individual freedoms in turkey
TRANSCRIPT
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INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS
IN TURKEY
Marc Pierini
E PTE MB E R 2013
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INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS
IN TURKEY
Marc Pierini
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2013 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views
represented herein are the authors own and do not necessarily reect the views ofCarnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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Carnegie Endowment. Please direct inquiries to:
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Tis publication can be downloaded at no cost at CarnegieEurope.eu.
CP 190
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About the Author v
Summary 1
Preface 3
Introduction 3
Freedom of Cultural Expression 5
Managing the Coexistence of Different Lifestyles 16
Conclusion 22
Notes 25
Carnegie Europe 28
Contents
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v
About the Author
Marc Pierini is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, where his
research focuses on developments in the Middle East and urkey from
a European perspective. He is also currently a fellow with the Open
Society Foundation, urkey.
Pierini was a career EU diplomat from December 1976 to April 2012. He
was EU ambassador to urkey (20062011) as well as EU ambassador
to unisia and Libya (20022006), Syria (19982002), and Morocco
(19911995). He also served as the first coordinator for the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, or the Barcelona Process, from 1995 to 1998
and was the main negotiator for the release of the Bulgarian hostages
from Libya from 2004 to 2007.
He has published three essays in French, Le Prix de la Libert,
lgrammes Diplomatiques, and O Va la urquie?
*
Te author is grateful to Philipp Kienemund for his excellent research
assistance.
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1
Summary
Turkeys ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has witnessed economic
success and launched major reforms, in particular writing a new constitution,
negotiating with the Kurdistan Workers Party, passing four judicial reform
packages, and install ing an ombudsman. In sharp contrast, the AKPs exclusive
reliance on its election victories for legitimacy and increasingly authoritarian
practices in the elds of freedom of cultural expression and coexistence of dif-
ferent lifestyles are at odds with its stated objective of establishing an advanced
democracy. Popular discontent with these practices and unending restrictionson media freedom resulted in major protests in May and June 2013.
Key Findings
The government has introduced more conservative norms in various
elds, such as cultural policy, the dress code, education, womens life-
styles, and alcohol sales.
Freedom of cultural expression of citizens of Kurdish origin has been
restricted by the government as part of the conict between separatist
Kurds and the state.
The government has increased ideologically oriented project funding,
imposed its political preferences on arts and culture, and has not con -
sulted with the cultural sector.
The ruling party has ramped up efforts to impose its own religious-
conservative views on society, using the majority it acquired in three suc-
cessive legislative elections as justication. The coexistence of different
lifestyles is not a goal.
The government has responded to recent protests with a divisive nar-
rative and heavy-handed law-and-order policies. It has used aggressive
language against specic people, groups, and institutions both in Turkeyand abroad.
Steps Turkey Should Take
Abide by commitments to the Council of Europe on cultural policy.The
state should formulate and manage a neutral policy on culture and the arts
reecting Turkeys vast ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity.
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2 | Individual Freedoms in Turkey
Create a cultural policy workshop. A nongovernmental-organization-
driven forum composed of cultural associations, lmmakers, civil society
organizations, academics, and other cultural actors should be created. It would
allow all concerned stakeholders to freely discuss cultural issues, to dene an
agreed upon concept for Turkeys cultural policy, and to consult on issues of
tolerance and coexistence in this eld.
Prioritize a policy that supports tolerance and the coexistence of life-
styles. In a liberal-democracy framework, the ruling party should avoid
imposing its preferred lifestyle and value system on the entire society and
recognize that diversity benets the country.
Create a culture of dialogue and consensus.Legitimacy that stems solely
from ballot-box results is not sustainable in an advanced democracy. Dialogue
and consensus should be built systematically at local and national levels.
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3
Preface
In any democracy, the success of the rule-of-law infrastructure is dependent
upon the ways in which the daily issues of democracy are handled. These
issues range from freedom of the press to accommodating cultural or religious
differences, as well as issues linked to individual lifestyles.
My rst paper, Press Freedom in Turkey, was issued in January 2013. This
follow-up paper addresses two additional issues linked to individual freedoms:
freedom of cultural expression and coexistence of different lifestyles. Taken
together, I consider these three issues as central to the advancement of democ-racy in Turkey. Recent protests in May and June 2013 illustrated how central
they are considered to be by a large segment of the population.
Research for this paper was conducted between February and July 2013 dur-
ing ve visits to Turkey, including some 40 meet ings with various stakeholders
in different sectors: academia, think tanks, cultural circles, the media, the rul ing
party, and the government. It was mostly written before the Taksim Square pro-
tests, was adjusted subsequently to take them into account, and was nal ized on
August 2, 2013.
IntroductionTurkeys ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has won three consecu-
tive elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011, has formed single-party governments,
and is committed to establishing advanced democracy in the country. Since
2002, the AKP has launched a large number of reforms and has been able to
build upon the economic policies of its immediate predecessor. Intense work
is under way on several major pieces of the countrys democratic infrastruc-
ture, such as writing a new constitution, negotiating a peace agreement with
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), passing a fourth judicial reform pack-
age, and installing an ombudsman. Yet, the government has been criticized for
restricting media and cultural freedoms and for interfering with private lives,
as well as for its lack of consultation with civil society and divergence from
European Union norms.
In recent history, Turkey was often governed under the armys inuence.
Military coups overthrew civilian leaders in 1960, 1971, and 1980, while a mili-
tary memorandum was issued in 1997 to precipitate the resignation of the prime
minister and an e-coup was launched in 2007 when the army General Staff
posted a statement on its website criticizing the presidential election process.
The current constitution has been in force since 1982 and was inherited from
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4 | Individual Freedoms in Turkey
the 1980 coup. Some analysts argue that, despite many recent changes, the fabric
of Turkish society dates back to the 1980s: fear of the state is deeply imbedded,
the government declares rather than effectively consults, and collective bargain-
ing and civi l society dialogue have no real place in the countrys management.
Yet, successive AKP governments have lifted many of Turkeys traditional
taboos. The role of the mi litary in politics has been challenged and gradually
eliminated. The concept of Turkishness has been modied in the Turkish
Penal Code. The cultural identity of citizens of Kurdish origin has been rec-
ognized and negotiations are under way with the PKKwhich is considered
a terrorist organization by Turkey, the EU, and the United Statesto end
decades of bloodshed in a conict over Kurdish autonomy. This negotiation,
by its very existence, amounts to a modication of the hitherto immovable
concept of a unitary state.
However, major issues with media, cultural, and personal freedoms persist.
From a liberal democracy perspective, the solution is not found exclusively inthe bal lot box for the simple reason that such solutions do not depend solely on
legislative changes but also on the day-to-day management, at the national or
local level, of differences of views among citizens. In modern and diverse soci-
eties, conducting inclusive forms of dialogue and build-
ing consensus is an essential part of advancing democracy.
This is especial ly true in Turkey, which is quite diverse in
terms of beliefs, religious practices, and lifestyles.
The European Unions Charter of Fundamental Rights
provides a valid basis for evaluating Turkeys positions on
these issues since the country is engaged in accession nego-tiations with the EU and wil l eventually adhere to the char-
ter. The code establishes principles related to the right to liberty and security;
respect for private and family life; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion;
freedom of expression and information; freedom of assembly and of associa-
tion; freedom of the arts and sciences; and respect for cultural, religious, and
linguistic diversity.
Similarly, the Council of Europe offers relevant texts to measure freedom
of cultural expression. As a member of the Council of Europe, Turkey adheres
to the main principles held by that institution in cultural matters. Those prin-
ciples include respect for identity; the promotion of cultural diversity andintercultural dialogue; respect for freedom of expression, association, and
opinion; the support of creativity; the promotion of cultural participation;
and the democratization of culture. These are the accepted benchmarks for
Turkeys cultural policy, and they may provide solutions to many of the con-
icts over the freedom of cultural expression.
By European standards, many of the changes Turkey has undergone rep-
resent advances toward democracy, at least as long as a balance is struck
among the various segments of society and their specic preferences. Yet,
Conducting inclusive forms of dialogue
and building consensus is an essential
part of advancing democracy.
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Marc Pierini | 5
in bringing about this change, and maybe unwillingly so, the AKP govern-
ment has crossed over a new frontier. The citizens of Turkey have overcome
their traditional submissiveness to the state. Civil society is more active, many
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been created, striking workers
have become more demanding, artists criticize both the state and their private
sponsors, and the youth is more rebellious and imaginative.
Turkey is not the only state undergoing a transition, of course. During the
last decade, change has come to the countries of the Arab world, Brazil, Spain,
and more. Although these countries cannot be directly compared, their citi-
zens are behaving similarly, daring to protest their rulers. These citizens have
introduced a new form of direct democratic expression to their societies that
is unrelated to the polit ical sphere. In Turkey in particular, the protests around
the Taksim Square and Gezi Park renovation project are a telling illustration
of this popular groundswell.
In this new socioeconomic context, there is a sharp contrast between theAKPs political and economic successes and its increasingly authoritarian
practices in the areas of cultural expression and tolerance of different life-
styles. Turkish society is polarized. Protesters confront what Todays Zamancol-
umnist hsan Da has described as postmodern authoritarianism, dened
as a framework in which the majority legislates a particular way of life and
uses the state apparatus to impose its choice of moral-
ity, lifestyle and values system.1Contacts with the arts
and cultural communities in Turkey have very much con-
rmed this view.
Since the AKP, in power alone for more than ten years,has increasingly used religious concepts and terminology
in the formulation and implementation of its policies, it
would be tempting to summarize the debate on freedom
of cultural expression and coexistence of lifestyles as a ten-
sion between secularism and religious conservatism. But the debate is much
broader than secularist political parties and nationalist movements. What is at
stake is the issue of fundamental freedoms in the daily life of Turkish citizens
and the limits on an elected governments way to exercise authority.
Freedom of Cultural Expression
Contrary to freedom of the press, in Turkey, freedom of cultural expression
a concept extensively dened by international organizations such as the United
Nations Educational, Scientic, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and
the Council of Europeis not extensively monitored by a large array of
NGOs and is not the subject of regular reports. Evidence is scarce, research is
minimal, and public events on the issue are few and far between.
What is at stake is the issue of fundamental
freedoms in the daily life of Turkish
citizens and the limits on an elected
governments way to exercise authority.
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6 | Individual Freedoms in Turkey
In Turkey, only a few organizations deal directly or indirectly with the
subject matter: Anadolu Kltr, Antenna, BiaNet, Bilgi University, the Black
Ribbon Project (Siyah Bant), Boazc University, the Istanbul Arts and
Culture Foundation (IKSV), as well as a few blogs and individual researchers
or activists. International actors such as UNESCO, the Council of Europe,
and the European Union are involved in monitoring developments in the eld
of freedom of cultural expression. International NGOs such as Art Freedom,
the Art Newspaper, Cultural Exchange Turkey-Netherlands, Index, Pen
International, and Red Thread are also active in this eld.
The risk posed by this dearth of coverage is that any research into freedom
of cultural expression in Turkey will give prominence to anecdotal evidence as
opposed to analytical ndings. Nevertheless, this paper represents an attempt
to collect available evidencefrom existing research, media, interviews with
stakeholders, governmental statements, and morein a systematic manner
and to provide a coherent assessment of the situation.Freedom of cultural expression can be separated into two sets of issues:
those related to the Kurds and those related to the relationship between the
state and culture. These two subjects take center stage because, in the available
literature and in the research conducted for this paper, they are the recurrent
sources of incidents and complaints about freedom of cultural expression.
The Kurdish Dimension
For several decades, Turkey has been confronted with terrorist acts perpetrated
by members of the Kurdish ethnic group pushing for a degree of autonomy
from the Turkish state. Until the end of 2012, no political negotiation processbetween the government and the Kurds had been successfully initiated. As
was the case with media freedom, the conict has impacted the freedom of
cultural expression.
For a long time, the Turkish government has censored books, banned art-
ists from performing, and taken legal action to limit Kurds freedom of cul-
tural expression. A large proportion of all such actions undertaken in Turkey
is related to antiterrorism legislation and is directed against the Kurdish seg-
ment of the population or those allegedly linked to the PKK.
Traditionally, Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code dealing with the notion
of insulting Turkishness (the broad meaning of Turkishness is being aTurk) was the main vehicle by which the Turkish government interfered with
the freedom of cultural expression. It was reformed in 2008 (Turkishness was
replaced by the Turkish nation) and its use now requires prior authorization
from the Ministry of Justice. However, other legislative tools remain available.
As stated by Professor Banu Karaca in a book entitled New Perspectives on
Turkey: While Article 301 seems to have outlived its function, leaving none-
theless a trail of intimidation, other articles of the Turkish criminal law pun-
ishing separatist expressions, for instance, remain active and are open for
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Marc Pierini | 7
promiscuous use. Together with police interventions, nancial and personal
threats and the like, they present a repertoire for delegitimizing and discour -
aging certain k inds of expressions, or their public circulation.2
As is the case with press freedom, the provisions of the Turkish Criminal
Code (Article 314) and the Anti-Terror Law (mainly Articles 5 and 7) consti -
tute the main bases for censorship or prosecution. The Law on Meetings and
Demonstrations (no. 2911) is also used.
This situation has been documented by researchers. For example, Pelin
Basaran, director of the Black Ribbon Project,3commented that in April 2012
a criminal lawsuit was brought against 13 members of the rst Kurdish musicgroup and the only Kurdish theatre company in [the city of] Batman . . . for vio-lation of Law no. 2911 on Meetings and Demonstrationson the grounds thatthey held a demonstration by participating in Newroz celebrations [the Kurdishnew year festival], issued a press statement, and inamed the public with erbane
[a tambourine with disks] that they sang along with. The court sentenced themto the punishment of non-performance of art.
The author points to simi lar charges of propagandizing for the terrorist
organization or being a member of the organization, the word organiza-
tion referring to the outlawed PKK.
Until recently, the government held the view that support for terrorism
could come from the arts and culture domain. In a speech in November
2011, then Turkish minister of the interior Idris Naim ahin said: There is a
backyard that feeds terrorism. In other words, there is propaganda, terrorist
propaganda. . . . What kind of support are they delivering? Perhaps they are
reecting it on a canvas with a painting. Reects it in his/her poetry, writeshere and there, writes daily articles in columns.4The authorities and the artis-
tic community strongly disagree about which activities are to be considered
artistic and which fall under the scope of propaganda for, or membership in,
a terrorist organization, which is similar to the situation with press freedom.
Even after the initiation of peace discussions between the state and the
PKK, difculties remain. During the 2013 Newroz celebration, a singer,
Niyazi Koyuncu, was met with protests on social media
for singing in Laz (the language of the Black Sea region)
and participating in a Kurdish festival. Several artists
supported him with statements such as: Arts and artistsstand for peace for humanity. With this commitment in
Diyarbakr, Niyazi Koyuncu was on the stage saying we
do not have to speak the same language to understand one
another, which is our sentiment.5
It remains to be seen if the current peace negotiations
between the government and the PKK will succeed in bringing about a con-
sensus on cultural issues. Undoubtedly, education in the mother tongue and
artistic expression in the Kurdish language will be of central relevance.
It remains to be seen if the current peace
negotiations between the government
and the PKK will succeed in bringing
about a consensus on cultural issues.
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8 | Individual Freedoms in Turkey
The Relationship Between the State and Culture
Turkey has always had a strong tradition of state management of public pol i-
cies and funding. Hence, the relationship between the state and culture has
long been a sensitive one, although never one of very high relat ive importance.During recent months, a number of public decisions in the cultural sector
have increasingly stirred up uneasiness and unrest.
Public Theaters
In April and May 2013, a major dispute erupted over public subsidies pro -
vided for theatersboth municipal and nationalreecting the cultural clash
between the ruling party and the art elite, especially in Istanbul. Turkey has 30
national theaters and Istanbul alone has nearly 100 municipal theaters. Until the
spring of 2013, all of those theaters received public subsidies in a pattern similar
to most European theaters. However, as reported in April 2013, the Istanbulmayor amended the regulations of the City Theaters, which are run by the
Metropolitan Municipality, to increase the inuence of civil servants in selecting
the repertoire and to better control the artistic content of the theater. 6
Subsequently, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan announced the priva-
tization of theaters. Referring to those protesting the move, the prime minis -
ter asked: They have started to insult us and all conservatives over a change
in the City Theaters regulations. . . . Who are you? From where do you get the
authority to express opinions on every issue, to argue that you are the only eli -
gible person to know everything? Are theaters your monopoly in this country?
Are arts your monopoly? These days are gone. He went on, You can play onyour theaters freely after privatization. If there is a need for support, then we
as the government can sponsor plays that we want.7
Reactions from the art sector have been biting. In May 2013, an NGO, Arts
Freedom, commented: Arts organisations described the attack as a point-
less witch hunt, pointing out that the theatre is subsidized in almost every
developed country and that Turkeys theatres are the fullest in Europe, thanks
to low prices and a most traditional repertoire that appeals to conservative
and religious audiences in the governing AK partys Anatolian heartland.8
The president of the Theater Critics Association, stn Akmen, declared,
Privatizing theaters means cultural murder. Look at the world, are the
English National Theater and the French Comdie Franaise privatized asso -
ciations? No, they are not.9
The Black Ribbon Projects Pelin Basaran also commented on the states
interference with the theaters repertoire: Instead of determining and rem-
edying content and organizational problems of theatres working in aflia -
tion with it, through a regulation that it suddenly put in effect excluding the
main actors from the solution process, the state changed the organizational
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Marc Pierini | 9
structure and shifted the function of creating a repertoire from the art direc-
tor to a bureaucrat appointed by the state.10
This reorganization of public subsidies to theaters was in a way direct ly
linked to the governments cultural preferences, and importantly, the state
did not consult with theater professionals (such as managers, actors unions,
theater critics, and academics) before making its decision. These steps were a
marked departure from the practice of developed countries and led to a sub -
stantial reduction in funds for public theaters in Turkey. All in all, this episode
effectively introduced limits to the freedom of cultural expression.
Television
The television sector is not exempt from difculties either. At a more anec-
dotal, but still politically signicant, level the widely publicized troubles
encountered by the soap opera The Magnicent Centuryare revealing. Advertised
in December 2010 and aired for the rst time in January 2011, the show led to
nearly 75,000 complaints being led with the Radio and Television Supreme
Council (RTUK).11On January 12, 2011, the council issued a warning to the
television station airing the program on the grounds that it broadcasted a pro-
gram that was contrary to the national and moral values of the society.12The
RTUKs warning constituted a form of intimidation that, later on, resulted in
the story line of the series being modied.
The show, based on the life of Suleiman the Magnicent, the Ottoman
sultan, is immensely successful with some 150 million viewers in Turkey, the
Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, and Russia. It has earned substan-
tial revenues and beneted Turkeys international image.Timemagazine described the program: Crammed with trinkets, eunuchs,
wine, giggly harem girls, seduction and intrigue, Magnicent Century, a
Turkish soap opera on the life and reign of Suleiman the Magnicent . . .
might at times appear gaudy, predictable and rife with historical inaccuracies.
To the shows estimated 150 mil lion v iewers, . . . however, its nothing more
than good entertainment. To Turkeys Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan,
though, its blasphemy.13
According to the Turkish prime minister, This is not the Suleiman we
know. . . . Before my nation, I condemn both the director of this series and
the owner of the television station. We have already alerted the authorities andwe are awaiting a judicial decision.14The prime ministers statement attracted
worldwide attention, as it revealed a direct intervention of the state into free-
dom of cultural expression. It was followed by the removal of the show from
Turkish Airl ines in-ight entertainment program.
Todays Zaman columnist hsan Da wrote: What we see in this anecdote
[the problems encountered by the TV series] is that an imagined history with
values attached to it is imposed not only on the producers of the series but on
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the society at large by the apparatus of the state. This exemplies construct-
ing a new society according to the image the powerful hold in their mind.15
Art in Public Spaces
In Turkey, debate and discussion about art in public spaces is in many respects
uncharted territory. The issue is extremely sensitive, as illustrated by the
controversy about the demolition of a statue in Kars symbolizing Turkish-
Armenian friendship. Despite the fact that the statue was commissioned by
the local authorities, it was demolished in 2011.16
Yet, there are some examples of instances in which dialogue about public
artwork has had positive effects. A 20092011 project entitled My City, part
of the EU-Turkey Cultural Bridges program, attempted to encourage debate
by engaging EU and Turkish artists, policymakers, local ofcials, and local
people in discussions about various topics. The themes included the tradi-
tion of using public space for the good of the community, the role of cultural
programming in regenerating cities, and the role of politicians and local gov-
ernment in the development of cultural identities. David Codling, My City
project director,17says:
In every society public space is a zone of contention. . . . Sometimes there areuncerta inties and disputes about ownership of a particular site or about the usesto which it can be put. Commercial interests seek to invade, colonise or intrudeon public spaces and to inuence not only how we move through them but how
we look at them.
Book Censorship
Book censorship in Turkey appears to be a complex mix of issues. The recently
implemented third judicial reform package allowed for lifting the censorship
of some 458 books and more than 645 other publications. However, citizens
challenged the reversal of the censorship of some of the books, such as John
Steinbecks Of Mice and Menand Jos Mauro de VasconcelosMy Sweet Orange
Tree.18 Those legal actions were condemned by the Ministry of Culture and
Tourism because both books are on the education ministrys recommended
reading list.
During a visit to Istanbul, the president of PEN International, John RalstonSaul, summarized his assessment of the situation in November 2012:
For several years, PEN witnessed the declining number of writers eitherin prison in Turkey or caught up in endless and personally destructive legal
mazes. . . . Then, abruptly, the arrests began again, the pre-trial detentions, thedragged-out tria ls, the cases suspended in order to leave writers in limbo. Worsestill, we have seen the Anti-Terror Law increasingly used with a lack of rigor.
This in turn has led to writers and publisherswho in our carefully researchedand considered opinions have nothing to do with terrorismbecoming the
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Marc Pierini | 11
unwitting victims of myriad legal traps. In other words, the law is being used tolimit freedom of expression.
A researcher, Emin Karaca, published a survey of book censorship in
Turkey under the t itle Look what happened to these books!19
According toKaraca, around 20,000 books remain censored by the authorities.
State Funding and Management of the Arts
The issue of funding cultural activit ies remains of concern in Turkey. The
Ministry of Culture and Tourism gets a minuscule proportion of the govern -
ments budgeton average 0.5 percent of the total state budget for the period
20122015and only 20 percent of the ministrys budget is allocated to cul-
tural activities and programs.
Banu Karaca argues that
contemporary art in Turkey has developed largely outside the patronage ofthe state, and maybe even despite the state. It is not only the fact [that] nei -ther the Ministry of Culture and Tourism nor local government agencies haveestablished standing provisions to support independent arts spaces and artis-
tic production through public monies, but that contemporary artists havebyand largerejected any dealings with the state, including voicing demands formore funding and support.20
As a result, private sponsorship of cultural activities and museums has
become a major nancial vehicle in Turkey. The best-known examples are the
IKSV, which runs major festivals in the elds of cinema, theater, music, and
jazz, as well as a contemporary art biennial; the Istanbul Modern Art Museum;and the Sakip Sabanc Museum. Major private business holdings and banks are
the main funders of arts activities and cultural venues.
There are still issues with this type of funding, however. Recently, a group
of cultural activists challenged the choices made for the IKSVs current
Istanbul Biennial. They alleged restrictions that private sponsors placed on
freedom of cultural expression because of their business dealings with the
AKP governmenta conict of interest that is also apparent in the media.
In addition, Turkey has issues regarding the management of cultural activi-
ties and programs by the state because of the long-standing, strong role of the
state and the record of the current government. Cultural stakeholders (includ-
ing associations, producers, lmmakers, and actors) describe the AKP gov-
ernment as considering the eld of arts and culture primarily as an economic
sector, giving priority to physical infrastructure rather than to the creation of
art and exchanges among artists, and privileging forms of art that glorify the
Ottoman past and represent the countrys religious heritage.
Banu Karaca states that cultural policy ofcials have seemingly felt uncom-
fortable with contemporary artistic production and have frequently conned
themselves to the rather narrow denition of traditional arts, and in the past
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12 | Individual Freedoms in Turkey
few years to heritage-based agship restoration projects.21These consider-
ations raise the question of whether such policy management has limited free-
dom of cultural expression by allocating public money to selected forms of art.
At present, a draft law is pending before parliament that a ims to create a
Turkish Art Counci l (TSAK) meant to evaluate all public funding provided
to art projects. This seems to encompass the elimination of recurrent state
subsidies to state theaters, opera companies, ballet companies, and symphony
orchestras, as a new eleven-member board appointed by the government will
choose which theaters, cinemas, ballets, or operas will receive state funds.
These measures triggered protests from members of these professions, includ-
ing street demonstrations such as the one in Istanbul on May 25, 2013.
Cultural Policy
Unlike many members of the Council of Europe, Turkey does not have a for-
mal document dening its cultural policy in line with international standards.
Several laws have been introduced since the proclamation of the republic in
1923, and a document entitled 20102014 Strategic Plan of the Ministry of
Culture and Tourism was published in late 2010. The document is based on the
notion of national culture dating back to 1923, but it introduces noteworthy
new elements, such as cultural diversity within national unity and the partici-
pation of civil society organizations in the denition of cultural policy.
As stated by Serhan Ada, associate professor at Bilgi University, at a 2011
conference at the university: In the course of the history of the republic,
Turkeys cultural policy has evolved through various stages. During this time,
Turkey never had a written cultural policy, nor a comprehensive document
providing directions for cultural life. Our cultural policy existed by default.22
The conference provided an occasion for the nongovernmental cultural mil ieu
to propose its views on what a cultural policy should be: As non-govern -
mental organizations, . . . we . . . began working on a report ourselves which
reected our views and positionswhile adhering to the systematic structure
of the Council of Europeas if the duty of preparing the report had been
assigned to us.23
At the same conference, Osman Kavala, chairman of the board of the
NGO Anadolu Kltr, declared:
We believe that the support and part icipation of non-governmental organiza-tions in a project aimed at identifying problems and coming up with solutionsfor resolving them, will contribute to the elaboration of public policies. We alsohope that these and other non-governmental institutions will play an active role
in the public debate around these proposals.24
The issue of Turkeys implementat ion of international standards is centra l
to the making of cultural policy.
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In 2008, the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism initiated a voluntary
national cultural policy review within the Council of Europe. According to
the councils procedures, the review encompasses the aims and outcomes of
Turkeys cultural policy, the models upon which it is based, and an analysis of
trends and potential.
The review resulted in the production of two documents: a Council of
Europe experts report, which has been nalized but not yet published, and
a government-produced national background report that will be submitted
to the Council of Europe. On May 27, 2013, the Council of Europes Steering
Committee for Culture, Heritage, and Landscape heard a so-called interim
presentation by the Turkish authorities. The national background report is
expected to be presented at the autumn session of the Steering Committees
Bureau, a smaller structure that meets more often.
How to Make Progress on Freedom of Cultural Expression
Advancements in freedom of cultural expression in Turkey are most likely
to be made on four primary fronts: the Kurdish peace negotiations, the new
constitution, the role of the state, and international cultural policy standards.
Negotiations with the Kurds are a game changer for freedom of cultural
expression in Turkey. Although the precise outcome of the process is far from
predictable at this stage, negotiations cannot reach a successful conclusion
without substantial improvements in the cultura l rights of citizens of Kurdish
origin, especially on issues such as the provision of education in the Kurdish
language; the use of the Kurdish language in dealings with the state (some
provisions are in place to make this a reality); the right to use the Kurdish
language in public events, publications, and performances (some of this is
already possible); and a degree of decentralization of administrative decisions.
All these changes wil l affect the domain of arts and culture and wil l have
repercussions in the legislative and regulatory elds.
Similarly, changes in the legislative environment such as the implementa-
tion of the fourth judicial reform package and related amendments to the
Turkish Penal Code, the Anti-Terror Law, and the Law on the Media should
reect the new political arrangements stemming from the Kurdish peace
negotiations. If necessary, additional measures should be implemented as part
of a fth judicial reform package.The new constitution under discussion in the Turkish parl iament will also
have to reect the new political reality stemming from the Kurdish peace
negotiations. However, the cultural aspects of the new constitution are more
far-reaching than the Kurdish issue. They concern the entire society and touch
upon deeply rooted issues, such as secularism and religious conservatism.
Culture has not featured prominently in the constitutional discussions in
parliament. This is why the IKSV has proposed a draft article on the right to
take part in, access, and contribute to cultural life, based on United Nations
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14 | Individual Freedoms in Turkey
principles. In part icular, the art icle relies on the principle that cultural rights
are an integral part of human rights. Important notions are covered by the
draft article, such as the respect of individuals cultural identity and their
choice to identify or not with a community, the protection, improvement,
and enrichment of cultural heritage with all its diversity, the protection and
promotion of cultural diversity, and the cultural rights of minorities. The
text has been sent to parliament.
The relevance of this article wil l be gauged by the way in which the govern-
ment and the parliament discuss the text during the draft ing and adoption pro-
cess for the new constitution. In addition to discussions with lawmakers and
the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, it is recommended
that public discussions of this draft article take place out-
side the context of the constitutional drafting exercise so
all relevant stakeholders are included in the process.
The role of the government in cultural affairs is anothercentral issue. In the Western concept of democracy, the
government should provide a broad framework for arts
and culture, but it should remain a neutral facil itator rather
than becoming a cultural actor deciding which forms of
culture are representative of the country. Such a concept
of a culturally neutral state not only corresponds to international practice
but is also in harmony with the rich mix of ethnicities, languages, beliefs, and
lifestyles that characterize Turkey.
The management of cultural diversity and the funding of cultural activi-
ties are complex endeavors. The processes involve a vast domain of materialand immaterial cultural heritage (including religious heritage), the creation
of culture, and the availability of funding mechanisms as well as actors from
the state, civil society, and the private sector. What makes the establishment
of cultural freedom particularly difcult in Turkey is the Turkish states tradi-
tionally major role in dening public policies and the tendency to decide uni-
laterally more than entertain a dialogue with stakeholders. Moreover, public
funding plays an extremely small part in cultural activities, and the current
government tends to give priority to its own views on societal issues, including
cultural issues.
According to EU and Council of Europe norms, in managing culturaldiversity, the state should refrain from imposing a given vision and operate
through inclusive consultation mechanisms. Several considerations factor into
this process:25
Culture requires exchanges, discussions, and openness to differences,
within and beyond each social group, society, and country.
Culture is, by denition, a civil society issue: it requires plural ism, free-
dom of initiative, and freedom of expression; cultural projects should not
be driven by political or specic interest considerations.
The concept of a culturally neutral state
not only corresponds to internationalpractice but is also in harmony with the
rich mix of ethnicities, languages, beliefs,
and lifestyles that characterize Turkey.
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Marc Pierini | 15
Cultural projects should give priority to organizing people-to-people con-
tacts and to illustrating diversity and coexistence. By staying away from
politics and by remaining close to the real people, cultural initiatives
wil l play a ful l role in the development of society.
Cultural initiatives need both public and private funding. The funding
should not come with strings attached and should preserve, even guaran-
tee, the freedom of artistic expression.
The government plays a multifaceted role: providing artistic and cultural
education, supporting cultural initiatives, and securing the appropriate
regulatory framework.
Abiding by international cultural policy standards is an important step in
the development of Turkeys cultural policy. In this respect, the Council of
Europes Cultural Policy Review currently under way is a milestone. When
the debate on Turkeys cultural policy occurs in the autumn of this year, theTurkish governments position on issues such as respect for identity, the pro-
motion of cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue, respect for freedom of
expression, the support of creativity, and cultural democracy will be watched
closely by international observers.
In addition, Turkey has signed but not yet ratied the UNESCO Convention
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.
The convention creates conditions for cultures to freely interact in a mutually
benecial manner.26If ratied, the convention would provide internationally
recognized principles to inform the formulation of Turkeys cultural policy
and provide benchmarks to measure progress in this area.One useful step that could be taken to make progress would be to set up a
nongovernmental cultural policy workshop composed of cultural actors and
operators (for instance, members of cultural associations, producers, lmmak-
ers, and actors), civil society organizations, academics, and representatives
of the private sector with the participation of the Ministry of Culture and
Tourism. This platform should be led by a small group of civil society organi-
zations with established expertise in the sector, and it could also include for-
eign observers so Turkish society can benet from best practices. The prime
objectives of such a platform should be to facilitate a free discussion of cultural
issues among all stakeholders concerned, help dene an agreed upon conceptfor Turkeys cultural policy, and provide a venue for consultations on issues of
tolerance and coexistence in the eld of culture. Such an initiative would ease
many of the tensions illustrated by the recent Gezi Park protest movement.
These issues of tolerance and coexistence of differences stretch beyond the
realm of culture into other domains that impact peoples lifestyles. At base,
this is about the state remaining neutral when it comes to the private lives of
its citizens.
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Managing the Coexistence
of Different Lifestyles
The denition and enforcement of social and moral norms in Turkey is not anew subject in the countrys domestic political debate. But it is one that has
evolved drastically during the last ninety years. Issues of personal freedom
when it comes to lifestyle choices have come more visibly to the fore during
the last ten years. These issues include the treatment of specic groups, such as
the Kurds; Roma; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Turkish citizens.
Between the proclamation of the republic in 1923 and the beginning of
AKP rule in 2002, most social and moral norms were the result of Kemalism,
which included as one of its basic tenets the Westernization of Turkey. The
difference in lifestyles was managed along strictly secularist lines.
In the early years of the republic, Turkeys rst president, Mustafa Kemal
Atatrk, introduced major changes: a new alphabet, new family names, a
European dress code, European-style social habits regarding culture and alco-
hol, a sense of belonging dened by the word Turkishness, and a strong def-
inition of a unitary state as a reaction to the dismantlement of the Ottoman
Empire. In many ways, a new Turkish identity was formed. From then on,
Turkey lived through some eighty years of r igorously monitored secularism.
A permanent feature was the glorication of Atatrk himself, while insult
toward Atatrk, the army, or Turkishness was promptly sanctioned.
After the Islamist-rooted AKP rose to power, it changed these norms in a
gradual manner, with a noticeable acceleration in 2011 in the promotion of con-
servative values and lifestyles. Recently, an important novelty has appeared inthe AKPs political narrative: words such as revenge or these days are over
have been used publicly by AKP personalities, while references have been made
to the perceived oppression of the conservatives by the secularists.
The main issue at hand is whether, since 2002 and the AKPs entry into
power, there has been a trend toward the Islamization of society. The issue
was for a long time one of perceptions. But recently, legislative steps have been
taken that chip away at the hitherto prevailing concept of state secularism,
while the countrys leadership has increasingly used rel igious concepts in its
political narrative and religious justications for its decisions.
Since legislative elections in June 2011, developments affecting lifestyleshave been frequent but were usually disconnected from one another. Apart
from the passing of two laws (on education reform and limiting the sale of
alcohol to a certain time of day) and two administrative rul ings (that banned
the wearing headscarves at universities and in courts), information on devel-
opments is scattered and research is almost nonexistent. These issues are,
however, of great political signicance and can be seen as part of the underly-
ing discontent that led to the Taksim protests of May and June 2013.
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Marc Pierini | 17
Dress Code
Whether women should be banned from wearing headscarves in public
institutions has long been debated in Turkey. Generally speaking, wearing a
headscarf was prohibited in all public universities and administrations. In2007, the AKP government submitted a constitutional amendment that would
allow headscarves to be worn by redening the regulations of public services
outlined in Article 10 and the restrictions on the right to education outlined
in Article 42. In February 2008, the amendment was adopted by the Turkish
parliament by a 411 to 103 vote.27
After an appeal by the opposition, the constitutional court annulled the
parliaments proposed amendment in June 2008. It concluded that lifting the
ban ran counter to the founding principles of the constitution. A ruling by the
constitutional court is nal.
However, in a landmark decision in October 2010, the higher education
board ruled that Istanbul University should stop professors from expelling
veiled female students from classrooms. Although some universit ies and pro-
fessors still insist on implementing the ban, which is legally still in effect, the
boards decision effectively stopped its application. This issue of great signi -
cance was actually resolved outside the framework of the constitution.
For many, the lifting of the ban was seen as progress for a womans right
to education irrespective of religious beliefs and behaviors. Secularist circles
at the time requested that parallel guarantees should be given by the state to
secular women to protect them against pressure to wear the headscarf. This
request was not heeded by the government, which argued that the constitution
guarantees secularism.
A parallel evolution was seen in courts, where women are normally prohib-
ited from appearing with a headscarf. However, in January 2013, the Council
of State (Turkeys highest administrative court) revoked the ban on wearing
the headscarf in judicial institutions, and for the rst time, a female lawyer
wore her headscarf during a hearing in an Istanbul court.28The court noted
that the practice of law, although a public service, is a private business in the
way it is conducted: Since the profession has codes of practice of its own,
practicing law is not seen within the denition of public service. Putting the
profession under the codes of practice of state employees just on the grounds
that lawyers provide a public service would not comply with the qualities and
standards of the profession.
Beyond the courts and as a follow-up to the January 2013 ruling, in February
the confederation of public servants trade unions (Memur-Sen) collected
12.3 mil lion signatures against the ban on wearing headscarves in public areas.
In March, the organization launched a civil disobedience campaign, with some
female teachers wearing headscarves in their classrooms.29However, the right
to wear a headscarf was contested in an Ankara court in March 2013.
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In practice, the headscarf ban has been substantially watered down during
the last ve years. The countrys new constitution is expected to set a broader
framework to ease tensions over the issue.
Sale of Alcohol
The sale of a lcohol has traditionally been debated primarily at the local and
municipal levels. During the last three years, there has been a gradual trend
toward banning the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages.
In 2010, a sharp increase in taxes on alcoholic beverages was introduced. In
May 2011, a regulation was issued by the Turkish Tobacco and Alcohol Market
Regulatory Authority prohibiting alcohol producers from sponsoring sporting
events and festivals or advertising campaigns. The same regulation stopped
the sale of tobacco and alcohol in vending machines.30
In June 2013, a new law came into effect banning retailers from selling alco-
holic beverages between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. (accompanied
by nes of up to 500,000 Turkish lira, or over $250,000, for violations). The
law also further restricted companies selling alcoholic beverages from adver-
tising and sponsoring certain activities, required the placement of warning
notices on all liquor bottles, and raised the penalties for drunk-driving. New
licenses for alcohol sales will require facilities selling alcoholic beverages to be
located more than 100 meters away from religious and educational buildings.
In a number of public statements, the government has cited health, safety,
and protection of youth as justication for the measures, arguing that it is also
moving Turkish regulations closer to the restrictive laws that apply to coun-
tries in the European Union as well as the United States. Critics, nevertheless,point to a new moral order being introduced by the AKP since statistics do
not depict a society put at risk by alcohol: only 6 percent of Turkish house-
holds consume alcohol, and only 1.4 percent of trafc accidents were related
to alcohol in 2012.
The issue seems to be not so much the restrictions on sales in themselves,
nor the health considerations, but the speedy manner in which the changes
have been introduced and the justications given in defending the stricter
measures. For instance, Prime Minister Erdoan queried, Why should a law
that is commanded by religion be rejected?31
Some observers have referred to the changes as Alcohol McCarthyism.As columnist Semih diz wrote in May 2013: the zeal with which the cam-
paign against alcohol is conductedin a country where alcohol consumption
is below international averageswith the prime minister, Erdoan, throwing
his full weight behind the campaign, has secular Turks wondering where their
country is headed.32
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The Governments Unease With Social Media
Social media plays a central part in democratic societies, but it is not fully
accepted by the authorities and parts of society in Turkey. For instance, in
April 2013, world-renowned pianist Fazl Say was indicted and sentenced to aten-month suspended jail term for re-tweeting a verse of an Omar Khayyam
poem that is considered an insult to Islam by some. Expressing his own views,
the minister of culture and tourism, mer elik, was quoted as saying: I
would not wish anyone to be put on tria l for words that
have been expressed. This is especially true for artists and
cultural gures.33In addition to his jail sentence, the art-
ist received hostile mail and phone calls.
In the wake of the Taksim protests, authorities declared
in June 2013 that Twitter was a scourge and launched
investigations into the use of Twitter and Facebook dur-
ing the crisis. They also announced the preparation of a
restrictive law on the use of social media. Previous experience has shown that
such tough policies can hardly defeat the inventiveness of users and the rapid
evolution of technology.
Infringements on Citizens Privacy
Recently, the government has made statements recommending that women
have at least three children and characterizing abortion as a crime. Reactions
to the statements focused essentially on the fact that much of the incitement
came from the prime minister himself in the form of a personal and moralinjunction about the conduct of womens private lives.
An education reform law passed in 2012 changed the structure of religious
education schools (imam hatips) and more importantly promoted a part icular
type of belief systemthe Sunni-Hana doctrine. This was interpreted by
those who belong to other branches of Islam as a state decision to support
a single faith group and as running counter to the principle of equality. The
issue of religion in education is immensely complex and is mentioned here as
an example of what some Turkish citizens describe as the states lack of respect
for their individual bel iefs.
Other incidents have illustrated Turkish societys uneasiness with moves,
real or assumed, by authorities to impose more conservative standards on citi-
zens private lives. These incidents include the ban imposed on displays of
affection in public places, the presumed directives to Turkish Airlines female
employees to use only pale shades of lipstick, and the same airlines reported
attempt to provide female employees with more conservative uniforms.
Such developments may seem inconsequential to observers outside of Turkey,
yet they are immensely signicant to entire segments of the Turkish population.
Tough policies can hardly defeat the
inventiveness of social media users and
the rapid evolution of technology.
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Secularism in the Constitution
At a more general level, a recent ruling by the constitutional court pointed to
a possible evolution of the legal denition of secularism:
According to the hardline understanding of secu larism, relig ion is a conceptthat should be reected only in the conscience of people and denitely shouldbe separated from the public and social eld. The more exible or liberal inter -pretation of secularism in contrast is based on the assumption that religionhas both individual and public dimensions. This understanding of secularismdoesnt conne religion to the inner world of the individual. Religion is seenas [an] important element of the individual and collective identity. This under-standing allows the social visibility of religion. In a secular political system,individual religious choices and the lives shaped by those choices are outside
[the] states intervention but under [the] states protection. Thus, secularism isthe insurance of religious and conscience freedom.34
This rul ing signaled at least an attempt to depart from the decades-longdenition of secularism in Turkey. Although it was only one ruling on one
issue, it was labeled a revolutionary change in the denition of secularism
by Hrriyetcolumnist Taha Akyol.35
On the issue of coexistence, the president of the constitutional court, Hasan
Kl, adopted a conciliatory line in a speech on May 30, 2013:
The democratic system has been dened as the most courageous regime ofall, not only because it allows opinions which do not arouse interest or con-
cern, but also because it allows those which hurt and shock the society. Thelimit for these voices is to avoid the path of terror, pressure, violence or insult.
Voices remaining within these l imits wil l not only strengthen the democraticstate of laws immune system but will also positively affect the coexistenceof differences.36
Advancing the Acceptance of Different Lifestyles
The current debate on how different l ifestyles can coexist in Turkey raises a
number of questions. Are social and moral norms rightly stemming from the
rul ing polit ical party or should they be the result of societal consensus? Should
the key objective in a diverse society be the organization of tolerance and
coexistence? And how compatible is the current trend toward majoritarian -
ism in Turkey with the countrys membership in the Council of Europe andits bid for membership in the European Union?
In many ways, Turkish society is undergoing a renewed phase of acute
polarization, which is exacerbated by the forthcoming municipal and presi-
dential elections of 2014 and the legislative elections of 2015. The popular pro-
tests about the Taksim Square and Gezi Park renovation have come to vividly
illustrate preexisting tensions. Their expansion to nearly all 81 provinces in
Turkey shows that dissatisfaction with the Turkish government is widespread.
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Marc Pierini | 21
In such a delicate context, societal issues deserve to be handled in a sensible
and forward-looking manner.
In recent months, analysts have drawn a parallel between the Kemalist
era and the AKP era. Previously the law was used to protect secular idols.
Today it is being used to protect religion and its idols. The basic instinct to
restrict freedom of expression, when the subject matter is considered sacro -
sanct, remains, wrote Semih diz. The author continued, The institutional-
ized culture of intolerance is alive in Turkey and warned of a looming clash
of civilizations in the country.37 Similarly, Todays Zaman columnist hsan
Da wrote:
The inheritance of Islamism in the AK Party is sti ll the prevai ling bel ief that anew society is possible, a new society constructed by the state apparatus accord-
ing to a set of imagined values. This is not any different from the social engi -neering Kemalism has implemented in Turkey. So if the Kemalist conducted
and achieved a social engineering project in Turkey, why not the AK Party?38
On the other side of the coin, conservative politicians have repeatedly
argued that the ruling party was brought to power by way of free and fair
elections, and that the ballot box is the only way in which political preferences
should be expressed. They add that conservative values have been suppressed
since the proclamation of the republic and that this era is over.
Due to the absence of a credible challenge from the political opposition,
the notion of majoritarianism and the intrusion of the governing partys
ideology into private lives are now considered even more worrying for the sec-
ularist portion of the population. This is what led to the
feelings of rejection expressed during the Taksim protests:
the segments of Turkish society that are not conservative
refuse to be force-fed conservative norms. Attempts to
try to install conservative norms have led to social unrest,
major economic disruption, and substantial tensions
within the conservative camp. In addition, authoritative
conservative personalities have recognized the legitimacy
of these different voices as well as the notion of diversity
in the society.
In such a context, the central question is whether
the governing party is contemplating a form of organized coexistence or toimpose its preferred lifestyle and value system on the entire society. In the lat-
ter option, it would do so with the sole justication that the current electoral
system gives it a majority of seats in parliament.
The AKP has without doubt gained the upper hand at the ballot box.
However, it can be argued that ballot-box democracy is only one part of
democracy and that civic dialogue represents its indispensable complement. In
addition, it is clear that even without an opposition party effectively defending
Due to the absence of a credible challenge
from the political opposition, the notion of
majoritarianism and the intrusion of the
governing partys ideology into private lives
are now considered even more worrying for
the secularist portion of the population.
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respect for different values, Turkeys civil society is intent on expressing its
opposition to decisions that are forced upon it.
From a Western perspective, the coexistence and tolerance of different eth-
nicities, beliefs, and lifestyles in a diverse society should remain a key objective
in order to achieve social harmony.
Looking at a way forward, it can be argued that, with its tradition of cen -
tralized government, where state authorities have long had a predominant say
in the conduct of public affairs, Turkey is not well equipped to nurture social
consensus. This puts a huge responsibility on the governing party, opposition
parties, and civil society organizations.
The governing party has seen that ignoring the different leanings of large
segments of the population has a price, both political and economic, even if
doing so does not put its electoral supremacy in jeopardy. Whether it wi ll draw
lessons from that experience remains an open question at this stage.
As in any democracy, Turkish opposition part ies have a role to play in pro-
viding the public at large with alternat ive proposals and should promote them
vigorously through dialogue with interested part ies. This implies that they
must grasp the new trends in the society.
Civil society organizations have a specic role to play in channeling the
new expressions of protest into a nonviolent form of political demands. This
can be done at the local level, as exemplied by the Taksim Platform that
brought together groups and activists opposed to the square and park renova-
tion; at the sector level in the form of a cultural policy workshop, for instance;
or at the national level.
In this effort, Turkeys civil society will face a number of challenges, suchas learning how to deal with a government unaccustomed to handling strong
civil society organizations or nurturing an effective consensus among numer-
ous and diverse stakeholders. Recent historical experience, not unique to
Turkey, shows that l iberal forces tend to be so democratic and ind ividualistic
in their thinking that it is difcult to form a united front. They risk prioritiz-
ing sheer protest over effective inuence.
Conclusion
Most of these issues related to freedom of cultural expression and coexistenceof lifestyles have been playing out behind the scenes in Turkish politics for
many years. Recently, after protests erupted in Taksim Square, what was sim-
mering discontent morphed into a new political situation in Turkey. The real -
ity is now lasting opposition to the governing partys ideology.
This situation is in part the product of a large segment of societys clear
refusal to be force-fed societal norms by the conservative government. It also
stems from the governments choice to oppose rather than engage in dialogue
with the protesters, which in turn makes the upheaval last longer. And the
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Marc Pierini | 23
wedge that the government has driven between itself and its Western all ies in
terms of democratic concepts is a factor as wellwith potential consequences
on the international stage.
Today, few Turkey observers would dispute the statement that the govern-
ment has become more authoritarian, polit ics have become more majoritarian,
and values have become more religiously conservative. This is apparent in
the areas of both freedom of cultural expression and the acceptance of differ-
ent lifestyles.
For a long time, Turkeys political pendulum was on the side of Kemalist
ideology. The rise to power of the AKP swung the pendulum to the side of
religious-conservative ideology. Both Kemalism and the AKP era have consti-
tuted cultural revolutions of sorts for Turkey. But the world has changed sig-
nicantly in the past ninety years. Thanks to globalization and social media,
Turkey is integrated in the wider world. Citizens are better educated and better
equipped to exert their own political judgments. And, most importantly, dur-ing the Taksim crisis, liberal citizens have demonstrated how attached they
are to liberal values, how fearless they have become in the face of repression,
and how resilient they intend to be in the defense of their beliefs. The ques-
tion now is whether political and social mechanisms will succeed in bringing
the pendulum to a point of equilibrium that all segments of society can accept
or whether the pendulum will stay at an extreme. The upcoming elections in
2014 (municipal and presidential) and 2015 (legislative) will be the rst gauge
of which way society will go.
Internationally, an open, pluralistic, and tolerant society is essential for
Turkey to be considered a ful l member of the rst league of world democra-cies. The substantial loss of international prestige by the AKP government
in the wake of its response to civilian protests is a signal
that Turkey is perceived as attempting to distance itself
from the Western world. Such a trend has severe conse-
quences not only domestically and diplomatically, but also
economically because Turkey has suddenly appeared to be
a potentially less reliable partner to international business.
And this is key because to fuel its ambitious economic
objectives and to make up for its insufcient natural
resources and domestic savings, Turkey needs steady inows of foreign capi-tal. It only has a temporary competitive advantage in todays industrial world,
its innovation and technological capacities are limited, and its demograph-
ics are ineluctably on the decline. In such a context, Turkeys performance is
dependent on the judgment made by international investors, banks, and rat-
ing agencies about its democratic credentials and social landscape, not just its
macroeconomic prospects.
Turkey is similar to the Western world in its geography and economic out-
look and its stated willingness to improve its democratic credentials. Turkey
An open, pluralistic, and tolerant society is
essential for Turkey to be considered a full
member of the first league of world democracie
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is afliated with multiple international organizations. It is a member of the
United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, UNESCO, and
the Council of Europe and therefore has a political obligation to respect the
norms to which it has subscribed. As a country negotiating its accession to
the EU, Turkey also has a number of commitments to respect and reforms
to make. As a consequence of this network of relations, Turkeys government
is not expected to decide on freedom of cultural expression, social norms,
and behaviors all by itself, but rather to build consensus around these issues
through meaningful consultations with all stakeholders. Yet, its response to
recent popular protests, based mostly on inaming societal cleavages and exe-
cuting repressive law-and-order policies, is not in line with Western values.
Turkeys domestic stability, economic performance, and inuence in world
affairs will be linked to the choices it will make in the coming two years.
Whether its political leadership wants to continue to rely on polarization and
repression, and to create distance rather than rapprochement between the
country and its main Western partners, remains an open question at this stage.
The U.S. relationship with Turkey is traditionally based on security issues
and devotes relatively less attention to governance issues. In June and July
2013, Washington signaled that substandard fundamental liberties in a stra -
tegically allied country are a serious cause for concern. The EU, for its part,
might be tempted to interrupt Turkeys accession negotiations with the union
on the grounds that the Turkish government has now adopted a policy on
fundamental values that is at odds with its principles. At the same time, the
EU can hardly ignore the political fact that a very large segment of the Turkish
population is strongly adhering to these fundamental values.The novelty of Turkeys political life is the emergence of a strong civil-
ian movement in response to the governments authoritarian practices. The
movements broad message is that the ballot box is not enough; the govern -
ment should also respect individual preferences. The months ahead will reveal
whether this message is heeded or ignored by the governing party.
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Notes
1 hsan Da, Imagining an AK Party Society, Todays Zaman, December 23, 2012.2 Banu Karaca, Images Delegitimized and Discouraged: Explicitly Political Art and
the Arbitrariness of the Unspeakable,New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 45 (2011): 15583, https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/18831/1/NPT-45_Karaca.pdf.
3 Pelin Basaran, Freedom of Expression in the Arts and the Current State ofCensorship in Turkey, Heinrich Boell Foundation Turkey,www.tr.boell.org/web/51-1403.html.
4 ileri Bakanndan yeni terr tarieri[New Explanation on Terror From theInterior Minister], CNN Trk, December 26, 2011,www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/12/26/icisleri.bakanindan.yeni.teror.tarieri/642042.0/index.html,andBasaran, Freedom of Expression in the Arts and the Current State of Censorshipin Turkey.
5 Support for Singer Niyazi Koyuncu, Freedom for Freedom of Expression,March 25, 2013, http://antenna-tr.org/sites.aspx?SiteID=36&mod=news&ID=5529.
6 Turkish Prime Ministers Bid to Privatize Theaters Stirs Uproar, Hrriyet DailyNews, April 30, 2012, www.hrriyetdailynews.com/pms-bid-to-privatize-theaters-stirs-uproar.aspx?pageID=238&nid=19577.
7 Ibid.8 Turkey: Prime Minister Will Not Tolerate Criticism From State Funded Theatres,
ArtsFreedom.org, May 17, 2012, http://artsfreedom.org/?p=1652.9 Turkish Prime Ministers Bid to Privatize Theaters Stirs Uproar.10 Basaran, Freedom of Expression in the Arts and the Current State of Censorship
in Turkey.11 Erhan Ustundag, Organized Intolerance Against Magnicent Century
Series, Bianet News, January 11, 2011, www.bianet.org/english/freedom-of-expression/127112-organized-intolerance-against-magnicent-century-series.
12 Erol Onderoglu, RTK: Magnicent Century Series Clashes with MoralValues, Bianet News, January 13, 2011, www.bianet.org/english/freedom-of-expression/127153-rtuk-magnicent-century-series-clashes-with-moral-values.
13 Ibid.
14 Piotr Zalewski, Why Is Turkeys Prime Minister at War With a Soap Opera? Time,December 26, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/12/26/why-is-turkeys-prime-minister-at-war-with-a-soap-opera/#ixzz2ZER8VSnw.
15 Da, Imagining an AK Party Society.16 Turkey-Armenia Friendship Symbol Being Demolished, BBC News, April 26,
2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13199787.17 Discover Our Arts Work in Turkey, British Council, Turkey, www.britishcouncil.
org/turkey-arts-culture-my-city.htm.18 Turkey: Ban on 453 Books LiftedNew Bans on the Way, ArtsFreedom.org,
January 7, 2013, http://artsfreedom.org/?p=4194.19 Emin Karaca, Vaay Kitabn Bana Gelenler! [Look What Happened to These Books!]
(Istanbul: Belgin Yaynlar, 2012).
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26 | Individual Freedoms in Turkey
20 Banu Karaca, When Duty Calls: Questions of Sensitivity and Responsibility inLight of the Tophane Events, Red Thread3 (2011), www.red-thread.org/en/article.asp?a=49.
21 Ibid.22 Speech at the conference on Cultural Policy Development in Turkey: A Civil Perspective
Report, held at Istanbul Bilgi University on March 2526, 2011. The conferenceproceedings have been published under the title Turkish Cultural Policy Report: A Civil
Perspective (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press). It includes in particular a comprehensivedescription of the legislative background of cultural activities in Turkey.
23 Ibid.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, UNESCO, October 20, 2005, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf.
27 Jens Kreinath, Headscarf Discourses and the Contestation of Secularism inTurkey, Bulletin for the Study of Religion 38:4 (2009): 80.
28 Lawyer Wears Headscarf in Court for First Time, Hrriyet Daily News, January 26,
2013, www.hrriyetdailynews.com/lawyer-wears-headscarf-in-court-for-rst-time.aspx?pageID=238&nID=39894&NewsCatID=339.29 Turkish Government Pledges Headscarf Freedom in Public Ofces,
Hrriyet Daily News, March 9, 2013, www.hrriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nid=42626.
30 Efes Pilsen to Change Name to Anadolu Efes, Hrriyet Daily News, May 10, 2011,www.hrriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=efes-pilsen-to-change-name-to-anadolu-efes-2011-05-10.
31 Who Are the Two Drunks, Turkish Politicians Ask After PMs Remarks, HrriyetDaily News, May 29, 2013, www.hrriyetdailynews.com/who-are-the-two-drunks-turkish-politicians-ask-after-pms-remarks.aspx?PageID=238&NID=47817&NewsCatID=338.
32 Semih diz Turkeys Clash of Civilizations,Al-Monitor, May 24, 2013, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/opinion/2013/05/turkey-clash-civilizations-secular.html.
33 Constanze Letsch, Turkish Composer and Pianist Convicted of Blasphemy onTwitter, Guardian, April 15, 2013, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/15/turkish-composer-fazil-say-convicted-blasphemhy.
34 Constitutional Court Decision 2012/65, www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=10000448&content.
35 Taha Akyol, Laiklikte Devrim [Revolution in Laicism], Hrriyet Daily News, April19, 2013, http://hurarsiv.hrriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=23080862.
36 Hasan Kl, speech at TSIAD meeting, May 30, 2013. A translation of the speechwas provided to the author by the Constitutional Court.
37 diz, Turkeys Clash of Civilizations.38 Da, Imagining an AK Party Society.
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Carnegie Europe
Founded in 2007, Carnegie Europe is the European center of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From its newly expanded
presence in Brussels, Carnegie Europe combines the work of its research
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European policy community. Trough publications, articles, seminars,
and private consultations, Carnegie Europe aims to foster new thinking on
the daunting international challenges shaping Europes role in the world.
Te Carnegie Endowment for International Peaceis the oldest inter-
national affairs think tank in the United States. Founded in 1910, it
is known for excellence in scholarship, responsiveness to changingglobal circumstances, and a commitment to concrete improvements in
public policy.
Carnegie launched a revolutionary plan in 2006 to build the first global
think tank and since then has transformed an American institution into
one fitted to the challenges of a globalized world. oday, Carnegie has
research centers in Beijing, Beirut, Brussels, Moscow, and Washington
as well as a program in Almaty.
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