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Independence for the Afars and Issas: Complex Background; Uncertain FutureAuthor(s): Said Yusuf AbdiSource: Africa Today, Vol. 24, No. 1, New and Emerging Small States in Africa (Jan. - Mar.,1977), pp. 61-67Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185660 .

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Independence for the Afars and Issas:

Complex Background; Uncertain Future

Said YusufAbdi

The French Territory of the Afars and the Issas (TFAI, formerly

French Somaliland), an arid patch of coastal land, a little smaller than

Maryland,provides a vital outlet to the sea for Ethiopia, furnishesa staging

post and base for the French, is claimed by the Somalis, whose fervent

desire for Pan-Somali unity is symbolized by their five starredflag, and is

inhabited by rival ethnic groups of near equal size. This volatile mix couldproduce a major conflict involving the whole Horn of Africa in a costly

armed confrontation. As France's last possession on the Africanmainland,

the territoryis a place where ethnic and ideological rivalries, big power

influence and territorial mbitionprovide all the ingredients of an explosive

situation. This short review will examine the political dynamics of the

internaland external situationof the territoryas independence draws near.

The InternalScene

There is no evidence that the Danakil (Afars) and northern Somali

coasts which comprise the present TFAI have ever been part of Ethiopia.'

The lack of centralized government among Somalis prior to the colonial

era leaves ethnic considerations the main base for Somalia's claims to the

territory.France'sneed for a coaling stationsubsequent to the construction

of the Suez Canal led to French occupation of the enclave. Britain, the

occupier of northern Somalia, recognized the French presence when

boundaries were fixed between the protectorates in 1888. The Djibouti-

Addis Ababa railroad, begun in 1897 and completed in 1917, established

a strong French link with Ethiopia, and remains vital to Ethiopia's

economy.

Local politics have been greatly influenced by the ethnic diversity of

the Territory. The population includes Somalis (mostly Issas), Afars,

Europeans, Arabs and a small number of residents from various former

1. See: John brysdale, The Problem of French Somaliland in Africa Report 1966. Three usefulreferences dealing with the history and politics of the area are: Virginia Thompsonand Richard Adloff's

Djibouti and the Horn of Africa (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 1968); Bruno Francolini's Djibouti,published by Societa Italiana Arti Grafische, Rome; and Afarset Somalis: Le Dossier de Djibouti, (Paris:Presence Africaine, 1971).

Dr. Abdiis an independentresearcher based in Denver, Colorado.

61







French olonies.2French ensusfigures, howing he Afars n themajority,arewidelydisputed,and most othersourcesclaima numericalmajorityorSomalis.

Both Somalisand Afars adhere to Islamand are pastoralpeople,

thoughsizeablenumbersn bothgroupshavebeen urbanized.More hanhalf of the population lives in Djibouti. In rural areas they aregeographicallyeparated ndspeakdifferentanguages.

Until1956, the localpolitical cene was dominatedby racialismwithFrenchnationals nd someArabs,whohadgainedwealthandinfluencencommerce, being the principalactive participants.But indigenouspoliticianswho had acquiredFrenchcitizenship apidlygainedinfluenceafterMohamoudHarbi,a Somali,was electedto the NationalAssemblyn

1956, and for some time now have been the dominantpoliticalactors.Europeansand Arabsincreasinglyame to operatethrough ndigenouspoliticians,using the historic ethnic rivalries,especiallythat betweenSomalisandAfars, ortheirownpurposes.2

A major hift n internalpoliticsoccurred n 1958 when GeneraldeGaulle'sgovernmentcalledfor a referendumon the Constitution f theFifthRepublic o be held in Septemberof thatyear. Overseasterritorieswereoffereda choice. The options were totalindependenceor joininga

new Franco-Africanommunityn whichtheyeithercouldbecome semi-autonomous tatesormaintainheirpresentrelationshipo the metropole.

TheseoptionsbroughtSomalinationalismo the fore. Awareof therisingnationalismamong Somalis in neighboringerritories,Somalis in

Djibouti spoused the cause of independencewith a view to eventualunionin a free and unitedGreaterSomalia.The balloting, upervisedbyFrenchcivilservantsand takingplace in the presenceof armedFrenchtroops,resulted n a majority ote for the new constitution nd against

independence.Somalileaderscontendedthatelectioneeringby the pro-independencepartyhadbeenobstructednd theelectionrigged.The electionalertedthe French o the powerof Somaliirredentism

and steps were soon takento reduce the Somalipredominancen localpolitics.The KamilElectoralLawof 1963 downgraded he Somalisandrewarded he Afars,who on the whole had votedagainst ndependence,byenhancing heirpolitical ositionandAliAref'snparticular.

Nevertheless,the drive for independencegained momentumandinternationalupportbetween he

first eferendumn 1958 and a secondin1967, augmentedby independence or neighboring omalia in 1960. In1963 the Liberation rontof the SomaliCoast(FLCS)wasformed,and,in response, withstrongEthiopianupportand initiative,The Movement

2. Subunitonflictamongboth heSomalisandAfarsare present,butcaneasily beoveremphasized.Inaddition o theIss, GadaboursisndIssaqarerepresentedntheSomalipopulation fTFAI.WithintheIsa majority, omedifferences xistbetween hesubunits f theAbgals,Dahols,andWardik.Afarfactionalisms foundn thetraditionalealousybetween heAfars fObock nd hoseofTodjoura.

62







Said YusufAbdi

for the Liberation f Djibouti,wasorganizedn 1964. Inthe same yeartheConferenceof Non-AlignedNationscame out for independence,and in1965 a similardemandwas madebythe AfricanLiberationCommitteeof

theOrganizationf AfricanUnity OAU).WhenGeneralde Gaullearrivedn Djiboutin August 1966, he was

confrontedwith pro-independencedemonstrations nd riotswhich, byofficialally, eftfourdead andseventywounded.De Gaulle's eactionwasto declare hat fitwere thewishof the majority,heterritoryouldbecomeindependent.But no policychangeswere initiated mmediately nd the

disorderswere blamed on alien agitators,especiallySomali nationals.However, at the end of Septemberde Gaulle announced a second

referendum,o be held March19, 1967, inwhichthepopulation'swishesin respect to independencecould be freely expressed. A choice wasofferedbetweentotal ndependenceandremaining partof Franceundera revised tatute hatsupposedlyallowedmore ocalautonomy.ThePartyof PopularMovement(P.M.P.) whichhad emergedas the majorpro-independenceparty, and the FLCSdemandedUN supervision,allegingthatthe Frenchhad falsified lectionoutcomes nthe mandatedTerritoriesof Togo and Cameroon,as well as in the 1958 referendumn Djibouti.

The Frenchadamantly pposed this, however.The outcome of the election seemed a foregone conclusion.Europeansand Arabswouldclearlyvote against ndependence,and theSomali electoratehad been substantiallyeducedby disenfranchisementand deportation, leaving the Afars in the majority.The officialtallyconfirmedthese predictions,reporting hat 60.74% of the populationvotedto remainwithFrance,with hedivision omingmainlyalongethniclines.Analysts ited as reasonsof the outcome the absence of democratic

safeguardswith ndependence, ribal ndpersonalrivalrieshatpreventedcooperation ndunityagainst he French, earsof mergerwithSomaliaorof Ethiopianmilitaryccupation,and the unwillingnessf some to giveuptheFrench onnection.

The pro-independence,Somali-basedpartiescontested the results,arguing hat the intimidating resence of inordinatenumbersof Frenchtroopsand the disenfranchisementsnd expulsionshas preventeda trueexpressionof the wishesof the majority.All realized hatthe referendum

had settlednothing and had led, at best, to a temporary ruce. It hadfurtherexacerbatedthe deteriorating elations between the two mainethnicgroupsand increasedSomalidistrust f the Frenchadministration.The riftwasdeepened bythenew dominanceof the Afars n thepoliticsoftheTerritorynd the controversial amechangefromFrenchSomalilandto the FrenchTerritory f theAfarsand the Issas.

63







ExternalRelations

The interestof a varietyof externalactors n the futureof the TFAI

has alreadybeen indicated.Somalia,Ethiopia ndFrance,ofcourse,head

the list, but, in addition, he two superpowers,he UnitedStates and the

SovietUnion,have become concernedas well as a varietyof internationalorganizations,ncluding he UnitedNations,the Organizationf African

Unity,and the ArabLeague.Since 1966, when the territorywas firstput on the agenda of the

decolonization committee, the UN has expressed support forindependence. Its resolutionof December21, 1966, calling for UNsupervision f the 1967 referendum,wasrebuffedby France,butultimatedecolonization asremained UNobjective.

Despite its reluctance o involve itselfin issues on which memberstates disagree,the OAU has been a forumin whichthe future of the

Territory as been extensivelydiscussed.The oppositionof Ethiopia nd

Kenyato Somalia's erritorial mbitionsand the close ties most French-speakingstates have maintainedwithParis ong mutedapplication f the

Organization's rincipleof total continentaldecolonization o the TFAI.

However, n Octoberof 1966, Somaliaandthe moreradical tatespressedfor anunequivocal ndorsement f independence.

A resolution allingon thepopulationo vote for ndependence n the1967 referendumand condemning alleged French intimidationwaspassed by the OAU'seleven-nationAfricanLiberationCommittee.But asharpdebateensuedon the resolution t the Councilof Ministersmeeting,where a compromiseversion was adopted expressing he hope thatthereferendumwould be free and impartial, ndpledging he member tatesto accord the populationall necessary assistance n case of need. Thematterwas next discussedby the heads of states who addeda statement

assertingOAU solidaritywith efforts to bring about and consolidateindependencefor the people of the Territory.After the referendumon

July 22, 1968, at a meetingat Algiers, he AfricanLiberationCommitteeofficially ecognizedboth the Somali-backedFLCS and the Ethiopian-supportedMLD, hus ndicatingtsfullsupportor the independenceof theregion, houghunable o reconcile he Somali/Ethiopian ositions.

In 1976 the OAU establisheda fact-findingmission on the FrenchTerritoryf the Afarsand lssas. Itsreportcontainedsix main resolutions.

Thefourmorecrucialones askforthe settingup of an ad hoc committeeof Djiboutinationalsto decide who should vote in the planned 1977referendumor independence;an OAU guarantee or the futuresecurityand territorialntegrity f Djibouti; delay in holdingof the referendumuntil the Ad hoc Committeehad been set up; and a call for Djiboutiliberationmovements o unite.The Committee alledon France o organ-izea referendum ndercompletelydemocratic onditionsand to abandon

64







SaidYusufAbdi

all ts military ases inthe territory, ndwithdrawll tsforces.

A third international organization that has followed thedecolonization ituation n the Territory as been the ArabLeague. A

meeting of Arab.foreignministers n March17, 1976 declaredtotalsupport orDjibouti'sndependenceand formeda committee o assist heLeague's SecretaryGeneral to press the French governmenton thequestion.Arabpressures orcedFranceto consultthoughthe talkswithSomaliabrokedown.

When we turn to relations with nation-states,we first note theTerritory's istoric inks with Ethiopia.Franco-Ethiopianriendshiphasbeen a nearlyconstant actor n the Territory'status.The railroad nd its

importantradehas cementedthese links. Beforethe 1965 resolutionofthe OAU supportingindependence of the Territory,Ethiopiatacitlysupportedthe continuationof Frenchsovereigntyin the Territorynoppositionto increasedSomali influence. But since 1964 Ethiopiahassupportedhe Movementof the Liberation f DjiboutiMLD), sa covertofacilitate irectEthiopiannterventionfFranceeverchose to meetSomalidemands.Ethiopia laimed he Afars o be supportive f MLD'sdemandsfor politicalautonomyfor the Territory nd close associationwith or

attachment o Ethiopia.3 n a change of policy the Ethiopianroiiitarygovernmentn 1975 or he irst ime enouncedts erritoriallaims4.

Somalia, as has been implied hroughout,has also hadgreat mpacton the politicsof the Hornbecauseof the dispersal f Somalipopulationacrossneighboringborders.The TFAI s one of the five points on theSomalistarand the SomaliRepublichas made no secret of itsclaimsonthe Territory.Somalia poses the questionnot explicitlyas a territorialclaim,butasa questionof decolonization ndself-determination:

'We have already made thisclear and repeat once more thatSomalia does notwant to use force, will not invade and will not claim the Somali coast, but only

want to see the people allowed self-determinationand freedom to decide their

future.

Somalia's position on the 1958, 1967 and the planned 1977referendums as been to pressstrongly or the presence of UN and OAUobservers s the onlyguaranteeof impartiality.venmorethan before heSomalisarguethatif the plannedreferendums not to be a replayof thepseudoreferendums eld in 1958 and 1967, guaranteeshaveto be made

forthecreationof theatmosphere ndconditions orunrestrictedndfreeexcerciseof votingrightsunderdemocratic rocedures:

3 This Ethiopian position seems to gloss over the complexity of Ethiopia's own minority problems,where the Afars within the country have organized a secessionist Afar liberation movement.

4. Facts on File, October18, 1975.

5. Statement by Somali President MohamedSiad Barre quoted in Africa Research BuHletin.February1976.

65







Grantingf unconditionalndependence o the SomaliCoast;allowing hereturnof the nationals xpelled rom heterritory;he removalof barbedwireandminesaround hecityof Djibouti;nnulment f the colonial awsandtheillegal ocalgovernment;withdrawalfallFrenchroops rom heTerritoryndimmediate essationof allatrocities gainst he peopleof Djibouti, eleaseof

allnationalswho aredetainedand an endto thebringingn offoreignersndtothepractice fprovidinghemwithbirth ertificates.The convening and holding of constitutional onference with the

participationf allprogressive artiesandfronts nsidethe countryas wellasoutside such as the LPAI, the FLCS, the labor unions, studentsandprogressiveouth;consultations ith he nomads n theSomalicoast;allowingthem to takepart nthepolitical rocess;andthe meansbywhich heyaretoobtain ndependenceand recognition f theirrights;an end to allatrocities,whetherby the colonialists,or theirstooges, againstthe nationalsof theTerritory;oreignersuch as the French olonialroops n theTerritoryotto

beallowed oparticipatenthecomingreferendum.FLCAconcursalsowithmost of thesedemands.

Finallywe must examine the convergence of the local conflictsituationwiththe interestof the superpowers,heircompetitionwitheachother,and assistance o theiralliesthatgreatlyenhancethe potential orconflict.Francehasbeenhesitanto giveupthisminisculeerritory ithnoresources in an age of decolonizationbecause of its alleged strategicsignificance.Due to Britain's epartureromSouth Yemen and Russian

friendshipwithSomaliaand the YemeniDemocraticRepublicn Aden,Frenchpresence has been depicted as fillingan essential vacuum inWestern ndianOceanstrategy.The U.S. andthe U.S.S.R. are militarilysupportingEthiopiaand Somaliarespectively.Because of this, the U.S.and the Soviet Union are being draggedinto a proxy confrontationthrough ttachmentso theirclients Ethiopia ndSomalia.

Ifthe localproblemsof the areaarenot seen forwhatthey are, theresultcouldonlybe uncontrollableuperpower onfrontation.fa conflict

develops, either superpowercan easily understandthe other to beexploitingdetenteto stakeout new positions or itselfbeyondits normalsphereof interest.ContinuedU.S. supportof Ethiopian itsdisputeswithSomaliacannotbe justifiedby the beliefthatSomalia is essential ortheSovietUnion's ndianOceanstrategy.

Inan appearancebeforethe Sub-Committee f AfricanAffairs,U.S.AssistantSecretaryof State for AfricanAffairs,WilliamSchaufele(whoseemslikely o retain heposition nthe newadministration),tressed hat

the U.S. had informedEthiopiaof its views of peaceful transition oindependence orTFAIand hoped thatthe Soviet Unionwouldlikewise

6. Ratio Mogadishu,April29, 1976.

7. Helen Desfosses in a well thought-outarticle entitled Naval Strategy and Policy: A Study of SovietSomali Relations in Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa, edited by Warren Weinstein, questions the thesisthat Soviet-Indian Ocean position relates to some long-range policy of achieving an offensive posture onthe world oceans and concludes that an examination of realities reveals a much less dynamic andsuccessful policy.

66







SaidYusufAbdi

tellSomaliato practicemoderation.8Thisobviously s not enough. The

U.S. should actively initiate an accomodation between the localprotagonists.The appearanceof a patron-client elationshipwith the

presentEthiopiangovernmentdoes not serve U.S. interests.The U.S.mustavoidframingocal ssuessolelyintermsof bigpowerrivalry.Somaliinterests annot be dismissedand the mostprudentcourseinvolvesU.S.drawing he Soviets, the OAU, and amenableArabstates into an activeeffort o resolvethe Somali-Ethiopianonflict,not only in Djibouti,butinthe whole of theHorn.

Conclusion

Challengedby the UN, OAU, and the ArabLeague,-France hadfinally made it plain it is ready to give the colony its independence.Obviously, France's intention to decolonize the territory and thesubsequent endorsement of all partiesto the conflictof the territory'sindependence s welcomedevelopment. Whatremains n dispute is thenatureof such independence.The newcoalitiongovernmentof the TFAIhasdemonstrated conciliatory pproach owards ts neighbors:Somaliaand Ethiopia.

Somalis who felt excludedfrom the governmentduringAref's eignwerepropitiatedome by beingwelcomeback o thepolitics fthe territory;hisis reflectedn thecompositionof the new government nwhichthe Somali have a majority atio of 6 to 4. Whatremainsto beresolved are the guaranteesfor a democraticreferendum.It behoovesneutral nternationalrganizations s wellas the superpowers o impressupon the French the importanceof a consensus from EthiopiaandSomalia on the safeguards for self-determination.The appointedcommissionmust consultwithSomaliaand Ethiopiaaboutpreconditionsfor a just and peaceful referendum.Unless the conditions for thereferendum reso freeand open thatneitherSomaliaor Ethiopiawillbeable to contend that it has not reflected he will of the people, the aimofsecuringhepeaceof theregionmaynotbeattained.'

A longandtortuous oadtowardsa stable uture ortheterritorymaycome to a successfulend if the referendumn Marchresults in a clearexpressionof the willof the people, followed by the formalgrantingofindependenceunder a genuinelyrepresentativeovernment ater in theyear.But theoutcomeisasyet far romclear.

S.AfricaResearchBlletIn, January,1976.

9.Formoredetailedprognosis ftheproblems fthe Horn ndSomalinationalism,ee DavidLaitin'sSomaliTerritorialClaims n Internationalerspective nAfrkaToday,Vol.23No.2,April-June7M;

andthenewCarnegieEndowmenteportby TomJ. Farerentited WarClo theHo oflAfria: ACrisisforDetente.Forpossible cenariosof an overallresolution f the problems,Somalinationalismraises ntheHorn,LeonardDoob'sResolvingConflit InAfrki (NewHaven:TaleUniversity res, 1970)isstilluseful.

67

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