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STUDENT REPORT

TACTICAL AIR FORCES NIGHT TRAINING *; S

MAJOR JAMES V. STEWART 88-2490

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DISCLAIMER

The views and conclusions expressed in thisdocument are those of the author. They arenot intended and should not be thought torepresent official ideas, attitudes, orpolicies of any agency of the United StatesGovernment. The author has not had specialaccess to official information or ideas andhas employed only open-source materialavailable to any writer on this subject.

This document is the property of the UnitedStates Government. It is available fordistribution to the general public. A loancopy of the document may be obtained from theAir University Interlibrary Loan Service(AUL/LDEX, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112-5564)or the Defense Technical Information Center.Request must include the author's name andcomplete title of the study.

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--e I_Z, Z '

REPORT NUMBER 88-2490

TITLE TACTICAL AIR FORCES NIGHT TRAINING

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR JAMES V." STEWART, USAF

FACULTY ADV(SOR MAJOR RON DUFRESNE, ACSC/3823 STUS-32

SPONSOR MAJOR ROD HAZEN, HQ TAC/DRFA

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of

requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112

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TACTICAL AIR FORCES NIGHT TRAINING

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19. ABSTRACT (Cniu nreverse i emayand identity by block number)

The TAF will soon acquire new weapons systems with increased nightemployment capabilities. To effectively employ these new systems wilrequire an increase in night flying training. This study examines thequantity and quality of current TAF night flying training and idetnti-fies and discusses the problems associated with an increase in nightflying training requirements.

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]MME-WA PREFACEWRnWnlrP

The US Air Force iz enhan-.ing it t- nightc apab ili t y by t he acqu is iti -:n .: f n ew wealo:n s s y Ztei Lut tc

effectively employ those systemz, and to respond tc, i *gr,:winzSoviet night threat, an increased level of night flyingtraining is required. Such an increase entailz difficulties.however, and this report will ex.amine some of the problems tobe dealt with when implementing an increase in night flyin-*1training requirements. The report will also provide theresults of research designed to quantify the quality ---fcurrent night tactical flying training.

The author wishez to thank several individualz f.-r thei.;rinvaluable sup-port in the completion *:,f this project.Many thankz- to-- Major Rod Hazen for his sponsors-hip it,~ieffort. Also, a debt of grattitude to the faculty &isrMajor Ron Dufresne, for his patienc:e, -:onztru,:,i%-- e-4i:rw3Ladvice, and dedication to excellence. Finally, specialthanks to Colonel A.K. Smith, 36th TFW/DO, for hiZ Zuprort ir,

conducting the research.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MAJOR JAMES V. STEWART

Major Stewart received a Bachelor of Science degree inBusiness Administration from the University of South Carolinaand was commissioned through the university's Air ForceReserve Officer Training Corps program in May 1973.

He graduated from Undergraduate Pilot Training at CraigAir Force Base, Alabama in November 1974 and was firstassigned to the 49th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at GriffissAir Force Base, New York. Major Stewart flew the T-33 fromJanuary 1975 to February 1976. He then flew the F-106 fromMarch 1976 to August 1981. While at Griffiss, he served asLife Support Officer, Instructor Pilot, Chief of Training,and Chief of Weapons and Tactics. In 1979, he graduated fromthe USAF Interceptor Weapons School, and in 1980 was the 49thFighter Interceptor Squadron William Tell Team Captain.

In 1981 Major Stewart was assigned to Headquarters AirDefense, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base,Virginia, where he was a Training Branch, and Weapons andTactics Branch Staff Officer. In addition to augmenting theMAJCOM Standardization and Evaluation Team as an F-106 FlightExaminer, Major Stewart was one of the eight USAF andCanadian Forces primary action officers who wrote, rewrote,staffed, and coordinated Joint Regulation 55-79, Aircrew/Weapons Controller Procedures for Air Operations.

From September to December 1984 Major Stewart attendedF-15 transition training at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona andwas assigned to the 525th Tactical Fighter Squadron atBitburg Air Base, Germany from January 1985 to August 1987.While at Bitburg, he served as Maintenance Liaison Officer,Safety Officer, and Wing Weapons and Tactics Officer.

Major Stewart is a Senior Pilot with over 2700 hours offlying time in the T-33, F-106, and F-15 as a flight lead,instructor pilot, special mission commander, and flightexaminer. He received a Master of Science in InternationalRelations from Troy State University - Europe in 1988. MajorStewart completed Squadron Officers School by correspondencein 1977, Air Command and Staff College by seminar in 1983,and is currently attending Air Command and Staff College inresidence.

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..... * - TABLE OF CONTENTS - -

Preface ..................................................... ii.About the Author ........................................... i%List of Illu3trations ....................................... "iExecutive Summary ......................................... vii

CHAPTER ONE: TACTICAL AIR FORCES NIGHT TRAININGIntroduction .............................................. 1Ov erv iew .................................................. I

CHAPTER TWO: REQUIREMENTS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ......... 3

CHAPTER THREE: QUALITY OF TRAINING ........................ 7

CHAPTER FOUR: AIRSPACE ISSUES AND OTHER LIMITATICNZ ....... I

CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS. RECOMMENDATION2. AND CNLi, N§Findings .. ...............................................1 6Recommendat ion .......................................... 17Conclusions .............................................. 17

BIBLIOGRAPHY. ............................................... le

GLO SSAR Y ................................................... 2 1

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

TABE

TABLE 1--TAF Semi-Annual Night Training Requirements ........

TABLE 2--Squadron "1' Selected Night Sortie D'ata............ 11

TABLE 3--Squadron ''2'' Selected Night Sortie Data............ 11

TABLE 4--Squadron "3" Selected Night Cortie Data............I-

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYPart of our College mission is distribution of Athe students' problem solving products toDOD sponsors and other interested agenciesto enhance insight into contemporary,

defense related issues. While the College hasaccepted this product as meeting academicrequirements for graduation, the views and

- opinions expressed or implied are solelythose of the author and should not be

construed as carrying official sanction.

"insights into tomorrow"

REPORT NUMBER 88-2490

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR JAMES V. STEWART, USAF

TITLE TACTICAL AIR FORCES NIGHT TRAINING

I. Problem: Future Tactical Air Forces (TAF) aircraft will havesignificant night employment capability, and to successfullyexploit this capability, TAF aircrews will need to train more atnight. Current night flying training requirements are minimal, andthe quality of that training is limited by airspace restrictionsand training Rules of Engagement (ROE). Additionally, an increasein night flying training requirements will be influenced byairspace restrictions, training ROE, maintenance factors, andpersonnel and support issues.

II. Objectives: This study has two overall main objectives: toexamine the quantity and quality of night flying training currentlybeing flown by TAF units, and to identify the problems associatedwith an increase in night flying training requirements for TAF air-crews. The quantity is obtained by a review of applicable taskingdocuments and training records. The quality of night flying train-ing is evaluated through an examination of restrictions to trainingwith respect to airspace and ROE, and by a data search of flightrecords compared with sunset times,

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'p

CONTINUED

III. Discussion 3f Analysis: in.t P u lati:n F- , --2used as the sz.urce for training POT, and Ta ti-al Air >cmmanManual (TACM) 51-50 was used as the source for semi-ann. ':'.training requirements. Host-nation letters of agreement fromGermany's Central Region were used to identify airspace restric-tions in Europe. The data search for individual night accomplish-ments was done using a small sample front a single, but reF: esent-ative, tactical fighter wing due to the difficulty in retrievingdata from current tracking systems. Other factors impaotin. anincrease in night flying training were identified but not discussedin great depth due to the scope of this project.

IV. FINDINGS: This project revealed several findings:- Current data tracking systemr r..ako i:tract i.n of nigt.

flying training information difficult.- A representative but small zamFle indica'es tha- m-st niln-

tactical flying training is being done in :.onditionz .of darkness.- Only two night sorties are currently required r'er trainin.7

half, although night event requirements are being increased.- Night training airspace in Central Germany is extremely

limited by host-nation rules, and restricts both the quantity andquality of training available.

- Numerous factors such as flying hour funding, maintenancecapability, crew rest, base support ictivitieZ, and family izsuezmust be addressed when increasing nig=ht flying training require-ments.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS: The research suggests the fc.llowin. rec.:..-mendations:

- Implement a modified tracking and data retrieval zysten inorder to fully validate and monitor the quality of night flyingtraining done by TAF aircrews.

- In order to support increased night flying training. ,::tainadditional airspace and remove restrictions whi.:h unnecessarilylimit the quality and quantity of training.

VI. CONCLUSIONS: This study has shown that the quantity :f TAFnight flying training required is minimal, and the quality of thattraining is limited by available airspace and training ROE. Numer-ous sources report the need to employ TAF aircraft at night and tctrain to that end. Both current and new systems must compete forairspace and flying hours. Increases in current night flyingtraining requirements must be fully evaluated and all relevantfactors considered. This study has been an effort to icentify Someof those factors and pr.ovide insight into the status of currentnight flying training programs. e

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. %- % - %

Chapter One

TACTICAL AIR FORCES NIGHT TRAINING

INTRODUCTION

The US Air Force is expanding its nighttime employmentcapability with the introduction of new systems such as theF-15E Strike Eagle, the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), andLow-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night(LANTIRN) pods. Additionally, new generation Soviet aircraftsuch as the MIG-29 Fulcrum and SU-27 Flanker have an expandednight capability and Soviet training continues to reinforce anight employment doctrine (13:1). Therefore, the TacticalAir Forces' (TAF) ability to effectively utilize these newcapabilities and counter a more capable Soviet threat willrequire its aircrews and support personnel to increasinglyoperate in conditions of darkness. Current trainingprograms, however, include only limited night trainingrequirements, use restrictive training rules of engagement(ROE), and do not require actual conditions of darkness forthe accomplishment of many training events.

These new systems require extensive training underconditions of actual darkness to effectively utilize systemcapabilities. This study will evaluate both the currentquality and quantity of actual night training in order toprovide a point of departure for the establishment andevaluation of future training goals. Given that new systemswill require an increased level of night training, this studywill attempt to identify and examine the various impacts ofan increased night training program. This analysis willprovide data to decisionmakers which has not been previouslyquantified, and which can be used to make informed decisionson future training programs.

OVERVIEW

Chapter Two will define night sorties and associatednight training events in accordance with Tactical Air Command(TACM) 51-50, Tactical Aircrew Training. A listing ofcurrent night training requirements will also be provided forseveral specific TAF weapons systems. Training rules of "

engagement (ROE) as specified in Joint Regulation (JR) 55-79,

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Iye 1

Aircrew/Weapons Controller Procedures for Air Operations,will be discussed as they enhance or detract from anticipatedwartime employment. Finally, types of night missions thatmight be anticipated during wartime will also be discussed.

Chapter Three will discuss and summarize the results ofa data search of night flying training accomplished by atypical Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW). Due to the limitedscope of this Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) project,the 36th TFW at Bitburg AB, Germany was selected as arepresentative TAF unit. However, an unexpected limitationto the data gathering process further limited the dataavailable for this report. This limitation will also beexplained.

Chapter Four will examine the potential impact andconflicts in airspace availability given an increase in nighttraining requirements using Air Traffic Control (ATC),Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and host-nationagreements (in Europe's Central Region) as sources. Inaddition to airspace requirements, Chapter Four will alsoidentify other areas for consideration such as: crew rest,base support, maintenance capability, and family issues whichwould be affected by an increase in night flying training.

Finally, Chapter Five will provide findings,recommendations, and conclusions based on an analysis of thedata obtained and the various factors examined.

I. N

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Chapter Two

REQUIREMENTS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Both TACM 51-50 and JR 55-79 identify and define TAFmissions. JR 55-79 divides those missions into Air-to-AirOperations and Air-to-Ground Operations, and Tactical AirCommand Regulation (TACR) 55-50, Night Flying for All TACAircrews, establishes the requirement to train for nightemployment. This chapter will examine the training for thosemissions and will use JR 55-79 as its primary source toidentify training ROE and TACM 51-50 as the primary sourcefor training event definitions and requirements.

Air-to-air operations which are addressed in JR 55-79are categorized into two major component missions: counter-air and aerospace defense. Night air-to-surface operationstasked by TACR 55-50 include: air reconnaissance (RECCE),suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and interdiction.

Training to perform those missions is accomplished by athree-pronged method involving academic ground training,simulator and part-task trainer missions, and actual flyingtraining. TACR 55-50 "... establishes the requirement for... operational squadrons to plan and conduct nightcontinuation training programs so that a basic level of nightproficiency and capability is maintained in the missionassigned to each squadron" (7:1). TACM 51-50 prescribes thesemi-annual training program for each weapon system anddefines the missions and events required to maintain MissionReady (MR) status.

TACM 51-50, Volume 1, Table 3-1 establishes the minimumsemi-annual basic flying requirements for all tacticalaircraft and includes the requirement for two night sortiesper aircrew per training half. "A night sortie is one onwhich either takeoff or landing and at least 60 percent offlight duration or one hour flight time, whichever is less,occur during official hours of darkness" (5:3-2). Theremainder of night flying training requirements are specifiedby each MAJCOM in their respective Chapter 6 to TACM 51-50.

Specific night, semi-annual flying training eventrequirements for TAC and USAFE aircrews by weapon system areshown in Table 1. All units are required to fly at least twonight sorties and one night air refueling per training half.

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Additionally, air-to-air tasked units are required to performa minimum number of night intercept events, and air-to-surface tasked units are required to perform a minimum numberof night weapons delivery events. The importance of nightemployment of tactical assets in theater warfare at manylevels (such as the use of F-111F aircraft in the Libyanstrike) has prompted USAFE to increase night trainingrequirements for strike aircraft in CY 88 to include threeadditional night low levels and four additional nightlaydown/loft deliveries (11:1).

Training to employ at night requires a logical balanceof risk versus gain. TACR 55-50 stresses a building blockapproach to the night training program combined with anemphasis on safety and supervisory involvement (7:3). Inorder to provide guidance for the safe conduct of flyingtraining, JR 55-79 specifies training ROE for night flyingtraining and states that "night operations are those takingplace between official sunset and official sunrise" (4:9-3).Only intercepts are authorized for night air-to-air trainingsince air combat training (ACBT) ROE requires a clearlydiscernable horizon (4:9-4).

Other differences between rules to train in daylight andrules to train at night exist. A summary of applicable JR55-79 training ROE as it differs from day/Visual Flight Rules(VFR) ROE is listed below:

- ...No visual 'Commits'/'Judys' are authorized byaircrew under night/IMC operation.

- ...To meet wartime training objectives, adversariesmay operate without exterior lighting at night withthe approval of wing/air division commander(s) andin a MAJCOM-approved airspace providing an appropriatewaiver to applicable directives has been obtained.

- ...Two-way communications will be required at alltimes for blacked-out operations.

- ...The minimum vertical separation between participat-ing aircraft inside 10 NM with no visual contact is1,000 feet.

- ...An MSA [minimum safe altitude] will be established500 feet above the highest obstacle for the operationarea, sub-area, or route .... Aircrews may descendbelow the established MSA only when visual referenceis established and can be maintained with the terrainor obstacles. Any time visual reference with theterrain or obstacles is lost, the aircrews will returnto a safe altitude at or above the MSA ... (4:9-3 - 9-4).

- ...Minimum altitude for all USAFE aircraft (exceptF-1ll aircraft using TFR) participating in nightintercepts is 2,500 feet AGL. F-1ll target aircraft

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operating below 5,000 AGL will observe normal TFR systemlimitations (10:7).

These rules represent a compromise between the actualwartime employment environment and the acceptable risks thatmust be taken when training to fight in that wartime arena.JR 55-79 training ROE is at times waived in pursuit ofspecific operational peacetime objectives. A recent exampleof such waiver is the modification of JR 55-79 ROE during theconduct of TAC Project 86W-010F, TD&E of F-15 Night/AdverseWeather Air-To-Air Employment. These modifications included:

- All external lighting could be off except thosethat would be useful in an aerial combat zone tomaintain relative position (example: strip lightingonly) while in restricted airspace.- Air-to-Surface aircraft using TFR were authorizedto operate down to 1,000 feet AGL.- Blue fighters were permitted to continue radarattacks on Red air-to-surface fighters during theirweapons deliveries. Weapons delivery profiles wereplanned and executed for level releases (6:A-1).

The additional risks involved in conducting the TD&Ewith less restrictive ROE allowed the participating crews tobetter evaluate the TAF's capability to employ at night underconditions more closely resembling the wartime environment.The final report of that TD&E concludes:

Pilots require more demanding and frequent nighttraining than is currently directed to gain andmaintain proficiency in four-ship operations againstmulti-aircraft air-to-air/air-to-surface adversaryforces in the night/adverse weather environment (6:vi).

Training ROE is a necessary part of maximizing availableresources to preclude the unnecessary loss of both crews andaircraft which impacts both training assets and real-worldemployment capabilities.

The TAF will employ at night in a variety of missions,however, as described above, there are limitations on nighttraining ROE, and the amount and complexity of requiredtraining. The next chapter will provide more insight intohow well and how much TAF aircrews train to employ at night.

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BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL AIRCRAFT:

Total Night Sorties - 2Night Air Refueling - 1Night Landings - 2

NIGHT CURRENCIES: Inexp. Exper. Notes

Night Air Refueling 15 months 15 monthsNight Landing 15 days 30 days 1Night Tactical Sortie 60 days 90 days 2Night Weapons Delivery 30 days 60 days 3Night Toss Delivery 60 days 90 daysIMC/Night TFR 21 days 21 days 4Night TFO/CS 15 days 15 days 5

AIRCRAFT SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS:

AIRCRAFT EVENT (Note 6) GCC A GCC B GCC C

RF-4 Night/Radar Low Level 3S 4S 4SSimulated Ngt/Rdr LL 8S 10S 12S

F-15 Night/Wx Intercepts 10E 15E 15E

F-16 Night Intercepts 4E 5E 6E(USAFE) Night Laydown/Loft 4E 4E 4E

F-111E/F Night TFD 2E 2E 4ENight/IMC Auto TFR 3E 4E 5ENight Formation 2E 2E 2ENight Formation Appch 2E 2E 2E

F-111F Pave Tack Ngt Laser Toss 4E 4E 4E

NOTES: 1. Update with day landing2. Only for air-to-surface missions3. Climbing, level, or diving deliveries4. Accomplish AUTO TFR event5. Accomplish TFO/CS event6. E = event; S = sortie

All information extracted from TACM/USAFEM 51-50, Volume 1,and TAC and USAFE Chapter 6

Table 1. TAF Semi-Annual Night Training Requirements

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Chapter Three

QUALITY OF TRAINING

The previous chapter listed night flying trainingrequirements and the ROE that is currently used in training.This chapter will examine the quality of that night flyingtraining. One of the primary goals of this study was toquantify the amount of night training required IAW TACM 51-50performed during conditions of actual darkness.

Conditions of actual darkness are not required tofulfill some night training requirements. A night airrefueling event can be flown under "field grade conditions",i.e., taking off before or just after official sunset, goingdirectly to the air refueling track, getting an immediatehookup ten minutes after sunset while at 28,000 feet, andlegally logging a night refueling while in near daylightconditions. Due to 55-series requirements to make all nightrecoveries IFR (8:3-7), a significant portion of a nightsortie may be spent navigating to and from the training areaand in the instrument recovery pattern. These examples arenot meant to minimize the value of navigation and instrumentflying training gained while flying at night, but areintended to highlight the need to fully evaluate our nighttraining programs.

The method originally selected to obtain the data forthis analysis was to access the Air Force Operations ResourceManagement System (AFORMS). By searching for sorties duringwhich the aircrews logged night time or night events, andcomparing the takeoff (or landing) times to official sunset(or sunrise), the percentage of time flown during darknesscould be determined. Accepted limitations to the study werethe effects of available moonlight, lighting conditionsaffected by clouds, altitudes at which training wasaccomplished, and percentages of tactical versus basicproficiency training. A condition of darkness was assumed toexist during activity that occurred 30 minutes or more afterofficial sunset, or up to 30 minutes before official sunrise.

However, after research began, a serious limitation wasdiscovered in the collection of data: AFORMS did not havethe capability to recover the desired data. An examinationwas then made of the Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS)data system which also lacked the ability to gather the

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desired data. AFORMS only stores dates, training events, andtypes of flying accomplished (i.e., weather time or nighttime) but does not store takeoff or landing times. The CAMSsystem does not record training events, types of training, orcorrelate any of the data to specific aircrews. A workaroundwas discovered with the help of 36th TFW flight recordspersonnel: AFORMS could be accessed to provide the dates onwhich any given aircrew logged night time. Then theaircrew's Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form 369 for eachof those days could be manually checked to provide thetakeoff and landing times for each of his night sorties.These times could be compared with meteorological tableswhich define official sunset and sunrise for a particularlocation (3:1-9 - 1-12). As this turned out to be a verylabor intensive, time consuming process, an alternativemethod was used to gather data for this project.

The compromise was to recognize the time and expense ofcollecting the desired data within the context of the ACSCresearch program and to significantly restrict the samplegroup size.

Because of the difficulty in gathering the data and thetime consumed conducting the manual records search, a singlefighter wing, the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing at Bitburg AB,Germany, was used for the data base. A representative samplefrom each of the wing's three squadrons was selected whichconsisted of: the Squadron Commander, one squadron instruc-tor pilot, two experienced non-IP's, and two inexperiencedpilots. Selection of the individuals within the classes wasrandom, except, of course, for the squadron commander. Anadditional criteria was that each selected pilot had to havebeen present for the entire training half. Wing attachedpilots were excluded from the selection. Although the samplesize of eighteen from a population size of ninety may not bestatistically sufficient, it does give a representativepicture of a typical F-15 wing and shows the potential valueof implementing a more thorough tracking system.

Tables 2, 3, and 4 summarize the results of theresearch. They provide both individual and summary data forthe selected sample squadrons. Although the sample size issmall, there is no evidence to indicate that the sample wouldnot be representative of any given F-15 wing. The dataindicates that each of the selected pilots completed hisrequired semi-annual night sorties, and that the majority ofthe logged night time was flown in the defined conditions ofdarkness. The overall average night time logged was 1.57hours per sortie, and the overall average darkness time flownper sortie was 1.39 hours, for an overall average of 89% ofnight sortie flying hours flown in conditions of defined

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darkness. The data also indicates that the inexperiencedpilots flew as much or more of their training in darkness asthe experienced or supervisory pilots.

The results of this research indicate that for thisparticular air-to-air F-15 wing, the majority of night,employment training is done during conditions of actualdarkness, in keeping with the training philosophy in TACR 55-50 and JR 55-79 to train like we will fight. However, thecurrent requirement to fly only two night sorties pertraining half represents less than five percent of theminimum sorties (42) required for an inexperienced F-15 pilotto maintain Graduated Combat Capability (GCC) Level A.

•N

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*A ArA A% F!A -

NIGHT DARK %DARKDATE T/O LAND SUNSET HE S NIGHT

SQ CC 11-16 1612 1750 1522 1.6 1.6 100%11-23 1520 1620 1524 0.8 0.4 50%11-30 1750 1936 1518 1.8 1.8 100%

TOTAL 4.2 3.8 79%

SQ IP 10-26 1615 1740 1607 1.4 1.0 71%10-28 1605 1750 1604 1.7 1.3 76%12-05 1500 1700 1516 1.7 1.3 76%

TOTAL 4.8 3.6 75%

EXP A 10-20 1620 1820 1619 2.0 1.5 75%10-23 1618 1828 1613 2.2 1.8 82%

TOTAL 4.2 3.3 78%

EXP B 10-27 1620 1800 1605 1.7 1.4 82%12-23 1600 1745 1517 1.7 1.7 100%

TOTAL 3.4 3.1 91%

INEXP A 11-23 1640 1845 1524 2.1 2.1 100%11-30 1755 1935 1518 1.7 1.7 100%

TOTAL 3.8 3.8 100%

INEXP B 10-06 1640 1750 1650 1.0 0.5 50%10-07 1805 1910 1647 1.1 1.1 100%11-30 1755 1935 1518 1.7 1.7 100%12-29 1433 1620 1521 1.0 0.5 50%

TOTAL 4.8 3.8 77%

SELECTED SAMPLE SUMMARY 25.2 21.4 84.5%

NOTE: DARK HOURS ARE COMPUTED USING 30 MINUTES AFTEROFFICIAL SUNSET AS THE START OF ACTUAL DARKNESS

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Table 2. Squadron "1" Selected Night Sortie Data10

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NIGHT DARK %DARK

DATE T/O LAND SUNSET HRS HRS NIGHT

SQ CC 10-30 1610 1810 1600 2.0 1.8 90%11-23 1611 1741 1524 1.3 1.3 100%11-24 1652 1900 1523 2.1 2.1 100%12-07 1632 1847 1515 2.2 2.2 100%

TOTAL 7.6 7.4 97%

SQ IP 10-19 1624 1745 1621 1.4 0.9 64%11-30 1700 1800 1518 1.0 1.0 100%12-02 1548 1805 1517 2.3 2.3 100%

TOTAL 4.7 4.2 89%

EXP A 11-16 1836 2017 1532 1.7 1.7 100%11-23 1644 1844 1524 2.0 2.0 100%12-02 1515 1802 1517 2.8 2.3 82%

TOTAL 6.5 6.0 92%

EXP B 10-20 1620 1710 1619 0.8 0.3 38%11-16 1720 1920 1532 2.0 2.0 100%11-19 1530 1635 1529 1.1 0.6 55%11-23 1710 1845 1524 1.6 1.6 100%11-24 1700 1830 1523 1.5 1.5 100%

TOTAL 7.0 6.0 86%

INEXP A 12-02 1550 1800 1517 2.1 2.1 100%12-03 1615 1736 1516 1.4 1.4 100%12-07 1630 1830 1515 2.0 2.0 100%

TOTAL 5.5 5.5 100%

INEXP B 11-23 1640 1820 1524 1.7 1.7 100%11-24 17-,0 1940 1523 2.0 2.0 100%

TOTAL 3.7 3.7 100%

SELECTED SAMPLE SUMMARY 35.0 32.8 93.7%

NOTE: DARK HOURS ARE COMPUTED USING 30 MINUTES AFTEROFFICIAL SUNSET AS THE START OF ACTUAL DARKNESS

Table 3. Squadron "2" Selected Night Sortie Data

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NIGHT DARK %DARKDATE T/O LAND SUNSET HRS HRS NIGHT

SQ CC 10-20 1705 1905 1619 2.0 2.0 100%10-27 1737 1915 1605 1.6 1.6 100%

TOTAL 3.6 3.6 100%

SQ IP 10-19 1545 1655 1621 0.6 0.1 17%11-06 1620 1750 1547 1.5 1.5 100%11-23 1653 1845 1524 1.9 1.9 100%11-24 1820 1957 1523 1.6 1.6 100%

TOTAL 5.6 5.1 91%

EXP A 08-31 1735 1900 1811 0.8 0.3 38%09-03 1720 1835 1805 0.5 0.0 0%10-26 1655 1825 1607 1.5 1.5 100%11-04 1545 1745 1551 1.9 1.3 68%11-05 1630 1815 1549 1.8 1.8 100%11-12 1740 1910 1538 1.5 1.5 100%11-30 1645 1825 1518 1.6 1.6 100%

TOTAL 9.6 8.0 83%

EXP B 08-31 1735 1850 1811 0.7 0.2 29%10-19 1545 1700 1621 0.7 0.2 29%10-22 1643 1810 1615 1.5 1.0 67%10-27 1745 1915 1605 1.5 1.5 100%

TOTAL 4.4 2.9 66%

INEXP A 07-20 1930 2100 1927 1.5 1.1 73%09-03 1940 2135 1805 1.8 1.8 100%12-01 1640 1910 1518 2.5 2.5 100%12-02 1555 1805 1517 2.2 2.2 100%

TOTAL 8.0 7.6 95% S

INEXP B 08-31 1735 1850 1811 0.7 0.2 29%10-19 1545 1700 1621 0.7 0.2 29%11-15 1650 1815 1534 1.4 1.4 100%11-17 1800 1915 1531 1.3 1.3 100%11-24 1820 2000 1523 1.7 1.7 100%

- - - - -

TOTAL 5.8 4.8 83%

SELECTED SAMPLE SUMMARY 37.0 32.0 86.5%

Table 4. Squadron "3" Selected Night Sortie Data

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Chapter Four

AIRSPACE ISSUES AND OTHER LIMITATIONS

An increase in the number of night training sorties forTAF aircrews will create additional problems in a variety ofareas. This chapter will identify and examine some of thoseareas which might adversely impact an expanded night trainingprogram.

Generally, the level of flying training is restricted bymaintenance generation capability and flying hour funding.An increase in the total number of sorties required willinvolve both an increase in the utilization rate for theaffected fighters and an increase in available flying hoursunless a decrease in the sorties available for other(daylight) training is directed. However, a decrease in thesorties and hours devoted to daylight training might alsodecrease combat capability. These training mix and fundingprogram issues are part of the numerous factors which must beaddressed.

Another significant problem which surfaces whenestablishing additional night requirements is the necessityfor more night training airspace. For CONUS-based units, theexistence of "warning" and "restricted" areas does offer lesscomplicated problems when attempting to schedule nightairspace. Europe's Central Region, including both 2nd AlliedTactical Air Forces (ATAF) and 4 ATAF, presents a majorobstacle in night airspace availability. The 4 ATAF area,where the majority of USAFE's fighter forces train (and wouldfight) does not have restricted training airspace. Airspacethat is used for daily training is not available at night in

the same way as it is in daytime. Certain Low Fly Routes areavailable for use, but are restricted by direction of travel,number of aircraft allowed, altitudes, weather, and speed.Areas for conducting night air-to-air training are extremelylimited. The Low Altitude Night Intercept Areas (LANIAs) andAir Defense Exercise Areas (ADEXAs) are the only air-to-airtraining areas available through host-nation agreements.They are established by Letter of Agreement (LOA) and aregoverned by restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) whichinclude: U

- only on working days Monday through Thursday-- US holidays limit their use

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-- not available on the numerous German holidays- VFR only, no weather intercepts allowed- four aircraft maximum- GCI radio and radar control required- single frequency radio for all aircraft- hard assigned altitudes- minimum altitude 2,500 ft AGL- limited medium altitude airspace

-- LANIAs 2,500 ft AGL to FL100-- ADEXAs FL200 to FL460-- none from FL100 to FL200 (9:--)

Scheduling of this limited training airspace will alsobe a problem for deconfliction. Currently, much of thetraining done by roth USAFE and NATO aircrews during the dayis done in the uncontrolled VFR airspace below FL100 (3:--).Because national rules prohibit VFR training after sunset,this option does not exist, and careful coordination isrequired to preclude the possibility of having more aircraftin the air than there is airspace to handle them.Additionally, since IFR recoveries are required at night, orin weather, normally available training airspace is sometimesdenied by ATC when holding patterns and recovery airspacebecome saturated with returning flights.

Compounding the problems of an increased night flyingprogram are the indirect, but nonetheless important factorscaused by expanding day-oriented operations into increasednight operations. Of immediate concern is the crew restrequirements for the aircrews. There have been numerousstudies conducted to evaluate the impact of changing fromday-oriented activity to night work. The circadian rhythmchange effects are obvious. Obtaining restful sleep duringthe day is often difficult, and fatigue may become a factor.Location of the unit is also a factor, as latitude and seasondetermine how much darkness is available during a given 24-hour period. Moreover, it is not only the aircrews whosuffer from a change in schedule, but many of the supportpersonnel involved both directly and indirectly in thegeneration of sorties (l:--,2:--).

One of the more obvious groups affected is th-emaintenance function. It is normally the swing shift (theshift immediately following the normal flying day) whichperforms required maintenance on non-mission capableaircraft. The mid shift then completes any remainingmaintenance, and preflights the aircraft for the morninglaunch period. The day shift then launches and recoversaircraft and performs required maintenance between sorties.When going to a night flying period, the maintenance complexmust also readjust the work schedules of required maintenance

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personnel to support the flying operation. This creates manyof the same problems with maintenance personnel as it doeswith aircrews, but in most locations, maintenance personnelare exposed to the elements, and operate with less thanoptimum lighting while they do their work. This canexaggerate fatigue and frustration for even the mostprofessional maintenance unit.

Other base support agencies such as air traffic control(ATC), weather detachment, fire department, command post, Pfuel support (POL), transportation, supply, and supervisorypersonnel also have to alter their work schedules to provide .

required support for the night flying operation.

Finally, the issue of family disruption must beaddressed. The impact that altered schedules, non-availability of one or both parents, marital stress, andother similar issues have on family life must be recognizedby individuals and supervisors at all levels. Family issuesalone provide enough of a challenge to justify a completestudy into their effects (14:--).

This chapter has identified several of the variouscomplications which must be considered if an increased nightflying training program is to be implemented. Decisions mustbe made with regard to funding issues and levels of dayversus night training. Competition for limited trainngairspace requires comprehensive planning and coordinationamong users. Supervisors must be aware of, and sensitive to,the personnel and family issues which result from theimplementation of an expanded night flying program, and therequirement for increased support activity functions mustalso be considered. The following chapter will summarize themajor factors, list findings from the research, and providerecommendations and conclusions.

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;p

I

Chapter Five

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will summarize the results of this researchproject and provide findings, recommendations, andconclusions. Chapter Two defined terms, examined trainingROE, and listed night flying training requirements. ChapterThree explained the process and results of a limited datasearch intended to examine the quality and quantity of nightflying training flown by a typical TAF unit. Chapter Fouridentified airspace, logistics, and personnel related issues.

FINDINGS

The overall purpose of this study has been two-fold: toattempt to examine the quantity and quality of night flyingtraining currently being flown by TAF units, and to identifyproblems associated with an increase in night flying trainingrequirements for TAF aircrews. The analysis revealed severalfindings:

- Extracting data from current tracking systems inorder to evaluate the quality of night flying trainingrequired extensive manual effort.

- Although only a small sample was examined, theevaluation of the limited data indicates TAF units aremeeting their night flying training requirements, and indoing so are flying the majority of each night trainingsortie during conditions of darkness.

- Currently, only two night sorties are required forTAF fighter crews per training half, although some nightrequirements are now being increased by MAJCOs. However, itshould be recognized that night employment training is alsoconducted in the simulator and part-task trainers and in theacademic arena. This non-flying additional training servesto augment and reinforce training for which night sorties arenot available.

- In Germany's Central Region, night training airspaceis very limited. It is only available four days a week, andonly four aircraft are allowed in the airspace at a time.This limits both the number of crews that can fly at anygiven time, and the complexity of that training. Therequirement for GCI close control does not allow for trainingfor degraded or autonomous operations.

- Other factors that should be evaluated when

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considering an expansion of the current night flying trainingrequirements include: flying hour funding, maintenancecapability, crew rest, base support activities, and familyissues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In response to the above findings, the followingrecommendations are made:

- Conduct a more thorough examination of the percentageof night sorties and events flown during actual darkness.Although there is no reason to view the sample data asunrepresentative, an easy method exists to collect completedata if implemented at the beginning of a training half. Asimple log could be filled out by each crew after all nightsorties indicating takeoff and landing times, and officialsunset (or sunrise). This data could then be entered intosquadron level computers by 271XX personnel for laterretrieval and evaluation.

- Obtain additional night training airspace, andremove restrictions which unnecessarily limit the quality ofnight flying training.

-- Change minimum altitude to 1,000 ft AGL or MSAwhichever is higher.-- Allow more than four aircraft to use the sameairspace at the same time as long as altitudedeconfliction is maintained.-- Delete the requirement for a single controllerand single frequency and allow dual frequencyoperation.-- Allow altitude blocks instead of hard altitudesto develop and improve employment tactics.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, this study has shown that the quantity ofTAF night flying training required is minimal, and thequality of that training is limited by available airspace andtraining ROE. Numerous sources report the need to employ TAFaircraft at night and to train to that end. Both current andnew systems must compete for airspace and flying hours.Increases in current night flying training requirements mustbe fully evaluated and all relevant factors considered. Thisstudy has been an effort to identify some of those factorsand provide insight into the status of current night flyingtraining programs.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. REFERENCES CITED

Books

1. Carpentier, J., and Cazamian, P. Night Work% ItsEffects on the Health and Welfare of the Worker.Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1977.

2. Pigors, Faith, and Pigors, Paul. Human Aspects ofMultiple Shift Operations. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1944.

Official Documents

3. Allied Air Forces Central Europe. AAFCENT Low FlyHandbook, EDN 2(6). Ramstein AB, Ge. 1984.

4. Tactical Air Command. Joint Regulation 55-79,Aircrew/Weapons Controller Procedures for AirOperations. Langley AFB, VA: HQ TAC/DOO, 14 March1984.

5. Tactical Air Command. TACM 51-50, Volume I_ TacticalAircrew Training. Langley AFB, VA: HQ TAC/DOO, 30October 1985.

6. Tactical Air Command. TAC Project 86W-010F, TD&E of F-15 Night/Adverse Weather Air-to-Air Employment. (U),SECRET-NOFORN. Classified by Multiple Sources.Declassify on OADR. HQ TAC/DOOW, March 1987.Unclassified information only used from this source.

7. Tactical Air Command. TACR 55-50, Night Flying for AllTAC Aircrews. Langley AFB, VA: HQ TAC/DOOFT, 26March 1984.

8. Tactical Air Command. TACR 55-115, F-15 PilotOperational Procedures. Langley AFB, VA: HQ TAC/DOV, 10 September 1984.

9. United States Air Forces Europe. Air Traffic ControlLiaison Office Letter of Agreement. Subject:Implementation and Operation of Low Altitude NightIntercept Area 6 (LANIA 6). Frankfurt, Ge. 21February 1986.

1~tWl! 1)1A .M1Pr AMWIIIT]"J APJAAM Rr %I An %., P " N~r~I An PO ,1.11W NZ FJINKLAr 2 .95.~I~~np JSZ'~M~ ~U. .~M~(~~

CONTINUED

10. United States Air Forces Europe. USAFE Chapter 10 to JR55-79, Aircrew/Weapons Controller Procedures for AirOperations. Ramstein AB, GE: HQ USAFE/DOOT, 4December 1984.

11. United States Air Forces Europe. USAFE/DO Msg, DTG051500Z Oct 87, Subject: Increased Night FlyingRequirements (U). Ramstein AB, Ge.

12. United States Air Forces Europe. USAFE/DO Msg. DTG071510Z December 1987, Subject: Night FlyingRequirements, Jan - Jun 88. Ramstein AB, Ge.

13. United States Air Forces Europe. UTAIS/INOA Msg, DTG221435Z Dec 87, Subject: Soviet Night Capabilities(U). SECRET-NOFORN. Classified by Multiple Sources.Declassify on OADR. Ramstein AB, Ge. Unclassifiedinformation only used from this source.

Unpublished Materials

14. Mudge, Wayne I., Maj, USAF. "Fighter Pilots' Guide toNight Flying." Research Report 87-1820, Air Commandand Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL,1987.

B. RELATED SOURCES

Official Documents

15. Tactical Air Command. TACM 51-50, Volume I. Chapter 6_Tactical Aircrew Training: Fighter. Reconnaissance,and FAC. Langley AFB, VA: HQ TAC/DOO, 10 January1986.

16. Tactical Air Command. TACM 51-50, Volume V F-4 AircrewTraining. Langley AFB, VA: HQ TAC/DOO, 21 February1986.

17. Tactical Air Command. TACM 51-50, Volume VII. F-15Aircrew Training. Langley AFB, VA: HQ TAC/DOOO, 26March 1982.

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I

----------- ~'~p V

CONTINUED, -

18. United States Air Forces Europe., USAFE Chapter 6 to TACM51-50, Tactical Fighter/Reconnaissance AircrewTraining. Ramstein AB, GE: HQ USAFE/DOOT, 23November 1984.

19. United States Air Forces Europe. HQ USAFE/DOO Letter,Subject: MCM 51-50, Vol I, USAFE Chap 6, TrainingTables. Ramstein AB, GE: HQ USAFE /DOO, 10December 1987.

Unpublished Materials

20. Heenan, Michael E., Lt Col, USAF. "USAF Night TacticalWarfare Training for the 1990's." Research ReportAU-AWC-0134-85-080, Air War College, Air University,Maxwell AFB, AL, 1985.

21. Hepler, William C. II, Lt Col, USAF. "Considering theFuture of Tactical Night Flying." Research ReportAU-AWC-84-099, Air War College, Air University,Maxwell AFB, AL, 1984.

Other Sources

22. Smith, William B., TSgt, USAF. 36th Tactical FighterWing Flight Records Branch NCOIC. Bitburg AB, GE:36th TFW/DO, Interviews, 21-24 December 1987.

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GLOSSARY

ACBT Air Combat TrainingACSC Air Command and Staff CollegeADEXA Air Defense Exercise AreaAFORMS Air Force Operations Resource Management SystemAFTO Air Force Technical OrderAGL Above Ground LevelATAF Allied Tactical Air ForceATC Air Traffic ControlATF Advanced Tactical FighterCAMS Core Automated Maintenance SystemCONUS Continental United StatesCY Calendar YearFAA Federal Aviation AdministrationFEBA Forward Edge of the Battle AreaFL Flight LevelGCI Ground Controlled InterceptIFR Instrument Flight RulesIMC Instrument Meteorological ConditionsIP Instructor PilotJR Joint RegulationLANIA Low Altitude Night Intercept AreaLANTIRN Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for

NightLOA Letter of AgreementMAJCOM Major CommandMR Mission ReadyMSA Minimum Safe AltitudeMSL Mean Sea LevelNAF Numbered Air ForceNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNTFD Night Terrain Following DeliveryPOL Petroleum, Oil, and LubricantsRECCE ReconnaissanceROE Rules of EngagementSEAD Suppression of Enemy Air DefensesTAC Tactical Air CommandTACM Tactical Air Command ManualTACR Tactical Air Command RegulationTAF Tactical Air ForcesTD&E Tactics Development and EvaluationTFD Terrain Following DeliveryTFR Terrain Following RadarTFW Tactical Fighter WingUSAFE United States Air Forces EuropeUSAFEM United States Air Forces Eurcpe ManualVFR Visual Flight Rules

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