individuating actions

Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Individuating ActionsAuthor(s): Judith Jarvis ThomsonSource: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 21, Sixty-Eighth Annual Meeting of theAmerican Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Nov. 4, 1971), pp. 774-781Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024950 .

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774 TIE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

John's deterring a pedestrian from 0 John's convincing his examiner that crossing the street he is a competent driver

John's getting his hand wet O John's signaling for a turn

(:) John's extending his arm out the window

0 John's extending his arm

Figure 3

Strictly speaking, the set of distinct acts we want on a single act tree cannot be ordered by the ordinary "by" locution. According to our criterion of individuation, John's singing (at t) and John's singing loudly (at t) will be distinct acts; but we would not ordinarily say either that John sings "by" singing loudly or that John sings loudly "by" singing. This problem can be handled by introducing a slightly broader relation, which I have called level generation, under which the ordinary by-relation is subsumed. I have tried to analyze the notion of level generation elsewhere, and cannot review it here.'6 I believe, however, that the inclusion of the additional cases does not upset our diagrammatic conception. For example, the pair of acts con- sisting in John's extending his arm and John's extending his arm out the window can be neatly and naturally fitted onto an act tree as shown in Figure 3.

The analysis I have sketched, then, satisfies two fundamental desiderata. First, it slices the units of action thinly enough to accommodate the by-relation. This need has been felt by a number of philosophers who have drawn a distinction between basic and nonbasic actions, but my theory allows for a stronger ordering of acts than a mere dichotomy. Secondly, we make use of this ordering to introduce the notion of an act tree, and we use this notion to explicate the unity among the diverse acts in, say, Anscombe's pumping case or Davidson's switch-flipping case.

ALVIN I. GOLDMAN The University of Michigan

INDIVIDUATING ACTIONS * M ISS ANSCOMBE had imagined a man replenishing the water supply of a house by operating a pump. She thinks that, in the circumstances, it would be true to say

16 Cf. chapter II, ibid. * To be presented in an APA symposium on The Individuation of Action,

December 27, 1971, commenting on Alvin I. Goldman's article of the same title, this JOURNAL, this issue, pp. 761-774.



INDIVIDUATING ACTIONS 775

(1) His operating the pump is his replenishing the water supply.

Mr. Goldman disagrees. I shall concentrate on the second of his arguments, partly because he himself regards it as fairly strong, partly because it seems to me to raise questions of interest.

I Goldman says of Miss Anscombe's man that

(2) He replenished the water supply by operating the pump.'

but, he says, it is false that

(3) He operated the pump by replenishing the water supply.

and "it would be odd to say that"

(4) He operated the pump by operating the pump. So, he concludes, (1) is false.

He doesn't explain, but I suppose that what he has in mind is that (1) should license substitution into (2) to yield (3) and (4). But how could it? (2) doesn't contain either of the singular terms 'his operating the pump' or 'his replenishing the water supply', so what's to substitute ?

Presumably he thinks that (2) is analyzable into, or paraphrasable into, something that does contain these singular terms. "As used here," he says, "the preposition 'by' seems to express a relation that holds between acts, e.g., between an act of replenishing the water-supply and an act of operating the pump (in that order)" (763). And I suppose it is that relation to which he later refers by the expression 'the by-relation'. So perhaps he thinks (2) is paraphrasable into

(2') His replenishing of the water supply has the by-relation to his operating of the pump.

and that it is into this that we are to make substitutions by appeal to (1).

But is (2) paraphrasable into (2')? Suppose Miss Anscombe's man has been pumping away every morning for weeks; only today, for the first time, were the pipes in order, and so only today, for the first time, did he replenish the water supply by operating the pump. Then (2) is true. But if in saying (2') the replenishing I refer to is today's and the pumping I refer to is yesterday's, then-in light of what one supposes Goldman means by 'the by-relation'-(2')

1 Goldman actually writes "He replenishes... by operating... " (763); I shift to the past tense to avoid a possible confusion between habitual and nonhabitual readings of his words.



776 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

should be false. The difficulty here was drawn attention to somne years ago by Donald Davidson: 'He verbed' doesn't itself contain any expression referring to a particular act, and is true even if he verbed many times, whereas the nominalization 'his verbing' con- structed from it purports to refer to a particular act.

Well, perhaps it is not (2') that he wishes us to take (2) to inean, but rather

(2") There is an x and there is a y such that x is a replenishing of the water supply by him, and y is an operating of the pump by him, and x has the by-relation to y, and x is before NOW.

(See again the passage I quoted: "an act of replenishing... ", "an act of operating.... ") But unfortunately (2"), like (2), contains neither of the singular terms 'his replenishing. . . ', 'his operating. . . ', and so there is no reason to suppose (1) should license any substitutions in it.

On the other hand, accepting (2") as a paraphrase of (2) would make trouble for

(5) Every x is such that x is an operating of the pump by him if and only if x is a replenishing of the water supply by him.

and this is something Miss Anscombe would be committed to by her acceptance of (1) in case that man operates the pump only once, and replenishes the water supply only once, or anyway never does the one without the other. For the conjunction of (2") and (5) entails

(3") There is an x and there is a y such that x is an operating of the pump by him, and y is a replenishing of the water supply by him, and x has the by-relation to y, and x is before NOW.

which is a paraphrase of (3) if (2") is of (2), and so should be false if (3) is false. And I do think we should agree with Goldman that (3) is false.

But should we accept (2") as a paraphrase of (2)? It would be fair to object that one can't tell until one is told just what relation this "by-relation" is. After all, if I said that for a man to verb, by verb2ing is for one of his acts to have the alpha-relation to an- other, you'd certainly want to know which relation I meant before agreeing or disagreeing. And Goldman gives us no account of what this by-relation is.

But perhaps he would reply that although analysis is no doubt needed, he has said enough for us to see intuitively, pre-analytically, which relation it is he means-that it's that relation which an act x has to an act y just in case the agent of x performs x by performing y.




II I think in fact that, in light of Goldman's views about what causes what, he could make a stronger reply than this; i.e., that it is possible to produce a fairly simple and straightforward account of what he has in mind. Presumably it couldn't be said that for x to have the by-relation to y is for y to cause x. If I ring a bell by pressing a button, Goldman wishes us to say that my ringing of the bell has the by-relation to my pressing of the button; but, as he points out, my pressing of the button doesn't cause my ringing of the bell. On the other hand, my pressing of the button does cause the bell to ring; and indeed, it does seem to cause whatever my ringing of the bell causes. If I ring by pressing the button, and my ringing causes a commotion, a collapse, a death, then my pressing of the button causes those things too. Again, if John's signaling for a turn caused a crash, and he signaled by extending his arm, then it does seem as if his extending of his arm caused that crash too. So why not say: x has the by-relation to y just in case whatever x causes, y causes?

This leaves it open that y should cause things that x does not cause, and thus that y not be identical with x. But on any view, Goldman's or anyone else's, this must surely be allowed for. Some people might find it plausible to identify your going to work with your taking the subway, but presumably no one would find it plausible to identify your getting to work with your taking the subway-and yet you might well get to work by taking the subway. Now presumably your taking the subway does cause all sorts of things that your getting to work does not cause. For example, your taking the subway might cause you to sweat (a hot subway), which your getting to work does not (a cool office). But if you get to work by taking the subway, then doesn't your taking the subway cause whatever your getting to work causes?

And at the same time, it leaves open that Goldman is right about Miss Anscombe's operator of the pump. Goldman can say that (2") is true: that whatever the replenishing of the water supply causes, the operating of the pump causes. And, in light of what he believes about what causes what, he can say that (3") is false. The example he uses in his discussion of causality is different, but his point, I take it, would be the same: there are things that the operating of the pump causes which the replenishing of the water supply does not. Thus, e.g., the pumping causes a clicking of the valves of the pump, a banging in the pipes leading to the house, a dripping from a leak in the valve leading into the house, and so on; but the replenishing




of the water supply of the house causes none of these things. So (3") is false. But then (5) must go, for the conjunction of it with (2") entails (3").

His opponents, of course, must deny that there is anything the pumping causes that the replenishing does not. Goldman can now reply: Fine-pending your providing us with a better account of the by-relation, and thereby of (3), this by itself shows you are wrong, for (3) is false.

Unfortunately, since a man's operating a pump is on any view identical with his operating that pump, and thus causes whatever it causes, one who accepts this view of the by-relation is left with (4) as true of any man who operates a pump. But perhaps this is not a serious objection. Goldman himself did not say (4) was false, but only that it would be "odd" to say it.

III All this seems to have a certain plausibility-in moods in which one can overlook one's worries about causality-and thereby to lend weight to the supposition that (2) is paraphrasable as (2"). But what surprises me is to find Goldman letting himself get tempted into this game in the first place. For let us remember that he doesn't say of

(6) Sebastian strolled through the streets of Bologna.

that "As used here, the preposition 'through' seems to express a relation that holds between an act and a place, e.g., between an act of strolling and the streets of Bologna (in that order)"; he doesn't offer us as a paraphrase of it:

(6") There is an x such that x is a strolling of Sebastian, and x has the through-relation to the streets of Bologna, and x is before NOW.

Again, 'by' is really only a special case of manner-means-method; yet one does not suppose he would say of

(7) Sebastian replenished the water supply with a pump.

that "As used here, the preposition 'with' seems to express a relation that holds between an act and a piece of equipment, e.g., between an act of replenishing the water supply and a pump (in that order)," or that he would offer as a paraphrase of it:

(7") There is an x such that x is a replenishing of the water supply by Sebastian, and x has the with-relation to a pump, and x is before NOW.




He could have made just as much trouble for Miss Anscombe by offering (7") as a paraphrase of (7) as by offering (2") as a paraphrase of (2). For let us suppose that (7) is true. WAe may, con- sistently with this, suppose that

(8) Sebastian operated the pump with a pump.

is false, that is, that it was with his hand, not a second pump, that Sebastian operated the pump. But, if the "him" of (5) is Sebastian, then one cannot affirm (7") and (5), and deny

(8") There is an x such that x is an operating of the pump by Sebas- tian, and x has the with-relation to a pump, and x is before NOW.

Yet one supposes that Goldman would not have offered (7") and (8") as paraphrases of (7) and (8) any more than he did offer (6") as a paraphrase of (6).

For the fact is that (2"), (6"), (7"), and (8") are all Davidson- type construals of the forms of, respectively, (2), (6), (7), and (8).2 And that's a game that Goldman is barred from playing by his account of the conditions under which an act x is identical with an act y. On Goldman's view, no strolling of Sebastian through the streets of Bologna is identical with any strolling of Sebastian: Sebastian's strolling through the streets of Bologna is his exemplifying one act property, Sebastian's strolling is his exemplifying an- other, different, act property, and therefore, as his criterion tells us, the acts just are different. But if (6") is a paraphrase of (6), then a strolling of Sebastian through the streets of Bologna is an x such that x is a strolling of Sebastian and x has the through- relation to the streets of Bologna; and every one of these is a strolling of Sebastian.

Similarly, on Goldman's view, no replenishing of the water supply by operating the pump by Sebastian is identical with any replenishing of the water supply by Sebastian. For the act properties '. . is replenishing the water supply by operating the pump' and '...is replenishing the water supply' are different. So he cannot have (2") as a paraphrase of (2). For if it is, then a replenishing of the water supply by operating the pump by Sebastian is an x such that x is a replenishing of the water supply by Sebastian and x has the by- relation to an operating of the pump by Sebastian; and every one of these is a replenishing of the water supply by Sebastian.

In sum, he cannot have both: (2") as a paraphrase of (2), and his criterion for act identity.

2 In Davidson's formalizations, tense is built into the predicates.




Now it will be remembered that the point of his argument against Miss Anscombe was precisely to pave the way for his own, "fine- grained", procedure for individuating acts. Unless some other way of reconstruing that argument can be found, it not only does not do so, it rules it out.

IV What seems to emerge is that we have in front of us, not two views of act identity, Goldman's and what he refers to as "the Anscombe- Davidson pattern of act-individuation," but instead three. There is, first, what we might call the "relaxed view," according to which we are to identify the replenishing with the pumping, a killing with a shooting with a pressing of a trigger, a flipping of a switch with an alerting of a prowler. It is this view which I think Davidson's causal criterion for act identity was meant to express. There is, third, Goldman's "extreme view." But there is, between them, a "middle ground," according to which we may not identify a replenishing with a pumping, but may, and indeed should, identify a replenishing with a replenishing by pumping, and that with a replenishing with a pump; according to which we may not identify a killing with a shooting with a pressing of a trigger, but may, and indeed should, identify a killing with a killing by shooting, and that with a killing with a gun; and so on.

What I think Goldman has shown is that if you accept Davidson- type construals of the logical form of action sentences, then 'by'- and, as I think we can see, manner-means-method generally- makes trouble for the relaxed view. So also, on this supposition, do time and place make trouble for it. (Goldman's causal arguments seem to me to be less compelling, but, as I think, aren't needed anyway.) But none of his arguments seem to me to give reason to retreat beyond middle ground to his own extreme view. As I can see nothing to support the extreme view, and am struck by its complications and counterintuitive results, I shall say no more about it.

For my part, then, there remain the relaxed view and the middle ground. If you accept Davidson-type construals of the logical forms of action sentences, then I agree with Goldman that you had better retreat from the relaxed view, and indeed I think you should become a middle-grounder. Middle ground might even be seen as, perhaps even defined as, the special home of that way of taking action sentences. But on the other hand, it is not at all obvious to me that we should take action sentences in that way. It would simplify life enormously if it were right; but is it? What



SINGLING OUT ACTIONS 78I

it involves, of course, is turning verbs, adverbs, and adverbial phrases into one- or many-termed predicates on actions, and there are serious difficulties facing such a program.'

Let us take just a quick look back at the adverbial phrase 'by operating the pump'. I made the best case I could for construing the 'by' in this as a relation term by giving the most plausible account of it that I could construct. But it wasn't really a very good case. For one thing, the account is plausible only if you are ready to grant that causality is transitive; and if you do grant this, then it is not obvious there won't be cases of an act y which causes whatever x causes, but which is not such that the agent of x performs x by performing y. And if we do not have an account of what this by- relation is, then I think we should be very suspicious of it. It ought to strike us as an odd business if the only explanation of it is: it is that relation which an act x has to an act y just in case the agent of x performs x by performing y. Compare: the with-relation is just that relation which an act x has to a piece of equipment just in case the agent of x does x with that piece of equipment. If there are such relations as these, how come we need to use the dummy verbs 'perform' and 'do', the same sort of adverbials now attaching to them, in order to say what they are? More generally, it seems to me that we really know far too little as yet about the structure of action to be blithely allowing ourselves such talk as this.

JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON Massachusetts Institute of Technology

SINGLING OUT ACTIONS, THEIR PROPERTIES AND COMPONENTS *

I. THE DIALECTICAL IMPASSE

INDIVIDUATION theorists like Anscombe and Davidson, whom I label unifiers, seem deadlocked with such multipliers as Kim, Goldman, and Davis. Unifiers notice how much of what a

person does during a given time has a common origin. Here's an illustrative story:

3For a budget of them, see J. A. Fodor, "Troubles about Actions," Synthese, xxi (1970): 298-319.

* To be presented in an APA symposium on "The Individuation of Action," December 27, 1971, commenting on Alvin Goldman's article of the same title, this JOURNAL, this issue: 761-774. Parenthetical references not otherwise specified are to pages of Goldman's paper.



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