I:\NAV\48\4-2.doc For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are kindly asked to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION

IMO

E

SUB-COMMITTEE ON SAFETY OF NAVIGATION 48th session Agenda item 4

NAV 48/4/2 11 April 2002 Original: ENGLISH

INTEGRATED BRIDGE SYSTEMS (IBS)

Recommendations for Operational and Design Guidelines

for the Integrated Bridge Systems

Submitted by Finland, Sweden and Japan

SUMMARY

Executive summary:

Finland submitted to NAV 47 a paper on the Recommendations for Operational and Design Standards for the Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS) (NAV 47/4). The NAV Sub-Committee decided that further studies were needed to generate guidelines on an overall integrated system. Finland in co-operation with Sweden and Japan has revised the paper and submits the paper for the consideration of the Sub-Committee

Action to be taken:

The Sub-Committee is invited to consider the proposal for Guidelines for IBS and decide as appropriate

Related documents:

NAV 47/4, NAV 44/INF.3, NAV 47/13 paragraphs 4.1 to 4.5

Introduction Integrated Bridge Systems have created a new variety of human errors. To meet this it is necessary to have a correct Mode Awareness, Situational Awareness and Workload Management in addition to traditional seamanship. The aim is to define the basis for minimum criteria on the plan, operation, training and the quality assurance for the Integrated Bridge Systems. 1 Scope IBS should consist of the functions of Integrated Navigation System (INS), stability, communications, machinery, propulsion controls and securities. The principles of the present standard are based on resolution MSC.64(67) Annex 1 (1996), Recommendation on Performance Standards for Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS) and the IMO resolutions of the individual performance standard of the equipment which have been mandated by the SOLAS convention. The IBS system requirement supports passage execution.

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2 Definitions For the purpose of this standard, the following definitions apply: 2.1 IBS An Integrated Bridge System (IBS) is a combination of systems which are interconnected in order to allow centralized access to sensor information or command/control from workstations with the aim of increasing safe and efficient ship's management by suitably qualified personnel. 2.2 Workstations Workstation is a station where display or operator control functions are provided in accordance with the requirements of these guidelines 2.3 Integrated Navigation System (INS) A combination of systems those are interconnected to increase safe and efficient navigation when used by suitable qualified personnel (resolution MSC.86(70), 3.3). 2.4 Mode awareness Mode awareness is based on knowledge and purpose of various operation modes included in the IBS. Use of different operation modes should follow bridge procedures based on company automation policy. 2.5 Situational awareness The perception of the navigational and technical information provided at the INS workstation, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future, as required for timely reaction to the situation that can be expected from the OOW trained in the operation of the INS. 2.6 Multifunction display A single visual display unit that can present, either simultaneously or through a series of selectable pages, information from more than one operation of a system (resolution MSC.86(70), 3.5). 2.7 Essential information Information that is necessary for the monitoring and control of functions required for the safe navigation of the ship. Examples of essential information include but are not limited to:

- Heading, position, speed and depth - Rudder angle

- Proximity to danger

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2.8 Integrity of the data flow Ability of the system to provide the user with information within the specified accuracy in a timely, complete and unambiguous manner, and alarms and indications within a specified time when the system should be used with caution or not at all (resolution MSC.86(70), 3.4). 2.9 Gravity system gyrocompass Gravity system gyrocompass is a bottom heavy gyro, which settles to north by precession. 2.10 Ballistic corrector Ballistic correction for a bottom heavy gyro. 2.11 Integrated Joystick system Integrated Joystick is a control system, which integrates thrusters, rudders and main propellers or rotation thrusters. Integrated Joystick is designed for docking and manoeuvring with slow speed but not for dynamic positioning operations. 2.12 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) The failure mode analysis aims to demonstrate that the system has a fail-to-safe functionality. The failure mode effects - and their consequences - are assessed for the actual components on FMEA sheets. 2.13 CBT form (programs) Computer Based Training. 3 Design philosophy 3.1 General The following considerations should be taken for the design of interconnection and relation among the IBS. The components of the IBS should be applied not inferior to each individual international equipment standard. The key for automation design is to complement the crew's capabilities, while at the same time compensating for the crew's limitations. Inadequate feedback is one of the most important issues affecting command authority in the design. Automation interface design should also follow BRM-like fundamentals. Communications by and with automation should be clear, concise, timely and supportive of crew activities and situational awareness. Automation should keep the operator informed of its actions and automation's behaviour should be predictable to the trained operator. Graphical methods are encouraged for display of the overall situation for the operator.

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Automation should be viewed from the perspective of a crewmember in design and operational aspects. The picture should represent an 'inside out' view. Digital form of information should be used only when absolutely necessary. Power interruption and shutdown If subjected to an orderly shutdown the IBS should, upon turn-on, come to an initial default state. After a power interruption full functionality of the IBS should be available after recovery of all subsystems. The IBS should not increase the recovery time of individual subsystem functions after power restoration. If subjected to a power interruption the IBS should, upon restoration of power, maintain the configuration in use and continue automated operation, as far as practicable. Safety related automatic functions should only be restored upon confirmation of the operator. 3.2 Integration The IBS should provide functional integration meeting the following requirements:

1. The functionality of the IBS should ensure that its operation is at least as effective as for stand-alone equipment.

2. Continuously displayed information should be reduced to the minimum necessary

for safe operation of the ship. Supplementary information should be readily accessible.

3. Where multifunction displays and controls are used to perform functions

necessary for safe operation of the ship they should be duplicated and interchangeable.

4. It should be possible to display the complete system configuration, the available

configuration and the configuration in use. 5. Each part to be integrated should provide details of its operational status and the

latency and validity of essential information. Means should be provided within the IBS to make use of this information.

6. An alternative means of operation should be provided for essential functions. 7. An alternative source of essential information should be provided. The IBS

should identify loss of either source. 8. The source of information (sensor, result of calculation or manual input) should be

displayed continuously or upon request. 9. A failure of one part should not affect the functionality of other parts. The result

should be ensured with ample filtering.

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3.3 Functionality It should always be clear, from where essential functions may be performed. The system management should ensure that one user only has the focus of an input or function at the same time. If so, all other users should be informed about it by the IBS. 3.4 Data exchange Interfacing to an IBS should comply with the relevant international marine standards1. Data exchange should be consistent with the safe operation of the ship. The integrity of the data flow in the network should be ensured. A failure in the connectivity should not affect independent functionality. 3.5 Sensors In order to ensure adequate system functionality the sensors employed should ensure communication compatibility in accordance with the relevant international marine interface standard2 and provide information about their operational status and about the latency and validity of essential information. 3.6 Failure analysis A failure analysis should be performed, documented and accepted. 3.7 Power supply Power supply requirements applying to parts of the IBS as a result of other IMO requirements should remain applicable. The IBS should be supplied:

1. from the main and emergency sources of electrical power with automated changeover through a local distribution board with provision to preclude inadvertent shut-down;

2. from a transitional source of electrical power for a duration of not less than 1 min;

and 3. where required, parts of the IBS should also be supplied from a reserve source of

electrical power. 4 Design aspects 4.1 General The Integrated Navigation system as part of the IBS should display the Passage Plan and information related to the plan. The Plan should be constructed according to the company automation policy and Standard Operational Procedures.

1 IEC 1162 Publication. 2 IEC 1162 Publication.

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The Navigation System should be provided with information on course and speed over ground. The automatic speed control should be operated separately from the heading control. The heading control and the automatic speed control should use the same Passage Plan database. The following considerations should be taken in the design of the IBS. 4.2 Heading equipment

1. The gyrocompass should be suitable for the speed and motion characteristics of the craft.

2. Two independent compasses are required as far as practicable. 3. The following techniques are recommendable for IBS design:

− A gyrocompass with a gravity system must be provided with a ballistic

corrector. − A directional gyrocompass can be used instead of a north seeking gravity

gyrocompass. − The direction gyrocompass should be north stabilized with magnetic or

position sensors. − Ship's heading should be derived with Kalman filtering techniques.

4.3 Speed measuring equipment

1. The method of measuring Speed and Course Over Ground with satellites should be explained in the operation manual. The danger of loss on signal should be clarified.

2. The speed should be measured through the water or with a two-component Doppler log measuring the movement over ground as far as practicable.

3. For the ECDIS system and the true motion radar the speed over ground measurement is mandatory.

4. The following techniques are recommendable for IBS design:

− Ship's speed should be derived with Kalman filtering techniques using data

from ship's log, position sensors, radar reference targets and engine thrust. 4.4 Position-fixing systems

1. Two independent position-fixing systems should be installed suitable for areas in which the craft is to operate.

2. A position surveillance system is required capable of displaying craft's real time position on the electronic chart or a simple digital chart interfaced with the radar and the position-fixing system.

3. The satellite position receiver should include integrity monitoring which is expounded in the operation manual.

4. The satellite receiver should not be interconnected with ship's heading and speed sensors.

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4.5 Radar equipment

1. Two separate and independent radar systems with plotting facilities and one radar on X-band should be installed.

2. The following controls should have separate controls. If the controls are turn

knobs they shall not be installed on top of each other.

− Electronic bearing line (EBL); − Variable range marker (VRM); − GAIN; − SEACLUTTER; and − RAINCLUTTER.

4.6 Heading and Track control

1. The heading control system must compute the rudder angle as a function to the longitudinal speed through the water. This is especially important in areas where strong currents are present. If this is not possible manual steering should be applied.

2. It should be possible to make a detailed Passage Plan in a safe and efficient manner not inferior to what can be accomplished on a paper chart.

3. The turns should be programmed with a turning radius. 4. The heading control system should have an automatic track keeping mode,

automatic bottom fixed turn control mode and mode without a drift and position-fixing control.

5. The heading control turn commands should be executed with a selectable turning radius.

6. Rate of turn indicators should be provided. 7. It should be possible to use manual steering and automatic speed control

simultaneously or vice versa. 4.6.1 Navigation displays The following information should be presented on the navigation displays: 1 Radar information

− The Course Up presentation should include true motion trails of moving targets, stationary targets without trails, ARPA functions, ENC or user-defined graphic navigational and Passage Plan data. The bearing dial should be redrawn every time the Course Up command is performed.

− The radar display may act according to the ECDIS standard − The radar display may present graphical motion prediction based on momentary

Course Over Ground, heading, rate of turn and speed over ground. 2 ECDIS information

− The ECDIS display may present graphical motion prediction based on momentary Course Over Ground, heading, rate of turn and speed over ground.

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− The ECDIS display may superimpose the RADAR/RP information according to the ECDIS standard.

3 Automatic Identification System (AIS) information

− Static, Dynamic and Voyage information covered in resolution MSC.74 (69) paragraph 6 should be presented on ARPA radar, ECDIS or Integrated navigation displays.

− Alphanumeric AIS data presentation in a separate window in accordance with resolution MSC.74 (69):

− Static information: IMO number, length and beam, type of ship and location of position- fixing antenna (static information), dynamic information as in the MS standard and voyage related information as in the AIS standard.

4.6.2 Dynamic positioning system (DPS) and Integrated joystick controller The aim of the DPS is to control the vessel when stationary or manoeuvring at slow speed. The position sensors may be acoustic or of special design. If the DPS is included with heading control modes to be used at all speeds with the integrated navigation system the requirements for the IBS should be applied to the DPS. 5 Operational aspects 5.1 General The Control System is divided into automated systems, manual controls and emergency controls. The automatic control system consists of the automatic steering, the automatic speed control and possibly the DPS The DPS designed to keep the vessel stationary or to manoeuvre at slow speed. The manual control system contains individual steering and propulsion controls and the integrated Joystick control. The Joystick philosophy is similar to the DPS but omits the positioning technology. The emergency controls are the main engine shut down, the steering and the propulsion devices. The emergency controls should have direct access to the steering and propulsion devices with no automation at all. A malfunction of the automation system should not prohibit switchover to the manual controls or to the emergency controls. Changing of the control mode should indicate the operation mode clearly. When the control mode changes from manual to the automatic control, it should confirm the status of the set and the condition of the actuator. The order or command should be illustrated and followed.

When the control mode changes to the manual control from the automatic control, it should be possible to start manual operation from the position of the actuator.

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When the control mode is changed to the Joystick or the DPS control from other control systems, there should be means to confirm that the rudder, the propulsion and the thruster actuators are in the condition to operate. 5.2 Situation and Mode awareness 5.2.1 Situation awareness

1. The IBS should provide the information of traffic situations to the navigator. 2. The information should be included traffic conditions, dangerous objects relating to

the own navigation course. 3. The information should be presented all relating information on one sight to well

understand immediately. 4. The information may be presented by the means of display or voice with use of any

component of the IBS or individual navigation display. 5. The situation awareness should be operated by simple action by the navigator.

5.2.2 Mode awareness

1. The IBS should provide the information of operation mode in use in the IBS. 2. The information should be included mode of sensing method, sensor connection,

display mode and command mode. 3. The information may be displayed as well as situation awareness.

5.3 Manoeuvring stations The Command workstation shall enable the navigation and manoeuvring functions to be performed safely and efficiently by one navigator under all normal operational conditions. A separate workstation for Navigation shall be sufficiently close to the Command workstation to allow good cooperation between two navigators. Additionally three auxiliary stations are required:

- The Bridge Wings. - The helmsman's console for manual steering.

Transfer of the manoeuvre from one workstation to another should be permitted only by principle of calling it to the active workstation. The previous workstation should never block this transfer. The switchover should be possible by only one command. It is not allowed to use mechanical switches to transfer the manoeuvring responsibility between manoeuvring stations. A mechanical switch may block the manoeuvre to some specific station during a critical situation. 5.4 Controls 5.4.1 DP System and Integrated Joystick Controls

1. The Integrated Joystick controls and the DP systems are mainly designed for slow speed manoeuvring.

2. The DP System and the Integrated Joystick ON commands act as OFF commands to all other systems.

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3. The DP System and the Joystick system are the only systems that have separate OFF commands. Joystick or DPS cannot be disconnected by other control systems.

4. The ON and OFF command devices should locate on the respective Joystick and DP System operation panels. The Joystick or DP OFF command places the control to the individual manual Follow Up levers. − Individual main propeller and rudder control Follow up tillers should

follow the Joystick and DP commands. This procedure ensures that the lever is in correct angle when the Joystick or DP system is switched OFF.

− If the thruster levers do not follow the Joystick or DP commands the levers should include buzzer alarms to indicate if not at zero position when not in use.

− The thrusters should go to zero in case of a malfunction I the system. (Annex table 1)

5.4.2 Automatic steering and speed control

1. The heading control and the automatic speed control should be switched on with only one command each and they should be installed in the heading control operation panel. The ON command is an OFF command for other steering devices except for the DP system or the integrated Joystick control.

5. The Follow Up rudder tiller should be situated as close to the heading control unit as possible. The same applies to the Follow Up propulsion control levers. The heading control or the automatic speed control should not include an OFF command. They should be disconnected with the ON command from other steering devices. (Annex table 2)

5.4.3 Individual manual controls

1. The individual manual controls should function according to the Follow Up principle. All the manual propulsion and rudder controls shall follow the orders given by the automatic speed control, dynamic positioning device or the integrated Joystick system.

2. The individual controls should be switched on with one synchronous command for the main propellers and one for the rudders.

3. The individual thrusters should be switched on by separate commands. 4. The ON command is an OFF command for the same steering controls on other

workstations. 5. Any manual control device should not disconnect the dynamic positioning or

integrated Joystick control. 6. The steering arrangement shall be so designed that the craft turns in the same

direction as that of the wheel, tiller and joystick or control lever. (Annex table 3) 5.4.4 Emergency Controls

1. Emergency controls may be operated either according to the Non Follow Up or the Follow Up principal.

2. They should be switched on by individual commands at each device (starboard propeller, port propeller, independent or synchronized rudder controls).

3. The emergency system ON command should also disconnect the Integrated Joystick Control or the DP system.

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4. The emergency controls should be clearly marked and easy to use. It applies to the emergency shutdown commands for the main engines and commands for propellers, rudders and thrusters.

7. Integrating the emergency controls with normal follow up manual controls can reduce human errors. (Annex table 4)

5.5 Alarms 5.5.1 Alarms and Messages of the Integrated Navigation System

1. The IBS alarm management should, as a minimum, comply with the requirements of the Code on Alarms and Indicators, 1995 (Resolution A.830(19)).

2. Facilities for adjusting frequency of audible alarms within the prescribed limits may be provided to optimise their performance in the ambient conditions (IMO Res. 686(17) 1991). High alarm tones should be avoided, as the reaction to a high tone is generally to silence the buzzer. In any case the visual alarm text should stay on until the cause of the alarm has been eliminated.

3. The alarm text should also display a command of correct action and the alarm field should be large enough to display the commands in a form of a checklist.

4. The number of alarm types and their release should be kept as low as possible by providing indication for information of minor importance.

5. An unacknowledged alarm should be flashing. The acknowledged alarm text should remain illuminated but not flashing. Alarms in a graphical form are recommended.

6. The alarms should remain in the memory and it should be possible to scroll them. Alarms should be displayed so that the reason for the alarm and the resulting functional restrictions can be easily understood. Indications should be self-explanatory.

5.5.2 Bridge alarms

1. Appropriate alarm management on priority and functional groups should be provided as the following manners within the IBS. Grouping of alarms with frequencies and waveforms as described in IMO resolution 686 should be used to indicate the degree of danger.

- Priority:

1) Rank 1: Danger to Human or Hull. Examples: Fire, Poisonous gas detected, Flood, Dead ship or Release fire extinguish.

2) Rank 2: Urgent actions are required. Examples: Steering system abnormal, Navigation lights abnormal, Vital failure of Machinery, Rocked in alarm, Ballast, Distress alert or Dead-man on bridge.

3) Rank 3: Abnormal conditions Examples: Navigation equipment abnormal, Radio communication

equipment abnormal, Machinery control system abnormal or Cargo condition abnormal.

4) Rank 4: Notice Examples: Radio communication in-call or Officer/Engineer call.

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- Grouping:

1) General 1) Navigation 2) Distress alert 3) Inoperable of equipment 4) Miss operation 5) Machinery 6) Miscellaneous and others

2. Alarm transfer system should be provided according to the resolution of IMO

MSC.[xxx](75) Performance standards for bridge navigation watch alarms. 5.2.3 Control system alarms

1. Rudder and propulsion follow-up systems should generate visual and audible alarm at the emergency steering controls with a clear indication that the emergency controls shall be used.

2. The alarm should be executed in all cases when the manual follow-up controls cannot be used.

3. If the emergency rudder and propulsion controls are integrated with the follow-up controls used in normal manoeuvring a visual and audible alarm shall indicate that the follow-up control is in emergency mode.

6 Policy for the integration and the automation. 6.1 General The role of the authorities is to define the design and the operational requirements for the Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS). The IBS should comply with all applicable IMO requirements and recommendations. Parts executing multiple operations should meet the requirements specified for each individual function they control, monitor or perform. The role of the company is to define the IBS automation policy, the operational limits and the operational procedures for normal, abnormal and emergency situations. The Company should establish a policy to control and monitor pilotage and navigation. The aim is to develop company Standard Operational Procedures. This also includes a clear policy for introducing new technology and equipment on ships. The Company should have personnel ashore capable of supervising, training and evaluating the company Operational Procedures and operation of the Integrated Bridge System. The role of the master is to implement the company policy and procedures and to review and report its deficiencies to the company. He should also take care that no changes are made in the manuals. The crew shall receive adequate training before the new modification/version is taken into use. The Company should ensure that the sensors to be connected to the integrated navigation system are installed in a safe manner.

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A Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMIEA) for evaluating system performance during various failure modes should be performed and documented. 6.2 Additional sub-systems In addition to the Passage execution IBS should support one or more of the following operations: 6.2.1 Communications

- Radio communication 6 equipment as defined in SOLAS Chapter IV, - Ship's internal communication. - Automatic Identification System (AIS) Res. MSC.74 (69) 1998 interconnected to

a position-fixing system. - Automatic Identification System (AIS) Res. MSC.74 (69) 1998 to be connected to

appropriate equipment for system management, display, reception and transmission of messages.

6.2.2 Machinery controls

- Requirements according to unattended machinery spaces. SOLAS Chapter II-1Part E.

- Emergency remote propulsion control as in paragraph 3.2.5.

6.2.3 Loading, discharging and cargo control

- Automatic measurement of draft, trim and tank volumes interconnected to an intact stability loading computer may be included.

6.2.4 Safety and security

- Intact stability software extended to Damage stability condition with sensors monitoring void spaces.

- Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) Res. 861 ((20) 1997. - Control system for watertight doors, hull openings and fire control system

interconnected with VDR and the damage stability computer. 6.3 Documentations 6.3.1 Supplier�s Operational manuals The operational manuals produced by the manufacturer should include general safety instructions for use of the system. The operational manuals cover sub-systems and technically different parts within the Integrated Navigation System. The manuals should also include operational procedures related to the nautical tasks, such as automatic plotting, piloting, monitoring pilotage and execution of the Passage Plan. The Integrated Joystick Control and the Dynamic Positioning System manuals should also inform about the hull forces during manoeuvring.

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Integrated systems are programmed for special tasks with various parameters to meet the requirements of different vessel types and operation areas. The parameters are divided into different categories. The user shall be provided with a list of the parameters with a description of their purpose. The parameters are usually grouped in three categories:

- Permanent parameters, which are inserted during maintenance. - User defined parameters, which can be changed during operation. - User defined parameters, which can be changed before operation.

Integrated Navigation Systems are subject to continual development. When new programme versions are installed the new manuals or pages to the manuals have to be delivered simultaneously. Version numbers and dates of issue should be printed on every page. The operational manuals should not cover installation, maintenance or technical descriptions. The manufacturer should provide the manuals for installation, maintenance and technical descriptions. The authorities should include the standard of the operational manuals in he type approval of the equipment. 6.3.2 Company documentation The vessel should be provided with adequate information and guidance in the form of a technical manual to enable the vessel to be operated and maintained safely. The main manuals are the vessel operating manual and the standard procedures for normal, abnormal and emergency situations. Information about specific routes are included in the Passage Plans. The company should ensure that adequate records are kept of equipment testing, training, passage execution, incidents, technical faults and human errors in operation of the Integrated Bridge System. The Standard Operational Procedures for normal, abnormal and emergency situations and the Passage Plan should ensure safe operation. 6.3.3 Vessel Operating Manual (VOM) The VOM shall incorporate the Company policy for implementing and using automation and the Integrated Bridge System. The operational manual consolidates and abbreviates the manufacturer's operational manuals to a comprehensive operational manual without detailed technical information. The VOM should clarify the integration and the priority of sub-systems within the control system. Special emphasis should be laid on the effect of sub-systems on the total outcome of navigation control. Advantages and disadvantages between control and automation modes should be explained in a clear form. It should be clearly indicated which situations the different modes are designed for. The VOM should indicate corrective actions to be taken when the system gives alarm, not how the possible failure of the system should be repaired. Operating limitations and their reasons should be thoroughly explained.

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A description of the check lists and purpose of the specific items should be included in the VOM. Terminology for standard Call-Outs should be developed by the company and presented in the VOM. Note: The VOM should include other items not included in IBS, such as cargo handling and vessel sub-systems not connected to IBS. 6.3.4 Normal procedures Standard Operational Procedures for normal situations should cover normal operation at different stages of the passage including the vessel's operational limits, manoeuvring trial data, ship's data including squat and anchoring. The route should be divided into zones according to the nature of navigation:

- Sea passage; - Shallow waters, pilotage waters and fairways; - Harbour areas.

The standard procedures should be documented in the form of checklists demonstrating transition from one zone to another. The items to be listed are e.g. manning, use of automated equipment, modes and sub-systems. Both manual and heading control modes should be clearly presented in the graphical or checklist flow chart form readily accessible to the operator. 6.3.5 Emergency and Abnormal procedures Emergency and abnormal procedures are essential for optimum Workload Management. The emergency procedures refer to SOLAS Conference 29.11.1995 'Decision support system for masters on passenger ships (SOLAS/Conf. 3/46, Annex, page 14, reg. 24.4). Operation of Integrated Navigation, Control and Communication systems should be considered in the following procedures:

- Blackout; - Fire; - Stranding; - Collision; - Man-over-board situations; - Emergency assistance to other ships; (the list is not complete )

All emergency procedures should be presented in the form of checklists, e.g. the emergency control mode should be clearly listed for each emergency. The abnormal procedures should focus on alarms and items not generally needed in normal operation. Typical situations are sub-system failures that require decisions regarding the level of automation to be used.

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Manufacturers' alarm lists should be harmonized to cover the whole Integrated Bridge System. Special emphasis should be laid on operational procedures in case of an alarm to switch the system on a lower automation level, manual mode or to switch sensor. Note: All checklists based on Standard Operational Procedures should be provided in an easy-to-handle, concise and durable form. 6.3.6 Passage Plans The Passage Plan should be programmed in the integrated navigation system. The normal procedures related to the route should be programmed in the waypoint data. The procedures should contain at least the following information:

- Speed limits; - Heading control mode; - Control mode; - Compulsory radio communication; - Reference to the checklists.

The route should be programmed with a safe practice taking into account traffic separations, fairway lines, channel marks, shallow water and oncoming traffic. The company should approve the Passage Plan. The track limits should be sufficiently large to avoid operationally unnecessary alarms. 6.4 Records 6.4.1 Navigational log

Automatic recording should be kept of: - Position and heading; - The alarms; - Operator�s commands to the system; - Deadweight and stability;

Manual records should be kept of the passage execution: - Passage control with checklists; - Traffic control messages;

Records should be kept of abnormal events: - Faults; - Incidents;

Specific records about the Integrated Bridge System: - Decisions about IBS operational restrictions; - Maintenance; - Record for letters and telephone calls to the manufacturer, the importer or the

company regarding the technical status of the Integrated System.

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6.4.2 Voyage Data Recorder The purpose of the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) is to ease incident reporting, which is required by the ISM Code. The Integrated Bridge System should record electronically the vessel's position, sensor status, modes, alarms, messages and wind, ARPA, propulsion and steering data according to Resolution A.861(20). 6.5 Implementing new technology During all new equipment or new version tests the procedure to switch to manual or emergency control must be obvious. The minimum requirement to conduct the procedure is one command per device. The procedure should be documented. A new system should not be operated before new manuals have been delivered and studied. The test should start in a safe area with the technically simplest mode. The technical level can be increased when the crew is familiar with the mode and when the crew has ensured that the desired operational safety is achieved. The officers should be aware of which area and which mode testing is allowed. Regular meetings should be held to plan and decide fixed time periods for the proceedings of the technical tests and operational training within the company limits documented in the VOM. 7. Training programme. The authorities should issue a type rating certification to the master and all officers which have operational duties involving IBS after successful completion of an authorized training programme. The certification should be included in the ISM audits. The company should carry the responsibility for all levels of training. The training programme should be sent to the administration for information. 7.1 Knowledge-based training Theoretical training should provide relevant and adequate knowledge of:

- Handling characteristics of the craft; - Operational limitations; - Propulsion and control systems, both manual and automatic modes of operation

and emergency controls; - Communication systems; - Integrated Pilotage System; - Navigation and communications procedures for normal, abnormal and emergency

situations. Training can be performed either in classroom or CBT form. Learning outcomes of the training should be examined and test results documented by the company for auditing by the competent authority. A successful test result is a prerequisite for the next step in training.

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7.2 Skill-based training Practical training should produce necessary skills for:

- Handling the craft in normal, abnormal and emergency situations; - Using all available levels of automation relevant to the operational situation; - Failure mode control; - Adherences to the company SOP.

The training can be accomplished in a simulator approved by the competent authority in terms of its fidelity. When no simulator is available the training can be held on board. Lower fidelity training devices should be used before actual simulator/on board exercises when available but they cannot replace exercises. The competent authority should approve all skill-based training programme. A successful operational check-run should be mandatory to complete the training. Check results should be documented on standardized sheets designed by the company. 7.3 Recurrent training Recurrent training should take place at least every second year. It should include both knowledge-based and skill-based elements, which can be integrated. The theoretical part can be performed using CBT programme. The practical part should be performed in an approved simulator, if available. The training programme should be created by the company and approved by the competent authority. Practical training programmes should include situations that occur during normal, realistic operating conditions. Special emphasis should be put on:

- Understanding different operational modes - Handling failure mode situations; - Following the Company Standard Operating Procedures.

Training should be evaluated using standard evaluation sheets, which should be documented for auditing. Successful passing of the recurrent training is a prerequisite for the continuation of operational tasks on board vessels equipped with IBS. 8 Quality assurance and test authority The Integrated Navigation System and the sub-systems should be type-certified. The manufacturer of the integrated navigation system should have a quality assurance system. The training programme should be checked by the administration. The normal operation of the IBS is controlled by the regular use of checklists according to the Company Standard Operational Procedures. This is especially important during departure, entry into a new zone, change of watch and arrival.

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The company should conduct regular operational checks using specially trained check masters. All operational officers should be checked within two-year periods. Special emphasis should be put on the strict compliance with the Company Standard Operational Procedures. The competent authority should supervise the recorded documents of procedures and training during ISM audits and perform operational checks when deemed necessary. 9 Glossary of terms ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid AIS Automatic Identification System Control System Device that controls steering devices such as rudders, high lift rudder

devices, propellers, thrusters, rotating thrusters, etc. DPS Dynamic Positioning System ECDIS Electronic Chart Display and Information System Follow Up The device follows the command of the follow-up tiller, lever or wheel. One does not have to concentrate on the indicator to operate the system. HSC CODE IMO High Speed Craft Code 1995 IBS Integrated Bridge System INS Integrated Navigation System Kalman Filter A statistical program which analyses and forecasts sensor data and integrates

the most probable value from all sensors. Non Follow Up The command device does not give any indication of the effect of the

command. One has to concentrate on the indicator of the particular device. VDR Voyage Data Recorder

***

NAV 48/4/2

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ANNEX

(Examples off control commands)

Table 1

ON/OFF

Push buttons on the operation panel

Integrated Joystick Control or Dynamic Positioning Systems (DPS)

No mechanical switches are allowed to change control between manoeuvring stations.

PORT WING CENTRE COMMAND CONSOLE

STARBOARD WING

ON request executed from the workstation to be used

ON Joystick or DP system on

with one command

ON Joystick or DP system on with one command

ON Joystick or DP system on

with one command OFF request executed from the

workstation in use OFF

Joystick or DP system off with one command

OFF Joystick or DP system off with one command

OFF Joystick or DP system off with one command

The Joystick or DP OFF command places the control to the individual manual Follow Up levers.

Table 2

Heading control and automatic Speed Control

CENTRE COMMAND CONSOLE

ON command for the Automatic Steering

ON command for the Automatic

Speed Control

Table 3

Manual Follow Up Controls

PORT WING CENTRE COMMAND CONSOLE STARBOARD WIMG On command for the Follow Up

rudder control.

Independent control for dual rudders.

On command for the Follow Up rudder control.

On command for helmsman's Follow

Up rudder control.

On command for the Follow Up rudder control.

Independent control for dual rudders.

ON command for individual Follow Up propulsion controls

ON command for individual Follow Up propulsion controls

ON command for individual Follow Up propulsion controls

Table 4

Emergency controls

PORT WING CENTRE COMMAND CONSOLE STARBOARD WING ON command for EMERGENCY

rudder control

ON command for individual EMERGENCY propulsion controls.

ON command for individual EMERGENCY propulsion controls.

ON command for individual EMERGENCY propulsion controls.

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