insurance and health care delivery n287e spring 2006 professor: joanne spetz 26 april 2006

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Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

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Page 1: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Insurance and health care delivery

N287E Spring 2006Professor: Joanne Spetz26 April 2006

Page 2: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

But wait! Let’s talk about the problem set!

Return on Investment = Profit margin / Asset turnover rate

Profit margin = total margin = net income / sales

Asset turnover rate = total asset turnover = total revenue / total assets

Page 3: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

But wait! Let’s talk about the problem set!

Return on Investment = Profit margin / Asset turnover rate

Profit margin = net income / sales = (operating revenue – operating

expense – nonoperating expense) / operating revenue

Page 4: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

But wait! Let’s talk about the problem set!

Return on Investment = Profit margin / Asset turnover rate

Asset turnover rate = total revenue / total assets

= (operating revenue) / (current assets + fixed assets)

Page 5: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

But wait! Let’s talk about the problem set!

Return on Investment = Profit margin / Asset turnover rate=

(revenue - expense) / revenue revenue (current+fixed assets)

= (revenue – expense) / (total assets)

This is the formula in the U of Missouri sheets!

Page 6: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

And now back to our regularly scheduled presentation!

Page 7: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Going back to demand for medical care…

We believe: Health = h(m,X) Medical care is a “normal good”

If price rises, demand drops If income rises, demand rises

Page 8: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Medical care does not produce only health

Medical care also produces: Caring Validation

Page 9: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

If price goes up…

Medical care

Other consumption Indifference curve

Price increase

Drop in medical care demand

Page 10: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

If income goes up…

Medical care

Other consumption

Income increase

Increase in medical care demand

Page 11: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Changes in health status:

Change the utility functionChange the indifference curve

Medical care

Other consumption

healthy

sick

Page 12: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

From this we can derive demand curves

Medical care

price

Normal demand

Demand for sick person

Page 13: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Demand for health care depends on…

PriceIncomeHealth statusAnd also… Quality of care Time required for care

Page 14: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Medical care is a group of products

Health = f(m1, m2, m3,…)All things equal, you want: Higher quality Care that takes less time

You decide on demand for medical care based on: marginal utility = marginal cost In theory!

Page 15: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Departure from theory

Health and illness are randomYou can establish a budget and consumption plan… And then get diagnosed with cancer So much for the budget!

Page 16: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Changes in health:

Changes in health Changes in demand for medical care Changes in spending on med care

Since health is random, spending on medical care will be random

Page 17: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Dealing with financial risk

Insurance protects against risk

Willingness to pay more than the average loss to insure against the loss is “risk aversion” This results from a utility function

with diminishing returns

Page 18: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Diminishing marginal utility

money

utility

$50 $100

•50% chance of getting $100•50% chance of getting $50

E(U) = .5*U($100)+.5*U($50)

E(U)

Page 19: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Diminishing marginal utility

money

utility

$50 $100

Utility of $75 is bigger than E(U)

E(U)U($75)

$75

Page 20: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

In this case, we have a plan

If you win $100, pay $25 (net=$75)If you win $50, you receive $25 (net=$75)

Guaranteed $75

In fact, even U($70) is higher!

Page 21: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Insurance is demanded by the market when there is risk

Problems with insurance Moral hazard

Once you have insurance you take more risks

Smoking Skydiving

Page 22: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Insurance is demanded by the market when there is risk

Problems with insurance Moral hazard

You seek more care because it’s already paid

You can view this as a decrease in price of medical care

But you also have a decrease in “income” because of the premium you paid

Page 23: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

More insurance problems…

Adverse selection You know more about your risk than

does your insurer Those with greatest risk want insurance You won’t seek insurance if your risk is

low Result: insurer gets a riskier group of

people than expected

Page 24: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

How do you deal with these problems?

Moral hazard Copayments

Coinsurance (percent of bill) Indemnity payment (flat rate)

Deductibles Don’t insure small losses

Page 25: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

How do you deal with these problems?

Moral hazard Upper limits on payments

Protects insurer from huge losses Serious health events are not insured

Managed care (more on this later…)

Page 26: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

How do you deal with these problems?

Adverse selection Pre-existing condition exclusions

These rules may prevent people from switching jobs

Pooled purchasing of insurance “Group insurance” Common in the workplace due to tax

breaks Can obtain economy of scale

Page 27: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

All insurance works through risk-pooling

Should smokers be in the same pool as non-smokers? What about the old and the young?

Larger pools get economy of scale Is this fair?

Many firms self-insure The insurance company handles

administration The company is a single risk pool

Page 28: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

What about managed care?

Fee-for-service insurance Insurer pays the bills as presented

Health maintenance organization Insurer manages your care within closed

network of providers

Preferred provider organization Insurer gives you incentives to choose

preferred providers

Point-of-service plan

Page 29: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

What is the social problem with health care?

Marginal cost/Marginal benefit

MB of health care

True cost of care

Price the patient sees

Optimalquantity

Actualquantity

Page 30: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Health costs in the U.S.

Year Annual health growth

Inflation GDP growth

1970

10.6% 5.6% 7.0%

1980

12.9% 12.5% 10.4%

1990

10.9% 6.1% 7.5%

1997

5.4% 1.7% 5.8%

2000

8.3% 3.4% 7.4%

Page 31: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Comparisons across nations

Female life exp.

Infant mort.

Spend per cap.

Spend per GDP

U.S. 79.4 7.1 $4373 13.0%

Australia

81.8 5.7 $2141 8.4%

Canada 81.7 5.3 $2428 9.2%

France 82.5 4.3 $2226 9.4%

Germany

80.7 4.5 $2616 10.7%

Japan 84.0 3.4 $1852 7.4%

Mexico 77.3 25.9 $452 5.4%

Page 32: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Sources of insurance

Employer-based insurance 2/3 of adults have this Often provides a choice of plans Group purchasing gives better rates Cost comes from your potential salary

Individual private insurance Can be expensive Adverse selection

Page 33: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Sources of insurance

Medicare Program for the elderly, to address

adverse selection Part A: hospital care Part B: outpatient/primary care Managed care plans Medi-Gap insurance (private)

Page 34: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Sources of insurance

Medicaid & Healthy Kids Medicaid

State-federal partnership Until 1990s, was linked to welfare Available up to 200% of poverty level for children

and pregnant women Covers nursing homes, pharmacy

Healthy Kids Private-style insurance for near-poor children Might be available for near-poor adults

Page 35: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

What happens if you’re uninsured?

Hospitals are a major safety net Public hospitals – sliding scale for cost Other hospitals

Charity care categories Uncompensated care Hospitals pay for charity by cost-shifting

Doctors Public clinics Self-pay (if they’ll take you)

Page 36: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

How much does access to care affect health?

Small effect of medical care on healthWealth and education improve health more than medical care Is this because you learn about health

when you obtain education? Or does this reflect your underlying

preferences?

Latino “paradox”

Page 37: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

The high number of uninsured may warrant policy action

National health reform usually focuses on the uninsured Medicare Clinton Plan Medicare reform proposals in 2000

election

Price of health care also is a concern High inflation rate since 1960s

Page 38: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

What about managed care’s effects?

Major literature reviews by Miller & Luft Equal numbers of better and worse

results Worse quality for Medicare HMO

enrollees with chronic conditions

Financial incentives to doctors have unclear effects on quality (Armour et al., 2001)

Page 39: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

More managed care effects

Preventive care Better cancer screening (Haas et al.,

2002)

Mental health Colorado study found no difference

after managed care introduced (Cuffel et al., 2002)

Page 40: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Managed care & costs

Miller & Luft No clear hospital/physician resource

use differences

Managed care probably reduced costs through mid-1990s Excess payments negotiated out of

system

Resurgence of cost inflation in 2000s

Page 41: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

Why is there high cost inflation?

Administrative costsHigh quality of carePrices of inputsNew technologies Incentive to develop new

technologies due to widespread insurance coverage

Hospitals compete by purchasing technologies (“medical arms race”)

Page 42: Insurance and health care delivery N287E Spring 2006 Professor: Joanne Spetz 26 April 2006

How would managed care control costs?

Why would a provider contract with a HMO/PPO? Guarantee a group of patients Prevent competitor from getting

those patients Some benefits of HMO management

services (?)