary to arrange their personal management system in such a manner as to instill a maximum of unit cohesion. Rigorous individual training is clearly necessary to prepare a soldier to succeed in such an environment but is not on its own sufficient. The unit to which the soldier belongs is his most immediate and vital source of support both on and off the battlefield. Because of this philosophy, Truppenfhrung stresses the importance of unit cohesion to overall victory.[footnoteRef:128] But how did the German Heer achieve such cohesion? To answer that question, it is necessary to examine how the German Heer created and maintained the combat formations that it took to war in 1940. [128: This is most clearly articulated in paragraph 13. Ibid., 19]

Recruitment

What will stand out immediately to the American eye as one looks at the recruitment methods of the Wehrmacht is the decentralized method of management. Except in the case of elite units like the Grodeutschland Infantry regiment, units of division size and down were recruited on a regional basis.[footnoteRef:129] This was done to give units a built level of cohesions owing to the uniform dialect and regional sensibilities of the men recruited to serve together.[footnoteRef:130] Furthermore, once a recruit arrived at his particular regiment, it was the regimental commander and not some distant personnel officer who ultimately decided the recruits MOS.[footnoteRef:131] It is not difficult to see how this policy, while perhaps less efficient than a centrally controlled one, served to immediately form strong bonds between the incoming recruit and his receiving unit. [129: van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982) 45] [130: There is an extensive body of literature promoting the idea that a common social background increases the cohesion of an organization. For one example, see A. Etzioni A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: 1961) 189] [131: German General Staff. Ausbildungvorschrift fur der Panzertruppen. (Berlin: Heeres Dienstvorschirft, 1943) 8]

Training

In discussing training it is necessary to first discuss the structure of the German Heer. The German Heer was broadly divided into the Feldheer or Field Army and the Ersatzheer or Replacement Army. [footnoteRef:132]All combat units were the responsibility of the Field Army while the Replacement Army oversaw such functions as basic training, replacements, and procurement,[footnoteRef:133] The Replacement Army was further divided into regional districts with several divisions of the Field Army corresponding to each district.[footnoteRef:134] Because, men of the Field Army would often rotate back to serve as cadre in their Replacement Army districts, new recruits were often trained by the very officers and NCOs with whom they would serve.[footnoteRef:135] [132: van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982) 43] [133: Ibid.] [134: Ibid. ] [135: Ibid., 75]

Replacements

Once a recruit had completed basic training within his district, or a wounded soldier had recovered, he would be sent to his unit in the Field Army in part of a marching battalion of roughly 1,000 men so that he never travelled individually.[footnoteRef:136] The marching battalion would be disbanded upon arrival to the receiving unit and its personnel taken in by the field replacement battalion of the receiving division.[footnoteRef:137] Each company in the field replacement battalion corresponded to a command within the division. The field replacement battalion, manned by the officers and NCOs of the receiving division, finished the training of the incoming recruits and incorporated any lessons learned in divisions area of operations into the recruits body of knowledge [footnoteRef:138] [136: Shills, E.A.., and M. Janowitz. "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II." Public Opinion Quarterly, 1948: 280-315.] [137: Ibid.] [138: van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982) 75]

The maintenance of a large number of vacancies within a divisions table of organization had several effects. First, it allowed soldiers recovering from wounds or returning from advanced training courses to return to their units. Additionally, by waiting until replacements could be grouped into marching battalions, it was possible to plan appropriately for their incorporation into the receiving division en mass. Additionally, the German practice of creating new divisions rather than maintaining existing ones at full strength allowed for regular rotation of units and ensured the replacements would not enter units piecemeal.

The Effect of This System

The elaborate system established by the Germans for personal management was not without its drawbacks. The system was inherently complicated because of its decentralized nature.. However, the impact of a system designed in every respect to build combt teams out of individuals, was an impressive level of unit cohesion. This cohesion is evident in the ability of German units to continue fighting after taking casualties well beyond those necessary to render them formally combat ineffective.[footnoteRef:139] Overall, it seems that the combat formations of the German Army outperformed their opponents for many of the same reasons that American airborne divisions were considered elite.[footnoteRef:140] As a rule, the men of the Wehrmacht trained together, fought together, and died together. [139: Again, the example of the Panzer Lehr division in France comes to mind. Reduced to well below 20% of its authorized strength on the eve of Operation Cobra, the division continued to fight until the end of the war despite near annihilation on 25 July 1944. See Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995) 207] [140: The American and British Airborne divisions of World War II were recognized as elite divisions for their combat ability. These units benefited from years of training as cohesive teams. The nessecity that combat replacements be airborne qualified also resulted in replacements returning to their original unit.s. Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy. New York: Vintage, 1984.]

VI: The American Experience

There is a Providence that protects idiots, drunkards, children and the United States of America.

Otto Von Bismarck[footnoteRef:141] [141: Speech to the North German Reichstag 1867. ]

Military organizations are learning institutions that evolve and change as a result of their experiences and considerations of the environment in which they operate. The experiences of the American Army in the second half of the 20th century, and especially those of Vietnam, are examples of such opportunities for institutional growth. Utilizing German doctrine and the lessons therein was a central aspect of the creation of the all volunteer force and the formulation of operational doctrine following the Armys traumatic experience in Southeast Asia.[footnoteRef:142] But how well were the lessons of the German experience in campaigns such as Fall Gelb learned? What lessons remained to be learned? [142: On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) xii]

To answer these questions, it is necessary to evaluate the recent performance of the U.S. Army in major combat operations. Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom serve as the cases to be examined. The examination of these two cases in tandem will provide not only a valuable snapshot of the state the U.S. Armys operational art, doctrine, and institutions, but also give a sense of trends over time..

Desert Storm

Memories of the Gulf War are dominated by images of the precision guided munitions flying through the windows of Iraqi command posts, vast armored columns thundering through the desert, and sound bites like the 100 Hour Ground War. As a closer examination of the conduct of the campaign reveals however, the visions of a dynamic offensive conjured up in the media and the reality of what happened could not be farther apart.[footnoteRef:143] [143: While Desert Storm would witness use of truly astounding technologies, the operational conduct of the campaign was timid and halfhearted. VII Corps, the main striking force of Allied arms in the Gulf, lost a critical opportunity to capture the Republican Guard because of its lethargic rate of advance. For a first hand account, see Macgregor, Douglas. Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press , 2009)]

At first glance, the overall scheme of maneuver for Allied forces developed by General Schwarzkopf and his staff resembles the German Sickle Cut plan of 1940 turned sideways. Marines, playing the part of German Army Group B, would simulate the main effort by feinting into Kuwait. The part of Panzergruppe Kleist was to be played by the U.S. Armys VII Corps. VII Corps was to execute a rapid sweep into the western Iraqi desert and fall upon the rear of the Iraqi Army in a giant Left Hook[footnoteRef:144]. Appearances are where the similarities between the German invasion of France in 1940 and the American invasion of Iraq end however. [144: U.S. Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V of Public Law 102-25. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992)251-8]

VII Corps was composed of the 1st Infantry division, 1st and 3rd Armored divisions, 1st Cavalry division, the 2nd Armored Cavalry regiment and over 110,00 men, 1,100 tanks and 2,000 other armored vehicles.[footnoteRef:145] This tremendous assortment of combat power was assembled to destroy and prevent the escape of Iraqs Republican Guard, the professional core of Iraqs conscript based army.[footnoteRef:146] Clearly, just as in 1940, success was dependent on speed and decisive maneuver. Unfortunately, the advance of VII Corps was typified more by timidity and caution than by the boldness merited by its overwhelming strength. Over the course of four days between 21 and 26 February 1991, VII Corps moved a little over 123 miles with an average rate of advance of just 1.25 miles per hour.[footnoteRef:147] The Second Armored Cavalry regiment, the lead element of VII Corps, was repeatedly commanded to halt during its advance across the open desert.[footnoteRef:148] At one point, the regiment was halted for a period of 24 hours between the 25th and the 26th.[footnoteRef:149] Almost more troubling than the inability of the VII Corps to move forward at anything faster than a snails pace was the almost complete absence of division and corps commanders from the front.[footnoteRef:150] The result of this lethargic advance was the escape of the bulk of Iraqs Republican Guard.[footnoteRef:151] These very same forces would later be used in committing various atrocities against the Shia population.[footnoteRef:152] [145: Ibid. ] [146: Macgregor, Douglas. Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press , 2009) 11] [147: Ibid., 71] [148: Ibid., 44, 47, 71, 80, 81, 82, 97 ] [149: Ibid., 97] [150: General Schwarzkopf issued a verbal directive barring battalion commanders and above from participating in combat! Ibid. 233] [151: Ibid., 215] [152: Ibid., 218]

Iraqi Freedom

In both its pacing and the aggressiveness of execution, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was leaps and bounds ahead of the ponderous campaign of 12 years earlier.[footnoteRef:153] In the span of three weeks, a force less than half the size of the one employed in Desert Storm toppled the Saddam regime and achieved the destruction of the Iraqi Army as a coherent fighting force.. In the rapid advance towards Baghdad that disregarded open flanks and emphasized speed, the echoes of blitzkrieg are clear. However, in the initial requests made by Army generals for additional ground forces, and original estimates that the ground conflict one the way to Baghdad would last three months, the echoes of the overly cautious conduct of Desert Storm are also apparent. [footnoteRef:154] While Baghdad was seized much faster than the original estimates had predicted, the very fact that these estimates had been drawn up is a sign of incredible timidity. In 2003, the fighting capabilities of the Iraqi Army were a known quantity and their readiness had been degraded by years sanctions and periodic Allied bombing[footnoteRef:155] [153: Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales. The Iraq War. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003) 13] [154: In pre war planning that did not include considerations for an occupation of Iraq by U.S. ground forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff originally requested 550,000 ground troops and projected a protracted struggle on the way to Baghdad. See Gordon, Micheal R., and Bernard E. Trainor. "Saddam's Utter Collapse Shows This Has Not Been a Real War." (Daily Telegraph, April 8, 2003) 2.] [155: Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales. The Iraq War. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003) 77-85]

American Personnel Management[footnoteRef:156] [156: The following is based on the authors personal experience with the Atrmys personnel management system. ]

Given the centrality of institutions to this study, a few brief remarks on the nature of current U.S. Army personnel management practices. Recruits for the Army are placed into a single national pool and assigned to units without regard for the recruits region of origin. After taking a basic aptitude test the recruit is assigned an operational specialty by Human Resources Command rather than any commander. Once assigned to a unit, the typical soldier or officer can expect to change divisions and posts every few years.

VII: Policy Implications

I pass with relief from the tossing sea of Cause and Theory to the firm ground of Result and Fact.

Winston Churchill[footnoteRef:157] [157: Churchill, Winston The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War ( London: 1898), 86 ]

The U.S. Army faces a crossroads. As already discussed, geostrategic trends promise to present the Army with a broad array of complex security dilemmas well into the future.[footnoteRef:158] Even as these challenges present themselves, the current political and budgetary environment promise to reduce the resources available to meet these challenges.[footnoteRef:159] Despite diminished resources, the nation will not expect less of its armed forces. It is therefore incumbent upon the Army to learn the lessons of 1940 and achieve success with less as the Wehrmacht did in France. [158: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. "Quarterly Operational Environment Review." West Point, September 22, 2010.] [159: The Heritage Foundation. June 23, 2009. http://www.heritage.org/Multimedia/InfoGraphic/Obama-plan-cuts-defense-spending-to-pre-9-11-levels (accessed March 15, 2011).]

The potential lessons of this study are of no small consequence to the Army as a profession. At a very fundamental level, this research requires the Army to at least address, if not adopt, a conceptualization of warfare that differs in subtle but highly significant ways from its current form. If this occasions the Army to redefine war a being dominated by a contest of independent wills, as opposed to the application of principles to varied situations in which the enemy is simply a factor to be accounted for, the implications are profound. In short, the engineering approach to warfare would give way to a Clausewitzian conception of conflict that embraces uncertainty and the need for decision in ambiguous conditions. Within such a framework, the individual and the small unit naturally rise to a place of prominence in doctrine. But what might this mean in practical terms?

The potential policy implications fall into several broad categories. The potential ramifications for Army practices can be divided into those that effect doctrine, those that affect the institutional army, and those that affect acquisitions and research. Each of these will be treated in turn.

Doctrinal Lessons of 1940

Like On War, much of what is found in Truppenfhrung and Achtung-Panzer! serve as historical period pieces. But, just as many of the words of Clausewitz have proven to be timeless, so are there many lessons to be found amongst the principles that guided the Wehrmacht to victory in France in 1940.

An examination of current Army doctrine reveals that many of the lessons to be gained from the German experience in 1940 have been acknowledged and put to paper. Many passages from FM 3-0, especially those concerning command and the nature of war, have their direct counterparts in the pages of Truppenfhrung.[footnoteRef:160] The echoes of Blitzkrieg are clear. [160: The principles of Battle Command mentioned in FM 3-0 are very much in line with those of Auftragstaktik while the discussion of the nature of war in the appendix shares Clausewitzian roots with its counterpat in Truppenfhrung.]

What is also clear however was that some of the lessons of 1940 did not make the leap from the printed page into practice. The halting of American armored units in hot pursuit of Iraqi Republican guard divisions along the eastings in 1991 serves as a case in point. It seems to suggest that the principles of Auftragstaktik, and the relentless pursuit of initiative, were not properly emphasized within the American high command. Additionally, division and corps commanders often oversaw operations from command posts far removed from the scene of the fighting. This is a clear violation of command principles stressing leadership from the front. The decisions to remove commanders from the front lines is made all the more puzzling in light of the fact that modern technology allows a commander to maintain a realistic operating picture of the battlefield from nearly anywhere. Why not at the front?

A reading of FM 3-0, the U.S. Armys capstone manual, however reveals that nearly all of the principles key to German success in 1940 have been incorporated into U.S. Army doctrine.[footnoteRef:161] This observation suggests that the principle issue lies elsewhere. In truth the issues rests with the mindset of the Army as an institution[footnoteRef:162] An overly formalistic and mechanical conception of leadership, rooted in Americas corporate culture, prevents the adoption and practice of the command principles embodied in the Wehrmacht and articulated in Battle Command[footnoteRef:163] The recommendations to be made with regard to official doctrine are therefore rather limited. [161: As mentioned in a previous footnote, FM 3,0 s principles of Battle Command and its concept of the nature of war constitute examples of concepts borrowed directly from Truppenfhrung] [162: The Army general officer is at times extremely risk adverse and unwilling to take the bold actions nessecary to secure success with minimal resources. Macgregor, Douglas. Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press , 2009) 218-220] [163: van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982), 218 .]

In light of the limitations it is still possible to make the following policy recommendations as they relate to doctrine. First the United States Army should review its doctrine in order to ensure that it places proper emphasis on the command principles of decentralized authority, faithfulness to the spirit, not the letter of mission, and leading from the front. All of the critical command principles mentioned as foundations of Auftragstaktik can be in FM 3-0, the U.S. Armys capstone manual, but placing a clearer emphasis on them would serve to better ensure their transmission into the force.

Second, the doctrine should be revised in order to be less prescriptive. Paragraph 4 in Truppenfhrung states that, Lesson in the conduct of war cannot be exhaustively complied in the form of regulations. [footnoteRef:164] While this concept also finds its way into FM 3-0, a side by side comparison of analogous sec