instituições políticas aula 10 ciência política ae
TRANSCRIPT
Topics
1) Definition of Presidential Institutions and Separation of Powers
2) Political Theory and Separation of Powers
3) Presidential Institutions and Liberalism vs Democracy
4) Governo Dividido5) Processo Decisorio e Democracia
Introduction
New Institutionalism• Economics: Douglas North Nobel
Prize (1990)• Political Science:March & Olsen, “On Organizational
Factors in Political Life” (1989)Linz & Valenzuela: Parliamentary
Government in Latin America ?
Definitions of Presidential and Parliamentary Government
• Linz/Lijphart/Powell: Presidential Government = “Direct Election of Executive”
• Mettenheim (Horowitz/Jones/Mayhew):
“Separate election of executive and legislature for fixed terms”
(minimal vs descriptive definitions)
Why?
• Definition 1 = residual category (parliamentary vs all other)
• Definition 2 = separation of powers vs Fujimori/Chaves/De Gaulle…
• Correlations, Parliamentary Govt + ….
• Spurious (income, history, region, context)
2 Biases
1) Liberal ReformismBurke, Hobbes, Huntington, Linz:Concentrate Power = GovernabilityRepresentative Government vs
Direct Democracy/Social Pressure
2) Euro-CentrismParliamentary Government, Stability vsUnderdevelopment/Instability/New World
Separation of Powers?
• Political Theory (mixed constitution,Montesquieu, Locke, Federalists…)
• VS Burke/Linz/Hobbes: Concentrate Power to Increase Governability =
• Vote MP Law Bureaucracy
Burke: “Address to Electors of Bristol”
Processo Decisório Contínuo sob Separação dos Poderes
MEDIA
ESTADOS
SOCIEDADE
ONG’s
MUNICÍPIOS
Political Institutions and Social Mobilization
1889 1930 1964 1985-2004
Oligarchy Middle Class Popular Classes
Praetorian
Popular
Middle
Oligarchy
Political
Institutions
Social Mobilization
Separação dos Poderes e Democracia vs Liberalismo
• Europa: 18th C = Monarchy vs Oligarch• 19th C + Liberalism = Representative
Government vs• Direct Democracy via • Corporatism, Populism, Direct Appeals
Presidential Institutions InstitutionalizeTension: Direct Democracy vs
Representative Government
Divided Government
Jones, Separated System (1994)Mayhew, Divided We Govern (1989)
US Presidents 1945-1990 w/o majority >US Presidents with majority in congress
WHY? “Fast Track” vs Party Discipline ? (vote
of confidence)
Weber dizia:
(Politica como Vocação):• Presidential Institutions Democratize
faster, because • Head of government directly elected• Free to nominate partisans to
bureaucracy• Outsiders gain power• Party Machines of Immigrants “realign”
Institutional Variation in Democracies
Party-system Two-party vs. Multi-party Electoral system Proportional vs. DistrictLegislature Unicameral vs. BicameralGovernment Unitary vs. FederalistCentral Gov. Parliament vs. PresidentialismCourts Review vs. PreviewLocal Gov. Weak vs. Strong autonomyCivil Service Spoils vs. Merit Armed forces Professional vs. ConscriptionState-market Liberal vs. Corporatist
Source: Bo Rothstein “Political Institutions: An Overview.” in Goodin, Robert E. & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds). A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998
Brazil
Debate = Pro-Parliamentary : • FHC, Serra, Lamounier, • Stepan, Mainwaring,
Pro-Presidential :• Andrade, Moises, Mettenheim
Brazil
Reality defines debate1) 1992-1993 Impeachment of Collor
(fixed terms, minority president, gridlock & paralysis)
2) 1993 April Plebiscite on Form of Government Presidential > Parliamentary
Abranches 1988: “Presidencialismo de Coalizao”
Questions about institutions
• Which institutions are best suited for creating "good" government and societal relations.
• What explains the enormous variation in institutional arrangements?
• What impact differences have on political behavior, political power and the outcome of the political process?
Regional and National Context
Parliamentary Government E. Europe?Communist Parliaments = 5000 Deputies
Brazil: Assis Brasil, Codigo Eleitoral 1932Proportional Representation LegislatureDirect Elections, 2nd Round, Executive
Transitions from Military Rule Deepening Democracy
“Modernization & Bureaucratic Authoritarianism”Guillermo O´Donnell 1973 Yale Dissertation…* Negative Correlation (“U”): GDP Military Rule
Then: “Transitions” i.e. Peaceful Regime Change !!!Argentina via Falklands War (1982)Chile via Plebiscite (1989)Uruguay via Plebiscite (1989)Brazil via protracted cat-mouse game between:
Military-Opposition (1989)
Like Spain/Portugal/Greece in 1970s & USSR 1990s
From Consolidation to Deepening
1) Linz & Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation 1992
“Two change rule” if 2X gov´t change, then democracy (But G. Almond & P. Converse said Japan & Germany would need 3 generations 1945+)(Colombia & Venezuela = most consolidated?)
2) O’Donnell “Illusions about Consolidation” 1996Democracy in global South/East: Norm? Ideal? Comparative
benchmark? Party systems? Parliament? Advanced economies? Historical Evolution?
Need New Empirical Studies/Concepts/Theories…
3) Mettenheim & Malloy: Deepening Democracy in Latin America, 1998: Social Exclusion & Electoral Behavior,
Policy Process & Democracy, Presidentialism = false problem
Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of
Democracy, 1996
Biases = Euro Centrism & Liberal Reformism(Euro ideal benchmark / ignores unexpected consequences)
Example 1: Parliamentary vs Presidential GovernmentMettenheim (ed), Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics:
Comparing Regional and National Contexts. Johns Hopkins, 1997Problem = Presidentialism residual category; US system is
separationist, not presidential…
Example 2: Electoral Behavior Mettenheim, The Brazilian Voter: Mass Politics in Democratic
Transition, 1974-1986. Pittsburgh, 1995European Voters = Ideological, US Voters = Group InterestBrazilian/Latin American Voters = immediate / personalist
US electoral history: Critical Elections & Party Realignment Shift Comparative Perspective
Debates sobre Instituições Políticas Brasileiras
“Como se Governa o Brasil? O Debate sobre Instituições Políticas e Gestão de Governo” Vicente Palermo DADOS, 2000
Compared to What? Assessing Brazil’s Political Institutions, Leslie Elliott Armijo et al http://cps.sagepub.com, Comparative Political Studies, 2006
Palermo: grau de concentração do poder decisório
segundo / capacidade de tomar decisões e implementá-las
a baixa capacidade de decidir e implementar
I
razoável capacidade de decidir e implementar
G
Poder decisório disperso
D
D-I : disperso/ ingovernável
(a governabilidade está fora do alcance da estrutura institucional vigente)
D-G: disperso/governável
(a governabilidade obtém-se graças à capacidade de produção negociada de decisões)
Poder decisório concentrado
C
C-I : concentrado/ ingovernável (a governabilidade se tenta obter excluindo; se fracassa neste propósito)
C-G: concentrado/governável
(a governabilidade obtém-se graças à capacidade de os presidentes forçarem os outros atores a cooperar)
Armijo et al:
Hyperactive paralysis (HP) interpretation of Brazil has been especially prominent in comparisons with postcommunist polities (Beyme, 2001; Clark & Wittrock, 2005; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Tóka, 1999, pp. 55, 90; Moser, 1999, p. 362; Papadoulis, 2004; Shvetsova, 1999).
Evidence = Brazil has not done worse than other Latin American countries in either policy reform or macroeconomic performance.
Argument = making is more centralized, decisive, and predictable than is claimed. We call this de facto executive dominance (ED; cf. Palermo, 2000).
Goodin, Robert E. & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds).
A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998
Part II Political Institutions 4 Political Institutions: An Overview Bo Rothstein, 133 5 Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives Barry R. Weingast, 167 6 Political Institutions: Legal Perspectives Gavin Drewry, 191 7 Political Institutions, Old and New B. Guy Peters, 205