insights on joint operations - the art and science

8/4/2019 Insights on Joint Operations - The Art and Science

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Insights on Joint Operations:

The Art and Science

Best Practices

The Move towardCoherently Integrated

Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations

GEN (Ret) Gary Luck

Senior Mentor

Joint Warfighting CenterU.S. Joint Forces Command

September 2006


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Introduction

The Joint Warfighting Centers deployable training team is afforded the uniqueopportunity to visit and support commanders and staffs of joint headquartersworldwide as they prepare for, plan, and conduct operations. We gain insights into

their challenges and their derived solutions as they support our national interests.The team also has the chance to analyze and compare practices amongst thedifferent headquarters, reflect on the various challenges, techniques andprocedures, and draw out and refine what we term best practices.

This paper presents a compilation of our insights and best practices. It provides ourobservations on the increasingly complex security environment, the resultantevolution of planning and execution of joint, interagency, and multinationaloperations, and best practices by commanders and staffs at joint forceheadquarters.

We lay out the commonly viewed observation on the need for a more holistic view ofthe environment expanding beyond a traditional military battlefield view to one farmore complex with many non-military players. We see this environment as aninterconnected system of systems (including political, military, economic, social,informational, and infrastructure) comprised of friends, adversaries, and theunaligned. The paper describes how various joint headquarters visualize thiscomplex, system of systems environment and use effects-based thinking tocomplement their operational planning processes. We describe how they are able toinclusively work with the many stakeholders, both interagency and multinational, toharmonize and synchronize military actions with the actions of other instruments ofnational and international power. This is the essence of operational art.

One overarching best practice is the continuing importance of commander-centricoperations in which the commander relies on his intuition and judgment, issuingmission-type orders to achieve desired effects. This remains essential, even in thisage in which the improvements in technology tempt one to centrally controloperations.

The team has also culled out many best practices in how joint headquarters plan,direct, monitor, and assess operations their decision cycles. Recognition that wecannot precisely model the behavior of the complex environment makesassessment an essential part of these decision cycles. We discuss assessment in

detail its an important best practice whose need is reinforced time and again inoperational headquarters.

We live in a dynamic period. Insights and best practices are continually evolving. Wehope to continue capturing and sharing these evolving thoughts and best practicesin subsequent insights papers.


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Contents

1) Executive Summary ........................................................................................ 12) Understanding the Environment...................................................................... 4

a) Todays complex environmentb) Visualization of the environment using a PMESII constructc) Catalysts for change in planning and execution of operations

3) Unified Action ............................................................................................... 10a) Need for Unified Actionb) The Stakeholdersc) Effects based thinking

4) Commander-centric leadership..................................................................... 12a) Value of commanders experience and intuitionb) Providing guidance and intentc) Importance of personal relationships & trust and confidence

5) Operational Design - Setting Conditions for subordinates............................. 13a) Gaining agility and flexibilityb) Interdependencec) Task organization and battlespace geometryd) Command relationshipse) Mission approval levels

6) Decision cycle ............................................................................................... 20a) The Assess, Plan, Direct, Monitor cycleb) Event horizonsc) Interaction with higher, adjacent, and subordinate hqsd) Inclusion with stakeholders

e) Elements of the decision cycle7) JTF Headquarters Organization.................................................................... 26

a) Organizationb) Battle rhythm

8) The Military Element of Strategic Communications....................................... 31a) Military support to strategic communicationb) Development of a communication strategyc) Action agents available to promulgate the commanders messaged) Staff role in developing and executing communication strategy

9) Intelligence Support ...................................................................................... 33a) Expanding perception from a mil-centric to a PMESII viewpoint

b) Adapting intelligence to maintain relevance with todays operationsc) Need for decentralization & its organizational Implicationsd) Data storage challenges to rapid intelligence support

10) Legal Considerations & Rules of Engagement............................................. 3511) Logistics ....................................................................................................... 3612) Information Management ............................................................................. 37


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Intentionally Blank


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1. Executive Summary

Our U.S. military has significantly evolved over the past 5 years as we have adaptedto an increasingly complex environment defined by the Global War on Terrorism(GWOT) and other security challenges.

Complex environment: Globalization, the information revolution, non-traditionaladversaries, and our changing military capabilities have significantly changedtodays security environment. It has changed from that of the traditional cold warbattlefield to todays dramatically different and more complex battlespace.

Unified action: Commanders have experienced the absolute need (andchallenges) of unified action - working inclusively with all the stakeholders, bothU.S. and international, to understand and visualize this complex environment,and synchronize actions to achieve strategic objectives. This need forinclusiveness and interdependence is possibly the most significant adaptationwe must achieve to reach ultimate success.

Commander-centricity: Observations clearly reinforce the absolute importance of

commanders guidance and intent, applying his instinct and intuition in exercisingcommand -- the Art of War. We see commanders not being lured into acontrol-centric Science of War style despite the technological and informationalimprovements in todays C4I systems. In fact the most successful commandersbuild a cohesive command, are good shepherds of their staff (giving guidanceand working with them), use mission type orders, and decentralize to the point ofbeing uncomfortable to empower their subordinates.

a. The complex environment and catalysts for change: The United States and itsallies are engaged in a protracted global war within a very complex securityenvironment. Our enemies are not only foreign states, but also non-state entities,

loosely organized networks with no discernible hierarchical structure. Theseadversaries can not be defined only in terms of their military capabilities. Rather,they must be defined, visualized, and attacked more comprehensively, in terms oftheir interconnected political, military, economic, social, informational, andinfrastructure systems.

Four major catalysts for change: globalization; the information revolution; thechanging adversaries; and a smaller, more technologically enabled, military forcehave contributed to the complexity of this environment and fundamentally changedthe way the U.S. military fights todays global war.

Globalization, the worlds open economic system of independent global markets,

global communication systems, and ubiquitous media presence have allbroadened security responsibilities beyond solely a military concern.

The information revolution has allowed unprecedented sharing of informationboth for us and for our adversaries.

The realization by our adversaries that winning a conventional mil-on-mil fight isnot possible, has led them to expand conflict into domains not previouslyconsidered within the realm of traditional military operations during the cold warsconventional battlefield era.


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Lastly, weve become a smaller military in size, albeit very powerful andtechnologically advanced, and we can no longer rely on pure massed forces inaccomplishing missions. Weve learned the need to harmonize our actions, bothwithin the joint force and also with our interagency and multinational partners, tobest achieve our collective objectives.

The combination of all these factors has led us to adopt a more integrated approachto crisis resolution which seeks to synchronize military planning and operations withthose of other government and non government agencies and organizationstogether with our international partners to achieve our objectives. In essence, wehave pursued a more fully integrated joint, interagency, and multinational approachto effectively counter todays adversary in an increasingly more complexenvironment.

b. Unified Action: To a greater degree than ever, diplomatic, informational, andeconomic factors affect national security in this complex environment. We

continually hear our operational commanders saying that they cannot achievestrategic objectives by military action alone in this complex environment. Weveobserved numerous best practices, all centered on an atmosphere of inclusiveness,in how operational commanders and our interagency and multinational partners worktogether to achieve objectives:

Inclusiveness in understanding the complex environment: The environment ismore than a military battlefield; its a network of interrelated political, military,economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems that are beyond amilitary-only ability to visualize.

Inclusiveness in developing plans and during execution: The best plans andoperations are those fully integrated with the other elements of national power

from the very beginning of planning. Inclusiveness in assessment: The other stakeholders have unique perspectives

and expertise. Together they help build a more enriched overall assessment thana military-only perspective. Inclusion of civilian stakeholders in the initialassessments process, estimates and planning facilitate a more completeunderstanding of the nature of the problem to be solved and actions required tosolve it. This more inclusive analysis leads to more coherent actions and betterfocused effort to achieve objectives.

We fight as one team with our joint, interagency, and multinational partners. Theseare not just words or a slogan; we depend on each other to succeed in todays

complex security environment. This is de facto interdependence: the purposefulcombination of capabilities to maximize their total complementary and reinforcingeffects while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities.1 Within our military, we live jointinterdependence daily, in which the joint force commander (JFC) purposely craftsthe organization and command relationships, recognizing that the components must

1Expanded from the Joint interdependence definition in FM 1, The Army, June 2005, pg 3-1.


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work together, supporting each other in an atmosphere of trust and confidence, toaccomplish the mission.

Observed best practices continue to reinforce the value of this interdependence -both at the unified action level and within the joint force. Weve observed several

best practices on necessary conditions for interdependence: The higher commanders setting of conditions by establishment of clear

command relationships, particularly supported/supporting command relationshipsbetween components of the joint force, together with measures allowing for unityof effort with our interagency and multinational partners.

Recognition that you dont need to own your partners forces in order to haveassured access to their capabilities.

Requisite trust and confidence that your partners will be there when you needtheir help in accomplishment of your assigned tasks.

c. Commander-centric operations: The commanders role in command -

employing the Art of War - in this complex, unified action environment is critical,regardless of the technological and informational improvements in control -- theScience of War. Without exception, we find that commander-centric organizationsout perform staff-centric organizations that lack clear commander guidance andintent enriched by the commanders experience and intuition. Our observer/trainer-senior mentor teams observe and offer several best practices gleaned from theseoperational commanders:

The more things change, the more they stay the same in leadership.

Commanders vision / guidance and intent provide clarity in todays dynamic,ambiguous environment. Mission type orders remain key to success.

Commanders who work with their staffs, giving guidance, and then staying with

the staff and helping them, get better solutions in a tenth of the time. Maintain a broad perspective on the environment; its more than a mil on mil

conflict. Understand the power of DIME on PMESII.

Rely on your instinct and intuition. Anticipate and seize opportunity. Guardagainst the staff tendency to over-control the fight. Work with and through yoursubordinate commanders. Continue battlefield circulation.

Personal relationships count in the joint, interagency, and multinational world.Build these relationships, and foster trust and confidence with your partners.

Be inclusive versus exclusive with your joint, interagency, and multinationalpartners in how you assess, plan, and make decisions.

Focus on unity of effort, not unity of command. Recognize the reality of different

perspectives and goals of your partners. Strive to arrive at a set of commondesired effects to promote unity of effort.

Stay at the operational level. Set conditions for operational and tactical success.Delegate authority to subordinates to fight the tactical fight.

Decentralize where possible to retain agility and speed of action. This will likelyentail decentralization some operational commanders have termed the phraseuncomfortably decentralized as the only way to be agile enough to takeadvantage of opportunities in todays operational environment.


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2. Understanding and Visualizing the Environment.

Globalization, the informationrevolution, and likelyadversaries have made

todays environment muchmore complex than what wefaced just a few years ago.Operational commandershave adapted to the realitiesof this dramatically differentand more complex securityenvironment from that of thetraditional cold warbattlefield to thecomplexities of todays

evolving battlespace.

Globalization: Thomas Friedman, in his book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree,defines globalization as The dispersion and democratization of technology,information, and finance. We see this today. Open economic systems allow forincreased trade on a global scale. Global brands foster familiarity andinterdependence of economies and institutions. Communications, transportation,and information technology, together with this interdependency of economiesconnects activity around the world all the time. Events in one region have immediateimpacts in other regions.

Globalization has also brought to the forefront other actors such as ethnic groups,transnational, non-state sponsored terrorism, and organized crime organizations.Globalization has precipitated more visible clashes of ideology through much fullerawareness of contrasts and gaps in cultural, religious, and value differences. Thereis more blurring of internal and external threats, and diminishment of traditionalnotions and authorities of national sovereignty.

This globalization has securityramifications. The world is much moreinterdependent; it is more vulnerableto regional issues, things like world oilflow, terrorism, and populationdisplacements. This is reality; werethere, and we cant back away from it.Security in this global environmentcan no longer be guaranteed bytraditional, military means alone. It hasshifted from a military defense focusto that of using all elements of National Power.

Marine Expeditionary

Force

Battlefield to Battlespace

XXX XXX

X X X

Conventional

Arty

Air

Corps

New Additions

PrecisionISRP

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Corps / MEF/ Fleet / NAF M on M (Attrition-based) Tactical Independent Symmetrical Massed Forces Massed Fires Lethality Combat Overwhelming Force Force Protection

Joint Force Commander (JFC) DIME on PMESII (Effects-based) Strategic / Operational Interdependent / Nested Asymmetrical Massed Electrons Precision Fires / ISR Lethal and Nonlethal Combat / PKO / HA / CMO Overmatching Power Protect the Mission

Nonlethal Nonlethal

JSTARS

Industrial Age

Information Age

Interdependence

Security = Defense + All Else

Mature GlobalizationEarly Globalization

Containment

Security = Defense


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Information Revolution: The information revolution has clearly changed the wayour world operates. We have unprecedented ability to transmit and receive data, andit is growing exponentially, both in speedand volume. This has affected us in manyways: our command and control systems

have changed, we have unparalleledsituational awareness, but the environment inwhich we operate and our adversary hasalso changed. The media has nearinstantaneous ability to broadcast eventsaround the world, affecting both regionalaudiences as well as those in the states.Governments have access to informationmuch more quickly and can affect national level decisions affecting our operations.And our adversaries also have gained ability to gain and share information muchmore quickly and in some cases surreptitiously.

Challenges: Together with the benefits of information revolution has come somechallenges. The amount of information has exceeded our ability to manage orunderstand it. Vital information is often camouflaged / buried in the volume oftransmitted data. And the human brain has not grown exponentially to keep abreastof the flood of information. Nor is everyone equal in their ability to send, receive, andunderstand data. The pipes are different; tactical units are often not able to receiveand process what higher headquarters can pump out from their larger headquartersand more sophisticated systems.

The information revolution has also changed expectations. Were expected to keepup with whatever media report comes out; tactical units may be inundated withrequests for information based on the insatiable demand for information both fromthe media, national leadership, and higher headquarters.

Our adversary has alsochanged. Our enemies arenot only foreign states butincreasingly are nonstateentities, loosely organizednetworks with no discerniblehierarchical structure. Theyoperate in an environment offailed or failing governments,ethnic stratification, religiousviolence, humanitariandisasters, stateless militantsand proliferations ofinformation technology andincreasingly dangerous

VirtualVirtual

GeographicGeographic

A Catalyst For Change?

Training Camps

Ideologically

Sympathetic NGOs

Front Companies

Safe Havens

Recruitment and

Education

Internet and

Proselytizing

Facilitators, Smugglers

Financiers

Human Capital

Fighters and Leaders

Technical Expertise

Weapons Suppliers

Sympathetic Members

of Legitimate Govts

Media and Propaganda

Information RevolutionThe Death of Time

Data Overloaded Information Camouflaged

We can

transmitthe entire

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Congresseach

minute

War in 2010:

1.5 trillion wpm

Wideband Datalinks

Vietnam:100 wpmSATCOM

World War II:60 wpmRadio

World War I:30 wpm

Field Phone

wpm - words per minute

Gulf War:192,000 wpmNetworkedComputers


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weapons. Our adversaries are an increasingly complex mix of local, regional andinternationally organizations that can no longer be defined solely in terms of theirmilitary capabilities.

Many of these adversaries realize the futility in attacking us symmetrically in a

conventional military-on-military fight. Rather theyve discovered the moreadvantageous way of operating on the fringes in domains not traditionallyassociated as being within the realm of military operations. They fight us by takingadvantage of globalization and the information revolution those same things thathave dramatically improved our quality of life. They fight us through the internet,through terrorism, through diplomatic means by leveraging sympatheticgovernments and international organizations, through the use of the media, and byhurting us and our allies both economically and financially. Their strength is nolonger tanks, airplanes, and ships it is financiers, webmasters, and terrorists.These adversaries sustain themselves by nontraditional means gone are the large,easily targeted supply depots, the characteristic communication systems and

headquarters. They work out of nondescript locations, internet cafes, hotels, andsafehouses.

Visualization challenge: The challenge for us then is how to understand andvisualize this new adversary so that we can effectively defend our national interests.The traditional military-centric single center of gravity focus that worked so well inthe cold war doesnt allow us to accurately analyze, describe, and visualize todaysemerging networked, adaptable, asymmetric adversary. This adversary has nosingle identifiable source of all power. Rather, because of globalization, theinformation revolution, and, in some cases, the non-state characteristic of ouradversary, this form ofadversary can only be described(and holistically attacked) as asystem of systems.

A systems understanding: Everyoperational headquarters weveobserved has implementedsome form of systemsperspective to better understandand visualize the complexenvironment. They have allemphasized the need for anexpanded perception of theenvironment beyond atraditional military battlefield view to a more multi-dimensional situationalunderstanding. They have recognized the importance of understanding the variousPolitical, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, and Infrastructure (PMESII)


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systems and their interrelationships.2 Additionally, they have recognized the likelyinterrelationships of the broader friendly, adversary, and neutral or unalignedsystems.

This systems perspective better enables a shared understandable visualization of

the complex environment across both military and non-military audiences. We seethis common visualization framework as the first key step in promoting cohesiveaction amongst disparate players. Now, some argue that our adversary can beprecisely defined and modeled through this system understanding and we canpredict its behavior. We disagree. We believe todays complex environment is far toocomplex for reliable modeling and prediction of outcomes. That said, we have seenthe value in using the systems perspective to visualize the environment, gain abaseline appreciation of the environment, and organize information in a form usefulto the commander and stakeholders. We have also seen its value in identifying likelykey nodes and links as decisive points for action. In all cases though, continuedfeedback and assessment remains critical as we adjust actions to ensure we are

attaining the desired effects and achieving our objectives.

The friendly environment has also changed significantly. Weve changed from thedays when General Colin Powell made famous the so-called Powell Doctrine, alsoknown as the Powell Doctrine of Overwhelming Force, as part of the run up to the1990-1991 Gulf War. His doctrine was based on the large force structure we had in1990. However, since then we have become a smaller military in size, albeit verypowerful and technologically advanced, and can no longer solely rely on massedforces in accomplishing missions, especially against this evolving, adaptive enemy.Looking at the figure, we as anation lost military forcestructure to pay for newtechnology in the years afterDesert Storm. So today, wereat point B with moretechnology and less forces.

A is different from B, not only intypes of forces and ourtechnology, but also in terms ofthe doctrinal and TTP3implications of thosedifferences. We cant simplytransfer the old doctrine and TTP that was so successful at point A (when we had amuch larger force structure and different environment) to point B. Old doctrine(overwhelming force) and TTP simply wont work in todays complex environmentand force structure. We need new doctrine and new TTP.

2I use these systems and the acronym PMESII simply as one way to illustrate this broader view of the

environment. These systems could be described differently and include other aspects.3

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

Our Changing Military

Force Structure

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BA = B TTP Implications

Doctrinal Implications


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Emerging doctrine and TTP Effects based thinking Better harmonization with all Elements of

National & International Power (DIME) Arranging Operations both Sequentiallyand Simultaneously to achieve desiredeffects

Increasing Agility and Flexibility within theforce

Leveraging Information Technologies toenhance situational understanding andcommand and control

Maturing Military aspect of StrategicCommunications

Limiting Footprint through host nationsupport and contractor support

Extensive use of Special Operations

Forces

Another observation on our changing military is that our national leadership and theAmerican people expect the B capabilities to be equal or greater than Acapabilities. The technology enhancements have served us well in the moreconventional fights. However were still finding the need for more forces, bothmilitary and other elements of national power, for todays challenges, especially the

counterinsurgency fights. This remains a challenge. Our commanders are workinghard at harmonizing our actions, both within the joint force and also with ourinteragency and multinational partners, to best achieve our objectives.

The joint force commanders and their component commanders have made greatstrides in enhancing their capabilities to operate in this complex environment despitebeing a smaller force to keep B greater than A. They are leading the way inthinking through the doctrinal and TTP implications of point B.

Well discuss their thinking and bestpractices throughout this paper, but a few

selected insights up front:

Effects based thinking. Changing ourperspective from that of friendly versusenemy military warfare (military onmilitary thinking) to the use of allelements of national power affectingthe broader adversarys environment(DIME on PMESII).4 Commanders arethinking this way, and developing andusing desired effects as a means to

provide common visualization andbetter achieve unity of effort with ourpartners.

Arrangement of operations. The operational commanders conduct bothsequential and simultaneous operations to achieve the desired effects. Theyrecognize that there is value in both types of operations.

Agility and Flexibility. Much progress has occurred here. The collectiverecognition of the value of interdependent over independent operations, missiontype orders, and decentralization of decisions, coupled with agile supported andsupporting command relationships based on developed trust and confidence hassignificantly increased the agility and flexibility of our joint force.

Information technologies. We have better situational understanding than everbefore thanks in large part to emergent technologies. Our operationalheadquarters are sharing information within the joint force and with ourstakeholders to better enhance both planning and execution.

4DIME diplomatic, informational, military, economic elements of power. Like PMESII, I use this acronym

simply as to get across the broader means to achieve objectives. There are numerous other acronyms / elements

of national and international power.


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The military aspect of strategic communication has matured greatly, but stillneeds more improvement. Our field commanders are continually focusing onpromulgating their messages using all means available, not just their publicaffairs or PSYOP capabilities, but also through civil military operations activities,maneuver forces, key leader interaction, and by leveraging the many non-military

assets. Interaction with the US embassies and other stakeholders is continuallyimproving, expanding the means for promulgating the commanders messages.

Integration with special operations forces has greatly improved due in large partto commander efforts, improvements in agility and flexibility described above,and the simple act of continuous interaction from the tactical to operational levelover the past five years.


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3. Unified Action.5

Every headquarters we visit identify the need for unity of effort as one of the keys tosuccess in achieving strategic objectives in this complex security environment. Allrecognize the value of harmonizing and synchronizing military actions with the

actions of other instruments of national and international power. This is basic andlong standing; JP 0-2 even states The United States relies for its security on thecomplementary application of the basic instruments of national power: diplomatic,economic, informational, and military.

Weve observed a very inclusive approach of working hand in hand with stakeholders(both interagency and multinational partners) in achieving this unified action. We dontsee the commanders taking an overall direction role vis-a-vis stakeholders (as notedin the definition in the footnote) but rather working together with the stakeholders tojointly develop objectives and the plans to achieve those objectives. This is significant.These commanders understand the different perspectives and cultures among both

our interagency and multinational partners, and that taking an authoritative lead role isoften counterproductive to overall unity of effort and mission accomplishment.

Effects-based thinking:Many of the jointheadquarters use an effects-based thinking approach tohelp harmonize thisapplication of all elements ofnational power (Diplomatic,Information, Military andEconomic) against theinterdependent systems(Political, Military, Economic,Social, Information and Infrastructure) that comprise the adversarys environment.In essence we see effects-based thinking as simply developing and using desiredeffects as a way to better achieve unity of effort with our partners. Three keyelements (referring to the figure):1) The commander and staff dialogue with national and international leaders and

translate what they see, hear, and feel into solid, logical Combatant Commandlevel campaign objectives. (the ends)

2) They collectively (with other stakeholders) define desired conditions of thecomplex environment (often expressed in terms of the desired effects on thesystems of that environment PMESII) to achieve objectives. (the ways)

5Unified Action: A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization

of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands,

subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of thosecommands. (JP 1-02)

Effects-Based Thinking

D

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EFFECTSEFFECTSEFFECTS

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Objectives

Combatant

Commander

Theater



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3) Collectively working with our stakeholders, they develop a set of actions to attainthose desired effects, and harmonize military actions with those of thestakeholders to attain the desired effects and achieve objectives. (the means)

Observations in this effects-based thinking:

This effects-based thinking is not new. Wed argue that good commanders havealways thought and led this way. Its underlying premise is the recognition of theintrinsic value of the art of war and the value - the necessity - of mission typeorders identifying the what in terms of desired effects versus the detailed how.Weve seen effects-based thinking misinterpreted by those who incorrectly wantto over-engineer it and turn it into a bunch of equations, data bases, and checklists.

Theater objectives: We find an enduring challenge faced by theater strategic levelheadquarters is the continual dialogue and translation necessary in determining and,when warranted, revising theater objectives. This takes a lot of effort and neverends. National and international positions and objectives change. Our theater-

strategic headquarters recognize this and maintain dialogue to ensure they remainnested within these national and international objectives.

Developing desired effects: With a common visualization of the complexenvironment we find that the military and other stakeholders are able to developa common, shared set of desired (and undesired) effects to serve as a unifyingbasis for action to achieve theater and strategic objectives. One danger isdeveloping too many effects. Like priorities, if every thing is important thennothing is important. Weve seen a rule of thumb that 8-12 effects are about rightfor a campaign.

Effects is a noun, not a verb: We still see some initial confusion in the word effects. Effects describe the state of the systems within the environment. We

take actions to attain these effects, i.e. a change in the environment. Ouractions affect the environment and bring about a desired effect.

Harmonizing actions: With a common set of desired and undesired effects, thecommander can issue guidance and intent to his staff and components, and workwith other stakeholders to accomplish fused, synchronized, and appropriateactions on PMESII systems within the operational environment to attain thedesired effects and achieve objectives.

Key to this effects-based approach is full participation of all of the players -military and other elements of national and international power- in a fully inclusiveprocess of assessing, planning,directing, and monitoring actions.

Development of objectives and effectsnormally occurs at the theater-strategic and operational level. Webelieve it is the essence of operationalart. That said, effects-based thinking isrelevant at all levels in terms ofunderstanding the environment andthe purpose behind operations.

Objectiv

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Effects

Unity of Effort

Commanders

Guidance &

Intent

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Actions

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US EmbassyHost

Nation

Requests

JTFOrders


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4. Commander-centric Leadership.

The commanders role in command - employing the Art of War - in this complex,unified action environment is critical, regardless of the technological andinformational improvements in control -- the Science of War. Without exception,

we find that commander-centric organizations out perform staff-centricorganizations. Staff-centric organizations lack clear commander guidance and intentenriched by the commanders experience and intuition. We offer several bestpractices gleaned from these operational commanders:

Leadership the more things change the more they stay the same Commanders courage and character remain paramount. Commanders vision / guidance and intent provide clarity in todays

dynamic, ambiguous environment. Mission type orders remain key to success. Rely on your instinct and

intuition. Anticipate and seize opportunity. Work with and through yoursubordinate commanders. Continue battlefield circulation.

Commanders must maintain a broad perspective on the environment; itsmore than a mil on mil conflict. Understand DIME on PMESII.

Be Commander-centric versus Staff-centric. Provide guidance to yourstaff, and help them. Youll get a better solution in a tenth of the time.Guard against the staff tendency to over-control the fight.

Be a learning organization before & during the fight, NOT after it.

Commander Insights in the interagency and multinational world: Personal relationships count in the joint, interagency, and multinational

world. Build these relationships, and foster trust and confidence with yourpartners.

Be inclusive versus exclusive with your joint, interagency, and

multinational partners in how you assess, plan, and make decisions. Focus on unity of effort, not unity of command. Recognize the reality ofdifferent perspectives and goals of your partners. Strive to arrive at a setof common desired effects to promote unity of effort.

Commander insights in the joint world: Stay at the operational level. Set conditions for operational and tactical

success. Delegate authority to subordinates to fight the tactical fight. Instill a one team, one fight mentality. Build and reinforce trust and

confidence. Recognize the value of the horizontal piece of warfighting. Establish

supported/supporting command relationships between subordinates.

Demand integration and promote interdependence. Condition/teachsubordinates to plan and execute within a framework of access to othersforces versus requiring ownership of those forces.

Establish mission approval processes that allow you and subordinates toretain agility and speed of action. This will likely entail decentralization some operational commanders have termed the phrase uncomfortablydecentralized as the only way to be agile enough to take advantage ofopportunities in todays battlespace.


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5. Operational Design - Setting Conditions for subordinates.

As noted upfront, our operational commanders are leading the way in the moveaway from independent, stovepipe operations to interdependent operations. Thisinterdependence is a mindset change from a vertical focus on receiving and

unilaterally accomplishing tasks from the higher commander to that of working muchmore closely with yourhorizontalwarfighting partners as depicted by the oval in theadjacent figure. This interdependence is more than interoperability -the technicalability to work together. It is the recognition that the Armed Forces fight as one teamof joint, interagency, and multinational partners and depend on access to eachothers capabilities to succeed.

This interdependence is a consciousdecision that the Joint ForceCommander (JFC) makes andimplements through his directed

reliance of each component on thecapabilities of others to maximizetheir total complementary andreinforcing actions, while minimizingtheir relative vulnerabilities.

This section addresses our observations and insights on how our operationalcommanders are making this a reality in the field through their operational design ofsetting conditions for their subordinates success. We find that they focus on five keyelements in their operational design. These elements are interrelated; together theyset conditions for success:

An effects-based construct in which they say what needs to be done (effects), butnot the specifics of how (discussed earlier).

A task organization comprising both battlespace owners and functional taskforces to take best advantage of all of the military force capabilities.

A battlespace geometry that provides sufficient control measures in the terms ofboundaries and fire control measures without over-controlling the fight.

Command relationships that promote interdependence amongst the components,instill a one team one fight mentality, provide authorities commensurate withresponsibilities, and build trust and confidence.

Decentralized authorities that empower subordinates to operate withincommanders intent and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities within the

chaos of battle.

Task Organization: Weve seen a huge evolution in how the joint forcecommanders are following the well known adage Form follows Function in taskorganizing their joint force and even naming their subordinate task forces. Theyveevolved beyond the traditional (and doctrinal) use of Service (e.g. ARFOR,NAVFOR) and Functional (e.g. JFLCC, JFMCC) components to tailoredorganizations of both battlespace owners and functional task forces to take best

Warfighting Imperatives:

Fully integrated (both military and other interagency players)

Components meet needs of Joint Force Commander and

designated components

Independent versus Interdependent Operations;

A better fight as a joint team

LandLand AirAir MaritimeMaritimeSOFSOF

Joint Force

Commander

Joint Force

Commander


18/44

14

advantage of all of the military force capabilities in accomplishing the mission. Wereseeing three key insights in terms of the task organization:

- Clear designation of battlespace commanders (e.g. JFLCC, JFMCC, RCSouth, MND-N).6

- Use of functional task forces (e.g. special operations, counter IED,

Medical, Engineer) operating throughout the joint operations area.- Dual-hatting Service force commanders as operational commanders

(battlespace or functional TF commanders) to increase efficiency andeffectiveness.

Insights:

Clear designation of battlespacecommanders. Our joint commanders stillprimarily organize to fight along ageographic orientation. At thecombatant command level, were seeing

the continued use of JTFs givengeographic joint operations areas(JOAs). Were also seeing the traditionalorganization along a JFLCC, JFACC,and JFMCC orientation for majorcombat operations giving thesecomponents geographic AOs, particularly at the Combatant Command level.GEN Franks organized his joint force by land, maritime, and air componentsfocused on those domains. He went a step further in his organization, andempowered his Special Operations component with an area of operation in thenorth, and his Air component with an AO in the west. Were also seeing a

common task organization, especially at theJTF level in land-centric operations, usinggeographically-based components directlysubordinate to the joint commander (e.g. theregional commands in Afghanistan, MNDs inIraq and Bosnia, and CSGs in the UnifiedAssistance operation see figure).

Use of functional task forces (e.g. specialoperations, counter IED, Medical, Engineer).This is a significant evolution. Weve seenalmost every joint force commander establish functional task forces in addition to

battlespace commanders to conduct specific mission sets required throughoutthe joint operations area. Often, the forces capable of performing these specificmissions are low-supply/high-demand forces, and the expertise and C2capabilities necessary for their employment may not be resident in each of the

6JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Command

JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component CommandRC South Regional Command controlling the southern AO (used in Afghanistan)

MND-N Multinational National Division Controlling the Northern AO (used in Iraq and Bosnia)

Unified Assistance

Organization (Tsunami JTF)

COMPONENTS

SUPPORTING

Provide Forces

Retain OPCON

Combined

SupportGroups

(CSGs)

SUPPORTED COORDINATE LOCAL OPERATIONS

Combined

Support Force

Combined

Support

Group

THAILAND

Combined

Support

Group

SRI LANKA

Combined

Support

Group

INDONESIA

JFSOCC

AFFOR/JFACC

NAVFOR

MARFOR


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15

battlespace headquarters (e.g. an MND). We discuss how the joint forcecommander promotes interdependence amongst the battlespace owners andthese functional task forces in succeeding sections on battlespace geometry andcommand relationships.

Dual-hatting Service force commanders to increase efficiency and effectiveness.

Were seeing very few cases of separate and distinct service force commandheadquarters within the joint task forces. In almost every case, the jointcommander opts to dual hat either himself or his subordinates as service forcecommanders. The joint commanders are also using their authorities toconsolidate selected Service Title X responsibilities for more efficient use ofresources.

Battlespace Geometry: As notedabove, we see joint commanders layingout the battlespace in terms of areas ofoperation and identifying battlespace

owners. They then empower thesebattlespace owners with the requisiteauthority commensurate with theirresponsibilities as battlespace owners.

Insights:

Todays battlespace is very complex. Many players are operating in thebattlespace owners joint operations area and the areas of operation. Thebattlespace owners need the support of these other players even though theymay not own them. Weve seen a huge evolution in this area in which thebattlespace owners are increasingly more comfortable with these other non-

assigned players in their battlespace while still recognizing and fulfilling theirauthorities and responsibilities noted in the figure.

Delineation of battlespace togetherwith supported/supporting commandrelationship provides sufficientcontrol measures without overlyrestricting the commanders. Wereseeing less reliance on boundariesas the primary means to control thefight. Commanders are increasinglyusing horizontal linkages means

such as supported/ing commandrelationships (discussed below),situational awareness tools, liaison,and commander crosstalk ratherthan fragmenting battlespace with unnecessary boundaries.

One continuing challenge in this battlespace geometry is the potential for otherplayers, i.e. those military forces not assigned to the battlespace owner and otherinteragency players, to not keep the battlespace owner apprised of their activities

Battlespace Geometry

JSOA = Area of land, sea, and

airspace used for the conduct

of special operations

JSOA = Area of land, sea, and


of special operations

AOs = Areas for component

commanders to conduct land

and naval force operations

AOs = Areas for component

commanders to conduct land

and naval force operations

JOA = Area of land, sea, and


of military operations

JOA = Area of land, sea, and


of military operations

Battlespace Owners

Normally the Supported Cdr

Synchronize Lethal and Non

lethal Actions

Land Use Management

Situation Awareness (Friendly,

Neutral, & Enemy)

Fire Support Control Measures

An Najaf

Habur Gate

Basrah

Irbil

Kirkuk

Tikrit

Al Amarah

Qurnah

Karbala

An Nasiriyah

As Samawah

Al Kut

Kuwait City

Basrah

Basrah

Baghdad

Tigris R.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

- Today -

TFTF

Directed Missions:

Supported Cdr: TF

Supporting Cdrs: MNC-I(MNDs, CJSOTF) & others

MND/B Areas of Operations (AOs):

SupportedCdr: MNDs / MNBs

Supporting Cdrs: CFACC, CJSOTF, TFs

LegendMNC-I: Multinational Corps IraqMND & MNB: Multinational Division and Brigade

CFACC: Coalition Forces Air Component CommandCJSOTF:Coalition Joint Special Operations Task ForceTF: Task Force

Key Insights

One Team, One Fight

Interdependent opns

Full Coordination (in

planning and execution)

TACON-like at tip of spear


20/44

16

and movements. Weve heard several joint commanders and subordinatesemphasizing the need for these other players to keep the battlespace ownerinformed. These players must recognize the battlespace owner authorities andresponsibilities as they all work to accomplish the mission.

Command relationships: Weve seen joint commanders spending a lot of timeensuring they get command relationships right up front. Their instincts are right ontarget. Weve found that getting the command relationships right up front isabsolutely critical to success.

We see them using OPCON, TACON, and Support command relationships to allowfor both unity of command of habitually organized forces (primarily OPCON andTACON authorities), and access to the capabilities of other forces (primarily Supportauthority).

OPCON provides for ownership of the

forces. It allows the commander to taskboth what to do and how to employ. Itrequires expertise in planning andemployment. It remains the preferredcommand relationship over forces that thecommander will continuously own andemploy, and for which he and his staff havethe expertise and capability to commandand control.

TACON, a subset of OPCON, also provides for ownership of the forces. It allows forlocal direction and control for accomplishment of a specific mission.We often see supporting commanders providing forces TACON to a supportedcommander. While most normally attribute this forces provided TACON to airsorties provided by the Navy or Marines TACON to the JFACC, another, veryeffective use is the supporting commander horizontally providing ground or SOFforces TACON to a supported commander. The key significance is that its thesupporting commander directly delegating the TACON authority. This TACON is notdirected from the higher commander in the form of a FRAGO, but rather delegatedhorizontally between supporting to supported commander. This TACON authorityprovides for unity of command at the tip of the spear at the tactical level. We seethis delegation of TACON, or in some cases a direct support relationship, as a bestpractice.

Support. We have learned in OEF and OIF that the support command relationship isprobably the most powerful command relationship in terms of gaining access toadditional capabilities. It provides the authority and basis for interdependence, andmay be the most appropriate in todays operational environment. This supportrelationship in essence makes the supporting commanders responsible for thesuccess of the supported commander. They cant simply provide some forces and

Supported / Supporting

Support is a command authority...

The support command relationship is, by

design, a somewhat vague, but very

flexible arrangement.

...The establishing authority is responsible

for ensuring both the supported and

supporting commander understand the

degree of authority granted.Joint Pub 0-2


21/44

17

walk away from the challenge. Rather, it requires them to stay involved with thesupported commander and continue to aid and assist him as he conductsoperations.

This support relationship allows for the horizontal integration discussed upfront in

this section. The support command authority is increasingly being used to provide asupported commander access to capabilities that he doesnt own. The flexibility ofthis support command relationship is one of its greatest advantages. It supportsdecentralized execution within mission type orders and commanders intent. Therewill normally be multiple, concurrent supported and supporting commanders - thusthere is a need for clear priorities being established by the establishing authority.

Insights:

The establishing authority is thehigher joint commander it may bea Combatant Commander, a JTF

commander, or even at the SecDeflevel in the case of certain GWOTor STRATCOM activities. This higher commander defines the support commandrelationships amongst his subordinates in terms of who is supported andsupporting, the respective degree of authority, and overall priorities especiallywhere there are limited resources supporting numerous operations SOF andAir are good examples of some limited resources. He is also the referee, the tiebreaker when subordinates cannot work out the necessary balance of accessto capabilities. Some establishing authority best practices:

-Giving clear direction to subordinates in terms of priorities and intent toallow subordinates to work horizontally with each other in accomplishing

tasks.-Set conditions for and demand crosstalk amongst supported and supporting

commanders to build and reinforce the necessary horizontal personalrelationships, and trust and confidence.

-Challenge your subordinates to self regulate their apportionment ofcapabilities to one another through horizontal crosstalk. This crosstalkamongst your components will allow them to arrive at the optimalapportionment of capabilities to accomplish both their assigned tasks andsupport the designated supported commanders.

-Staying involved when necessary to arbitrate / resolving conflictingunderstanding of priorities.

Supported Commander. The supported commander is given access tosupporting capabilities and has the authority to provide general direction,designate and prioritize missions, targets, or objectives, and other actions forcoordination and efficiency (to include requesting liaison and directing ofreporting requirements). Some supported commander best practices:

- Identify needs to supporting commanders. This is a continuing, not onetime, activity.

Joint Force Commander

(Establishing Authority)



SupportSupportedCommander

SupportedCommander

SupportingCommander

SupportingCommander


22/44

18

-Request liaison from supporting commanders to help coherently integratesupporting capabilities in the operation.

-Bring lack of support first to supporting commanders, and if necessary toestablishing authority for resolution.

Supporting Commander. The supporting commander is responsible to bothascertain and satisfy the needs of the supported commander within the prioritiesdirected by the establishing authorities. Some supporting commander bestpractices:

-Recognition of your role in ensuring the success of the supportedcommander. We see those believing and following through on the one teamone fight view set the conditions for success.

-Understand and respect the authority of supported commander. Recognizethat your support to another supported commander may have even a higherpriority than a mission for which you have been tasked.

-Take time in ascertaining supported commanders requirements and

understanding the overall priorities in apportioning your forces to accomplishboth your assigned tasks and those of other supported commanders.-Send liaison to supported commanders to assist them in planning and in

ascertaining your requirements.-Direct appropriate command relationships

to your subordinates to ensure you (andyour subordinates) fulfill your supportingresponsibilities. You, as the supportingcommander, can provide forces orcapabilities in a direct support or evenTACON relationship to a respective

supported commander to ensure hissuccess.

Administrative Control (ADCON). Defined as Thedirection or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respectto administration and support,7 ADCON normally includes the organization ofService forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unitlogistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization,discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of thesubordinate or other organizations. ADCON for the numerous Service Title Xresponsibilities remains an important authority and responsibility. This is anotherarea in which were seeing the Combatant Commanders, JTF commanders, andService Component Commanders focusing on to make administration and supportas efficient and effective as possible. It is further discussed later in the logisticssection.

7Definition from JP 1-02





SupportSupported

Commander

SupportedCommander

Supporting

Commander

SupportingCommander

SubordinateHqs

Subordinate

HqsSubordinate

Hqs

Subordinate

Hqs

Tactical UnitTactical UnitTactical UnitTactical Unit

Support

Direct Support

TACON

Force Provided

Tip of the Spear Unity of Command

An Example of Implementation of the

Support Command Relationship


23/44

19

Decentralized authorities. Our commanders have made great strides in developingthe decentralized authorities to allow their subordinates to operate within theadversaries decision cycle. They recognize the reality that the higher one needs togo in the chain of command toreceive mission approval for an

operation, the longer it willnormally take. Fleeting targetsmay be lost. The ability to rapidlytake advantage of chaos in theenvironment is lost. Initiative canbe lost. Additionally, complicatedmission approval processes takeboth time and effort and takestaffs and commanders awayfrom the operations at hand towork through mission approvals.

Mission Approval. The figureportrays the challenges andmeans to operate inside the adversarys decision cycle. The vertical axis addressesthe mission approval level with all the various levels of command culminating withthe President at the top. The horizontal axis is time the time to request and gainmission approval. So, what we see is the higher one goes along the y-axis (i.e.centralized / higher approval level), the longer it takes to gain mission approval andthe more likely you will miss targets of opportunity.

At the bottom of the figure we depict two options that weve seen out in operationalheadquarters to shorten the time required to gain mission approval.The left option focuses on decentralizing mission approval levels pushing themdown into the lower left quadrant Here we see the value of mission type ordersand a priori decisions.

The right side addresses streamlining the processes, especially where missionapproval cant be delegated. Here we see the value of technological andorganizational solutions.

Insights:

Delegate authorities to the point of being uncomfortably decentralized in order toget inside the adversarys decision cycle.

Gain agility and flexibility through horizontal collaboration in which supportingcommanders work directly with supported commanders, provide capabilities anddelegate authorities to take advantage of emerging opportunities within the chaosof battle.

Agility and Flexibility-Mission Approval Levels-

Getting inside theadversarys decision cycle

Centralized,

High Approval

Level

Decentralized,

Low Approval

LevelTime

Considerations

Risk to Mission and Unit

Mission Sensitivity

Adversarys Decision Cycle

Required Responsiveness

Unit

JTF

RCC

POTUS /

SecDef

Options

Technological &organizational

solutions

A priori decisions, trust andconfidence, and supported / ing

command relationships solutions

Centralized,

High Approval

Level

Decentralized,

Low Approval

LevelTime Time


24/44

20

6. Decision cycle.

The decision cycle assists the commander inunderstanding the environment and in focusing the staff tosupport critical decisions and actions. We see every

command using a cycle similar to the one depicted here.They all assess how theyre doing, conduct planningbased on this assessment to achieve desired effects andobjectives, direct tasks to subordinates and request /recommend actions to stakeholders, and monitoroperations and the environment to support assessment. They communicatethroughout this cycle, both within the headquarters and with higher, adjacent, andsubordinate commands.We have observed that inclusion of stakeholders in this decision cycle is critical forachieving unity of effort. We will further describe this cycle after touching on eventhorizons and how the headquarters interact in terms of their decision cycle with its

higher, adjacent, and subordinatedheadquarters.

Three event horizons: We find thatthe joint headquarters function onthree general event horizons current operations, futureoperations, and future plans. We findeach event horizon moves (spins) atdifferent rate in terms of how it goesthrough the key aspects of thedecision cycle. Each event horizon also requires supporting battle-rhythm eventssupporting its planning, execution, and assessment.

The current operations event horizon focuses on the what is, and can rapidlyprogress through the decision cycle sometimes minutes for quick breakingevents. Current operations produce a larger volume of orders includingadministrative fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) & small tactical FRAGOs (e.g.change in priorities). These kinds of activities generally do not require full staffintegration. It does, however, require some limited planning capability.

The future operations event horizon focuses on the what if, and normally movesslower with more deliberate assessment and planning activities resulting in suchthings as major FRAGOs directing major tactical actions (e.g. named operations)

and troop movements within theater (e.g. mvmt of a brigade from one MND toanother). It generally requires full staff integration.

The future plans event horizon is focused on the whats next, interacts heavilywith higher headquarters planning efforts, and moves very deliberately throughthe decision cycle. It focuses on activities such as development of OPLANs andFRAGOs to Campaign Plan and Policy directives or Major troop rotations. Thesekinds of activities normally require full staff integration.

Three Event Horizons

ASSESS

PLAN

DIRECT

MONITORSmaller circles

revolve faster

Future Plans

Future OPS

Current OPS

Future PlansOperational focus is onwhats next. Typicallyresponsible for planning

the next phase ofoperations (sequels),

assessing campaign/planprogress, validating plan

assumptions

Future Ops Current OpsOperational focus is on whatif. Typically responsible forbranch planning. Validates ,

refines, redirects futureoperations based on Effects

assessment & task execution.Prepares future operations -

Warning Orders(WARNORDs)

Operational focus is onexecution of current

operations, what is.Evaluates task

accomplishment. Directsexecution of branches and

sequels - FragmentaryOperation Orders

(FRAGOs)

Monitor

Communicate

Plan

AssessDirect

Decision Cycle


25/44

21

This decision cycle nests with otherechelon headquarters decision cyclesacross all three event horizons as depictedin the adjacent figure. Its continuallyinterfacing with the higher headquarters

decision cycle (which is normally moredeliberate and slower moving), withadjacent units, and with subordinate unitdecision cycles (which will likely be movingmore rapidly).

Insights on the elements of the decisioncycle:

Assessment: Assessment is an importantbest practice whose need is reinforced time

and again in operational headquarters.These headquarters all recognize that theycannot precisely model the behavior of thecomplex environment nor predict results.They all use assessment to measure howtheyre doing (see the three areas ofassessment task, effects, and campaignassessment on the adjacent figure) andthen adjust (following commandersguidance and intent) to stay on course.

Insights:

The danger in over-engineering assessment. A balance is needed between aquantitative and qualitative approach to assessment. Assessment, especiallyeffects and campaign assessment, is tough, and in many cases subjective.Because of the difficulty in measuring progress on attainment of effects orcampaign objectives, weve seensome staffs over-engineerassessment, building massivequantifiable briefings that do notalways logically or clearly support acommanders assessmentrequirement nor assist him indeveloping guidance and intent. Theytoo often focus on assessing activityversus progress toward achieving thecommander' objectives. Quantitativeindicators should only serve as a startpoint for commanders and staffs subjective assessments based on observationand experience. Weve seen as a best practice a balance of quantitative and

Assess:

CDRs Assessment

What happened? (Analysis)

So What? (Assessment)

What do we need to do?

- Continue

- Reprioritize

- Redirect

Assessment

Task AssessmentAre we doing things right?

Effects AssessmentAre we doing the right things?

Campaign AssessmentAre we accomplishing the mission?

Interagency / Component

actively involved

in all Phases Guidance / Intent

Planning Drawn from effects Synchronized through

CONOPS Resourcing: appropriate

to the desired effect

Components / Outside Actors Orders vs requests Supporting / Supported

relationships

Future Plans

Future OPS

Current OPSDIRECT ASSESS

MONITOR

Future Plans

Future OPS

Current OPSDIRECT ASSESS

Supported / Supporting Relationships

with other agencies and countries

MONITOR

A Multi-echelon Process

PLANS

FUOPSCurrent OPSDIRECT ASSESS

EXECUTE

PLANS


EXECUTE

PLANS


EXECUTE

CombatantCommand

JTF

Components /MSCs

Plan

AssessDirectDirect Assess

Task Assessment

Effects Assessment

INTELINTEL

OPSOPS

Assessment

Boards

Campaign Assessment

Assessment

Monitor

CommunicateDirect

Plan

Assess

Other impacts:National / Embassy

Intl Interests

Higher Headquarters

Components

Regional Contacts

Perceptions


26/44

22

qualitative input to assessment with the commander using numerous venues(including battlefield circulation and discussion with commanders andstakeholders) to gain his personal assessment. These commanders balance apossible staff tendency toward a science of war solution, limit the amount oftime and effort their staffs put into quantifying assessments, and recognize their

command role in applying their experience, intuition, and own observations in anart of war approach to assessment.

Recommendations based on assessment: Another staff challenge is developingand making recommendations to the commander on what needs to be donebased on assessments. Often, just developing the what happened and the sowhat of assessment exhauststhe staff and they dont get to the most importantaspect recommending what needs to be done. An observed best practice isalways providing recommendations at all levels of assessment task, effects,and campaign.

Frequency and command level of assessments: Task, effects, and campaignlevel assessments have different levels of focus for tactical, operational, and

theater-strategic headquarters, and have different frequencies of formalassessment. Weve observed that tactical and operational level headquartersroutinely conduct task assessments using friendly measures of performanceanswering are we doing things right. These assessments normally occur fairlyfrequently and are a focus area within the current operations staff area.Operational level headquarters, most of the JTF headquarters we observe, focustheir efforts on effects assessment, answering are we doing the right things toachieve our desired effects. Because the assessment process needs to supportthe commanders decision cycle, the frequency of formal assessments needs tomatch the pace of campaign execution. In places where we are conductingsustained operations, formal effects assessments normally occur monthly, and

drive future operations activities. In faster paced operations, this might occurmore often. Theater-strategic headquarters normally focus on campaignassessment answering are we accomplishing the mission (achieving ourobjectives), and occur quarterly or semi-annually. We see joint headquartersrecognizing this differentiation, and focusing their efforts on the appropriateassessments, at the right frequency, while minimizing redundant assessmentworkloads on subordinate headquarters.

Stakeholder involvement: Every command weve visited extensively reaches outto stakeholders and other venues in arriving at their assessments. Withoutexception, these stakeholders perspectives enrich the assessments. In manycases, the stakeholders have not traditionally conducted these types of

assessments, may not always understand the benefits, and may be leery tocommit to a position. But upon recognizing the value of involvement in theassessment process, they share their perspectives and enrich (and influence) theprocess.

Periodic validation of the basis of assessments objectives, effects, and actions:We noted earlier that we cant predict outcomes in the complex environment weoperate in today. Likewise, we dont always initially develop the preciseobjectives, effects, or actions necessary to achieve the desired outcomes. Weve


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seen joint headquartersperiodically revalidate theirdeveloped objectives, effects,measures of effectiveness(MOE), and measures of

performance (MOP) based onthis observation. This isdifferent from the assessmentprocess discussed to now. It isa review of our basis foroperations, our assumptions,and our systems perspective. Like the assessment process discussed above,this review / validation is also conducted at different levels and differentfrequencies. Obviously, revalidation of the objectives occur at the level at whichthey were developed normally the theater-strategic or above level. Review ofthe desired and undesired effects primarily occurs at the operational level, while

review of MOE and MOP to determine if we are measuring the correct trends andactions and using the correct metrics occur at the operational and tactical level.These reviews / revalidations keep the units on course by taking into accountboth higher level direction, adversary actions, and other changes in the securityenvironment.

Planning: Planning occurs from the 3 to 9oclock position on the decision cycle.Planning efforts are based on assessmentand resultant commanders guidance. Abest practice that we have seen in thefield, especially in headquarters like CFC-K, MNC-I, & CJTF-76, is incorporatingeffects-based thinking into the existing operational planning process. Incorporatingthis thinking into the operational planning process does not represent a departurefrom the existing doctrinally-based process. It simply constitutes a way to broadenthe types of things we think about when approaching planning problems.Two overarching insights weve gained in planning are:

An effects-based thinking approach to operations enriches our existing planningprocess.

Commander involvement in theplanning process enhances and

focuses effort.

The adjacent figure identifies six areas(noted in blue) in which an effects-basedthinking approach to operations enrichesthe existing planning process. The leftside of the figure depicts the theaterobjectives derived from the translation of

D

I

M

E


Strategic Operational Tactical

Guid

ance

/

Guid

ance

/

Inte

nt

Inte

nt

Analysis

Dialogue

/Tr

ansl

ate

Objectives Effects Actions

Elements of AssessmentValidate

Validate

Are we measuring

correctly?

Task

Assessment

3

4

Are We Achieving Our

Assigned Objectives?

Are We Achievingour Effects? 2

Dont Confuse Activity with Progress

1

P

M

E

S

I

I



Combatant

Commander

Theater

Objectives

Combatant

Commander

Theater


Planning: 3 to 9 oPlanning: 3 to 9 oclockclock

Plan


Supported by:B2C2WGs ( inclStakeholders)

Communication Strategy

Intelligence / Sustainment

Components

Operational Protection

Coordinated with:Higher Headquarters

Components

OtherMilitary

Stakeholders

Decision

Boards

CommunicateDirect

Plan

Assess

Recommended COAs

Proposed Requests

Draft Orders CurrentOPS

Current

OPS

Future

OPS

Future

OPSFuture

Plans

Future

Plans

Joint Planning Group

Commanders Assessment

Commanders Guidance

Assessment

Boards

Effects Integration intoEffects Integration intoOperational Planning ProcessOperational Planning Process

COA Analysis,Comparison, Selection

COADevelopment

Feasible

Acceptable

Suitable

Complete

Distinguishable

Orders and

Requests

COAs: Sequenced Tasks

JIPB

Facts

Assumptions

Limitations

Risks Specified Tasks

Implied Tasks

Essential Tasks

Mission Analysis

Restated M ission

Commanders Guidance

Initial Intent

Campaign Plan / OPORD

Theater

Campaign

Objectives

TheaterTheater

CampaignCampaign



DIME on PMESII

Systems

Understanding

Actionsand

Resources

Measuresof

Performance

Effects

Refinement Nodesand

Links

Measures

Of

Effectiveness


28/44

24

national-strategic guidance, and the developed effects.

Insights:

They fully bring the stakeholders into their planning from the very beginning ofmission analysis, though course of action (COA) development to orders

development. Commanders have found that extensive consultation withstakeholders in visualizing the environment, development of guidance and intent,and decisions on courses of action pay big benefits in arriving at optimal plansand subsequent success in achieving objectives.

During mission analysis a broader viewpoint enabled by a systems perspectiveenhances the traditional JIPB process. We find that the staffs and commanders,together with stakeholders, are continually refining desired and undesired effectsas they better understand the environment provided by this systemsunderstanding. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are difficult to develop in thisnetworked, complex environment. A best practice is starting the development ofMOE up front during mission analysis, and continually refining those MOE

throughout the planning process. An enhanced JIPB assists in the determination of key nodes and links which will

likely be the focus for actions by the military and stakeholders. Courses of action(COAs) normally address the arrangement of actions against these key nodesand link to attain desired effects.

We find that Measures of Performance (MOP) are developed concurrently withCOA development and selection, and finalized upon COA selection and ordersdevelopment.

Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) are also developedduring the planning process to support the commanders future decisionrequirements. Weve seen a close

correlation between these CCIR anddeveloped MOE and MOP. Oftenthese CCIR will support commanderdecision requirements to either staythe course or changing the plan (interms of either a branch or sequel).Often these CCIR will be answered intask, effects, and campaignassessments.

Directing: Directing occurs from the 9 oclock to 12 oclock position on the decision

cycle. We find three key activities occurring in this directing function. The commander provides mission type orders to subordinates specifying

objectives and desired and undesired effects, the arrangement of requiredactions, and required assets and command relationships that will enable missionaccomplishment.

The commander requests necessary support (in terms of actions) from otherstakeholders necessary for the attainment of desired effects. A key insight: theseactions will have been developed earlier in conjunction with the stakeholders

Focused CCIR

PIR FFIR

CCIR

Decisions

Assessment

Intel-led

focus on all

facets of

threatPMESII

Operational

reporting to

addressALL

elements of

DIME


29/44

25

through continuous collaboration within an inclusive mindset discussed earlierand should come as no surprise to the stakeholders. Operational headquartersemphasize this best practice of early and continuous collaboration withstakeholders.

The command issues a collection plan that allows for subsequent assessment

activities recognizing that adjustments will be required within this complexenvironment.

Monitoring: Occurs in conjunction with assessment from the 12 to 3 oclockposition. Joint headquartersmonitor the environment consistingof friendly, adversary, andnonaligned actors to gaininformation for assessment, andprovide feedback to higherheadquarters (in support of their

information requirements) andsubordinates in terms of necessarymission approval requirements andbranch or sequel taskings.

Insights:

Current operations is the focalpoint for monitoring and relevant reporting to the commander.

An inclusive mindset with stakeholders assists in ensuring a broader monitoringfunction. Liaison with these stakeholders pays big dividends.

Liaison elements can assist in situational understanding, but should not be the

conduit for subordinate unit reporting. These liaison elements, assist the currentoperations monitoring primarily by surfacing their commanders issues, and willlikely spend most of their time in the planning area where they can provide theirrespective components perspectives and ideas to enhance planning. Currentoperations desk officers should be responsible for maintenance ofcommunications and reporting with subordinate and adjacent commands.

Common awareness of CCIR, together with MOP and MOE, is essential forcurrent operations personnel. We find that proactive attention to maintaining thisawareness is necessary.

Notification criteria and channels should be clearly understood to preventstovepiping of information or inadvertent failures in notification.

Staff battle drills based on likely contingencies should be developed andrehearsed to minimize confusion during actual crises.

Communication: Communication, both within the staff and externally with otherheadquarters and stakeholders is key to effective planning and execution. All of thejoint headquarters we visit focus command level attention on how they communicate both the pipes, systems, tools, and processes. We discuss this more in theinformation management section.

Plan


Supported by:B2C2WGs (incl Stakeholders)

Communication Strategy

Intelligence / Sustainment

Components

Operational Protection

Coordinated with:Higher Headquarters

Components

OtherMili taryStakeholders

Coordinated

Requests /

Intent

Stakeholders:National / Embassy

Intl InterestsHigher Headquarters

Combatant Commander

NGOs

Other impacts:National / Embassy

Intl InterestsHigher Headquarters

ComponentsRegional Contacts

PerceptionsINTELINTEL

OPSOPS

Commanders Decision Cycle

Decision

Boards

Unity of Effort

Monitor

CommunicateDirect

Plan

Assess

CCIR

Task Assessment

Effects Assessment

Campaign Assessment

Recommended COAs

Proposed Requests

Draft Orders

Approved Orders

CurrentOPS

Current

OPS

FutureOPS

Future

OPSFuturePlans

Future

Plans

Joint Planning Group

Commanders Assessment

Objectives and Themes

Commanders Guidance

Assessment

Boards


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7. JTF Headquarters Organization.

Were seeing the formation and continuedemployment (rotations) of more jointheadquarters than ever before. The staffs of

these headquarters are faced with dauntingchallenges in managing information, sharingunderstanding, and supporting the decisioncycle both within their headquarters and withhigher, adjacent, and lower headquarters and the DIME stakeholders.

This section initially addresses insights on the formation and the continuingreadiness requirements of rotating headquarters. It then goes into depth on two keyinsights in how todays joint headquarters are organizing and crafting their battlerhythms to meet these challenges.

Insights on newly forming JTFs:It is common knowledge; were in atime of high OPTEMPO. Wereseeing the common practice byGeographic CombatantCommanders (GCCs) to stand upJTFs to conduct requiredoperations as they arise. Insightson challenges for newly formingJTF hqs:

Not all JTFs are the same. They all have different missions. Their operational

mission requirements should drive the JTF headquarters organization andmanning.

Inclusion: The uncontrolled tendency for newly formed JTF hqs is to simplysurvive the almost overwhelming challenges in forming, deploying, planning, andproviding direction to subordinates. That said, weve seen a best practice ofreach-out to partners (particularly our interagency and multinational partners) andthe various supporting DoD agencies and commands early on in the formation ofthese headquarters both through commander interaction and exchange ofliaison elements all with the intent of inclusion.

The JTF hqs personnel will work in the DIME arena. This has implication fortraining, required expertise, and organizational considerations addressed further

below. Manning will be a challenge. The joint manning document development,

validation, and fill process is tedious and slow. The designated Service orTheater SOC hqs will normally provide the core of the joint headquarters and beaugmented in accordance with mission requirements. This augmentation willcome in the form of both joint plug enablers and individual augmentees fromwithin theater and CONUS. The core headquarters must be prepared to go it

1

10

2

10

11

16

6

24

19

7

2000

2001

2002

2003

NumberofJTFHeadquarters

2004

JTF HQ OperationalDuring fiscal year

New JTF HQ Formed

During fiscal year25

20

15

10

5

2005

24

5

2006

19

1

NumberofJTFHeadquarters

Time Available to Form (Days)

05 10 20 30 40 50

Requirements for JTFHeadquarters are

Increasing

Forming Time for newJTF Headquarters is

Short

Source: DTT

Observations

JTF Headquarters Requirements

Normalforming timeis


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alone initially with key support by theGCCs SJFHQ and individual augmentationfrom within the Theater (both GCC hqs andcomponent hqs personnel).

Key billets: Upfront, the commander will

need to pursue getting some key billetsfilled with the right people. Some of theseare: Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff,Foreign Political Advisor, Cultural advisors(a new best practice seen in current JTFs),Command Senior Enlisted Leader,Information Management Officer (IMO), HQ Commandant, and Coalitionembedded staff.

Different Service cultures. Weve continually observed what many would callcommon knowledge that our Military Services do have different cultures. Thevarious Service augmentees will come to the JTF hqs with their Service

viewpoints and understanding in terms of expectations on their staff duties andresponsibilities. We find that the Services also have unique skill sets in terms ofbeing more suited for filling the different staff principal positions. Example: USAand USMC seem to be great CofS and J3s, and USAF and USN have unique J6skill sets. Obviously, th

insights on joint operations - the art and science

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