113

n literature, the Baltic States are usu-ally called �small� although their total

area is not that unimportant at all. It isroughly as large as two thirds of North-ern Germany or the UK, it comprisesabout half of Japan or California and itis about one and a half times larger thanthe area of the BeNeLux states (Belgium,the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Re-garding transport and commerce, theBaltic States are perfectly situated betweenEastern and Western Europe. They areagriculturally self-sufficient. Slate in Esto-nia and waterpower in Lithuania and es-pecially Latvia create optimal conditionsfor the industrial development and elec-trification of these states. After World WarII, even oil fields were found in Lithua-

The military situationin the Baltic States11111

By Edgars Andersons

nia and Latvia. The forests in the BalticStates, especially in Latvia, can be regardedas one of their great natural riches. Moreo-ver, the Baltic States are not as poor inmineral resources as commonly assumed.An important factor in the Baltic Stateswas the development of an industry thatwas based on local starting substances, butthat later turned into a specialization inelectrical engineering, precision instru-ments, chemistry and similar branches. Thisindustry, especially in Latvia, could moreeasily compete with the great powers onthe world market. The long coast of theBaltic Sea with its great ports, especiallyRiga, Ventspils (Windau), Liepâja (Liebau),Tallinn (Reval) and Klaipeda (Memel), isof considerable economic importance for

the Baltic States. Although the Baltic Seagives access to the Atlantic Ocean, oneshould pay attention to the fact that itbelongs to the so-called border seas, whichcreates certain military difficulties. TheBaltic States are also a natural basis forinternational traffic routes in the air, onrailroads and roads. The land�s surface ismostly very suitable for the creation oflarge-scale traffic connections.2

However, the military situation of theBaltic States must be regarded as highlydangerous. They are in the northern sec-tion of a long and narrow line of smallerstates that are an obstacle for the accessfrom the Russian territory to the Atlan-tic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, and the Medi-terranean Sea. One should always be aware

114

of the fact that the Russian empire, knowntoday as the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics (USSR), makes up one sixthof the earth�s total surface area. The situ-ation of the Baltic States was aggravatedby the fact that the access to the BalticSea was most comfortable just in theirterritory. This fact poses a serious threatto the independence of the Baltic peo-ple as long as the Russian empire existsand the non-Russian peoples that areunder Russian influence (about one halfof the general population) do not gainsovereignty. In the rear of the Baltic peo-ple � in the West � is the open sea. TheScandinavian people on the other side,remembering their sad experiences in thepast, have always tried to stay away fromthe problems of the European continentand especially of the Baltics and to re-main in relative isolation on theScandinavian Peninsula. However, theBaltic and Finno-Ugrian people havebeen able to stay at the coast of the Bal-tic Sea for more than 4.000 years althoughthey have lost wide areas in Northern andCentral Russia.3

The German Empire adjoined the Bal-tic States in the Southwest. Just like inthe Middle Ages, it has been a serious threatto the independence of the Baltic Statesin modern times. But centuries-old expe-rience has taught the Germans that theBaltic �horn� � situated far in the North-east and under German rule � has alwaysbeen extremely difficult to defend and,thus, constantly endangered in militaryterms.4 Therefore, the opinion has devel-oped that a support of the bastion of theindependent Baltic States and an encour-agement of the right of self-determinationof the Baltic people against the presump-tions and the pressure of the non-Balticpeople (especially those of the Russians),would be the best solution for the Ger-man interests.5 Unfortunately, this under-standing came to late.

An extremely unfavourable factor isthe small Baltic population. Only 6 mil-lion people live in that area, among theman unusually high number of descendantsof late immigrants such as Russians, Poles,Germans, Jews, White Russians, Swedishand others. Estonia and Lithuania (except

for the areas of Petseri, Wilna, and Memel)were nationally quite uniform, whereasLatvia�s situation in this respect was threat-ened. In the recent years, as much as 25%of Latvia�s population has been non-Latvians.6

Another negative factor was the centu-ries-old alienation between the Baltic peo-ple and the lacking sense of community.Even while the Baltic States were independ-ent, little was done to remedy this situa-tion. Only when the threatening cloudsof World War II started gathering, theBaltic people realized that they shared acommon destiny. But then it was too lateto combine their powers on a large scale.7

In international literature one can findthe view that the independence of theBaltic States was just a short incident inworld history and that the Baltic peopledid not play a part in political, economicand military terms in the past. This opin-ion is completely wrong. In the course ofhistory, the fact went unnoticed that theBaltic and Finno-Ugrian people have beenable to stay in their present areas of settle-ment for 4.000 to 5.000 years, that about

115

2.000 B.C. the Baltic people inhabited anarea that extended from the Ural to theOder and from Estonia to Central Po-land and that from the birth of Christup to the sixth century the Baltic tribes,had reached a cultural peak that was quiteunusual compared to their neighbours.8

For several centuries, the Latvian and Es-tonian tribes not only resisted the simul-taneous pressure of the Scandinavian andSlavic tribes, but also started counterat-tacks into the areas of the Swedes, Danesand Slavs.9 The Baltic people showed unu-sual persistence and bravery and weremilitarily successful against enemies thatoften were technically better equippedduring the crusades. The Estonians� fightfor freedom against the Swedes, Danes andGermans lasted from 1191 to 122710 andthe resistance of Latvia against the com-bined German powers lasted even consid-erably longer � from 1186 to 1290. TheOrder of the Brothers of the Sword wasdestroyed and the Livonian Order wasseverely beaten.11

The Lithuanians not only managed tohold their ground against intruders, but

also enlarged the area under their controlseveral times until it stretched from theBaltic Sea to the Black Sea, becoming thelargest state in medieval Europe.12 Thecombined powers of the Poles and theLithuanians stopped the advance of theTartars and the Mongols towards Europe,saved several Russian areas from the Mon-golian yoke, slowed down the Germans�drive towards the East by beating theGerman Order in 1410, and absorbed theOttomans� advance towards the HolyRoman Empire.13 Unfortunately, theLithuanians lost their political and evencultural independence to a considerableextent during the union with Poland, al-though kings from the LithuanianJagellons-Dynasty governed both states forseveral centuries.14 The Poles on their partmade a historic mistake when they triedto subjugate not only the people of thestates they had conquered � White Rus-sians, Ukrainians and Latvians � but alsothe Lithuanians, who were their allies andmuch larger in number. The Poles werenot interested in a confederation in whichthese peoples would have had equal

rights.15 This mistake cost the Poles as wellas the unfortunate peoples who werelinked to them dear.

Although the German conquerorssaved the Latvians and Estonians frombecoming assimilated by the masses of theSlavs, connected them with Western cul-ture and did not try to Germanise them,they committed a crucial mistake in ex-ploiting these peoples in the interest ofGerman squires and merchants ever moremercilessly. A deep rift opened up betweenthe German immigrants and the nativepeople, a rift that weakened the bastionof Livonia and was hard to overcome.Although Latvian and Estonian unitsfought bravely under their own com-manders, together with the German troopsof the Livonian League against the Rus-sian intruders in several battles, theLivonian League fell apart. The conflictbetween the leading groups was to blamefor this. In the following centuries theleading German social classes mainly triedto defend their own interests and privi-leges and failed to unite the native peopleagainst the supremacy of foreign states.16

116

Although the local landowners sub-jected the majority of Latvians, Estoni-ans, and Lithuanians to serfdom, thesepeople did not lose their national andmilitary spirit even under the most se-vere conditions. The great Estonian re-volt of 1343 against the Danish and Ger-man supremacy, which liberated the wholeof Northern Estonia for a short period,proved this.17 In 1372, the Lithuaniansconquered the Kremlin in Moscow.18

During the Livonian War Latvian andEstonian peasant armies operated.19 Unitsof Latvian soldiers were among the troopsof Sweden and the Dukedom of Courland.Latvian soldiers fought not only in theirnative country, but also in Poland, Aus-tria, and the Netherlands and some sol-diers and seamen even showed up in thecolonies of the Dukedom of Courland,in Africa and America.20 In 1560, the Es-tonians even liberated a part of theircountry again for a short period oftime.21 During the Great Nordic War,twelve Latvian infantry battalions and ar-tillery units fought on Swedish side.22

When Latvia and Estonia fell under Rus-

sian control, soldiers of these people werein Russia�s army and fleet, where theygained ranks at the end of the 19th andthe beginning of the 20th century.23 Dur-ing Napoleon�s invasion and during theCrimean War, there were purely Latviannavy and army units in fight against theinvaders.24 When the Lithuanians gotunder Russian control, the opposite hap-pened. Lithuanian units volunteered forthe fight against the Russians in 1812.25

In the part of Lithuania that had fallen toPoland, the Prussian army had two Lithua-nian cavalry regiments for many years.26

The times of the Russian administra-tion were nevertheless the hardest trial forthe Baltic people. Several revolts, under-taken by Estonians, Latvians and Lithua-nians against the local authorities of theRussian, German-Baltic and Polish land-owners and against the Russian adminis-tration, clearly show this. These uprisingsreached their peak in the great Polish-Lithuanian revolutions of 1830-1831 and1863-186527 , the Estonian Mahtras Warof 185828 , and the bloody revolution ofall three Baltic people, but especially of

the Latvians and Estonians, in 1905, whenthese countries were more or less undercontrol by their own people.29 Lithua-nian and, in smaller numbers, also Latvianemigrants took part in the American CivilWar. The first victim of this war was theLatvian Martiò¿ Buciò¿.30 During theSpanish-American War, Lithuanian emi-grants even sent their own militaryunits.31 All the above shows that the pe-riod of oppression that lasted for centu-ries could not suppress the national con-sciousness and the instinct for truth, jus-tice and soldiery among the Baltic peo-ple. Latvians and Estonians not only hadtraining opportunities in the Russianarmy and fleet, but were also able to gainexperience in the highest commandingpositions. The Catholic Lithuanians werenot accepted as officers into the Russianarmed forces.32 Instead the political lead-ers of Lithuania had � due to the longperiod of proud independence � the clear-est and the farthest-reaching political goal:the restoration of Lithuania�s independ-ence. The part of the Lithuanian popula-tion that was under Russian control was

117

more strongly oppressed economically andculturally than the other Baltic people.Although the political goals of the Latviansand Estonians were not as far-reaching asthe ones of the Lithuanians, these peoplewere able to create a solid economic andcultural foundation for greater self-deter-mination and, eventually, for independ-ence. 33

The lessons of World War I andthe fights for freedom

Since 1795, all Baltic states, with theexception of a small area in Prussia in-habited by Lithuanians, were under Rus-sian rule. Except for the short period ofNapoleon�s invasion, the Baltic people didnot have the slightest hope of getting ridof the Russian control. A pact with Ger-many would only have meant strengthen-ing of the local German oligarchy. Be-cause of the Polish weakness and lack ofunderstanding, the Lithuanians bitterlyregretted their co-operation with themduring the revolutions of 1830 and 1863.The Russian Revolution of 1905 gave rise

to greater hopes among the Baltic peo-ple; the majority of the local leaders, how-ever, even then only hoped for an au-tonomy of their peoples Only unusuallybig international changes could help theBaltic people to gain the longed-for inde-pendence. Extremely favourable condi-tions were created by the World War I,the Bolshevist Revolution in Russia, thecollapse of the German Empire, the rightof self-determination of the people pro-claimed by the Entente and the wide-spread economic and political prepared-ness of the Baltic people for an independ-ent life.

The Baltic region � just like in earliergreat wars � became a battleground rightat the beginning of World War I, a factthat did harm especially to Lithuania andLatvia. The native soldiers that were mo-bilized in the Baltic area had to withstandthe first advance of the German army, butlater also had to undertake the first inva-sion into East Prussia. Tens of thousandsof Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian sol-diers were put into Russian units, wherethey fought bravely under the command

of incompetent and corrupt Russian gen-erals. Right from the beginning of thewar, the soldiers showed excellent brav-ery, steadfastness, and contempt for death.Observers of the Battle of Augustova com-pared the 20th Russian Corps, which wasalmost completely comprised of the Bal-tic soldiers, to Napoleon�s guards. The suc-cess of the Baltic soldiers was described asthe Russians� success by the press. Roughly20.000 Latvians, as many Lithuanians, andmany Estonians fell in the name of Rus-sia�s glory, their people not gaining anyadvantages by that.34 In the big rearguardactions, however, two Latvian garrison-battalions were able to draw attention; 70%of the men were wiped out.35

Latvian politicians achieved the crea-tion of national Latvian light-infantryunits. From the 1st of August 1915 andonwards, they consisted of some battal-ions, later of eight combat regiments andone reserve regiment that were combinedin two brigades, for a short period inone division.36 These units, commandedby officers, broke through the Germanfront lines several times by using new tac-

118

tics and rescued Russian units out of hope-less situations. Due to their bravery andsuccesses they were so different from Rus-sian units, that they drew attention notonly of Western military observers, butalso of the international press.37 Unfor-tunately, these excellent Latvian units werethirsty for glory and wanted to get atten-tion and thus let themselves get manoeu-vred into hopeless situations, paying ahigh toll of lives during the offensive ofJuly 1916 and the heroic offensives ofChristmas 1916 and New Year 1917. Theyall led to negative reactions among thesoldiers. The complete national-Latvianunits consisted of approximately 45.000men. About 10.000 Latvian soldiers foundtheir death in these units, e.g. during thedefence of Riga in September 1917.38 Alltogether about 35.000 Latvian soldiers fellin Latvian and Russian units during WordWar I.39 The Latvian soldiers found a wayof drawing the attention of the Russiansand their allies to their victims, but theLatvian people did not gain any advan-tages from these victims of World War I.Only after the Revolution of 1917 did

two Latvian regions � Livonia andCourland � get autonomy; Lettgallen didnot receive it, and the whole area of Latviawas not united into one national terri-tory. After all, the Russian governmenthad to take into account the morale amongthe Latvian units.40

The Estonian political leaders were longin doubt whether it was worthwhile hav-ing the Russian government draw up Es-tonian national units. They were afraidthat all Estonian units might be annihi-lated in one single battle, whereas with adistribution of the soldiers along thewhole, long Russian front, there was hopethat the basis of the Estonian peoplewould survive.41 Yet in the end, the opin-ion prevailed that national units wouldbe necessary for the achievements of theirpolitical goals. On the 21st of April, thefirst Estonian infantry regiment wasformed.42 Due to the weakness and theretreat of neighbouring Russian units, thisregiment suffered a great deal when de-fending its positions, just as the Latvianregiments did.43 As late as the 19th ofDecember, did the Estonians get permis-

sion to put up an Estonian division,something they had really done already.In contrast to the Latvian brigades, whowere pure infantry units, the Estoniandivision was allowed to raise an artillerybrigade, a cavalry regiment and a techni-cal unit.44 Maybe because the units wereformed so late, the commanders of theEstonian division (in contrast to theLatvian commanders) managed to avoidmilitarily and politically unnecessarybloodshed and to prevent a distributionof the Estonian units across Russia afterthe breakdown of the front. Some Latvianunits broke up; others were transferredto Russia, where, after the Bolshevik Revo-lution, they were forced to fight as a spe-cial division for the Bolshevik, while theirhome was being occupied by Germantroops.45 Later, an Estonian soviet-divi-sion was formed in Russia.46

As the representatives of the Lithua-nian people abroad had demanded fullindependence right at the beginning ofthe war, the commanders of the Russianarmed forces tried to prevent the forma-tion of the national Lithuanian units. The

119

first four Lithuanian battalions and twosquadrons were created as late as Augustand September 1917.47 Many Latvian andEstonian officers were in the Russianarmy, even in the highest ranks, but therewere only few Lithuanian officers. Towardsthe end of the war, Lithuanians weretrained as officers in spite of their reli-gious belief. Now there were some Lithua-nian officers among the lower ranks, butthere were virtually none in the higherranks. Those soldiers who remained onthe Bolshevist side after the revolutiondispersed for the most part.48

In February and March 1918, units ofthe Estonian division � in co-operationwith the Germans � helped liberate thelater proclaimed Estonian Republic, but inMarch the German military administra-tion disarmed the Estonian units; onlybadly armed militias remained.49

The Lithuanians did not do any bet-ter. In January 1918, a Lithuanian battal-ion deserted to the Germans in the Rovnoarea in the Ukraine. Until August, theGermans used this battalion for garrisonduties, but then sent it to Lithuania, where

it was immediately disbanded.50 The Ger-man authorities did not approve of aformation of the Lithuanian self-protec-tion units. As the Latvians were consid-ered to be the most radical, all men fitfor service that had been in the Russianarmy were brought into prison camps.51

The Latvian light-infantry units whichwere distributed across all of Russia wereof greatest importance at the front of theRussian Civil War. To a certain degree,this was also true of the Estonian Soviet-units. These units showed extraordinarybravery, discipline, and sense of respon-sibility in the fulfilment of military tasksunder the command of their own offic-ers. They also very much differed fromthe revolutionary Russian units, that � forthe most part � were very undisciplined.52 Some Latvian and Estonian officers thatwere cast away in Russia were also ap-pointed to highest position in the armedforces of Soviet Russia. They commandedbrigades, divisions, armies and even armygroups and fronts.53 The Latvian Colo-nel Joachims Vacietis was even in com-mand of the whole armed forces during

critical times.54 Latvian units held the frontand won the battles of Kasan�j, Orla,Perekop and others, that decided the out-come of the Civil War.55 Military observ-ers of the Entente and Germany acknowl-edged the importance of the Latvian unitsand tried to win them over. All of them,however, made a crucial mistake becausethey regarded the Latvians as mercenariesthat would fight in the name of anythingfor money, but they did not promise in-dependence and social justice.56 TwoLatvian regiments and a Lithuanian bat-talion nonetheless fought for the allies inthe Far East, where they sustained heavylosses, while the Estonian legion played arole in Northern Russia.

When the German Empire collapsed,the national governments of Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania had the chance tostart their work. Although Soviet Russiahad given up the Baltics in the Treatiesof Berlin and Brest-Litovsk, its govern-ment nonetheless tried to re-conquer themafter Germany�s breakdown.

World War I was over. The right ofself-determination for the people had been

120

declared, and the League of Nations hadbeen founded. But several small states,among them the Baltic States, still had tofight hard to protect their independence.The Baltic States were dragged into theconflict between the communist and anti-communist powers, into the imperialis-tic contest of several states and into theattempts by the communist and anti-com-munist Russian governments to get theBaltic States under their control again.57

The proclamation of the independenceof the Baltic States was not sufficient. TheBaltic States had to use their own armedforces in order to defend their nationalinterests. The leaders of the Baltic Stateshad to experience that the Western pow-ers ignored the right of self-determina-tion that they themselves had declared58

and that they only took advantage of theBaltic States in their own national inter-est and in order to get support for theanti-communist forces in Russia. Moreo-ver, these leaders did not get any promiseof a future independence of the Balticpeople.59 The democratic government ofGermany, which approved of the Baltic

independence in principle, was too weakto influence the huge administrationaland military machinery, which for themost part was led or influenced by peo-ple that were in favour of imperialism.Some of the German revolutionary forceson their part sympathized with or wasagainst any continuation of the waragainst Soviet Russia in the interest ofthe Entente. The latter did not promiseany support for Germany�s victims norjust any kind of alleviation in the peacetreaty.60 The eighth and tenth Germanarmies were supposed to defend the Bal-tic region until the Baltic States would beable to defend themselves. But war-wearyand influenced by Bolshevik propaganda,they retreated to the German borders anddispersed.61 The voluntary units that tooktheir place got under the influence ofpolitically short-sighted and reactionarypeople. After some successful battles againstthe Bolshevik forces that threatened notonly the Baltic States but also Germany,these people manoeuvred the voluntaryunits into the fight against the anti-com-munist forces in the Baltic States. The best

example was the Battle of Cesis (Wenden)in June 1919 against the Estonian andLatvian troops. The German armies couldhave gained the status of liberators of theBaltic States, as it had happened in Fin-land. But instead they earned the eternalhatred and suspicion of Estonia and Latvia.If the Battle of Cesis had ended with avictory of the German troops, this wouldhave been reason enough for an occupa-tion of whole Germany by the armies ofthe Entente. We have to emphasize that theattack on the Estonian and Latvian troopswas made although the German commandhad given contrary orders. A disadvanta-geous outcome of the Battle at Cesis wouldhave exposed the Baltic States to a com-plete pincer movement by the Bolsheviks.But the national forces won, and the Ger-man reputation was severely damaged.62

All of the above shows that the BalticStates could not rely on any declarations.They really needed their own armed forces.Similarly, a strong co-operation was es-sential.

When World War I was coming to anend, only Estonia was practically able to

121

form a small army in a short period oftime. The largest part of the forces, in-cluding the commanding ranks, had sur-vived, but they were lacking arms andmoney. The German help was very reluc-tant and small. The support by the Brit-ish fleet and the Finns was most impor-tant, but nevertheless the Estonians hadto rely mainly on their own abilities, theirresourcefulness and their toughness.63

The majority of the Latvian soldierswere in Russia or in the German Pris-oner of War camps. The Latvian troopsthat were in Russia were supporting So-viet Latvia and were opposing the Latviannational government. The Russian Sovietgovernment did this. At that time, theCommander-in-Chief of the armed forcesof Soviet Russia was the Latvian ColonelJoachims Vacietis, who was a Latvian pa-triot, but still was loyal to Russia�s Sovietgovernment, hoping to find support forLatvia�s independence there.64 At first,there were no soldiers, no weapons, andno money in Latvia. There was a very radi-cal atmosphere among the population,who had suffered tremendously during

the war. This situation was aggravated bythe negative attitude of the leaders of theGerman civilian government and of themajority of the military commanders to-wards Latvian independence and the crea-tion of the national Latvian forces. Thesepeople were still influenced by imperial-istic and colonial ideas.65

In Lithuania, the military units werebetter preserved, but they did not haveany qualified officers, weapons, or money.As Lithuania was right on the Russian-German border and as Germany as well asLithuania was in conflict with Poland, theGerman government agreed upon a par-tial support of the state of Lithuania. Thissupport dropped when Lithuania madeofficial claims for the Memelregion.66

All Baltic States were economically ex-tremely weakened. Furthermore, Latviaand, to a large extend, Lithuania were verymuch destroyed. Financial and economicsupport by the Western powers was verysmall and came under very unfavourableconditions. Weapons and other armamentsmaterial delivered were mostly worn outand damaged.67

The Baltic States, that were virtuallyforeign to one another, started some kindof diplomatic co-operation, especiallyLatvia, Estonia and Finland, whereasLithuania was only partially involved. Butthe newly formed military forces oper-ated independently from one another.68

Yet, some remarkable examples of co-operation should be mentioned as theyalways ended with important military orpolitical victories that gave the states in-volved the same advantages and sense ofsecurity. The co-operation between theEstonian and the Latvian Northern Armyin the battles at Cesis and Jugla (Jegel) inJune and July 1919 should be especiallymentioned, although the neutrality of theLatvian Southern Group, which was un-der German control, was a negative fac-tor.69 The Estonian army also covered andprotected a part of the Latvian border inthe East until December 1919. In the sum-mer of 1919, it actively took part in thefights against the Bolshevik forces that werethreatening Latvia.70 The Lithuanian armyon its part held its ground against theBermont Army without any Estonian or

122

Latvian support for a long time and fi-nally defeated it. This was in the interestof all Baltic States.71 Unfortunately, onehas to point out the belated co-operationbetween the Latvian and Lithuanian ar-mies in November 1919 in this connec-tion. The Lithuanians are not really toblame for their late involvement becausethey had to fear a possible aggression bythe Polish troops.72 Despite the fact thatPoland did not recognize an independ-ent Lithuania, but was aiming at a Polish-Lithuanian Union, Poland promised notto take advantage of Lithuania�s situationduring the threat by Bermont. Its armyeven protected the Eastern border ofLithuania, while the largest part of Lithua-nia�s troops was involved in fights withBermont.73 The co-operation between theLatvian and Polish armies during the of-fensive in January 1920 against the Sovietforces was very successful. We have to stressthat Poland was the only big state thatdid not demand any payment for itshelp.74

To be historically true, we must alsoemphasize that Germany, whose voluntary

units liberated Western Latvia, helpedwith the formation of new Latvian troopsfrom January until May 191975 and sup-ported the Lithuanian army just as long,did not receive any compensation.76

The fundamental help for Estonia bythe English fleet from December 1918until January 1920 has to be mentionedas well as the support by English andFrench naval units during the fights ofthe Latvian army against the BermontArmy in October and November 1919.The presence of the British fleet itself wassome kind of a guarantee and moral sup-port for the independence fighters in theBaltic States.77

The Russian Soviet government, who -at the beginning of the invasion � hadtolerated the formation of military forcesby the Soviet governments in Latvia,Lithuania, and Estonia for political rea-sons, later tolerated their disintegrationbecause of new political considerationsand made peace with the national gov-ernments of the Baltic States. The real rea-son for this disintegration of the Baltic

Soviet troops was the violent and shortsighted politics of the Soviet governmentand the aversion of the troops themselvesto fight against national forces. The larg-est part of the Baltic soldiers mobilizedby the Soviets found ways of going overto the national forces in order to con-tinue their fight together with them.78

Viewed in its entirety, another nega-tive factor was the insignificant mutualdemands by the Baltic States to correctthe borderlines that were a disadvantageto the common military and politicaloutline.79 However, the Baltic States wereable to solve their problems rather early,in 1920 and 1921.

During the wars of liberation of theBaltic States, only two attempts were madeto consolidate the action of the armedforces. English General Frank. G. Marchinitiated the first one on the 26th of Au-gust 1919. The anti-Bolshevik troops ofGeneral Judeniè, the Estonian and Latviantroops, the anti-Bolshevik Russian-Ger-man troops of Bermont as well as thePolish and the Lithuanian armies were

123

supposed to start a common offenceagainst the Bolshevik troops.80 The sec-ond attempt, initiated by British GeneralArthur J. Turner, was made on the 6th ofJanuary 1920 and was supposed to createa military alliance among the Baltic States.Representatives of the Estonian, Latvian,and Lithuanian armies agreed in Valka(Walk) upon regular meetings and thestandardization of war material, but apolitical agreement or a war alliance didnot follow this meeting in Valka. Thepolitical leaders of the Baltic States missedthe unique chance to gain greater secu-rity and international prestige for theirstates.81

After initial misjudgement of what washappening and short apathy in the his-tory of the wars of liberation, one couldwitness a spontaneous growth and morestrength among the national forces. A clearexample is the formation of a nationalarmy in Latvia.82 Estonia showed thegreatest stability. Latvia showed the samelevel of stability after it had overcomedifficulties that originated from outer andinner negative forces. There was less sta-

bility in Lithuania. The interference inpolitics by the army often created dan-gerous situations that could have endedwith a catastrophe.83 Latvia and partlyEstonia, too, were negatively influencedby the integration of a part of their troopsinto the Latvian and Estonian Soviet di-visions of Russia. However, these divi-sions, which fought at the heart of theRed Army and won crucial victories overanti-Soviet Russian forces that were averseto an independence of the Baltic States,indirectly helped to secure the independ-ence of the Baltic States.84 Yet, one has tokeep in mind that the Baltic States had tofear an attack by Soviet Russia throughthe period of their independence. The So-viet government was only waiting for theright moment to consolidate its powerin the Baltic States. Such favourable con-ditions developed in 1939/1940 and thenagain in 1944/1945.

Though poorly armed and their ac-tions often impeded by foreign politi-cians, the armies of all three Baltic Stateswere enormously successful on the bat-tlefield.

At the end of the war, the Estoniannational army consisted of 74.500 menand had 39 gun batteries, 10 tank platoons,eight armoured vehicles, 28 aircrafts and10 warships. During the war of libera-tion, the Estonian army lost 3.588 soldiers(2.236 of them fell at the front) and had13.775 injured.85 The Latvian army had �at the end of the war � 76.394 men, 91pieces of heavy artillery, 707 light andheavy machineguns, five tank platoons,eight armoured vehicles, five tanks and19 aircrafts. It lost 3.046 men and had4.085 injured.86 At the time, the Lithua-nian army had 60.000 men in four divi-sions and three cavalry regiments, 48 piecesof heavy artillery, 450 heavy machineguns,four armoured vehicles, one armouredrailway train, and 18 aircrafts. During thewar, Lithuania lost 614 men, another 822died after their injuries. There were 1.175injured and 154 invalids. 87 In World WarI, the Latvians had lost about 35.000 men,the Lithuanians approximately 15.000. Theexact number for Estonia is not known.During the Russian civil war, the Latvianslost at least 20.000 men. The Estonian casu-

124

alties were high in number, as well. Lithua-nians also fought in the British andAmerican units that fought for the En-tente in Siberia.

This overview shows the military spiritand the absent fear of death among theBaltic people. It also shows that, becauseof the unfavourable geographic situationand the historical conditions, the Balticslost a great part of their �national strength�in the battle for the interests of foreignpowers, without gaining a real advantagefor their own states. Considering the overallpolitical and military situation as well asthe conditions that were unfavourable forthe independence of the Baltic States, onehas to say that the Baltic politicians andtheir military leaders were very successfuland showed extraordinary competence insecuring the independence of the BalticStates. Their co-operation could have beenmore extensive, but we have to admit thatthe Baltic States were not really able tohelp one another as they all had to sufferfrom the collapse of the economy thatthe World War I and the exploitation bythe occupying powers had brought about.

The Situation of the Baltic Statesafter the War of Liberation

In the first decade of independence,the leaders of the Baltic States were some-what optimistic about their military situ-ation. They had full confidence in theLeague of Nations and believed that thepeople of the world seriously wanted peaceafter the extraordinarily destructive andbloody World War I. They also were fullyconfident not only about the treaties made,but also about the self-interest of the greatpowers, which would not allow for onestate or a bloc of states to gain controlover the Baltic States.88

The leaders of the Baltic States did eve-rything imaginable to foster peace, over-all co-operation and disarmament. Theynot only signed, but also ratified all in-ternational treaties that had these goals.89

It was not the fault of the Baltic States,but because of the egoistic interests ofthe great powers that all these treaties re-mained not more than paper and werenot brought to full life.

In their resistance to the Soviet Unionand, later, to Nazi Germany, the BalticStates defended the goals of the League ofNations and remained their members upto the last day of their independence.90

The political leaders of the Baltic Statestried to forget that they had not beenaccepted into the League of Nations in1920 only because the other states fearedthat due to their prominent geographi-cal situation, they might have to helpdefend the independence of these states.91

In 1921, at last, the majority of the mem-bers of the League of Nations had thecourage to accept the Baltic States intotheir number.92 The lack of a commonspirit and courage was typical of the ac-tions of the League of Nations during itsentire existence. It was paralyzed by theexaggerated egotism of its member statesand by the lacking intention to seriouslyco-operate and support peace. The mem-bers soon realized that they had to relyonly on their moral, economic and mili-tary power. Thus, the smaller states alwaysemphasized their complete neutrality incases of conflicts.

125

The hopes that the League of Nationswould guarantee the Baltic States� inde-pendence got smaller. Yet, the leaders ofthese states believed the victorious pow-ers of World War I would be able to main-tain their leadership position for a longtime and that it was in their interest tosupport the independence of the BalticStates, directly or indirectly.93

But the Baltic States were mistaken inthis respect, as well. They viewed with con-cern the disagreement among the UK,France, the USA, Japan and Italy as well astheir economic and even military compe-tition and their lacking co-operation.However, the two biggest potential threatsto the Baltic independence, Germany andthe Soviet Union, were weak due to warand revolution, a fact that somewhat less-ened these worries. Until 1933, the BalticStates even saw a democratic Germany as aguarantor of the independence.94

The gigantic neighbour in the East, theSoviet Union, caused the greatest concern.Although the Baltic States did everythingto give the Soviet Union convenient us-age of their ports in order to build eco-

nomic ties with them, it was clear that theloss of the Baltic coasts was very painful,not only because of political prestige, butalso for practical reasons. The Gulf of Fin-land, which also meant the Russian partof the Baltic Sea, was covered with ice forsix to seven months of the year. Duringthese months, the navy as well as the mer-chant fleet of Russia were captives of theice and they could not be stationed inthe ports of the Baltic States. It was veryinconvenient for a great power to be de-pendent upon the small Baltic States forthe transport of goods, especially as it reallyhad to fear that these states might soonbe under the influence of hostile greatpowers or power blocs.95

Another concern was the aims of theworld revolution declared by the SovietUnion. A seventh of the Latvian popula-tion as well as a large number of the Esto-nians and Lithuanians had remained in theSoviet Union. Among these Baltics, theflames of hate against the democratic gov-ernments of the Baltic States were fannedand the Communist Information Bureau(COMINFORM) supported by the Soviet

Union as well as Baltic organizations inRussia repeatedly promised the re-intro-duction of the soviet system in the BalticStates by revolutionary means. 96

Spies, saboteurs and political agitatorswere continuously pouring across theborders of the Soviet Union into theBaltic States. This could not lead to goodrelationships between the Baltic States andthe Soviet Union, although the latter hadbeen the first one to recognize the inde-pendence of the Baltic States and hadwaived all claims to their territory.97

The Baltic States� fear of the SovietUnion was later somewhat calmed by thefact that the most extreme groups wereremoved and those in power wanted toavoid wars as long as the social system wasnot consolidated and the armed forceswere not ready for an offensive.98

The growing military power of NaziGermany was a real concern as well as itsaggressive ideology and its open effortsto expand which also were aimed at theBaltic States and Eastern Europe in gen-eral. From 1933 and onwards, militaryplanners in the Baltic States had to reckon

126

with an invasion from the East as well asfrom the West.

At least there was some hope that theneighbouring quarrelling powers wouldnot allow each other to take up its posi-tion in the Baltic region, but would ratherkeep it as a kind of a buffer zone betweeneach other, at least as long as they did notintend any open conflict.99

The self-destructing policy of the West-ern powers and the real, ideological, de-mographical, and military weakness ofPoland, the �fifth European great power�,created real concern among the leaders ofthe Baltic States during the last years be-fore World War II. In Latvia and Estonia,they did not fear any military conflictbetween Lithuania and Poland because ofthe Wilna conflict. Still, the latter was asenseless hindrance to a political and mili-tary co-operation of all small states situ-ated between Germany and the SovietUnion and to a concept of some kind ofdefence system in an obviously hopelesssituation.100

During the first post-war years, Latviaand Estonia regarded the UK as its strong-

est ally, whereas Lithuania saw the samein Germany and Poland in France. To-wards the end of World War I, the Brit-ish were without doubt interested in asupport of the efforts undertaken by theBaltic States to reach independence inorder to weaken their enemy, Germany.Moreover, they wanted to create possiblylong-lasting chaos for their potential com-petitor Russia, no matter whether it wasBolshevik or anti-Bolshevik.101 Later, theUK supported the Baltic States only toprevent the Soviet Union from invadingEurope through their territory and inorder to tie them to itself economically.

From the point of view of the UK,the Baltic States were too far away, geo-politically too endangered and economi-cally too unimportant. British militarybases in the Baltic region would have beenin constant danger. They would have beenright in the border zone of Russia andGermany, far away from the British Isles,and their access would have been verycomplicated because of the �closed� char-acter of the Baltic Sea. The missing agree-ment among the Baltic States also pre-

vented the possibility of a far-reachingco-operation.102

Representatives of the UK admonishedthe Baltic as well as the Scandinavian Statesrepeatedly during the first post-war yearsto build closer political and military con-nections, but all in vain. It did not onlyseem to be unwise, but also dangerous tomake treaties of military support withseveral small states that did not get alongwith one another.103 The British did notwant to get involved in the meaninglessquarrels among the Baltic States, but theyused them, especially Estonia, as recon-naissance base against the Soviet Union.104

After the emergence of the Third Reichof the Nazis, the British were aiming at aconfrontation between the latter and theSoviet Union, hoping both totalitarianpowers would destroy each other with-out the UK getting involved.105 When itgot fully clear that the German policy wasmore dangerous for the Western powersthan the Soviet Union, the UK reluctantlyapproached the Soviet Union shortly be-fore the war to induce Germany to cometo an agreement with the Western pow-

127

ers. In this connection, the idea of a guar-antee for the Baltic States was initiated bythe Soviet Union. This suggestion wasdangerous for the Baltic States due to sev-eral suspicious conditions. The UK andFrance were virtually not able to giveguarantees for the Baltic States as Germanylay between them.106

The interest of France in the BalticStates was different from The British. Bothpowers were political and economic com-petitors. As long as Germany did not godirectly against the UK economically, thelatter was interested in a relatively strongGermany as a useful business partner.However, it was France�s interest to keepthe weakened Germany down as long aspossible and to build up a group of newallies under the leadership of an enlargedand strengthened Poland east of Germanyreplacing of Russian, which was lost as anally. Moreover, France tried to get backthe enormous amounts of money investedin Russia by putting pressure on thestate.107 Should it have been possible tocome to a direct agreement with Germanyor the Soviet Union, France was prepared

to leave Poland and the other East Euro-pean states to their fate.108

Nevertheless, there was some exchangeof information between the general staffsof France and the Baltic States. SeveralLatvian officers were trained at Frenchmilitary academies, and most of the Latvianwar ships were built in France.109 But thatwas all.

In the first post-war years, Latvia andEstonia refused to enter a military alli-ance with Poland as long as the latter didnot settle the conflict with Lithuania in away that satisfied both states. Because ofthat, Latvia and Estonia were not evenindirectly integrated into the French sys-tem of military alliances.110

Latvia and Estonia did not directly co-operate with Germany militarily, but theGerman military literature and Germanmilitary know-how were used to a largeextent.

Lithuania had close connections withGermany for some time concerning mili-tary supply and the qualification of high-ranking officers.111 For a long time, Ger-many and the Soviet Union played Lithua-

nia off politically against Poland. AlthoughLithuania felt safe from further aggressionsby Poland because of its co-operation withthose ones, Germany and the Soviet Un-ion did not help Lithuania re-gain theWilna area nor did they plan to protectLithuania from potential furtheraggressions by Poland. Germany�s onlyintention in case of a Polish attack was totake back the Memel region that it hadlost to Lithuania in the Treaty of Ver-sailles.112 The aggressiveness of Nazi Ger-many in the question of re-gaining theMemel region put an end to the close mili-tary co-operation between Germany andLithuania.113 With the Soviet Union,Lithuania did not maintain any militaryco-operation at all. It only bought a cer-tain number of expensive field guns.114 Asthe Western powers were not interested inan obligation to defend the East Europeanstates and the League of Nations was not asafeguard for safety and peace, the onlyoption was a regional military bloc. Therewere two realistic possibilities: a neutralNordic bloc of the Scandinavian and Bal-tic States, or a defensive alliance of all states

128

from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Seathat had a common border with the So-viet Union.115

To the Baltic States, a Scandinavian-Baltic bloc seemed to be the best solu-tion. This bloc would have been situatedcompletely north of the Central Europeanarea of conflict between Germany and theSoviet Union, and the problems concern-ing territory between Poland and Ruma-nia on the one hand and the Soviet Un-ion on the other would not have affectedit directly either. But the politicians ofthe Scandinavian states were of the opin-ion that the Soviet Union would soontry to take up its position on the Balticcoasts again and thus absolutely refusedto enter into any kind of connectionswith the Baltic States. The Scandinavianstates felt quite safe in their isolation as apeninsula and in their long-lasting tradi-tion of neutrality.116 Therefore, Finlandand the Baltic States had only one op-tion, to come to an agreement among eachother and to find a better solution. Until1922, the orientation towards the BalticStates was predominant in Finland; then

its orientation shifted towards Scandina-via. Finland�s politicians regarded theBaltic States as more endangered than theirown state. Finland is so far up north thatit cannot have the linking function thatis so characteristic of the Baltic States.Historically and politically, Russia hadconsidered Finland to be an autonomousentity already previously. Moreover, itwould not see the crucial necessity of hav-ing bases in Finland if it could have themin the Baltics. In case of a war, the Gulf ofFinland, which separates these states fromFinland, would have made an alliance withthe Baltic States difficult. The united na-vies of Finland and the Baltic States werealso too weak to keep the strong Sovietnavy in the Eastern part of the Gulf. Butespecially, the Finns feared a co-operationwith Poland, which they regarded as a dan-ger to their security. That is why Finlandwanted to get as close as possible to theneutral Scandinavian bloc and refused toco-operate militarily with the BalticStates.117 Only Finnish military observerstook part in general staff meetings of theBaltic States and Poland in the 1920s and

the beginning 1930s. The highest officersof Finland, Estonia and Latvia visited eachother several times and observed militarymanoeuvres. In individual cases, Estoniaand Latvia took advantage of the lately cre-ated Finnish armaments industry.118 Exceptfor Lithuania, the Baltic States did not makeuse of the highly developed Swedish arma-ments industry. Economic considerationswere the reason. Sweden did not need theproducts of the Baltics; thus, the expen-sive weapons and ammunition would havehad to be paid cash, which the Baltic Statescould not afford because of their financialdifficulties. The British as well as the Frenchdemanded that the Baltic States should buyweapons and ammunition primarily fromtheir states if they wanted to sell their goodsin the UK and France. However, mostlyused and very old weapons were sold tothe Baltic States. In case of a war, therewould have been no hope of securing acontinuous supply with spare parts andammunition from these countries. The traf-fic with Sweden was much less disturbedand safer.119

For military protection, the BalticStates either had to join together or they

129

had to seek co-operation with the strong-est neighbour of the Soviet Union, Po-land, and its ally, Rumania. Such co-opera-tion would have dragged the Baltic Statesautomatically into the Polish border dis-putes with Germany and the Soviet Un-ion, and further into the conflicts in theBalkans and the border disputes of Ruma-nia and the Soviet Union. On the outside,Poland was a big and powerful state, buton the inside, it was unstable and weak. Alarge part of the Polish territory was notethnically Polish, especially along the bor-der with the Soviet Union. Only two thirdsof Poland�s population were Polish, therest was composed of the Ukrainians,White-Russians, Germans, Lithuanians andJews. Only five percent of Poland�s borderwas common with friendly Rumania. Withthe latter, Poland did not even maintainvery close relations although a militaryconvention had been concluded. Every-where else Poland bordered the hostilestates: Germany, the Soviet Union, andLithuania, with all of which it had borderdisputes. The border with really neutralLatvia was 106 km long. The latter had been

Poland�s ally during the wars of liberation.But Poland�s action against Lithuania,whose historical capital and wide borderareas it had occupied in 1920, as well as thethreat posed to the Lithuanian independ-ence in general and the territorial claimsagainst Latvia forced it to avoid closer re-lations with this state.120

Theoretically, Lithuania and Polandwere even at war and in 1926, and Lithua-nia was the only one of the Westernneighbours of Russia to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the USSR.121 Po-land protected Lithuania against a pos-sible attack by the Soviets with its terri-tory that was stretched towards the northalong Lithuania. But the military lead-ers of the Baltic States did not have ahigh opinion of the big Polish armybecause of its old-fashioned organization.From a strictly practical point of view,Estonia would have been willing to ap-proach Poland, but Latvia as Lithuania�sneighbour refused to do so. Because ofLatvia�s opposition, the project of a mili-tary alliance between Estonia, Latvia andPoland failed.122

There were only two alternatives left: amilitary union of Estonia, Latvia andLithuania; and the union Estonia-Latvia.For many years, Lithuania demanded thata military union of the Baltic States bepointed mainly against Poland. But Latviaand Estonia rejected this demand. Polandcould have been the only source of some-what reliable support against an attack byGermany or the Soviet Union. Until 1933,Lithuania was also little interested in acloser union of the Baltic States as it re-garded Germany and the Soviet Union asnatural allies against Poland, whichLithuania considered to be its main en-emy.123

A military union of Estonia and Latviawas the only option left. And so it was;but this union was not a very importantfact, as we will see later.124 In the long lineof neighbours of the USSR, each stateconsidered itself to be less endangered thanthe others for some reasons. For each stateits own, often egoistic, interests were moreimportant than the common ones. Thefeeling of a common destiny and a com-mon region was still poorly developed.

130

Latvia�s Military Situation

After the overview of the indeed un-friendly general situation, we have to takea closer look at the military conditionsin each of the Baltic States. Latvia(65.791,4 km2) was the largest of the Bal-tic States; it was situated in the middle ofthis group of states. With regard to popu-lation (1939: 2.001.900), it was in the sec-ond place. The common border (1939)with the friendly Estonia was 374,6 kmlong (19,94%), the one with the hostileSoviet Union 351,3 km (18,66%). Thecommon border with Poland was 105,9km long (5,64%), and the one withfriendly Lithuania 570,4 km (30,3%). Thecoast was 479 km long (25,46%), whichone fourth of the overall length.125 Anynatural obstacles, disregarding small riv-ers, lakes, marshland, and small woodlands,did not protect this state boundary. Incase of an invasion by the Soviets, thedefence was planned to really start in themiddle of the state, along the line Pededze,Lake Lubahn and Aiviekste (Ewst), an area

with broad marshlands and large woodedareas and further along the Düna, whichwould also have been an important natu-ral hindrance in case of a German inva-sion.126

Concerning food and clothing, Latviawas self-sufficient. But it was completelydependent on foreign states for fuel andheating, disregarding the large supply ofwood and the electrification started in thelast years of Latvia�s independence. Latvia�sindustry was the most developed of allBaltic States. The metallurgical industry,the car-parts industry, precision engineer-ing, the manufacture of appliances andinstruments (e.g. the world�s smallest cam-era �Minox�), aircraft and ship construc-tion in Riga and Liepaja and the arsenalin Riga have to be named. The latter builtguns, machine guns as well as infantry-and artillery-ammunition. Latvia also pro-duced mines and anti-submarine weap-ons.127

75% of Latvia�s population wereLatvians, the rest was made of several na-tionalities who were represented only insmall percentages (1938): 10,6% Russians,

4,8% Jews, 3,2% Germans, 2,5% Polish,1,4% White Russians, further Lithuanians,Estonians and others. The minorities hada complete cultural autonomy and in theLatvian army their sense for Latvian citi-zenship was strengthened.128 The Latvianarmy was comprised of 2.200 officers and23.000 sergeants and other ranks in 1938.The yearly draft of troops was about 13.500men, but it decreased during the last yearsof independence. The police had onlyabout 3.100 men, the border guard hadabout 100 officers and 1.100 men. Onlythe militia reached 35.000 men. Accord-ing to the US information, the trainedreserves had about 17.000 men, whereasthe untrained reserves were 20.000. Intheory, Latvia could deploy an army of200.000 men, but in reality only 130.000to 180.000 could be armed. In times ofpeace, 10 out of 1.000 inhabitants ofLatvia were members of the armed forces,the ratio for the militia was 28 out of1.000 citizens. These figures changed fromyear to year, of course. Latvia was dividedinto 15 defence regions. During the lastyears of independence, the troops were

131

supposed to be mobilised within threedays (i.e. 72 hours).

In times of peace, the armed forces hadfour infantry divisions, which comprised12 infantry regiments and one cavalryregiment. Each infantry division had onefield artillery regiment. The Infantry Regi-ments 1, 2 and 3 and the Courland Artil-lery Regiment belonged to the First Di-vision, whose headquarters was in Liepaja(Liebau). The Second Division consistedof the Infantry Regiments 4, 5 and 6 aswell as the Livonian Artillery Regiment.This division�s headquarters was in Riga.The Third Division consisted of the In-fantry Regiments 7, 8 and 9 and theZemgal Artillery Regiment. The FourthDivision had the Infantry Regiments 10,11 and 12, the Cavalry Regiment and theLettgal Artillery Regiment. Its headquar-ters was in Daugavpils (Dünaburg). TheTechnical Division consisted of the Engi-neer Regiment, the Tank Regiment (laterthe motorized brigade), the Air ForceRegiment, the Intelligence Unit, the TankPlatoon Regiment and the Coastal Artil-lery Regiment. The four field artillery regi-

ments mentioned above, the heavy artil-lery regiment, the anti-aircraft regiment,the special artillery section, the tank pla-toon regiment and the coastal artilleryregiment were under the control of theChief of Staff of the Artillery concern-ing the training, weapons and organisa-tion. The Staff Battalion, which corre-sponded to elite troops in other armies,was an independent unit. All naval forceswere united in a squadron under the com-mand of the Commander-in-Chief of theFleet.

In times of peace, an infantry regimenthad two battalions � 50 officers, 700 ser-geants and men, the enforced regimentshad three battalions � 80 officers, 1.220sergeants and other ranks. In case of a war,each regiment would have been enlargedup to three battalions. The weapons con-sisted of English Ross-Enfield M-14 guns,Lewis-light-machine-guns and Vickers-Bertier heavy machineguns, all with cali-bre 7,7 mm. The production of lightmachineguns of the type �Bren� had beenstarted in the state. They were more use-ful in combat. During the last years, the

regiments also received 47-mm Böhler anti-tank guns and 7-cm Skoda infantry guns.Further, they were equipped with 81-mmStoks minelayers. Each regiment had in-telligence and sergeant companies; somealso had bicycle and ski companies. Thecavalry regiment had five squadrons andone heavy machinegun squadron, the re-mount squadron, two bicycles squadronsand one battery, all together 1.200 horsesand 1.200 men, four cannons, English Lee-Enfield 7,7-carbines, Madsen lightmachineguns and Vickers heavymachineguns. During the experimentalstage, there also were bicycle battalionsand motorcycle companies that were in-tended to be army equipment in war.

Each artillery regiment had two unitswith two cannon batteries and one how-itzer battery; thus the whole regiment hadsix batteries with 24 cannons � six howit-zers. All regiments had English 18 (8,38cm) cannons and 4.5" (11,43 cm) howit-zers. English 13 (7,62 cm) and Russian 75mm (M-02) cannons were in reserves. Forwar times, three units (35 cannons) andone to two anti-aircraft batteries (four to

132

eight cannons), which was 40 to 44 can-nons altogether, was intended for each fieldartillery regiment.

The heavy artillery regiment consistedof three units, including the anti-aircraftbatteries that were separated into an inde-pendent anti-aircraft regiment. In the heavyartillery regiment, there at least 30 heavyguns � English line guns 47, Russian 42,English 18 Pound Port, English 6" andGermany 152 mm howitzers. Except forthe German howitzers, all guns were out-of-date. Out of the four platoons of theTank Platoon Regiments, three were inDaugavpils (Dünaburg) and one in Riga.With regards to material, six tank platoonsand 6" Canet ship guns were intended fortwo batteries of railway artilleries.

The overall firepower comprised: six10,5 cm, one 152 mm (6"), ten 77 mm ,three 12 pound howitzers and five 6" CanetGuns, two 38 mm anti-aircraft guns and36 heavy machineguns. In times of peace,the regiment had 40 officers and 245 ser-geants and other ranks.

In the sea fortress Daugavgriva(Dünamünde), the Coastal-Artillery Regi-

ment had five batteries (20 guns), onesearch light battery and one auxiliary ship.As weapons, they had Russian 3", 6"Vickers and 6" Canet Guns and one anti-aircraft battery. In times of peace, the regi-ment had 500 men. Moveable railroadbatteries were in preparation. The anti-aircraft regiment had 15 batteries � Rus-sian 3" (76-mm) and 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns. It had about 1.000 men. Anti-aircraft batteries were also formed for alldivisions, but the Third.

The Autotank-Regiment had six ar-moured vehicles, two heavy, one middle-weight and six light tanks as well as 18tankettes (a small tracked reconnaissancevehicle). Altogether six armoured vehiclesand 27 tanks. Moreover, it had 40 trans-port cars and 15 motorcycles. For timesof war, each division was supposed tohave three tankettes (21 altogether). In1938, the regiment was restructured intoa motorized brigade with five battalionsin three motorized groups. Furthermore,motorized anti-tank units were planned.

The engineer regiment consisted of twobattalions and 500 men, including the

bridge- and the pontoon-company. Theintelligence battalion had four companies.

The air force regiment had three units,100 to 150 aircrafts in three destroyersquadrons in Riga, one reconnaissancesquadron in Gulbene, one long distancereconnaissance squadron in Krustpils andone naval fighter wing in Liepaja.

The Latvian navy had one minelayergunboat, two minesweeper-minelayerboats, two submarines, one auxiliary sub-marine and some motorboats. A mine-layer yacht (3.000 tons), four submarinesand twelve hydroplanes were planned.There also was an observation system.

The border guard brigade had fivebattalions and one speedboat. The self-defence organisation was divided into 19self-defence regiments and consisted of cav-alry and motorcycle-units with a tankette,one railroad-self-defence regiment, oneaircraft-self-defence regiment as well as sev-eral self-defence units. 12.000 were in thisself-defence-organization, too. The aircraftself-defence had 24 aircrafts. In contrastto the other Baltic States, the self-defenceorganization in Latvia was not subordi-

133

nate to the Department of War, but tothe Social Department. Nevertheless, 150active officers and 100 sergeants workedfor the military training in the organiza-tion.129

Of all Baltic States, Latvia had the besttraffic network. In 1940, there were 1.880km of avenues, 9.621 km of first-class roads,7.625 cars, 4.321 motorcycles, 3,466 kmof railway tracks, 294 locomotives, 11motor wagons and 6.684 wagons. Further,there were three large seaports and severalsmall ones. In 1940, the Latvian merchantfleet had 89 steamers, 7 motor ships andseven sailing ships, altogether 103 shipswith 120.676 net tons. The civilian avia-tion system had a large number of train-ing and sport planes as well as two mid-dle-sized passenger aircrafts.130

For times of war, Latvia planned tooperate with 130.000 men in seven divi-sions, two regiments of special cavalrysquadrons, three motorized brigades,three to four bicycle battalions, three tofour special artillery units, and one fleet.A supplies division and one garrison unitwould have been in reserves.

Should the Soviet Union attack, onebattalion and one company of the Sev-enth Regiment in Vilaka and Liepna, onebattalion and two companies of the NinthRegiment in Ludza, Zilupe and Karsava,one battalion and one company of theTenth Regiment in Daugavpils, later inKârsava and Dagda, would have been de-fence units. Together with three to fourbattalions of the border guard and amounted battery these forces would havehad to defend a front line of 200 to 260km from the Estonian border to Piedrujaand Semgallen respectively. Thus, real de-fence was not planned, but just resistanceto stave off the enemy.

The Fourth and Third Division withthe First Cavalry Regiments, but withoutthe Infantry Regiment 12 and 8 were sup-posed to cover the mobilization of theforces and the occupation of the defenceline Malupe � Pededze � Litene � Lubana� Varaklani � Livani � Dauavpils and towithdraw to the line Pededze � LakeLubana � Krustpils. They were supposedto accomplish that by following the Esto-nian troops with their left wing and � in

their centre - by using the natural defenceline in the marshland around the LakeLubana and the widespread forests in thenorth. Should the Fourth Division stillbe able to move east if necessary, the com-mand of the Third Division could easilylose connection to the Regiments 7 and 8that were further north. To subordinatethese regiments to the Third Division afterthe arrival of the First and Second Divi-sion at the front would have been veryproblematic. A retreat of the Fourth Di-vision along the left bank of the Daugavainto the area of the Aiviekste would havebeen highly alarming, too. The SecondDivision was supposed to operate east ofRezekne. The fourth mobilization planhad three prepared alternatives: A, D, andK. Alternative A intended a deploymentof armed forces for a defence against anattack by the Soviet Union, whereas op-tion D planned the same if Germany at-tacked. Alternative K consisted of simul-taneous defence against the Soviet Unionand Germany.

Option A had been worked out in alldetails; option D had been prepared rela-

134

tively thoroughly. Option K was onlyoutlined in rudiments as a co-operationbetween Nazi Germany and the SovietUnion appeared to be hardly imaginable.

According to option A, the mainforces should be deployed on the lineSkrudaliena-Lielborna-Izvalta-Andrupene-Kaunata-Stocerova-Berzgale-Nautreni-(Rogovka)-Tilþa-marshes north of Tilza-Kuprova-Liepna-Pededze River, withother troops covering them. After thisdeployment, the following was planned:either a defence on this line, an offensivein order to re-gain the third of Lettgalllost during the mobilization or a retreatto the line of the Lake Lubahn in orderto prepare the decisive defence battle. TheFirst Division Group (three divisions)would have operated on the right andthe Second Division Group (two divi-sions) on the left. The border betweenthese two division groups would havebeen the northern bank of the LakeLubahn-Karsava. The Supreme Com-mander would have had two divisions inthe areas of Madona, Barkava, Lubana andCesvaine at his disposal. Each division

would have received one unit of heavyartillery and a certain number of recon-naissance flight hours. Positions were sup-posed to be taken by the fifth day ofmobilization, which seems to have beentoo optimistic.

Option D comprised the defenceagainst Germany. The main idea was todeploy the armies some kilometres northof the southern border of the state asprotection by the Lithuanian army wasexpected. Plans for cover did not exist,but those for fortification did. The forceswere supposed to operate in two divisiongroups, whereas the cover units shouldremain at the eastern border.

Option K existed only in outlines. Threedivisions were supposed to operate towardsthe south, four towards the east.

After the ceding of military to theSoviet Union in 1939, a fifth mobiliza-tion and defence plan was worked out,but now a defence of the state was almostimpossible. According to options A andD of plan 4, a further defence of theDaugava line was provided for. In case ofan attack by the Soviet Union, a further

retreat to Lithuania and a following in-ternment in Germany was planned.131

Neither Latvia nor the other Baltic Statesbelieved that each single one on its ownor all together would have to fight with-out any support by a great power. Thishope was partly based on active supportby one or the other great power. Treatiesor even plans, however, for such a co-operation did not exist with any greatpower, not even with neighbouring Po-land. Military observers of the great pow-ers classified the Latvian armed forces tobe behind the Finnish and Estonian forcesregarding the degree of readiness. Soldiersand line officers were considered to begood to very good. Their endurance andcourage were praised, but brutality thathad been supposedly noticed was criti-cized. The assessment of higher officerswas altogether bad, with some remarkableexceptions. Reasons were old age, insuffi-cient training, lacking initiative and bu-reaucracy. Regarding supply and weapons,Latvia�s army was considered to be betterthan Estonia�s, but worse than Lithuania�s.In the opinion of the US observers, the

135

divisions that would have had to be de-ployed after the beginning of the warcould have moved to the front as late as30 to 60 days after the proclamation ofthe mobilization. Active divisions couldhave reached the front within 24 hours.The morale and composure of the Latvianarmy were rated high. Thus, success wasexpected not only in defensive, but alsoin offensive battles.132

The Military Situation in Estonia

Regarding the area (47.549 km2) andpopulation (1939: 1.133.917), Estonia wasthe smallest Baltic state, but its borderswere the longest. The common border withfriendly Latvia was 374,5 km (9,4%) long,the one with the hostile USSR 258 km(6,3%), of which 145 km went across the84 km long and 31 km broad Lake Peipsi,a further two km across the endangeredMehikoorma Strait and across the LakePleskau, which was hardly smaller than theLake Peipsi. The coastal border comprised1.159 km as the crow flies. Because of themany bays and 818 islands, the coastal

border was even 3.449 km long (84,3%).133

The section between the Gulf of Fin-land and the Lake Peipsi was relatively easyto protect, the Narva River being a natu-ral obstacle. The area north as well as southof the river is marshy and wooded. Onlya seven to eight km broad gap along theWest-East railroad and the avenue was eas-ily accessible for a potential enemy. Thechain of lakes made up by the Lake Peipsiand the Lake Pleskau was a great advan-tage. Regarding defence, the area southof the Lake Pleskau was less favourable,but not hopeless. The area is sandy andwithout any transport routes. In the mid-dle section, there was a deep valley in anorth-south direction that could be usedfor defence. The marshy and wooded areaof the Lida and Vruda Rivers extendedwidely. Should these positions be lost, theEstonian army could retreat to the linePjusa-Petseri-Pankjavitsa-Laura-Liepna, the9 km wide middle section between Petseriand Pankjavista being the most endan-gered. Furthermore, the Estonians couldretreat to the line Lake Võrtsjärv-EmajõgiRiver-Lake Peipsi. A defence of the long

coastal border was virtually impossible.The navy and the coast batteries alonecould defend Tallinn, which was also pro-tected by several islands. With the help ofthe Finnish fleet, Estonia could close offthe Gulf of Finland between Tallinn andPorkkala with a mine belt.134

Concerning food and clothing, Esto-nia was self-sufficient. Yet, the situationconcerning food was not as good as inLithuania or Latvia. Slate (about 5.500.00tons [sic]), out of which petrol and ma-chine oil were produced and which wasalso used as fuel, was an important natu-ral resource.

Regarding the ethnic composition ofthe population, Estonia was the mostuniform. 88,2% of the population wereEstonians, 8,2% were Russians, 1,5% Ger-mans, 0,7% Swedish, and 0,5% Latvians.135

Usually 0,98% to 1,2% of the populationwere in the armed forces. The number ofthose drafted was 12.000 men, but it de-creased in the last years. In earlier years,the armed forces consisted of 14.000 to17.000 men, but in 1938 there were only11.358 men (1.358 officers). The police

136

had 1.200 men, the border guard 1.200men, and the self-protection units 60,000men. According to the Intelligence Serv-ice of the USA, the total number of peo-ple organized, including police, borderguard and self-protection unit was 51.000men, including reserves 121.000 men andincluding untrained reserves 161.000 men(14,2% of the population). The whole statehad three defence districts (correspond-ing to the number of divisions in timesof peace) and eight defence counties (cor-responding to the number of brigades intimes of war).

In times of peace, the Estonian armyhad three infantry divisions. The staff ofthe First Division was in Rakvere andcomprised the defence counties Narva andVõru-Järva. The First Infantry Regiment,the Fourth and Fifth Infantry Battalion,the First and Second Artillery Group andtwo units of the Tank Platoon Regimentin Taps belonged to this division. Thestaff of the Second Division was locatedin Tartu (Dorpat). The defence countiesof Tartu, Petseri-Võru and Valga wereunder its command. The Seventh Infan-

try Regiment, the Second, Third andEighth Infantry Battalion, the PartisanBattalion Kuperjanov, the Cavalry Regi-ment, the Third and Fourth ArtilleryGroup and two tank platoons belongedto this division. The staff of the ThirdDivision was in Tallinn. The defence coun-ties Harju, Pärnu-Viljandi and Lääne-Saarebelonged to it. The Sixth, Ninth, andTenth Infantry Batallion and the PartisanBattalions Kaleva, Scouts and Sakala, theFifth Artillery Group, the Tank Regiment,the Engineer and Intelligence as well asthe Guard Battalion were in this division.At the beginning of 1940, the FourthDivision in Viljandi and Pärnu was cre-ated.

The First and Fourth Infantry Regi-ments were active units. Each regimenthad 2.000 men. The recruits were trainedin independent battalions that were sup-posed to be transformed into regimentsin case of war. Half of the staff and lineofficers of these regiments were alreadyactively serving. In case of war, there wouldhave been 14 infantry regiments, each onehaving 3.331 men (107 officers). In each

division, two brigades with two infantryregiments each were planned. The normalpersonnel strenght of a division in peace-time was 100 officers, 400 sergeants, and2.500 men. In peacetime, the regimentshad two battalions each; in wartime itwould have been three. The weapons ofthe infantry were outdated: Russian 7.62-mm-rifles from 1891, Madsen lightmachinegun, calibre 7,69 mm and Rus-sian Maxim heavy machinegun, calibre7,62 mm, from 1905 and 1910. There werealso English 7,7-mm Lewis lightmachineguns in reserve. The arsenal of theWar Department started to standardize thecalibre to 7,69 mm. Towards the end ofthe independence, the equipment of theinfantry was to be infantry guns and anti-tank weapons. Experiments with heavymortars, calibre 81 mm, with anti-tank riflesfrom Solothurn, with anti-tank cannonsfrom Bofors, calibre 37 mm, and withheavy anti-tank guns from Rheinmetallwere undertaken. In Võru and Narva, therewas one anti-tank battery.

The First Cavalry Regiment was inTartu. It had three sabres, one

137

machinegun, and one skiing and bicyclesquadron, one combat vehicle company(six armoured vehicles and six tankettes)as well as a technical unit. The weaponswere: English Ross-Enfield-Mid. 14 rifles,calibre 7,7 mm, six heavy machine guns,16 light machineguns and the weapons ofthe combat vehicles. In case of war, theregiment would have had to operate to-gether with Latvian units in the area ofLaura between Boberikova and Vöborka.As a quick retreat was planned for theLatvian army at the beginning of the war,the Estonian cavalry might have been ableto hold the connection between theLatvian and the Estonian armies. The FirstCavalry Regiment was the basis for theSecond, which would have been deployedin Tartu at the beginning of a war.

In the Estonian army, there were fiveartillery units. The first and the thirdgroup were active units. According to theLeague of Nations and to informationfrom the German defence, Estonia hadmore than 70 field guns and 60 heavyguns besides anti-aircraft guns and infan-try guns in 1938. The artillery was divided

into eleven field, six heavy and 17 coastguard batteries. The division-artillery wasorganized in artillery groups. The FirstDivision had the first artillery-group (fourbatteries) in Olgino and the second groupin Rakvere � heavy artillery and materialfor another four batteries. The third ar-tillery-group (with four active batteriesin Petseri) and the fourth group belongedto the Second Division � two batteries inTartu and one in Võru. The fifth artil-lery-group of the Third Division, withmaterial for four new batteries, was un-der the command of the Fourth Divi-sion that was to be created. In its place, anew, sixth group was created in Tallinn(Reval). This group was supposed to havetowing vehicles, which did not arrive bythe beginning of the war. Thus, old Rus-sian guns had to be used.

Each battery had four guns or howit-zers and 90 men (four officers) with 60horses in peacetime. Most guns were out-dated, Russian 76 mm guns from 1902,English 84 mm and French 76 mm can-nons, English light howitzers, calibre 114mm, Russian heavy 102 mm cannons from

Schneider (1910), English 102 mm, Ger-man 150 mm and Russian 152 mm howit-zers (the latter from Schneider, 1909).Horses were used to tow all guns. Towingvehicles were still in an experimental stage.

According to Estonian information,the coastal artillery had ten batteries: one30,48 cm (12") battery in Äigna, 20,32 cm(8") batteries in Suuropi and Viimsi, two152,4 mm batteries in Äigna, two inNaissaare, one in Suuropi and two 13 cmbatteries in Viimsi. The anti-aircraft artil-lery had three batteries with twelve guns,one searchlight and one chemical defencecompany.

In the last years, the tank regiment andthree tank and armoured vehicle compa-nies, one transport company, one train-ing company, and two batteries were de-ployed. One regiment had four old heavyEnglish tanks Mark V, twelve old lightRenault-17 tanks, six modern Polish TK 3tankettes, twelve self-made Crossley-Austinarmoured vehicles. In reserves, there wereseveral heavy armoured vehicles of the typeGarford. There were about 400 men. In1924, Estonia still had two tank platoon

138

regiments, later only one with 350 men.The regiment had one heavy broad-gaugearmoured railway-train with one 152 mm,two 119 mm, two 105 mm cannons andfour heavy-machine guns, two light broadgauge and one narrow-gauge armouredrailway-train, each having two 76 mm can-nons, eight heavy machineguns and sixlight machineguns.

The air force consisted of three airdivisions, in Rakvere, Tartu, and Tallinn,as well as of the sea-air division in Tallinnwith auxiliary units. Each division hadtwo reconnaissance squadron and onedestroyer squadron with nine aircrafts each,the sea-air division had one reconnaissancesquadron (six aircrafts) and one destroyersquadron (four aircrafts). Altogether, therewere 54 reconnaissance and 27 destroyeraircrafts as well as 10 sea aircrafts, together91 units, but 125 when counting the train-ing aircrafts. In 1937, there were 540 menin the air force.

The engineer battalion had three engi-neer companies, each single one havingone gas-war, railroad, search light, trans-port, work, training, and sergeant com-

pany. The intelligence battalion had threeintelligence and one sergeant company.

The base for the Estonian navy wasTallinn. The fleet comprised the Sea andthe Peipsi Division, the coastal artillery andthe garrison administration, altogether2.100 men (of whom 900 were in the coastalartillery). Initially, the fleet had two heavydestroyers, one torpedo boat, six gunboats(two on the Lake Peipsi), two minelayers,two mine boats, two patrol boats (one onthe Lake Peipsi), four icebreakers, threevehicles of the hydrographical service, fivetenders and one tug. The largest part ofthese ships was old and worn-out. Themaintenance of this fleet demanded tre-mendous resources.

In 1933, the Estonian government soldthe two heavy destroyers and agreed upona programme for the development of anew fleet. Two submarines, eight patrolboats, twelve torpedo boats and ten speed-boats were planned. As funds were scarce,the programme was cut down to two U-minelayers, four motortorpedoboats, andtwelve bombers. During the last years ofEstonia�s independence, the navy had two

submarines, four motortorpedoboats,four gunboats (two on the Lake Peipsi),two patrol boats (one on the Lake Peipsi),one customs cutter, five icebreakers, fourhydrographical ships, five tenders and onetug. Altogether the tonnage was 5.200tons, not including the icebreakers andthose ships that belonged to the sea routeadministration.136 The Estonian merchantfleet had 304 ships (143 steamboats, 60motor ships and motor sailing ships aswell as 101 sailing ships) with 214.000 reg-ister tons.137

In Tallinn, there was a large arsenal withunits for machineguns, artillery, optics,foundry, smithy, handguns, electronics,carpentry, leather goods, and much more.Ammunition for rifles and artillery wasproduced there, reserve grenades weretransferred and army rifles as well as lightand heavy machine-guns were producedfor the self-protection units.138

The number of cars in 1940 was 3.618;there were 2.476 trucks, 285 busses and1.401 motorcycles. Estonia had 195 steamand 22 electrical and motor locomotives,529 passenger and 5.633 goods wagons,

139

three radio stations, six commercialairplanes, eleven ports, twelve airports. Thetotal length of the railway system was 1.702km. First order highway were 2.531 kmlong, second-order highways 8.168 km.139

In case of a war, 100,000 men in eightbrigades and in the navy were supposedto be mobilized. The amount of uniformsand equipment was sufficient, but theweapons were generally bad and outdated.The Estonians relied on the competenceof their scouts, who would have discov-ered any movement of Soviet troops to-wards Estonia early. They also believed inthe ability of their defence county offi-cials to conscript the soldiers within oneto 24 hours.

The First Infantry Regiment and theFirst Artillery Group were in Narva,Narva-Jõesuu, Kuurtna and Vasknarva, twotank platoons were in Tapa, and one squad-ron was in Rakvere. These forces had toreinforce the border guard units, to oc-cupy the line of defence along the NarvaRiver, to close off the river crossings atNarva-Jõesuu, Krivasoo and Vasknarva,and to observe the enemy�s movement in

the Gulf of Finland and up to the lineMustvee-Oudova, where the section of theSecond Division began. 50 steel-concretebunkers were erected at the endangeredspot between Riigi and Kulgu. The staffof the army had calculated that the Sovi-ets were able to move three to four divi-sions to the Narva front within seven days.The active units of the Estonians were ableto take their positions already on the firstday and to repel the attack by the enemyfor the next three days. Although theSoviet air force might be able to attackmain targets, they would not be able toconfuse the decentralized Estonian systemof mobilization. The regiments wouldhave gathered by train, by car, andthrough night marches. They could havebeen mobilized within three days, andwithin the next two days they would al-ready have been at the assembly points.On the fifth day, the Infantry Regiments1, 5, and 4, the First and the Second Ar-tillery Group would have reach the front,the Tenth Infantry Regiment would be inRakvere, the Reserves-Regiment in Tallinn,and the Scouts-Regiment in the area of

Haapsalu. However, the US observers as-sumed that the Estonian army would notbe completely ready for war fewer thanseven to 10 days after the beginning ofthe war.

The Seventh Regiment, the Third Ar-tillery Group, the First Cavalry Regiment,one anti-tank company, one armed-vehi-cle and tank company, one tank platoonand the Second Air Division were sup-posed to be at the front of Petseri. Theseforces would have had to defend the lineLake Pleskau-Irbosk Valley-Velje Lake, thenfor five days the line Piussa-Petseri-Pankjavitsa-Laura, then Piussa-Lepssaare-Vastsellina-Misso. They also would havehad to watch the movements by the en-emy on the Latvian territory. In the south,there were no fortifications. Instead, ar-tillery and entrenchment would have hadto do the job. The enemy was expected toneed five to seven days to move three tofour divisions and tank and artillery unitsfrom Pleskau to Ostrov. In order to ab-sorb the offensive, the Estonians wouldhave had the Kaleva and the Põlva-SakalaRegiment at their disposal on the sixth

140

day, the Second Kuperjanov Regimentfrom Pleskau to Misso, the Seventh,Eighth and Third Infantry Regiment, theFirst Cavalry Regiment, the Fifth, Fourthand Third Artillery Group, the Sixth In-fantry Regiment close to Ape, and theNinth Infantry Regiment in the area ofPärnu-Mõisaküla. This would be allEstonias forces.

As the Soviet Union had only very weakforces on the Lake Peipsi (some landingcrafts), the two gunboats of the Estoniansand three more sent by the base in Tartucould have defended the shore line rea-sonably well for two to three days, espe-cially the dangerous strait of Mehikoorma,where the Lake Peipsi and the Lake Pleskaumeet each other. Local self-protection unitswould have supported the war ships.

In the Baltic Sea, the Estonian navycould not compete with that of the So-viet Union. Nevertheless, it was widelyknown that the Soviet Navy Commandwas afraid of the strait between Aegnaand Porkkala. Soviet submarines couldpass this strait in order to sink Estoniansupply vessels, and ships could lower

landing crafts. To prevent any provoca-tion of the Russian fleet, the Estonianfleet could have laid out its mines onlyafter the start of clashes. The underwaterminelayer would protect the area aroundthe island of Suursaar and Tütarsaar andthe minelayers on the line Äigna-Porkkala. With support by the Finns,another mine belt in the area ofSuursaar, Tütarsaar and Lavansaar couldhave been laid out, while submarines anda large Finnish armoured vessel (with 8"artillery) would have offered protectionduring the operation.

At worst, the Estonians would try toretreat to their capital and to fight a finalbattle of despair, or to flee to their is-lands. According to calculations of Ameri-can observers, the ammunition lasted forabout two weeks of fighting. But suppos-edly the army could defend Estonia onlyone or two weeks if no other states thanLatvia supported them.

In case of an attack from the SovietUnion, Estonia intended to co-operate withLatvia, something it did not want to doin case of a German attack. Estonians con-

sidered a German attack on Lithuania tobe possible; they also thought that Latviamight be endangered. But even shortlybefore the World War II, they were con-vinced that for the next ten years Ger-many was not interested in an occupa-tion of the Estonian islands as a base fortheir actions against the Soviet Union.140

Estonia�s military planners saw danger onlyin an attack by the Soviets. Estonia regardedits other neighbours and Poland as its natu-ral allies and hoped for a German inter-vention, but it did not expect any helpfrom Western European powers. The Esto-nians were worried because the Finnsavoided any relationship with the BalticStates to protect the Eastern borders andsought protection in the Scandinavianbloc. The Scandinavian States publicly pro-claimed that they did not wish to get intoany kind of relation with the highly en-dangered Baltic States. Moreover, the Es-tonians were worried about the unsteadyforeign policy of Latvia. Estonia�s militaryplanners doubted whether Latvia reallyintended to resist any ultimatum or anopen invasion. Estonians were especially

141

worried by missing fortifications of Latvia�seastern border and by the Latvians� planto retreat to the line Pededze-Lake Lubahn,which opened the whole southern frontof Estonia and virtually destroyed its de-fence system. There were also problems witha direct co-operation under common com-mand. Until the abrupt change in theLatvian military command in 1940, Esto-nia�s military command did not rely uponLatvia�s preparedness and ability to com-mand the armed forces under modern com-bat conditions. The Estonians believed thatin case of a co-operation, the Latvian Su-preme Command would try touse the Es-tonian army not to defend its own coun-try, but Latvia.141

Western observers all agreed that theEstonian army was the best one of all Bal-tic States although it was most poorlyarmed and had the shortest training forsoldiers. The Estonian officers were be-lieved to be highly qualified, the Esto-nian soldiers were said to be tenacious,brave, intelligent and patriotic. In co-op-eration with the armed forces of the greatpowers, the Estonian army was regarded

to be a potential force not only for de-fensive, but also for offensive actions.142

The Military Situationin Lithuania

With a population of 2.575.300,Lithuania was the largest Baltic state. Itsarea (55.670 km2) was the second largest.The length of the border was 1.367 km.Lithuania did not have a common bor-der with the Soviet Union, but 525 km(37,7%) bordered hostile Poland, 272 km(20,5%) the dangerous German Reich, andonly 570,4 km (41,8%) bordered friendlyLatvia. The border regions were mainlycompletely open, except for a small sec-tion from Zarasai till Giedraiciai in thenortheast, where a wide range of lakes wassituated, and another section in the South-west, where the Nemunas River formedthe natural border to Germany. In thecoastal area, the Lithuanian part of theCourian Spit was separated from the restof Lithuania by the German part and theCourian Lagoon. Furthermore, Lithua-nia had only limited sovereignty in the

Memel region (2.848 km2). Germany dideverything possible to keep the idea ofseparatism alive in this region. Becauseof the lost, nationally mixed Wilna region(32,441 m2), Lithuania was technically atwar with her second largesy neighbour,Poland.143

Concerning food supply, Lithuania wasnot only self-sufficient. It even exportedfood. In contrast to Latvia and Estonia,however, its industry was not very devel-oped.

The population was more uniform thanin Latvia. 80,6% were Lithuanian, 7,15%Jewish, 4,1% German, 3,04% Polish, 2,3%Russian, 0,7% Latvian, 0,2% White Russian,etc. 80% of the population were Catholic,in contrast to Lithuania�s northern neigh-bours, who were mainly Lutheran.144

In 1939, the army of Lithuania con-sisted of 24.000 men (1.100 officers, 500war administrators, 1.400 sergeants). Onthe average, 1,25% of the population werein the armed forces; 13.000 to 17.000 menwere drafted each year. The police had4.000 men, the border guard 3.500 men,and in the self-protection units there were

142

55.000 men. In theory, Lithuania couldhave mobilized up to 250.000 men. Outof technical and financial considerations,only 120.000 to 135.000 men were sup-posed to be mobilized.

The Lithuanian army consisted of threeinfantry divisions; a fourth division wasbeing formed. The First, Third andFourth Infantry Regiment as well as theFirst and Second Artillery Regiment be-longed to the First Division in Panevezys.In the Second Division, whose headquar-ters were in Kaunas, were the Second,Fifth and Ninth Infantry Regiment andthe Third Artillery Regiment. The Sixth,Seventh and Eighth Infantry Regimentand the Fourth Artillery Regiment werein the Third Division, whose headquar-ters were in Siauliai. Towards the end ofthe independence, only one artillery unithad been deployed in the Fourth Divi-sion, which was being formed inKedainiai.

The infantry weapons were mostly out-dated, but some kind of modernizationdid take place. The army had 7,9 mmMauser-Mod. 24 rifles, Praga light

machineguns and Maxim M. 08 heavymachineguns. There were experiments withStokes-Brandt trench builders, infantryguns and anti-tank guns. One infantryregiment had 2.279 men.

The cavalry brigade with headquartersin Kaunas had three regiments: The Hus-sar Regiment in Kaunas, the Ulan Regi-ment in Alytus, later in Taurage, and theDragoon Regiment in Taurage, later inVilnius. There was also a unit of mountedartillery, three bicycle companies and onetank car company. Each cavalry regimenthad about 1.000 men.

The field artillery had about 120 gunsin 10 units. These guns were mostly out-dated: French 75 mm Schneider M. 97 andRussian Putilow M. 02 75 mm cannons.The heavy artillery had 48 barrels in sixunits. The weapons were 155 mm and 105mm howitzers made in Germany. In re-serves, there were also English 127 mm andFrench Schneider guns, calibre 155 mm.The anti-aircraft unit had 150 modern SwissOerlikon 20 mm and 12 old English 75mm cannons from Vickers, modern sounddetectors and searchlights. During the last

years of independence, there were no for-tress artillery and no tank platoonsanymore, as they were deemed impractical.

In Kaunas there was a tank battalionwith twelve light French Renault M 26/27 tanks and 51 Swedish tankettes madeby Skoda as well as one tank car companywith twelve armoured vehicles made byRenault and Landskrona.

Each of the three divisions had oneengineer battalion. An intelligence battal-ion was also planned for each division,but until the end of the independencethere were only two such battalions.

The Lithuanian army had the strong-est air force of all Baltic States. A part ofthe reconnaissance, training and destroyeraircrafts (of the type �Anbo�) was pro-duced in Lithuania. The air force had eightair stations and four landing strips at itsdisposal. It was divided into reconnaissance(three squadrons), destroyer (four squad-rons), bomber (one squadron) andtraininggroups (two squadrons) and hadschools, workshops and supply units. A partof the planes was out-dated, but in theirplace modern machines were obtained. In

143

1937, 795 men served in the air force; in1939, 80 active and 30 reserve aircrafts �110 aircrafts altogether � existed.

The fleet had only one patrol boat thatcould lay mines and six armoured cus-toms boat. Six submarines, several speed-boats, minelayers and coastal batteries wereplanned. But the loss of Memel destroyedthese plans for armament.

The weapon factory Radviliskis hadproduced rifle, machinegun and artilleryammunition since 1938. It also repairedrifles and completed orders of the airforce.

In contrast to Latvia, the self-protec-tion organization in Estonia and Lithua-nia was subordinate to the War Depart-ment. Lithuania�s self-protection unit wasdivided into 12 infantry regiments andone dragoon regiment. There were alsoengineer, intelligence, air and sea-self-pro-tection units that were partly motorized.Plans that included the training of self-protection members for the partisan warwere not realized.145

Concerning traffic routes and meansof transportation, Lithuania was the weak-

est of the Baltic States. In 1939, Lithuaniahad only 1.526 km of railroad and 1.481km of solid roads. It had 205 locomo-tives, 313 passenger and 4.351 goods wag-ons, 1.765 cars, 298 trucks, 298 busses and619 special cars. The merchant fleet con-sisted of only 11 ships with 10.299 regis-ter tons. Moreover, Lithuania had onlytwo ports, i.e. in Klaipeda (Memel) andSventoji. In the whole state, there wereonly two radio stations, in the last yearjust one.146

In contrast to Latvia and Estonia,Lithuania really had only one friendlyneighbour: Latvia. It had to reckon witha direct attack by Germany or Poland andwith an indirect attack by the Soviet Un-ion through Latvia or Poland. In case ofa war, Lithuania could only operate withfive infantry divisions and two cavalrybrigades. Active units were the First Regi-ment in Ukmerge, the Seventh in Taurageand Zemaiciu Naumiestis and the Ninthin Marijampole and Vilkaviskis. Theirstock was enlarged and they were rein-forced by artillery. Until 1939, the SixthRegiment in Klaipeda and Plunge was also

an active unit; then it was transferred toTelsiai.

Until 1935, the mobilization plans con-sisted of mobilizing the units within oneweek after the beginning of the war (12days according to the US information).Stasys Rastikis achieved a decentralizationof the mobilization and thus shortenedthe time span to 24-72 hours. Weaponsand clothing were divided among the mo-bilization points. A quick modernizationof the equipment now also took place.

Although Lithuania sought to reclaimthe Wilna region from Poland, its plansfor war against Poland were of completelydefensive nature. Just as defensive werethe plans for a resistance to potential at-tacks by Germany or the Soviet Union.The Lithuanian army hoped for a sup-port by Latvia in these two cases or evenfor an active involvement of the Westernpowers. The defence plans against Polandand Germany had priority, those againstthe Soviet Union were of second impor-tance. The Lithuanian Army Commandhoped to be able to fight for two weekswithout foreign support.

144

In case of an invasion by the Polish orSoviet troops, a retreat to the line Kaunas-Nevezis was planned, later to the DubysaRiver. With its high banks, this river wasalmost the only natural obstacle in theinner country. A defence line with bun-kers also existed there. In case of a Ger-man attack, a retreat to the Dubysa wasplanned, as well. The retreat to the Dubysaafter an attack from the East would havemeant the giving up of the largest part ofthe state and a simultaneous opening ofthe southeast front of Latvia. In case of aPolish or Russian attack, a retreat towardsGermany after the loss of the Dubysa-linewas intended. During a German attack,the Lithuanians wanted to retreat into theLatvian territory after the loss of theDubysa-line.

During the last two years of their in-dependence, Lithuanians started the en-largement of the peacecorps. The Infan-try Regiment 3 was intended to be thebasis for a fourth division in the regionKedainiai-Raseiniai-Seredzius. When theWilna area was regained in 1939, theLithuanian army command transferred the

First Infantry Regiment and the ThirdDragoon Regiment to that place.147

Western observers did not judge theLithuanian army in friendly terms. Theyregretted the unusual influence of poli-tics and chauvinism in the Lithuanianofficer corps. According to their judge-ment, many high-ranking officers ofLithuania were political creatures that wereincompetent to fulfil their tasks and werenot interested in their completion. Posi-tive changes in the command of theLithuanian army could only be noticedin the very last years of independence. Incontrast to the other armies of the BalticStates, the Lithuanian soldiers� quality wasjudged to be only satisfactory, the mainreasons being the low education and in-sufficient training. Nevertheless, the sol-diers were regarded to be tenacious, physi-cally strong, modest and especially suit-able for the partisan war. Although eve-ryone acknowledged that the equipmentof the Lithuanian army was more mod-ern than that of the other Baltic States,they still assumed that this army couldnot be used in offensive actions. How-

ever, there was no doubt that they weresuitable for a defensive war. The opinionthat the Lithuanians would be more fitfor a partisan war than the other Balticpeoples is interesting. Observers viewedthe extraordinarily frequent change of theWar Minister, the Supreme Commandersand the Chiefs of Staff as well as the in-trigues in the army undertaken by vari-ous political groups negatively. All of thisnot only influenced the officers� morale,but also the morale among the soldiers inan unfavourable way.148

As a gap in the defence system alongthe border with the Soviet Union haddeveloped due to the politically independ-ent line of Lithuania, it can be assumedthat western military observers regardedthis aspect as highly important. Nobody,however, blamed Poland.

The Military Co-operation of theBaltic States

Latvia and Estonia were the only statesin Northeast Europe that had concludeda military alliance. This alliance was based

145

on the traditions from the war of libera-tion. The basis of this alliance was thetreaty of 7th of July 1921, which was ex-tended in the treaties of 1st of November1923, and the 17th of February 1934. Thealliance was of a defensive character. TheEstonian-Latvian defence treaty of 1934gave similarly interested states the oppor-tunity to join.149 On the 12th of Septem-ber 1934, all three Baltic States � Estonia,Latvia, and Lithuania � came together inthe Baltic Entente, but the treaty onlyconsisted of a general co-operation amongthe states and regular conferences of theForeign Ministers, but not of military co-operation.150 Estonia and Latvia categori-cally refused to conclude a military treatywith Lithuania before the latter had solvedits conflicts with Poland and Germany.However military treaty was not con-cluded when Lithuania was forced inMarch of 1938 to re-establish diplomaticrelations with Poland and when it lostthe Memel-region to Germany in Marchof 1939.

Despite the existing military treaty, themilitary co-operation between Estonia and

Latvia was really very meagre. There was �to a small extent � an exchange of officersto learn about the military training ofthe other state, to establish connections,and to learn the language of the neigh-bour. In 1930 and especially in 1931, large,common army and navy manoeuvres ofboth states took place, but were not re-peated in the following years. In individualcases, the three Baltic States exchangedweapons or sold them to one another. Toa small extent, the arsenals of all three statesalso co-operated.

During the whole period of their in-dependence, the Baltic States were not ableto agree upon common defence plans incase of a threat. The single interests ofeach state seemed to be more importantthan the common interests. Each Balticstate hoped - for little convincing reasons- that it would be able to prevent the lossof its independence, even if one or bothof the others had already lost it. Westernobservers pointed out the extraordinaryfear that showed in all foreign policy ac-tions of the Baltic States. Each Baltic statehad the strong wish to avoid any provo-

cation of the Soviet Union. A militaryunion of the Baltic States was consideredto be possible reason for an attack by theSoviet Union. Yet, there are indicationsthat at the time of the creation of theBaltic Entente in 1934, it was in the inter-est of the Soviet Union to have a Balticmilitary bloc between itself and emergingNazi Germany. This view changed later,of course. From 1933 on, the Baltic Statesalso avoided to provoke Nazi Germany,which did not want to see a Baltic mili-tary bloc come into existence. The Ger-man diplomatic representatives repeatedlypointed out the hostile relationship withLithuania because of the Memel regionto Latvia and Estonia, and tried to usethe disagreement between Latvia and Es-tonia by showing itself as the understand-ing and benevolent great power to thelatter. Poland too repeatedly pointed outto Latvia and Estonia that it did not wantany military agreement of the Baltic Stateswith Lithuania. Therefore, all three BalticStates tried to remain absolutely neutraland even weakened their conditions tothe League of Nations (refusal of the ob-

146

ligations of the members of the Leagueof Nations mentioned in Article 16).

A Baltic bloc could have mobilized anarmy of 550.000 men, which would havebeen a remarkable force even on an inter-national scale. One has to remember thatneither the Soviet Union nor Germanyor Poland, because of the constant threatto their borders, would have been able toturn their complete forces or just a partof them against the Baltic States underany conditions. The Wilna and the Memelproblems were tricky and dangerous, buta military union of the Baltic States couldhave been formed because of the interna-tional situation without being influencedby threats of certain states, threats thatwere not serious anyway. Among the peo-ple, self-confidence, unity, and power arerated higher than the splitting up offorces and the idea of neutrality. Westernobservers have made many ironic remarksabout the extreme individualism of theBaltic politicians, about the exaggeratedemphasis on solely nationalist interests,and about the inability to co-operate inthe common interest and for the protec-

tion of security. The great powers tookcare not to reach any military agreementswith the individualistic, small Baltic States,which were not connected to one another.

Of course, the question arises howmuch the Baltic States could have co-op-erated militarily and what they could havedone to foster such a co-operation evenbefore a treaty had been concluded. Theanswer is: a lot!

It is a sad fact that the Baltic States �during the whole period of their inde-pendence � felt very foreign to one an-other and that they really did not knoweach other. It often happened that theEstonians, Latvians and Lithuanianstreated each other not only with benevo-lent humour, but even with sarcasm. Un-fortunately, the latter happened a lot onan international level, during talks betweenrepresentatives of these people and thoseof the great powers. Measures that sup-ported mutual learning of history, cul-ture, and economy of the neighboursstarted late and remained small. There wasalmost no enlightenment about the com-mon fate and the common goal, and very

little was done to foster mutual respectand friendship as well as the developmentof a co-operation. Such efforts came toolate, were too small and too �official� toreach larger parts of the population. Muchmore could have been done!

Each Baltic state had a different nationallanguage. There was no common linguafranca. Older generations were partly ableto communicate in Russian, to a small ex-tent also in German, but in Lithuania inPolish. It would have been perfect if thecitizens of the Baltic States would haveunderstood the language of the other twostates, but this was virtually impossible.Because of the geographic situation, it wasimportant for the population of the Bal-tic States to learn international languages,making it even more difficult to learn thelanguages of the neighbouring states inaddition. Sure, there were people that spokethese languages, but they were only few.After the war, the Baltic States stressed theirindependence from Russia and Germanyand their attachment to Western Europe.Thus, Russian or German were rejected asthe first foreign language. However, they

147

could not decide which of the western lan-guages, English or French, should be cho-sen as the first foreign language. So, Eng-lish and French were taught at the sametime, German being the second foreignlanguage. School graduates, however, hadonly acquired basic knowledge in these lan-guages and did not normally use them ineveryday life. The majority of the high-ranking officers could also communicatein Russian, but the younger ones hardlyunderstood the language. On the otherhand, the majority of the older officers �with few exceptions � spoke neither Eng-lish nor French, and a large part did notspeak German, either. An agreement on acommon foreign language that could havebeen used for mutual communication inthe Baltic States would have been highlynecessary. Scandinavians understand with-out difficulty all their languages; never-theless they all can also communicate inEnglish and mostly in German.

During the whole period of independ-ence, the Baltic States did not develop aneconomic union. The small states evencompeted with each other economically

and were unfit for broader economic co-operation. Estonian slate could have partlysolved the fuel problem, but the quarry-ing started too late and was too little.Regarding fuel, the Baltic States were de-pendent upon Poland and even more soupon the western powers, which on theirpart were far away from sources of rawmaterial. Latvian waterpower also remainedunused for common economic measures.

Without any effort, a standardizationof the organization of the armed forcescould have been implemented, as well as aunifying of ranks, badges, etc., but noth-ing happened.

Each of the Baltic States spent aboutone fifth of its budget on weapons anddaily needs of the armed forces. Theseamounts were tiny compared to the pur-pose aimed at, but they were tremendousfor the small states that had suffered a lotand had to do it without any interna-tional help, especially when compared tothe larger and luckier countries. Thus, theresources had to be used wisely. The sup-ply of the armed forces with uniforms,towing machines and food posed no prob-

lems. But weapons were a very great prob-lem. They had been acquired during thestruggle for liberation in insufficientamounts. They consisted of different sys-tems, were for the most part out-dated,and partly even defective and withoutspare parts.

The weaponry had to be standardizedand modernized. If the three states hadacted together, it would have been easier,more convenient, and also cheaper. Be-cause of political and economic combi-nations, the governments of the BalticStates and their troops did not co-oper-ate, though. The weapons of the armedforces of the Baltic States were, thus, vary-ing and made up of very different sys-tems, which also limited the possibilitiesof a co-operation extremely. Not even anagreement on the standardization of am-munition was reached. The Estonians usedRussian ammunition; the Lithuaniansused German, and the Latvians Englishammunition. In case of a war, the ammu-nition supply would have been very lim-ited, In Estonia�s and Latvia�s case evenimpossible. If the three states had been able

148

to agree on common ammunition for lightweapons, they would have become inde-pendent from foreign states at least in thisrespect and would have saved a lot ofmoney by producing the material neededin their own state. In addition, they couldhave helped each other out. Finland pro-vided foot artillery and mine-throwers. TheBaltic States, with nearly double the popu-lation, could have accomplished that evenmore easily. During all years of its inde-pendence, Lithuania built fairly useabletraining and destroyer aircrafts. Latvia didso during the last years of independence.But the Baltic States did not co-operate inthis respect either, but wasted resources inmutual competition.

The supply with heavy weapons hadto be concentrated on states that were ac-cessible most conveniently in terms oftraffic and from which spare parts couldalso received in wartime. Sweden wouldhave been the best choice. Due to eco-nomic considerations, the Baltic Statesordered nearly no weapons in Sweden.The latter had few economic relations tothe Baltic States, whose products it did

not need. Moreover, Sweden demandedpayment in cash. The UK and France, onthe other hand, threatened not to takeproducts from the Baltic States if weap-ons were not bought from them. Usually,the Baltic States received only out-datedweapons for a price that was at least twiceas high as for the English and Frenchforces. Lithuania also bought a few weap-ons from the Soviet Union, but their gunswere also out-dated and very expensive. TheBaltic States also feared to have relationsto a state whose political leaders supportedelements that were aiming at their even-tual incorporation into the Soviet Union.The weapons became more and more com-plicated and more and more expensive,making a close co-operation between theBaltic States essential. In 1939, a modernEnglish destroyer already cost a fortiethof the whole budget of the Latvian WarDepartment. Today twice of the annualbudget of 1939 would be needed to buyone single supersonic aircraft, to say noth-ing of missiles.

The question of a supreme commandin wartime was also important. It seems as

if the Baltic States hoped to co-operatewith some great powers, which then wouldhave taken over the command, of course.There were no treaties between the BalticStates and the western powers nor any plansfor a potential co-operation in wartime.There were arrangements between Latviaand Estonia for a potential common su-preme command in wartime. But questionsof prestige and about the military qualifi-cation as well as political considerationsand memories from the war of liberationwere brought up. Estonia regarded its su-preme command as more competent, whichwestern military observers confirmed intheir evaluations. The Latvian forces, onthe other hand, would have been nearlytwice as strong. The Estonians had a lowopinion of the long-time Latvian WarMinister, who had not supported them inthe Battle of Cesis (Wenden) and in timesof peace had not cared about the comple-tion of his military knowledge, but - ac-cording to several observers � wanted tobecome supreme commander. The Estoni-ans also remembered how they were forcedduring the war of liberation to hold a

149

considerable part of the Latvian front al-though their forces were urgently neededsomewhere else. The fact that the Latvianswere in an extraordinarily unpleasant situ-ation had been forgotten. The Latvians ontheir part had the suspicion that Estoniansupreme commander would try to use theLatvian forces mainly for the defence ofEstonia, whereas the Estonians thought theLatvian supreme commander would use theEstonian forces mainly for the defence ofLatvia. The defence plans of both states werediametrically opposite. Nevertheless, theplans provided for a co-operation betweenthe Latvian Eighth Dünaburg Infantry withits Fourth Battalion and the Estonian FirstCavalry Regiment at the beginning of awar.

Shortly before World War II, theLithuanians did not raise any objectionsthat a Latvian general would commandthe combined forces of the Baltic States,but the Latvian government did not wantto be politically connected with Lithua-nia. Thus, the question of a common su-preme command remained unsolved.Western observers pointed out that the

supreme command started to put reallyhighly qualified and gifted officers intoleading positions only during the last yearbefore the catastrophe. They would havebeen able to command troops undermodern combat conditions. Names shallnot be mentioned in this article.

The Baltic States shared a common fate.The militarily advantageous situationwould have come up for them in connec-tion with a democratic and liberal Russiain their back, as many Western observerspointed out. But such a situation did notexist. If the Soviet Union threatened Eu-rope, only a common resistance of allEuropean states would evoke hopes fordeliverance. In the opinion of the Rus-sian and Western observers, the individualBaltic States were militarily dead losses,but joined together they would have beena significant enemy. Much could have beendone to consolidate this defence powerwithin 20 years, but almost nothing hap-pened. External factors are partly respon-sible for this, but to a large extent theleaders of the Baltic States have to takeresponsibility, too. The Baltic States were

not the only one, the �regional guilty�.The Scandinavian States as well as the statesin the Balkans had to learn the hard wayduring World War II. At any rate, thearmies of the Baltic States had a great moralmeaning for the strengthening of the na-tional self-confidence of the Baltic peopleand posed a considerable threat to a po-tential attacker.

1 Offprint from Acta Baltica 1969, INSTITUTUMBALTICUM.

2 For a general overview, the following sourcescan be referred to: Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs (London), The Baltic States (London: Ox-ford University Press, 1938); Louis Tissot, La Baltique(Paris: Payot, 1940); Max Friederichsen, DieZentraleuropäischen Randstaaten mit besondererBerücksichtigung des Baltischen Dreibund-ProblemsLettland, Estland und Litauen (Rifa: Selbstverlag, 1921).

3 United States of America National Archives,Record Group 165 � Military Intelligence Divi-sion (Hence: USA, N.A., R.G. 165) � General Analy-sis.

4 Already during World War I did Theobaldvon Berthmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the Ger-man Reich, comment on General Ludendorff�sproject of the annexation of the Baltic territory,pointing out the difficulties such an incorpora-tion would implicate.

5 Such views were already met with response inGerman Reichstag-discussions from 1916-1918. See

150

ed. Andersons, Latvijas vçsture 1914-1920, Stock-holm: DAUGAVA, 1967), pp. 165-166, 216, 272-273, 286-287.

6 Royal Institute, pp. 30-38.7 Edgars Andersons, �Toward the Baltic Entente

� The Initial Phase�, Pro Baltica, Mélanges dédiés àKaarel R. Pusta (Stockholm: Publication du Comitédes amis de K. R. Pusta, 1965), pp. 41-42, 50. Hence:Andersons, Toward the Baltic Entente � The InitialPhase.

8 Marija Gimbutas, The Balts (New York:Frederick A. Präger, 1963), pp. 21-29, 43-172.

9 Ibid., pp. 153-158; Alfred Bilmanis, A History ofLatvia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1951), pp. 33, 35; Ewald Uustalu, The History ofEstonian People (London: Boreas Publishing Co.,1952), pp. 31-32.

10 Uustalu, pp. 32-48.11 A. Bîlmanis, pp. 53-83.12 Constantine R. Jurgela, History of the Lithuanian

Nation (New York: Lithuanian Cultural Institute,Historical Research Section, 1948), pp. 45-145.

13 Ibid., pp. 146-160.14 Ibid., pp. 161-163, 229-250.15 Ibid., pp. 265-352.16 Edgar Dunsdorfs, Arnolds Spekke, Latvijas

Vçsture 1500-1600 [Latvia�s History 1500-1600], Stock-holm: Daugava, 1964, pp. 67-73, 172-184.

17 Uustalu, pp. 54-56.18 C. R. Jurgela, p. 100.19 Dunsdorfs, Spekke, 1500-1600, pp. 41-42, 67-

73, 127-141, 172-184, 678-680.20 Edgar Anderson, The Couronians and the West

Indies, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Uni-

versity of Chicago, August 1956, pp. 59, 110, 146,229, 309, 311.

21 Dunsdorfs, 1500-1600, pp. 127, 129.22 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Latvijas vôsture 1600-1710

(Stockholm: Daugava, 1962), pp. 50, 100-102, 159-165.

23 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Mûþîgais latvieðu ka?avîrs[Eternal Latvian Soldier] (Melbourne, Australia:Generâïa Kârïa Goppera fond, 1967), pp. 189-192;Edgars Andersons, Latvieðu cîòas vçstures notikumos[The Latvians� Fights in the course of history], inLAIKS, XIX, No. 26 (1959), April 1, 1967.

24 Edgars Andersons, �Krimas kaº� Latvijâ�[Crimean War in Latvia], in Ceïa Zîmes, No. 9,March 1952, pp. 367-372; No. 10, July 1952, pp.450-455.

25 Jurgela, pp. 385, 394.26 Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December

20, 1963.27 Jurgela, pp. 408-416, 427-456.28 Uustalu, pp. 109-110.29 Bruno Kalnins, De Baltiska staternas frihetskamp

[The Fight for Freedom of the Baltic States], Stock-holm: Tidens Förlag, 1950, pp. 33-42.

30 Dr. Constantine R. Jurgela, personal inter-view on November 21, 1968.

31 Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December20, 1963.

32 Ibid.33 Ibid.34 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 34-38; Pulkv.

[Col.] Dr. Gustavs Grînsbergs, letter from Janu-ary 22, 1962; Colonel Elmar Lipping, letter fromApril 17, 1963; Gen. Jânis Lavenieks, interview on

November 16, 1968.35 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 47-49.36 Ibid., pp. 78-85, 92-93.37 Ibid., pp. 90-92, 96-97.38 Ibid., pp. 97-104, 107-109, 113-133, 218-225.39 Ibid., p. 225.40 Ibid., 186-189.41 Eesti vabadussõda 1918-1920 [Estonia�s Fight

for Freedom 1918-1920], Tallinn: VabadussõjaAjaloo komitee, 1937-1939; I, pp. 53, 63-70, 525-526; E. Andersons, 1914-1920, p.207.

42 Ibid.43 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 70-71, 93-95; Kindral

[General] Johan Unt, Tallinn: Kaitsevägede Staabi,VI, Osakonna kirjastus, 1931, pp. 28-29, 31.

44 Eesti, Haridusministeerium [Estonia, Depart-ment of Education], Eesti Maa, Rahvas ja Kultuur[Estonia, People and Culture], Tartu, 1926, pp. 17-19, 34-37, 62, 268.

45 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 225-226, 276-277, 301.

46 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 123-124; JohannesTipner, Punaarmee Eesti vaeosade võitlustest 1917-1920[The Fights of the Estonian Units in the Red Army],Tallinn: Eesti riiklik kirjastus, 1957, pp. 20-22.

47 Kari Archyvas, I, pp. 73-79, 84, 100-101, 234,268, IV, 182-190.

48 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, p. 209.49 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 84-86; Unt, p. 34.50 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, p. 209.51 Ibid., pp. 226-226.52 Ibid., pp. 257-260, 301-309.53 Ibid., pp. 310, 592.54 Ibid., p. 307.

151

55 Ibid., pp. 586-591.56 Ibid., pp. 328-330; Winfried Baumgarten,

Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918, München: Oldenbourg,1966, pp. 240-241.

57 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 624-626.58 Edgar Anderson, �British Policy Toward the

Baltic States�, Journal of Central European Affairs,Vol. XIX, No. 3, October 1959, pp. 276-283, 285-286.

59 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 475-494, 499-500.

60 Ibid., pp. 343-346.61 Edgars Andersons, British Policy, pp. 277-278.62 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 394-398, 406-

414, 427-441, 456-471.63 Ibid., pp. 415-417; Edgars Andersons, �An

Undeclared Naval War�, Journal of Central Euro-pean Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 1, April 1962, pp. 41-50.

64 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 367-376.65 Ibid., pp. 352-363.66 Pirmasis nepriklausomos Lietuvos deðimtmetis 1918-

1928 , Kaunas: Iðleido Vyriausias LietvuosNepriklausomybés 10 metu saukakatuvémskomitetas, 1930 [The First Ten Years of Lithuania1918-1928, Kaunas: Highest Committee for thePreparation of the Tenth Anniversary of Lithua-nia�s Independence, 1930], pp. 64-65; Karo ArchyvasI [War Archives], pp. 140, 161-; Friedrich Janz, DieEntstehung des Memelgebietes [The Origin of theMemel-Region], Berlin-Lichterfelde: Edwin Runge,1928, pp. 59-60.

67 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 490-492.68 Edgars Anderson, Toward the Baltic Entente �

The Initial Phase, p. 44.69 Ibid., pp. 43-44.70 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 553, 556, 568.71 Ibid., pp. 506-536.72 Ibid., pp. 536-537.73 J. Þukauskas, Jonas Steponavièius, Lietuvos

kariuomené, Kaunas: Iðleido Sajunga ginkluotomskraðto pajegoms remti [Lithuania�s Army, editedby the Association for the Support of the ArmedForces of the Country], 1938, p. 8; KonstantinasÞukas, Þvilgsnis i praeiti [Look into the Past], Chi-cago: Terra, 1959, p. 394.

74 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 568-575.75 Ibid., pp. 367-375, 378-383, 394-398, 406-414,

434-441.76 Forschunganstalt für Kriegs- und

Heeresgeschichte, Darstellungen aus denNachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps[Research Institute for War and Military History,Descriptions of the Post-War Fights of GermanTroops and Volunteer Corps], Berlin: E.S. Mittleru. Sohn, 1936-1939, I, p. 128; II, p. 58; III, pp. 159,161-162, 167-168, 203, 206-208.

77 Edgars Andersons, An Undeclared Naval War,pp. 43-78.

78 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 404-406, 445,552.

79 Edgars Andersons, Toward the Baltic Entente �The Initial Phase, pp. 50-51.

80 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,First Series, 1919-1929. ed. Ernest Llewellyn Wood-ward, Rohan Butler, J. P. T. Bury (London: H. M.Stationery Office, 1947-1961), III, pp. 54, 69, 72-73,81-82, 86-87, 93, 225. 81 Les Problémes de la Baltique

(Paris: Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie,Division des relations internationales et del�éducation, Bulletin, No. 8/9, Publications de laConciliation internationale, 1934), pp. 731-732;Frank Percy Crozier, Impressions and Recollections(London: T. W. Laurie, 1930), pp. 245-246.

82 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 566-567, 584,615.

83 Ibid., p. 600.84 Ibid., pp. 586-592.85 Ibid., pp. 566-567.86 Ibid., p. 584.87 Ibid., p. 615.88 USA, N.A., R.G. 59, 860. P 00/115; Germany,

Foreign Office, Microcopy T-120, R. 1466, D596533; 3. 2783, E 378494-95; Latvju Enciklopçdîja,Stockholm: Trîs Zvaigznes, 1950-51, I, pp. 108-109, 528-529.

89 USA, N.A., R.G. 59, 860. I.00/71; 860. M.00/56;Fçlikss Cielçns, Laikmeti maiòâ [The Change ofTimes], Stockholm: Memento, II, pp. 256-260, 349-374.

90 Bîlmanis, pp. 386-387.91 League of Nations, The Records of the First As-

sembly, 1920, Plenary Session, 27th Meeting, Annex6, pp. 634-636; John Spencer Bassett, The League ofNations. A Chapter in World Politics, London:Longman, Green & Co., 1928, pp. 101-102.

92 British Documents, First Series, XI, pp. 714-715,732-737; League of Nations, Records of the SecondAssembly, Plenary Sessions, 16th Plenary Meeting,pp. 318-319, Annex A, 334; Cielçns, Laikmeti maiòâ[The Change of Times], II, pp. 181-191.

93 Former long-term Secretary of the War Minis-

152

try of Latvia, Pulkv. [Col.] Pçteris Kaòeps, letterfrom March 24, 1962.

94 Edvards Virza, ed. Z. A. Meirovics, Riga: Z. A.Meirovica piemiòas fonda izdevums, 1935, pp.85-86, 90-91; Vilhelms Munters, �Meirovicaârpolitikas orientâcija [Orientation of Meirovics�Foreign Policy], in Sçjejs, Vol. I, No. 3 (1937), pp.235-236; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 1466,D 595311-12.

95 Pulkv. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 24,1962.

96 Latvijas PSR Zinâtòu Akademija, Vçstures unmateriâlâs kultûras institûts, Latvijas PSR Vçsture,III [Scientific Acadamey of the Latvian SSR, Insti-tute of History and Material Culture, History ofthe Latvian SSR, Vol. III], ed. K. Strazdiòð, Riga,1959, pp. 338, 356-361, 370-372; Jürgen von Hehn,Die Entstehung der Staaten Lettland und Estland, derBolschewismus und die Großmächte [The Origin ofthe States of Estonia and Latvia, Bolshevism andGreat Powers], ed. Horst Jablonovski, WernerPhilipp, Vol. IV (Osteuropa-Institut an der FreienUniversität Berlin, Historische Veröffentlichungen,1956, pp. 127-128, 163.

97 Latvijas PSR Vçsture, III, pp. 232-239, 244-245,247, 249, 156-258, 274; USA, Nat. Arch., 860. P. pp/18, 21; 860. P. pp. B/8, 14, 32, 860. I. 00/92; 860. N.00/62; 860. P. 00/50; 860. I. 00/31, 33, 45, 60; 860.N. 00/55; 860. N. 00/B./3; Germany, Foreign Of-fice, T-120, R. 2778, E. 374516.

98 Pulkv. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 24,1962.

99 Ibid.100 Ibid.

101 Edgars Andersons, British Policy, pp. 276-289.102 Edward W. Polson Newman, Britain and the

Baltic, London: Methuen & Co., 1930, pp. 224-226; John Duncan Gregory, On the Edge of Diplo-macy (Rambles and Reflections 1902-1928), London:Hutchinson & Co., 1929, pp. 87-88.

103 United States of America, Department of State,Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, Russia, 1918, Washington, D.C.: Govern-ment Printing Office, 1931-32, II, pp. 839-841, 849.

104 Interview with the leader of the former intel-ligence service of the Eastern part of Poland, JerþyNiezbrzycka (pseudonym: Richard Wraga) onJuly 11, 1964.

105 Ibid.106 Jânis Ritenis, �Great Britain and the Baltic

States During the Anglo-French and Soviet Talksof 1939�, Unpublished Master�s Thesis, Depart-ment of Politics, University of Adelaide, Febru-ary 1966.

107 Cap. Jerþy Niezbrzycka, interview on July 11,1964.

108 Ibid.109 Col. Edvins Mednis, letter from March 11,

1964; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2781, E.377014-16; Sîpols, Slepenâ diplomatija [Secret Di-plomacy], pp. 81-84, 90-91, 96-98, 215-216; USA,Nat. Arch., R. G. 165.

110 Edgars Andersons, �Toward the Baltic Un-ion, 1920-1927�, Lituanus, Vol. XII, No. 2 (1966),pp. 37-38, 44-45, 48.

111 Col. Edvîns Mednis, letter from March 11,1964.

112 Edgars Andersons, �Toward the Baltic Un-

ion, 1927-1934�, Lituanus, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1967),pp. 6-8; USA, Nat. Arch., 860. P. 00/105; Germany,Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2311, E 154-226; R. 2777,E 374025-26; R. 2779, E 374974-76.

113 Capt. Jerzy Niebrzycki, interview on July 11,1964.

114 USA, Nat. Arch., RG, 165, DD 21/8, fromSeptember 20, 1935.

115 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14,1962.

116 Ibid.117 Edgars Andersons, 1920-1927, pp. 37, 49-50;

Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, 1962.118 USA, Nat. Arch., 860. I. 00/60, 61; 760. I. 6111/

119, 120, 121; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R.1466, D 596349, 51-52, 62, 68-71; R. 3605, E 685736; Latvijas Saeima, VIII Session, 10th meeting,kol. 354-355; Sîpols, Slepenâ diplomâtija, pp. 132,133, 139, 217, 220.

119 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14,1962.

120 Ibid.121 USA, Nat. Arch., 860. I. 00/141; 860. P. 00/102;

Leonas Sabaliûnas, �The Politics of the Lithua-nian-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of 1926�,Lituanus, Vol. VII, No. 4, p. 101.

122 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14,1962.

123 Edgars Andersons, 1927-1934, pp. 17-19, 22-28.124 Edgars Andersons, 1920-1927, pp. 356-357,

42-44.125 Latvia Country and People, ed. Jânis Rutkis (Stock-

holm:: Latvian National Foundation, 1967), p. 154.

153

126 Lt. Col. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from April27, 1967.

127 Ibid.128 Latvia Country and People, pp. 302-303.129 USA, Nat. Arch., Rg 165, 10641-355/5, 2621-

74/1, 2587/52-6, 2621-53/7, 2667-D-59; Col.-Lieut.Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from April 27, 1967, May5, 1967; League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book1938 (Geneva: Series of League of Nations Publi-cations, IX, Disarmament, C. 206, M. 112, 1938,IX), pp. 566-567; Kurt Passow Taschenbuch des Heers,Ausgabe 1939 [Pocketbook of the Army, 1939 edi-tion] (Munich, 1939), p. 229; Latvija i ejo armija(Moscow, 1938), pp. 60-61, 80-81; Col. PçterisKaòeps, letter from January 23, 1963; Col.-Lieut.Jânis Druvaskalns, letter from March 19, 1963;Col.-Lieut. Kârlis Plûmanis, MS. 1962 (Mobilisa-tion); Col.-Lieut. Jûlijs Íikulis, letter from January13, 1964, February 17 and March 2, 1964; Gen.Voldemârs Skaistlauks, letter from March 21, 1962;Gen. Eduards Kalniò, letter from August 20, 1962;Col.-Lieut. V. Ginters, letter from March 7, 1963;Col.-Lieut. K. Zîverts, letter from February, 1963;Capt. Adolfs Blâíis, letter from August 26 andOctober 19, 1963; Capt. Kârlis T. Dakteris, letterfrom April 29, 1967; Gen. Jânis Lavenieks, letterfrom July 12, 1962; Col.-Lieut. Pçteris Dzçrve, let-ter from December 10, 1962, and February 4, 1963;Capt. Antons Buls, letter from October 15, 1962,and August 4, 1967; Capt. Teodors Dreimanis,letter from January 24, 1962, and March 2, 1967;Col.-Lieut. Vilis Hâzners, January 31, 1967 (con-nection); Col.-Lieut. Jânis Rucels, August 3 and16, 1962, March 18, 1967; Eng. Kârlis Irbîtis, April

19, 1967; Capt. Edgars Mittenbergs, February 19and August 26, 1962, March 18, 1967; Capt. RobertsRiks, December 16, 1960; Capt. Kârlis Ercums,November 2, 1968; Capt. Arvîds Strazdiò, No-vember, 1962.

130 Rutkis, pp. 237, 451-457; Latvijas TirdzniecîbasFlote [Latvia�s Merchant Fleet], 1934, 1940; FormerMinister Dr. Alfreds Valdmanis, letter from Feb-ruary 15 and March 10, 1963; Air Pictorial, 1957,pp. 254-257; H. Volck, �The Irbîtis Line�; Eng. K.Irbîtis, letter from April 19 and 28, 1967.

131 Col.-Lieut. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter fromAugust 8, 1962, April 27 and May 2, 1967; USA,Nat. Arch., RG 165, 1064-355/5; Germany, ForeignOffice, T-454, R. 92, 53 (Gen. Oskars Dankers).

132 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-41/1; 2587-52/6; 2584-67/2; 10641-355/5.

133 Villibald Raud, Estonia, New York: The Nor-dic Press, 1953, p. 33.

134 Maj. Kohn Madise, letter from April 4, 1966;USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, S. 2503-118.

135 Raud, p. 34.136 Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; Capt. Elmar

Lipping, correspondence from 1966; USA, Nat.Arch., RG 165, 2780-1; 2775-3/9; 2780-1, 2, 3, 5/1;2881-DD-2. 7/1; 2584-44/7, 9, 10; 2737-18/1.

137 Raud, pp. 73-76.138 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, Estonia - passim.139 Raud, p. 76.140 Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; USA, Nat.

Arch., RG 165, November 20, 1937.141 Germany, Foreign Office, MC T-120, R. 1807,

411573-75; Gen. Rudolfs Bangerskis, Mana mûþaatmiòas [Memories of My Life], Copenhagen:

Imanta, 1959, II, pp. 91-92.142 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/6.143 Anicetas Simutis, The Economic Reconstruction

of Lithuania After 1918, New York: Columbia Uni-versity Press, 1942, pp. 15-16.

144 Ibid., pp. 12-14.145 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2587-55/1; 2587-53/

6, 7, 11; 2724-DD-21/9; 10641-342/3; Gen StasysRastikis, letter from April 12, 1959, and January 4,1963; interview on June 12, 1959; Gen. MikasReklaitis, letter from February 3 and 14, 1964;Col.-Lieut. Kazys Alik�auskas, �Lietuvoskariuomene� (ms., 1958)

146 Royal Institute, pp. 191-194.147 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2587-52/7; 10641-

342/3; Gen. Stasys Rastikis, letter from April 12,1959, and January 4, 1963; interview on June 12,1959.

148 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/6; 2584-67; 10641-342/2.

149 Ibid., 2584-67/2; Sîpols, Dzimtenes nodevîba(Betrayal of the Fatherland), pp. 140-141.

150 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2584-67/1, 2731-10/1; RG 84, 760. M. 605/48 Bangerskis, II, p. 93.