india's maritime security

8/13/2019 India's maritime security

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Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law

University

POLITICAL SCIENCE III

FINAL DRAFT

Indias Maritime Security

SUBMITTED TO: - SUBMITTED BY:-

Ms. Monika Srivastava Aditi Mangal

Roll no. 11

IIIrd

Semester

B.A. LL.B (Hons.)


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Contents

Acknowledgement ..................................................................................................... 3

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4

Traditional Threats ..................................................................................................... 6

Non-Traditional Maritime Challenges ....................................................................... 8

Piracy Issues: Current Status and Challenges ..........................................................10

Indias Maritime Power...........................................................................................12

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................14

Bibliography .............................................................................................................15


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Acknowledgement

Firstly, I would like to thank my Political Science Teacher, Dr. Monika Srivastava for having

provided me with the inspiration and guidance for this project. Without her help this project

wouldnt have been possible. I would also wish to thank our Vice-Chancellor who constantlyexhorts us to deliver our best at every level. I would also express my gratitude towards my

seniors who were a source of constant support and inspiration. Lastly, yet equally importantly, I

am grateful to my family and my friends for supporting me all the way through the making of

this project.

Last, but not the least, I thank God for his grace and divine blessings.


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Introduction

Trade is the life blood of a nation and international trade is carried out predominantly through the

mode of shipping. India is an emerging economic superpower much of which is attributable to a

spirit of entrepreneurship and a visionary instinct inherent in its people. India enjoys a richmaritime heritage in trade and commerce and its associated law is firmly rooted in historical

antiquity.

India being a major coastal state has numerous public law interests including exercising

sovereignty over its territorial seas and sovereign rights over its ocean resources, their

exploration and optimum economic exploitation. As a port state India is obviously interested in

asserting its port state jurisdiction under international law and effectuating it through port state

control of visiting ships. India is also a flag state and a major trading nation. Therefore,commercial maritime interests of India are equally important.1

India is faced with multiple and complex security and strategic challenges. There is political

turmoil and instability in the immediate neighbourhood. Maritime security threats and challenges

faced by India are very vast and complex. They span from terrorism and piracy to drug

trafficking, gun running, illegal immigration, environmental pollution and movement of

contraband. There are many constituents of such growth but two essential ingredients are

security of energy and trade. As the economy grows, so will these two, on the contrary, if these

are hindered in any way, there will be adverse effects on that growth. Both are almost entirely

dependent on our ability to ensure their safe movement at sea. Therefore, as India grows

economically, maritime security concerns will become increasingly important. This is quite aside

from the preparedness that must be maintained to deter threats at sea from possible nation state

adversaries. A clear recognition that sea power is an integral part of the country's national

interests is, therefore, imperative.

The Indian Ocean represents an increasingly significant avenue for global trade and arena for

global security. Rising flows of commerce, investment, and people are linking the Indian Ocean

nations to each other and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to the rest of the world, more closely.

1Proshonto K. Mukherjee, Enhancement of Maritime Law Education in the Indian Context, NUJS Law Review,Vol.4 (2011).


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The Indian Ocean has become a key strategic arena in the 21st century. One reason is the growth

of the Asian economies and their increased need for raw materials, including energy from the

Middle East, to provide for their economic growth. But trade is a twoway street and we have

witnessed an increasing flow of Asian labor, capital, and consumer goods, particularly to the rich

countries of the Arabian Peninsula. In addition, the end of the Cold War and ongoing crises in

Iraq and Afghanistan have diminished the importance of the Atlantic Ocean and boosted the

importance of the Indian Ocean as a conduit for Western military supplies. As a result,

traditional maritime security concerns have become more important.

"Nontraditional" maritime issues in the Indian Ocean region are now on the agenda. Forced

migration due to rising sea levels and polluted sea water is a problem that all Asian countries

have to take seriously in the years ahead if global warming continues. This is paralleled by

growing desertification in East Africa leading to food shortages, which in turn would increase

migration, much of it illegal. And fishery depletion in the Indian Ocean due to poor monitoring

and overfishing has become a serious matter that the international community must address.


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Traditional Threats2

Pakistan and China have been in military conflict with India, the former as many as four times,

and are the two countries which could pose a future military threat to India; no others are on the

horizon. Even with these two, the probability that any of them may want to go to war is not high;however, it cannot be ruled out. Pakistan might well find a short and sharp conflict advantageous

in overall terms as this might serve to unite a country fast fragmenting under sectarian and ethnic

pressures complemented by burgeoning fundamental Islamist forces.The fact that war with India

may be disastrous for Pakistan might be overlooked by its military leadership just as it did in

1971, losing half of its territory, and, in a different way, in1999. Till such time as the Army

remains in control in Pakistan, in particular of India related policy, this possibility must be

considered real even though the 'modus operandi' of asymmetric operations launched through

non state actors, is seen to be more economical with little risk of retaliation. This

notwithstanding, the Pak Army continues to seethe with its defeat in 1971 leading to the division

of the country and irrational conduct cannot be ruled out. It is, therefore, essential that India

maintain a convincing military deterrent against Pakistan. At sea, our naval power is superior and

needs to remain so; it must also be able to act in support of the war on land. Indian naval ships

can already hit targets quite deep in the hinterland with missiles fired from sea and increasing the

range of these weapons will enhance this capability. High states of preparedness to cope with

terrorist threats, at and from the sea, are a 'non sequitur'.

China falls in a different category. Its reasons for initiating military operations against India, if

that happens, will be largely strategic, to teach India a lesson, as it were, and to establish its

unchallenged dominance in Asia. It already has possession of that part of India it claims its own

in the western and central sectors of the boundary. In the eastern region, it has laid claim to

Arunachal Pradesh and this could well be the excuse that might be used to initiate any future

military conflict. It has built, and is building road and rail infrastructure right across the border

which will facilitate speedy movement of troops and logistics; airfields have also been expanded.

Events in Tibet following the demise of Dalai Lama might also create some tension.

Nevertheless, in the last decade, relations with China have been the most tranquil ever and not

just on the boundary. Bilateral trade between the two countries is crossing $ 60 billion and

2Prem Vir Das, Maritime Power: Key to Indias Security Interests, Aspen Institute India, 10.


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rising- even if skewed to China's advantage-making it India's largest trading partner. While it is

necessary, for both sides, particularly China, to rectify the mismatches in this trade, its rapidly

continuing growth is a positive in the relationship. The two countries interact at many

multilateral forums e.g. BASIC, BRIC, EAS and at Climate Change and WTO negotiations.

China has also not made much fuss over tests of our Agni missiles which are clearly not Pakistan

related. Meetings between leaders of the two countries have been positive. The two militaries

have also exercised together in a small way and there have been exchange of high level visits and

by warships to ports. This engagement needs to be enhanced; maritime cooperation is the easiest

and least problematic and will contribute in toning down the suspicion and deficit of trust that

plagues relations between the two countries. A structured mechanism can be put in place to

institutionalize the interface. Both countries have mutual concerns in ensuring the safety of sea

lanes in the expanded IO space and can work together towards this objective.


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Non-Traditional Maritime Challenges

Non-traditional maritime challenges create political, economic, and humanitarian problems and

include a diversity of state and non-state actors. Moreover, whereas the hard security questions

of the maritime domain remain a familiar problem set for policymakers, they have a much hardertime conceptualizing non-traditional, transnational, and human security issues that do not respect

national boundaries and which transcend institutional and policy stovepipes. Climate change is

of significant importance for the movement of people, especially in the Indian Ocean region.

Environmental problems such as sea level rise, desertification, and the submergence of islands

have contributed to the environmentally-driven migration of 50 to 200 million individuals and

created a new set of migrants, "environmental refugees." With a rise in environmental refugees,

additional problems such as health issues, scarce resource competition, and social and ethnic

tensions will surface.

This is important when examining the strategic environment of the Indian Ocean. Tensions

between India and Bangladesh could increase, and could worsen when Bangladesh faces extreme

environmental distress. Dunkerley also cited an earlier argument by Zakheim's that the US is

always tempted to focus on the most immediate and obvious of their national problems, which

usually lead to neglecting more critical, long-term issues. This tendency is only exacerbated by

policy elites who are uncomfortable working with non-state, private actors; hence the tendency

to ignore such issues. The tension inherent in immigration politics between countries was cited

as a case in point.

Commander Neil Gadihoke also spoke on the effects of climate change, arguing that the ensuing

rise in sea levels will bring a higher frequency and magnitude of natural disasters, more

complicated maritime boundary disputes, and health issues to the coastal populations as a result

of water damage. Importantly, the armed forces of Indian Ocean countries should expect to bear

the brunt of natural disaster response. Civilian agencies in these developing states simply do not

have the capacity or resources to respond in a satisfactory manner.

Dunkerley also discussed the challenges posed by food. He spoke about marine resources,

specifically fisheries, which provide nourishment to much of the Asian population. With an

increase in dependency, the global catch is now in trouble fish stocks are becoming

increasingly exploited and the number that is overexploited is expanding. He argued that


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increasing competition in these areas will intensify bilateral frictions as former fishermen resort

to piracy for its more lucrative wages and families migrate en masse for new economic

opportunities. This will cause difficulties in an Indo-US dialogue on the strategic environment,

as many of the non-traditional challenges are highly sensitive issues with differing priorities for

each.

Mohan Guruswamy addressed the population growth rate in Asia, citing the high potential for

significant grain shortages, and the associated challenges for Indian companies when purchasing

land for food cultivation in Africa, where much of the population is starving. Mostly though,

Guruswamy addressed trade in the region, citing Indian dependence on trade with Saudi Arabia

and the UAE. He also contended that part of Gwadar in Pakistan would become a Hong Kong of

South Asia and a major export hub for the Middle East. He emphasized as well that Gwadar Port

is not part of a larger "String of Pearls" conspiracy, but rather the cumulative result of many

economic developments. To put his colleagues at ease, Guruswamy noted that there are 25 ports

in the Indian Ocean in which the Indian Navy can refuel and re-supply within 24 hours Indias

own String of Pearls. He recommended working on labor issues to compete with China,

increasing foreign investment, and stimulating a domestic debate in order to respond to the

potential economic challenge posed by Gwadar.


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Piracy Issues: Current Status and Challenges

Dr. Geoffrey Kemp opened the session on piracy with an explanation as to why the Indian Ocean

region is an ideal location for piracy. As the region has attracted more capital and tourists, pirates

have simply followed the money. Open waters, coastlines that are difficult to penetrate, largedistances, crowded sea lanes, and most importantly, failed states, have all created the perfect

environment for piracy. Somalia, with an ungoverned coastline as long as the US eastern

seaboard, is particularly susceptible as a result. It is well known that a lack of economic

opportunity and defunct governance structures provide a breeding ground for pirates. As such,

the only long-term solution is to control the land from where the pirates originate. This is the

central challenge. 3

Commander Shishir Upadhyaya said that two-thirds of the Indian Ocean is under the threat ofpiracy. He identified challenges such as the size of the surveillance area and reaction time that

have hindered navies from capturing pirates, while inadequate legal mechanisms for the trial of

pirates has been an issue on land. He suggested that cooperation between navies and the shipping

industries and using private security measures would deter pirates.

In the discussion that followed, it was remarked that surveillance costs more and is more difficult

to coordinate than the simple payment of ransoms, thus creating an economic incentive for

inaction and exacerbating the problems of prevention and response. Participants agreed that

piracy is an immediate concern for India, while only a regional concern for the US, and

furthermore, only one of minimal interest. One participant argued that it would take a major

event, such as the hijacking of a nuclear transit, in order to galvanize a response from the

international community. When the question of how to address piracy from land arose, it was

suggested that a global convention be held that would clearly outline the circumstances under

which multilateral efforts can and should be coordinated.

In the third quarter of 2011, maritime security concerns in the Indian Ocean continued to be

dominated by piracy and armed robbery at sea, specifically the hijacking of merchant vessels by

well-armed Somalia-based pirates. By the end of 2011, 214 vessels had been attacked, 31

hijacked (a 14-percent success rate), while eight vessels remained under capture awaiting release

3Maritime Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region: A Workshop Report, Center for the National Interest,(2011).


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and of payment of ransoms, 497 seafarers had been held captive, and 10 seafarers had died.

Piracy Attack Groups (PAGs) are increasingly well armed, highly motivated by the prospect of

very large ransom payments (average payment is currently $5.4 million), and many are using

captured merchant vessels as motherships to stage further attacks.4

At the moment, it is too early to tell whether Somali pirates will be willing, or indeed able, to

regain the offensive initiative in 2012 and beyond. Currently, three outcomes are plausible:

The better-equipped, better-armed, and more experienced PAGs will make concertedmoves to attack ships with embarked armed security personnel, using tactical acumen

and far greater weight of fire (including the use of heavy machine guns if available) to

defeat vessel defenders in a protracted fire-fight. Such hijacking attempts would

necessitate that pirates overcome BMP defences. But successful seizures would boost

captured vessel inventory and supply more motherships for attacking operations, which

could better yield further successful hijackings.

The steady proliferation of privately contracted armed security personnel on vesselsoperating in the HRA, coupled with the limited numbers of decent motherships, will

cement the current deterrent effect, and will dilute PAG operational capacity to the

extent that attacks and successful hijackings further decline in 2012 and beyond.

The current status quo will be maintained. There will be an ebb and flow of attackingrates during the monsoon cycles, and a scattering of successful hijackings of vessels that

are either insufficiently prepared with full BMP-4 and/or do not have an armed security

team on board.5

4David Michel, Russell Sticklor. Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges, (2012) 26.5Rupert Herbert-Burns Countering Piracy, Trafficking, and Terrorism: Ensuring Maritime Security in the IndianOcean, (2012) 8..


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Indias Maritime Power

As stated earlier, as the premier maritime force in the region, India has both security concerns at

sea and responsibility to ensure safe movement across the shipping routes of the IO which needs

both capabilities and cooperative interfaces with others. While the Indian Navy is, undoubtedly,the largest littoral sea power, the numbers of its seagoing platforms has stagnated, even declined

in some categories, over the last several years even as those of China have continued to increase

rapidly. There are many reasons that have led to this unhappy state of affairs including

unjustifiable delays in decision making; inadequate capacities in public sector shipyards has also

been, and are, a serious constraint. Until recently, all orders for building of warships have been

restricted to defence yards only which are not only overstretched but also suffer from

inefficiencies endemic to government undertakings. It is essential that the private sector be

brought into play. No doubt, competences required in constructing warships are more complex

than those needed for building merchant vessels but a beginning has to be made. Recent

measures to farm out some orders to private shipyards are, therefore, a step in the right direction.

These yards will need full support from the Navy in terms of close interaction and provision of

supervisory personnel on the ground. It is also desirable to selectively follow a 'buy-make'

approach in which one or two platforms are purchased outright from a foreign shipyard and the

rest four or five of that type built in our own; this will enable faster induction of technology in

the yards and of new ships and submarines in the Navy. Routinely ordering all of them to be

built locally, on the plea of fostering self-reliance, is a shortsighted measure; it must be

realized that older ships have to be scrapped even as new ones are brought in. The challenge is to

ensure that the latter process is faster which will never happen unless the suggested measure is

put in place. Furthermore, the buy-make approach will promote, and not hinder, indigenous

capabilities, and quicker. In this context, recent decisions to build seven new frigates and six

submarines in three defence shipyards will, contrary to the exaggerated claims that have been

made, have no impact on the force levels of 2020 as none of them will materialize in that time

frame, leaving these platforms at the same numbers as today.

There is a mistaken belief that Navies and Coast Guards alone comprise maritime power. A

country's merchant marine and its ports are equally important elements of its strength at sea. In

the last three decades, India's merchant shipping has grown to just 11 million tons from 7 million


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tons in 1980; in this same period, China, beginning from the same threshold, has built a fleet of

over 80 million tons. From five shipyards until ten years ago, their number has gone up to just

seven in India even as China has more than ten times that number. Less than one fifth of our

overseas trade is carried in Indian vessels. Similarly, in a country endowed with long coast lines

on either side, we have just 13 major ports. These are very disturbing statistics. With India's

economy, and consequently, trade growing at the rate that they are, these numbers need to be

speedily enhanced. Until recently, this sector was not open to the private sector; happily this self-

defeating approach has now been reversed. Measures are also necessary to encourage private

sector shipbuilding through suitable incentives so that merchant shipping tonnage doubles to at

least 25 million tons in the next ten years.


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Conclusion

India's security interests, in the changing environment, stretch across a broad spectrum which

covers geo-strategic considerations arising from the country's size and location, its energy and

trade security, traditional threats posed by nation state adversaries, and those that are of adifferent but equally threatening kind. We have to ensure that we can safeguard our interests

across this wide spread. To this menu should be added the ability to respond to natural disasters

which visit the IO region more often than they do elsewhere. A mix of capabilities, essentially

maritime, is needed, ocean going as well as coastal, supported by a comprehensive and

networked information, intelligence and command and control mechanisms. Ability of these

systems to withstand sophisticated levels of hostile cyber warfare is equally important. To this

list should be added a vibrant merchant marine served by ports that are both quantitatively and

qualitatively capable of coping with the escalating need. Finally, to answer the challenges and

responsibilities arising from the developing scenario, it is imperative that the nation's diplomacy

and its maritime strategies function in sync with each other. A holistic approach is essential if

India's sea power is first, built to the required level, and then, exploited consistent with the

nation's security interests.


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india's maritime security

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