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Page 1: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

Jim Fenton

Identity Systems

Page 2: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 2 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 2

“Defining identity is like nailing Jell-O® to the wall.”

– Source Uncertain

Flickr photo by stevendepolo

Page 3: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 3 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 3

Terminology

!!Subject

The person (usually) whose identity is involved

Sometimes called the User

!!Relying Party

The entity the Subject is interacting with

Sometimes called the Service Provider

!!Attribute

A piece of information about the Subject

Sometimes called a Claim

Page 4: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 4 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 4

A Basic Identity System

Identity

Provider

Government

Commerce

Social Media

Authentication Request

Page 5: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 5 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 5

A Basic Identity System

Identity

Provider

Government

Commerce

Social Media

User Authentication

User Credentials

Page 6: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 6 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 6

A Basic Identity System

Identity

Provider

Government

Commerce

Social Media

Authorize Info Release

Attribute Request/ Response

Page 7: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 7 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 7

Elements of Identity Management

Percent

Authentication Establish who the Subject is

Credential Management Prove to Relying Parties

who the Subject is

Attribute Management Provide information about

the Subject

Page 8: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 8 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 8

User Trust

!!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental

Not all users trust any one entity

Most likely to trust entities they do business with and strong, trusted brands

Different trusted entities in different cultures

!!An ecosystem of identity providers is required

Users need to choose their own identity provider

Need to consider ability to migrate to a different provider if required

Page 9: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 9 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 9

Authentication

Flic

kr

photo

by s

hannonpatr

ick17

Page 10: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 10 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 10

Authentication Methods

!!Methods useful for user authentication are situation-specific

Type of endpoint being used

Required authentication strength (transaction value, etc.)

!!Problem: Many existing identity systems are bound tightly to specific authentication methods

Page 11: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 11 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 11

Authentication Strength

!!Authentication strength should depend on transaction value

iTunes purchase (99 cents) vs. vehicle purchase

!!NIST Special Pub 800-63 defines 4 levels:

Level 1: Minimal challenge/response

Level 2: Single-factor identity proofing

Level 3: Multi-factor identity proofing

Level 4: Hardened multi-factor

!!Relying party specifies the required strength to the identity management system

Page 12: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 12 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 12

Authentication Endpoint Diversity

!! The Web is pervasive, but not everything is a browser

!!Examples

Vending Machines

Set-top boxes

Doors (physical security)

!!Modular approaches to authentication needed to consider a wide range of use cases

Page 13: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 13 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 13

Security Opportunities

!!Users that authenticate frequently at a given service are more likely to detect anomalies

More likely to be suspicious about, for example, lack of a certificate

Browsers can be configured to specially flag “chosen” identity providers

!! Identity providers can detect anomalous user behavior

Similar to detection of fraudulent credit card transactions

Business/policy framework should encourage this

Page 14: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 14 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 14

Credential Management

Imagery supplied by Photodisc/Getty Images

Page 15: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 15 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 15

Credential Management: Functions

!!Act as a “key cabinet” for the user

Each relying party has its own credentials

!!Support Directed Identity

Prevent undesired release of correlation handles

Identifiers to Relying Parties are opaque by default

!!Enforce secure use of credentials

Require use of secure channel (e.g., SSL)

Page 16: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 16 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 16

Directed Identity

!! It should not necessarily be possible for different Relying Parties to correlate identifiers

Insurance company vs. supermarket account

Pseudonymous identifiers for tip hotlines

!!Users may still choose to link relying parties’ identifiers

!!Attributes may also provide correlation handles

!!Credential manager can be subpoenaed if appropriate

Page 17: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 17 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 17

Security and Availability Issues

!!Security

The credential store is a very high-value target

Credentials can be distributed to diffuse attack

High-level physical security is also required

!!Availability

Failure of an Identity Manager may have severe impact on its Subjects

Solvable problem, but needs to be addressed

Page 18: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 18 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 18

Attribute Management

Page 19: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 19 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 19

Distributed Attributes

!!Self-asserted attributes have limited utility

!!Authoritative sources for different attributes come from different places

FICO scores from a credit bureau

Driving record from state Motor Vehicle Department

Proof of employment from employer

!! Identity system has a role in locating trustable sources of attributes

!!Attributes delivered as signed assertions

Page 20: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 20 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 20

Attribute Distribution: Example

Identity

Provider Birthdate Request Authorization

Request

Healthcare

Provider

Motor Vehicle

Department

Wine Merchant

Page 21: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 21 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 21

Attribute Distribution: Example

Identity

Provider Trust Negotiation Release

Authorization

Healthcare

Provider

Motor Vehicle

Department

Wine Merchant

Page 22: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 22 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 22

Attribute Distribution: Example

Identity

Provider

Birthdate Request

Healthcare

Provider

Motor Vehicle

Department

Wine Merchant

Page 23: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 23 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 23

Attribute Distribution: Example

Identity

Provider 4 July 1976

–DMV

Healthcare

Provider

Motor Vehicle

Department

Wine Merchant

Page 24: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 24 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 24

Attribute Trust

!! Federation: Prearranged trust relationships

Personnel Security Clearances among Federal agencies

Business partners

!!Accreditation: Indirect federation

Financial institutions, schools

Scales much better than direct federation

Page 25: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 25 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 25

Identity Provider Trust

!! Identity Provider has a fiduciary responsibility

!! To the Subject:

Must use credentials only for the proper Subject

!! To Relying Parties:

Must associate attribute requests and responses reliably

!! Identity Provider may coincidentally function as an Attribute Provider

Functions should be considered separate to maintain privacy

Page 26: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 26 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 26

Summary

Page 27: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 27 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 27

Observations

!!Scaling is critical

Technical (protocol) aspects of scaling are a solved problem

Scaling of trust relationships is the real limitation

!!Chosen technologies need to consider a very wide range of use cases

!!An ecosystem of identity and attribute providers is needed

Need business models for these functions

Public policy should encourage constructive behavior and help these entities manage liability exposure

Page 28: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users

© 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 28 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Fenton 091120 28

Questions

Page 29: Identity Systems - cfp.mit.educfp.mit.edu/events/apr2010/Fenton Identity Systems 100415.pdf · 15/04/2010  · !!User trust in their Identity Provider is fundamental Not all users