***INDEX***

***INDEX***.................................................................................................1***NEG DETERRENCE CP***......................................................................2

1NC – Deterrence CP................................................................................32NC – Drones/Surveillance Solves............................................................8AT: Drones Cause Accidents...................................................................112NC – AT: Perm.......................................................................................122NC – Deterrence Solves........................................................................16

***AFF AT: DETERRENCE CP***...............................................................23Permutation Solves.................................................................................24XT – Perm Solvency.................................................................................262AC – Drones Bad....................................................................................29XT – Drones Bad......................................................................................32

***NEG DETERRENCE CP***

1NC – Deterrence CP

Text: The United States federal government should:- adopt a “shamefare” strategy of documenting and making public Chinese transgressions in the South China Sea;- adopt a “flexible response” strategy that involves tailored and proportional military responses to low-level Chinese maritime aggression; - and increase deployment of surveillance drones in the South China Sea, including an increase in sales of surveillance drones to our regional allies.

“Shamefare” strategy is key to challenge Chinese salami-slicing --- combined with strong military posturing it can force the PRC to back down. Harry J. Kazianis, 6/2/2016. Senior fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest, fellow for National Security Affairs at the Potomac Foundation and a senior editor at The National Interest. He is the former editor-in-chief of The Diplomat. “For the US, Sailing Around the South China Sea Is Not Strategy,” Yale Global, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-sailing-around-south-china-sea-not-strategy.

After President Barack Obama’s visits to Vietnam and Japan, the wider Asia-Pacific region has to wonder what the future holds as a dangerous geostrategic rivalry develops between the People’s Republic of China and the United States. And considering the stakes, such worries are completely justified.The rise of China – and its campaign to “salami slice” its way – occupying small pieces of reefs and semi-submerged features in the South China Sea in increments towards regional dominance – threatens America’s dominant position in Asia. Beijing’s seemingly inexhaustible need to control the world’s most economically vibrant region has set in motion what the New York Times rightly called a “game of chicken” that many fear could spark a tragic great-power war. China’s goal is simple: Dominate the Asia-Pacific and slowly but surely push America out. To achieve this, Beijing must negate the sizeable military assets Washington has in the region – especially the US Navy. To operationalize such a strategy, Beijing has developed a concept known to Western strategic analysts as anti-access/area-denial, or A2/AD. Leveraging the combined strength of such military platforms as ultra-quiet submarines; more than 80,000 sea mines, the world’s largest inventory; air-defense platforms; budding undersea tracking systems; various cruise missiles; and two deadly anti-ship ballistic missile systems, China has set the stage to turn areas around its near seas, as far away as the very ends of the South China Sea towards Indonesia, into what some are calling a “no-man's land” for US naval vessels and aircraft. And Beijing’s A2/AD strategy launched in early-2000s seems now to be expanding into what author Robert Kaplan called Asia’s Cauldron, or the South China Sea. China has undertaken what can only be described as a clever effort to build small military outposts on reclaimed reefs, underwater features and islands. While at various times claiming it would not “militarize” the area, Beijing has placed advanced anti-ship weapons, anti-air assets and rotated fighter jets into the area thanks to massive new airfields. If China proceeds by installing anti-ship ballistic missiles along with newly purchased Russian S-400 air-defense batteries, the stage would be set for not only a credible South China Sea air-defense

identification zone (ADIZ) but the severe degradation of America’s military capabilities in this economically critical body of water. In the event of a crisis, Washington would face a terrible choice: unthinkable military losses or simply walking away, thus leaving the region to China’s mercy and America and its critical alliance networks marginalized or even broken.As for responding to the changing strategic situation in Asia, the United States has suffered a series of setbacks, some unavoidable and others self-inflicted.When Washington could turn its attention to Asia – complicated by Russian actions in Ukraine and the rise of the Islamic State – the results have been mixed. While the Pentagon has attempted to dampen the impact of China’s A2/AD strategy with an important operational concept named Air-Sea Battle (ASB) – designed to leverage the combined joint warfare operational powers of the US Navy and Air Force to take down Beijing’s anti-access networks – fears of possible escalatory strikes on the Chinese mainland that could lead to a nuclear showdown have stirred controversy and unneeded doubt. Also, by its very nature focusing on armed conflict, ASB does nothing to place needed roadblocks to stop China from expanding its potential zone through reclaimed reefs and military equipment in the South China Sea.So far, the only US action that demonstrates resolve has been to conduct three so-called “freedom of navigation” operations, or FONOP – suggesting to Beijing that Washington will “fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows.” Unfortunately for the United States, while such actions show some sort of response, they do nothing to slow China’s attack on the status-quo – and fall far short of a much needed comprehensive strategy. As Washington simply sails around the South China Sea, Beijing presses ahead with installing ever-more advanced pieces of military hardware and could be planning to reclaim the strategically important Scarborough Shoal next. Beijing’s new islands and equipment are permanent; while America’s naval excursions are temporary, the vessels destined to float away.Considering the stakes in the South China Sea for the United States along with regional allies like Japan, the Philippines and others, a stronger set of options is needed to dramatically slow or halt Beijing’s attempts to unwind the status quo. Sizeable roadblocks must be placed before China that, if crossed, would entail a sizeable price from Beijing.I have proposed in the past a concept called “shamefare” as a challenge to Chinese actions in the South China Sea by publicly embarrassing China for its expansionist moves. The United States, along with its regional partners and allies, must make every effort at documenting Beijing’s actions and distributing them around the world – especially through social media.For example, video cameras should be placed on any military asset that has the potential to come in contact with the Chinese military or paramilitary actors. If an aggressive action is taken by China – as when a Chinese J-11 fighter came within 15 meters of a US surveillance plane on May 17 – the US government should release the recording without delay. Reports have noted the Pentagon has footage of the incident, but won’t release it – an error that must be corrected. Additionally, the recent US FONOP in the South China Sea near Fiery Cross Reef should also have been documented – putting a human and important non-threatening face on such operations.Shamefare should also be expanded to allies and partners like the Philippines and Vietnam who have had negative interactions with China on the high seas. Imagine if Manila had documented the 2012 standoff with Beijing over Scarborough Shoal for the whole world to see? What if Hanoi had filmed in greater detail China’s billion-dollar oil rig off its coast surrounded by more than 100 fishing and other vessels? Imagine if such images and video were shared on popular social media networks then filtering down to television and standard news organizations – the impact

and outcry would be truly historic while dramatically increasing the costs of such aggressive Chinese actions.Shamefare itself though is not a strategy. It must be combined with a revitalized Air-Sea Battle concept, now called JAM-GC; continued FONOP operations; complete documentation of Beijing’s destruction of the environment around island reclamation projects; increased “lawfare” with Vietnam and other South China Sea claimants suing China in international courts; and Washington once and for all making Asia its single most important foreign policy focus. Anything short of such an effort will see China dominate the region. Considering the dilemma presented by Beijing, Washington has been caught off guard by the scope, size and sophistication of China’s coercion. A do “something foreign policy” full of slogans and slick-sounding military concepts alone is a recipe for disaster. Only a focused America, willing to enact a bold strategy in the face of Beijing’s aggressive actions has a chance of success. Indeed, one thing is plainly obvious – simply sailing around the South China Sea is not a strategy for success.

Flexible response resolves problems with status quo deterrence --- reliance on strategic level deterrence like the nuclear umbrella doesn’t challenge low-level Chinese aggression --- proportional responses improve credibility. Truong Minh Vu and Ngo Di Lan, 4/7/2016. **director of the Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City; and ** PhD student in Politics at Brandeis University, where he focuses on U.S foreign policy and U.S-China relations. He is also a research associate at the Saigon Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City. “FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO DETER IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, http://amti.csis.org/flexible-response-deter-south-china-sea/. China’s growing assertiveness regarding maritime disputes in the South China Sea is not the result of a burst of nationalism or any short-term calculation. In fact, China has consistently pursued a single long-term strategy with the effective control of the entire South China Sea as its ultimate goal.This strategy has five core features. First and foremost, it seeks to change the territorial status quo gradually, island-by-island. This stands in contrast to a strategy whereby a country tries to gobble up the entire disputed territory in one fell swoop. China first occupied the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then slowly expanded its presence southward by attacking Vietnam’s islands in the Spratly chain in the 1980s. Most recently, after a tense standoff with the Philippines, China took effective control of the Scarborough Shoal, thereby changing the territorial status quo further in its favor. China pursues this course of action in order to gain incremental advantage in the dispute while avoid upsetting the other disputants too much, thereby preventing a unified and effective response from other countries.Second, it is founded on full-spectrum diplomacy, meaning the skillful use of every instrument of statecraft available, from military coercion and geo-economics intimidation to economic rewards and high-profile negotiations. Nowhere was this clearer than during the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oilrig crisis. China precipitated the crisis by dispatching the massive oilrig to waters claimed by Vietnam as part of its exclusive economic zone. It then maintained pressure on Vietnam by deploying a combination of coast guard ships and warships. After having denied many Vietnamese requests to

deescalate the conflict, Beijing sent State Councilor Yang Jiechi to smooth out differences with Hanoi.Second, China’s strategy relies on low-intensity but constant and simultaneous small provocations at multiple pressure points, which serve to stretch thin the capabilities of others to respond while limiting the risk of escalation to a manageable level. This prevents a resolute and unified response from China’s smaller neighbors because they are led to think that the benefits of resisting China during any given provocation are smaller than the costs of disrupting the overall relationship with Beijing. Thus major crises like the oil rig deployment are rare. Instead China has focused mainly on land reclamation activities and the incremental militarization of it artificial islands.Third, China emphasizes the “bilateral” nature of disputes to avoid intervention by external powers such as the United States and Japan on the side of weaker claimants. Since China is much more powerful than each of its neighbors, bilateral negotiations give China the most leverage. Furthermore, by reducing the number of players involved in the dispute, China minimizes uncertainty in its planning and gains the confidence to behave more assertively.Lastly, the Chinese strategy is heavily dependent on the non-lethal use of military coercion, which aims to create and fortify “situations of strength” rather than provoke a full-blown armed conflict. Future actions in this category would include declaring an air defense identification zone or deploying surface to air missiles in the Spratly Islands.This strategy, known as salami-slicing, involves the slow accumulation of small changes, none of which in isolation amounts to a casus belli, but which add up over time to a substantial change in the strategic picture. The strategy’s purpose is not open confrontation but the creation of faits accomplis, which has limited the possible responses from ASEAN claimants and the international community, including the United States.Current measures cannot effectively deter Chinese expansion in the South China Sea because they mostly take place at the macro-level and do not aim to directly change the status quo, whereas Chinese activities in disputed waters are mostly micro-level and have direct effects on the ground. The U.S. nuclear umbrella and web of military alliances can effectively deter a Chinese attack on another country but cannot not credibly deter low-intensity activities that do not involve a direct use of military force.To counter China’s “salami-slicing,” a strategy of flexible response is needed—one that imposes immediate and proportionate costs on every Chinese escalatory action . Such a response should have four core features: it should be discrete, targeted, proportionate, and immediate.The U.S. retaliatory response to a Chinese action should be discrete, meaning a single, independent action that can be unilaterally or multilaterally carried out at will. A clear example was the sending of two B-52s to contest China’s announcement of an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea in 2013.It should be targeted instead of indiscriminate. This is important because it limits the risk of large-scale Chinese retaliations. At the same time, ensuring that U.S. actions are only aimed at those actively and directly engaged seeking to change the status quo in the South China Sea bolsters the legitimacy of the U.S. response. For instance, instead of imposing sweeping economic sanctions on China, the United States should respond to China’s land reclamation by sanctioning companies involved in the process, such as the China Communications Construction Company Dredging firm.The response should also be proportionate, in that its intensity should roughly match that of the Chinese act. This limits the risk of escalatory

response while allowing the costs that China would have to suffer to vary according to its own actions.And lastly, U.S response should be carried out immediately after a Chinese escalatory action to show that there is a cost to every misbehavior, as well as to negate any potential benefits that China could reap from its action. For instance, if China deploys surface to air missiles on its features in the Spratlys, the United States should help Vietnam and the Philippines acquire assets specifically designed to counteract those Chinese capabilities.To stop China from continuing to change the status quo in the South China Sea and militarize the dispute, the United States must be able to deter effectively. And ultimately, the greatest value of flexible response lies in its ability to send an unambiguous deterrence signal to China. As long as U.S. responses rely on actions with a primary purpose other than deterrence, such as joint exercises and freedom of navigation operations, it is not able to send a message of resolve to China because it suggests Washington is not ready to bear the costs of directly confronting China’s actions.A flexible response strategy would show China that there is a cost to deconstructive actions. It would also demonstrate that the United States has both the will to challenge China and a specific plan to counteract every Chinese measure. And it would strongly reassures allies and partners in Asia that Washington will match words with deeds.

Drone surveillance reduces the risk of miscalculation and promotes stability --- prevents low level aggression and surprise attacks --- comparatively outweighs the risk of accidents. Michael C. Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, 1/25/2016. Department of Political Science @ University of Pennsylvania; Cornell University; and Department of Political Science @ Texas A&M University. “The Consequences of Drone Proliferation: Separating Fact from Fiction,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2722311.

Most international disputes arise from border disputes,94 where the primary risk of escalation on a regular basis comes from miscommunication and misinterpretation, rather than a deliberate decision to change the status quo. In the maritime arena alone, there are more than 430 bilateral boundaries that are not governed by formal agreements. States concerned with upholding their claims in these boundary areas might be especially drawn to using drones for persistent surveillance due to the technology’s superior endurance, and because states could literally “test the waters” with less risk than would be incurred with a manned equivalent.95 Moreover, the ability to substitute robots for people might make countries more likely to deploy drones into contested regions and behave more assertively, because the costs of losing them seem lower.96 If deployments move from close-to-the-border to inside an adversary’s territory, there is some risk of triggering an armed confrontation.The deployment of drones could increase the risk of accidents and unintended clashes in this context. When one state deploys UAVs, the other side may not clearly understand whether the drones are intended for offensive or defensive purposes.97 This uncertainty may cause a state to adopt worst-case thinking, potentially leading to a forceful response. The likelihood of using force increases insofar as a pilot or captain knows that his or her actions would not result in another individual being killed. China, for example, is reported to have a policy of shooting down unannounced drones with

surface-to-air missiles or fighter aircraft.98 Compounding matters further, the rules of engagement for responding to drone incursions – whether and when to shoot down a drone that transgresses borders – are currently ambiguous. This could create a vacuum in terms of mutual understandings and lead to escalation.Consider, for example, the numerous incidents that have spilled into the public sphere concerning the United States military and the Chinese military over the last few decades, including the EP-3 incident in 2001, the confrontation between a Chinese naval frigate and the USNS Impeccable in 2013, and the reported near miss between a US surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter jet in 2014.99 The spate of Russian air incursions into NATO airspace in the Baltic Sea region likewise underscore the potential for diplomatic incidents resulting from military deployments. During 2014, Russia conducted over 400 patrols in the region, corresponding with deteriorating relations with the West.100 With long-range drones added to the mix, the number of incursions into NATO airspace could significantly escalate as the costs of incursion decrease for Russia. The potentially destabilizing consequences could be more intense because of the unclear rules of engagement that attend the use of armed drones.101The above arguments certainly have some merit. However, it is important not to overstate the risk of drone deployments for regional or international stability. None of the aforementioned incidents actually led to armed military engagement. On the contrary, emerging norms on the consequences of shooting down a drone, though clearly still in the early stages, suggest that states distinguish between when manned and unmanned systems are shot down. Thus, even if accidents happen in these types of situations, they are less likely to trigger crises or escalation than the pessimistic view implies. For example, when Pakistan shot down an Indian surveillance drone in the Kashmir region in summer 2015 that it said strayed beyond the line of control, India did not escalate the long-simmering conflict to war.102 Similarly, compare the muted international discussion when Turkey shot down a drone flying on its border with Syria in fall 2015 with the diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Russia that erupted when Turkey shot down a manned SU-24.103 Countries appear to know that opponents will value drones differently than manned aircraft, and behave accordingly, meaning that drones carrying out surveillance and reconnaissance missions need not be destabilizing, as long as all actors hold the same views about shooting down drones. This may not always be the case since, as noted previously, the rules of engagement in this context are not clearly defined.There are reasons to think that using drones for surveillance could actually be stabilizing. Drones could give both sides in a dispute real-time information about the situation at lower cost, and with lower risk to personnel, than is possible at present. This is especially true since countries can use drones deployed near or at their borders to “see” into contested areas or even their adversaries’ territory more persistently with drones. This could reduce the risk of conflict, for two reasons.First, the state deploying a drone to a contested area for surveillance purposes will have more information. Assuming that its enemy is not planning to launch an attack, this information could reduce fears of aggression, potentially reducing the risk of destabilizing countermeasures. Second, the existence of surveillance drones could decrease the ability of potential aggressors to conduct surprise attacks or covert activities. With surveillance drones operating near the border, an adversary may observe military deployments, allowing it to take appropriate preparations. Drones, then, may be useful for deterrence by denial:104 if the potential aggressor believed that the element of surprise was critical to operational success, and that drones flying near the border would give the other state adequate notice, they may be less likely to launch an attack.

Both of these mechanisms could reinforce stability, even when their relative impact is small.To illustrate, consider the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Japan currently maintains situational awareness through satellite photos, deploying manned maritime vessels, and other means. Japan could gain even better situational awareness if it had more robust unmanned systems in the air and on the sea. While this type of capability would not make a conflict less likely in the case of a deliberate Chinese attempt to take the islands, it could help reassure Japan about Beijing’s intentions (if China deployed similar capabilities at a longer standoff range, it might be similarly reassured). And, in a world where China would only want to take the islands if they could catch Japan unaware, Japanese surveillance drones might reduce the feasibility of a surprise attack.This scenario is not just hypothetical. Japan’s purchase of Global Hawk, confirmed in November 2014, suggests that UAVs are likely to play a growing role in maritime surveillance.105 Given the large number of maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea, unmanned surveillance systems could provide a new type of confidence building measure that makes inadvertent escalation less likely. Moreover, such surveillance systems could make it easier for regional actors to monitor Chinese actions such as building airstrips in the Spratly Islands.106 In some cases, actors may lack knowledge about Chinese activities until they are too late to stop and new facts on the ground exist. Unmanned surveillance systems, if they provide real-time monitoring, could therefore serve a deterrent role as well because those actors deliberately attempting to change the status quo in disputed regions will have to do so in the public eye.

2NC – Drones/Surveillance Solves

Increase situational awareness is necessary to transparently de-escalate coming crises in the SCS.Dr. Van JACKSON ET AL., Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, 16 [Other contributors: Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper (Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS), Paul Scharre (Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS), Harry Krejsa (Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS), and Jeff Chism (Commander in the U.S. Navy and at the time of writing was a Military Fellow at CNAS), “Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, March 2016, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160309.pdf]

The South China Sea is strategically important and resource-rich, crucial to the lifeblood of U.S. and Indo-Pacific economies. Roughly one-third, or $5 billion, of the world’s commercial shipping passes through its waterways annually. The South China Sea is home to proven reserves of at least 7 billion barrels of oil, as well as what is estimated to be 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.1 Fifty percent of all global oil tanker shipments pass through the region.2 And these shipments are vital to meeting the energy needs of most Asian countries, providing 60 percent of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy, two-thirds of South Korean imports, and 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports.3It is also a highly contested space, and the proximate sources of tensions are well-known. Ongoing sovereignty disputes among China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei lead to competition over hundreds of islands, reefs, and reclaimed land. The strategic implications for growing tensions among these claimants are profound. Together these nations produce $11.7 trillion of global gross domestic product (GDP) and are home to a third of the world’s population, including half a billion who live within 100 miles of the South China Sea coastline alone.4Yet underlying these resource and sovereignty tensions is something even

more pernicious: The South China Sea is an opaque, low-information environment . Most S outh China Sea islets are hundreds of miles from shore, making it especially difficult for governments and commercial entities to monitor events at sea when they occur. This dearth of situational awareness worsens regional competition in the S outh China Sea. The region is already rife with rapid military modernization, resurgent nationalism, the blurring of economic and security interests, and heightened geopolitical wrangling with China (by great and small powers alike). Left unchecked, these pressures make conflict more likely by tempting major military accidents and crises that could drag down the economic and political future of the region.These negative trends converging in the South China Sea also create missed opportunities among regional stakeholders for positive gains. South China Sea stakeholders

have many transnational and economic interests of growing importance in common – from counterpiracy to maritime commerce and disaster response – but the competitive nature of the South China Sea today impedes collective action to solve shared problems. States have trouble engaging in cooperation, even when it would advance shared interests. This challenges the foundations of a stable regional order . The more states believe they live in an anarchical neighborhood, the more likely the region sees the worst of geopolitics: security dilemmas, arms races , and policies motivated by fear and greed rather than reason and restraint.There is no silver bullet to entirely resolve the historical, strategic, and technological factors that are contributing to a more contentious security environment in Asia. Nevertheless, there remain practical and politically viable

initiatives that could have a substantial effect in mitigating insecurities while fostering cooperation on issues of common interest.

This report proposes that enhanced, shared maritime domain awareness (MDA) – that is, a near-real-time understanding of air and sea activities – in the South China Sea is a realistic means of addressing some of the underlying and proximate problems facing this strategic waterway. A m aritime d omain a wareness

architecture may engender cooperation in a region devoid of trust, prevent misunderstandings , encourage operational transparency , and lead to capacity-building efforts that contribute to the regional public good. This study explores how advances in commercial technology services, regional information-sharing, and security cooperation can contribute to enhanced regional security. We believe these advances can do so by moving the region closer to establishing a common, layered, and regularly updated picture of air and maritime activity in the South China Sea – a common operational picture (COP) for a tempestuous domain.

Surveillance drones serve as a confidence building measure that prevents surprise attack and enables confidence that prevents over-reactions --- this comparatively outweighs the risk of accidents.Michael C. Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, 1/25/2016. Department of Political Science @ University of Pennsylvania; Cornell University; and Department of Political Science @ Texas A&M University. “The Consequences of Drone Proliferation: Separating Fact from Fiction,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2722311.

Beyond the use of drones in ongoing military conflicts is the question of how UAV deployments may influence stability in contested regions of the world. Precisely because soldiers’ lives are not directly at risk, pessimists about drone proliferation fear that states might take crossborder actions with fewer reservations, which could be particularly destabilizing in areas where countries are already prone to mistrust, such as the East and South China Seas. Michael Boyle argues, for instance, “The risks of a conflict spiral arising from the shoot-down of the drone or an accident of some kind in the East China Sea are real and potentially dangerous.”93 Despite the technical limitations of armed drones, it is nonetheless possible that a state might attempt to carry out drone strikes on an adversary’s territory, potentially triggering a crisis if the UAV is shot down. It is more likely, however, that countries would use drones for persistent

surveillance in a contested area. Indeed, this is a case where unarmed drones could carry significant, possibly salutary implications for international security.Most international disputes arise from border disputes,94 where the primary risk of escalation on a regular basis comes from miscommunication and misinterpretation, rather than a deliberate decision to change the status quo. In the maritime arena alone, there are more than 430 bilateral boundaries that are not governed by formal agreements. States concerned with upholding their claims in these boundary areas might be especially drawn to using drones for persistent surveillance due to the technology’s superior endurance, and because states could literally “test the waters” with less risk than would be incurred with a manned equivalent.95 Moreover, the ability to substitute robots for people might make countries more likely to deploy drones into contested regions and behave more assertively, because the costs of losing them seem lower.96 If deployments move from close-to-the-border to inside an adversary’s territory, there is some risk of triggering an armed confrontation.The deployment of drones could increase the risk of accidents and unintended clashes in this context. When one state deploys UAVs, the other side may not clearly understand whether the drones are intended for offensive or defensive purposes.97 This uncertainty may cause a state to adopt worst-case thinking, potentially leading to a forceful response. The likelihood of using force increases insofar as a pilot or captain knows that his or her actions would not result in another individual being killed. China, for example, is reported to have a policy of shooting down unannounced drones with surface-to-air missiles or fighter aircraft.98 Compounding matters further, the rules of engagement for responding to drone incursions – whether and when to shoot down a drone that transgresses borders – are currently ambiguous. This could create a vacuum in terms of mutual understandings and lead to escalation.Consider, for example, the numerous incidents that have spilled into the public sphere concerning the United States military and the Chinese military over the last few decades, including the EP-3 incident in 2001, the confrontation between a Chinese naval frigate and the USNS Impeccable in 2013, and the reported near miss between a US surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter jet in 2014.99 The spate of Russian air incursions into NATO airspace in the Baltic Sea region likewise underscore the potential for diplomatic incidents resulting from military deployments. During 2014, Russia conducted over 400 patrols in the region, corresponding with deteriorating relations with the West.100 With long-range drones added to the mix, the number of incursions into NATO airspace could significantly escalate as the costs of incursion decrease for Russia. The potentially destabilizing consequences could be more intense because of the unclear rules of engagement that attend the use of armed drones.101The above arguments certainly have some merit. However, it is important not to overstate the risk of drone deployments for regional or international stability. None of the aforementioned incidents actually led to armed military engagement. On the contrary, emerging norms on the consequences of shooting down a drone, though clearly still in the early stages, suggest that states distinguish between when manned and unmanned systems are shot down. Thus, even if accidents happen in these types of situations, they are less likely to trigger crises or escalation than the pessimistic view implies. For example, when Pakistan shot down an Indian surveillance drone in the Kashmir region in summer 2015 that it said strayed beyond the line of control, India did not escalate the long-simmering conflict to war.102 Similarly, compare the muted international discussion when Turkey shot down a drone flying on its border with Syria in fall 2015 with the diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Russia that erupted when Turkey shot down a manned SU-24.103 Countries appear to know that opponents will value drones differently than manned aircraft, and behave accordingly, meaning that drones carrying out surveillance and reconnaissance

missions need not be destabilizing, as long as all actors hold the same views about shooting down drones. This may not always be the case since, as noted previously, the rules of engagement in this context are not clearly defined.There are reasons to think that using drones for surveillance could actually be stabilizing. Drones could give both sides in a dispute real-time information about the situation at lower cost, and with lower risk to personnel, than is possible at present. This is especially true since countries can use drones deployed near or at their borders to “see” into contested areas or even their adversaries’ territory more persistently with drones. This could reduce the risk of conflict, for two reasons.First, the state deploying a drone to a contested area for surveillance purposes will have more information. Assuming that its enemy is not planning to launch an attack, this information could reduce fears of aggression, potentially reducing the risk of destabilizing countermeasures. Second, the existence of surveillance drones could decrease the ability of potential aggressors to conduct surprise attacks or covert activities. With surveillance drones operating near the border, an adversary may observe military deployments, allowing it to take appropriate preparations. Drones, then, may be useful for deterrence by denial:104 if the potential aggressor believed that the element of surprise was critical to operational success, and that drones flying near the border would give the other state adequate notice, they may be less likely to launch an attack. Both of these mechanisms could reinforce stability, even when their relative impact is small.To illustrate, consider the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Japan currently maintains situational awareness through satellite photos, deploying manned maritime vessels, and other means. Japan could gain even better situational awareness if it had more robust unmanned systems in the air and on the sea. While this type of capability would not make a conflict less likely in the case of a deliberate Chinese attempt to take the islands, it could help reassure Japan about Beijing’s intentions (if China deployed similar capabilities at a longer standoff range, it might be similarly reassured). And, in a world where China would only want to take the islands if they could catch Japan unaware, Japanese surveillance drones might reduce the feasibility of a surprise attack.This scenario is not just hypothetical. Japan’s purchase of Global Hawk, confirmed in November 2014, suggests that UAVs are likely to play a growing role in maritime surveillance.105 Given the large number of maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea, unmanned surveillance systems could provide a new type of confidence building measure that makes inadvertent escalation less likely. Moreover, such surveillance systems could make it easier for regional actors to monitor Chinese actions such as building airstrips in the Spratly Islands.106 In some cases, actors may lack knowledge about Chinese activities until they are too late to stop and new facts on the ground exist. Unmanned surveillance systems, if they provide real-time monitoring, could therefore serve a deterrent role as well because those actors deliberately attempting to change the status quo in disputed regions will have to do so in the public eye.

AT: Drones Cause Accidents

UAV spread is net stabilizing --- they don’t provoke crises and actually increase stability through monitoring of disputed regions. Michael C. Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, 1/25/2016. Department of Political Science @ University of Pennsylvania; Cornell University; and Department of Political Science @ Texas A&M University. “The Consequences of Drone Proliferation: Separating Fact from Fiction,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2722311.

This paper conducts a comprehensive assessment of the consequences of current-generation drone proliferation, concluding that both of these perspectives are misguided. Examining the effects of UAVs in six different contexts – counterterrorism, interstate conflict, crisis onset and deterrence, coercive diplomacy, domestic control and repression, and use by non-state actors for the purposes of terrorism – we show that, while current-generation drones will introduce some unique capabilities into conflicts around the world, they are also unlikely to produce the dire consequences that some fear. In particular, drone proliferation carries potentially significant consequences for counterterrorism operations and domestic control in authoritarian regimes. Drones lower the costs of using force by eliminating the risk that pilots will be killed, making some states – especially democracies – more likely to carry out targeted attacks against suspected militants. This technology also could provide autocratic leaders with a new tool to bolster their domestic regime security.Yet, in general, current-generation drones are likely to have a minimal impact on interstate relations. Armed or advanced unarmed drones are unlikely to provoke international crises or incite regional instability. In addition, current-generation drones offer little utility for coercion against other governments. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, moreover, drones might actually enhance security in disputed border regions by providing states with greater ability to monitor contested regions persistently at lower cost, leading to reassurance that potential adversaries are not attempting to change the status quo through force. The limited significance of current-generation drones in interstate contexts beyond monitoring stems from a key technological limitation: UAVs currently in operation are vulnerable to air defense systems, meaning that they are much less likely to be effective when operating in hostile airspace.8

2NC – AT: Perm

China is committed to revisionism --- US restraint only encourages more aggression --- only effective balancing is key to stability.Aaron L. Friedberg , May 2015. Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” Survival, 57.3, p. 89-110.

The six strategies discussed here reflect differing assumptions about the sources of Chinese conduct and the likely impact of US behaviour upon it, as well as on the actions of other Asian nations. The first three options rest on what appear increasingly to be overly optimistic assessments of the likely extent of the ambitions of the current Communist regime and the degree to which it can be placated or appeased. As regards ‘enhanced engagement’, the notion that the regime wants nothing more than to be accepted as a full-fledged member of the prevailing American-led order does not comport well with the evidence of recent Chinese behaviour; it also reflects a certain lack of imagination and historical perspective. Rising powers typically want to change things for reasons of pride and prestige, as well as rational material calculation. Their leaders believe that prevailing structures, put into place when they were relatively weak, are inherently unfair and disadvantageous. But they also chafe against having to accept rules and roles that were designed by others; they want to make their own mark and to receive the deference to which they believe themselves entitled.41In intensifying its claims to offshore waters and resources, Beijing has already made clear its desire to alter certain aspects of the status quo in Asia. The fact that it has not yet put forward a full-fledged alternative vision for global order is hardly surprising, and should not be mistaken for acceptance of the one that currently exists. The growth of China's power has been so rapid in recent years that the nation's strategists have only just begun to lift their eyes from their immediate neighbourhood and to think about how they might like the wider world to look someday.42 Instead of allowing themselves simply to be absorbed and transformed by the existing global system, as optimistic Western observers believe, China's leaders seem to have chosen to play within its rules for the time being, exploiting them to their advantage and pushing for marginal modifications wherever they can, while continuing to accumulate the wealth and power that will be needed to implement more far-reaching changes. Meanwhile, in its own neighbourhood, Beijing is already seeking to establish alternative structures, including regional trade agreements and new political mechanisms that serve its interests and enhance its influence, while marginalising the United States. An American strategy that continues to bank on the transformative potential of engagement may yet bear fruit, but only if it is accompanied by a programme of balancing sufficiently vigorous to defend the existing order and to compel China to continue to operate within its boundaries.The claim that the United States needs to find ways to reassure China reflects a questionable reading of the dynamics of the current strategic competition, as well as what appears to be an overly benign interpretation of Beijing's motivations and intentions. While it may be true that China's leaders see their ongoing military build-up as in some sense ‘defensive’, this does not make it any less threatening to their neighbours or to the interests of the United States. Proposals for restraint rest on the belief that the United States and China are on the verge of an ‘arms race’. In fact, a competition is already well under way. As during the Cold War, the mechanical ‘action–reaction’ image grossly oversimplifies the character of the interactions between the two sides and points towards prescriptions that are likely to be unhelpful, and possibly dangerous. China's leaders feel constrained and potentially threatened, not by any particular US weapons programme or operational concept, but by the presence of its forward-

deployed forces, the persistence of its alliances and its continuing commitment to intervene on behalf of its friends if they are threatened or attacked. Beijing has had to live with these facts because, for many years, it lacked the means to challenge or change them. Today that is no longer the case. China now has the resources, as well as the resolve, to push back against American power, and it has started to do so. Many of its military-modernisation programmes appear to be aimed precisely at making it more difficult, costly and dangerous for the United States to continue to project power into the Western Pacific. Unfortunately, at this point in the sequence of strategic interaction, China's leaders are likely to interpret gestures of restraint not as an indication that a more aggressive approach is unnecessary, but rather as a sign that it is succeeding.Advocates of reassurance also likely overestimate the degree to which the leadership of the Communist Party of China is motivated by fear and insecurity about external, as opposed to possible internal, threats. The current cycle of Chinese ‘assertiveness’ did not begin when the United States was building up its forces in the Western Pacific, but rather when it seemed to be weak, preoccupied and in decline.43 While the initial announcement of the ‘pivot’ gave Beijing pause, the subsequent lack of follow-through has reinforced the view that the United States is constrained, at least for the time being. Despite their protestations about ‘encirclement’, China's leaders evidently believe that their more assertive stance is succeeding, rather than provoking an effective countervailing response from the United States and its allies.44Beijing's decision to push harder on maritime issues in 2009–10 may have been motivated primarily by a perception of American weakness, but it appears also to have reflected a concern that the global economic crisis would have damaging reverberations within China itself. At the onset of the crisis, the Communist regime had reason to fear that falling exports would lead to dramatically slower growth, rising unemployment and possible social unrest. Ratcheting up external tensions may have been seen as one way of deflecting internal frustration and discontent. In the event, the massive stimulus programme unleashed in 2009 helped to stave off the worst effects of the global down-turn, but it did nothing to address the structural imbalances in China's investment- and export-driven model of economic development. After a brief bump in 2010, growth began to slow, and it has now sunk to its lowest level in a quarter-century.45 The prospect that the regime may not be able to deliver on the promise of never-ending increases in prosperity seems to be reinforcing its inclination to use nationalism and international tension to sustain popular support. Given its internal preoccupations, as well as the external ambitions that are driving its behaviour, efforts to reassure Beijing are unlikely to have the desired effect.The belief in Beijing that, whatever its current challenges, China's relative power will continue to grow while America's declines does not augur well for attempts to forge a ‘grand bargain’. For as long as they see the tides of history flowing in their favour, China's leaders are unlikely to accept a spheres-of-influence arrangement based on the current distribution of power, even if it is in some respects an improvement on the status quo. In the past, Beijing had little choice but to accept America's dominant regional presence and its alliances, albeit with the caveat that they were ‘relics of the Cold War’. Why should it ratify their existence now, when it has more means at its disposal than ever before with which to try and weaken them, and when (especially insofar as Japan is concerned) they no longer seem to be acting as a restraint on the military programmes of other regional powers?The idea that China's leaders believe they can subsist comfortably as a continental power, leaving control of the maritime domain to the United States, also appears increasingly implausible and at odds with the facts. Even if China succeeds in ‘marching West’, building transport and communication links through Central and South Asia, it will continue to be heavily reliant on seaborne imports of energy, food and raw materials.46 The presence of US forces and bases around China's maritime periphery, and its leadership of a maritime coalition that extends from Northeast Asia into the Indian Ocean, will likely be perceived as posing an even greater threat in the future than it does today.

Attempting to implement a spheres-of-influence strategy would also carry significant risks. In addition to the harmful implications for its people, ‘backing away’ from Taiwan could unleash a cascade of damaging consequences for the United States. Finally succeeding in its decades-long campaign to ‘reunify’ with Taiwan seems more likely to feed Beijing's appetite for further gains than to satisfy it. Aside from its impact on China's intentions, gaining access to the island would increase its capabilities, enhancing its ability to project power into the Western Pacific and potentially threatening the sea lines of communication of Japan and South Korea.47 Regardless of the way in which it was framed, a decision to abandon its ambiguous but long-standing commitment to Taiwan would inevitably raise doubts in the minds of America's other friends and allies. If they conclude that continued balancing is no longer a viable option, some may choose instead to band-wagon with China.An explicit American shift towards ‘offshore balancing’ would greatly exacerbate these risks. While it is possible that the prospect of being forced to provide for their own security would shock at least some current US allies into more vigorous defence programmes, it would likely demoralise others, creating new opportunities for Beijing to pursue divide-and-conquer strategems. The advocates of this approach assume that, even if they cannot balance China alone, in the absence of full US support other Asian countries will be impelled to cooperate more closely with one another. Again, this may be easier in theory than it turns out to be in practice. Some of the states that would have to join in a countervailing coalition (most notably Japan and South Korea) have long histories of suspicion and animosity. Others (such as Japan and India) do not, but they also have little experience of close strategic cooperation of the kind that would be needed to counter a fast-growing challenge.If it were to happen overnight, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by current US security partners in East Asia (perhaps including Taiwan, as well as Japan and South Korea) might improve their prospects for balancing against Chinese power. But here again, there is likely to be a significant gap between theory and reality. Assuming that Washington did not actively assist them, and that they could not produce weapons overnight or in total secrecy, the interval during which its former allies lost the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and the point at which they acquired their own would be one in which they would be exposed to coercive threats and possibly pre-emptive attack. Because it contains a large number of tense and mistrustful dyads (including North Korea and South Korea, Japan and China, China and Taiwan, Japan and North Korea and possibly South Korea and Japan), a multipolar nuclear order in East Asia might be especially prone to instability.48In contrast to the unduly optimistic assessments of Beijing's interests and intentions that underlie most proposed strategies for dealing with China, the assumptions underpinning a policy of pure containment are unnecessarily bleak. While it may eventually become far more tense and polarised than it is today, the relationship between the United States and China remains mixed, containing important areas of actual or potential cooperation, as well as intensifying competition. Abandoning attempts at engagement would create the self-fulfilling prophecy that critics of balancing have long and generally wrongly warned against; it would be tantamount, as Otto von Bismarck put it in opposing proposals for preventive war, to ‘committing suicide for fear of death’.Even if they wanted to shift towards a policy of pure containment, barring some major discontinuity, American leaders would find it extremely difficult to do so. Current budgetary constraints are neither permanent nor insurmountable; the United States can certainly afford to fund a far more vigorous military competition with China than the one it is conducting today. Without an obvious breakdown in relations, however, forging a political consensus to support the required increase in expenditures would likely prove impossible. The fact that powerful and influential groups and individuals in American society remain deeply committed to preserving the best possible relations with China and opposed to any measures that, in their view, might damage them, will make the task of mobilising support even more difficult.Elsewhere in the world, although concern over China is growing, there is no appetite for a full-blown rivalry. Aside from bigger defence budgets and less trade and investment, a shift toward containment would provoke fears of war. All parties would suffer in such a conflict, but China's Asian neighbours have reason to fear that they would suffer more than most. Even if American strategists concluded that it was necessary, the democratic countries that are its principal strategic partners in Asia are simply not ready to abandon engagement and sign on to a policy of containment.

What this leaves, then, is a strategy that combines continued attempts at engagement with expanded and intensified balancing. Unlike containment, which would likely be both extremely costly and highly controversial, such an approach has the very important virtue of being feasible in light of current political and economic constraints. Unlike offshore balancing, it would not rest on unrealistic and potentially dangerous assumptions about the behaviour of third parties. And, in contrast to enhanced engagement, reassurance or a notional grand bargain, it is rooted in a realistic appreciation of the likely extent of China's ambitions, given its recent achievements and current momentum. Better balancing is not a perfect strategy, and arguing about how it should be adjusted at the margins is not as stimulating as debating the merits of bold new alternatives. But in the real world of practical policymaking, it remains the best available alternative.

Confirmation bias means China will never trust conciliatory US gestures --- deterrence must form the bedrock of the relationship --- any ambiguity in US resolve will be exploited by China.Erik French, Winter 2014. Nonresident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum, a PhD candidate at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, and a contributing analyst at Wikistrat Inc. “Motivated Reasoning in US-China Deterrence and Reassurance-Past, Present, and Future,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 8.4, p. 70-93.

As mentioned in the introduction, the United States faces two potential challenges in its relations with China: deterring China and reassuring China. On the one hand, it must convince China that it is committed to upholding the regional status quo, particularly freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas and the defense of its key allies, including Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia.62 On the other hand, the United States must reassure China that it will not threaten the legitimate national interests of China if it behaves as a responsible stakeholder in the international system. A failure to reassure China that the United States is a status quo rather than a revisionist power could lead to a costly arms buildup driven by an acute security dilemma.63If motivated bias does play a significant role in how China interprets US signals, what are the implications for how the United States should tailor its deterrence and reassurance policy? Confirmation-motivated reasoning suggests that when the United States sends signals that contradict Chinese leaders' preconceptions, then consistency, clarity, and strength are critical. China will act as a motivated skeptic and scrutinize the US signals when those signals do not fit with how its leaders see the United States. Policymakers need to make these signals as strong, clear, and consistent as possible. Any ambiguity or irresoluteness, signaled intentionally or unintentionally, will be picked up by motivated skeptics and will undermine reassurance or deterrence.Alternatively, when the United States sends signals that are consistent with Chinese leaders' preconceptions, it can afford to be less consistent and to send weaker signals. In these instances, China will be less likely to pick apart US signals and more likely to be easily persuaded, regardless of the objective quality of the signal. Therefore, it may be in the best interest of the United States to conserve resources or send weaker signals to avoid putting itself at risk for costs.To truly appreciate how to the United States should tailor its deterrence and reassurance signals using the insights of motivated reasoning, however, we must appreciate the current state of Chinese leaders' perceptions. In particular, how do Chinese leaders see (1) US capabilities and (2) US intent? If China sees US intent as hostile and its military capabilities as threatening, then reassurance will be exceptionally difficult. However, if China sees US

intent as benign and its capabilities as nonthreatening, reassurance will be simpler, but deterrence will be more daunting.There is no real consensus among Chinese policy elites on the threat posed by US capabilities. In general, they hold one of two perspectives regarding US power-either focused on US absolute and relative decline or the persistence of the gap in relative power between the United States and China.64 Some Chinese intellectuals believe the United States is increasingly weak; Wu Liming argues that "to be frank, US power is declining and it hasn't enough economic strength or resources to dominate the Asia-Pacific region."65 Others feel differently; General Chen claims that "a gaping gap between you and us remains" in terms of military power.66Although there is no agreement among Chinese policy elites on the extent of US military power, recent research indicates they hold increasingly adversarial views of US intent. As Nathan and Scobell stated in Foreign Affairs, "most Americans would be surprised to learn the degree to which the Chinese believe the United States is a revisionist power that seeks to curtail Chinas political influence and harm Chinas interests."67 Polls in a recent report by the Carnegie Endowment showed that less than 20 percent of Chinese government officials thought the United States could be trusted either a great deal or a fair amount. More than 60 percent saw the United States as a competitor, and more than 25 percent said it was an enemy. More than 50 percent of polled officials also argued that US efforts to contain Chinas rise presented a serious problem for China.68 Although China has benefited tremendously from the regional stability provided by the United States and its allies, it appears to increasingly feel US intentions are less than friendly.This presents immediate problems for US reassurance efforts and puts the United States at risk of falling into an acute security dilemma with China. While Chinese policy elites are split on the threat posed by US power, they view US intentions as threatening and will be inclined to scrutinize any signals that do not fit with this belief. China will likely be receptive to US deterrent threats which fit with its view of the United States as a revisionist, adversarial power, but it will be skeptical of US signals designed to reassure it that the United States has no intention of threatening Chinas interests if it behaves as a responsible power. This situation enables two alternative policy implications. The first is that deterrence will prove a more effective strategy for managing US-China relations than reassurance. The second is that deterrence will be easier and less costly than reassurance, but both strategies can be employed simultaneously and symbiotically provided the United States dedicates extensive resources to making its reassurance signals clear, consistent, and persistent.A Deterrence-Centric StrategyBroadly speaking, these trends in perceptions indicate that deterrence may simply be more effective than reassurance as a strategy for handling a rising China. US deterrence attempts toward China are likely to be effective given Chinas increasingly adversarial views of US intent. Reassurance, on the other hand, may fall on deaf ears unless it is executed to perfection. Motivated reasoning, driven by the desire to achieve cognitive consistency, will make Chinese leaders discount and discredit US reassurance signals.If this is the case, reassuring skeptical Chinese leadership would be difficult and possibly ineffective. Instead, the United States should utilize deterrence as the lynchpin of stable US-China relations. In regard to upgrading the US-Japan alliance, for instance, it should not prioritize convincing China that the alliance is not designed to contain China. Nor should it focus on sculpting the alliance in a way that alleviates Chinese concerns about Japanese remilitarization. Instead, it should rely primarily on deterrence to keep China

from threatening Japanese security by reinforcing allied commitments to mutual defense, improving joint operational capabilities, and developing contingency plans for dealing with Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea. Deterrence, rather than reassurance, will prove effective in upholding regional stability given Chinese predispositions to view US intentions as adversarial.

2NC – Deterrence Solves

China is exploiting gray areas in US commitment --- only lower-level responses like ship trailing checks China’s gradual erosion of maritime norms.Matthew Hipple, 7/2/2014. U.S. Navy surface warfare officer. A graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, he is Director of the NEXTWAR blog for the Center for International Maritime Security. “CHINA: LEAP-FROGGING U.S. DETERRENCE IN THE PACIFIC,” War on the Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/china-leap-frogging-u-s-deterrence-in-the-pacific/.

The Vice Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, Vice Admiral Currier, touched on how China is maneuvering around this wall during his panel at the Naval War College’s 2014 Current Strategy Forum (CSF14):

We see China, in the disputed claims area, using what is now called the coast guard. They took four or five maritime governance organizations, and in a course of a couple of months, painted all the ships white and put a stripe on them, and now it’s called the China Coast Guard. What’s the maneuver there? Is it a soft-power application? Is it a part of their maritime portfolio that we should be aware of?

What VADM Currier is describing is neither soft power nor the war America is trying to deter. The declaration of the ADIZ over the East China Sea, island-building, and the game of bumper-boats with civilian vessels—these maneuvers would continue in spite of an increase in forward deployed U.S. forces. China has discovered a critical asymmetry to exploit in America’s deterrence regime.Asymmetry: It’s Not Just Small Boats and MissilesDefense strategists usually discuss asymmetry in terms of operations or tactics: specialized anti-ship missiles, cyber-attacks on command-and-control functions, or insurgency against conventional forces. Strategic-level asymmetry is less discussed—in this case, a force designed to stop an opponent’s war versus an opponent using those forces for everything but a war.The United States is leaving a gap in its strategy. At CSF14, Andrea Dew describes this gap in the context of groups in active conflict: “Although we artificially draw lines between different domains, other adversaries use them seamlessly.” Dew’s specific concernsare about armed groups fighting a state through the exploitable seams of its stove-piped perspectives. This general concept applies to non-combat operations, where China is utilizing a gap in how the West views the scope and appropriate use of military action as a political instrument. Between the committee chambers of diplomats and the joint operations center of admirals, there is a blind spot in our strategy being manipulated, the same as if it were a small boat attack against a conventional blue-water combatant.Taking to the Dance FloorIf no amount of submarines, carriers, or destroyers “deterring war” could stop this continuing non-war, how does the U.S. maintain the norms with which we have enjoyed peace at sea? The U.S. must tread an uncomfortable path by entering the gray space—the seams—currently dominated by China.The current U.S. strategy of backing deterrence with conciliatory “shaping” diplomacy is, ironically, allowing the U.S. itself to be shaped. China has already shown its disregard for maritime law, ignoring UNCLOS in its boat-smashing rampage through the South China Sea. Attempts to “shape” China’s actions, such as the Code of Conduct for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, will serve only to constrain and shape the United States. New guidelines provide a blueprint for the unlawful antagonist to force a crisis, driving the lawful and predictable protagonist to de-escalate.

Successful Cold War experiences, notably the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea agreements, do not serve as accurate models for our current policy. China is playing for new norms of state police powers and sovereign jurisdiction. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had such grand aims, their encounters more concerned with tactical harassment and braggadocio. The U.S. is allowing a manipulative China to shape our expectations and actions, short-circuiting the expected effect of our forward deployed military presence.The U.S. Navy will have to get close, very close, to counter China’s asymmetric strategy. Rather than conduct mere “freedom of navigation” passages, the U.S. should be learning a lesson from the Iranians: closely shadow Chinese naval or coast guard vessels and let them know the U.S. cares. The U.S. Navy must more aggressively seek to oppose excessive 200-mile PLAN security zones and fallaciously imposed versions of “safe navigation.” U.S. naval vessels should be interposing themselves, or at least videotaping when Chinese vessels attempt to smash non-military ships. U.S. Navy ships may have to trade paint or start acting as an interloper when the unfettered navigation of less powerful allies is being infringed in order to successfully challenge China’s nascent ideas about its reign at sea.At the 2014 Current Strategy Forum, Lawrence Freedman noted that “there is a flaw derived from the model of the classics [of Western military strategy]…the separation of the military and political strands of strategy.” China is using this seam in perception to bypass U.S. strategies of deterrence. The U.S. responds to China’s military buildup and growing arsenal of asymmetric weaponry—but this is only part of China’s strategy. U.S. deterrence is braced for the impact of an approaching shadow: the shadow of China jumping right over it. The U.S. needs to stand up and throw a shoulder into China’s plans.

Chinese maritime aggression is the result of decades of Chinese military developments --- only a strong counter-A2AD deterrent posture can prevent forceful Chinese maritime claims --- accepting strategic friction is necessary. Dr. Andrew S. Erickson, Winter 2016. Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, associate in research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA,” Naval War College Review, 69.1, https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx.

A major Chinese narrative regarding the South China Sea is one of unreciprocated restraint. But Chinese leaders have clearly had an ambitious long-term vision of some sort, backed by years of efforts , themselves based on long-standing claims encapsulated in an ambiguous “nine-dash line” enclosing virtually all of the South China Sea.Beijing’s stance regarding South China Sea sovereignty issues is categorical and steadfast. In a position paper rejecting outright the Philippines’ recent initiation of international arbitration regarding their bilateral dispute, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states,

China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands (the Dongsha [Pratas] Islands, Xisha [Paracel] Islands, the Zhongsha Islands [whose main features include Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal] and the Nansha [Spratly] Islands) and the adjacent waters.*

Despite all its rhetoric, actions, developmental efforts, and apparent preparations, however, China has repeatedly declined to disclose the precise basis for, the precise nature of, or even

the precise geographical parameters of its South China Sea claims. As the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence documents, China “has never published the coordinates of the “nine-dash line” that it draws around virtually the entire South China Sea—perilously close to the coasts of its neighbors, all of whom it has disputes with. It has not “declared what rights it purports to enjoy in this area.”* Beijing still has not specified whether or not it considers the South China Sea to constitute a “core interest.” Given China’s statements and actions to date, however, there is reason for concern that it is determined to maintain expansive claims based on unyielding invocation of the “nine-dash line.”Island Seizure History. China’s military and paramilitary forces have a halfcentury-plus history of capturing islands and other features, many in the South China Sea. It appears that Beijing long harbored ambitions to seize significant numbers of South China Sea islands, and indeed took several occupied by Vietnam in 1974 and 1988 even though severely limited in sea and air power at that time. Such operations have not received sufficient analytical attention. In some respects, they may have been more complex than previously appreciated outside China. For example, maritime militia forces appear to have been employed in the 1974 Paracels conflict, the 2009 Impeccable incident, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, and the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff.† It is important to note that in none of these cases—nor in recent Chinese cutting of the cables of Vietnamese oil and gas survey vessels or Chinese intimidation of Philippine forces at Second Thomas Shoal—did the United States intervene to stop Chinese actions. Regarding the above-mentioned cases that occurred since the end of the Cold War, this is, in part, because Washington does not take a position on the relative validity of South China Sea countries’ sovereignty claims per se. Instead, what the United States opposes consistently is (1) the use of force, or the threat of force, to resolve such disputed claims; and (2) attempts to limit freedom of navigation or other vital international system-sustaining norms.‡Industrial-Scale Island Construction. That brings us to recent events, which I believe have precipitated today’s hearing—and rightly so. In 2014, China greatly accelerated what had long been a very modest process of “island building,” developing land features in the Spratlys and Paracels on a scale and [with a] sophistication that its neighbors simply cannot match, even collectively over time.* “Features” is the key word here, because many were previously small rocks or reefs not legally considered “islands.” Then China used some of the world’s largest dredgers to build up some of the most pristine coral reefs above water with thousands of tons of sand, coral cuttings, and concrete. U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Harry Harris aptly terms China’s creation a “Great Wall of Sand.” It has created over two thousand acres of “land” where none remained above South China Sea waters before.† But it’s what China is constructing atop this artificial edifice that most concerns its neighbors and the United States: militarily relevant facilities, including at least two runways capable of serving a wide range of military aircraft, that could allow Beijing to exert increasing influence over the South China Sea.Beijing itself has stated officially that there will be military uses for the new “islands” it has raised from the sea. On 9 March 2015, China Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated that Spratly garrison “maintenance and construction work” was intended in part for “better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.” ‡ Hua elaborated that construction was designed in part to “satisfy the necessary military defense needs.” Chinese military sources employ similar wording.The likely translation, in concrete terms:• Better facilities for personnel stationed on the features• Port facilities for logistics, maritime militia, coast guard, and navy ships• A network of radars to enable monitoring of most of the South China Sea• Air defense missiles• Airstrips for civilian and military aircraftThen-commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Locklear’s 15 April 2015 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee supports this assessment: In addition to basing Chinese coast guard ships to expand influence over a contested area, “expanded land features down there also could eventually lead to the deployment of things, such as long-range radars, military and advanced missile systems.” Locklear added: “It might be a

platform for them, if they ever wanted to establish an ADIZ [air defense identification zone] for them to be able to enforce that from.”Airstrips . . . and ADIZ? For airstrips, after structural integrity, it’s length that matters most. There’s no need for a three-thousand-meter runway (as China now has on Woody Island and Fiery Cross Reef) to support evacuation of personnel for medical or weather emergencies via turboprop and other civilian aircraft.* Such a runway is only needed to support a full range of military options. Building a separate taxiway alongside, as China has already done at Fiery Cross Reef, suggests plans for high-tempo, high-sortie-rate military operations. No other South China Sea claimant enjoys even one runway of this caliber on any of the features that it occupies.One logical application for China’s current activities: to support a South China Sea ADIZ. Beijing announced an ADIZ in the East China Sea in November 2013. Many nations—including the United States—have established such zones to track aircraft approaching their territorial airspace (out to twelve nautical miles from their coasts), particularly aircraft apparently seeking to enter that airspace. † Radars on China-controlled features can form a network providing maritime/ air domain awareness for the majority of the South China Sea. Fighter aircraft can allow China to intercept foreign aircraft it detects operating there, particularly those that do not announce their presence, or otherwise engage in behaviors that Beijing deems objectionable.But while any coastal state is legally entitled to announce an ADIZ, the way in which China has done so in the East China Sea is worrisome. China threatens still-unspecified “defensive emergency measures” if foreign aircraft don’t comply with its orders—orders that an ADIZ does not give it license to issue or enforce physically. This suggests that China is reserving the “right” to treat international airspace beyond twelve nautical miles as “territorial airspace” in important respects.China’s record on maritime sovereignty fuels this concern. The vast majority of nations agree that under international law a country with a coastline controls only economic resources in waters twelve to two hundred nautical miles out— and even less if facing a neighbor’s coast less than four hundred nautical miles away. But China additionally claims rights to control military activities in that exclusive economic zone, as well as, apparently, in the airspace above it.China currently lacks long-range capable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) assets akin to U.S. P-3 and P-8 aircraft. The more “islands” it builds, even if only with helicopter pads (as opposed to full runways), the more it can increase helicopter-based ASW coverage of the South China Sea. In this way, distribution of Chinese-held features could compensate for ASW helicopters’ “short legs.” China could thereby attempt to start to negate one of the last remaining major U.S. Navy advantages—submarines—and possibly pursue a bastion strategy for its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the South China Sea.Tipping Point. My Naval War College colleague, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) director Peter Dutton, characterizes the aforementioned Chinese activities as a “tipping point,” meriting U.S. government response. “Militarization of the newly constructed islands,” which China appears determined to do, will, he argues cogently, alter strategic stability and the regional balance of power. “It will turn the South China Sea into a strategic strait under threat of land-based power.”* This is part of a “regional maritime strategy . . . to expand China’s interior to cover the maritime domain under an umbrella of continental control.” † Dutton contends, and I agree, that Beijing’s militarization of artificial islands

sets the clock back to a time when raw power was the basis for dispute resolution. China’s power play, combined with its refusal to arbitrate, its aversion to multilateral negotiations, and its refusal to enter into bilateral negotiations on the basis of equality, undermines regional stability and weakens important global institutions.‡

As bad as things are already, they could get worse —particularly if American attention and resolve are in question. In attempting to prevent China from using military force to resolve island and maritime claims disputes in the South China Sea, the United States will increasingly face Beijing’s three-pronged trident designed precisely to preserve such a possibility. Maritime militia and coast guard forces will be forward deployed,

possibly enveloping disputed features as part of a “Cabbage Strategy” that dares the U.S. military to use force against nonmilitary personnel. § Such forces would be supported by a deterrent backstop that includes both China’s navy and its “anti-navy” of land-based antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD), or “counterintervention,”* forces, collectively deploying the world’s largest arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. In the region, only Vietnam also has a maritime militia, and the U.S. Coast Guard is not positioned to oppose China’s. Meanwhile, China’s coast guard is already larger than those of all its neighbors combined, and still growing rapidly.†More broadly, worries about China’s island construction, developing force posture in the South China Sea, and accompanying official statements exemplify broader foreign concern about China’s rise—that as it becomes increasingly powerful, Beijing will• Abandon previous restraint in word and deed• Bully its smaller neighbors• Implicitly or explicitly threaten the use of force to resolve disputes• Attempt to change—or else run roughshod over—important international norms that preserve peace in Asia and underwrite the global system on which mutual prosperity dependsChina’s combination of resolve, ambiguity, activities, and deployments has corrosive implications for regional stability and international norms. That’s why the United States now needs to adjust conceptual thinking and policy to stabilize the situation and balance against the prospect of negative Chinese behavior and influence.The Need for a Paradigm ShiftAs Peter Dutton has long emphasized, the way forward for the United States is clear: Even as China advances, we cannot retreat. Together with the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, the South China Sea is a vital part of the global commons, on which the international system depends to operate effectively and equitably. Half of global commerce and 90 percent of regional energy imports transit the South China Sea alone. We cannot allow Beijing to carve out within these international waters and airspace a zone of exceptionalism in which its neighbors face bullying without recourse and vital global rules and norms are subordinated to its parochial priorities. This would set back severely what Beijing itself terms “democracy” or “democratization in international relations.”* Instead, we must maintain the national will and force structure to continue to operate in, under, and over the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas and preserve them as peaceful parts of the global commons for all to use without fear.Accepting Moderate Friction. Here, given China’s growing power and our own sustained power and resolve, we must accept a zone of bounded strategic friction and contestation. Such friction is manageable, and we must manage it. To do so effectively, we should develop the mind-set that we are in a great power relationship wherein we need to act to protect our vital interests and support the global system even as China is working to promote its own vital interests. It means preparing to live in the same strategic space together, with overlapping vital interests. This is the essence of great power relations, reflecting a reversion to historical norms after the brief and unsustainable unipolar moment is over—even as the United States remains strong as the world’s leading power, and the world remains far from being a true “multipolar” system.†This robust but realistic approach includes accepting the fundamental reality that we will not roll back China’s existing occupation of islands and other features, just as we will not accept its rolling back its neighbors’ occupation of other islands and features. Most fundamentally, the United States must preserve peace and a stable status quo in a vital yet vulnerable region that remains haunted by history.

Embracing Competitive Coexistence. The paradigm we need to think about is a form of great power relations that I term “competitive coexistence.”‡ It is not a comprehensive rivalry, as between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Hence, charges that it constitutes a “containment strategy” driven by a “Cold War mentality” would be inaccurate. Rather, it has specific competitive aspects that we should not exacerbate gratuitously, yet must not shy away from. China’s current leadership is clearly comfortable with a certain level of friction and tension . Given the current unfortunate circumstances, for the foreseeable future we too must accept—and make clear that we are comfortable with—a certain level of friction and tension.The above paradigm has important implications for both U.S. rhetoric and policy. First, American officials must recognize what their Chinese counterparts have long understood: words matter. The United States must not appear to embrace Chinese policy concepts or formulations that make us appear to fear tension, or to be willing to yield to Beijing’s principled policy positions in order to mitigate it. Such optics would only encourage Chinese testing and assertiveness vis-à-vis Washington and its regional allies. Accordingly, two particularly problematic formulations favored by Beijing (and their variants) must be banished from the lexicon of American official discourse:1. “The Thucydides trap”2. “New-type great-power relations”Avoiding Thucydides Claptrap. As invoked by none other than Xi Jinping himself to pressure U.S. counterparts, as well as by influential Chinese public intellectuals to call for U.S. concessions, the idea of the imperative to avoid a “Thucydides trap” represents a misapplication of history.* It falsely implies that only by taking drastic measures can the United States and China avoid previous patterns of ruinous conflict between an established power and a rising power. The product of a time that human progress over the past century has finally rendered obsolete, Thucydides offers a cynical, outdated interpretation that has no place in American values, or the world that the United States seeks to promote: “The strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must.” I’m confident that’s not the kind of world we’re here to promote today.Nor should we. As Thomas Christensen argues persuasively in his new book The China Challenge—already recognized as one of the leading works on U.S.- China relations—the evolution of nuclear weapons, international institutions, globalization, financial markets, and transnational production chains have made the world a very different place than it was just over a century ago in 1914 when the Great War erupted. † Washington and Beijing certainly face friction, tensions, and even the possibility of future crises of some severity, but significant shared interests—economic and otherwise—as well as collective reliance on a dynamic international system, together with mutual deterrence, will enable them to avoid war. Both sides are restrained by these strong positive and negative incentives; it is not necessary for Washington to shoulder the burden of restraint alone. Instead, raising false hopes in Beijing only to have them dashed disappointingly is significantly more dangerous than being clear and firm from the start. U.S. policy makers must thus consistently avoid embracing flawed historical analogies that encourage unrealistic expectations on Beijing’s part. Such dangerous “claptrap” must be relegated to the dustbin of history, where it truly belongs.To set the right tone and expectations while safeguarding U.S. interests, the Chinese policy bumper sticker that flows from falling for the “Thucydides trap” must likewise be rejected. As originated and promoted by Beijing, the concept of “new-type great-power relations” is invoked to imply that Washington must yield to China’s principled “core interests” (including, apparently, in the South China Sea) while not committing Beijing to corresponding accommodation in return.* As one Japanese contact asked me pointedly, “Why would you choose to wrestle in China’s own sumo ring?”Why indeed? Instead, the United States should proactively and consistently promote its own policy formulations. Robert Zoellick’s “responsible stakeholder” concept is an excellent example, and it was a serious mistake for the Obama administration to cede the field in this competition of ideas. To the extent that Beijing opposes the idea of responsibilities being thrust upon it, I propose that “strategic stakeholder” might be a better phrase. In any case, each side is free to employ its own concepts and rhetoric. But, at a minimum, the policy

formulations that we ourselves embrace should at least meet the standard of the Hippocratic oath of international relations: “first, do no harm.” That typically means using our own wording unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise. Specific Policy RecommendationsAs for substantive efforts, we must develop and maintain a force structure and set of supporting policies and partnerships geared to ensuring access despite Chinese development of counterintervention capabilities. Even maintaining mutual deterrence vis-à-vis China could be good enough for the United States— Washington’s key objective is to prevent the use, or threat, of force to resolve regional disputes. But allowing even the perception that such ability to “hold the ring” has eroded could gravely threaten the stability of a vibrant yet vulnerable region. Key questions for consideration thus include:• What systems do we need to develop and acquire?• How should we engage our military and other government forces to act?• What risks must we accept?• What should we ask of our allies and security partners in support?In addition to cooperation and capacity building with regional allies and partners, the United States must maintain robust deterrence that paces China’s growing arsenal of counterintervention weapons. Here, unfortunately, Washington continues to suffer lingering effects from the mishandling of the Iraq War and its aftermath. Among other problems, a decade of land wars with unclear, unrealistic objectives diverted attention and resources from capabilities to preserve the ability of the U.S. military to operate in maritime East Asia even while threatened by Chinese systems. Washington is finally devoting increased attention to several types of weapons with particular potential to demonstrate that counterintervention won’t work, but existing efforts may still be too slow and limited to arrest an emerging gap between U.S. goals and capabilities.As I have testified elsewhere, at least some of the key military hardware requirements to meet these objectives are straightforward and affordable.* We must make particular effort to preserve the significant U.S. advantage in undersea warfare by emphasizing nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and offensive naval mines. We must also take a page from China’s counterintervention playbook and prioritize antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). We are already facing a significant reduction in SSN numbers because of earlier decisions that are resulting in rapid retirement of Los Angeles–class SSNs without corresponding replacements to maintain force levels. That’s why I have consistently emphasized the following bottom line: if we’re not building at least two Virginia-class SSNs per year, we’re not being serious—and regional allies, partners, and China will see that clearly. Three a year would be even better, and I believe we can and should get there soon.

Chinese aggression increases in the absence of US presence, not as a reaction --- proves deterrence is the critical factor in preventing conflict.Shaohan Lin, June 2015. MA Student @ Royal Military College of Canada. “After the Pivot to the Asia-Pacific: Now what?” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 16.2, p. 1-24.

The last tool of statecraft employed in the pivot is deterrence via alliance building and joint military exercises. While diplomatic exhortations and economic challenges are to transform unwanted behaviour to rule-based conduct, deterrence draws a line at Chinese belligerence. It is by no mean a constructive approach to China’s rise. Rather, it is a latent threat that serves to preserve regional security through reinforced US

military presence that can quickly take compellence acts if China goes overboard in its unilateral schemes. Deterrence is the ace in the hole in Sino-US relations ; China can, to a certain extent, scoff at multilateral binds and shrug off economic initiatives, but it cannot ignore the stick at the US’ disposal. Unfortunately for the US, the balance of power is not completely tilted in its favour. As commonly stated, the US risks massive economic repercussions and lethal military responses, should China feels threatened. For China, there is nothing more threatening than military projection in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, the “hedge” is emphatically pronounced in deterrence, as demonstrated by the delicate, low-intensity military deployments in the region. As previously mentioned, the US has garrisoned troops in Darwin, Australia, and their number is projected to increase to 2,500 by 2016.54 Then again, Australia is hardly part of the Asia-Pacific region. Military bases in South Korea and Japan notwithstanding, the US has not put troops on any new soil closer to China. Deterrence has mainly taken the guise of joint military exercises and military aid with allied AsianPacific states and those that enjoy a security partnership with the US. Prominent military exercises include Cobra Gold and Balikatan. Traditionally annual bilateral events between the US and a Southeast Asian ally, these exercises have significantly expanded to include multiple states in the region at a time consistent with the pivot. With respect to the South China Sea dispute, the US has offered military aid to the claimants challenging China. Since 2011, the US has continuously supplied hardware and intelligence to the Philippines.55 American ships have also visited Filipino ports on a regular basis. As well, the US signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation in 2011, which was a breakthrough in US-Vietnamese relations since the US had always rejected closer defense ties with this state.56 Joint naval training was conducted as well. In addition to traditional allies in the region, even Cambodia was included in the US-led Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercise in 2010.57 The latest expansion of military exercises and military aid, while indicative of a response to China’s truculent rise, does not necessarily threaten it. The balance of power in Asia-Pacific has changed little. US-led military activities certainly display intent – displeasure towards China and readiness to confront it if need be – but not the material resolve to structurally alter Chinese strategic calculus. To be sure, installing new military bases on China’s periphery would create a much greater impact on China’s decision-making than spectacles featuring combat vessels and sailors. In short, the American delicate military measures warned China, but have yet to plunge Asia-Pacific in security crises. Sino-US relations have not deteriorated to an irreversible point and the door is open for both parties to cool off existing tensions between them. A strictly military example of working Sino-US relations is China’s participation in Exercise RIMPAC in summer 2014. Due to low-cost military activities and the inclusion of China in military exercises, the deterrence dimension of the pivot cannot be taken more than “hedging,” and must not be mistaken for containment or balancing.Soft military procedures did not prevent China from retaliating in its own ways. When the US navy increased its presence in the Asia-Pacific and took sides in the South China Sea disputes, China responded with a rapprochement with North Korea. Not only did China abandon all efforts in persuading North Korea to denuclearize, it also improved aid and trade relations with it.58 China stymied US denuclearization efforts on another occasion; in 2012, just as the US and other states sanctioned Iran for its illicit nuclear program, China reached an arrangement with Iran to purchase oil.59 Both the North Korea and Iran cases are definite responses to the pivot as China worked alongside the US before the latter’s increased involvement in the Asia-Pacific. Syria is yet another additional area of contention where China challenged the US. In spring 2014, China, along with Russia, vetoed a resolution backed by more than sixty-five countries to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court for its numerous instances of human rights violations. This veto was in fact the fourth time China foiled Western resolutions regarding Syria.60 Admittedly, it is unsure whether these sabotages were done out of spite or quite independently of the US pivot. What these examples of reprisals show is that China avoids directly compromising the security of the AsiaPacific. It has not answered the US military presence by increasing its own military

presence, at least not in a fashion that menaces the US. Granted, China did voice its discontentment towards American territorial “infringement” in the South China Sea, but contrarily media and some scholarly claims, China has not escalated tensions because of the pivot; it may have very well done so without American interference in the region. As claimants challenge a rising China, it should be expected for the latter to make full use of its leverages, especially without the scrutinizing gaze of the Americans. It is not folly to believe that security conditions would be worse without displays of US commitment and force that serve as a check to Chinese aggression. The harassments of Vietnamese and Philippine survey vessels by Chinese patrol boats in 2011, 2012 and 2014 are often cited as proof of Chinese behaviour aggravated by US showboating. But in 2005, when US presence in the Asia-Pacific was minimal, Chinese ships fired at Vietnamese boats, killing nine people.61 Assuming that the US Navy has an impact on Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea, then it would be beneficial as cable-cutting and collisions, the primary mechanisms of violence today, are considerably milder than firing with the intent to kill. Thus far, the deterrence element of the pivot has succeeded in restraining real Chinese aggression and has not shifted the status quo in the region.

***AFF AT: DETERRENCE CP***

Permutation Solves

Combination of assurance with deterrence measures prevent miscalculation and assuage Chinese concerns and prevents the perception of US weakness.James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, 2014. Dean of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University and University Professor of Social Science, International Affairs and Law; and PhD Public and International Affairs @ Princeton, senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution. “Military Contingencies: Enhancing Crisis Stability,” in Strategic Reassurance and Resolve, p. 197-201.

The U.S.-China tensions that arise from these dynamics are unlikely to be resolved by an American decision to reduce substantially its regional military activities. Although some scholars and members of Congress have urged the United States to alter its strategy and reduce its military footprint by adopting an approach of" offshore balancing," leading voices in both parties advocate a sustained American presence for reasons that make good strategic sense.36 Similarly, China's growing naval and air capabilities, along with expanding economic interests, suggest that China is unlikely to dramatically reverse course and reduce its operational activities in these areas.But despite these inherent tensions, there are steps that both sides can take consistent with current strategies and operational concepts that can reduce the risk of accidental confrontation and increase trust about the underlying purposes of these activities. One potential area for confidence building involves U.S. reconnaissance in and around Chinese territory. The Open Skies Treaty may provide a useful model. Signed in 1992 and entered into force in 2002, it involves thirty-four members or former members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Aircraft involved in the operations are unarmed but equipped with visual, infrared, and radar sensors. Typically the United States hosts six to eight flights a year by Russia while conducting fourteen to sixteen flights a year over Russia. In total, the United States and Russia are required to accept up to forty-two overflights of their territory annually if requested. Although signed after the Cold War and implemented a full decade after that, the treaty is still notable for the transparency and openness it codifies and facilitates. Russia and the United States still have complex relations on matters such as nuclear security, missile defense, and at times even crisis management (as with Georgia in 2008), so their willingness to allow such overflights over their respective territories is significant. As such it could be a useful model for the U.S.-China relationship in the future. 37 Certainly given the degree of openness of American society-as well as the extent of existing Chinese intelligence activities on American soil through other means-this should not be an unreasonable idea for Washington to consider. For the United States, it could reduce somewhat the need for the airborne reconnaissance missions near Chinese territory that presently tend to lead to the Chinese scrambling of escort aircraft.That said, open skies arrangements cannot satisfy all U.S. reconnaissance needs. Traditional methods will surely continue to be required as well, since open skies observations are predictable in time and limited in number. American ships and aircraft conducting reconnaissance near China's coasts need to keep up that mission to an extent. If satellites can do more of the work, that might be preferable, but some forward missions will still be needed.Other steps the United States can consider to reduce frictions include conducting reconnaissance with unarmed or lightly armed systems. It could also limit mock penetrations of Chinese airspace (flying right up to PRC territorial airspace

before having planes change course). Certain unmanned aerial vehicles and, in the future, unmanned underwater vehicles could be configured to operate entirely without armaments. This kind of understanding probably cannot be formalized because it cannot be easily verified given the sensitivity of some American operational practices. It could instead be done informally, in a manner similar to George H. W. Bush's decision back in the early 1990s to announce that the United States would cease deploying tactical nuclear weapons on ships as a routine matter. Bush's announcement was intended in part to elicit Soviet reciprocity and was successful in that regard. In this case, China does not routinely operate armed platforms near American coasts, so the main benefit would be to lower tensions in the Western Pacific while also reducing the scope of any future Chinese temptation to mirror America's deployment patterns with armed patrols near America's West Coast.But even if these ideas are adopted, American and Chinese ships and planes will sometimes come into proximity with each other. So it is important to consider how their close encounters, involving not just military vessels but possibly others as well, might be conducted in the least risky way possible. By analogy with the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement in 1972, the United States and China could agree to set guidelines to avoid threatening or otherwise dangerous approaches between the naval forces of the two sides. INCSEA reaffirms the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, as well as the International Code of Signals, applicable to all states. It acknowledges that forces will conduct reconnaissance of each other but expects them to do so from a safe distance. It prohibits the mock firing of weapons at each other or the use of high-power beams to disrupt each other's navigation. It requires notification of submarine operations when they are exercising in proximity to other ships. It requires general notification of dangerous activities like weapons tests. It further requires prudence in aircraft carrier operations, including expecting ships not to obstruct or interfere with the operations of the other nation's aircraft carriers. 38 It made a real difference for the better in reducing dangerous encounters at sea.39 The advantages of this type of agreement to reducing distrust and avoiding unintended confrontation between the United States and China are apparent.Any understanding would have to take into account the specific character of U.S.-China maritime frictions. Chinese ships that can be sources of conflict are often not naval vessels but those of private fishermen, merchantmen, or other government agencies, so consideration needs to be given to how to include their activities, building on Sino-American cooperation in enforcing fishing laws and conducting search-and-rescue exercises together. (The Chinese might agree not to arm such vessels with anything more than light weaponry needed for their standard and traditional missions, moreover, as part of such an accord or separately.) These cooperative activities have included the U.S. Coast Guard, the China Fishery Law Enforcement Command, and the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration among other entities.40Some may argue that the multilateral International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea already provides the necessary ground rules for avoiding dangerous encounters. But that accord does not relate to vesse ls that have incentives to shadow or otherwise trail or even provoke each other. Codifying rules of restraint for such vessels could in fact be useful.41 Agreements for mutual observation of military exercises are another important avenue for enhancing trust. Here, too, the NATO-Warsaw Pact Cold War experience provides a precedent, this time through the activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)- which even today continues to organize more than one hundred annua l inspections by the part ies to the organization, on each other's territories for confidence building purposes. 42 Already today, the two countries occasionally observe each other's exercises. During his September 2012 visit to China, Secretary Panetta invited a Chinese warship to join a U.S.-led multilateral exercise off the coast of Hawaii known as RIMPAC in 2014. The two countries have exchanged port calls, though these have decline d to an average of less than one a year and should be increased. China and the United States participate together in the Gulf of Aden counterpiracy mission. And in 2012, China and the United States conducted a joint command and control exercise simulating a response to a humanitarian disaster.

These kinds of efforts can be broadened and deepened. Other joint activities could be expanded, including joint participation in humanitarian operations and support for UN missions, which would allow for routine U.S.-China interactions on types of operations that would not compromise high-technology secrets on either side but could build working relationships and even some trust. It would also allow their largest respective military services, their armies, to develop working relationships in ways that might be easier than for their navies or air forces. What about stronger naval cooperation? Some see the Gulf of Aden counterpiracy mission as a useful precedent that could lead to further collaborative steps in light of the two sides' complementary interests in ensuring that sea-lanes are safe for trade.

XT – Perm Solvency

Engagement is a complement for deterrence --- cooperation succeeds as long as its backed up by force.James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, 2014. Dean of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University and University Professor of Social Science, International Affairs and Law; and PhD Public and International Affairs @ Princeton, senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution. “Military Contingencies: Enhancing Crisis Stability,” in Strategic Reassurance and Resolve, p. 203-6.

There is a growing recognition by both policymakers and analysts that the U.S.-China relationship is at a crossroads. The largely amicable relations that characterized strategic interactions between the two during the first forty years after Nixon's historic visit lie in the past-and there is a growing apprehension on both sides of the Pacific that the best days may be behind. These fears are well grounded. Indeed, unless the United States and China recognize the dangers created by their inherently competitive and dynamic relationship and develop a deliberate strategy and associated policies to address those risks, these apprehensions may well become reality for the reasons we discuss at length in this book. Strategic reassurance is a necessary, but not sufficient, element of a comprehensive strategy. Each side must be prepared to do what it can to reassure the other of its cooperative intentions-but at the same time, each will need to demonstrate that it has the necessary will and capacity to defend its vital interests if necessary. Put another way, strategic resolve is the necessary complement to strategic reassurance.While each side must do its part to make this strategy succeed, in our view China, as the rising power, has a special responsibility to demonstrate to its neighbors, the United States, and the wider international community that its pursuit of national security will not come at the expense of others. After all, the United States has shown through its policies and action over the past forty years its willingness to support China 's emergence as an economic and political power. China now needs to act in ways that reinforce the continued wisdom of the U.S. approach. For the United States, as the more powerful nation, the challenge is not to alter its course prematurely in the absence of concrete reasons to do so, simply because China is becoming stronger, and to draw on its longer experience in crisis management and arms control to light the path forward.Pursuing strategic reassurance comprises several key elements. First, the two sides must endeavor to understand each other's self-images and national security narratives; many high-level policymakers have done so effectively in the years since the famous opening of the 1970s, but a different generation in both countries is gradually taking over and this generation needs to develop the same awareness. Second, each country must look for ways to limit its rivalrous behavior under normal peacetime conditions, even as it also seeks to project strategic resolve and champion its own country's interests. Should major disagreements erupt between the two countries, they must adopt strategies that keep the door open to peaceful resolution and deescalation, avoiding brinkmanship behavior that evokes Schelling's famous phrase of the "threat that leaves something to chance."The preceding chapters have laid out a number of concrete steps that the United States and China can take in the coming years to reduce the risk of arms racing and conflict. They are summarized in appendix A. Taken individually, many of these actions may seem modest in contrast with the stakes involved. But they should be seen as illustrative of a broader approach, and, taken together, they serve three complementary purposes.First, to provide reassurance that each side does not seek to achieve security at the other's expense. Second, to provide ample time to allow

either side to adjust its strategy if the other's intentions prove to be less benign-without requiring premature hedging that would induce self-fulfilling responses predicated on fears of hostile intent. Third, by avoiding premature hedging, to create an opportunity for both sides to work on the positive side of the ledger-deepening cooperation on a broad range of issues of common interest-that, over time, will raise the barrier to conflict by demonstrating the concrete benefits of collaboration. None of these steps requires either to side to rely on benign assumptions about the other's intentions, either short or long term. Nor do they require conceding vital interests, including in the case of the United States, commitments to allies' security. Thus as we have stressed, strategic reassurance is a way of dispelling misperceptions and clarifying what is and is not in real dispute between the two sides.Throughout this book, we have seen that strategic reassurance can emerge from the creative use of four core elements: restraint, reinforcement, transparency, and resilience . The judicious exercise of restraint-forgoing actions that may be misinterpreted as threatening-is a powerful tool for signaling intentions . For this reason we have suggested a number of areas where each side should exercise restraint in both weapons development (such as nuclear weapons, missile defense, and antisatellite capabilities) and operations (basing and exercises). We recognize, however, that restraint runs the risk of being misperceived as a sign of weakness (not only by the other country but by domestic audiences as well). Therefore, reinforcement is a vital adjunct: by undertaking reciprocal steps in response to the other's restraint, a virtuous cycle can be initiated that will build confidence, as can be seen in proposals to link actions by each side in areas such as strategic systems and doctrine. Transparency not only is a way of dispelling uncertainties about capabilities but also can help give the other side adequate warning of changing intentions (from open skies to observations of exercises), thus reducing the risk of breakout and lowering the potential dangers from unilateral restraint. Resilience, too, lowers the risk of exercising restraint and, most important, reduces the need to resort to preemptive or escalatory measures, thus increasing crisis stability and avoidance of conflict through inadvertence (cyber is a particularly powerful domain that exemplifies the stability-enhancing value of enhanced resilience). Strategic resolve is important too-each side must clearly identify and communicate its fundamental interests so that deterrence failure does not result from a lack of clarity about them.This discussion has also shown the limits of confidence building. These steps will prove highly valuable if-but only if-each side is convinced that it ,cannot achieve its goals unilaterally. In other words, both sides must be convinced that their relationship resembles what game theorists call the prisoners' dilemma. If they cooperate, both sides will achieve their best outcome, but if one unilaterally seeks to improve its position at the other's expense, the second will take steps in response that ultimately will make both sides worse off.There are powerful reasons to believe that this model accurately characterizes the U.S.-China relationship. China's economic success and growing nationalism mean that China likely will possess both the means and the will to resist U.S. unilateral steps to sustain its primacy in its past form and to hold China vulnerable. Conversely, the United States possesses enormous military capability. Its capacity for technological innovation and the support of key actors in the region suggest that Washington will not accept any Chinese attempts to establish a sort of East Asian Monroe Doctrine that would drive the United States out of the region. If both sides share this perception of a possible negative and dangerous interactive dynamic, they will have a powerful incentive to avoid moving down this slippery slope. The policies we suggest-in their broad philosophies and in their specifics-can help them achieve that.

If, by contrast, either or both misjudge the other's capacity or intentions, the tragedy of the prisoners' dilemma could become a reality. This could come about as a result of an exaggerated sense by each side of its own future capabilities-or an underestimation of the will or capacity of the other. For example, should Chinese strategists become persuaded that the United States is in decline or embracing more isolationist policies, they may be tempted to believe that they could prevail in a head-to-head competition. Similarly, should the United States become convinced that flaws in China's political system or adverse demographics will limit China's ability to keep pace with determined U.S. military modernization, American planners might try to apply what might be called the "Reagan" narrative concerning the end of the Cold War-that the U.S.-Soviet arms race bankrupted the USSR and brought about an era of unipolarity.

Maintaining dual containment/engagement policy is key --- cooperative efforts can integrate China into the international order, but maintaining a strong military presence to hedge against Chinese aggression is necessary.Michael Lumbers, July 2015. Visiting Fellow at The Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, PhD in International History from the London School of Economics and Political Science. “Whither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China's Rise,” Comparative Strategy, 34.4, pages 311-329.

The policy of choice for the great majority of China watchers, the foreign policy establishment at large, and U.S. policymakers for more than 40 years, containment and engagement draws on a long heritage of essentially liberal ideas about international order. As with confrontation and enhanced balancing, the objective of containment and engagement is perpetuating American preeminence in the Asia–Pacific. It aims to do so, however, by supplementing politico-military pressure to check Chinese ambitions with an interlocking, mutually beneficial web of economic, institutional, and cultural links that incentivizes China to cooperate with the global order rather than challenge it: sticks and carrots. An underlying assumption of this approach is that reliance on overtly hostile measures to ensure Chinese compliance with international norms will only confirm the mainland's worst assumptions of U.S. intentions and turn it into an enemy with a revisionist agenda.Aside from being provocative, most containers and engagers deem such measures unnecessary. “China does not pose a threat to America's vital security interests today, tomorrow or at any time in the near future,” Robert Ross concludes in a typical assessment. In stark contrast to confrontationists and enhanced balancers, these observers draw attention to a myriad of deep-seated economic and demographic problems in China that they see as constraining its development and likely to divert resources needed for an assertive foreign policy, problems that afford some latitude for modulated containment and the pursuit of initiatives aimed at muting the more corrosive elements of the Sino-American rivalry. A defensive, risk-averse foreign policy would seem to be a logical course for a country consumed with implementing much-needed economic reform, meeting the growing demands of a restless populace, and hemmed in on all sides by vigilant regional actors wary of its expanding influence. In fact, this is exactly how containers and engagers interpret Chinese grand strategy in the post–Cold War era. China's overriding priority is to sustain the remarkable economic growth of the past 30 years, which its leaders regard as key to maintaining political and social stability among a populace that can no longer be swayed by appeals to ideology. A stable international environment is conducive to this focus. While Beijing chafes at America's military presence in the region, particularly its informal commitment to the defense of Taiwan, and longs for a transition to a multipolar world where U.S. power is constrained, it recognizes both the

need for avoiding confrontation and advancing its economic and security interests through constructive relations with Washington.While cautioning against overreacting to a threat that has been exaggerated in some quarters, containers and engagers do not take a cooperative, peaceful China for granted. According to their logic, the Chinese government's acute sense of aggrievement over historical episodes of international humiliation and its responsiveness to a pugnacious streak of nationalism among its people is worrisome, as are its uncertain long-term intentions, at best shaky commitment to the liberal global order, and rapid military modernization. As a hedge against China's rise veering off in an antagonistic direction, they call for preserving the U.S.-led hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia. To Beijing's great irritation, this policy also entails maintaining the flow of arms to Taiwan to uphold the credibility of America's security commitments throughout the region, as well as holding the Chinese government's feet to the fire for human rights violations and pressing it to make itself more accountable to the population, the long-held assumption being that a more democratic China will be less prone to aggression.The great appeal of containment and engagement for U.S. decision makers is that, more than any other choice of strategy toward China, it preserves the greatest number of options and has hitherto proven sufficiently flexible to accommodate evolving conditions in the Sino-American relationship. Most importantly, this blend of deterrence and conciliation has largely succeeded in keeping a lid on tensions between China and its neighbors in a region rife with flashpoints and has made some progress in integrating the PRC into the existing international order. It seems well suited for today's challenging strategic environment, in which the United States is buffeted by resource constraints, extensive global commitments, and anti-interventionist popular sentiment as it looks to preserve its leadership role in Asia by means short of confrontation.Yet over the coming years, this longstanding policy, which has worked well while China has remained relatively weak and preoccupied with internal development, will be subjected to unprecedented strains. Whether it seeks to translate its growing power into increased regional clout or attempts to outwardly deflect domestic discontent through aggressive posturing, acting out of strength or weakness, the PRC is likely to present new security challenges that will test the support of voters and policy elites alike for engagement. If moderate efforts to encourage China's further adjustment to U.S. preferences in the realms of security, trade, and global governance are seen as falling short or, even worse, displaying timidity in the face of Chinese assertiveness, a stronger emphasis on containment will surely result.

2AC – Drones Bad

US surveillance drones in Japan antagonize China and risk dangerous escalation of smaller disputes.John Glaser, 10/3/2013. Editor at Antiwar.com. He has been published at The Washington Times, Al Jazeera, The American Conservative Magazine, and The Daily Caller, among other outlets. “US Teams Up With Japan to Spy on China With Global Hawk Drones,” Antiwar, http://antiwar.com/blog/2013/10/03/us-teams-up-with-japan-to-spy-on-china-with-global-hawk-drones/.

The U.S. has just announced a deal with Japan that will allow basing rights for surveillance drones. Oh and the Pentagon swears their purpose is to surveil North Korea. Really, they promise. China? What’s a China?“The primary mission for the Global Hawks will be to fly near North Korea, where U.S. officials hope they will greatly enhance the current spying capabilities,” reports the Washington Post. Maybe – perhaps – an unintended side benefit to the drone missions will be to coordinate with Japan on ” the movements of Chinese ships in the vicinity.”You can bet Beijing won’t see North Korea as the primary target for the U.S. spy drones. In recent weeks, the Japanese Defense Ministry has indicated a strong interest in obtaining drones for themselves in order to spy on and respond to Chinese military movements in and around the disputed maritime territory of the Senkaku/Diayou islands, currently the most intense point of tension between Japan and China.Immediately following these indications, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visit with their Japanese counterparts and secure a deal to allow the U.S. to base its own drones on Japanese territory and take care Japanese defense for them. It’s a win for the U.S. in that it mitigates the Japanese desire to obtain its own drones, a privileged capability that gives the U.S. an edge, and it maintains U.S. military autonomy in Japan at a time when tensions with China have influenced Tokyo towards beefing up its long-dormant national security state.But it’s not exactly a win for regional security. The U.S. has been antagonizing China by militarily encircling the rising Asian power and reaffirming defense agreements with all of China’s neighboring rivals, Japan foremost among them. A new scheme to increase spying on Chinese military movements in its own backyard is not going to go over well with Beijing . “The presence of Global Hawks in East Asia is sure to irritate China , which has become increasingly vocal in pushing back against the U.S. military presence in the region,” the Washington Post reports. “Officials in Beijing had criticized Tokyo in recent days for reports that the Japanese military was considering acquiring its own Global Hawks, saying the introduction of the drones could escalate tensions.”U.S. policy could easily exacerbate Sino-Japanese tensions and prompt a very dangerous escalation. “My biggest fear is that a small mishap is going to blow up into something much bigger ,” says Elizabeth C. Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations.“If there is a use of force between Japan and China,” warns Sheila A. Smith, also of CFR, “this could be all-out conflict between these two Asian giants. And as a treaty ally of Japan, it will automatically involve the United States.”

US surveillance drones undermine deterrence stability --- they risk accidents and also incentivize counter-measures by China and North Korea to aggressively increase operational opacity in their militaries --- the cumulative effect increases the risk of dangerous conflict spirals.Michael J. Boyle, Winter 2014/2015. Associate Professor of Political Science at La Salle University and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “The Race for Drones,” Orbis, 59.1, pp. 76–94.

The impact of the proliferation of drones likely will be seen first in surveillance and reconnaissance. Most major militaries engage in regular surveillance of the activities of their prospective opponents to look for signs of new or worrying behavior. Throughout the Cold War, such monitoring and detection was done through a variety of means, including manned aircraft and satellites and occasionally rudimentary drones.47 The expansion of the drone technology across the system, and the gradual improvement in the quality of the technology, will change the rules of the game as medium and long-range, high altitude drones become the default method of surveillance between rival states. Over time, they are likely to supplant manned aircraft, and even some satellites, due to three advantages that they hold over the alternatives. First, drones can linger over sites of interest to detect patterns of behavior over time in a way that few satellites can.48 Second, drones can be adaptable, particularly as they remain under the control of a remote operator who can redirect them towards points of interest. Third, these drones can fly closer to the target, thus, allowing for more fine-grained imagery than many satellites are capable of doing. Combined, these advantages will make high altitude drones increasingly useful for espionage and surveillance and will gradually change some of the rules of the game that have governed this activity between states for the last few decades.As with much of the history of drone use, the United States has taken the lead in using drones for surveillance over conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet as these wars wind down, the United States is finding a large number of alternative uses for its surveillance drones. As The Washington Post has reported, its arsenal of 400 Predators, Reapers, Hunters and other drones now are being directed to “a mélange of armed groups, drug runners, pirates and other targets that worry U.S. officials.” 49 At present, U.S. surveillance drones are flying over parts of the Sahara, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf, from bases in Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Seychelles and other locations.50 U.S. officials also have directed surveillance drones to assist both Turkey and Colombia in fighting insurgencies in their own borders. For the last several years, the United States has focused the use of drones against its enemies, such as Iran. The United States also plans to use high-altitude drones based in Japan to spy on North Korea.51 The Obama Administration also has begun recently to deploy surveillance drones against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rebel forces.52While their technology and doctrine lags, other states are joining the United States in seeking to use drones for close surveillance over more limited geographic areas. Russia has purchased nearly one hundred drones from Israel and UAE to use for monitoring borders in the Caucasus, and employed drones for 24-hour surveillance over the airspace of the 2014 Olympics in Sochi.53 Once its long-range, high altitude drones are ready in 2018, Russia may decide to replace some manned overflights over its territory and borders with drones. China has also been using drones for overflights over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. It is reported now to be developing a range of surveillance drones to match virtually every sophisticated American model.54 Japan recently announced that it would deploy a Global Hawk surveillance drone by 2016, in part to match China's use of drones over contested sea regions.55 India has expressed some interest in using surveillance drones over Kashmir, over its western frontier, the central regions affected by the Maoist-insurgency, and its coastline, and has made

surveillance drones a focal point of a substantial investment in new technology over the next decade.56In the short term, the technological advances of surveillance drones may have the beneficial effect of reinforcing deterrent relationships between states by improving the flow of information and reducing the risks of miscalculation. If, for example, a state is able to track in a detailed way the movement of troops along a border, and determine that that the movement is a training exercise rather than an invasion, this may reduce the risk of accidental war. For example, India is deploying 49 hand-held mini-drones along its borders with China and Pakistan to watch troop movements, especially in high-altitude regions.57 Such an effort, while fallible, might provide better intelligence to Indian commanders than they might otherwise possess and reduce the risk of misperception and conflict. Similarly, the United States is conducting drone surveillance operations over Iran from its bases in Qatar and UAE, thus, providing fine-grained details on Iran's nuclear programs that may help verify or falsify its claims about the purpose of its program.58 The growing use of surveillance drones, and the quality of the information that they produce on rivals, may reduce uncertainty and make accidental war less likely over the short term. Yet these benefits have to be weighed against the risk of drone accidents, as surveillance drones are subject to collisions with civilian aircraft which may lead to heightened tensions or conflict . This is a particular danger in the East China Sea, as both China and Japan will be fielding drones in a contested airspace.Over the long term, however, the positive effects of increased drone surveillance on deterrent relationships are less clear. As the drone technology improves the flow of information about what other actors are doing, there will be pressure for more aggressive (and risky) counter- measures designed to block the gaze of drones, as well as calls for more aggressive operational security about controversial activities, such as building nuclear programs. Today, most drones can be noticed when flying above targets and are countered by a range of simple counter-attacks. States such as Israel have shot down drones, and a number of others have scrambled aircraft to force drones to leave their airspace. Iran has also claimed to have shot down both the ScanEagle and RQ-170 U.S. drones and has even displayed the wreckage for the international media. Potential American rivals are considering new steps to ensure that they can take to shoot drones from the sky if they are detected in their airspace. Russia has developed a new model of its Tor M2 surface-to-air missile defense system, designed deliberately to shoot down drones.59 China has also developed a home-made laser defense system capable of shooting down U.S. drones.60 Another response in the future might be the development of counter-UAV operations in which drones are developed specifically for the purpose of detecting and destroying other drones.61 A consequence of a proliferation of drones might be a dangerous sequence of UAV operations and counter-UAV strikes by adversaries, thus, setting the stage for conflict spirals and dangerous accidents.Non-state actors also have devoted considerable efforts towards thwarting drones. The U.S Air Force has become concerned that states or insurgents might hack drones or use lasers and dazzlers to blind drones in contested environments.62 Al Qaeda has established a cell of engineers working on ways to jam or hijack American drones that target them.63 A recent publication by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb identified some low-tech countermeasures for drones, including jamming the frequency of drone use, using underground shelters, and even burning tires to generate black smoke.64Moreover, states will not accept the widespread use of surveillance drones, and the corresponding loss of secrecy, without a response. One way they may respond is to go further to ground to conceal their activities and to adopt stronger countermeasures to block detection of their activities. Russia recently has fielded a Krasukha 4 radar system designed to block surveillance of ground targets and emphasized that the system was capable of blocking both Global Hawk and

Reaper drones.65 It is not hard to imagine Iran or North Korea, for example, seeking to buy similar radar or laser defense capabilities to block U.S. surveillance drones. If that is not possible, these states may seek to build even more underground nuclear and military facilities to avoid their gaze. The spread of surveillance drones—and the corresponding conclusion that one must assume everything is being watched from the skies— paradoxically may lead these states to become more opaque, not less, due to aggressive countermeasures and improved operational security over military bases and sensitive locations. If so, the race for ever-more sophisticated surveillance drones may increase information asymmetries and generate more uncertainty, possibly to the point of destabilizing standing deterrent relationships over the long run.

XT – Drones Bad

Surveillance risks direct conflict --- creates pressure for China to shoot-down drones --- US couldn’t just back down.The Manila Times, 5/23/2015. “China jams US drones,” http://www.manilatimes.net/china-jams-us-drones/186040/.

Meanwhile, rapid militarization has security experts worried about the potential for a conflict.Rick Fisher, a China military affairs analyst, said China could increase pressure on the United States to halt surveillance flights in Asia by first attacking one of the unmanned aircraft flights.“Though UAVs like the Global Hawk are rather expensive, they are also regarded as more expendable because they are unmanned,” Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, told the Washington Free Beacon.“But failing to defend these UAVs runs the risk of China viewing them as ‘fair game’ to shoot down whenever they please.”Beijing also might attempt to capture a Global Hawk by causing one to crash in shallow water, or by attempting to snatch one in flight using a manned aircraft, Fisher said.