ideology and praxis in thomas sankara's populist revolution of 4 august 1983 in burkina faso

Ideology and Praxis in Thomas Sankara's Populist Revolution of 4 August 1983 in Burkina FasoAuthor(s): Guy MartinSource: Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 15 (1987), pp. 77-90Published by: African Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1166927 .

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IDEOLOGY AND PRAXIS IN THOMAS SANKARA'S POPULIST REVOLUTION OF 4 AUGUST 1983 IN BtRKINA FASO Guy Martin

This article is an inquiry into the origins, the ideological basis, political and economic organization and

prospects of the Populist Revolution ushered in Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) by the military coup d'6tat of 4

August 1983 led by Captain Thomas Sankara. Set against an inauspicious background of scarce resources, dismal poverty, recurrent drought and regional and international hostility, and occurring at a time when Socialism is on the wane in Africa, the coup initially seemed doomed to failure. The very fact that it has been able to survive for almost three years in such an unfavourable context is in itself intriguing. We venture the hypothesis that the relative longevity and temporary success of the Sankara regime is to be explained by the fact that--contrary to many similar socialists experiments--it has actually managed to actively and durably mobilize genuine and significant popular support for its policies. This is so because these policies, which are clearly articulated and simply formulated, are essentially focused on the satisfaction of the basic needs of the populace, and thus enjoy wide popular appeal. In addition, the Sankara regime has been careful to build, on the basis of this popularity, a broadly-based military and civil defence system designed to safeguard the Revolution against internal and external threats. Ultimately, we think that the Burkinabe Revolution should be gauged not according to ideological purity and historical precedents, but according to its own aims and objectives. Only thus can its actual potential for survival and success--which ultimately depends on its capacity to maintain popular enthusiasm and support--be properly assessed.

THE ORIGINS OF THE POPULIST REVOLUTION IN BURKINA: FROM CMRPN TO CSP1

On 25 November 1980, a group of disgruntled army officers led by Colonel Saye Zerbo overthrew the corrupt and unpopular regime of General Sangoule Lamizana which had been in power since it itself took over from Burkina's first (civilian) president, Maurice Yameogo, on January 1966. This group was made up of a loose coalition of nationalist and reformist-minded officers. The regime's ruling body, the Military Committee for Reform and National Progress (CMRPN), promptly indicated its intention to radically break with past practices and policies and to initiate bold reforms such as financial and budgetary austerity, moralization of the public service, and rationalization of the management of state enterprises.2 However, as a result of a series of ill-advised restrictions on civil liberties (strict regulation of the workers' right to strike, banning of all political parties), the CMRPN soon found itself in direct conflict with the trade-unions, traditionally a powerful political force in Burkina Faso. This conflict resulted in yet another military coup d'etat on 7 November 1982. This coup was led by a group of younger, more radical junior army officers. The new governing body, the People's Redemption Council (CSP), headed by Cmmdr. Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, clearly indicated its willingness to reinstate the freedoms suppressed by its predecessors and to work towards a policy of social justice. The CSP consisted of 120 soldiers and included the key members of Thomas Sankara's group, namely Captains Blaise Compaore and Henri Zongo, and Major Jean-Baptiste Boukari Lingani, who held the Secretaryship of the Council. This radical group, whose vanguard was the "Regroupement des Officiers Communistes" (ROC), established a close and regular working relationship with various civilian leftist and extreme-leftist forces in the unions and among intellectuals (teachers, students), notably with the Marxist "Ligue Patriotique pour le Developpement" (LIPAD), the pro-Chinese "Union des luttes communistes" (ULC), the "Parti communiste revolutionnaire voltaique (PCRV), a pro-Albanian party, and the country's most powerful leftist trade-union, the "Confederation Syndicale Voltaique" (CSV). Colonel Gabriel Yorian Som6 and his group represented the moderates within the CSP. This group was close to Western (particularly French) interests and favourable to a return to power of the old civilian first president Maurice Yameogo.

On 11 January 1983, President J.B. Ouedraogo appointed Captain Thomas Sankara as the government's Prime Minister. Subsequently, through a number of pronouncements at public meetings (notably on 26 March 1983 in O'iagadougou and on 14 May 1983 in Bobo-Dioulasso), the Prime Minister imprinted a markedly progressive and anti-imperialist orientation to the regime. This culminated in Cpt. Sankara's official visit to Libya and North Korea. His uncompromising anti-imperialist speech at the Non-Aligned Nations summit in New-Delhi, as well as the personal invitation he extended, unknown to President Ou6draogo, to Colonel Gaddafi to visit Burkina on 1st May 1983 largely contributed to frighten the moderates and their allies abroad and probably gave them an excuse for destabilizing the region and subsequent intervention. In any event, on 17 May 1983 took place what one observer has

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appropriately called "one of the most audacious neo-colonial interventions in post-colonial African history."3 All the available evidence indicates that Col. Yorian Som6 met the French President's special adviser on Africa, Guy Penne, who flew into Ouagadougou on 15 May. Following this meeting in the French ambassador's residence, it was decided that Cpt. Sankara should be arrested along with other supporters in the ruling CSP. Indeed, Cpt. Sankara and most of his key supporters were rounded up, while President Ou6draogo was immediately confronted with the choice of supporting Sankara and being removed from office, or backing Col. Some. He opted for the latter. Meanwhile, Cpt. Compaore, having escaped aest, managed to reach the paratrooper's commando garrison in Po (120 kms South-West of Ouagadougou, close to the Ghanaian border) and to anaian be an rally it around Sankara. Threatening to march on the capital, Compaore demanded and obtained the release of Sankara and the other arrested (which took place on 30 May 1983), the restitution of Sankara to his military post, and the dismissal of Col. Some. Thereupon Sankara plotted the course of his return to full power, which took place on 4 August 1983. Col. Yorian Some and some of his followers were killed in the ensuing fighting.4

THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE POPULIST REVOLUTION IN BURKINA: THOMAS SANKARA'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

Any revolution hass its ideologue and its leader. In the case of Burkina, both are conveniently merged in the person of Cpt. Thomas Sankara. A young (37 years old), articulate, energetic and charismatic junior army officer of peasant origin with a good general and professional training, Cpt. Sankara typifies that new brand of post-World War II African military men who have not been associated with French colonial ventures and who are fiercely nationalist a aand particularly sensitive ands of sympathetic to the needs and aspirations of the African masses.5

One can get a precise picture of Cpt. Sankara's political thought through his various interviews and official pronouncements expressed in clear, simple and direct language. First of all, the leader of the Burkinabe Revolution acknowledges the unescapable need for some kind of ideology: "There is no politics without ideology. For us, ideologies provide a beacon, tools of analysis which enable us to better understand our social reality."6 In spite of an avowed fascination for Marxism, Cpt. Sankara vehemently denies that the Burkinabe Revolution is inspired by or patterned after any past or present foreign ideology, experience or model. For him, the necessity of attributing ideological mentors to the leaders of the Third World is a typically Eurocentric attitude: "Why try at all cost to put us into ideological boxes, to categorize us?"7 Much in the same vein, he declared before the 1984 U.N. General Assembly meeting that "(...) the salvation of our peoples and our development require a total break with the wom-out models which all kinds of quacks have tried to force on us during the last twenty years."8 Asked after which model the Burkinabe Revolution is patterned, Sankara replied: "It is the revolution of Burkinabe, the people of Burkina (...) our revolution is the result of our specific experiences and history. It cannot be exported, just as we cannot copy other models."9 However, he goes on to admit that "we retain whatever is dynamic and creative in foreign experiences."10 Although certain elements in his political thought are clearly influenced by Marxism, Sankara sees himself as neither a "Marxist", nor a "Communist" as he has often been portayed in the Western press. He is first and foremost an ardent Nationalist and convinced Panafricanist who has at heart the restoration of the dignity of the African and the well-being and progress of the African continent. The Burkinabe leadership openly rejects the "Socialist" label which is often applied to the country: " (...) Nowhere is it stated that we claim to build Socialism in Burkina today (...) We are building a democratic, modern society (...) according to its economic content, our Re- volution is a bourgeois revolution. It does not aim at the elimination of private property or private economic initiative and entrepreneurship (...)"11

According to its leaders therefore, the Burkinabe revolution is essentially democratic and popular; it is seen as a transition towards a higher stage of development in the Burkinabe society: "After all, all modern republics, whether of capitalist or socialist orientation, have had to undergo, as a first stage, such a revolution." 12 Central to Sankara's political thought is the notion that the "People" is the main actor and should be the main beneficiary of the revolution. Thus, he unequivocally stated in 1983 that "The revolution's object is to give the people power (...) The primary objetive of the revolution is to take power out of the hands of our national bourgeoisie and their imperialist allies and put it in the hands of the people."13 As the only legal and legitimate repository of political power, the People should be invested with this power if it is to assume its responsibilities and to control its destiny. In this perspective, democracy means that the people should be in a position to actually control the revolution's leadership. More specifically, " (...) democracy means the freedom of expression of a conscious majority, well informed of the issues and of their internal and external implications, capable of verifying the fairness of electoral processes and in a position to influence their outcome."14 Sankara thus sees himself and the ruling group as the people's servants, as mere enforcers of the people's dictates: "I consider myself as someone who has a duty to respect the wishes and the demands of the people. I will do as I am told by the people." 15 Asked whether he was acting as a proxy of

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Gaddafi's Libya in Africa, Sankara replied: "I am nobody's agent. Well, yes, in fact I am someone's agent I am the agent of the people of Burkina."16 "What would happen", asked another journalist recently, "if the Burkinabe people refused to follow his directives?" "If they don't follow me, I'm out" was his reply.17 What, one might legitimately ask, does Sankara exactly mean by "the people"? Again, the leader of the Burkinabe revolution provides a clear and precise--if sociologically disputable--answer to this important question. According to him, "the people" is constituted by a coalition of popular classes who hitherto have been persistently ignored and marginalized politically and shamelessly and utterly exploited economically by successive colonial and neo-colonial regimes. This popular coalition is made up of the following classes:

(1) the working class, seen as the "truly revolutionary" class; (2) the petty bourgeoisie, usually unstable and undecided, and which includes petty traders, craftsmen and

"intellectuals" (students, civil servants, office clerks etc.); (3) the peasantry, considered as an integral part of the petty bourgeoisie, though poorer and more exploited

than the latter and constituting the numerically more significant force within the Revolution; and (4) the lumpen-proletariat, impoverished and marginalized city-dwellers and an easy prey to counter-

revolutionary movements.18

The institutional instruments of this popular power are the National Revolutionary Council (CNR) and the Revolutionary Defence Committees (CDRs). The CNR is entrusted with the power of conception, direction and control at the national level in the political, economic and social fields. As to the CDRs, they constitute "the institutional expression of the people's revolutioriary power. It is the instrument forged by the people in order to become truly sovereign and masters of their own destinies and thus to extend their control over every facet of society."19

On the economic level, the assumption of popular power implies a development strategy geared towards the satisfaction of the basic economic and social needs of the people. In this perspective, the CNR aims at establishing an independent, self-sufficient and planned national economy. This entails a radical socio-economic transformation, including a transformation of the structures of production and distribution, and comprehensive reforms in the areas of agriculture (land reform), administration, education and social services (housing, health and sanitation).20 Pending the launching of the forthcoming five-year development plan (1986-1990), the immediate instrument of this global development strategy is a fifteen-months Popular Development Programme (PPD) which provided for a total amount of 1607 billion CFA francs (CFA471 = $1 US) to be invested over the period October 1984 to December 1985, 20 per cent of which was to be financed out of national resources.21 This development strategy is to be implemented in an overall climate which emphasizes such virtues as austerity, integrity and the moralization of public service.

At the international level, the Burkinabe revolution proclaims itself firmly opposed to any form of imperialist and neo-colonialist domination and exploitation, and to all kinds of hegemony. Sankara would like to conduct a genuinely non-aligned foreign policy, politically independent but actively anti-imperialist. For that purpose, the Burkinabe leader extends an offer of friendship to any country able and willing to help his country achieve its global objectives: "We want to be, and we seek to be, friends with peoples from all over the world who will help us in our struggle against injustice and tyranny."22 Thus, the Burkinabe revolution proclaims its desire to establish diplomatic relations with all countries regardless of their political and economic system on the basis of the following principles: (1) reciprocal respect for independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty; (2) mutual non-agression; (3) non-intervention in internal affairs; and (4) trade with all countries on the basis of equity and reciprocal advantage.23 The Burkinabe revolution expresses its solidarity and support to all national liberation movements fighting for independence and the liberation of their people, notably to the Namibian, Saharaoui and Palestinian peoples.24 In their struggle for political and economic independence, justice and dignity, Burkina considers other anti-imperialist African countries as "objective allies."25

Both thinker and doer, Thomas Sankara is not content with just enunciating a comprehensive and coherent political doctrine; he also tries, with various degrees of success, to put his thoughts into practice. To that extent, he observes one of the supreme principles of Marxism-Leninism, unity of theory and "praxis": "Theory without practice is pointless, practice without theory is blind. Theory indicates the way and helps to find the most efficient means of achieving practical objectives."26 Incidentally, this reminds us of Marx's celebrated dictum: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point, however, is to change it." To what extent has T. Sankara, the ideologue of the Burkinable revolution, been able to initiate a process of change within the Burkinabe society? What has been the role of the various political organs set up under the Revolution in the political, economic and social transformation of Burkina? What have been some of the teething problems and "infantile disorders" of the young Burkinabe revolution? The remaining sections will be devoted to a brief examination of some of the issues raised by these important questions.

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REVOLUTIONARY PRACTICE IN BURKINA FASO: POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Political Organization In a recent article, Jean Ziegler has rightly observed that in Burkina, political power is distributed according to a

"concentric circles" pattern. The core of the system is made up of four men, namely Capts. Thomas Sankara and Henri Zongo, and Commdrs. Blaise Compaore and Jean-Baptiste Lingani. Around this hard core of intimate

colleagues and friends, one finds the CNR, whose membership is kept secret, but who is known to be composed of the same as above plus Commdr. Abdou Salam Kabore and the main political and military leaders of the country. Then comes the government, predominantly made up of civilians, and finally the CDRs.27

While, as already noted above, the CNR has a general power of conception, direction and control, the CDRs constitute the institutional expression of the people's sovereignty and revolutionary power. More specifically, the CDRs have three main functions: (1) a political function of developing the masses' consciousness through education, training and mobilization; (2) a socio-cultural and economic function, i.e. to organize collective public works at the local level; and (3) a military function, namely the defence of the revolution against potential internal and external enemies. The CDRs are to be found at all levels of the country's streamlined administrative structure: village, city, department, trade and high schools, military and para-military units, garrison, district and province.28 The CDRs are structured according to a five-level hierarchical system, graphically represented in Figure 1.

The apex of the system is constituted by the office of the General Secretary (headed by Cpt. Pierre Ouedraogo) which is directly linked to the CNR. Just below the CDRs' Congress, the organization's supreme body, is an

assembly of all its constituent units. Further down, one finds the Revolutionary Provincial Executives ("Pouvoirs Revolutionnaires Provinciaux": PRP) which have executive powers at the local level. Below the Provincial Councils ("Conseils Provinciaux") and the District Committees ("Comites Departementaux") each regroup the CDRs from the lower level. At the lower level, one finds various types of local cells (village, city, ward, work place, military unit and student committees). These grass-roots committees are to be found at each level of the administrative structure, from the village up to the province. Each of the lower-level echelons (from the District Committees down) has a nine-members executive committee elected by and answerable to grass-roots militants.29 The CDRs operate according to the principle of "democratic centralism" which implies, inter alia, subordination of lower to higher echelon, freedom of expression, contradictory debate as well as criticism and self-criticism.30 Such a

system is supposed to encourage and facilitate communication and a proper feedback from the masses to the leaders, i.e. from the CDRs to the CNR. Thus, through their structure and functioning, the CDRs are meant to be a genuine mass organization which should be in a position to fully and efficiently translate popular aspirations into immediate and concrete political decisions. (See figure 1, p. 81.)

An additional structure, the Revolutionary Popular Tribunals system (TPRs), created on 19 October 1983, is supposed to further contribute to that aim. The TPRs include eighteen (18) members (3 judges, 3 members of the military and 12 members of the CDRs) and are chaired by a magistrate. As a rule, the TPRs' competence extends over any political or economic offense or crime committed by civil servants or public officers in the course of their duties.31 Since their creation, the TPRs have publicly tried hundreds of former high officials and civil servants

guilty of mismanagement, embezzlement, theft or misappropriation of public funds. Verdicts are usually lenient and sanctions include fines, expropriation, repayment of money stolen and soft prison terms.32

In setting up the TPRs, the leaders of the Burkinabe revolution were trying to achieve two main objectives. First, they wanted to clearly demonstrate their determination to "moralize" the country's public life. Secondly, the TPRs should appear as an additional instrument expressing the people's revolutionary power. By allowing the people to become both witness and actor in the process of revolutionary justice, the TPRs would contribute to demystify and democratize the judiciary.33 Most observers agree that on the whole, the TPRs have been able to satisfactorily fulfill these important functions.34 Furthermore, the TPRs have recently been entrusted with the delicate and complex case of the West African Economic Community (CEAO), better known as the "Diawara affair". At its the Summit Meeting (Ouagadougou, 26/27 March 1986), the CEAO confirmed that the TPRs were competent to judge the case. Two French lawyers delegated by an NGO as observers to the trial--and therefore not suspect of complacency towards the revolutionary regime--have commented favourably on the TPR's functioning and have testified to the regularity and impartiality of the Burkinabe judicial process. According to one of them, Burkina's revolutionary tribunal "works well compared with similar systems elsewhere, for example Iran or Libya."35

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Figure 1: The CRDs' Organizational Chart

CNR

National General Secretariat

CRDs' Congress

Revolutionary Provincial Executives

Provincial Councils

I Garrison Committee District Committee Work Place Coordination Committee Work Place Coordination Committee

Local Committees

I I

I Village Ward City

I I 1 Work Place Students Military Unit

Source: Adapted from CNR, Statut General des CDR, p. 53.

r A

-

I

81

I




Economic and Social Development Underdevelopment and Burkina's Strategy of Development

Adverse economic and climatic conditions added to over twenty years of economic mismanagement, corruption and downright plunder have left the Burkinabe economy in shambles. A cursory look at some basic indicators for 1983 shows that with an area of 274,000 square miles and a population of 6.5 millions, Burkina has a GNP per capita of US $ 180, which grew at a rate of only 1.4 per cent over the period 1965 to 1983. The average annual rate of inflation over the period 1973 to 1983 stood at 10.8 %; life expectancy at birth was 44 years in 1983.36 If we turn to agriculture and food indicators, the picture is even bleaker. Thus, while the average index of food production per capita remained constant between 1974/76 and 1981/83, cereal imports stood at 59,000 metric tons in 1983 (as against 99,000 in1974), and food aid in cereals amounted to 45,000 metric tons in 1982/83. 37 Finally, the debt and debt service position of Burkina is just as appalling. The available data shows that the total debt of Burkina dramatically increased over the period 1975 to 1983, from a low of US $ 62 million in 1975 to $197 million in 1978, $299 million on 1980, $376 million in 1982 and $461 million in 1983.38 The country's debt service witnessed a similar increase over the same period, from US $8 million in 1975 to $9 million in 1978, $17 million in 1980, $23 million in 1982, and 18 million in 1983.39

In view of such a dismal economic situation, one of the CNR's primary objectives has been to establish an independent, self-sufficient and planned economy. Such a development strategy entails a radical and global socio- economic transformation. In this context, the most urgent priority is the attainment of food self-sufficiency through an appropriate agricultural development strategy. The abolition of private land ownership in the Fall of 1984 is part of this strategy. The main objectives of this strategy are embodied in the fifteen-months Popular Development Programme (PPD) October 1984 to December 1985), which is designed to lay the foundation for the next five-year development Plan (1986-1990).40 "Economic self-reliance (...) as an immediate objective and as a stage towards economic independence" is the underlying philosophy of the PPD. The PPD thus constitutes a programme of sectoral investments at the national, regional and local levels designed to cater for the most urgent basic needs of the rural and urban masses. Indeed, the government launched the PPD in order to build a basic infrastructure capable of laying the foundation for planning. The PPD provides for a total investment of 160.7 billion CFA francs (US $40 million), 129 bn CFA francs of which (i.e. 80 per cent) should be financed by foreign contributions.

The PPD is clearly the expression of the needs of the rural masses, by the masses themselves. It is a concrete translation of the principles of self-reliance and popular participation which lay at the core of the Burkinabe development strategy. Thus, the PPD's projects have been deliberately maintained at a cost not exceeding 500 million CFA francs (US $1.25 million) so as to enable the people to manage and control them at the local level. Furthermore, the rural and urban masses are allowed and encouraged to actively and permanently participate in all the stages (design, selection, implementation, management and control) of the development projects. Thus, villagers actively participate in the management of water-development projects within the framework of "Village management committees" ("Comites villageois de gestion").41

Because it set itself well-defined and limited objectives (building of a basic infrastructure, attainment of food self-sufficiency), the PPD should significantly contribute to the improvement of the standards of living of the Burkinabe masses. Yet, it is true that "The economic impact of the PPD cannot be quantified since its very conception eludes the conventional techniques of analysis and measurement of economic growth."42 The best we can do at this stage is to identify a number of possible constraints and contradictions likely to adversely affect the realization of the PPD's objectives.

Constraints and Contradictions External Constraints: Economic Dependency

First of all, one notes an obvious contradiction between the proclaimed objective of economic self-reliance and the fact that 80 % of the development programme is to be externally financed. This is all the more surprising that the potential aid donors (developed capitalist countries and intergovernmental organizations/IGOs) have generally been--for understandable political reasons--quite reluctant to help the new Burkinabe government. Of all the international organizations engaged in development assistance, only the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have spontaneously and unconditionally supported Burkina's PPD. Furthermore, the Burkinabe economy remains largely dependent on receipts from Burkinabe migrant labourers working in Ivory Coast. As Yves Lacoste rightly observes,

(...) as long as Burkinabe migration to the Ivory Coast will remain so significant, national development projects will be less attractive to Burkinabes than the salaries they can earn abroad. Is it possible to initiate a self-reliant development strategy when most of the work force finds more profitable working conditions in a neighbouring country? 43

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Finally, it should be pointed out that Burkina has a limited degree of autonomy in its credit and development financing policies due to the fact that it belongs to the Franc zone system. 44 In this regard, the creation of UREBA (Revolutionary banking union) in July 1984 should not significantly reduce the dependency and remedy the inadequacies of the Burkinabe banking system.45

Internal Constraints Ultimately, the PPD's success largely depends upon the degree and extent of popular mobilization in support of

the CNR's development programme. In order to be really successful, such mobilization should focus on priority objectives with concrete and immediate benefits to the local populations involved, such as bore-holes, wells, small dams, anti-erosion sites, and school and sanitation infrastructure. However, such essential popular mobilization might fizzle out because the CNR has apparently not been able to make a clear distinction between priority objectives and much less urgent objectives such as provision of domestic electricity, housing programmes for civil- servants, building of stadiums, movie-theatres and poultry farms in each province.46 The situation is much the same with respect to large-scale projects. These projects include a number of hydro-electric dams for agricultural purposes aimed at helping the country achieve its goal of food self-sufficiency: Sourou, Kompienga and Bagr6. It also includes an old mining project which has been revived by the Sankara government, the Tambao manganese mines. This project, whose total cost is estimated at CFA F 22.5 billion, requires the construction of a 380 kms-long railway at a cost of CFA F 33 bn. It has been branded as unrealistic and unviable by potential Western aid donors who have refused to come up with the necessary funds. Consequently, the Burkinabe government has decided to launch a vast mobilization campaign of voluntary labor to help in the construction of the railway, now referred to as "the battle of the Railway", which initially aims at completing 100 kms of rails by the end of the PPD (December 1985).47 Through this initiative, the revolutionary regime meant to dramatically emphasize the fact that it will not be dictated

to, even by such powerful international financial institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World bank, and that it is intent upon keeping firm control over its national strategy of development. These same international financial institutions readily acknowledge the dedication, discipline, integrity and determination of the Burkinabe government in the conduct of its economic policies. After years of aborted projects and unfulfilled promises, the Burkinabe leaders are anxious to quickly achieve tangible results: "They mean to deliver."48 Such a "target-driven approach", although quite commendable, will necessarily come up against certain natural obstacles. First among these is the country's very limited financial and managerial capacity, which is reflected in the development projects' inadequate pre-investment studies.49 Secondly, the PPD's ultimate success depends on the regime's capacity to maintain and strengthen popular mobilization and support without resorting to coercion.

Other internal constraints have to do with the fact that the Burkinabe state does not yet have complete control over the national economy. This introduces a certain ambiguity in the respective significance and role of the public and private sectors in the Burkinabe economy. Thus, while the government's decision to increase the producer's price of staples has had a positive impact on the peasantry's standard of living, the full effect of the measure has been somewhat mitigated by the fact that the state's control over the distribution network is restricted to 20 %, the private sector retaining a dominant position in this area.50 Similarly, the Burkinabe government recently extended the very liberal tax exemptions and privileges enjoyed since 1964 by IVOLCY--a major local cycle and motor-cycle manufacturer which is a subsidiary of the French multinational firm CFAO--to the detriment of a major competitor with predominantly national private capital, SAVCC-Senisot.51 Needless to say, such a decision is in total contradiction with the PPD's declared objective of economic independence. While the Burkinabe government has indicated its intention--and taken appropriate measures--to control the commanding heights of the economy, it is also trying to work with the private sector, which it feels has an important role to play in the country's development. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Burkinabe authorities have called upon none other than Elliot Berg--the American liberal economist who recently authored a controversial World Bank report--to write a report suggesting ways of using the private sector in achieving the objectives of Burkina's future five-year development plan.52 Burkina's revolutionary government will, of necessity, have to eliminate these constraints and to resolve these contradictions in order to achieve the PPD's objectives and to lay the groundwork for a sound and independent economy as projected in the future 1986-1990 development plan.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE POPULIST REVOLUTION IN BURKINA

While the Burkinabe leaders reject the "Socialist" label, the Bukinabe revolution clearly belongs to a long tradition of Socialist regimes in Africa going back to the early independence period in the 1960s. Since that time, there have been nineteen (19) different African civilian or military regimes who have claimed, or still claim, to be Socialist in their ideology and policies.53 Of these 19 regimes, five (5) (Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Somalia)

83




have dismally failed for political or economic reasons; they have since returned to a strictly capitalist path of development.54 Five (5) others (Benin, Congo, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Zimbabwe) seem to be socialist in nothing but name. Another six (6) (Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania) are plagued with such severe political and economic difficulties that their future is uncertain at best. From this evidence, one miight be tempted to conclude that Socialism does not constitute a viable ideological alternative and appropriate development strategy for the African states. Yet before such a conclusion can be reached, a much more thorough and detailed country-by-country analysis of these political and economic difficulties would have to be conducted. It is therefore quite intriguing that Sankara's Populist revolution of 4 August 1983 has been able to survive for almost three years in such an unfavourable context and hostile environment. The remaining sections will be devoted to a tentative explanation of this rather unusual situation.

Burkinabe Revolutionary Practice First of all, it is by now abundantly clear that the process of socio-political and economic change initiated on 4

August 1983 was not simply just another military coup d'etat. Indeed, it is a genuine popular revolution. As Rene Otayek rightly observes, this was already discernible in the Burkinabe leaders' earlier statements of intent: " (...) for the first time in the political history of the country a regime was clearly asserting its intention of transforming society by transferring power from the hands of the bourgeoisie into those of the popular classes'."55 But while most African socialist regimes are content to remain at a purely rhetorical level, the leaders of the Burkinabe revolution--whatever their critics may think56--actually mean what they say and act according to what they preach. True, the Revolution has brought about some formal changes in the country. Thus, on the Revolution's first anniversary (4 August 1984), a number of national symbols, such as the country's name, the national anthem and motto, and the national flag, have been modified so as to better reflect the radical break with the past and the new revolutionary orientation and objectives. Sankara explains the change brought about in the country's name (from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso) thus: "Burkina means noble, upright; faso means an organized community--a nation-- that upholds integrity, nobility and uprightness." 57 Yet these are not mere rhetorical and cosmetic changes. Austerity and integrity are not simply slogans, but constitute an integral part of the Burkinabe revolution, and typify cardinal values which serve as a guide to action for all the Revolution's participants, leaders and masses alike. The Burkinabe presidency itself has concretely demonstrated its dedication to these ideals. Thus, the fleet of Mercedes-Benz cars which was used by former Heads of State and ministers was given away as prizes in the national lottery after the Revolution, and all state officials, including Sankara himself, now drive around in unassuming Renault 5s. Similarly, only a paltry 500.000 CFA francs (US $ 1250.00) has been set aside for much-needed maintenance and repair works at the presidential palace in the 1985 budget. 58 Furthermore, it is noteworthy that, contrary to what has happened in some other African countries where mere Master-sargeants have become Generals in less than three years, the Burkinabe military leadership has not yet been affected by the "self-promotion" syndrome.

The same austerity and integrity is expected from other members of the national bourgeoisie, particularly from army officers and civil servants. Thus the government has demanded that the civil servants sacrifice their standard of living in favour of that of the rural masses through the gradual implementation of specific austerity measures: reduction in salaries of 40 % in real terms since 1982; cancellation of all indemnities and privileges; sacrificing the twelfth month's salary; compulsory contribution of between 5 and 12 % of earnings depending on rank), plus 5 % of indemnities accumulated, to the new "Popular Effort for Investment", a programme to improve basic social infrastructure.59 These measures are designed to demonstrate "the willingness and the determination of the salaried workers to endure and overcome with the masses all the problems militating against the development of the people."60 In addition to the compulsory exercises to which they are like everybody else, subjected twice a week after work, civil servants are sent back to the land at regular intervals (as was the case in August 1985) for short periods of time in order to halt the formation of "petty bourgeois tendencies." 61 Conversely, other measures are designed to slightly ease the financial burden of the impoverished masses. Thus, on 31 December 1984, President Sankara announced that all housing allowances and rents would be suspended for the calendar year 1985.62 On 4 August 1985, the President announced the total cancellation of all outstanding taxes due by the poorest sections of the population.63 Other measures include the reduction of the costs of schooling, the control of food prices, the introduction of ceilings on rents as well as of a projected "vital salary" which would represent the amount of money needed by a family for its essential needs.64

In the final analysis, the most original feature and distinctive characteristic of the Burkinabe regime is that it has managed to actively and durably mobilize genuine and significant popular support for its economic and social policies. These policies really enjoy a broad popular appeal because they are geared to the fulfillment of the needs and aspirations of the masses, and because they actually involve them in the developmental decision-making process. However, like all previous revolutionary experiments, the Burkinabe revolution has, predictably, been plagued with numerous teething problems and what Lenin aptly called "infantile disorders". It is therefore necessary to precisely

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identify the nature of these problems and to correctly analyse the essence of these contradictions in order to prescribe appropriate remedial mechanisms. This is what the following sections will attempt to do in dealing successively with internal social and political constraints and external constraints.

Internal Political and Social Constraints Social Constraints

By unambiguously proclaiming its intention of bringing about a new social order, the Burkinabe revolution was naturally coming up against a variety of traditional socio-political forces and vested interests--notably the traditional chieftancy and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie--likely to slow down, or even to break up entirely, the initial revolutionary drive. The Burkinabe government thus embarked on a skillful policy of neutralization of these antagonistic social forces. In the first place, the revolutionary regime launched a frontal attack on the traditional chieftancy, still very influential and powerful among the Moose, the country's dominant ethnic group.65 Confronted with an unusual situation whereby a number of traditional leaders had been voted in as local CDRs' chairmen, the CNR promptly undertook sweeping administrative reforms. The decree of 23 January 1984 resulted in the division of Ouagadougou into 30 districts and that of Bobo Dioulasso into 25 districts. All cities and villages were divided up into a number of wards each managed by a CDR set up as a "Municipal revolutionary council" (CRM). Similarly, the 4 August 1984 decision to abolish private lane ownership affected al traditional chiefs. These various measures, absolutely unheard of in the country's history, have brought the traditional chiefs down to the level of the ordinary Burkinabe citizen, thus enabling them to participate in the Burkinabe revolution.66 However, insofar as the Burkinabe regime wants to use the peasantry as its main social basis, it will have to temporarily placate the chiefs, traditionally an efficient and reliable channel of communication with the rural masses. 67

Furthermore, the revolutionary leadership has taken bold measures in order to drastically reduce the privileges and standard of living of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. A series of successive measures have resulted in a 40 per cent reduction in the civil servants' purchasing power since 1984. In addition, the CNR has quickly embarked upon a systematic policy of personnel reduction in the civil service through the implementation of early retirement schemes or the dismissal ("d6gagement") of many civils servants who have been accused of acting contrary to the Revolution's interests and objectives.68 Predictably, these measures have alienated most civil servants, who have threatened to pack up and go elsewhere for better pay and conditions if the government persisted in squeezing them.

These measures are designed to reduce the standard of living of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie to the benefit of the peasantry, through a complex mechanism of income redistribution. This reversal of traditional class alliances derives from the Burkinabe regime's committment to use the peasantry as its main social base. 69 However, since the bureaucratic bourgeoisie continues to be--through the strategic position which it holds in Burkina's administration and political system--a significant social force, a major social contradiction remains. The Burkinabe regime has launched a policy aimed at neutralizing petty bourgeois, counter-revolutionary elements. Another complementary policy should, according to Amilcar Cabral's vivid formulation, result in the collective "suicide" of the Burkinabe leadership as a petty bourgeois class, which would make it the true servant of the masses. The ultimate success of the Burkinabe revolution will be measured, to a great extent, by the success of this most delicate and painful "social surgery" operation. As to the merchant class, in spite of governmental decisions detrimental to its interests (IVOLCY affair, 1985 rents cancellation and excessive taxation), it has, on the whole, been spared by the revolutionary regime which has indicated its willingness to work hand in hand with the national private sector.

Political Constraints Since coming to power, the CNR has clearly indicated its willingness to strictly control all aspects of Burkina's

social and political life. Thus, it has successively curbed the powers of the traditional chieftancy, reduced the role of political parties and trade unions and placed voluntary associations under strict control. For instance, LIPAD and most of the trade unions have been progressively marginalized. Besides ROC ("Regroupement des Officiers Communistes"), the main political parties which currently support the Sankara regime are the "Union des luttes communistes" (ULC), led by minister of foreign affairs Basile Guissou; the "Groupe communiste", led by minister of culture and information Wattamou Lamien; and the "Union des communistes Burkinabe (UCB), led by the CDRs' Secretary general Pierre Ou6draogo.70 In the area of mass organizations, the CNR has instigated, late last year, the creation of an "Union of Burkinabe Women" (UFB) and, early this year, a "National Union of Burkinabe Elders" (UNAB).71 It is noteworthy that among UNAB's most prominent members are the first two Heads of State of the country, Maurice Yam6ogo and General Sangoule Lamizana.

In August 1985, the CNR had its administrative competence and political power considerably increased. Yet it remains torn by contradictory tendencies. Should the revolutionary process be radicalized as advocated by Cmmdr. J.B. Lingani or is it, on the contrary, necessary to conclude a temporary, tactical alliance with petty bourgeois,

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reactionary forces in order to reinforce national unity, an option favoured by Sankara? Originally conceived as "the institutional expression of the People's sovereignty and revolutionary power", the CDRs are currently plagued by internal conflict due to the presence of opportunistic, reactionary elements in their midst.72 Furthermore, the CDRs' autonomy and room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis the CNR is, at best, limited, the former acting essentially as the "transmission belt" of the latter. The Burkinabe government will necessarily have to somehow resolve these various contradictions likely, in the long run, to adversely affect the proper functioning of the CNR and the CDRs, the two central elements in the state's political and administrative machinery.

In the final analysis, this problem is related to that of the new class alliance on which the regime should be based. As Pascal Labazee aptly remarked, "The success of the revolutionary process initiated on 4 August 1983 largely depends on the CNR's ability to quickly rally the peasantry and the urban workers around it".73 Yet, some foreign observers' accounts suggest that conmunication between the leadership and grass-roots militants is far from adequate: "One has (...) the feeling that a vanguard has offered the Revolution to his people; yet his people do not fully comprehend what is actually happening and is somewhat suspicous."74 Indeed, the success of the Burkinabe revolution ultimately depends on the Burkinabe regime's ability to actively and durably mobilize genuine and massive popular support for its ambitious programme of socio-political and economic transformation. In this perspective mass political education constitutes an essential prerequisite to such mobilization. This implies a massive campaign of political education designed to enhance the level of the masses' political consciousness and understanding of basic contemporary political, social and economic issues. As Fanon rightly observed,

(...) in the final analysis everything depends on the education of the masses, on the raising of the level of thought and on what we are prompt to call 'political education' (...) political education means

opening their minds, awakening them, and allowing the birth of their intelligence (...) To educate the masses politically (...) means (...) to try, relentlessly and passionately to teach the masses that

everything depends on them; that if we stagnate it is their responsibility, and that if we go forward it is due to them too, that there is no such thing as a demiurge (...) that the demiurge is the people themselves and the magic hands are finally only the hands of the people. 75

External Political Constraints The Burkinabe government has proclaimed its desire to pursue a genuinely non-aligned foreign policy,

politically independent but actively anti-imperialist. In the conduct of such a foreign policy, the government has naturally come up against the latent or open hostility of certain Western or African countries favourable to the preservation of the neo-colonial status quo in West Africa.

Relations between Burkina and France have always been characterized by distrust and ambiguity. Really bad since 4 August 1983, these relations have somewhat improved in early February 1986, on the occasion of the signing of a new cooperation agreement to replace the 24 April 1961 Franco-Burkinabe cooperation agreement. However, a certain malaise in these relations persists to the extent that the Burkinabe government suspects apparently with some justification, the French to indirectly and covertly encourage the openly hostile policy of some of Burkina's neighbours (notably the Ivory Coast, Mali and Niger) as well as movements opposing the Burkinabe regime operating in these countries or in France. Thus, on 27 May 1984, a coup attempt organized from the Ivory Coast by Capt. Jean-Claude Kamboule was foiled by the Burkinabe government. On 1 June 1985, two ammunition storage depots located in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso were sabotaged, apparently as part of another military plot. These various, seemingly unconnected, events are presumably part of a deliberate destabilization campaign by internal and external enemies of the revolution, most prominent among which, are Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo's "Front Progressiste Voltaique" (FPV), and Cpt. J.C. Kamboule's and former foreign minister Michel Kafando's"Mouvement de la Resistance Voltaique" (MRV).

During the past three years, a number of Burkina's immediate neighbours--notably the Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and Togo--have given clear indications of their latent hostility towards the Burkinabe revolutionary regime. Thus, at the last Entente Council Summit of 12-13 February 1985 in Yamoussoukro (Ivory Coast), Sankara's Burkina was deliberately marginalized and obliquely accused of being responsible for a number of destablilization attempts which had recently affected Niger and Togo.76 More recently, major differences and contradictions have surfaced between Burkina and Mali, the latter having lately initiated a marked "rapprochement" with France, in the course of negotiations about the March 1986 CEAO summit meeting. These contradictions have finally erupted into a brief, but violent, armed conflict between the two countries over the Agacher border area from 25 to 30 December 1985. This conflict, which resulted in a total death toll estimated at 300, has finally been settled within the framework of ANAD, CEAO's non-agression and defence assistance pact, apparently with the decisive mediation of Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny. This war, often described as "absurd", has revealed the extent of French military assistance to Mali, thus vindicating Burkina's view that the war was really an international plot, backed by imperialist forces, to overthrow the revolutionary regime. The Yamoussoukro ANAD summit meeting (17/18

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January 1986) has finally brought about an uneasy truce between the two countries which, in fact, have much in common.77

It has now become abundantly clear that Sankara's regime causes much concern and worry among a small coterie of autocratic and corrupt neo-colonial rulers acting as watchdogs of French and Western imperialism in West Africa under the cover of such Francophone regional organisations as the Entente Council, CEAO and its offshoot, ANAD.78 These neo-colonial rulers are (justifiably) worried about the demonstration effect of the Burkinabe Revolution on their impoverished and exploited masses.79 With the encouragement and support of their Western allies, these rulers will probably maintain and intensify their destabilization efforts aimed at the eventual overthrow of the Sankara r6gime.

CONCLUSION

Initially depicted as just another military coup d'etat, the process of socio-political and economic change initiated on 4 August 1983 by Thomas Sankara's young officers rapidly turned out to be a genuine popular revolution, in the etymological sense of the term. Set against an inauspicious political and socio-economic background, this Revolution was nevertheless able to survive for almost three years. The relative longevity and temporary success of the Sankara regime is to be explained by the fact that contrary to many similar socialist experiments, it has actually managed to actively and durably mobilize genuine and significant popular support for its policies. This is so because these policies, which are clearly articulated and simply formulated, are essentially focused on the welfare of the populace, and thus enjoy wide popular appeal. After a brief description of the origins, ideological basis and actual practice of the popular Revolution in Burkina, the present article has attempted to identify and analyze the various internal and external economic, social and political constraints and contradictions likely to slow down, or even possibly to radically alter, the ongoing revolutionary process. This analysis has led to the conclusion that the ultimate success of the Burkina Revolution depends on the resolution iof these contradictions. The following are among the most significant and urgent problems to be resolved by the Burkinabe leadership:

(1) the military and civil defence system designed to safeguard the Revolution against internal and external threats. The recent Agacher war has highlighted this system's shortcomings, notably lack of preparedness and huge logistics problems;80

(2) external economic dependency and its corollary, the incomplete mastery of some of the national econony's mechanisms;

(3) the latent or open hostility of the reactionary bureaucratic bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie whose privileges have been significantly reduced by the Sankara regime and who constitute an active internal and external opposition force to the regime;

(4) the progressist bureaucratic and merchant bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie's capacity to "commit suicide" as a social class in order to truly become the people's servant;

(5) the preservation of the initial popular enthusiasm and revoltionary drive in the pursuit of socio- economic goals and political objectives without resort to coercion;

(6) mass political education; (7) the overt and covert destabilization activities conducted or engineered by fundamentally hostile

Western powers or Africa's countries, aimed at overthrowing the Sankara regime.

The new Burkinabe revolutionary motto, borrowed from the Cuban revolution--"Motherland or death, we shall overcome!"--is a testimony to the Burkinabe leaders' and people's determination to successfully complete the revolutionary process. It is to be hoped that they will be able to do so without hindrance or interference from within or without. In their courageous and resolute struggle for the betterment of the condition of their masses, the Burkinabe leaders certainly deserve the full cooperation and support of all the states and governmental and non- governmental organizations in the world, regardless of political and ideological inclinations and preferences. For once, the fight against poverty, disease and ignorance should take precedence over political and ideological considerations. As President Sankara himself succinctly puts it: "We seek human dignity; that is our ideology." 81

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NOTES

This is a revised and updated version of a paper by the same title presented by the author at the 28th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 23-26 November 1985.

1. The main sources on this section are: Victoria Brittain, "Introduction to Sankara and Burkina." Review of African Political Economy no. 32 (Aprill985): 39-47; Roger Jouffrey, "Thomas Sankara et la revolution voltaique." Afrique contemporaine vol. XXIII, no. 130 (avril 1984): 44-53; Rene Utayek, "Le Changment politique et constitutionnel en Haute-Volta." L'Anne Africaine 1983: 86-106; and Larba Yarga, "LUs premices a I'avenement du Conseil National de la Revolution en Haute-Volta." Le Mois en Afrique vol. 18, nos. 213/14 (octobre 1983): 24- 41.

2. R. Otayek, "Le Changement politique et constitutionnel en Haute-Volta", op. cit., p. 89. 3. V. Brittain, "Introduction to Sankara and Burkina", op. cit., p. 44. 4. These events are chronicled in V. Brittain, op. cit.: 44-45; R. Otayek, op. cit.: 93-96; L. Yarga, "Les premices a

l'avenement du CNR en Haute-Volta" op. cit.: 34-40; "Upper Volta: At last a really radical coup. Africa Contemporary Record vol. XVI (1983/84), p. B 590; and, particularly, "Upper Volta": Postponing Marxism?" Africa Confidential vol.24, no. 12 (8 June 1983): 7-8. On French interventions in African affairs in general, see Guy Martin, "'The Historical, Economic and Political bases of France's African Policy." The Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1985): 189-208.

5. For a socio-political analysis of the Bukinabe military in terms of generations, see in particular "Haute-Volta: les Raisons Sociales d' un Coup d'Etat." Politique aricaine no. 9 (mars 1983): 86-89; R. Otayek, op. cit.: 90-91, and Catherine Some, Sociologie du pouvoir militaire: le cas de la Haute-Volta (Bordeaux, 1979).

6. "Sankara: cet Homme qui Derange." Interview of Thomas Sankara by Siradiou Diallo in Jeune Afrique, 12 octobre 1983, p. 43 (author's translation from the French, as elsewhere in this article).

7. Ibid, p. 43. 8. Declaration du Capitaine Thomas Sankara a la 39e session ordinaire de 1'Assemblee G6n6rale des Nations Unies, 4

oetobre 1984. Ouagadougou: Ministere des Relations ext6rieures, 1984, p. 3. This is quite reminiscent of some of Fanon's most forceful statements: "We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe (...) Let us decide not to imitate Europe (...) If we wish to live up to our peoples' expectations, we must seek the solution elsewhere than in Europe (...) we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man." (Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1967: 251-255, translation modified by the author).

9. "We Have to Depend on Ourselves." Interview of Thomas Sankara by Patricia J. Sethi in Newsweek, 19 November 1984, p. 68

10. "Sankara: cet Homme qui Derange", op. cit., p. 43. 11. Letter of Mr. Basile L. Guissou, Burkina's Minister of Exteral Relations, to the author dated 9 August 1985. 12. lbid. 13. Conseil National de la Revolution/CNR, Discours d'Orientation Politique pronounc a la Radio-television nationale

par le Captaine Thomas Sankara le 2 octobre 1983. Ouagadougou: Ministere de 1Information, 1983, p.23. 14. 'Thomas Sankara: le multipartisme? Une mascarade qui nous a coute tres cher." Interview of Thomas Sankara by

Mohamed Maiga in Afrique-Asie, 24 octobre 1983, p. 32. 15. "Sankara cet Homme qui Derange", op. cit., p. 46. 16. Interview of T. Sankara by M. Maiga in Afrique-Asie, 15 aoiut 1983, p. 19. 17. Quoted in Susan McDonald, "Burkina: Sankara in Paris." West Africa, 17 February 1986, p. 339. 18. CNR, Discours d'Orientation Politique: 17-19. 19. Ibid, p. 25. 20. Ibid, p. 38-43. 21. CNR, An 11: Programme Populaire de Developpement. Ouagadougou: Imprimerie Nationale, n.d. 22. Interview of T. Sankara by P.J. Sethi in Newsweek, 19 November 1984, p. 68. 23. CNR, Discours d'Orientation Politique, p. 44. 24. Ibid, p. 44-45. , 25. Ibid, p. 45. Thus, since the 4 August 1983 Revolution, Burkina has established close political, economic and

military relations with a number of progressist African regimes such as Chadli Bendjedid's Algeria, Jerry Rawlings' Ghana and Muammar Gaddafi's Libya. Since early 1984, there has been a noticeable uneasiness in relations with Libya coincidental with a clear "rapprochement" with Algeria.

26. V.G. Afanasyev, Marxist Philosophy: A Popular Outline. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 4th edition, 1980, p. 155. 27. Jean Ziegler, "Dans la Haute-Volta du capitaine Sankara l'espoir,malgre tout." Le Monde diplomatique no. 360

(Mars 1984), p. 10. Alongside this official structure there is another one of unoffocial advisers to the President, including, inter alia, the Zairian political activist Buana Kabue and the late Malian journalist Mohammed Maiga (who died in Ouagadougou on I January 1984 in mysterious circumstances).

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28. Interview of Cpt. Pierre Ouedraogo, Secretary general of the CDRs, in Liberation Afrique-Caraibe-Pacifique no. 22 (juillet 1984): 14-17; Sennen Andriamirado, 'urkina: Assurer la marche de la revolution", interview of Cpt. P. Ou&draogo in Jeune Afrique, 17 juillet 1985, p. 28.

29. CNR, Statut Gneral des Comites de Defense de la Revolution. Ouagadougou. Imprimerie des Forces Armees Nationales, 1984, Title I, article 4, p. 7; Title 11: 10-23.

30. Ibid, Title Ill, Chapter 1: 23-24. 31. Ordonnance no. 83-015 CNR/PRES du 19 octobre 1983 portant creation de tribunaux populaire de la revolution,

article 2 & 3, reproduced in Afrique-Asie, 30 janvier 1984, p. 34. 32. Ibid, article 11. 33. The recent decision by the CNR to modify prefectoral functions from appointed to elective aims at a similar

objective. This decision was taken in order to demystify the functions of a prefect, and to make power truly a people's power (see West Africa, 11 November 1985, p. 2393.

34. See in particular R. Otayek, "Le Changement politique et constitutionnel en Haute-Volta", op. cit.: 97-98. 35. Statement by Professor Michel Maille, delegate of the International federation for the rights of man to the trial;

quoted in Lyse Doucet, 'The Diawara Affair." West Africa, 14 April 1986, p. 762. A former Ivorian government minister turned successful international businessman, Mohamed Diawara was, along with Moussa N'Gom, former Senegalese Secretary general of CEAO and Moussa Diakite, former Malian director of the CEAO's Solidarity and Development Fund (FOSIDEC), accused of embezzling CFA francs 6.5 billion (about US $ 18 million) belonging to the CEAO. The legal proceedings initiated in October 1984 led to the detention without trial of the three accused. After a brief trial conducted during Ouagadougou's TPR fifteenth session (25 March-April 1986), the revolutionary tribunal sentenced the three men to 15 years in prison. Diawara and Diakite were ordered to pay almost CFA F 6.5 bn between them as well as CFA F 650 mo in damages and interest (about $ 20 mo) as well as individual fines of CFA F mo (about $3,000) each. N'Gom was ordered to repay CFA F 142.5 mo plus CFA F 14.2 mo in damages and interest (about $550,000). Their property is to be seized and there is no right of appeal outside of requests for grace from the Burkinabe leader, Cpt. Thomas Sankara (on the Diawara affair and its outcome, see S. Andriarmirado, "CEAO: Pret pour un nouveau redemarrage." Jeune Afrique, 9 avril 1986, p. 38; S. Andriamirado, "Proces Diawara: Ce qui n'a pas ete dit." Jeune Afrique, 16 avril 1986: 30-35; Lyse Doucet, 'The Diawara Affair." West Africa, 14 April 1986, 761-762; Sadio L. Sow, "Le Sommet du Proces." Afrique-Asie, 14 avril 1986: 18-19; and Sadio L. Sow, "Diawara: chronique d' un proces." Afrique-Asie, 21 avril 1986: 6-14).

36. World Bank, World Development Report 1985 (New York, 1985), p. 174. 37. Ibid p. 184. 38. Ibid p. 204; OECD, External Debt of Developing Countries: 1983 Survey (Paris, 1984), p. 209; OECD, External

Debt of Developing Countries in 1984. Doc. DCD/85.43 (Paris, 1985), p. 61. 39. OECD, 1983 Survey, p. 209; 1984 Survey, p. 61. 40. On the PPD, see CNR, An 11: Programme Populaire de Development, C. Benabdessadok, "Burkina: audace et

prudence. "Afrique-Asie, 6 mai 1985: 14-15; Burkina: la Volonte de Vaincre." Actuel Developpement no. 67 (juillet 1965): 32-53; and Jean Viero, "Burkina: Towards Self-reliance." West Africa, 14 january 1985: 58-59.

41. Pascal Labazee, "Reorganisation economique et resistances sociales: la question des alliances au Burkina." Politique africaine no. 20 (decembre 1985), p. 14.

42. J. Viero, "Burkina: Towards Self-reliance", op. cit., P. 59. 43. Yves Lacoste, "Developpement: la course d'obstacles." Actuel developpement no. 67 (juillet 1985), p. 41. 44. On this point, see Guy Martn, 'The Franc Zone, Underdevelopment and Dependency in Francophone Africa." Third

World Quarterly vol. 8, no. 1 (January 1986): 225-231. 45. P. Labazee, "Reorganisation economique", op. cit.: 19-20. 46. P. Labazee, "La voie etroite de la revolution au Burkina." Le Monde diplomatique no. 371 (fevrier 1985), p. 13. 47. On this point, see Howard French, "Strategists Wage Battle of the Budget." African Business, February 1986: 24-

25. 48. Ibid, p. 25; see also Francois Misser, "Working Together for a New Revival." African Business, July 1985, p. 20. 49. This point is made by Lyse Doucet in "Burkina: Economics and Revolution." West Africa, 10 February 1986, p.

295. 50. P. Labazee, "Reorganisation economique", op. cit.: 14-17. 51. Ibid. 23-24. 52. Lyse Doucet, "Burkina: Economics & Revolution", op. cit., p. 296. 53. These are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina, Congo, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,

Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique , Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. 54. The case of Ghana is unique. That country changed from Socialism to Capitalism with the 25 February 1966

military coup d'etat which overthrew Kwame Nkrumah, and later moved back to Socialism with the 1st January 1981 military coup which brought Flight-Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings to power.

55. R. Otayek, "Le Changement politique et constitutionnel en Haute-Volta", op. cit., p. 96. 56. Most notable among these are Claude Dubuch, "Langage du pouvoir, pouvoir du langage." Politique africaine no.

20 (decembre 1985): 44-53; Yves Andre Faure "Ouaga et Abidjan: divorce a l'africaine?" in ibidem: 78-79; and Paul Michaud, 'Turning off the Burkinabe." New African, April 1986, p. 34.

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57. Interview of T. Sankara by P.J. Sethi in Newsweek, 19 November 1984, p. 68. 58. Zie Douaba, "Burkina Faso: parlons chiffres." Afrique-Asie, 31 decembre 1984, p. 56. 59. See Lyse Doucet, "Burkina: Economics & Revolution", op. cit., p. 296; "Burkina: Salary Cuts." West Africa, 13

January 1986, p. 100. 60. "Burkina: salary cuts." West Africa, 13 January 1986, p. 100. 61. See Maggie Jonas, "Burkinabe officials sent back to the land." African Business, October 1985, p. 68. 62. Alfred Thierry, "Burkina: les surprises de Sankara." Afrique-Asie, 11 fevrier 1985, p. 29. 63. "Message du President Thomas Sankara lors du deuxieme anniversaire de la RDP." Sidwaya, 6 aout 1985, p. 5. 64. On these measures, see in particular Lyse Doucet, "Berkina: Economics and Revolution", 22. cit., p. 296. 65. This new spelling of "Moose" (instead of the former "Mossi") conforms to the directives contained in the 16

December 1975 presidential decree (ref. 75/PRES/EN). 66. On this point, see the excellent study by C. Savonnet-Guyot, "Le Prince et le Naaba." Politique africaine no. 20

(decembre 1985): 29-30, 41-43. See also C. Savonnet-Guyot, Etat et societes au Burkina: Essai sur le politique africain. Paris: Karthala,1986.

67. C. Savonnet-Guyot, "Le Prince et le Naaba", op. cit., p. 43. 68. The total number of civil servants dismissed is generally estimated at about 3,000. 69. On this point, we disagree with the official categorization of the peasantry as part of the petty bourgoisie (cf.

CNR, Discours d"Orientation Politique, p. 18). In agreement with Fanon's analysis, we are of the opinion that the impoverished, over-exploited and proletarized African peasantry constitutes an authentically revolutionary class (Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 47).

70. "Mali/Burkina: Post-mortem." Africa Confidential vol. 27, no. 3 (29 January 1986), p. 6. 71. West Africa, 11 November 1985, p. 2393; West Africa, 10 March1986, p. 543. 72. Message du Prdsident Thomas Sankara a l'occasion au deuxeime anniversaire de la RDP." Sidwaya, 6 aout 1985: 3-

4. 73. P. Labazee, "La voie etroite de la revolution au Burkina", op. cit, p. 13. See also P. Labazee, "Rorganisation

economique, op. cit., p. 28. 74. D. Coutellier, "A Propos du Dossier Burkina: Reflexions d'un cooperant sur une revolution." Actuel developpment

no. 69 (novembre 1985), p. 63. 75. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 159 (translation modified by the author). 76. Bouzid Kouza, "Conseil de 1'Entente: la Cabale d'Houphouet." Afrique-Asie, 7 octobre 1985: 15-16. 77. On the Burkina/Mali armed conflict, see in particular "Burkina-Mali: au-dela des frontieres." Afrique-Asie, 13

janvier 1986: 10-19; "Sankara-Traore: peuvent-ils se reconcilier?" Jeune Afrique, 15 janvier 1986: 30-35; "Le Prix de la Guerre." Jeune Afrique, 15 fevrier 1986, 10-15; and Lyse Doucet, "Mali/Burkina: Two sides, one peace." West Africa, 21 January 1986: 170-172 (especially pp. 171-172 for the Burkina version).

78. On this point see Guy Martin, 'The (...) Bases of France's African Policy", op. cit.: 206-207. 79. The following statement made by Cpt. Thomas Sankara at a public rally in Ouagadougou on 11 September 1985

has certainly not contributed to ease mounting tensions between Burkina and Mali:

'The sister Republic of Mali should know that her happiness will be our happiness, and her unhappiness will be our unhappiness; the Malian people's worries are the Burkinabe people's worries. The Burkinabe Revolution is at the disposal of the Malian people, who badly needs it. This is so because only revolution will enable it to combat hunger, thirst, disease, ignorance, and above all to combat neo- colonial and imperialist exploitation." (Quoted in S. Andriamirado, "CEAO: Sommet a Abidjan ou a Dakar." Jeune Afrique, 13 November 1985, p. 34).

80. On this point, see "Mali/Burkina: Post-mortem." Africa Confidential vol. 27, no. 3 (29 January 1986), p. 5. 81. Interview of T. Sankara by P.J. Sethi inNewsweek, 19 November 1984, p. 68.

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ideology and praxis in thomas sankara's populist revolution of 4 august 1983 in burkina faso

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