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INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE IN SUPPORT OF FISHWORKERS

No 1 - JANUARY 1990

M O N O G R A P H

FISHING LEGISLATIONAND GEAR CONFLICTSIN ASIAN COUNTRIES

Fishing legislation and gear conflictsin coastal waters

A case study of selected Asian countriesBY SEBASTIAN MATHEW

Fisheries researcher from Kerala State, India

SUMMARY

� Acknowledgements

� Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

� Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

� Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

� The Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

� Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

� Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89

� Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109

� Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119

The editorial board wishes to thank Jeremy Herklots for sub-editing this SAMUDRA-MONOGRAPH.

(Cover : Artisanal fishing boats in the Catbalogan harbour (Samar - Philippines) /Photo François Bellec)

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Editor

François BELLEC

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Registration : D. 1990. 5.694 .3 Imprimerie MEDIASCREEN - Bouge

FISHING LEGISLATIONAND GEAR CONFLICTSIN ASIAN COUNTRIES

Sebastian Mathew

SAMUDRA MONOGRAPH No 1

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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

I am extremely thankful to Dr. Francis T. Christy Jr. who helped megreatly in selecting the countries for the study and in facilitating contact withvarious fishery administrators and researchers. The discussions I had withhim in Rome and the materials he provided were considerably useful informulating the study and honing my perception. Above all, I would like toexpress gratitude for his useful comments on an earlier draft of this study.

Discussions with Mr. Rolf Willmann of FAO were useful in formulatingquestions on conflict management. Prof. Jean Ph. Platteau of NamurUniversity, Belgium, helped me organise the framework of my inquiry.

In the countries I visited, the extensive network of the InternationalCollective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) facilitated contact with thesmall-scale fisherpeople. This enabled me to gather information on theawareness and implementation of fishing legislation.

In Japan, Prof. Hisahi Nakamura of Ryukoku University, Kyoto was ex-tremely kind in providing interpreters, fixing up appointments with the fisheryauthorities and in sparing time for discussions. I thank him and his family.Ms. Junko Yamaka of Pacific Asia Resources Centre (PARC) organiseddiscussions with various people working on Japanese fishery and accom-panied me to these discussions. I am thankful to her. Mr. Masaki Yamada, astudent of Tokyo University accompanied me on most of my interviews asan interpreter. Without his invaluable help it would have been impossible tomove around in Tokyo. I would also like to thank Prof. Hirasawa Yutaka,formerly of Tokyo Fisheries University for clarifying issues and providing an

insight into Japanese fishing history. Dr. Kenneth Ruddle of NationalMuseum of Ethnology, Osaka was extremely useful in supplying ideas andsource material on the Japanese fisheries management.

In the Philippines, I would like to thank the fishermen of Perez Island,Lamon Bay, particularly Mr. Reynaldo Alpay and Mr. Raymondo Asia; theanimators of Asian Social Institute, Manila; Dr. Max Aguero of InternationalCentre for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM), Manila; Mr.Reuben Genaden, Mr. Santos and Mr. Gamilla of Bureau of Fisheries andAquatic Resources (BFAR); Commander Quevas of the PhilippineCoastguards; and my friend, Attorney Antonio Oposa Jr. Thanks also to Fr.Desmond D’Souza of Organisation for Human Development (OHD) forallow-ing me to use the facilities at his office.

In Indonesia, various officials at the Office of the Director General ofFisheries (DGF); scientists of Research Institute for Marine Fisheries,Jakarta, and the Fishing Technology Development Centre, Semarang; Mr.Yoshibumi Kihara, Consultant Fishing Technologist and other friendsspared considerable amount of their time for discussions and provideduseful insights into the fisheries situation.

In Malaysia, Mr. V.C. Mohan of Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM),Penang, arranged all my contacts and interpreters. Mr. Mathew George,Ms. Halima and Mr. Sul of SAM also extended considerable assistance.Ms. Chee Yoke Ling, Secretary of Sam provided an overview of the legalsystem of Malaysia. I am grateful to all of them for their help especially forallowing me access to library and office facilities. I am also thankful to Dr.Ishak Shari of National University of Malaysia (UKM); Dr. Jahara Yahaya ofUniversity of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur; Mr. Alip Rahim of USM, Penang andvarious officials of the Department of Fisheries for the discussions we had.

In Thailand, Ms. Amporn Sugandhavanij, of Kasetsart University andmember of the ICSF, took me to fishing villages, arranged contacts and foundtime for discussions. Mr. Vernon Pietersz of FAO Regional Office helped meto meet Government officials. Mr. Manu Pottaros, Inspector General ofFisheries provided me with details of enforcement. I am thankful to all of them.

Numerous discussions with Mr. John Kurien of the Centre for Develop-ment Studies, Trivandrum, India, proved particularly useful for the field visits

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FISHING LEGISLATION IN ASIA

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and in writing up the report. Ms. Nalini Nayak, Mr. K.G. Kumar, Mr. Mihir Shah,Mr. Chandan Mukherjee and Mr. C.R. Reddy read a previous draft of thisreport and gave valuable comments. To all of them, my deep gratitude.

I am thankful to Mr. V. Vivekanandan, Chief Executive of South IndianFederation of Fishermen’ Societies (SIFFS), Trivandrum, for makingavailable the computer facilities at his office. In the computer work Mr.Satish Babu, Executive (Systems & Management), SIFFS, helped meimmensely. Mr. P.K. Krishnan and Mr. C.R. Aravindan did an excellent jobin preparing the typescript. I am grateful to them.

I must also thank the many fishermen who, although they could notconverse with me, shared their experiences through interpreters andhelped me to improve my understanding of inter-gear conflicts.

Much more pronounced than all this is the feeling of gratitude I havetowards the ICSF for entrusting the study to me. Not only was it thoroughly,enjoyable and rewarding, it also led me into grounds I had never ‘trawled’before! For this, a special piece of thankful appreciation to Mr. Pierre Gillet,Secretary, ICSF.

Needless to add, all responsibility for any error or omission is entirely mine.


«We must not make a scarecrow of the law,Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,And let it keep one shape till custom make itTheir perch, and not their terror.»

Shakespeare,Act Two, Scene 1Measure for Measure

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About the Author

SEBASTIAN MATHEW was born in Trivandrum, Kerala, India in 1957. Afterobtaining an M.A. in Economics from Kerala University, he undertook a jointstudy on technological changes in fishing and impact on small-scalefishermen in India. He also co-authored a study on the impact of pollution onfishing villages. Later, he obtained an M. Phil. in Applied Economics from theCentre for Development Studies, Trivandrum. His dissertation work for thiscourse was on the structure of the frozen prawn export industry in Kerala. Hisinterest in environmental issues has led him to campaign against destructionof evergreen forests and helped to set up an eco-restoration project in a tribalarea in the Western Ghats of Kerala.

Adress: T.C. 4/953, Kawdiar P.O. Trivandrum, 695 003 INDIA.


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I N T R O D U C T I O N

As part of the triennial programme of research of the InternationalCollective in Support of Fishworkers, I was assigned a study on the role oflegislation in mitigating or resolving inshore conflicts among fishermen inAsian countries which have adopted a zoning system. The main foci of thestudy, according to the letter of assignment, are— to examine the history of fishing regulations and the genesis of conflicts

over fishing space and resources.— to study the effectiveness of fishing regulations in resolving these conflicts.— to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of administering fishing regulations to

protect the interests of the small-scale fishermen and,— to assess the extent of awareness of fishing legislation among the

artisanal fishermen.

In consultation with Dr. Francis T. Christy Jr. (formerly Senior FisheryPlanning Officer, Fishery Development Planning Service, Fishery Policy andPlanning Division, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome) and Mr. RolfWillmann, (Fishery Planning Analyst, Fishery Policy and Planning Division,FAO, Rome), five countries in the Asian region were chosen for the study.These were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Japan.

Both Indonesia and Malaysia witnessed violent conflicts in the inshorewaters between trawlers and traditional gear groups leading to destruction offishing unit and loss of life in the 1970’s. As result of these conflicts, which alsohad other ramifications, Indonesia and Malaysia introduced a zoningarrangement to safeguard the interests of small fishermen. In addition,Indonesia also banned trawling in the waters west of 120 degrees E Iongitude.

In the Philippines, although there were no violent conflicts betweentrawlers and traditional gear groups, there has always been discernibletension between the two. A series of legislative measures were drawn up.Principal among them was the legislation reserving the coastal waters fornon-trawl/non purse-seine gear groups. Moreover, in the Philippines therights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of marine resourcesare guaranteed by the Constitution.

Thailand has one of the earliest set of laws to conserve its fisheryresources. However, inter-gear conflicts have not taken place on asignificant scale although the desertification of the Gulf of Thailand is anongoing process ever since otter-board trawling was introduced in 1961.

Japan has an efficient system for the management of coastal waterswhich has its origin in its feudal period from 1603 to 1867 A.D. Almost allintra-sectoral conflicts are resolved within its unique co-operative structureand only inter-sectoral conflicts are referred to the judiciary. In spite of thesystem’s efficiency and viability, Japan has not been able to overcome twoproblems common to almost all the commercial fisheries of the world, viz.,over capitalisation of the fishery and overfishing of resources.

With these illustrations, methods of conflict management will bediscussed in the following chapters. In addition to the examination oforigin/nature of conflicts, the role of legislation and the status of enforcement,the study will also discuss the economic, political and social specificities inthese countries that constitute the texture of the conflict and its mitigation.

The study is based on an extensive visit to all these countries.Discussions were held with fishermen, marine biologists, economists,anthropologists, administrators, politicians, lawyers and social activists.The visit occurred between the first week of November 1988 and the middleof February 1989. The attempt was to talk to as wide a spectrum of peopleas possible. In addition, secondary material in the form of legislation,research papers, newspaper clippings and other relevant publications werecollected from the respective countries.

The following libraries were consulted for the study:— University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway;— FAO Fisheries Division, Rome, Italy;

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— Institute for Developing Economies, Tokyo, Japan;— National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, Japan;— International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management

(ICLARM), Manila, the Philippines;— Director General of Fisheries, Jakarta, Indonesia:— Research Institute for Marine Fisheries, Jakarta, Indonesia;— Fishing Technique Development Centre, Semarang, Indonesia;— Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand;— Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC), Bangkok,

Thailand;— Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM), Penang, Malaysia; and— INFOFISH Library, Kuala Lumpur.

The nature of conflicts and their magnitude are different in differentcountries. They depend very much on historical situations and the prevailingconditions. The focus of this study hence has to adjust to these changes.

In Indonesia, we will consider in detail the «success» of the trawling banin terms of its objectives. The motives behind the ban will also be discussed.

Various adjustments made in the zoning system and their role in theamelioration of conflicts between trawlers and inshore gill-net fishermen willbe the focus in Malaysia.

The diffused nature of perception, poor awareness of legislation andtotal lack of implementation of various provisions will be discussed in thecontext of the Philippines.

The tradition of legislation, particularly for ensuring conservation ofaquatic resources and its poor implementation, will be the focus of Thailandsince there is very little evidence of conflicts between small fishermen andother fishery operators.

And finally, in the case of Japan, we will discuss the evolution offishermen’s co-operatives and the viability of a system, which resolvesconflicts within its framework, without resorting to the State machinery.

Limitation of language was a problem in gaining access to all therelevant material for the study and visiting all the fishing villages one wouldhave liked to. Constraint on time was another limitation. The cost-aspectsof enforcement also could not be obtained either because of confidentialityor lack of availability. Thailand was the only exception.


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Indonesia is an archipelago of over13,000 islands located strategically

between the Indian and PacificOceans. Total fish production in1986 amounted to 2.5 million tonesvalued at US$ 1700 million with themarine sector accounting for 75percent of production and 60 percentof gross value. The fisheries sectoraccounted for 4 percent of the totalIndonesian agricultural productionby value and contributed to one percent of the GDP in 1986. Fisheriesexports accounted for only 1.3percent of total Indonesian exports in1985 and 4.3 percent of non-petroleum exports. In quantity terms,this is only about 3 percent of thetotal production. Thus the fisheriesproduction is primarily orientedtowards the domestic market.According to an ADB Study the percapita consumption of fish is about41 kg (as against the official figure of14 kg.)

There are over 3 million fishermenin Indonesia, 43 percent of whom arein the marine sector; another 43 per-cent in aquaculture and the remain-ing 14 percent in inland capturefisheries. The marine fishermen com-prise equally of full-time and part-timefishermen and of the 700,000 full-timefishermen, over 50 percent are in theMalacca Straits and the Java sea.These areas account for about 50percent of the total production.

There is no coherent definitionof different sub-sectors but there is anominal one according to which allgear operated without the use of acraft and all boats powered by sail oroutboard motors constitute the small-scale sector. All boats with inboardengines belong to either the medium-scale or large-scale sectors. Althoughthere is no clear distinction betweenthe two, the quantum of investmentis used to distinguish between the two

I N D O N E S I A

sub-sectors. According to Bailey et al(1987) the large, medium and small-scale sub-sectors contributed toroughly 2 percent, 43 percent and 55percent respectively of the total catchin 1982.

Artisanal fishermen operated219,000 non-powered craft in 1986,about half of which were dug-outcanoes. This is about 70 percent ofthe total number of craft in Indonesia.These craft operate a wide variety ofgear including gill-nets, cast-nets,trapsseines and hook-and-line.Artisanal fishing has a low produc-tivity (about 1400 kilograms/fisher-man/year) and takes place in anarrow band around the coast. Morethan 60 percent of the fishermen livebelow the national poverty threshold.

The number of powered vesselshas increased rapidly in recent yearsfrom 32,000 in 1979 to 99,000 in1986. About 65 percent are poweredby outboard motors. Of those withinboard engines 80 percent are lessthan 5 GT (gross tonnage). The in-crease in both forms of motorizationis particularly significant after thetrawling ban of 1980.

The medium and large-scaleoperations comprise purse-seiners,pole and line vessels and trawlers.Prior to the imposition of the ban ontrawling, 3,000 trawlers located main-

ly in the Malacca Straits, northernJava and Kalimantan took about 57percent of the total demersal catchi.e., 10 percent of the total catch of allmarine fish. After the ban their catchhas come down to 0.5 percent of thetotal. This is because trawling is stillpermitted in the waters east of 120degrees E longitude i.e., in theArafura Sea.

The catch of purse-seiners hasincreased from 10 percent of totalmarine catch in 1979 to 15 percentin 1986. These vessels operate main-ly in the Malacca Straits and the Javasea in areas quite distant from theshore.

Purse-seining and trawl fishingwere introduced around the sametime in Indonesia. In the late-1960s,purse-seine was introduced underthe auspices of the government inthe northern coast of Java. Trawlingdeveloped fully on private initiativeunlike in countries like the Philippinesand Thailand. It was introduced bythe ethnic Chinese in an area calledBagansiapi-api in Malacca Straits,from the western coast of Malaysia in1966 (Yamamoto, 1977).

The development of purse-seinefishery did not lead to any significantconflict with the small fishermenprimarily because the area of opera-tion is away from the shore. Trawlers,

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on the other hand, confined theiroperations to the inshore waters. Thedevelopment of the trawl fishery,therefore, led to serious conflicts bet-ween trawlers and gill-net fishermenin Malacca Straits and northernJava. More than a competition forresources, this is believed to be aresult of destruction of craft and gearby trawlers harvesting prawns within12 miles from the shore, the usualfishing ground of small fishermen.

Background of thetrawl ban

Before we begin our discussionon the impact of trawling and the im-plications of the trawl ban in In-donesia, certain points have to bekept in mind. Firstly, more than 80percent of the otter trawlers in In-donesia were confined to Java andSumatra, particularly to the MalaccaStraits and northern Java. Secondly,Malacca Straits and Java have thelargest concentration of fishermen’spopulation. Together they account forover 50 percent of the total full-timefishermen. Thirdly, more than 50 per-cent of the total marine productionand 60 percent of exportable prawnscome from these areas. Fourthly,most of the trawler/purse-seineowners and traders in Indonesia are

of Chinese origin.

The ethnic factor plays a very im-portant role in the economy of In-donesia. This is so in the fishingsector as well. This is very importantfor understanding the conflict bet-ween the trawlers and smallfishermen and this has been com-pletely overlooked in all the majorstudies on the trawl-ban (Chong, Kee-Chai et al 1987; Bailey et al 1987;Naamin 1984; Darmoredjo. S 1983)perhaps because of the highly sen-sitive nature of ethnic politics in In-donesia (See May. B. 1978.

The sea around Kalimantan isalso an important prawn fishingground but interestingly this area didnot witness any conflicts betweentrawlers and small-scale fishermen,perhaps because the operators in thesmall-scale as well as large-scale sec-tors are both predominantly Chinese.

Unlike in Malaysia where the con-flicts between trawlers and gill-netfishermen erupted in the same yearthat trawling was commercially in-troduced, in Indonesia it was only bythe mind-1970’s- a decade after theirintroduction-that these tensionsstarted surfacing in the form ofclashes in the sea. The early conflictsin Malaysia are documented but in In-donesia there is hardly any suchdocumentation. They broke out for


the first time in the Malacca Straitsand were presumably a spill-over ofMalaysian conflicts. The commonnature of the «problem» in the Malac-ca Straits combined with similar ethnic characteristics — with almost all the trawler owners being Chineseand traditional fishermen beingpredomi-nantly Malay or Indonesian — gave the conflicts a similar form inboth the countries. From the Malac-ca Straits the conflicts spread to nor-thern Java.

As mentioned earlier, MalaccaStraits and northern Java, wherethere were conflicts, are the areaswith the largest concentration offishermen and the largest production.The conflicts arose mainly because of competition for space, leading todestruction of craft and gear, par-ticularly of gill-net fishermen operatingin the narrow confines of the coastalwaters. Since the commerciallyvaluable species are largely confinedto the inshore waters, trawlersoperated very close to the coast. Ac-cording to Dr. Naamin of FisheriesResearch Institute, Jakarta, thesetrawlers — called «Cung-King» (1) —were mostly operating in the 5-40meters depth zone (Naamin, N. 1984)and sometimes in depths as shallow

as 2 meters.

Though the overall production ofthe traditional sector did not suffer asa result of trawling, the aggregate an-nual output of the gill-net fishermendid decline. Their production in boththe Malacca Straits and northern Javadropped to 80,000 tonnes in 1980from 120,000 tonnes in 1976. Thissubsequently doubled — presumablyas a result of the trawling ban—to160,000 tonnes in 1986. Thus theunequal competition for space not on-ly led to destruction of craft and gearbut also affected the harvest of thetraditional gill-net fishermen.

The various measures aimed atmanaging the fisheries sector par-ticularly trawl fishing, should be seenin this backdrop.

History of fishing legislation

Before the advent of conflicts bet-ween trawlers and gill-net fishermen,the fishing legislation in Indonesiawas primarily colonial in origin. Themain focus of the early legislation of1927 and 1939 — which reserved allmarine fisheries to local citizens andprohibited foreigners from fishing

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(1)Interestingly, Cung-King is also the name of a port in S W China, in Szechwan province at theconfluence of the Yangtze and Chialing rivers. It is a major trade centre for W China and was thewartime capital of China between 1938 and 1945.

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operations without special permission— was on security ( Bailey et al ibid.).The fisheries law was basically a ployby the Dutch to check encroachmentsof other colonial interests into Indone-sian archipelago. The first efforts atthe formulation of new fisherieslegislation were attempted after theeruption of inter-gear conflicts in themid-1970s. The new measures hadthe twin objectives of conservation ofresources and elimination of conflicts.

The first significant measure wastaken by the government in 1975when Decree 1 was issued. Thislimited fishing effort through regula-tion of the fishing season, of the type,size and number of boats in a par-ticular area and of the mesh size(Bailey et al ibid.). An area-specificquota system was also established bythe Decree. Subsequently in 1976,Ministerial Decree 607 was issuedwith the specific purpose of controll-


Zone Distance from shore Closed to

I. 0-3 nautical miles 1. Boats with inboard engines displacing over 5 GT;2. Boats with inboard engines over 10 HP;3. All types of trawl gear;4. All purse-seines;5. Encircling gillnets and drifting gillnets for tuna;6. Seines not longer than 120 meters.

II. 3-7 nautical miles 1. Boats with inboard engines displacing over 25 GT;2. Boats with inboard engines over 50 HP;3. Otter trawls with head ropes longer than 12 M;4. Midwater trawls and pair trawls;5. Purse-seines longer than 300 M

III. 7-12 nautical miles 1. Boats with inboard engines displacing over 100 GT;2. Boats with inboard engines over 200 HP;3. Demersal and midwater trawls using otter boards

equipped with head ropes over 20 m in length;4. Pair trawls;5. Purse-Seines longer than 600 m;

IV. Over 12 nautical miles 1. Pair trawl, except in the Indian Ocean where they are permitted.

Table I

Zones of Operation for Fishing Boats Established by the Ministerof Agriculture’s Decree 607 in 1976.

Source: Bailey, C et al 1987. Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries

ing trawling operations. According tothis Decree, which is still in force, thesea was divided into four zones withthe main purpose of preventingphysical conflict and social frictionbetween the traditional and trawlingsectors (Naamin, N. op. cit.). Thiszoning is, however, not applicable infishing grounds in the Arafura seaand adjacent waters where, alleged-ly, there are no traditional fishermen(Darmoredjo, S. op. cit.)(1).

The table I gives details of thezoning arrangement.

Soon after the issuance of Decree607 Decree 609 was brought outrestricting the operation of trawlers tothe area for which they were licen-sed. Attempts were made to imple-ment both these Decrees. However,effective enforcement was impossi-ble, particularly in Malacca Straitsbecause of inherent difficulties. Manyillegal trawlers were already in opera-tion and in the absence of a strongenforcement machinery the efforts tolimit the number of trawlers resultedin thousands of trawlers beginning tooperate without licences.

This further aggravated in inter-gear conflicts and by 1980 in situa-

tion became so bad that «not onlywere the resources impaired andfishing boats and gear sunk of burn-ed and houses burned, but humanlives were lost» (Chong, Kee-Chai op.cit). The President Soeharto for thefirst time stepped in and banned trawlfishing by virtue of PresidentialDecree (P.D) 39/1980.

The ban initially covered watersoff Java and Bali (1 Oct 1980) andthree months later waters in theMalacca Straits off Sumatra werebrought under the ban. But whentrawlers started moving out of theirexisting base of operation to otherregions, the ban was extended to thewaters off Kalimantan and WestSulawesi as well from 1 July 1981. Asit is now, trawling operations are com-pletely banned to the west of 120degrees E longitude. Trawling isallowed in waters to the east of 120degrees E longitude, provided thevessels are equipped with a by-catchexcluder device (BED). These are thewaters monopolised by the Japanesefishing interests (2).

Objectives of the trawl ban

According to Chong, Kee Chai et

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(1) But, according to Fisheries Statistics of Indonesia for the year 1980, 20 percent of the totalpopulation of active fishermen are in sulawesi and Irian Jaya.(2) «Indonesia’s fleet of large fishing vessels was heavily concentrated in Maluku and Irian Jaya in1980; 121 of the 161 fishing vessels over 50 gt were based in these provinces and virtually all of thesewere refrigerated shrimp trawlers of the Japanese joint venture companies«». (ADB, IBRD. 1983).

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al (ibid.) the ban on trawling «is themost bold or courageous and in-novative fisheries management stepwhich the country has so far under-taken» and it «represents an impor-tant reaffirmation of small-scalefisheries development as a nationalpriority» (Bailey et al ibid.). Accordingto the then Director General ofFisheries, Sardjono, P.D.39 wasclearly a «political decision» intend-ed at protecting the interests of thetraditional fishermen and the«philosophical and moral rationale»for the P.D., according to Bailey et al,are the priorities mentioned in theFive Year Plan of Indonesia whichprimarily aim at «the distribution ofdevelopment benefits among thewidest possible number of Indone-sians» (Bailey et al ibid). The sameauthors also hold that the ban is « themost recent in a series of manage-ment policy measures designed toprotect coastal fisheries resources»though overfishing due to trawling isestablished only in Malacca Straitsand northern Java (personal discus-sion with Purwito Martosubroto,Director of Fisheries Management, In-donesia)

Thus the ban apparently hasthree objectives:1) to facilitate better resourcemanagement;2) to ensure the development of the

traditional sector; and3) to prevent open conflicts.

Along with the declaration of theban on trawling, P.D.No.39 alsocreated the biggest credit programmefor fisheries in Indonesia under theGovernment Agricultural CreditScheme (BIMAS), a credit pro-gramme established in 1965 primarilyfor the agricultural sector. The pro-gramme aimed mainly at assistingfishermen affected by the prohibitionon trawling. It was to enable them toconvert to another type of fishing orto brackish-water fish culture.

Out of the total allocation of RP238 billion (US$ 245 million), 20 per-cent was for the conversion of 2,300trawlers into other gear, 9 percentwas for the promotion of non-trawlfishing methods and 71 percent wasfor (a) the intensification of shrimpculture on 100,000 ha in existingponds, (b) creation of 30,000 ha ofnew ponds and (c) for construction ofshrimp hatcheries. Under this pro-gramme the maximum amount ob-tainable was RP 5 million. The loanperiod was five years with a one yeargrace period and credit could be us-ed for both working capital and invest-ment. No collateral was required(ADB, IBRD. 1983).

In other words, the main focus ofthe credit programme was the inten-


sification of aquaculture to offset thepotential loss of prawn production asa result of the ban. The credit pro-gramme’s objective was certainly notenhancement of the productivepotential of the traditional sector sothat it could exploit the prawnresources that were now free fromcompetition from an incompatiblegear.

Under the scheme only trawlersbuilt within five years of P.D.39 andin good condition would qualify forconversion. Owners of eligible boatswere given the option of selling theirboats to the government, which wouldthen be converted for use with othergear and sold to crewmen under theBIMAS programme (Bailey et al op.cit.). Though the total credit coveredboth investment and working capitalrequirements, the investment compo-nent was specifically for modificationof the hull (under ALTERNATIF I & II);modification of hull and fishing gear(ALTERNATIF III) and purchase of ex-trawl vessels, modification of hull andfishing gear (under ALTERNATIF IV).The amount disbursed under ALTER-NATIF IV was through the co-operatives (KUD) and the entireamount disbursed under ALTER-NATIF I, II & III was given directly tothe applicant (from discussion withBank Rayat Indonesia).

Trawl ban: an analysis

Too much panegyric has beenpoured on the Indonesian govern-ment for its «bold» and «innovative»fisheries management strategy inbanning trawling. This measure hasbeen hailed all over the world andthe whole world is closely watchingthe strides Indonesia is making in itsimplementation.

The ban is definitely innovativebecause this is perhaps the onlycountry in the world where a total banhas been resorted to for defusingtension and developing traditionalfisheries. But the important questionis whether a unilateral ban cannecessarily lead to the desiredfulfillment of objectives like properresource management and develop-ment of traditional sector.

In other words, how is it to at-tribute all the «evils» affecting tradi-tional fishermen to the trawlingsector? Is it not an over simplificationof an otherwise complex set of causalfactors responsible for the indigenceof a large number of fishermen inIndonesia? In the following sectionwe will discuss in detail theimplications of the ban and its effect inachieving the stated objectives. Wewill also try to examine the realmotives for its implementation.

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Two facts should be borne inmind: only 3 percent of the totalexpenditure of the Director General ofFisheries (DGF) is targeted forfisheries resource management andenvironmental protection (out of US $490 million) during REPELITA IV (thefourth five year development plan1984-89) (Bailey et al ibid.); secondlyin the Indonesian Navy — the regula-tory enforcement authority — «hasduties extending far beyond regula-tion of fisheries» and «has neither theresources nor the incen-tive tobecome involved in regula-tions ofnational fisheries» (Min of Agri., DGF& ADB, 1988). Consequently, it is amatter of great convenience that atotal ban was effected. This effectivelymakes it easier for implementationand according to a top official of theDepartment of Fisheries, thefishermen themselves will ensure theenforcement of the ban.

According to Naamin (ibid.)over 3,500 vessels were affected bythe trawl ban. About 44,000 workerslost their jobs (this includes trawlercrew, employees of cold storages,ice plants, fuel/food suppliers, etc.).The figure, 3,500 probably includesin illegal trawlers because accordingto the DGF’s Fisheries Statistics ofIndonesia for 1980, there were only3,100 trawlers in 1980 whichincludes the trawlers operating from

the Arafura sea also. The totalnumber of trawlers operating in thearea affected by the ban was onlyabout 2,500.

Impact on owners

How did the ban effectively affectthe owners of trawlers? According toChong, Kee-Chai et al (op.cit.), at anannual depreciation of US$ 6,200, thesalvage value of the trawlers wasalmost zero since many of them wereover twenty years old. The ownershad already recovered their capital in-vestments. This is perhaps why veryfew trawling units benefited from thecredit programme under BIMAS. Ac-cording to the above authors, out ofthe 600 trawlers operating from thenorthern coast of Java more than 50percent were either tied up at theiroperation bases or their fate wasunknown. Naamin (1982) reportedthat of the 1,040 trawlers, which wereoperated from the major fishing portsof Java & Sumatra, 45 percent wereinactive in the middle of 1981.

According to the Department ofFisheries, Indonesia, US$48 millionwas earmarked for the conversion of2,300 trawlers into purse-seiners, gill-netters, tuna long liners, etc. But acc-ording to the Bank Rayat Indonesia(BRI), the principal credit agency of


the government, only 15 per cent ofthe total amount was distributed forrehabilitation of ex-trawlers. Only oneinstalment was released and the pro-gramme was dropped in 1980 itselfbecause of the fear of poor repay-ment (from per-sonal dis-cussion withthe Bank authorities).

This credit programme was meantto cover both the owner and the crewof trawlers. About 480 units benefitedfrom it. Of these, 44 percent werefrom the Malacca Straits, 22 percentfrom Kalimantan and the rest werefrom Java. Only about 20 percent ofthe total number of intendedbeneficiaries benefited from thisscheme. The joint ownership of ex-trawlers combined with the nature ofcredit distribution seem to have bad-ly undermined the intended benefitsof this programme. There are successstories, but according to FAO exten-sion workers in Semarang, these arethe ones operating on kin-ship lines.In most cases, however, the pro-gramme failed miserably. As on 1stAugust 1988 51 percent of the loansadvanced remained outstanding.

In addition to ineffective manage-ment, there were other problems. Inmany cases, inappropriate gear wassupplied (Bailey et al op. cit.). Thisproblem arose because the distribu-tion of the credit was not in the form of direct payment to the applicants.

The Bank, according to the recom-mendation of the local authority fromthe fisheries depart-ment, wouldrelease the credit to the supplier ofgear and engine. As a result, the jointowners did not have the freedom tochoose the gear they wanted. And ofcourse, there were problems of cor-ruption with collusion between thetrader and the local fishery authority.

Secondly, the cost of the fishinggear and engine provided under theBIMAS loan programme was higherthan the prevailing market price,sometimes by as much as 30 percent(ibid.). The failure of the BIMAS creditprogramme was also highlighted bythe leaders of the All IndonesianFishermen’s Organisation (HNSI) whoattributed the failure to corruptionamong government officials (frompersonal discussion).

What happened to trawlers whichdecided to convert to other forms offishing or non-fishing operations?There has been no effort on the partof the Department of Fisheries tomonitor their perform-ance. However,from our discussions with fisheriesscientists, extension workers etc. itappears their performance has beenquite mixed.

Some of the trawlers completelywound up fishing operations andmoved into the movement of goods

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and people between islands. Of thosewho shifted to other forms of fishing,the trawlers from Cilacap (on thesouthern coast of Java) moved intogill-net and trammel-net fishing. Thereare 35 GT boats operating trammel-nets in Cilacap. Almost all the trawlersfrom northern Java diversified intopurse-seine fishery. Similarly most ofthe converted ones in Sumatra mov-ed into purse-seining and a fewbecame tuna-long liners. Accordingto some of our sources the trawlerswhich converted to purse-seines aredoing well in northern Sumatra(where there are rich pelagicgrounds), whereas those operatingfrom northern Java are not doing par-ticularly well because of intense ex-ploitation in the coastal waters. Thefishing ground there, is now at adistance of three days cruise (1988).Many of these converted vessels arewinding up their operations. Those

converted to gill-net operations arefinding the cost of operation exorbi-tant because of the high costs ofoperating a large engine (Bailey et alop. cit.). Among the ones that are do-ing well are those operated on kinshiplines.

According to a study quoted byBailey et al on Aceh province inSumatra, « of the 69 ex-trawlers con-verted in 1981 through BIMAS loantotaling RP 1.3 billion, nine of theseboats had since sunk and most of therest were not in operation due toaccumulated losses» (ibid.).

One factor, which has beenoverlooked by all the studies on thetrawl ban, is the fact that the totalnumber of otter trawlers in operationwas showing a stagnation from 1978onwards — even before the ban. Butthe number of purse-seiners morethan trebled in the period 1975-1980(See table II).


Table ll

Number and Type of Indonesian Fishing Gear 1975-1982

Type of fishing Gear Number of Gear by Year

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Otter trawl 2202 2692 3266 2511 2570 2476 666 453

Purse-seiner 1144 1481 1706 2137 2838 3700 3572 4933

Source: Bailey et al (1987)

This would mean that there wasalready a redistribution of fishing ef-fort from trawling towards purse-seining even before the ban wasdeclared. In other words capital hadalready started moving out of thetrawling sector, particularly in the in-tensively fished area like MalaccaStraits and northern Java, into otherforms of fishing where the returnswere much higher. The ban perhapsspeeded up the movement. This sug-gests that the owners of trawlers werenot all that affected by the ban. If atall it has affected some, they must beowners without adequate financialclout to undertake new investments.In other words, any managementmeasure presumably taken for thebenefit of disadvantaged fishermendoes not imply that the privilegedgroup (of trawler owners in this case)will have to pay a price. If alternatechannels of investment are openwhich ensure an equal if not a higherreturn, and if the expected mark-upis ensured, capital will move. Formost of the owners who are ethnicChinese, trawling was only one ofmany avenues of investment. Theydid not have any difficulty in diversi-fying into other activities.

Impact on workers

We have mentioned earlier that

over 44,000 workers were affected bythe ban, including over 20,000 crewmen. Out of these only about 2,500benefited from the BIMAS pro-gramme (about 15 percent). As in thecase of ex-trawl vessels, there hasbeen no monitoring of the well-beingof these workers after the ban.Therefore, we had to rely on our in-formal sources to get an idea abouttheir situation after the ban.

Among the ex-trawl workers, ap-parently the ones most affected werethe workers who came from non-fishing communities. They werebasically peasants from the moun-tains. After the ban they could not ac-quire the requisite skills to operategill-nets/trawl-nets, purse-seines, etc.As a result they had to leave thefishing sector for work in the informalsector where their earning capacity ismuch lower vis-à-vis income fromtrawling operations. Though the con-dition of the workers who joined thepurse-seine sector was better, theeconomic returns were lower com-pared to that in the trawling sectorsince the returns to labour had to beshared among a large number ofworkers (the crew size of a trawlerwas about a quarter of the crew sizeof a purse-seiner). As Chong, Kee-Chai et al (op. cit.) observe:

«In general, ex-trawl crew fishermencollectively have not benefited in a

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positive manner from the Ban interms of improved and sustainedincomes. For those ex-trawl crewfishermen who have been able tohang on to their newly acquiredboats/nets through the creditprogramme, their incomes havereportedly improved somewhat.However, the number of suchfishermen reporting improvedincomes is limited».

The discussion of the fate of theex-trawl workers will not be completeunless we discuss the allocation andutilization of credit under BIMAS forthe intensification of shrimp culture.Though RP 168 billion (US $ 171million) was to be earmarked for thispurpose according to P.D. 39/80, on-ly 30 percent was finally allocated.This scheme was supposed to benefitex-trawl workers also but our discus-sions with BRI and other sourcesrevealed that there were very few reci-pients from the ex-trawl workers andof the 28,000 people who were ad-vanced loans, most of them werefrom non-trawl fishing operations orfrom the aquaculture sector. Thescheme was also dropped after therelease of the first instalment becauseof poor repayment. Only nine percentof the RP 53 billion advanced underthe scheme was repaid as on 1 Aug1988.

Impact on traditional sector

So far we have been discussingthe impact of the ban on trawling onthe owners and the workers. From ourdiscussion it can be seen that the ex-trawl crew men are the worst affectedby the ban. The credit programme in-tended to rehabilitate them does notseem to have resulted in anydesirable improvement in their levelof income or earning capacity.

As we have mentioned before, themain objectives on the ban includedthe development of the traditionalsector and better resource manage-ment. Now let us see to what extentthese objectives were achieved.

One of the main problems indiscussing how the benefits of theban accrued to the traditionalfishermen arises from the way tradi-tional and modern sectors are defin-ed in Indonesia. The definition is craft-specific viz. all vessels with orwithout outboard motors are viewedas forming the traditional or small-scale sector whereas all craft with in-board engines from the modern sec-tor. This definition does not help usget an idea about the benefits accru-ing to the small-scale sector becausethe marine fishery produc-tion figuresare given by type of fishing gear in theannual statistics published by theDirector General of Fisheries (DGF).


Gear have a protracted use and bothsmall-scale and modern sectors usesimilar gear. Since we do not havecraft-gear specific production figures,it is difficult to establish the benefit ac-cruing to the small fisher-men as aresult of the ban. Gear-wise produc-tion figures would have been ten-tatively sufficient if different types ofgear were sub-classified according totheir size. Unfortunately, this is alsonot done. At the most, we have onlygeneral indicators like an increase inthe number of trammel-nets, shrimpgill-nets or increase in the rate ofmotorization.

Of course, there are figures toshow the production of prawns butthese figures indicate only the non-trawl catch. In other words, though«the trawl ban effectively redistributes

fishing effort away from the trawloperation to the other fisheries»(Chong, Kee-Chai et al ibid.) it doesnot presuppose «a reallocation of theresources... in favour of small-scalefishermen» as contended by theabove authors. There is no data tounderstand the distribution of fishingeffort within the non-trawl sector bet-ween artisanal and commercialoperators. Therefore, increase in pro-ductive capacity, or production doesnot mean that the small-scale sectoris benefiting from the ban. However,we will examine these to get a generalidea about the impact of the ban onthe non-trawl gear-groups, assumingthat part of the benefit would be ac-cruing to the subsistence fishermentoo.

Since the total marine fish produc-

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Table III

Total Output by Gill-Net(in 1000 tonnes)

Area/Year 1976 1980 1986

Aggregate production 223 315 477

1. Malacca Straits 38 34 53

2. Northern Java 80 48 103

Total (1+2) 118 82 156

Total marine production 483 850 923

Source: Annual Fisheries Statistics of Indonesia 1976, 1980, 1986 DGF Jakarta.

Malacca Northern Kilimantan Irian Jaya TotalStraits Java Total & Total for the

Moluccas Country1 2 1+2 3 4 1–4

Tiger Prawn1976 5,100 300 5,400 1,100 2,000 8,500 9,3001980 7,000 400 7,400 1,500 1,200 10,100 11,0001986 5,100 200 5,300 7,100 1,000 13,400 14,100

Banana Prawn1976 4,000 5,000 9,000 2,900 3, 000 14,900 19,0001980 10,000 5,500 15,500 10,400 5, 000 30,900 38,7001986 4,700 7,600 12,300 8,500 4, 100 24,900 33,000

Endeavour Prawn1976 6,600 1,700 8,300 1,500 500 10,300 12,6001980 2,900 2,300 5,200 2,700 2,500 10,400 14,0001986 4,800 2,600 7,400 4,400 1,200 13,000 16,500

Total1976 15,700 7,000 22,700 5,500 5,500 33,700 40,9001980 19,900 8,200 28,100 14,600 8,700 51,400 63,7001986 14,600 10,400 25,000 20,000 6,300 51,300 63,600

Compiled from Annual Fisheries Statistics (1976, 1980, 1986), DGF Indonesia.

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tion was growing at an annual rate of5 percent between 1981-86 we aretaking certain specific indicators toassess the benefit to the non-trawlsector. These are the (a) total gill-netproduction figures (b) the total outputof tiger, banana and endeavourprawns, and (c) the in-crease in pro-ductivity. In our analysis we are in-cluding only Malacca Straits, northernJava — the areas where there wererampant conflicts between trawlers

and gill-netters.

Though the total marine produc-tion almost doubled from 483,000 ton-nes to 850,000 between 1976 and1980 there seems to have been adecline in the aggregate productionof all gill-net units in the MalaccaStraits and northern Java.

The figures for Malacca Straitsand northern Java are particularlysignificant because, while during the


Table IVMarine production of Prawns (In Tonnes)

period 1976-1980 total gill-net produc-tion for the whole country had in-creased by 30 percent the totalproduction in Malacca Straits andnorthern Java actually declined by 30percent. The recovery after the banin these two areas is also significant.When the aggregate output of gill-netters increased by 34 percent bet-ween 1980-1986, in these two areasit increased by 48 percent. Thesefigures unequivocally estab-lish thepositive impact of the ban on gill-netfishermen, thus highlighting theeconomic rationale behind the earlierconflicts.

Since tiger prawn, banana prawnand endeavour prawn are the com-mercially most valuable species ofprawns, we have included only theirproduction (from Malacca Straits andnorthern Java) to see the extent towhich the gill-net sector could replacethe productive capacity of thetrawlers.

Indonesia seems to have comeback to the pre-trawl ban levels of pro-duction by 1986 in the case of com-mercially most valuable species ofprawns. Three factors are worth notic-ing in Table IV. Firstly, total produc-tion has recovered. The production ofprawns in northern Java in 1986 sur-passed the 1980 level and that inMalacca Strait was just a little belowthe 1980 catch. Secondly, the in-

crease in total production is primari-ly due to an im-pressive increase inproduction from Kalimantan whichregistered a more than 30 percent in-crease in output between 1980 and1986. This in-crease is perhapsbecause of an in-crease in fishing ef-fort following mig-ration of fishermeninto these areas (See MOA, DGF &ADB 1988). Thirdly, the total produc-tion in Molluccas-Irian Jaya seems tobe declining — though the productionin these areas is attributed to trawlers– giving credence to the fear of over-fishing in Arafura sea which is thepreserve of joint-venture companieswith Japan.

Considering the fact that all theseprawns are harvested by non-trawlfishermen, it is quite significant thatgear with low efficiency (just 20 per-cent of the trawl gear’s productivity)are able to harvest commerciallyvaluable species in all the areaswhere trawling is banned.

During the period 1980-86 therewas a discernible increase in themotorization of traditional crafts andin the population of boats with inboardmotors. The total number of OBMs in-creased by 130 percent and IBMsmore than doubled. In the lattercategory the craft belonging to the<5 GT category increased by 150percent between 1980 and 1986 ex-hibiting the highest rate of growth.

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Most of these vessels (belonging toboth categories) are operating fromMalacca Straits and northern Java,which as we have mentioned in thebeginning, are the most importantfishing grounds in Indonesia with thelargest concentration of fisher peo-ple’s population. The total number ofshrimp gill-nets (including trammel-nets) also doubled between 1980 and1986 (See table V).

The increase in outboardmotorization, inboard engine-poweredvessels and shrimp gill-nets need notnecessarily be a consequence of theban on trawling though the ban musthave provided a definite incentive formoving in this direction. This is

because, even in the years prior tothe ban these variable were show-ing an increase in numbers (Seetable V).

The higher incidence of motorisa-tion and the increase in shrimp gill-nets after the trawl-ban only indicatethe restructuring of fishing effortresulting in the availability of viableopportunities for relatively less effi-cient gear. But this does not presumethat the cake is redistributed in favourof poorer fishermen. What is perhapshappening in all likelihood is that thebalance of power within the fishingsector (in the coastal region) is acquir-ing a new form with the owners ofmotorized boats becoming the domi-


Table VTotal Number of Inboard &

Outboard Motors and Shrimp Gill-Nets

1976 1980 1986

No. of OBMs 8,000 27,000 63,000

No.of IBMs<5 GT 5,000 11,000 28,000<5<30 4,000 7,000 8,000>30<100 200 300 400>100 100 100 100

Total 17,300 45,400 99,500

Shrimp Gill-Nets(including trammel-nets) 17,000 25,000 50,000

Source: Annual Fisheries Statistics, DGF, Indonesia.

nant force and the large number ofunmotorized fishermen (over 70 per-cent of fishing craft in Indonesia arestill unmotorized) remaining thedeprived class. All the studies doneso far on the trawl ban tend to hidethe differentiation within the non-trawl/non-purse-seine sector and donot throw any light on the emergenceof new contradic-tions within thissector.

Since the ownership of craft andgear is highly skewed in Indonesia(from personal discussions), even anincrease in total number of outboardmotors is not a sufficient indicator ofan increase in the welfare of sub-sistence fishermen. In the light of thepresent ownership pattern, a declinein the total number of dugout boats(the predominant fishing craft in In-donesia) does not imply that moresubsistence fishermen are acquiringoutboard engines. Contrarily, it is like-ly to indicate that more fishermen arebecoming dispossessed of craft andgear and becoming wage-earners. InBakassi fish landing center, Jakarta,for example, I came across a largenumber of trammel-net operators whoare actually employed by absenteeowners from the eastern side of Java.But the value of labour share has ap-preciated in the trammel-net sectorbecause of prawns. However, the ac-tual picture is not very clear because

the season for prawn in mainly for fourmonths in a year (Dec - Mar). Thetrammel-net fishermen tend to con-centrate on trammel-net operationseven in off seasons without attemp-ting a judicious shift to other gear.There is no idea about the opportunitycost of fishing effort in the leanmonths.

The picture that emerges fromnumerous discussions I had with per-sons working in the field of fisheriesis that the trawling ban has not reallybenefited the vast majority of sub-sistence fishermen though it hasbenefited the trammel-net operators.In other words, we can say that afterthe ban trammel-net operators havecome to be relatively better-off com-pared to other traditional gearoperators. I was told a few successstories of how some owners havebecome very rich after the impositionof the ban. A few have amassed somuch wealth that they have movedout of fishing into cultivation of clovesin the plantation sector, for example.But the general tendency apparentlyis to continue in fisheries by becom-ing absentee owners of the fishingunits.

What was the fate of the creditprogramme under BIMAS for thetraditional shrimp fishing with gearother than trawls? RP 22 billion wasoriginally to be provided according to

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the P.D. No.29/80 but only 40 percentof this was actually spent (in 1982-83).This programme was also droppedbecause of poor repayment. As on 1Aug 1988 the total repaymentamounted to only 10 percent of theoutstanding loan (BRI sources).

On the whole, as Chong, Kee-Chai (op.cit.) have observed, in theirtongue-in-cheek paper, «the small-scale fishermen have only benefitedmarginally if at all». Perhaps the peo-ple who benefited most from the banare the local traders who procureprawns for the domestic and interna-tional markets. Since the total numberof landing centers increased as aresult of widely dispersed use oftrammel-nets all over western In-donesia, procure-ment seems to havebecome less competitive and morerewarding for the traders.

Impact on resources

Even if we concede for conve-nience that the trawl ban has led tothe recovery of resources in theMalacca Straits and northern Java, isbanning of excessive effort anecessary and sufficient condition toensure their sustainability? As theMOA, DGF, ADB study (1988)Observes

«Although the banning of trawlerswest of the 120 degrees E line oflongitude gave a temporary respite tosome fish supplies available toartisanal fishermen, the relief wastemporary. The continuing environ-mental abuse of esturial food chainsystems and the use of small meshand other unauthorized gear con-tinue to reduce supplies available».

Moreover, inherent contradictionsin government policies also tend toundermine the resource-base, par-ticularly that of prawns. Though thecredit programme initiated underBIMAS was presumably for therehabilitation of the ex-trawlers, as wementioned before, the focus wasmainly on aquaculture to promoteprawns production. Even otherwise,the provincial governments in In-donesia are blatantly opening upmangrove forests for converting intotambaks (brackish culture ponds) togrow more prawn, particularly blacktiger, which fetches the highest pricein the international market. The rapidexpansion and intensification ofprawn culture has led to increasedharvesting of fry and gravid femalesfor the culture-farms. Thus, for exam-ple, the collection of fry in Java in-creased from a mere 3,000 (in no.) in1980 to 80,000 in 1986 (AnnualFisheries Statistics DGF). To quotefrom the MOA, DGF, ADB study (ibid.)which clearly establishes the link bet-


tween marine production andaquaculture:

«The rapid development of black tigershrimp production has meant anequally accelerated effort to acquiregravid females from the wild for hat-chery spawning and egg supply. Anew set of acquiring and distributingorganizations have developed tosearch out and market these femalesby the hundreds of thousands.Although some regions still have areasonable volume and are able tosupply other parts of the country somemarine stocks have had their gravidfemale population heavily harvested.

The advancement of tambak develop-ment for black tiger shrimp export hasthus deprived the marine resource ofa critical share of its breeding stock.Both the removal of the mangrove andthe capture of gravid females willreduce the natural populations of allshrimp, and specifically the naturalpopulations of tiger shrimp».

The consequences of over-exploitation of gravid females havenot yet started showing up in themarine production figures of prawns.However, it is only a matter of timebefore they surface.

Although sustainability of theresource base is an important re-quisite for the subsistence offishermen, especially the unmotoris-

ed ones who are more dependent onthe coastal waters, no efforts havebeen made to ensure its protectionfrom conflicting user-groups. Regula-tion of access to resources like thetrawl ban for example, would betranslated into positive results in thelong run only if complementarymeasures are taken to protectwetland areas needed for fish andcrustacean breeding grounds. This inturn is further related to the natureand intensity of economic activities inthe upstream regions.

Thus, as Yamamoto (op. cit.)points out, the main reason for thenarrowing of the fishery inBagansiapi-api, leading to forcedmigration of trawlers into northernJava, was the large discharge of mudinto the sea following heavy loggingalong the coast of Rokan river inSumatra. As the MOA, GF, ADB(op. cit) study points out, there is in-creasing pressure on coastalresources in densely populated areaslike Java from expansion of urbanareas, forestry practices in theupstream regions (1), industrialisa-tion, modern methods of agriculture,intensification of aquaculture etc. thatare all affecting both the quality andquantity of discharges from rivers andthe quality of the coastal waters.

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(1) « Deforestation will affect the coastal fisheries more slowly, but may ultimately be a more serious threat to the livelihoodof Indonesian fishermen, particularly small-scale fishermen forced to operate near land» (ibid).

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Although there is a ban on conversionof mangroves in the 200 metregreenbelt, it is not being observed(ibid.). Unless there is an integratedsystem for management thatminimises conflicts between differentuser-groups of coastal resources, thelong-term interests of the subsistencefishermen will be jeopardised ir-respective of the ban on trawling.

At the level of management ofresources and development of small-scale fishermen, we have tried toshow how two of the main objectivesof the trawling ban have not beensuccessful. Our perusal of the creditpolicy of the government also revealsits bias towards aquaculture. Thepriorities of the government are stillin the old groove of enhancement ofproduction for the export market,reflected in the excessive importanceattached to the development oftuna/skipjack fishery recently in In-donesia. Moreover, as we have men-tioned elsewhere only 4 per cent of thetotal expenditure of the Departmentof Fisheries is meant for resourcemanagement. Though the ban couldhave been a very good beginning forthe development of an integratedresource management system,

nothing has happened after its im-position in the early-80s.

At the same time, it is really doubt-ful whether the ban was really intend-ed to serve any management purposebecause according to well-placedsources in the Fisheries Department,there was never any suggestion fromtheir department for the impositionof the ban. (1) The department wasmainly in favour of proper enforce-ment of the zoning system, which theyhad devised. The ban was a unilateraldecision of the President of Indonesiaand it the first Presidential interven-tion in Indonesian fisheries.

Contrary to what Bailey et al con-tend that «prior to Presidential Decree39, President Soeharto consulted withthe government’s fisheries policymakers and scientists» and «theylargely sup-ported the imposition of atrawl ban» (Bailey et al op. cit.), suchconsulta-tions do not seem to havetaken place. Apparently, there weredis-cussions only with the leaders ofthe All Indonesian Fishermen’sOrganisa-tion (HNSI), a constituent ofthe ruling GOLKAR (2) under thetutelage of President Soeharto. Afterthe imposition of the ban, the Depart-


(1) Interestingly and understandably, the fisheries officials and researchers revealed this information only when I askedthem specifically whether it was they who made the suggestion to ban trawling to the President!(2) «GOLKAR is an agglomeration of bodies representing at present over 2,000 occupational groupings ranging fromcivil servants and security personnel to women and fishermen». Its main function is to support government policies(See Thoolen, H. 1987).

ment of Fisheries was caught in apeculiar situation of having to defendthe parenthood of a child who was nottheirs! Hence the tongue-in-cheeknature of their studies on the ban.Moreover, because of the uniquepolitical atmosphere in Indonesiathere is a certain hesitation to call aspade a spade. I do not know to whatextent it is true, but according to oneof my sources, the then DirectorGeneral of Fisheries Mr. Sardjono losthis job because he showed the‘audacity’ to defend the trawlers!

The motive behind the ban

If we look at macro indicators itcan be seen that fisheries do not forma significant source of Indonesia’s ex-port earnings. They accounted for on-ly 1.3 percent of total Indonesianexports in 1985 and 4.3 percent ofnon-petroleum exports. Its share isbound to have been lower in 1981when the ban was imposed. Thus,although in absolute terms the coun-try had to forego an annual averageearnings of about US$ 200 million

from 1981 to 1983, this may not havebeen substantial considering the ac-tive oil market in the early 1980s (1).Perhaps an intended economic objec-tive for the ban was to redirect scarcecapital from over-exploited shrimpresource grounds in certain areas togrossly under-exploited tuna/skipjackfisheries and tambak production ofprawns.

But a plausible objective of theban is the resolution of physical con-flicts between trawlers and gill-netfisheries which were exacerbatingfrom the mind 1970s leading todestruction of property, bloodshedand loss of lives. The governmentmust have realized that the price interms of export exchange earningsforegone is worthwhile, consideringthe social, economic and politicalprice they would have had to payotherwise.

The government seemed to havehad an overt and a covert motive forbanning trawling. Thus, according toHNSI, the legitimate mouthpiece ofIndonesian fishermen (particularly ofthe non-Chinese fishermen)maintenance of law and order in the

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(1) The losses suffered by the government have always been much more in terms of illegal exports and transfer pric-ing. As the MOA, DGF, ADB study (1988) contends «The bulk (of shrimp exports) is transferred at sea and transporteddirectly to the Japanese market. Sets of Indonesian data on harvest and export of marine shrimp differ considerablyfrom each other and from Japanese import data». Secondly, the f. o. b prices to Singapore (which accounts for 11percent of Indonesian shrimp exports) are generally reported as only half of what they actually are. And thirdly, thereare losses resulting from the re-export of Indonesian-processed shrimp from Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore.

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archipelagic water is of paramountimportance in Indonesia. Thefishermen, according to the rulingGOLKAR, have to provide the effec-tive communication-links bet-weenislands. Since the process of in-tegrating all Indonesians into one na-tionality is still in progress, the watersseparating these six thousand andodd inhabited islands (out of 13,700)have to be kept peaceful. Moreover,according to HNSI, the Govt. of In-donesia is trying to revoke the Dutchcolonial policy, which tried to keep theislands separate from each other toexercise easy control. But the con-cept of nationality is still in its nascentstage for most Indonesians (1).Regarding this objective, the govern-ment was completely successful andthere are no more stories of violencein the sea after the declaration of theban.

The following section will discussthe covert motive behind the ban.Although the «political» aspect hasbeen mentioned, its importance vis-à-vis other objectives has not beenhighlighted. Most of the writing on theban is in the form of rhetoric to pro-vide a semblance of «scientificity» tothe decision. Moreover, the ethnic

dimension to the entire conflict hasnot been discussed except for a pass-ing mention (Chong, Chee-Chai op.cit.). This section is based on discus-sions with the leaders of All IndonesiaFishermen Organisation (HNSI),political activists, scientists andbureaucrats and field workers of theFAO Extension Programme.

The political factor

As anybody in the office of theDirector General of Fisheries or forthat matter, any scientist involved inresearch on demersal fisheries will tellyou, the ban is a « political» deci-sion. Even the then Director Generalof Fisheries called it a «political deci-sion» (Sardjono, l. 1980). The implica-tion of the word «political» is thecovert objective of the ban.

As we have mentioned in thebeginning, trawling was introducedfor the first time in Indonesia by theChinese entrepreneurs. Even in thelater period almost all the trawlers inoperation were of the ‘Cung-King’type and built in Sumatra. Even todaynot only in trawl fishing, but in the


(1) «Depending on to whom he is speaking, an Indonesian will identify himself usually first by his village, then hisethnic group, and lastly when meeting a foreigner, his country..…the view that an Indonesian takes of his country isaffected by the place of his ethnic group in the scheme of things. There are some 300 such groups, differingconsiderably in size» (Palmier, L 1985).

entire range of medium and largelarge scale operations, the people ofChinese ethnic origin control thefishery sector. This is so in the caseof aquaculture too. Their involvementis rather fully inte-grated: the entiregamut of produc-tion, processing andmarketing is controlled. According toone of my sources, their involvementis near total in Sumatra and Kaliman-tan and about fifty percent in theisland of Java. In the traditional sec-tor too, the Chinese are controllingthe markets for fishing/ processingaccessories, product and credit. Thusone can say that they control the en-tire fishing industry of Indonesia.Their operations are generallyresented and considered to be highlyexploitative in character.

The resentment within the fishingcommunity, particularly of fishermennative in origin, against the Chinesehas also a broader backdrop in theIndonesian economy. The Chinese(called ‘peranakans’) though believ-ed to number only about 4 million outof a total population of 155 million ofso (1), control a major share ofdomestic capital in Indonesia.Perhaps because of their wealth andtheir attempts to maintain their owndistinct identity, the Chinese are wide-ly disliked by the Pribomi

(autochthonous Indonesians). This isin spite of the government’s attemptsto assimilate the Chinese into the ma-jority culture through various means.As Palmier observes (1985):

«All this forced homogeneity does notso far seem to make much differenceto the dislike in which the Chinese areheld».

But one should also stress thepoint that the native dislike is directedmore against the Chinese capitaliststhan against the peasants andworkers of Chinese origin.

The decision taken to ban trawl-ing is inextricably linked with thepolitical atmosphere prevailing in In-donesia after Soeharto became thePresident in 1968. Two factors arerelevant in the political milieu: firstly,the resentment among zealotMuslims, in Indonesia not beingdeclared as an Islamic state (SeePalmier, L. ibid.; May, B. op. cit.) andsecondly, the anti-Chinese feelingsin the mainstream society. Since thebusiness involvements of Soehartoand his circle with Chinese Cukongs(financiers) are well established (SeeMay. B op. cit.) and his apathytowards making Indonesia into anIslamic state is well known, the

36


(1) «No account has been taken of ethnic origin since the 1930 census» (Palmier. L ibid.).

37

resentment of political Muslims is alsodirected against Soeharto.

The conflicts that broke out onthe fisheries front got the support ofMuslim leaders and it was largelyaimed at the Chinese. These conflictsshould be seen as a protraction ofethnic riots within the mainstreamsociety and these riots were increas-ing in frequency in the 1970s. Therewas a particularly bad anti-Chineseriot in Bandung, Western Java in1973. According to some of mysources, more and more people fromthe non-fishing community were join-ing the struggle against trawlersmainly because of ethnic reasonsand by the late-1970s it was threaten-ing to acquire extremely grave dimen-sions. The Muslim zealots were alsotrying to use the issue to chastiseSoeharto for his alleged support toChinese capitalists.

The ban was a useful piece ofstrategy to gain political capital on theeve of 1982 elections with intrestingramifications. On the one hand,Soeharto could portray himself as atrue friend of the Pribomi and thepoor: to the extent the decision wasaimed at (or affected) the Chineseowners it was pro-Pribomi; and to theextent it benefited the traditionalfishermen it was pro-poor. Thus, inone shot the P.D. could be portrayedas a vehicle of his concern for the

Pribomi as well as the impoverished.This aspect of the ban must havesilenced his Muslim critics to someextent.

But it is interesting to observethat although the P.D. ‘affected’ theChinese owners of trawlers, it endedup greatly benefiting the Chinesecommunity as a whole. How did thishappen?

The most crucial benefit of theban was that the President preventedthe inter-gear conflicts from acquiringlarger dimensions at a time when theconflicts were threatening to ag-gravate racial tension. This, perhaps,would have led to nation-wide ethnicriots and would have been disastrousfor the Chinese community becauseof their stake in the economy. Theban contributed towards the dilutionof a major threat to their investmentsin Indonesia although it restrictedtheir involve-ment in trawling. Butcompared to the quantum ofdomestic capital they control, the pro-portion tied up in trawling was in-significant. Moreover, trawling wasone among many avenues of invest-ment: the ‘losses’ resulting from theban would have been insignificantcompared to the benefits they obtain-ed in the form of «protection» to theirlarger invest-ment in the rest of theeconomy.


Considering the nexus betweenthe New Order and the Chinesecapitalists (May, B. op. cit.; Palmier,L. op. cit.), the large benefits at thecommunity level could not have justbeen incidental. (1) Thus, through aclever decision President Soehartobecame at once a friend of Pribomi,of the poor and of the Chinese withoutthreatening to upset the wellestablished equation of power in theeconomy.

Conclusion

Indonesia is the only country inthe world where trawling is proscrib-ed in all areas where there is apreponderance of traditional fishermen. Not only is it the largestarea-closure of trawl fishery, it alsohas in place the longest uninterruptedban in the world. Thus, in waters westof 120 degrees E longitude trawlinghas been prohibited for the past nineyears and it is unlikely to be lifted inthe near future.

Though the professed objectives

are facilitation of better managementof resources, development of thetraditional sector and prevention ofopen conflicts, only the last one hasbeen seriously adhered to.

Although the trawling ban is agood beginning it has not led to fur-ther development in, or initiativetowards better fisheries management.In the Arafura sea, for example, inspite of signs of overfishing ofprawns, no worthwhile measureshave been adopted for the conserva-tion of prawn resources. ManyJapanese trawlers are in the processof winding up their activity becauseof high costs of operation arising fromlower production. Also no attemptwas made to provide base-line infor-mation before the ban was imposed.

Other than the ban, precious lit-tle has been done to reorganize thefishery for sustainable harvesting ofresources. Destruction of mangroves,removal of gravid females of prawnsfor aquaculture, pollution and conflic-ting interests of various sectors areseriously jeopardising the conserva-tion of resources in Indonesia. This,in the long run, will have a serious

38


(1) As Palmier, L observes,«Some of their richest entrepreneurs are in close concert with prominent figures in the New Order. As a group, theChinese have undoubtedly benefited considerably from the measures of economic development taken by thegovernment» (Palmier, L op. cit.).As May observes,«the ruling junta of today use selected Chinese and the Chinese use them to accumulate wealth» (May, B op. cit.).

39

bearing on the development of tradi-tional fishermen.

The positive contributions of theban are: the government could put anend to the bloody conflicts in the sea;the traditional fishermen could suc-cessfully replace trawling gear withtrammel-nets and produce as muchof prawns as was caught before theban. As a result at least some of thetraditional fishermen are now earningmore. The ban also provided a jolt inthe arm for the gill-net fishermenleading to rapid increase in motorisa-tion and the expansion of gearbase.However there is no information ondistributional justice within the tradi-tional sector, considering the highlyskewed ownership pattern of fishingunits in Indonesia.

More than the welfare of thefishermen or conservation ofresources the motive behind the banwas explicitly political because of thecomplexity of ethnic factors and thepower structure in Indonesia. Con-sciously or unconsciously, various at-tempts have been made toerroneously highlight the ban as aprogressive and bold step towardsresource conservation without at-tempting an explanation of themotives (and under currents) behindthe decision. The ban is fishery-related only to the extent of mitigationof open conflicts. In terms of other ob-jectives, precious little has been at-tempted or achieved. If not for thesensitive nature of ethnic-politics,perhaps this decision would not havebeen taken by President Soeharto.


40


41

With a coastline of over 1900 kmsPeninsular Malaysia produced

about 700,000 tonnes of fish in 1987.About 53 percent of this was con-tributed by trawlers, 22 percent bypurse-seiners and over 25 percenttraditional fisheries. Thus in Malaysiathe contribution of the commercialsector (which includes only trawlersand purse-seiners) is significantlymuch higher than that of the tradi-tional sector (which include all othergear). After Thailand, this is thecountry in the Southeast Asian regionwith the smallest contribution from thesmall-scale sector in marine fisheries.

The fisheries sector contributesto about 2.3 percent of GDP, accountsfor 11 percent of total agricultural andforestry production and is second onlyto the Philippines in these respects(1986 figures). It is one of the sourcesof employment for the rural popula-tion, employing less than 2 percent of

the total labour force in 1986. Thesector contributes to a little less than1.0 percent of total foreign exchangeearnings (SEAFDEC 1986).

Fish constitutes about two-thirdsof the animal protein supply and a lit-tle more than 50 percent of the totalprotein supply in the country.

Malaysia has the highest propor-tion of motorized fishing craft in theSoutheast Asian region. Of the22,000 vessels, only 4 percent thenon-powered.

Unlike many of the Asian coun-tries, Malaysia has a history ofgradual development of fishingtechnology. In the first two decadesof the twentieth century, fishingstakes were the most common fishinggear. With the introduction of restric-tions on their use by the British,purse-seine — introduced into Malayain the late nineteenth century by a


M A L A Y S I A

group of Chinese from Pakhoi inSouth China — became morepopular, particularly so from the ear-ly 1930s. This was also influenced bythe removal of duties on salted fish(Ling, Y.C. 1976). Purse-seine fisheryfurther developed in the same decadebecause of political developmentsresulting from the Sino-Japanesewar (1). Mechanization was also in-troduced around the same time in agradual manner. Synthetic materialsfor fishing gear were introduced in the1950s (Shari. l. 1985). Finally, in themid 1960s trawling was introduced onthe west coast of Malaysia fromThailand. This was in Pangkor byconverting purse-seine boats intotrawlers.

As Shari points out (ibid.), thedevelopment of fisheries technology,particularly that of trawling and purseseining, is the result of thefishermen’s own initiative. This wasadequately supported by the govern-ment through the development of in-frastructure, improvement inproductive capacity of small-scalefishermen, institutional improvementin pricing and marketing facilities,marine fisheries research etc.However, this support was primarily

directed towards ethnic Malayfishermen to the east coast.

The advent of trawling

The introduction of purse-seiningdid not lead to any significant conflict.But trawling sailed into rough watersfrom the very year it was introduced.This is quite unique because in mostof the countries where conflicts aroseas a result of trawling there was atime lag between its introduction andthe emergence of conflicts. The non-trawl, small-scale fishermen reactedviolently to trawling, «charging that itwas destroying their gear and woulddeplete their fishing grounds» (Gib-bons, D, 1976). The Governmentpostponed its decision to licensetrawlers and undertook a pilot studyon the economic viability of trawlingin waters beyond 12 miles from shoreand more than 20 fathoms deep, i.e.,away from the traditional fishinggrounds (Gibbons. Ibid.).

In late 1965 the governmentdecided to license trawlers throughco-operative trawling societies whilesubjecting trawling to strict regula-tions. These regulations were design-

42


(1) The fresh fish market in the 1920-30 period was dominated by the Japanese fishermen operating more ami (breamnet) resulting in local purse-seine fishermen unable to make any dent into their market share. However, with the Sino-Japanese war in the Far East, the local Chinese were reluctant to buy fish supplied by the Japanese. «There was adefinite bias against Japanese fishermen because prices for fish landed by local fishermen improved during that year,while the prices for fish landed by the Japanese fishermen fell» (ibid). The Japanese fishermen were also deniedlicences to fish by the British authorities.

43

ed to ensure conservation of fisheryresources and to improve the securi-ty atmosphere. As a result, licencesfor trawling would be issued onlythrough registered co-operatives toboats of and above 50 tonnes capaci-ty and fishing beyond 12 miles fromthe shore. These cooperatives, con-verted from existing autonomous(largely Chinese) co-operatives werealso asked to ensure the participationof traditional fishermen, particularlyMalay fishermen.

This programme did not have thedesired impact because manyfishermen continued to practiseunlicensed trawling, particularly atnight, leading to the destruction of in-shore gear like bag-nets (pompang)and drift-nets (hanyut) (Gibbons, D.ibid). Enforcement was very weaklargely due to inadequate enforce-ment capacity and corruption of theofficials concerned. In addition, therewere loopholes in the law and thefines were low.

The operation of trawlers alsodirectly clashed with the catch poten-tial of a traditional gear called pukatpayang (boat –seine), thus adding tothe animosity of traditional fishermenagainst trawlers. With the introductionof trawling, the catch of this gear issaid to have dropped off dramatically.

The discontent and anger of tradi-

tional fishermen were precipitated byan incident in late 1965 when an il-legal trawler rammed into an inshoreboat leading to the destruction of theboat and drowning of the crew. In-shore fishermen attacked a trawler inthe same area, murdering eight of thecrew and burning the boat. InDecember 1966 about 1,000 inshoreboats rallied to Weld Quay (Penang)with the objective of burning the of-fice of the George Town Co-operativeTrawling Society. They were dissuad-ed by the police.

In the meantime, the inshorefishermen formed a pressure-group,the United Fishermen’s Organisationof West Malaysia (UFOWM), in early1964 to air their grievances to thegovernment, to mobilise public opi-nion in their support and to providecompensation for members whosegear had been destroyed by trawlers.It had branches in twenty six inshorefishing villages on the west-coast.

Government’s responseto trawling

Ironically enough, in spite of allthe objections raised by the inshorefishermen and the open conflicts inthe sea leading to destruction of pro-perty and loss of life in the early 1970sthe government reduced the restric-


tion of trawling, increased thenumber of licences available for ex-isting co-operatives and issuedlicenes to new co-operatives inPenang and Kedah. The regulationon trawling and related procedureswere relaxed in three respects: thesize of boat, fishing area and fishingtime. The minimum tonnage of 50was relaxed to include both mediumsized trawlers (25-30 tonnes) and minitrawlers (< 10 GT). The minimum 12mile limit was relaxed to 3 miles. Azoning arrangement was introduceddividing the trawlable grounds amongthe trawlers according to horsepower. Thus, trawlers with engines of60 HP and above had to fish in waterbeyond 12 miles; with 25 HP to 60 HPin water beyond 7 miles and thosewith engines less than 25 HP had tofish beyond 3 miles. The fishing timewas extended for those with 50 GTand below from the diurnal hours totwenty four hours on all days exceptSundays (Gibbons, ibid.).

The relaxation in governmentpolicy vis-à-vis trawling waspresumably for facilitating the switch-over by inshore fishermen to trawlingwith the idea of eliminating conflicts.However, the participation of tradi-tional fishermen remained insignifi-cant because there was nogovernment programme to finance orsubsidize the purchase of trawler

boats. The traditional fishermen werealso very reluctant to become crew-members of trawlers because of fearof social sanctions from their fellowvillagers. In addition, the incomesfrom trawlers (for the crew) were notsignificantly better than that fromtraditional gear (Gibbons, D. ibid.). As a result, the trawler owners — whoare mostly Chinese — drew labourfrom non-fishermen, mostly from theChinese community leading to achange in the ethnic composition offishermen. The proportion offishermen who were Chinese increas-ed from 33 percent in 1959 to 43 per-cent in 1972. Thus, the governmentpolicy to ensure better participation ofinshore fishermen, particularly Malaysin trawling was a gross failure. AsGibbons observes,

«Only a minority of traditionalfishermen are participating in trawlingand most of the economic surplusgenerated by this more productivegear has been extracted by formernon-fishermen, especially business-men, who have provided the capital tofinance trawling» (Gibbons, D. ibid.).

Similarly, enforcement of fishingregulations through the co-operativewas also a failure. Contrary to the ob-jective, the co-operatives seem tohave encouraged the trawlers toviolate the zoning arrangementbecause they were entitled for a 5

44


45

percent commission from the catch.

The co-operatives, the vehicle ofgovernment policies, were not abovethe structural limitation of the Malayaneconomy and society. Gibbonsobserves that these co-operatives are‘not co-operatives at all in any mean-ingful sense of the word’, they are«cartels» (ibid.) of local political andeconomic elites. He further observesquite sharply:

«Manipulation of trawler co-operativesby local elites for their own short-termbenefit... has been a major reason forthe ineffectiveness of these societiesin goal attainment. Control of thesecooperatives by local political andeconomic elites was made likely by thedecision to open up membership tonon-fishermen, i.e., local political andeconomic entrepreneurs and boatowners. Such people were likely to beelected to the committee... The chair-man and/or secretary would be localUMNO leaders, often the chairmanand secretary of the local UMNOBranch; the treasurer, a Chinesebusinessman, either a supplier of oiland/or ice to the society or a boatowner and fish dealer; and the rest ofthe committee would contain otherlocal Malay notables often connectedwith UMNO… Absent from the commit-tee or present in very small numberswould be active fishermen…» (Gib-bons, D. ibid.)

The appropriation of co-operativesby vested interests, political in-

terference in the issue of trawlinglicences and the difference of en-forcement officials resulted in theworsening of conflicts in the 1970s.These became very violent andbloody.

As Teik, Goh Cheng observes:

«Between 1964 and 1976, a total of113 incidents involving 437 trawlersand 987 inshore vessels was record-ed for the whole of west Malaysia. 45vessels were destroyed; 62 vesselssunk and 34 lives lost.» (Teik, G.C.1976)

The response of the governmentto the intensification of conflicts in theearly 1970s is intriguing. In 1974Fisheries (Maritime) (Amendment)Regulations, 1974 was legislated.These regulations further liberalisedthe terms and conditions of license fortrawling. The inshore watersdesignated for the traditionalfishermen remained the same. Butthe horsepower specifications for allthe zones were relaxed. Thus boatsof 60 HP and below could beoperated in waters beyond 3 milesprovided they were below 25 GT andvessels with 60 HP to 200 HP (25GT-100 GT) in waters beyond 7 miles.And those with an HP of more than200 (and 100 GT) in waters beyond12 miles.

There was a further relaxation


for trawlers operating from the eastcoast. Between November and March(the fishing season), trawlers irrespec-tive of size could operate at anydistance from the east coast.

However, the new licensing policydid not have any uniformity acrossstates. Since the maximum numberof licences that can be issued was notspecified, the respective states issuedas many according to their discretion.The conflict was further worsened bythe new legislation which resulted inthe rapid fleet expansion of «mini»trawlers, (trawlers below 20 GT, butmostly below 10 GT). Enforcementcontinued to be very weak. In Perak,for example, there was only one boatto undertake enforcement. TheFisheries Department had to fre-quently resort to assistance frommarine police.

Conflict management

A concerted effort was made toalleviate conflicts through theFisheries (Amendment) Regulation of1980 which restructured the existingzoning system. In addition, a newlicensing policy called Fisheries com-prehensive Licensing policy (FCLP)was introduced to limit the fishing ef-fort (Abu Bakar H.S. & Looi, Ch’ngkim 1987).

According to the new zoning ar-rangement, the existing reservation ofinshore waters up to three miles fortraditional fishermen was further ex-tended to 5 miles for ‘artisanal,owner-operated vessels’ (Yahaya, J.1988). However, the horse powerspecification was removed and thedesignation of zones was made ac-cording to gross tonnage of thevessel. Thus, trawlers and purse-seiners below 40 GT and owner-operated are assigned 5-12 mileszone; those above 40 GT, whollyowned and operated by Malaysianfishermen, the 12-30 miles zone andthose vessels above 70 GT underjoint venture or foreign ownership,waters beyond 30 miles.

The zones 5-12 miles and 12-30miles were specifically reserved fortrawlers and purse-seiners butbeyond 30 miles any vessel couldoperate.

The new arrangement thusallocates fishing grounds accordingto fishing gear, size of vessel andownership status now.

In addition to the zoning arrange-ment and license limitation, mesh sizeregulations for the cod end of trawl-nets were extended from 1 inch to 1.5inches and beam trawlers were strict-ly prohibited. The issue of additionallicences for trawlers within 12 miles

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47

was frozen.

Finally, with the adoption ofMalaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone,Parliament enacted the Fisheries Actof 1985. In addition to imposing heavyfines on poaching vessels fromabroad, the Act also enhanced thefine on local trawlers and purse-seiners encroaching into prohibitedwaters. It was raised from $ 1000(Malaysia) to $ 50,000 and/or twoyears of imprisonment. The enforce-ment officers were also given vastpowers. The main objective of the Actaccording to the then AgriculturalMinister Anwer Ibrahim is ‘to protectinshore fishermen who have beencomplaining of irresponsiblefishermen trespassing into theirfishing grounds’ (Star 24.4.1985).

Fishing legislation:an analysis

The fishing regulations during thecolonial times were framed with theidea of resource conservation, as itwas in the case of almost all the Asiancountries. These regulations dateback to restrictions on various typesof fishing stakes (1909-1916 and thegradual prohibition of the mostdestructive types in Perak in the ear-ly 1920s (World Bank 1983). Thelegislation was in the form of or-

dinances, enactments or orders-in-council. A unified system of regula-tion was introduced in 1923 to co-ordinate and control fishing activitiesfor the whole country.

After the independence ofMalaysia in 1957, a new Fisheries Actof 1963 was introduced with the ob-jectives:

«to conserve a natural resource; to ra-tionalise its utilisation of exploitation,to safeguard the interests offishermen, to administer fishing activi-ty by preventing or settling anydisputes among fishermen, pricesetc.» (Notes on the Fisheries Act(F.M. 8 of 1963)).

The act also delineated fisheriesinto federal or state concerns ongeographical basis. Accordingly,maritime and estuarine fisheriesbecame the Federal responsibilityand riverine fisheries, the State’sresponsibility.

From the objective of the Act itis clear that conflict management wasone of the important objectives. TheAct also stressed the fact that

«the question of legislation couldnever be separated from that ofobservance and enforcement…»

However, in this respect theMalaysian Fisheries Department hasnot yet been fully successful.


The role of regulation inameliorating conflicts was furtherreiterated when the Fisheries Com-prehensive Licensing Policy (FCLP)was introduced. This underlies thecurrent programme of fisheriesmanagement in Malaysia. The objec-tives of FCLP included among othersthe following:1. Elimination of competition and con-

flict between traditional and trawlerfishermen in the inshore water;

2. Prevention of over-exploitation ofthe resources in the inshore watersand,

3. Equitable distribution of resources(Abu Baker, H.S. & Looi C.K. op.cit.).

Thus, right from 1963 the govern-ment had taken cognizance of con-flicts in the fisheries sector and eversince trawling was introduced, effortswere made to contain them. Even thedefinition of traditional and commer-cial sector is according to the percep-tion of disputes. Thus, commercialsector includes all trawlers and purse-seiners (irrespec-tive of craft size andgear, horse power and fishingground) and the traditional sector allother gear. According to this defini-tion, many of the capital- intensivegear like drift-nets, bobu traps, etc.are considered to be traditional.

In the Asian region, after Japanthis is perhaps the first country whereacute conflicts arose in the sea afterthe introduction of a more efficientgear like trawling. And in the historyof world fisheries this is perhaps themost bloody conflict claimingnumerous lives. For a period ofalmost fifteen years from 1965, therewere frequent clashes, destruction offishing craft and loss of lives.

The trawlers are mostly owned bythe Chinese who are mostly fishdealers and/or businessmen and whodo not go to the sea (called towkays).(1) However, the conflicts cannot becharacterized as an ethnic conflictbecause many traditional Chinesefishermen are also involved in thefights with trawlers. According to Mr.Cheah Eng Kean, formerly the Headof Planning and Development Divi-sion, Fisheries Department, in one in-cident, 33 Chinese trawler workerswere killed in Perak by the traditionalChinese fishermen from that region.At the same time, it cannot be saidthat ethnic factors have not playedany role in the tensions. Like in In-donesia, in Malaysia too there issocial tension between the Chineseand the indigenous groups. There areanti-Chinese feelings among thetraditional fishermen, but at the same

48


(1) According to a survey conducted by Gibbons (1976) more than 90 percent of trawler owners inKedah and Penang states were of Chinese origin.

49

time these are directed more againstthe absentee-owners of trawlers thanagainst small fishermen from theChinese community. Expectedly, inall the conflicts, none of the towkayslost their lives. Only trawler workerswere killed.

Enforcement of fisheriesregulations

The violation of inshore watersand destruction of fishing gear stillcontinue (though of low frequency) inthe west coast in spite of beefing upof enforcement and more com-prehensive management policies.These are caused by pair trawlersmostly below 10 GT, popularly knownas «Apollo» boats. However, the in-tensity of conflicts has been reducingover time in the 1980s. There are nowno open conflicts, no destruction ofboats and no loss of lives. Protest isexpressed through demonstrationsand petitions. Can the de-escalationof violence be attributed to improve-ment in enforcement?

Malaysia has a relatively longhistory of legislation for the purposeof eliminating conflicts (and theirviolation by fishermen!). The inade-quacies of enforcement have beenhighlighted by many authors (Yahaya,S. and Yamamoto 1988; Yahaya S.

1988; Gibbons D. op. cit). Legisla-tion, although undertaken with anunder-standing of the situation, doesnot seem to have contributedsub-stantially to the present im-provement.

According to Yahaya andYamamoto (op.cit) there are threereasons for poor enforcement. First-ly, enforcement efforts are hamperedby limited capabilities arising fromshortage of operating funds, patrolvessels, personnel etc. Secondly,there are procedural difficulties aris-ing from too many bureaucratic for-malities in cases that involve thejudicial machinery. Often there ispolitical interference as well in thelegal process. Thirdly, co-ordinationamong the various agencies respon-sible for enforcement is lacking.

As the Head of the LegislationDepartment observes in a joint paper,

«Fisheries enforcement…, is not effec-tive against the operation of illegal en-croachment of trawlers into the A zone(0-5 miles) or in ensuring that theboats fish only in their authorizedzones. Almost no enforcement occursalong the boundaries of the B and Czones. Although coordinated enforce-ment between the Fisheries Depart-ment and other enforcement agencieshas been initiated…this has been ef-fective only against illegal foreignvessels» (Abu Baker and Looi, C K,op. cit.).


Even the premises on which ma-jor decisions like FCLP are takenseem questionable. Imposing restric-tion on fishing effort presupposesreliable information on fisheriesresources:

«Existing data on stock abundance,recruitment and mortality rate, catchrates, types of species, etc are someagre and fragmentary that theyreally cannot serve as the basis for ar-riving at any definite conclusion aboutthe status of the fisheries resources»(Yahaya & Yamamoto op. cit.).

Since the basic information isunreliable, it is difficult to assess theextent of overfishing (if at all it is tak-ing place as contended).

The results of resource surveysundertaken by the FisheriesResearch Institute indicate that theMSY has been exceeded. However,these surveys, according to the aboveauthors, are «merely indicative» andnot «conclusive» of the status of the«fisheries resources»(ibid.). Thus, forexample, average annual productionfor the decade 1971-1980 for the westcoast had been 340,000 tonnesthough the estimated annual MSY isonly 250,000 tonnes! It has been con-sistently higher in the 1980s peakingat 500,000 tonnes in 1987. If the MSY

estimate is to be believed, theresources on the west coast havebeen continuously overfished for thepast seventeen years which is quiteridiculous. (1)

The status of information on finfish, prawns and mollusks is also verymeager. Fishery managers aretherefore, unable to confidently deter-mine the number of licences to beissued by types of fishery, gear andarea (ibid). As a result, the fisheriesofficials have to «resort to intuitionsand arbitrations» (ibid.) in deciding oncertain regulatory measures. Thisoften leads to criticism by fishermen,politicians and other governmentagencies.

Political factors inlegislation

As in other countries, political fac-tors are very crucial in the formula-tion and implementation of legislationin Malaysia. The socio-economic en-vironment is manipulated by the elitehegemony (2) (for details see Gibbonsop. cit.) to attain their political ends.This, in combination with the «subjectpolitical culture» — defined as «onein which a person has some

50


(1) Although the total catch has increased, Dr. Christy points out a significant shift in composition to lower valuedspecies. He also observes that a price-weighted output index shows declining production.(2) They belong to all ethnic groups, predominantly Malay.

51

knowledge about his political system,especially about the bureaucracy, butdoes not see any active role forhimself in it» (ibid.) — has createdextra-legal space within the law’sboundaries. With the result there isa lot of tentativeness in enforcement.

Above every thing else, politicalintervention seems to be the most im-portant reason for poor enforcement.Thus, for example, the governmentrelented under pressure whentrawler-operators agitated against theenhancement in fines (for the viola-tion of zones) and the zoning arrange-ment. According to press reports,(Star 12.5.85) after a demonstrationby trawlers in Kedah state, thegovernment relaxed (informally) theclosed area for trawlers from 5 milesto 3 miles from the shore. Similarly,the then Agriculture Minister AnwarIbrahim guaranteed the trawlerowners that they had been «misled»on the $ 50, 000 fine imposed ontrawlers found fishing in prohibitedwaters. As Star quotes him (May 15,1985):

«This maximum fine will be imposedonly on big fishing boats and foreignfishing boats which have encroachedinto Malaysian waters».

Obviously, the attempt is to pacifyboth traditional and commercialfishermen to soften the jagged points

of conflict even if it leads to relaxa-tion of legislation which is presumablydesigned to protect the interest oftraditional fishermen. This is furtherevident from the following statementmade by the same Minister in Kedah:

«The enforcement of the zoning couldnot be totally called off but we wouldrelax the enforcement a little to benefitthem (meaning trawler operators). Wewill allow them to cross about as far asone mile into the prohibited zones»(Star. ibid.) (parenthesis added).

As a report of the working Group(1976) points out:

«in the territorial waters the objective(of enforcement) is the maintenanceof a peaceful balance of the interestsof competing fishing activities» (paren-thesis added) «whereas in the EEZwaters the objective is to conserve andprotect the fisheries resources for thebenefit of Malaysian fishermen» (P 33).

It is this maintenance of a«peaceful balance of interests» whichhas led to a certain degree of am-bivalence in fisheries legislation. Thecriterion at the point of implementa-tion is explicitly political, although atthe level of legislation the objectivesare lofty. The process of legislationand implementation in a sense sum-marise the relative political clout ofboth the Chinese and the Malay com-munities in a society where every


economic activity is influenced by theethnic factor.

The ambivalence in legislation for-mulated with the main intention ofresolving inter-gear conflicts is furtherreflected in the shroud of secrecy vis-à-vis the detailed provisions of theseActs and amendments. The logisticalaspects and details of enforcementare confidential and inaccessible,presumably because of the sensitivenature of this information. Variouscriteria governing the nature of im-plementation is also a State secret.The detailed provisions are in theform of an Administrative Manual (inMalay) which again is a confidentialdocument.

Both traditional and commercialfishermen have a lot of political cloutand they have their spokesmen inParliament. Since the government isa coalition of Malay, (Chinese and In-dian communities (it is better todescribe it as a coalition of the elitesof these communities) the basic at-titude is to keep the conflicting par-ties separate rather than to resolvethe conflicts. At the peak of the ten-sion between trawlers and traditionalfishermen in the 1970s the function

of the enforcement authorities was tokeep the warring parties separaterather than enforcement per se (per-sonal discussion with Mr. Cheah EngKean, formerly head of Planning &Development, Department ofFisheries, Kuala Lumpur).

Similarly, enhancement of the finefrom $ 1000 to 50,000 is mainly adeterrent measure not meant to beactually implemented. According tothe fisheries officials I talked to, thereare no cases where the violators ofzoning arrangement are fined, theyare only warned if they are Malaysiannationals. Fining or prosecution isresorted to only in the case of foreignviolators. (1)

What is quite interesting toobserve in Malaysia is that in spite ofthe lackadaisical performance of theenforcement authorities, tension inthe sea has considerably reducedduring the 1980s. The burningcauldrons of Perak and Penangstates have now cooled downsignificantly.

This must be related to the recentchanges in the fisheries sector andeconomic development in Malaysia.Between 1980 and 1987 the marine

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(1) As Dr. Christy has pointed out, fines have been levied in quite a few cases. According to the Annual FisheriesStatistics, 1987 almost 50 percent of the total fisheries revenue is from fines — the single largest source of revenuefor the Department of Fisheries. But there is no break-up of the fine according to it’s origin, therefore, we do not knowthe relative share of revenue arising from various violations. These fines contribute to 0.0014 percent of the total valueof marine landings in 1987.

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fishermen’s population has declinedby 30 percent from 90,000 to 60,000.In the same period, the total numberof large scale gear (trawl and purse-seine) registered an increase from 18to 29 percent and small scale gears(mostly gill/drift nets — about 64 per-cent — and gear like hook and line,portable traps, other seines etc.)decreased from 76 to 61 percent.When the total number of unpoweredand outpowered units decreased from37 to 33 percent, inboard unitsregistered an increase from 63 to 67percent. The data implicitly shows themobility of fishermen from small-scaleto large-scale operations. This musthave considerably weakened theclout of the gill-net fishermen andperhaps this is one of the reasons forthe de-escalation of conflicts.

The decline in the fishermen’spopulation is due to inter-sectoralmobility arising from the developmentof industries in the coastal regionsand the government-sponsoredrelocation programme of fishermen.This programme envisages therelocation of 10,500 fishermen underthe Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990)into agriculture, manufacturing, smallscale business, aquaculture and off-shore fishing at an estimated cost ofM$ 280 million. It has alreadyrelocated 1,400 fishermen between1976 and 1984 (Hotta, M and Wang,

L.T., 1985).

As Yamamoto and Yahaya (1988)have observed in their survey inPenang, youth are also able to findjobs in the growing industrial sector.

A decline in the number offishermen seeking to exploit availableresources seems to have contributedmore to the reduction in tension thanstringent legislation.

Awareness of legislation

What is the extent of awarenessof fishing legislation among thefishermen? According to a surveyconducted by Yamamoto and Yahaya(op.cit) in fishing villages in Penangstate

«nearly 78 percent of those interview-ed said that they were very aware ofthe restricted licensing, 16.5 percentsaid they were aware and those notaware only 5.8 percent» (ibid.).

They further observe

«It is interesting to note that thepercentage reporting awareness ofspecific programmes was highest forthose programmes which affect thefishermen directly, but declined withprogrammes which has not direct effecton them. For example, among theFOH (Fishing Operators’ Households)with inboard powered boats, nearly 80


«percent of those interviewed said thatthey were very aware of the regulationbanning trawling in the 0-5 mile waters,while only 52.5 percent reported thatthey were very aware of the minimummesh size regulation meant for thetrawler fishermen…»

Conclusion

Malaysia is perhaps the first coun-try in the South and Southeast Asianregion which introduced legislation for«eliminating» conflicts between dif-ferent gear-groups and for reducingoverfishing. The earliest Act in thisregard (1963) also highlighted the im-portance of enforcement. Differentmeasures were undertaken with self-defeating results leading to a strangesituation where the government hadto promote the spread of trawlingtechnology to prevent disputes thatarose from its introduction! Subse-quently, different forms of zoning ar-rangements were brought into force,but to no avail. Finally, the FisheriesComprehensive Licensing Policy(FCLP) was introduced in 1981 but itcould not plug the loopholes in thesystem nor could it be implementedproperly. Restrictions on size of thevessel, for example, are not match-ed with any on horsepower resultingin trawlers below 25 tonnes using up-

to 270 HP engines! (1) (from personaldis-cussion with fishermen). Zoningviolations by local fishermen are notpunished, thus underscoring theredundancy of a steep enhancementin fines. But use of illegal gear isfined.

Of late, it is not the absence of amachinery but the ineffective use ofit that is responsible for zoning viola-tions within their EEZ. The Enforce-ment Branch has even got airsurveillance facilities now but theseare used only for detecting foreignvessels poaching in their waters.From my discussion with fishermenin Penang & Perak states and thestudy done by Yamamoto andYahaya (op.cit) it is quite evident thatthe inshore fishermen, operating gill-nets/-drift-nets are aware of the law’sprovisions. At the same time they arealso aware that these regulations arenot implemented. Thus according toYamamoto and Yahaya (op. cit) onlyabout 9 percent of the respondentsbelieved that the trawl ban within 5miles is being very effective.

In spite of primacy of equity con-siderations and elimination of con-flicts in the legislation, the measuresdevised seem to be largely ‘used’ ac-cording to the context by a govern-

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(1) These are only for the illegal Apollo boats and they are used as a means of evading patrol vessels, which isperhaps an indication that enforcement is having at least some effect.

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ment which is more interested in themaintenance of the hegemony of theelite irrespective of ethnicity (thoughwith more stress on Malay) than in theachievement of professed objectives.Equity and other social considerationsare subsumed under the political in-terest of the government which is anamalgamation of three distinct and in-congruous ethnicities. Within the per-missible limits of dissent and protest,conflicting parties are offered solu-tions depending on the degree of in-tensity of conflict and politicalconvenience. Nevertheless, the pointholds that Malaysia is the firstdeveloping country to attemptseriously to limit fishing effort inresponse to indications of overfishing.

The situation is also complicatedby the nature or organisations of con-flicting groups. Both the commercialand the traditional sectors are power-fully organised. What is more crucialis the fact that the government can-not do away with the support of eitherof the two. This is further complicatedby the structure of the fishery.Trawlers and purse-seiners accountfor only 23 percent of the total numberof gear units (1987) but they accountfor 42 percent of employment in thefisheries sector and for 75 percent ofproduction. The main traditional gear(drift/gill-nets), though accounting for54 percent of the total number of

gear, contributes to only 6 percent ofproduction (38 percent of employ-ment). More than 75 percent of trawl-nets and 80 percent of drift/gill-netsin operation are on the west coast(1987 figures).

What seem essential in any pro-cess of legislation and its implemen-tation is political will and generalawareness. The efficacy of legislationviz., legitimacy, is also related tothese two factors. But in a societywhere different social/economicgroups have political leverage, it ishighly unlikely that legislation will bepermanently used to the detriment ofa powerful group. It has only the roleof a palliative. In a country where acommon property resource viz.,forests, are indiscriminately exploited,we cannot expect a genuine concernfor another common propertyresource. As the Working Group(1979) contended, it is the«maintenance of a peaceful balanceof the interests of competing fishingactivities» that is attempted and notthe elimination of conflict or the con-servation of resources.

But then the situation seems tohave improved in the 1980s. The fre-quency of conflicts has declined andthey have lost their intensity. This islargely due to the growth in theeconomy, which allowed those whoare not relocated to move into other


employment. The role of overallgrowth in the economy contributing

to the resolution of inter-gear disputeshas to be systematically looked into.

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From a fairly modest output of300,000 tonnes in 1953 the total

fishery production in the Philippinesincreased to two million tonnes in1986, contributing to about 5.11 per-cent to the Gross National Product.The fishing industry comprises mainlyof three sectors: municipal, commer-cial and aquaculture. The municipalsector, which comprises all fishingcraft below 3 GT and thosefishermen not using a craft, is themost important among the three.About 52 percent of total production(46 percent of value) was contributedby this sector in 1986. The commer-cial sector comprising all fishing craftsabove 3 GT contributed to 26 percentof production and 25 percent of value.

About 700,000 people are fullyor partially dependent on fishing as asource of livelihood. Nearly 90 per-

cent of those engaged in fishing arein the municipal sector (Spoehr,A.1984). These fishermen can beclassified into three types:a) Farmer-fishermen, those who

farm their land and normally fishduring the monsoon time,

b) Agriculture labourer-fishermen,those who complement theiragricultural wages with incomefrom fishing particularly duringthe monsoon and,

c) Full-time fishermen.

The ownership pattern of themeans of production is skewed witha large number of fishermen not own-ing a craft (ibid). The distribution offishermen across the Philippines isuneven with 40 percent of themlocated in Southern Tagalog, Bicol,and Central Visayas (Smith, I.R. et al1980).


T H E P H I L I P P I N E S

Brief history ofthe Philippine fisheries

The developments in Philippinefisheries can be broadly classified intopre-World War II and post-Warphenomena. Most of the majorchanges in Philippine fishery are ofpost-War phenomenon. Before theWar, fishery was mainly dominated bythe Chinese and the Japanese. TheChinese introduced gill-nets, cast-nets and a large lever-net calledSalambaw into the Philippines in the18th century when Manila was agrowing city. Trawling was introduc-ed by the Japanese in the early 20thcentury when they operated beamtrawls with sailing sampans. Theestablishment of a technological basein tandem with the development of amarket in Manila led to theemergence of fishing towns in the1900s. An entrepreneurial class ofnon-fishing owners rose up as a resultand in the years soon after the Warthey adopted trawling / purse-seiningto increase production (Spoehr, A. op.cit.).

The subsistence sector, mainlydue to marketing bottlenecks, remain-ed dormant during the pre-War periodthough they already had a repertoireof techniques in accor-dance with thediversity of species. But with thedevelopment of markets, technolo-

gical improvements resulting frommotorisation, use of synthetic fibresand change of boat size, there werechanges in the municipal sector in thepost-War years. However, the sectorstill remained one of low productivi-ty, primarily because of overfishing inthe narrow fishing grounds in theland-sea interface. But in spite of this,it has contributed the most to produc-tion and Gross National product.

It is quite interesting to notice thatmany of the problems beleagueringthe Philippine fisheries today werealready manifest from the 1930swhen beam trawling became verypopular. Thus, as early as 1940, therewas the promulgation of an ad-ministrative order closing San MiguelBay to trawl fishing for five months ina year. By 1950, Manila Bay, S.W. Samar and Regay Gulf werealready overfished so much so thatthe fishery reached a point of com-mercial extinction resulting in trawlersswitching to basing (bag-net), fish car-riers, cargo movers, etc. Similarly,destructive fishing practices were alsorampant. According to a source, themost important cause of fish deple-tion in the Visayas sea in the late1950s was the rampant and wantonuse of explosives.

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Conflicts in thecoastal waters

Though depletion of resourcesand over-capitalization of fisheries arementioned, there is no reference toconflicts between trawlers andmunicipal fishermen in fisheriesliterature until the early 1980s.Perhaps, these conflicts were notgiven their due importance in spite oftheir existence in the 1970s. More over, these conflicts must havebeen seen as a price to be paid forenhancing production at a time whenefficient technology was seen as theprincipal weapon for alleviating pover-ty. The perception of conflicts as aris-ing from a clash betweenincompatible technologies gainedground only when these conflictserupted into violence in some of theSoutheast Asian countries likeMalaysia and Indonesia.

Conflicts as they are addressed inthe Philippines like in many othermarine contexts have essentially gotto do with the co-existence of incom-patible technologies in an environ-ment of growing population pressureon a shrinking resource base. This isfurther aggravated by degradation ofthe coastal zone by pollution, destruc-tive fishing prac-tices, destruction ofmangrove forests and coral reefs. Ina worsening resource environment it

is quit logical that the relatively moreefficient technology in use will be at-tacked.

Like in many other countries, theimportant trawling grounds are alsothe fishing grounds where traditionalsmall-scale fishermen fish. For exam-ple, Manila Bay, San Miguel BayVisayas, Leyte, Samar etc. are alsoareas where there is a large concen-tration of municipal fishermen.

What is quite special abouttechnology-based conflicts in thePhilippines is that unlike Malaysia orIndonesia the incidence of open, con-flicts with trawlers is insignificant, inspite of a long history of struggle fromthe 1970s. The structure of conflictsis slowly changing. As a result ofdepletion of trawlable resources in thecoastal waters, the trawlers are mov-ing out in search of other species.There is relatively much less talk andconcern expressed about trawling inthe municipal waters now. This wasconfirmed by the fishermen I talkedto at a national convention inBatangas City, organized by AsianSocial Institute in December 1988.According to the fishermen, the mainreason for trawlers moving out ofmunicipal waters is dissipation of pro-fit. The national regulations were leastresponsible for this phenomenon.

According to some, the techno-


logy-based conflicts now are between(i) basnig operators and smallfishermen and (ii) purse-seineoperators and fish aggregatingdevices’ (FAD) operators. After muchprodding, all fishermen, however, ad-mitted that the problem with the ut-most severity is destructive fishingpractices by municipal fishermenthemselves using dynamite (blastfishing) and cyanide (for druggingfish). Concern was also expressedagainst muro-ami fishing, a methodintroduced by Japanese to catch cor-al fish.

Though the magnitude of damagedone by blast fishing and cyanidepoisoning was obvious, the percep-tion of this magnitude in terms of theactual situation was not so evident asthe concern against trawling. In otherwords, even when a fisherman ar-ticulates the hierarchy of problems af-fecting his fishery and fishing ground,there is a refraction of the actualsituation conditioned by his preferen-tial use of information rather than bythe actual situation. This informationis mostly derived from outsidesources mainly social activists. Orperhaps it is more convenient toblame trawling because of his lowparticipation in this kind of fishing.Whereas, in destructive fishing prac-tices almost all the small-fishermenare involved.

This attitude of fishermen speakseloquently about the inherent limita-tions of any fishery managementsystem. Certain practices like blastfishing and cyanide poisoning thoughthey meet with disapproval at thestate level, do not meet with socialdisapproval at the local level. Thelocal community will not hold an actof this kind against its interests. Inother words, these practices, or, forthat matter, the use of fine mesh netsdo not violate the professional ethicsor the behavioural norms of the localcommunity. At the same time, pro-blems caused by trawling seem toevoke the entire support of the villagein admonishing it, irrespective of therelatively smaller damage caused tothe resource and the fishing groundby trawling vis a vis destructive fishingmethods. The admonition is more sowhen it is a commercial trawler andnot a ‘baby’ trawler (below 3 GT).

Though fishermen have beendemanding a blanket ban on trawlingwe have not yet come across anystudy on whether or not any seriousdifferences in attitude towards com-mercial and baby trawlers exists. Arethe villagers soft on baby trawlersoperating from the locality in thetraditional fishing ground as againstthe port-based commercial trawlersviolating their communal waters? Ifperceptible differences occur, to what

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extent are they related to the powerstructure within the barangay ormunicipality controlling the tradingoutlets? Is the suki relationship — apatron-client relationship covering allthe economic transactions offishermen — in any way muffling thereal voice of subsistence fishermen?

From the municipalities I visited inLamon Bay these questions could notbe answered because of absence oftrawler owners in the area. Never-theless, from hearsay evidence it canbe said that there is a difference inattitude towards commercial vesselsand municipal trawlers within amunicipality. Therefore, one wonderswhether the movement against com-mercial trawlers is manipulated by thelocal elite who want to ensure trawl-ing rights for their own fleet. This theydo by exploiting the sentiments ofsubsistence fisherfolk about resource-depletion and habitat destruction.This has to be looked into in moredetail.

The organisations working amongfishermen (which are by and largeorganised from above), perhaps as atactical step, seem to be avoiding anythreat to the established order. In asituation where the credibility of theexecutive and the judiciary is low,such an approach has only led to law-making (as a ritual) without any effortat enforcement. It remains a war of

words without any scope for correc-tive measures being taken tosalavage a deteriorating situation.

History of fishing legislationin the Philippines

The Philippines has a history offishing legislation dating back to1932. The distinction between‘municipal’ and ‘commercial’ fisherieswas made this year mainly with thepurpose of licensing and taxingvessels in the commercial class(Spoehr, A. op. cit.). Jurisdiction ofwaters upto three nautical miles (5.5km) from the coastline was grantedto the municipality in the same yearaccording to Commonwealth ActNo.4003 (Smith. I.R. et al 1983).

After the introduction of trawlingand its subsequent emergence as thedominant fishing gear for catchingdemersal species, many kinds oflegislation were passed at sporadicintervals with the idea of protectingresources from over- exploitation.Regulations were also made to pre-vent the use of explosives andpoisonous substances in fishingoperations.

The thrust of the early legislationon conservation of resources andgeneration of revenue was maintain-ed when a comprehensive fisheries


policy was formulated and introduc-ed in the form of Presidential DecreeNo. 704 in 1975. A major shift fromthis tradition was observed onlyrecently when the new Philippinesconstitution, ratified on 2 Feb 1987,talks about supporting and protectingthe interests of subsistencefishermen.

According to the Constitution, Ar-ticle XIII, Section 7:

«The State shall protect the rights ofsubsistence fishermen, especially oflocal communities, to the preferentialuse of the communal marine and fishresources, both inland and offshore. Itshall provide support to suchfishermen through appropriatetechnology and research, adequatefinancial, production and marketingassistance and other services. Thestate shall also protect, develop andconserve such resources. The protec-tion shall extend to offshore fishinggrounds of subsistence fishermenagainst foreign intrusion. Fishworkersshall receive a just share from theirlabour in the utilization of marine andfishing resources.»

The Philippines is perhaps the on-ly country where the rights of the sub-sistence fishermen to the preferentialuse of fish resources are guaranteedby the constitution.

However, the provisions of this ar-ticle have not yet been implemented.The bills are still in the process of

legislation, i.e., two years afterratification of the new constitution.The operational aspects of fishingand fisheries are regulated accordingto the Presidential Decree 704 and itsvarious amendments even now.

The presidential Decree No. 704was passed with the idea of con-solidating all laws and decrees affec-ting fishing and fisheries. The mainfocus of the Decree was the revitaliza-tion of the production structure to in-crease supply to the domesticmarket; to achieve import substitutionof fish and fishery products throughwise utilization, proper conservationand integrated development.

According to this Decree, alicence, lease agreement or permitwas made compulsory for all fishingvessels. Commercial fishing vesselsabout 3 GT and above are prohibitedfrom operating in waters below 7fathoms, ostensibly to ensure therights of municipal fishermen (this isnot spelt out in the Decree). The babytrawlers using fishing boats of 3GT orless, are however, allowed to operatein waters beyond 4 fathoms from thecoast provided they are authorised todo so by existing municipal or-dinances. Thus, by inference, trawl-ing is completely prohibited up to 4fathoms depth zone. However,through a subsequent amendment,P.D.No.1015 in 1976 provision was

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made for banning trawling operationswithin a distance of 7 kilometers (3.78nautical miles) from the shore line, ifpublic interest so requires’, thus pass-ing an apparent reference to existingconflicts. For banning, the recom-mendation had to come from theSecretary of Fisheries (replaced by aMinister now).

According to the Decree No. 1015,Letter of Instruction No.480 wasissued in the same year prohibitingtrawling and purse-seining (commer-cial) within a distance of 7 kilometersfrom the shorelines of the provincesof Northern Leyte, Southern Leyte,Northern Samar, Eastern Samar,Western Samar and Sorsogon.

Subsequently, through a letter ofInstruction No.1328 in 1983 the Presi-dent of the Philippines prohibitedcommercial trawling and purse-seining (i.e. boats above 3 GT) withina marine area of 7 kilometers from theshoreline of all provinces of the Philip-pines. This letter of Instruction ex-plicitly states as its objective, theurgency «to improve the standard ofliving in the rural fishing com-munities», to protect municipalfishery resources against the heavyexploitation of fish and aquaticresources on the entire marine waterareas…, to provide municipal andsmall-scale fishermen a wider areawithin which to operate the fishing

boats of three gross tonnes or lessand to increase their catch per uniteffort» (PLOI No.1328).

Thus, at the national level, restric-tions on commercial vessels were inthree stages.

Firstly, commercial operationswithin 7 fathoms depth zone from theshore were prohibited. Among themunicipal fishing craft, restrictionswere placed on baby trawlers in thesense that they could operate only inwaters beyond 4 fathoms, providedmunicipal ordinances permitted it(otherwise, they also had to operatebeyond 7 fathoms). Secondly, com-mercial fishing activities, specificallytrawling and purse-seining were pro-hibited in selected areas within 7kilometers from the coast line and,thirdly, operation of commercial trawl-ing and purse-sening were bannedwithin 7 kilometers all over the pro-vinces of the Philippines.

The penalty for violation of clos-ed areas, however, is quite nominaland it is clearly spelt out only for viola-tions by trawlers. The penalty, asmentioned in P. D. 704 of 1975 is: ‘afine of not less than 1000 pesos (US$ 50) or imprisonment for a period ofnot exceeding one year, or both fineand imprisonment at the discretion ofthe court’. The task of enforcement isentrusted with Bureau of Fisheries


and Aquatic Resources (BFAR),Philippine Constabulary/IntegratedNational Police and PhilippineCoastguard ‘through close coopera-tion and systematic coordination ofthe personnel under their respectivesupervision’ (Memorandum of Agree-ment on the Joint Implementation andEnforcement of All Fishery Laws,Decrees, Proclama-tions, Memoran-dum Circulars, General Orders, Let-ters of Instruc-tions and All Rules andRegulations promulgated thereunder,1976).

Penalty for violation of closedareas within the municipal jurisdictionof 3 nautical miles from the shorelineis, however, vested with the municipalgovernments. The penalty would varyfrom municipality to municipality ac-cording to the provision made in themunicipal ordinances.

Among the violations, the one at-tracting the heaviest punishment ac-cording to P.D.704, is gathering fishwith the aid of explosives and obnox-ious or poisonous substances or bythe use of electricity. The penalty wasoriginally 10 to 12 years if explosiveswere used, 12 to 20 years if injury toany person was caused and 20 yearsto life imprisonment or death in thecase of loss of life. It was further in-creased through a PresidentialDecree No. 1058 in 1976. Accordingto this Decree mere possession of ex-

plosive with intention for illegal fishingcould bring a penalty of imprisonmentfrom 12 to 25 years and if the ex-plosive is actually used it could be 25years to life imprisonment. If the useof explosives resulted in loss ofhuman life the penalty is life imprison-ment to death.

The strong punitive measuresperhaps reveal the widespread use ofexplosives in the Philippine ar-chipelago. According to a positionpaper prepared by Bureau ofFisheries and Aquatic Resources(BFAR) on use of dynamite, other ex-plosives and poisonous substancesabout 60 percent of the coral reefs ofthe Philippines have been destroyedby these illegal fishing methods(BFAR 1988).

Thus, we can see that the impor-tant problems faced by the Philippinefisheries are addressed in the legisla-tion process. But to what extent havethese regulations been successfullyimplemented?

Enforcement of fishinglegislation

In order to get a clear idea aboutthe process of enforcement I haddiscussions with the Director of En-forcement, Bureau of Fisheries andAquatic Resources, Commander of

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Philippines Coastguard, Mayors ofthree municipalities and the policebelonging to Philippine Constabularyin the Lamon Bay.

Another important aspect in theimplementation of law is itsawareness among the fisherfolk.Regarding this I had discussions withfishermen at a National Conventionof Small Fishermen, Batangas city,community organizers of the AsianSocial Institute, and leaders ofPamalakaya, an organization of smallfishermen and peasants.

The enforcement is at two levels.As I mentioned earlier, BFAR,Coastguards and Philippine Con-stabulary/Integrated National Policetogether are supposed to implementthe law in all instances except incases of transgression of commercialvessels into municipal waters. This isleft to the municipal council to im-plement.

In spite of the ‘Memorandum ofAgreement’ between various agen-cies entrusted with the task of im-plementing and enforcing provisionsof Presidential Decrees which clear-ly spell out the role of respectiveagencies, the enforcement machineryis a gross failure in the Philippines.

Though five specific offences viz.(i) illegal fishing (ii) fishing with finemesh nets (iii) trawl fishing in waters

seven fathoms deep or less (iv) banon exportation of bangu fry and (v)pollution of waters are mentioned inP.D.704, the only offence on whichsome action is taken is illegal fishing.As far as violation of the 7 km-ban isconcerned, not a single case hasbeen charged so far in the Philip-pines. In other words, section 35 ofP.D.705, its subsequent amendmentsin P.D. No.1015, Letters of Instruc-tions Nos. 480 and 1328 are not im-plemented at all. This was admittedby Commander Quevas of Coastguard and Mr. Gamilla, Director ofEnforcement, BFAR.

Though the concerned depart-ments are supposed to send a bi-monthly report ‘pinpointing the areaswhere illegal fishing is rampant andcontaining a list of persons ap-prehended for having violated thefishery laws, decrees, rules andregulations’ (Memorandum of Agree-ment, 1976), these reports mentiononly apprehensions of illegal fishingactivities. A Fisheries AdministrativeOrder No.156 was further issued in1986 specifically on the implementa-tion of L.I.1328 prohibiting the opera-tion of com-mercial purse-seine andtrawl operations within 7 km, and itinsisted on a monthly report from theimple-menting agencies on their ac-complishments. This order also is notcomplied with.


In spite of the ‘Memorandum ofAgreement’ it is quite clear that thereis no effective co-ordination betweenthe various agencies concerned. Thiswas evident from the manner BFARand the Coastguard expressed theirmisgivings about each other. Accor-ding to Commander Quevas, BFARis not really serious about implemen-tation of various provisions. A similarview was also expressed by thePhilippine Constabulary which mansthe police stations in Perez Island.

Though the ‘Memorandum’ wasdrawn up there was no effort on thepart of the government to strengthenthe implementing machinery toundertake its task effectively. Thus,in real terms, precious little is doneby the government to ensure the ef-ficacy of legislation though sufficientnumber of «paper tigers» werecreated.

Reasons for poorenforcement

Commander Quevas briefed thepractical difficulties they face. TheCoastguard is to protect the interestsof twenty departments, mostlymutually exclusive ones. Consideringthe vast waters of the Philippines andits archipelagic character, he said it isphysically impossible to do a

satisfactory job for all these depart-ments. Moreover, among the dutiesthey perform, the lowest priority isgiven to enforcement of fishingregulations. And among the regula-tions the one with the lowest priorityis implementation of the seven kmban! In fact, not a single case hasbeen charged by the Coastguard inthis respect. Similarly, BFAR has alsonot charged a single violation of thisprohibition. Regarding their inabilityto enforce fisheries laws BFAR has ahost of reasons to give. Thesereasons are expressed, however, inthe context of difficulty in apprehen-ding violations under section 33 whichdeal with illegal fishing (meaning,mainly fishing with dynamite andcyanide) nevertheless, they can bevalid in the enforcement of otherregulations also.

To quote from their position paperon illegal fishing:

«To be strict in the implementation offishery laws is quite difficult becauseof possible retaliatory actions fromviolators and lawless elements. »

The enforcement officers aresometimes harassed, relieved of theirduties and transferred to inconvenientplaces as a result of political in-terference.

The institutional problems speltout by the paper are:

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«(a) Lack of support and sufficientresources exemplified by the absenceof/or lack of operation/effectivelyfunctioning equipments of facilitieswhich include the lack of firearms pro-vided for active law enforcement, forpersonal defence or protection pur-poses against the violators/enemies (b)…(because of) existing low pay orfunding support, despite the risk anddanger in their assigned duties, lawenforcement personnel could easilysuccumb to temptations which aresimply graft and corruption.»

Lack of support from the judiciaryis another factor mentioned in thepaper, which was also corroboratedby the municipal authorities and theCoastguard.

Lastly and most importantly, thereare no safeguards and support ex-tended to law enforcement officersagainst harassment and counter-charges (on technical grounds). Insuch a situation, the mother agenciesdo not provide them with legalcounsels or financial support. Thereare cases where the law enforcementofficers get suspended. This functionsas a clear disincentive to law en-forcers in booking violators.

The local municipal governmentsare also quite lax in implementing thelaws. Their approach is quite differentfrom that of the national government.They would rather prefer to settle theviolations/disputes informally at the

municipal level itself. One of thereasons for this approach is the nonco-operation from BFAR and the lackof credibility of the judicial machinery.And secondly, because of various in-surgent movements in the Philippinesthey do not want to offend theviolators fearing a reprisal later.Therefore, they opt for an amicablesettlement by requesting the violatorsto pay a small amount (which is nor-mally less than half the fine specifiedin the P.D.704) as compensation.Here again the municipal governmenttakes cognizance of the violation on-ly if the fishermen bring it to theirnotice.

In the municipalities of Perez,Alabat and Quezon Quezon that Ivisited, the main problems weredynamiting of fish, cyanide-poisoningof coral fish, encroachment of basnigsinto the waters around traditional FishAggregating Devices (boya fishing)using powerful lights at night and theuse of fine-mesh nets (called hulbotor buli buli, a variant of trawl-net in-troduced only three years ago).

In Perez during October-December about twenty buli bulioperators were apprehendedbecause of encroachment intomunicipal waters but they were notformally charged. They were allowedto go on payment of a nominal fineto the municipality. The approach of


the municipality would differ accor-ding to the nature of the violator. Forexample, if a citizen of the municipali-ty is apprehended for illegal fishingusing dynamite, a case will be formal-ly charged and forwarded to the courtwhereas if the violator is a ‘stranger’from a different island the issue isamicably settled.

The scenario in the other twomunicipalities I visited was differentfrom Perez. In Alabat the P.D.704 of1975 was ratified only in 1987! The7 km ban is not yet ratified by themunicipality. Even illegal fishing is notreferred to the court because of ap-parent non co-operation of the BFARand lack of credibility of the judiciary.Though there are seasonal encroach-ment (during Jan-Aug) into municipalwaters by trawlers from Manila,Cavite, Lucina provinces no action istaken against them mainly out of fear.The trawlers are supposed to be arm-ed to the teeth! Even municipalfishermen are afraid of these en-croachers. As far as violations withinthe municipality are concerned, themayors of Alabast and QuezonQuezon are more tactical because ofpolitical reasons. The political out-come of the election is quite depen-dent of the fishermen and if themayor strictly implements the lawagainst illegal fishing and use of fine-mesh nets, the majority of fishermen

will have to be booked! In thesemunicipalities with coral reefs andmangrove forests, dynamiting is animportant method for catching fishand the mayor would not like to riskhis political future for the sake of im-plementing fisheries regulations.

According to the organizers ofAsian Social Institute, these are themunicipalities where there is somesemblance of implementation. If thesituation is like this here, one can ima-gine what it would be like in othermunicipalities. Thus, at the nationaland local level the enforcementmachinery is grossly inadequate andincapable of implementing the regula-tions, exposing the total fallacy ofpresidential decrees.

Even after the change of govern-ment and the ratification of a newconstitution there is no discernible in-terest shown by the government inqualitatively improv-ing the situationprevailing on the enforcement front.

A classic example of lack ofpolitical will on the part of the govern-ment was quite evident in the case ofSan Miguel Bay as demonstrated bythe ICLARM study (Smith et al 1983).According to the existing rules whichdisallow trawling within 4 fathomisobath, 55 percent of the Bay is in-accessible to trawling. In 30 percentof the Bay’s surface area trawlers

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below 3 GT could be permitted andonly in 15 percent of the Bay cantrawlers above 3 GT fish. In the Bayarea only two out of the total twelvemunicipalities have passed resolu-tions legalizing trawling within 4 to 7fathoms. However, in these particularmunicipalities the 4 fathom mark isbeyond the municipal boundary(which is 3 nautical miles), thus mak-ing these ordinances superfluous.Therefore, in this Bay vessels below3 GT can fish only in areas above 7fathom isobath and this means only15 percent of the waters are legallyaccessible to trawling! However,small trawlers indulged in in-discriminate trawling all over the Bayirrespective of this According toSmith, I, et al

«…if only existing legislation were en-forced, the problems of competitionand conflict between small-scale andtrawl gear could be avoided. Certain-ly, confinement of small trawlers to that15 percent area of the Bay (SanMiguel) where they can legally operatewould do much to shift the distributionof catch and incomes from the large-scale trawl fishery in favour of the non-trawl fishery». (Smith et al. ibid.).

Awareness of legislationamong fishermen

Regarding the awareness of

various provisions of presidentialdecrees among the non-trawlmunicipal fishermen, it was quiteshocking to notice that most of them(in Perez, Alabat & Quezon Quezon)became aware of these provisions on-ly in 1987-88 as a result of the interac-tion with the community organizers ofASI, i.e., about five to twelve yearsafter the decrees/letters of instruc-tions were promulgated. Mr. Santos,Head of the Legal Division, dealingwith municipal fisheries admitted thatthere were no mass-contact program-mes organised by BFAR todisseminate the content of variousdecrees and LOI among fishermen.

Destructive fishingpractices

The impression I got from thefishermen at the national conventionand in the municipalities I visited isthat the encroachment of trawlers intoprohibited waters is decreasing overtime. The reason given by thefishermen is that the municipal watersare not rich fishing grounds any morefor trawlers. They are, therefore, mov-ing into deep waters or using othergear. Some of the fishermen werevery critical of destructive fishing us-ing dynamite and cyanide. Accordingto them, it is the problem which has


the gravest consequences forresources. But at the same time thereis no disapproval of the practice at thelocal level. The fishermen from TawiTawi, the southern most islands in thePhilippine archipelago, e.g., evendefended dynamiting claiming that inspite of using dynamite as the prin-cipal fishing method from the 1940sthere is no depletion of resources intheir waters.

The practice of dynamiting/cyanide poisoning or fish seems to beconcomitant with farming activities.But this is largely a coral reef-specificactivity. Two reasons are mainly at-tributed by fishermen for the use ofdynamite. Firstly, it is cost-efficient:the cost of one day’s operation is on-ly equivalent to one US dollar.Secondly, it saves a lot of time, (littletime need to be spent in preparingand repairing gear before and afterthe operation!). The second reasonis particularly important because itfacilitates fishing on a day they haveto undertake farming activities.Destructive fishing practices, ir-respective of the severe penaltieswhich can go upto death sentence,are rampant all over the Philippinesand, ironically, the main source ofdynamite is the Army itself, followedby mining companies! Cyanidefishing is used for catching ornamen-tal fish for aquaria and cyanide is sup-

plied by agents of ornamental fishdealers in Hong Kong. Thepreference of part-time fishermen fordestructive fishing practices have tobe looked into in more detail,especially in archipelagic waters. Thisphenomenon was also observed in In-donesian archipelago.

It is also interesting to observethat farmer/agricultural labourerfishermen are also less militant com-pared to full-time fishermen. Even ifthe trawlers are violating prohibitionsin municipal waters, right in front oftheir eyes, they do not, out of fear, tryto mobilize the enforcement authori-ty to apprehend the violators. Thecommercial fishermen are feared tobe armed or members of the outlaw-ed National People’s Army (NPA).

Conclusion

The tensions between trawlersand traditional gear-groups are ofrelatively recent origin in the Philip-pines. Various regulatory measureshad been taken, mainly with the pur-pose of conservation of resourcesand, until 1983 there was no mentionof the conflicts in the municipalWaters.

As the situation is today, trawlingis prohibited in waters below 7fathoms isobath and trawlers and

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purse-seiners above 3 GT are bann-ed all over the Philippines in watersbeyond 7 km from the shoreline. Ac-cording to the new constitution, rightsof the subsistence fishermen to thepreferential use of fishery resourcesare also guaranteed, however little isdone to ensure these rights to sub-sistence fishermen.

Social and political factors seemto determine the nature of articulationof protest. There seems to exist dif-ference in attitude towards trawlerslocally based and those coming fromoutside. This is influenced by the ex-tent of integration of subsistencefishermen into the local power-structure. At the same time, theprevailing political atmosphere —resulting from insurgencies — also in-fluences the nature of protest.

As in Malaysia, in spite of poor en-forcement there is less tension in the1980s. The fishermen attribute this toa decrease in frequency of transgres-sions into municipal waters. Morethan the efficacy of enforcement, thisis because of resource depletion for-cing commercial trawlers into deeperwaters.

Nevertheless, tensions betweenfish aggregating device operators andpurse-seine fishermen are severe.Destructive fishing practices are stillcontinuing unabated. This is perhaps

the worst problem affecting thePhilippine fisheries.

However, the enforcement sceneis very dismal. The awareness ofvarious regulations also seem to bepoor among the municipal fishermen.

The Philippines is a sad case oftotal lack of legitimacy for thelegislative process, the enforcementauthority and the judiciary. In this con-test the decrees only become alibi forproviding a semblance of equity.Moreover, the regulations/decrees donot take into consideration thegeographical variations according toresource availability, organization andmeans of production, complexity offishing ground etc.

In a situation like this it is impossi-ble to have any meaningful im-plementation unless alternativemeans are used. At a Conference onEnvironmental Law Education andPractice, organized by the HaribonFoundation for the Conservation ofNational Resources on 15 December1988, in Manila, the inadequacy of thejudicial system was discussed. It wasobserved that law cannot be abovethe dominant interests of society. Oneof the participants suggested per-suasive tactics outside the judicialsystem (which according to him is«unfair, corrupt sand unreliable») forsettle-ment of disputes, thus advo-


cating promotion of arbitration withoutinvolving the judiciary.

Even if arbitration is carried outoutside the ambit of judiciary, it ishighly unlikely that the poor fishermenwill be able to receive justice becauseof the inequality inbuilt into the Philip-pine society as a whole. Even if extra-judicial methods are resorted to, it islikely that these methods will also beappropriated by the ‘better-offs’ in therespective communities. Unless theopportunity cost of labour increasesthe situation in the fishing sector is dif-ficult to change for the better.

In this situation unless the socialcondition of production and organisa-tion change, legislation process willnot have much relevance. But thistransformation has to be aided byboth intra and inter-sectoral factors.Thus, for example, there could, on theone hand, be a seaward expansionof the fishing grounds towards untap-ped areas and, on the other, thereshould be inter-sectoral mobility oflabour leading to reduced pressureon the municipal waters. Generallyspeaking, only in a situation of im-provement in economic conditionswill an atmosphere for the efficacy oflegislation develop. Otherwise, itshould be a case where the nationaleconomy is capable of subsidisingparticular groups of fishermenbecause of growth in other sectors.

(like in Norway, for example). In otherwords, the most meaningful resolu-tion of conflicts within the fisheriessector really lies outside, not within.

New draft billsunder discussion

After the ratification of the newconstitution which lays special em-phasis on the rights of subsistencefishermen, there has been a rethink-ing in political circles regarding theadequacy of P.D.704 in resolving pro-blems of small fishermen. As a result,a new bill was introduced in theHouse of Representatives on the 18thMay 1988 (House Bill No.9580) ‘topromote... distributive justice andachieve genuine national economicdevelopment’ with priority to sub-sistence fishermen and special em-phasis on resource conservation. Thebill envisages the setting up ofResource Management Councils atthe municipal, provincial and nationallevels to manage communal waters(defined as waters within 25 fathomisobath from the shoreline), coastalwaters (waters beyond the seawardboundary of communal waters to adistance of 30 nautical miles) and off-shore water (waters beyond thecoastal waters). The demarcation ofthe sea into three areas is also gear-

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specific. Within the communal waters,only passive gear (including hookand line, fish pens / traps, gill-nets etc)are allowed and in the other twodemarcated fisheries both active andpassive gear can be used. Similarly,within the communal waters onlyvessels below 3 GT can be used. Andin all the three fisheries only Filipinoscan operate, thus precluding anyforeign collaboration.

The users of communal watersare supposed to be subsistencefishermen who are directly involvedin fishing activity (but do not under-take operation without active par-ticipation) with or without theassistance of fishworkers (defined asthose who are employed by anoperator or a fisherman). And theusers of coastal and offshore watersaccording to the draft law will befishery operators (defined as thosewho own and provide the means toengage in fisheries) registered withand licensed by the provincial govern-ment (for coastal areas) and with theBureau of Fisheries and Aquatic

Resources (BFAR) (for offshorewaters). They should have aminimum experience of three to fiveyears in the respective fisheries.

The draft bill aims at devolution ofpower to the RMCs for the Manage-ment and control of the Philippinewaters and fishery resources. It alsomakes provisions for arbitratingdisputes at the coastal, provincial andnational levels through the RMCsthus minimizing the dependence onthe judicial machinery.

If implemented, this will be aradical measure for managing thefisheries sector with minimum in-volvement of the governmentmachinery. According to a senior of-ficial in the BFAR, this is far tooradical and therefore they have sub-mitted another bill to remove the‘revolutionary’ content of House Bill9580. This Draft Bill (No.18422), sub-mitted by BFAR, is very similar to theP.D.704 in essence except for thedeclaration of policy objectives andthe definition of municipal waters.


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With a coastline of 2614 kmsThailand accounted for 2

million tonnes of marine catch in theyear 1986 — the highest in theSoutheast Asian region. About 70percent of the total catch is trash andunder-sized fish and is converted in-to fishmeal which accounts for thehighest volume of marine productsexports from Thailand.

The marine fisheries sector islargely export-oriented with over 70percent of production moving intofishmeal, canning and frozen food in-dustries (in the order of importance).In 1987 Thailand earned an estimatedUS$ 1.2 billion from her fish exports,out-earning rice, the country’s one-time top export (Teresa Sofia, 1988).Export earnings from marine products

accounted for 11 percent of the totalexport earnings of the country.(SEAFDEC 1988).

The fisheries sector contributed to1.6 percent of the country’s GDP andaccounted for 9 percent of agriculturalGDP in 1986 (ibid.). Fishery productsconstitute an important source of pro-tein for the Thai people. The per-capita consumption of fish is approxi-mately 22.5 kg.

According to the latest MarineFishery Census (1985) there areabout 140,000 fishermen and 60,000fishery establishments in Thailand.About 8,000 fishermen are in the sub-sistence sector, 100,000 in the small-scale and 13,000 in the commercialsector (1).


T H A I L A N D

(1) According to the National Statistical Office (NSO) all fishing establishments with powered vessels of and below 10GT belong to the small-scale sector and all establishments without boats belong to the subsistence sector. Allestablishments with inboard-powered vessels of 10 GT and above are large-scale operators. (Teresa Sofia. ibid.)Fishery establishment ‘refers to an economic unit which was engaged in marine capture fishery/coastal aquacultureduring the past one year’ (1985 Marine Fishery Census of Thailand, NSO and Department of Fisheries, Ministry ofAgriculture and Co-ops 1987).

Nearly half of the total number offishermen are fully dependent onfishing as the only source of income.Of the three sectors mentionedabove, the largest share to the totalproduction is from the commercialsector (almost ninety percent). Thecontribution of the small-scale sectoris 8 percent and that of the sub-sistence sector is negligible. Thus,less than 10 percent of the totalnumber of fishermen account for 90percent of production.

History and developmentof Thai fisheries

Traditionally, fish is the most im-portant source of protein for the Thaipopulation who are predominantlyhinayana Buddhists. ‘There is rice inthe fields, fish in the water’ is the waypeople used to express theirlivelihood (Insor, D. 1966) from timeimmemorial. Until the early decadesof this century, this taste for fish waslargely confined to the rivers andlakes of Thailand. Inland fisheries wassecond only to agriculture as the mainoccupation of the Thais. It was thechief employer of coastwise popula-tion and a large revenue earner forthe State (Smith, H.M. 1925). Accessto the fishery was not open and it

depended on the capacity of the in-dividual to pay taxes which wererather heavy (almost 7 percent ofthe total value of production) (1).

Infrastructural facilities were goodfor the market to absorb fresh fish. Icealso was used in the 1920s for preser-vation. As a result, large quantities offish moved within the domesticmarket particularly from the head ofthe Gulf of Siam by rail and steamerto Bangkok. Inland fish resourceswere subjected to a lot of stressleading to overfishing and farmerswere forced to eat marine fish.

Although the contribution of themarine sector was not significant inthe domestic market, there was abroad-based group of gear. Most im-portant among them was the bamboostake trap used in the estuaries. Avariety of seines and gill-nets was alsoused in addition to troll-lines and set-lines. The marine sector also cateredto the export market. Large quantitiesof small fish were caught even thenand were used for feeding domesticanimals and fertilizing land (Smith,H.M ibid.). The fishing units in themarine sector were also subject totaxation and this effectively took awaythe «open access» status of fisheryin Thailand, enjoyed by almost all theother countries of the world.

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(1) Calculated from Smith, H.M. ibid..

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The shortage on inland fish coupl-ed with the development of infrastruc-tural facilities must have triggeredinterest in marine fisheries in a big-ger way. Two new gear — theChinese purse-seine and Japanesetrawl — were introduced in 1925 and1930. In 1960, on the eve of the in-troduction of the otter-board-trawlfrom West Germany, the total marineproduction had already outstrippedthe inland fish production by over 30per cent.

From 1961 onwards, as result ofthe introduction of otter-board-trawling from West Germany therewas a rapid expansion of fishing ef-fort and investment by the commer-cial sector. Many factors seem tohave contributed to the developmentof commercial fishery in Thailand.Firstly, the 1950s and 1960s were thedecades when Thailand experiencedan economic boom with capital beinginjected into all sections of theprimary industry (Hinton, P. 1985).The Government subsidised loans atlow interests which were available forinvestors in the commercial sector(Panayotou & Jetanovanich 1987).

Secondly, the demand-side fac-tors were favourable to the develop-ment of fisheries. With the increasein per capita income in the West therewas a strong impetus to internationaldemand for marine products, par-

ticularly prawns and shrimps(Sakiyama, T 1984.). The local urbanmarkets were also able to offer bet-ter prices because of the increasingpurchasing power of the citizens con-sequent upon the economic «boom».

And, thirdly, to exploit the marketpotential there were immigrantChinese fishermen from Fukien,Guangdong provinces and HainanIsland of China who integrated opera-tions of fishing (particularly trawling)and marketing through kinship links(Sakiyama ibid.). They were alsoadept at maintaining good relation-ships with institutional banking.

Since infrastructural facilities werealready being built into the economy,the transition from a largely localizedindustry into one organized on a na-tional and international level was fairlyquick. What is significant about thistransition is that it did not result in anydiscernible conflicts. Unlike inneighbouring Malaysia where the in-troduction of trawling was met withimmediate reaction from the tradi-tional sector, there were no such con-flicts in Thailand in the nascent stagesof the introduction of trawling.

As sakiyama observes:

«In Thailand relatively harmoniousreligious and ethnic relationship havebeen maintained between local andimmigrant Chinese fishermen, who


have entered marine fishing with fewconflicts resulting between them andlocal traditional fishermen, mostlyethnic Thais and Malays».

(Sakiyama ibid)

The main reason for the absenceof conflicts seem to be related, first-ly, to the lack of an organized tradi-tional marine fishery and secondly, toits diminutive size. The most impor-tant gear in the marine sector, as wehave mentioned before, was the bam-boo stake trap operated by lesseeswho paid taxes to the government.Since commercial operations werecontingent on one’s capacity to paytax, fisheries may not have been aworthwhile occupation for themarginal population to follow.Secondly, the population-land ratio inThailand earlier was quite low. Sothere was no pressure to move fromfarming to fishing as the principal oc-cupation. And thirdly, the develop-ment of commercial marine fisherycoincided with an impressive growthin the Thai economy. The 7 percentgrowth in national income in the1960s opened up avenues foremployment outside fishing. This isan important difference betweenThailand and other Southeast Asiancountries during the initial stages ofthe introduction of trawling.

The above factors do not implythat there were only a few householdscatching fish from the sea. AsNagalaksana points out.

«Almost without exception, every adultrural inhabitant regardless of sexknows by life-time experience how tocatch fish». (Nagalaksana, C. 1987).

For a large proportion of thecoastal population, particularly innorth Thailand, fishing perhaps wasa supplementary activity to rice far-ming and horticulture, and met con-sumption requirements rather thanbeing directed towards the market.Large tracts of mangroves and in-dented coastline must have facilitatedeasy access to fish.

The situation in south Thailandseems to have been different. Accor-ding to some of my informants, in thesouth there are a large number offishermen eking out subsistence fromfishing. Most of these fishermen aredescendants of immigrant Malayfishermen. They share the concernfor resources expressed by theircounterparts in Malaysia and resenttrawling technology (Sakiyama, ibid.)(1) According to Sakiyama (ibid.).most fishermen on the east coast ofsouth Thailand are engaged in gill-

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(1) But according to Fraser, T.M (1966) resentment is mainly because of their inability to raise capital to compete onan equal footing.

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netting or purse seining using craftof the size 1-5 GT. According toThomas (1975) as reported in Hinton(1985), violent clashes took place bet-ween coastal villagers and crews oflarge fishing vessels in south Thailandin the early 1970s.

There seems to be a differencein perception of the trawling problembetween the north and the south. Thisseems to be related to the degree ofdependence on fishing as the prin-cipal source of livelihood. The nor-therners are perhaps less dependenton fishing compared to thesoutherners. Or is it that communalfactors account for this difference inperception — that Buddhists aremore tolerant of ‘injustice’ than thereMuslim counterparts? The regionaldifferences in perception, regardingcommercialisation of fisheries andfactors responsible for it will make aninteresting study.

There is only very rudimentaryevidence on the existence of conflictsbetween commercial and smallfishermen in the northern waters ofthe Gulf of Thailand. (1) The nature ofthe conflict itself, particularly oftrawlers with operators of traditionalgear is not properly discussedanywhere. The problem is also made

difficult by the definition of the small-scale sector. The definition of thesmall-scale sector according to Na-tional Statistical Office (NSO) (Seefootnote 1 - p. 75) is different from thatof the Department of Fisheries, whichhas a gear-based definition (2). Thesedefinitions do not seem to do justiceto the perception of ‘conflicts’ as ar-ticulated by the fishermen. Thus, forexample, according to a fisherman ofTrat (who is also a communityorganizer), the major conflict in theirwaters is actually between ‘small’ and‘big’ trawlers, and the traditionalfishermen (operating gill-nets, crab-nets, hook & line and squid traps)support the ‘small’ trawlers. Thesesmall-sized trawlers are from thelocality and there seems to be littletension between the traditionalfishermen and these trawlers.

Within the locality the focus ismore on avoidance of conflicts bet-ween trawlers and traditional gear.Thus, e.g., as Teresa Sofia observesfrom another part of the east coast,the gill-net operators and the trawlersin the locality operate at differenttimes to avoid conflicts (Teresa, S. op.cit.). In these two areas the conflictsseems to be determined by the villageethos which seem to accommodate


(1) Even in the south there is no literature for the situation in the 1980s.(2)All gear excluding trawl, purse-seine, Spanish mackerel gill-net, mackerel encircling gill-net, bamboo stake-trap aredefined as small-scale gear. According to this definition, 80 per cent of total production is from the large-scale sector.

incompatible technologies providedthey are locally based. But thefactors determining the socialconsent of these technologies haveto be studied.

However, in the fishing villages Ivisited in Trat province there are con-flicts within the traditional gear base:between gill-nets and crab-nets; hook& line and dynamite/ cyanide; squidtrap and crab-net/gill-net and finallypush-nets and oyster fishermen. Inthe first type of conflicts, the gear getsentangled leading to fights; in the se-cond, hook & line fishermen are con-cerned about the wanton destructionof fish by dynamiting/ cyanide poison-ing. In the third, traps get entangledwith the crab and gill-nets. Oysterfishermen fight push-nets because ofindiscriminate killing of cockles.

These conflicts sometimes leadto open fights but there is no resort tojudiciary for their resolution. Theconflicts are seen as part of the riskthey have to undertake while fishing.Interestingly, almost all the fishermenhave a combination of these gear(except dynamiting and cyanidepoisoning). Therefore, these conflictsare purely circumstantial. There is nodivision of labour according to gear.But all these fishermen unite to fightagainst granting ownership rights ofmangrove forests to individuals forconversion into prawn culture ponds.

Conflicts involving trawlers arelargely inter-regional. Inter-gearconflicts are circumstantial andlocalised, i.e., within the traditionalusers of the inshore waters. Incursionof commercial interests into theprovince, in the form of investment inprawn culture, at the same time, isstrongly opposed.

History of fisherieslegislation

Thailand is one of the first coun-tries in the world to introduce an Actto manage its fishery. Thus, in 1864the Water Duty Act was introducedprimarily with the objective of manag-ing the inland waters. The Act divid-ed the fishing grounds into asanctuary area and a reserved area(Isvilanoda, S. et. al, in press). Fishingwas prohibited in the sanctuary area,which was defined as the area closeto monasteries or places of worship.Similarly, the law also prohibitedfishing during the spawning seasonthat coincides with the monsoon andthe use of toxic substances for killingfish. The reserved area was thatdesignated for persons who paid du-ty depending on the nature and thearea of the fishing ground and thegear used. The Minister of Financehad the authority to determine and

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collect the duties and the Minister ofLands and Agriculture to look afterthe conservation of fishery.

But as Dr. Smith points out,

«Those (regulations) that are strictlyprotective or conservative, asdistinguished from those that pertainto the imposing of taxes, the raising ofrevenue,…, constitute an insignificantpart and are not very impressive ef-fective or adequate…» (Smith, H.M.op. cit.) (parenthesis added)

and,

«that Ministry (Lands and Agriculture)has no powers or authority for the pro-mulgation or enforcement of conser-vancy and regulative measures» (ibid.)(parenthesis added).

However, due credit should begiven to the fact that the need to con-serve fishery resources was recogni-sed by the Thais as early as the 1860s.

Dr. Smith, in his seminal reviewof the fisheries situation in theerstwhile Siam in the 1920s after stu-dying the fishing practices and thepriorities of the government made animpassionate plea for proper conser-vation of fishing resources to caterto the food requirements of thepopulation:

«There must be a thorough revision ofthe entire body of fishery regulations

that are now in operation, and theremust be formulated new regulations,applicable to the country at large anddrawn primarily with a view to thepreservation of the industry» (Smith,H.M. ibid.).

Perhaps as a result of Dr. Smithbecoming the first Director ofFisheries in Thailand, increased at-tention was paid to conservation ofresources, particularly in the inlandwaters in the 1930s.

The Fisheries Act of 1947

Although various fisheries taxlaws were enacted between 1901 and1938, the first comprehensivefisheries act was enacted only in1947. Like in the case of previouslaws this Act also covered both inlandand marine fisheries. As Mooreobserves:

«Having been drawn up in 1947 beforethe development of marine fisheries,the Act is drafted primarily with inlandfisheries in mind» (Moore, G.1978).

On an area basis the fisheriessector was divided into fourcategories. These were:

i) Preservation fisheries ii) Leasable fisheriesiii) Reserved fisheries and


(iv) Public fisheries (1)

Preservation fisheries refer tofishing grounds in the precincts of amonastery or a place of worshipsimilar to the sanctuary area accor-ding to the 1864 Water Duty Act.

Leasable fisheries are fishinggrounds leased out on the basis of anauction for a period of one year, en-suring exclusive right to thedesignated area. However, sub-sistence fishing was permitted in thisarea.

Reserved fisheries are siteslicensed out on the basis of fixedfee, according to the size of the sta-tionary gear.

All waters excluding the threementioned above were publicfisheries.

The Act empowered the Ministerto issue notices regarding registrationof fishing gear and fishermen, licen-sing of fishing implements (meaningfishing gear) and specifica-tion offisheries tax for the operation oflicensed implements.

The Minister also had the powerto impose conservation controls likemesh size regulation, closed season,quota restriction, minimum size ofspecies and restriction on the nature

of the fishing implements.

The Act provided the legal basisfor the management of fisheries.However, its main focus was onrevenue generation like in all theprevious fisheries tax law. It pro-hibited the operation of stationarygear in public waters. Access topublic waters was open but registra-tion was mandatory.

Moore (op. cit.) finds this Actanachronistic considering the factthe Thailand has a multi-million dollarindustry based on marine fisheries.He further opines,

«The changes in the law of the sea, theadoption of a policy of limiting entry in-to certain sectors of Thai fisheries, andthe negotiation of foreign fishingagreements indicate a substantialredirection of policies, policies whichit is suggested cannot be properly im-plemented through the existing legisla-tion». (Moore, ibid.).

Rather than any amendments tothe existing Act which «will serve on-ly to pull further apart the fabric of alaw that was intended only as theframework for the control of smallscale inland fisheries» (ibid.) he ad-vocated a general revision of the Actto serve as a basis for the manage-ment and regulation of Thai fisheries.

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(1) We did not come across any material on the division of the fishing ground according to this classification.

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Fisheries Acts (No.2) 1953& (No.3) 1985

Despite Moore’s recommenda-tions, there were no attempts toundertake a general revision of thefisheries laws. There were twoamendments, the second being themore important one. Even theseamendments did not take into con-sideration the current requirements ofthe fishery sector. The principal taskof these amendments particularly ofthe Fisheries Act of 1985, was toenhance the fines for violations ratherthan to undertake a general revision.

From a careful reading of theFisheries Act of 1947 and its subse-quent amendments in 1953 and 1985it is evident that within its frameworkit is possible to resolve many of themanagement problems of thefisheries. Even though there is ‘openaccess’ to ‘public waters’ it isregulated by various provisions of theAct. Thus even in ‘public waters’fishermen have to respect variousregulations pertaining to conserva-tion, and without registration nobodycould enter any fishery. But none ofthe provisions for conservation seemto be evoked in any meaningful man-ner so that the regulations can at leastfunction as a deterrent.

Under the aegis of these Actsvarious regulatory schemes were

devised from 1952 onwards to con-serve stocks of various groups ofspecies. Almost all these regulationsemphasized the need to controlfishing effort. Thus the Ministry ofAgriculture and Co-operativesthrough a decree in 1972 proscribedtrawl and powered push-nets inwaters upto 3 km from the shore andwithin 400m from other locatedfishing gear. What is quite specialabout the regulation on trawl gear isthat unlike in the Philippines,Malaysia and Indonesia in theSoutheast Asian region the prohibi-tion in Thailand is for protecting thenursery and breeding grounds ratherthan to resolve conflicts betweenincompatible gear-groups (personaldiscussion with Inspector General ofFisheries, Thailand). On beingspecifically asked whether smallfishermen have made any formal pleafor banning trawling, the officials ofthe enforcement department and theInspector General of Fisheries repliedin the negative.

Reasons for poormanagement

In spite of the fact that the govern-ment was cognizant of the need forconservation, the Gulf of Thailand hasbeen described as «potentially amarine desert» (Sakiyama op. cit.) or


an «underwater desert» (BangkokBank, 1977, quoted in Hinton, P. opcit.). The resource depletion and thepre-ponderance of trash fish andundersized fish underscore the failureof the management schemes. This isquite evident from the fact that only0.2 percent of the total value ofmarine catch is expended on enforce-ment (from the Inspector General ofFisheries, Bangkok). The viciouscircle of overcapitalization of thefishery and over fishing along with theclout of trawler fishermen, lack ofpolitical will and the declaration of theExclusive Economic Zone by othercountries in the 1970s seem to haveaggravated the predicament of Thaifisheries so much so that the lamentof Dr. Smith remains as valid today asin 1925.

As we have mentioned in thebeginning, the Thai marine fishery isbasically an export-oriented one. It isalso designed to be operated in therich waters off the coasts of othercountries in the South China Sea andthe Indian Ocean. Before thedeclaration of the EEZ in South andSoutheast Asian countries almostone half of the total Thai trawl catcheswas believed to have originated frominternational waters. As a result of thedeclaration of EEZ by theneighbouring countries, Thailand lostabout 780,000 sq. km of distant water

fishing grounds (Panayotou &Jetanovanich 1987) and was thecountry most affected by thedeclaration in this region. This led toan intensification of fishing in theirterritorial waters (Thailand was thelast country to declare its EEZ in theSoutheast Asian region, in 1981).

It is difficult to control theexpansion of fishing effort in the terri-torial waters. Firstly, the rich fisher-men are politically very powerful. TheFishermen’s Co-operative Society(FCS), Fishermen’s Group and theFishermen’s Associa-tion are con-trolled, particularly by owners or skip-pers of trawlers and/or purse-seiners.Not only are they able to fish wherethey wish but are also capable ofobtaining a steady supply ofreasonably priced fuel and scarcecredit (Sakiyama op. cit.).

In 1980 the government tried tostop the registration of trawlers andpush-nets to control fishing effort butthe move was thwarted because theFishermen’s Association did notagree with the proposed restrictions.In 1983, because of resource deple-tion, the government decided to closethe fishing ground in the Gulf aroundPrachuab, Chumpon and Surat.Trawling and purse-seining wereprohibited for a period of two months.However, these fishermen refused toaccept the prohibition and the restric-

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tions had to be relaxed by the govern-ment. Two factors are revealed by theabove examples. Firstly, the bigoperators do not believe in the con-servation of the fishery for regenera-tion and Secondly, the government,either because of a lack of politicalwill or the clout of trawler/purse-seineoperators was unable to implementthe management measures(Isvilanoda et. al. op. cit).

Officials of the enforcementdepartment in a discussion with meagreed that the enforcement offishing regulations is very sloppy.However, they say, they are trying toimprove the efficacy of enforcement.

According to them there are basicallyfour difficulties. Firstly, the indentednature of the coastline and size of thefishing ground make enforcementvery difficult. Secondly, the villagersby and large do not co-operate withthem in apprehending the violators.Thirdly, there are budgetary andpersonnel con-straints. And finally,the judiciary does not cooperate withthe officials. Most of the violationschanged by the officials aredismissed by the court.

The following list was providedby the enforcement department onthe number of violations recordedbetween 1986 and 1988.


Considering the fact that thereare over 7,000 trawlers, 1,000 purse-seiners and 1,500 push-nets it is dif-

ficult to believe that a more 0.03percent of trawlers and purse-seinersand 0.01 percent of push-net

Table I

Number of Prosecutions for the Violation of Fishery Regulations(1986-1988)

Sl. Years Nature of violationGear

No. 1986 1987 1988

1. Pair trawling 10 11 43 Closed season and 3 km ban

2. Other trawling 10 20 31 -do-

3. Purse-seines 11 25 32 Closed season

4. Push-net 31 25 21 3 km ban

5. Bag-net 441 398 228 Not known

Source: Enforcement Section, Department of Fisheries, Bangkok.

operators violated regulations. Thehigher incidence of apprehension(10 percent) or bag-net operators isperhaps because regulations on thisgear have been in operation sincethe early-20th century.

What Teresa Sofia opines onthe basis of field work in Ao Cho inTrat province reiterates the poorenforcement of regulations:

«Perhaps the most importantproblem with marine fisheriespolicies in Thailand is not the lack ofmeasures of proposals, but theenforcement of these measures»(Teresa Sofia op. cit.)

She further observes:

It is highly unlikely that the marinepolice is able to effectively enforceany of the measures mentioned,there is simply not enough patrolboats and personnel, there arenumerous security problems andmany officers (themselves localpeople) sympathize with thefishermen’s view point and turn ablind eye over the matter» (ibid.).

Conclusion

Unlike in the other SoutheastAsian countries of our study, theincidence of conflicts following the useof incompatible technologies seems tobe low in Thailand. This is perhapsrelated to the diminutive size of the

traditional sector and its weak politicalclout, which stands in sharp contrastwith the power, and influence of thetrawler lobby in Thailand.

Because of economic and socialspecificities, the trajectory of fisheriesdevelopment in Thailand wasdifferent from other countries in theregion. The rapid industrialisation ofa modest fishery into one of thelargest in the world was achieved atthe cost of killing the ‘golden goose’of rich fishing grounds. In spite oflegislation that is reasonablysufficient to check this tendency verylittle has been done.

In this context, an observationmade by Dr. Smith in 1925 stillmakes sense:

«The history of fisheries and fisheryregulations everywhere has beenthat fishermen and governments areloathe to make even so small aconcession to the requirements ofnature, and the result is that we seefisheries languishing and resourcesgradually diminishing andproceeding to the point ofcommercial extinction, whereas,with very little restriction on fishingoperations the same resourcesmight have been preservedunimpaired for indefinite periods oftime» (Smith, H.M. op. cit.).

To use an analogy, what is hap-pening in the Gulf of Thailand is akinto slaughter tapping of rubber trees

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once their commercial life is over.Lack of enforcement is the key factorpromoting over-exploitation. At thesame time, it is linked up with thepolitical milieu of the State and theclout of the offenders. Irrespective of

the nature of destruction, if revenue isforthcoming especially from exports,the State has a tendency to swapforeign exchange for long-termsustenance of the fishery.


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Japan is the biggest producer andconsumer of fish in the world. In

1986 Japan harvested 12 milliontonnes of fish. The per capitaconsumption of fish is approximately70 kg accounting for one half of thedietary supply of protein. But only 0.4percent of the total population of 120million is actively involved in fishing.

For the sake of fisheriesmanagement, Japanese marinefishery is divided into Coastal fishery,Off-shore fishery and Distant-waterfishery. These sub-divisions are notlegally defined but there is anoperational distinction.

Coastal fishery refers tooperations (including mariculture)within the 12-mile territorial watersusing powered vessels of less than10 gross tones. These are mostlyfamily enterprise engaged in avariety of single day operations.

Offshore fishery refers to opera-tions beyond 12 miles using poweredvessels above 10 GT. Medium andsmall enterprises are engaged in thisoperation. The fishing trip may extendfrom one day to a week.

Distant-water fishery is inwaters beyond the Japanese EEZand off those of various coastalnations around the world.

About 80 percent of the labourforce comprises family membersengaged in coastal fisheries. Theremaining 20 percent is engaged indistant-water and off-shore fisheries.Although coastal fisheries account foronly 27.2 percent of the total produc-tion, they account for 48 percent ofthe total value which is the highestcontribution in terms of value amongall the three sub-sectors. This is be-cause of the concentration on captureand culture of high-value species.


J A P A N

The focus of this chapter ismainly on the historical evolution ofJapanese coastal fisherymanagement.

The feudal period

The traditional concepts offishing rights found their way into thecodified laws of the nation statesfrom the Tokugawa period in Japan(1603 to 1867 AD). Village-basedfishing territories were establishedand developed by the feudal lordsbetween 1560 and 1808. The seawas regarded as an integral part ofthe feudal domain and considered tobe an extension of the land.

The fishing rights were grantedostensibly for two reasons. Firstly, forKako (corvee labour) and secondly,for taxes. The foremost duties asdefined by the feudal fiefs were theprovision of Kako and payment oftaxes in cash and kind. Kako wasmainly for naval defence and guar-ding the coast, transportation for therulers and for rescuing ships indistress. There seems to be a thirdreason for granting fishing rights tothe coastal villages viz. administra-tive. Since the entire coastal waterswere apportioned among coastalvillages, it served the security in-terests of the fiefs. The rights were

almost like an invisible fortification ofthe sea and the fishermen did notenjoy freedom of movement fromone village to another.

Thus it was a reciprocal arrange-ment (though unequal in content)between the feudal lords and thefishermen. In return for the taxes andservices that the latter provided, theywere given fishing rights and tradingprivileges. A salient feature of thisarrangement, which exists eventoday in Japanese coastal fisheries, isthat the responsibility (for labour andtaxes) was delegated to the villageand not to individuals. Secondly,relations between a village and theoutside world were regulated by theauthorities. But within the village,matters were left to the villagers.

However, the formation of village-based fishing territories was unevenbecause of unequal development ofthe market, varying geographical andtopographical circumstances anddiffering produc-tive capacities of thefisheries. By 1650s most exclusivefishing terri-tories had been firmlyestablished.

The establishment of exclusivefishing territories does not mean thatthis is the only type of fishing rights.«To make an otherwise rigid systemof exclusive territories, flexible andworkable» (Culland, A.1984), com-

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mon fishing territories were alsodemarcated where fishermen frommore than one village could fishsubject to prescriptive and mutualagreements. Thus there was a dualsystem of exclusive and commonfishing territories which continue to beso even now. As Culland remarks,«the system of sea tenure was thus apatchwork of criss-crossing rights thathad developed through prescriptiveand mutual agreements» (ibid.).

Within the exclusive-rights areaand the common fishing territory,fishing operations were subject to alicensing system which was largelyspecific to the gear and the species.The granting of licences in the caseof small-scale gear like gill-nets, set-nets, drift-nets and traps was vestedwith the village leadership. Thispractice continues even today. Theonly difference is that the villageleadership is now vested with theFisheries Co-operative Association(FCA). But no licences were requiredfor simple technologies like hook andline, seaweed and shell collection.

A third type of rights was alsogiven, but only to the affluent netowners by the feudal authorities. Thiswas mainly species-specific. Whales,tuna, and sardines could be caughtunder this system of prescriptiverights which was perhaps the mostrewarding source of revenue for the

authorities. These rights could besold, mortgaged or inherited.

Though the feudal authoritiestried to divide fishing rights betweenaffluent net owners and smallfishermen, the territorial rights systemhad very little egalitarian content.Within the village a fraction ofvillagers monopolised the fishinggrounds in return for payment oftaxes. The establishment of a publicfund in 1762 (in Fukuoka) with theidea of providing cheap credit to smallfishermen was mainly for strength-ening their clout vis-à-vis the interestsof large owners. At the same time, thelicensing scheme was very strictlyimposed on the large gear operatorsto discourage monopolisa-tion offisheries by a few owners (ibid.). Inother words, there were some effortson the part of the feudal authorities tobalance the power between differentgear-groups (but, significantly, notbetween the rich and the poor). Sincethere is no critical analysis of thefeudal strategies vis-à-vis allocationof rights, we are unable to sayanything more about the priorities ofthe authorities — whether it is due toadministrative reasons or financialreasons or for securing corvee labour.

Though exclusive fishing ter-ritories were established, there wasno indication on how borders shouldbe defined on land (regarding access


to sandy beaches) and at sea (demar-cating different fishing territories).This, in addition to the privatisation offishing grounds and monopolisationof gear, led to various disputes. Thesedisputes were either betweenvillages or between different gear-groups. The former were largely overboundaries, the rights to commonfishing, and licensing of large nets.The latter were because of labourshortage, gear destruction andimpact on shoal movement.

Poaching was another inter-village problem undertakenprobably with the intention ofacquiring prescriptive rights tocommon fishing in the water of theneighbouring villages. Concern wasalso expressed regarding resourcedepletion caused by larger gear.

Implicit in the above discussionare three factors. Firstly, the develop-ment of the market in Japan,particularly its uniform developmentacross the country. Secondly, theexistence of rich resources andthirdly, the existence of technologyand skill to capture and supply fish tothe market.

The post feudal period

In 1876, fiefs were abolished andall fisheries reverted to the central

government. A new system ofoperation was introduced under whichthe individual fisherman had to pay ause tax. But because of heavyopposition from the fishermen thissystem was replaced by fisheries co-operatives in 1887 «to co-ordinate theuse of coastal fishing grounds»(Ruddle, K. 1987).

The first national fisheries lawwas enacted in 1901 and it was mainlywith the idea of maintaining peaceand order in the fishing villages (ibid.).The law was based on traditionalpractices without any effort to removethe inequities during the feudalperiod. The feudal rights were sup-plemented and formally categorisedinto those for capture fisheries,beach-seines, set-nets andmariculture. The fishing village guilds,of which fishermen were membersduring the feudal times, were madethe nucleus under the new law anddesignated as Fisheries Associations(FAs). Their functions were more orless the same till 1910 viz. granting offisheries rights and the issuance oflicences within the territorial limits ofthe villages. But in 1910 the law wasamended and FAs were permitted toengage in economic activities, in-cluding co-operative marketing.However, the principal functionremained the former.

The 1901 Fisheries Law also did

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precious little to alleviate small-scalefishermen from exploitation bymiddlemen and fish wholesalers.This situation was made worse bymotorization and gear modernizationwhich began in the 1920s, resultingin efficient offshore vessels fishing incoastal waters. The recession in the1930s aggravated their distress evenfurther. The Meiji governmentreorganised the FAs to improve theircondition. One Association pervillage was established. The jointfishing rights areas were extendedfurther offshore to protect them fromoffshore fishermen. Attempts weremade to break the grip of themiddlemen by encouraging co-operative marketing by the FAs.According to Ruddle:

«from the late 1930s, with the greatdecline in the number of middlemen,wholesalers and moneylenders,many of the residual elements offeudalism were essentially eliminatedfrom Japanese fishing villages andfish landing ports. Henceforth, thefishermen themselves were themasters of the coastal fishinggrounds and their communities…»(ibid.)

However, Zengyoren (NationalFederation of Fisheries CooperativeAssociation) is of a different view. Ac-cording to their ‘Fisheries Cooperatives in Japan’ (Zengyorennd.),

«During the pre-War years, manyfishing villages were dominated bymerchants, landlords, or absenteenet masters, who lent out theirfishing rights and lived off thecommission they received. In manyinstances, such people were alsothe controlling officers of the villagefishermen union (FishermenAssociation). The actual fishermenmerely rented land and house, andborrowed operating expenses fromthe people» (parenthesis added).

The truth must be somewherebetween the rosy picture painted byRuddle and the dismal picture byZengyoren. One is likely to agreemore with the latter view becauseunder Meiji law the concept of fisher-man was not defined. Therefore, allthose who lived in the coastal village,irrespective of whether he was anabsentee or actual fisherman, gotmembership in the FAs. Theabsentee fishermen in all likelihoodmust have maneuvered the Associa-tion to protect their interests that pri-marily lay in fixed net fishery. Further-more, as Comitini (1967) remarks:

«Even though the fishermen’sassociation was the legal owner of thefishing right, it could not itself engage infishing operations. Its importance layprimarily in its control over thefishermen. Thus, even though thefishermen fished independently, theywere subject to regulation laid down bythe association. The section of the lawprohibiting the association from direct-


ly operation the «the fishing rightsensured that the large scale fixed-netrights remained in the hands of the«customary» users. These privateright fisheries, pre-empting the bestfishing grounds, were several timesmore productive than the common-right fisheries» (Comitini 1967).»

The post waradministration of coastalfisheries

In an attempt to «democratize»the institutional structure of Japanesecoastal fishery and to promote fisheryproductivity, a new fisheries law wasenacted in 1949 by the CentralGovernment with the assistance ofthe SCAP (Supreme Commander forthe Allied Powers) authority. The mostsignificant aspect of the new Law wasthat it granted fishery rights andlicences only to fishermen or fishingenterprises actually engaged infishing. It prohibited the transfer orleasing of fishing rights. This Lawwas complemented by the FisheriesCooperative Association Law of 1948which had the objective of improvingthe economic and social status offishermen and fish processors in ad-dition to increasing fishery productivi-

ty. The main intention behind thedemocratization process was to weedout the last vestiges of feudalism. In-stead of displacing the 1901 law witha new one, what was attempted wasa strengthening of conventionallaws/customary practices by remov-ing the non-democratic and ex-ploitative content of the previousLaw. The customary managementprinciples were also formalisedunder the new system.

The present management offisheries is in compliance with a dualsystem of rights and licencesadministered by the Ministry ofAgriculture, Forestry and Fisheriesaccording to the Fisheries Law of1949. (see table 1) Most of the respon-sibilities for administering coastalwaters are delegated to theprefectures. Fishing rights in themarine context refer to the coastalwaters and cover those fisheries«that either employ fixed gear or thatexploit a relatively immovablebenthos» (Ruddle 87). All coastalwaters where fishing is permitted aredivided among FCAs. In contrast,the licences govern those fisheriesthat catch migratory or highly mobilespecies and are issued for coastal,offshore and distant water fishing.

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Table I

The Structure of Japanese Fishing Rights and Licences

Rights

Categories Granted to

(1) JOINT FISHERY RIGHTS

A. Gathering seaweed, shellfish and other benthos

B. Specific to small-scale net fisheries Exclusively to FCA’s

C. Beach seines, unmotorized trawling, fish shelters

(2) DEMARCATED FISHERY RIGHTS

A. Special Demarcated Rights Exclusively to FCA’s private

B. Demarcated Rights organizations and individuals

(3) LARGE-SCALE SET-NET FISHERY RIGHTS -do

Licences

(1) LARGE-SCALE OPERATIONS IN Mostly to privateDISTANT WATERS Organizations and individuals

(2) MEDIUM-SCALE OPERATIONS IN DEEP WATERS -do-

(3) SMALL-SCALE NEARSHORE OPERATIONS FCA’s or individuals

(Source: Ruddle, K. 1987)

The fishery rights system protectscoastal fisheries and fishermenagainst encroachments of otherfisheries and other economic sectorsby granting them property rights.

Joint rights are issued for thecoordinated use of a fishing area andits resources by all members of anFCA. The allocation of fishing territoryamong the types of gear mentioned inthe table and the fishermen to beengaged in their operation areinternally decided by an FCA (ibid.).

Demarcated Rights are grantedfor aquaculture and are usually validfor five years. The Special Demar-cated Fishing Rights are grantedwhen many fishermen would want toengage in aquaculture in a large areaof the sea. And Demarcated FishingRights are granted for pondaquaculture.

Rights for Large-Scale Set-Netfisheries are largely species-specificand are managed by the prefecture.When joint rights embrace the entiresea territory of an FCA, demarcatedrights and those for set-nets aregranted only for specific areas withinthe joint rights area. All fishermenbelonging to a specific FCA are en-titled to fish within its sea territory butonly a limited number of fishermenare granted set-net and demarcatedrights. An FCA is granted demarcated

and set-net rights only if it has areassuitable for them within its territory.

Thus the tentativeness of Meijifishing rights was removed and therights were neatly categorized forcapture and culture fisheries withreference to the species caught andthe technology used. In other words,the species caught, technologyused and the fishing ground becameclear determinants of fishing rights.Therefore, there is no ambiguityabout its definition.

Fishing licences

Licences for small-scalefisheries in coastal waters aregranted by the prefecture to individualfishermen. They do not have the legalstatus of property rights. « In prin-ciple, licences are issued for fisheriesnot covered by fishing rights and inparticular for migratory species takenfrom trawlers larger than 15 GT andpurse-seiners over 40 GT». (ibid.)

Prior fishing experience is aprecondition for applying for fisheriesrights. To be considered as a fisher-man 90 to 120 days must be spendactually fishing in the sea. It is alsoimportant that they must have notbeen found guilty of flagrant violationsof the Fisheries Law or labourregulations and not in possession ofother fishery rights.

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Table II

Administration of Japanese Fisheries

Organ Area of Function CompositionJurisdiction

Central Fishery National level To deliberate 25 CommissionersAdjustment Council Under the Min. Important

of Agriculture, matters relating 15-representativesForestry and to the enforcement of fishery operatorsFishing of 1949 law & fishery employees

10-persons oflearning andexperience

Fishery Adjustment Prefectural To carry onCommission matters relating

To the fisheries.

a) Sea – Area Every Within the sphere 15 CommissionersFishery prefecture of the sea-areaAdjustment in which it is set up 9 - elected byCommision fishermen.

4- fishing specialists

2- representingpublic interests.

b) United Sea-Area 2 or more Need basedFishery prefecturesAdjustmentCommission

Source: Ruddle, K. 1987.

Allocation problems in the rightsto large-scale set-net fisheries and indemarcated fisheries are pre-emptedby granting top priority to the FCAs.

The management of coastalfisheries through this dual system ofrights and licences is at three levels.At the national level there is theCentral Fishery Adjustment Counciland at the prefectural level, theFishery Adjustment Commission.There are two types of FACs. One isthe Sea-Area Fishery AdjustmentCommission and the other, the UnitedSea-Area Fishery Adjust-mentCommission. The former — about 65in number is formed in everyprefecture, whereas the latter isestablished only when there is a needfor it, e.g., to control the fisheries ofseasonally migratory species whichwould require the coordinated effortof more than one prefecture. (SeeTable II). And lastly, there is FisheriesCo-operative Association, more than3000 in number, established in everyfishing village and entrusted with theduty of implementing the Law with theparticipation of fishermen.

The FCA plays the most centralrole in the management of coastalwaters. Its principal functioning is«planning, management and sustain-ed development of the sea territory forwhich the individual community hastenure» (ibid.). The near-shore waters

are essentially self-managed by theFCAs and they form the vital linkbetween individual fishermen and thecentral and prefectural government.

The national and prefecturalagencies are established as per theFisheries Law of 1949 and the FCAsas per the Fisheries CooperativeAssociations Law of 1948. Thus, inJapan the co-operative movement iswell integrated into the Fisheries Lawand because of this, the law has greatdeal of legitimacy, unlike most of thefishing nations in the Asian region.

The efficacy of Japanesefisheries management is essentiallybecause of its organisational struc-ture which facilitates a proper integra-tion of national management principleswith the local customary practices. Inother words, there is no «kink» in thelegislation between the national andlocal levels. In addition, the regula-tions are flexible and contextuallyapplicable according to the discretionof the FCAs because the responsi-bility to interpret the Law according tothe specificities of the region is left tothe local FCA. Thus, the room forpositive manoeuvrability enables theviable functioning of a system in acountry of multiple fisheries.

The social basis of its organisa-tional structure is the behaviouralnorms of Japanese society where

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«harmony together with communityor group orientation still stronglyinfluence... social behaviour » (ibid.).In other words, the relativelysuccessful implementation oflegislation and regulation through itsorganizational structure is because ofspecific value judgements of societythat inspire belief in legitimacy. This isperhaps further linked with the spirit ofnationalism or a national ideologywhich has given the State a greatdeal of legitimacy.

What is most interesting aboutthe development of Japanese fishingindustry is that the Fishery Law of1949 could successfully achieve thetwin goals of democratisation andenhancement in production bymaking these goals compatible witheach other.

Two aspects of the 1949 Law areworth mentioning. Firstly, the Lawsuccessfully demarcates the fishingindustry into coastal, offshore anddistant water fishery and successfullyprevents any conflicts between thethree. This does not mean that thereare no conflicts within these sectors.But for resolution of intra-sectoralconflicts there is no resort to judicialmachinery because the organiza-tional structure is such that theseproblems can be settled within theindustry through the FCA or SAACs.Resort to the judicial machinery arises

largely in the context of inter sectoralproblems when there are issues ofpollution and reclamation affectingthe livelihood or the tenurial rights ofthe coastal fishermen.

The demarcation of the fishingindustry into coastal, offshore anddistant water is mainly with theobjective of easing competitionbetween different class interests(See Comitini op. cit.). According toOka (quoted in Comitini, op. cit.) theimplicit objectives of fishery control inJapan is to leave the highproductivity fishing grounds (coastalwaters) to low efficiency boats andthe low productivity (offshoregrounds) areas to high-efficiencyboats since low-efficiency boatscannot exploit the off-shore groundssuccessfully. Again the rationale formanagement, according to Oka, isnot the maintenance of balancebetween fishing effort and total yieldbut on the other hand, «a countermeasure against a recession in thefishery business caused byfluctuations in the Japaneseeconomy» (ibid.).

Management of conflicts

One of the salient aspects ofconflicts in the fisheries sector of Japanis that, the conflicts are not between


coastal and offshore fisher-men. Theyare primarily between two sectors ofthe economy (i.e. between fisheriesand industry), localized, inter-prefectural or intra-prefectural innature and within the coastal region.As Ruddle points out, one of themajor sources of fisheries conflict inJapan was the «differential rates atwhich different communities adoptednew technologies» (Ruddle op. cit..The major disputes have stemmedfrom entry rights disputes, gearconflicts, illegal fishing, bound-aryjurisdictions, island ownership, etc.With the advancement of theeconomy the nature of conflicts alsohave changed in Japan.

During the feudal time theprincipal conflicts were over access tosandy beaches (for the operation ofbeach seines) and the demarcation ofthe boundary at sea. Therefore, theconflicts were either land or seabased. During the Meiji period theconflicts became largely technology-based because of the introduction oftrawling and other efficient fishingtechnologies like purse-seining. Thus,for example, the conflicts betweentrawler fishermen, traditional anglersand longliners in the Essa straitfollowing the introduction of trawlingin 1919-21 period still continue.

With the rapid industrialization ofJapan during the post-War period

there was increasing pressure onthe coastal waters. A series ofgovern-ment policies wereformulated to generate the flow oflabour to the industrial sector at theexpense of agriculture and fisheries(lwakiri, S. 1979). The policy of rapidindus-trialization and high economicgrowth led to large scale reclamationof coastal areas on the one handand pollution of inshore waters onthe other. According to theEnvironment Agency, in 1973, 21.2per cent (5650 km) of the total length(26,539 km) of Japan’s coast-linehas been com-pletely reclaimed andclosed to the people (ibid.). This wasparticularly severe in the Tokyo Bayarea and the Seto Inland sea. Thus,as a result of new priorities theconflicts graduated from intra-sectoral to inter-sectoral incharacter.

What is quite interesting toobserve in conflict management isthat intra-sectoral problems areresolved with the assistance ofvarious agencies which have arepresentational character and func-tioning within the sector. Whereas,inter-sectoral problems are largelyreferred to the adjudication of thecourt of law. In other words, traditionalconflicts originating in the pre-War eraare resolved within the sector andthose which are a product of the post-War period are referred to the courts.

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According to Ruddle, in inter-sectoralconflicts traditional methods of resolu-tion are generally not useful becauseof clashing world-views of the partiesconcerned resulting in the recourse tojudiciary to resolve disputes.

At the local level, customarytechniques are employed to avoid orminimise interpersonal conflictswhich include avoidance behavior(i.e. avoiding to fish at the favouritespot when there are other fishermenaround, instead of fighting with them)and the acknowledgement of therights of a first-corner to a particularfishing spot (Ruddle, op. cit.).

Prevalence of certain voluntarycustomary pratices do not precludethe occurrence of conflicts within anFCA. But unlike in many othersocieties there are social forces thatbalance and iron out disputes for thebetterment of the village as a whole.According to Ruddle, consensusdecision-making is very central to thefunctioning of FCAs. In other words,the decision-making process is struc-tured in such a manner that every in-terest is represented/ reflected in thedecision taken. We are not clear fromhis discussion how exactly an FCAtakes care of hierarchy of powerwithin a village in this consensus ap-proach. Could it be that the importantpressure groups are able to elicitdesired response from less powerful

groups within the FCA through covertmeans? At an informal level, inter-mediary and peer pressures are alsoused to resolve minor conflicts. Thethreat of social ostracization is theultimate penalty in unyielding casesof conflicts, which facilitatesconformity to the collective will incases of outright theft or deliberatedamage to another person’s gear.

Formal resolution ofconflict

While intra-village problems areinformally resolved, inter-FCA, intra &inter prefectural problems areresolved at a formal level. Such con-flicts could include violation of closedseason, destructive fishing, poaching,illegal sale of tainted fish andproblems arising from incompatibilityof technologies like, for example, theconflicts between set-netters and gill-netters. These conflicts, if occurringwithin a prefecture, are resolved bythe Sea Area Adjustment Commissionand if inter-prefectural, by the UnitedSea Area Adjustment Commission.However, such incidents are notnumerous in number, and accordingto the Zengyoren, the number of suchviolations are dwindling over time(personal discussion with the ChiefExecutive of Zengyoren).


Resolution of inter-sectoralproblems

Inter-sectoral problems arisemainly out of the conflicting interestsof industry and fisheries. As we havementioned before, post-War Japanfocused mainly on industrialisationand economic growth at the expenseof the agriculture and fisheriessectors. This led to problems for thefishing communities particularlyproblems created by pollution andcoastal reclamation. Until the end of1960s these problems wereconsidered to be a price to becollectively paid for economicprogress. However, the desirabilityof industrial growth at the expense ofcitizen and community welfare andrights was challenged in the 1970s inthe wake of «Big Four» pollutionincidents (Mina-mata disease ormercury poisoning; Itai-itai disease orcadmium poisoning and variouspulmonary disorders) (Ruddle op.cit.).

In the post-War period, inter-sectoral problems were mostlyresolved with the help of the judicialmachinery. The judiciary got involvedmainly due to the refusal of thecompanies to own responsibility fordamages done to life by pollution anddue to the attitude of the governmentwhich often sided with the polluter.

Thus the judiciary originally gotinvolved on humanitarian groundsthough later it also took up cases ofinadequate compensation for therelinquishment of fisheries rights.

According to Ruddle there arethree reasons for the use of judiciaryby the fishermen.

Firstly, traditional processes ofmediation were not trusted to rendera just solution because of theirabuse by polluting companies.Secondly, the growing realisationthat the situation had becomecompletely atypical and divorcedfrom traditional precedents. Andthirdly, the desire of fishermen to fixaccountability on the perpetrators ofdestruction which was possible onlythrough the judicial process.

The judicial process had anadded legitimacy because of thewidespread sympathy for fishermenas a result of the «Big Four» tragedy.

The redress for pollution andpartial or total loss of fishing rightsdue to reclamation was mainly in theform of compensation. Thus, asRuddly remarks,

«reinforcement of that traditionalright to compensation may perhapshave been the most importantachievement of the post-warcampaign against pollution»(op.cit.).

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However, the distribution ofcompensation is very poor (ibid.)and according to Prof. Hirasawathere are malpractices in itsdistribution (personal discussion).

The current problems ofJapanese coastal fishery

With rapid economic growth, im-provement in welfare, and excellentopportunities for mobility of labour,fishermen in present day Japan, areincreasingly becoming disinterestedin fishing as an occupation. As aresult, more and more FCAs arewilling or wanting to sell their fishingrights for phenomenal compensation.Reliance on compen-satory paymentshas become a way of life for manylocal fishing communities. Theamount paid as compensation partlyfinds its way back to the fishing sec-tor and partly gets invested in realestate and small industrial enter-prises. The reinvest-ment in the fishingsector has made it more capital-intensive (as somebody jokinglyremarked, the modern Japanesefishing boat is like a battle ship!) im-

plying an enhancement of productivecapacity in fishing grounds alreadyrendered fragile by degrada-tion andhabitat destruction. (1)

In spite of a reasonably efficientmanagement system, Japanesecoastal fisheries are not free fromproblems. Two main problems stillfaced by the coastal fisheries are:

(i) decline of resources because ofoverfishing and the reduction offishing grounds due to coastalland reclamation projects andmarine pollution and

(ii) ageing of the fishery work forceand the disinterest of youngstersto join fisheries (Zengyoren op.cit.).

Overfishing in the coastal watersis mainly because of mechanizedgear, efficient fishing techniques andmotorized vessels, combined withfishermen’s «strong natural tendencyto overfish» (ibid.). This has also ledto over-capitalisation of the fisheriessector (lwakiri op. cit.)

According to the Seventh FisheryCensus of Japan (1983), about 60percent of the individually owned


(1) However, Matsuda and Kaneda (1984) are of the view that the money is not invested in fisheries development.They observe:«As the economic functions of Fisheries Co-operative Association (FCAs) increased so their administrative functionbegan to be misused i.e., they took advantage of their administrative function only for the members’ short-termeconomic welfare, but neglected both social welfare as well as long-term economic welfare».

fishery management units are headedby men over 50, 25 percent by menover 50, 25 percent by men over 60,and only 15 percent are controlled bymen under 40. This is complementedby a shortage for brides in the coastalvillages (arising from womenmigrating to urban centres andmarrying from other com-munities).Many people expressed the fear that,over time, the coastal fishing sectorwill become less and less important.In addition to over-fishing and over-capitalisation Matsuda and Kaneda(op. cit.) also point out that,

«the productivity of common fishery rights areas has notincreased since 1952, regardless ofhigh subsidies for coastal fisheriesdevelopment, which have includednationwide ocean ranchingprograms and artificial reefprojects» (ibid.)

The indifference or lack ofinterest of youngsters towards fishingas an occupation is further reflectedin the activities of fisheries co-operatives. Members increasinglyshow no initiative to participate fully inthe functioning of their FCA. Therelationship between the co-operativeand the memebers is degenerating insome places into a simple customer-supplier relationship (Zengyoren op.cit.). If the tendency continues,Zengyoren fears that,

«the fisheries Co-operative will be indanger of becoming bureaucratisedand having its democratic naturereduced to a mere formality» (ibid.)

Since the co-operatives aregetting excessively involved in theabandonment of fishery rights forcompensation, the fishermen havealso gradually lost public support(Matsuda and Kaneda op. cit.)Because of this, and the inability ofFCAs to accommodate recreationalfisheries under the existing legalframework, Matsuda and Kanedaforesee a limited future for the FCAs.There are about 10-20 millionrecreational fishermen who havealready begun to claim their rights inthe common fishery rights areas. Inaddition, the general public isclaiming rights to the beach. In thelight of these new developments,combined with the inertia of theFCAs, it will be interesting to watchthe coastal fisheries of Japan infuture.

Conclusion

In spite of problems of over-capitalisation, overfishing, and otherrecent developments the success ofcoastal fisheries management inJapan is umatched anywhere else inthe world. What are the factors thatfacilitated this success?

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Japan is a classic case wheremany positive factors coexisted andcomplemented one another therebyfacilitating the efficacy of the system.These factors are not confined only tothe fisheries sector — they are vitallyinter-sectoral in character. Japan,again, shows that the successfulmanagement of the fisheries sectorbecomes a concrete reality only whenthere is overall development of theeconomy. In other words, problemswithin the sector cannot be solved inisolation but only in conjunction withother sectors.

Historically speaking, grantingof tenurial rights to fishermen in thesea, right from the Tokugawa periodonwards provided a proper basis forthe future development of coastalmanagement. Our discussionsshow that these rights form the hubof the management system. Thissystem is unique to Japan.

In a country where fish is themain source of protein, even in theolden days, development of marketsfor marine products took place ratherearly. Since the entire population isfish-eating, the size of the market wasas incentive for enhanced production.This was further complemented bythe settlement pattern of the popula-tion. The archipelagic nature of thecountry coupled with forested, moun-tainous hinterland resulted in the con-

centration of population in the coastalareas. Further there was no tabooattached to fish-eating (unlike theBalinese in Indonesia, for example,who were averse to eating fishbecause they considered the sea asa repository of filth!) (See Polunin1984).

By inference, we can see thatthe required skill and technology werelocally available. The sea was alsovery rich in resources. Availability ofresources, skill and technology andtenurial rights in conjunction with anabsorptive market provided a broaderbase for the development of thefisheries sector.

The successful democratizationof the fishing sector, strengthening ofthe co-operative movement and theclassification of the fishery intocoastal, offshore and distant water,resulted in the betterment offishermen. While improvement in thewelfare of coastal fishermen wasachieved by reserving the coastalwaters through joint and demarcatedrights, the objective of enhancedproduction was achieved by thesuccessful seaward expansion offishing fleets into the offshore anddistant water areas. In other words, aneat division of fishing space betweenthe small-scale and large-scale sectorcould be a reason for the success ofthe management system.


In this context, it is important toremember that big capital in Japanwas able to successfully diversify in-tonew areas and into new forms oftechnology. The investors were ableto diversify the technology base tomeet the national objective of higherproduction. Thus even when therewere conflicts within the coastalwaters, these were confined to thedesignated fishery. Of course, thetechnology-induced offshore and deepsea fishing ventures were supportedby a rapidly growing economy whichpaid the highest per unit value for fishin the world. Therefore, the massiveinvestment in these frontiers were notat the mercy of the vagaries of theworld market, but, on the other hand,were adequately compensated by thenational economy.

Even after the declaration of EEZand the oil price rise in the 1970swhich adversely affected Japanesedistant water operations, the rapidgrowth achieved by the Japaneseeconomy enabled the importation offish products to meet domesticrequirements. Concomitantly, culture-fishery was further strengthened in thecoastal waters. In other words, thedifficulties within the sector could beneutralised to a great extent by certainmacro-developments in the economyas a whole.

Demographic factors also alle-

viated any increase in pressure onthe limited fishing space within thejoint rights jurisdiction. On the otherextreme, there is a potential threatthat the coastal fishery may have towind up ! The total number offishermen in Japan has come downfrom around 700,000 in the mid1940s (source: Hirasawa, I. personaldiscussion) to around 200,000 in1983 (The Seventh Fishery Censusof Japan 1983) and it is dominated byfisherman in the age group 50-60.This gives credence to the hypothesisthat, given a choice, a fisherman hasa tendency to decide against fishing.In other words, among the primaryproducing sectors, fisheries isperhaps the last resort in a situationof unlimited supply of labour. Whenthere are opportunities for inter-sectoral mobility there is an outwardmigration from the primary producingsectors, particularly from the fishingsector.

The «objective» factors we havementioned above have definitelyplayed a positive role in the reproduc-tion of customary ethos without muchdilution. The balancing of economic,social and political forces was suchthat it enabled the strengthening ofthe ‘consent’ content within the socialfabric of relationships in favour of cer-tain norms already established in themarine context. In other words, the

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legitimacy of law has a certain strongeconomic basis and if this basis wasweaker there would have beentremendous refraction betweenlegislation, on the one hand, and itsacceptance and enforceability on theother.

But at the same time, because ofthe changing economic environmentin Japan, there are rapid changes in

the fisheries sector too. The dwindlingfishermen’s population and the grow-ing involvement of FCAs in for-sakingfishing rights for compensation areportentous indicators to the future ofthe present framework of fisheriesmanagement. This is furthercomplicated by the pressures exertedby recreational fishermen for fishingrights and the general public for rightsto the beach.


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Conflicts in the coastal waters

The attention that conflictsbetween trawlers and traditionalgear-groups has received in Asiatends to give an impression thatemergence of tensions within thefisheries sector is a result of theintroduction of trawling. However,historically there have been manykinds of tensions even between thetraditional gear-groups. Thus, forexample, access to sandy beach forthe operation of beach-seine was animportant form of conflict in Japan inthe feudal period. In Sri Lanka therewere conflicts between the localfishermen (using coir-made beach-seine) and the migrant fishermenfrom India (using cotton beach-seine)as far as back as in the 1860s.Similarly, in certain parts of Thailand,conflicts between gill-nets and crab-nets and squid-trap and crab-netsare common within the traditional

sector even today.

Such tensions have been eitherland-based (over access to thebeach) or sea-based. The latter couldbe territorial disputes in areas wherethere are tenurial rights to the coastalwaters or they could be disputes overoverlapping resource-space. Otherfactors have also contri-buted towardstension in coastal waters: muddischarge following deforestation,dumping of tailings after mining (e.g.Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines),industrial pollution, coastal reclama-tion, conversion of mangroves intoaquaculture-ponds, etc.

Of course, introduction oftechnology vastly more efficient thanwhat is in use gives the tensions acertain edge. This is so with theintroduction of trawling, developed inresponse to interna-tional demand forprawns, which builds up to a classic


C O N C L U S I O N

case of clash between incompatibletechnologies.

Often, the destruction of fishinggear and the falling share in the totalproduction of the non-trawl fishermenare instrumental in the build-up oftension. This is further worsened byallegations of resource depletion andinequity from differences in efficiency.

Even here, tensions do notalways lead to open conflicts. Theexperience of Southeast Asiancountries shows that a uniquecombination of factors —- oftenspecific to each country/society —influences the open manifestation ofthese tensions in the form of conflicts.Thus, in Indonesia and Malaysia, theethnic factor in combination withdestruction of gear and decline in theshare of total catch of gill-netfishermen was responsible for theviolent eruptions. In Thailand,however, the eruption of conflicts wasrelatively benign because of thedimunitive size of the traditionalsector. Similarly, in certain pockets ofthe Philippines and Thailand there isno apparent incompatibility betweentrawlers and traditional gear-groupswhen they operate from the samelocality. But there is tension if thetrawlers come from outside.

The eruption of tension intoconflicts also seems to be determinedby other social factors. In villages mark-

ed by a strong patron-clientrelationship between the localfisherman and the village trader (e.g.Suki relationship in the Philppines),there seems to be fewer eruptions ofconflicts if the trader is also a trawler-owner. Alternatively, if the fishermanbelongs to a community, traditionallyknown for its militancy (the Buginesecommunity in Indonesia, for example),the occurrence of conflicts are morefrequent, often marked by violence.How the degree of militancy decidesthe nature of conflicts also seems tobe influenced by the nature ofinvolvement in fishing —- whether thefisherman is a full-time fisherman orone who combines fishing withfarming operations. In the latter case,he seems to be less inclined to, orinvolved in, articulating protest.Conversely, in Indonesia andMalaysia — where the most intenseconflicts broke out — the fishermenactively involved in open fights weremostly full-time fishermen. Thus,cultural factors and the extent ofinvolvement in fishing can eithersubsume conflicts between incom-patible technologies or exacerbatethem in different societies.

The role of legislation inconflict management

The response of the State to theseconflicts —- primarily between trawling

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and traditional gear —- is throughenactment of legislation. This gesture ismore common when there is intensearticulation of protest against trawling(e.g. Indonesia and Malaysia). Wherethe expression of protest is diffused andfeeble, either the State does not step in(e.g. Thailand) or it intervenes in such amanner that the legislation, at best,remains an exercise in rhetoric (e.g. thePhilippines).

But legislation in fisheries hasnot been restricted to conflictmanagement. Historically, it aimed at conservation of resources.Particularly in the Southeast Asiancountries, non-quantitative regula-tions like mesh restrictions, area/seasonal closure and proscription ofdynamiting/cyanide-fishing were inforce, either in isolation or incombination, from the late nineteenthand early twentieth centuries. (1).

At present, with the exception ofThailand, all countries in this regionclaim that the twin-objectives oflegislation are management ofconflicts and resources. The principalmethod for the attainment of theseobjectives is the zoning arrangement,which grants exclusive use-rights to

traditional gear-groups in the inshorewaters.

Efficacy of legislation

However, the legislative processhas never been comprehensiveenough to make provisions that aretruly efficacious. This is largely dueto the absence of discussions withconflicting gear-groups at theformulation state and the lack of anattempt to disseminate the content ofvarious provisions after enactment ofthe law. Whatever could be achievedby these laws is further limited by theconfusion of the judiciary regardingtheir interpretation. This seems toarise from an inability to understandthe specificities of the marine context(which are different from the agrarianscene), particularly it three-dimensional nature.

In any case, zoning is incapableof achieving intended goals if threeis a preponderance of commercialspecies of prawns in the shallowwaters ( trawling is used in tropicalwaters mainly for catching prawnsand is the most efficient method of


(1) An interesting difference between the West and the East is that, in the Northern Atlantic area, e.g., the main focus ofearly fisheries policies were the protection of fishermen’s rights/interests and the maintenance of their fishingopportunities everywhere rather than the protection of fish (see Derham, P.J. 1987). However, in the Asian waters,earliest regulations were concerned with the conservation of resources (Japan excluded) — Thailand, e.g., had acceptedprinciples of conservation from the nineteenth century onwards (Smith,op. cit.) - and not the protection of the fishermen.

harvesting them). In such instances,the temptation to violate laws is toogreat even at the risk of apprehensionby the enforcement authorities. Butlegislation will be effective if theproscribed waters are so overfishedthat there is no worthwhile incentiveto violate the zone. But in this case,the legislation, would have come toolate to serve any real purpose.

Thus, considering the ineffec-tiveness of zoning, Indonesia hasperhaps the best method for resolvingthe conflicts, viz., a total ban ontrawlers in the waters dominated bygill-net groups. But there too existstories of covert violations by trawlersunder the aegis of corrupt armyofficials. And to what extent thisdecision is fishery-related is open toquestion. One should also note thatthe Indonesian experience since1980 suggests that a ban on trawlingby itself does not solve the problemsof operators of traditional gear.

Is effective promotion of equitableexploitation of resources possiblethrough legislation at all? Since theState represents a powerful coalition ofinterests which are «allied» with usersof the more modern technology,legislation becomes more a form ofconflict management aiming atpeaceful balance of interests, as wehave cited in the case of Malaysia,rather than a resolution per se. It may

tantamount to only rhetoric to establishthe State’s apparent «sympathy» forthe protestors.

Legislation is Janus-faced andseems to serve a dual purpose.What Aubert observed (1973) in thecontext of inadequate enforcementof the Law of Housemaids in Norwayin 1948 is quite relevant to the intra-sectoral conflicts in fisheries too:

«The law appears to yield to thedemands from one side in thesubstantive clauses, while the otherside is fairly well protected by thelack of effective enforcement. Thelaw thus serves a symbolic functionand ameliorates group conflicts»

(Aubert, V. 1973)

The ‘symbolic function’ of law aselucidated by Aubert is the purposeserved by legislation in the fisheriescontext too. The appearance ‘toyield to the demands from one side’also has the subtle function to de-escalate conflicts into a manageableform. Concurrently, it also tries toprevent the escalation into totallyundesirable realms. Thus, forexample, in Malaysia and Indonesia,the government would not want thegraduation of inter-gear conflicts intofull-fledged ethnic-violence.

But at the same time, if the con-flicts have already acquired certainthreatening dimensions (this depends

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on the perception of the State), theState does not hesitate to resort toradical measures (like the total ban inIndonesia). In such instances, therole of law rises above its ‘symbolicfunction’. But then the decision isless fishery-related; it is more inresponse to the glaring ethnicdimensions of the conflict rather thanto the need to develop the traditionalsector and to prevent overfishing.

The question of legitimacy

Even if legislation had beenenacted, the legitimacy of regulationsis very central in determining its suc-cess. In most cases this is absent,whether in the case of zoning viola-tions (e.g. Malaysia, Thailand) or inthe case of destructive fishing. AsJentoft and Kristoffersen observe intheir study on Lofoten Islands,Norway:

«Regulations which the fishermenthemselves consider illegitimatewill be ineffective because, theywill tend to be resisted and by-passed by the fishermen.Legitimacy is not just a result ofthe management decision itself,for instance, its distributive effectsbut also how it is reached».

(Jentoft, S. and Kristoffersen,T. 1988-89)

As they rightly point out, themost important question is howlegitimacy is arrived at. This dependsso much on an understanding ofdifferent world-views and therealisation of the necessity to evolvecodes of conduct that minimise coststo respective user-groups. But as wehave mentioned before, in theabsence of ex ante discussions orany attempt at disseminating thecontent of legislation, different gear-groups see legislation primarily as atransgression into their legitimaterights. Though legally they are in thewrong, morally they feel they are inthe right vis-a-vis the violations. Aclassic example is the case ofdestructive fishing practices usingdynamite and cyanide in thePhilippines, Indonesia and Thailand.In these countries, perhaps in manyothers too, dynamiting and use ofcyanide become destructive in theireyes only because of theintermediation of an outsideperception — in this instance, theState’s. Otherwise, these practiceshave local sanction.

Reasons for poor enforcement

Lack of legitimacy is also animportant reason contributing towardsthe ineffective enforcement ofregulations. As Derham observes:

«They are often vociferous exponentsand demanding of enforcement,


provided of course it is directedelsewhere, and it is not unknown forfishermen to claim a «legitimateexpectancy» of non-enforcement asa defense in this situation».

(Derham, P.J. op. cit.)

Thus, for example, restrictionson trawling are found unjust by itsoperators but supported by non-trawlfishermen. At the same time thosewho use fine mesh-nets and indulgein destructive fishing among thetradi-tional gear-groups do not agreewith the restrictions on thesemethods.

Corruption among enforcementofficials and political interferencealso contribute towards poorenforcement in addition to otherdifficulties we have mentioned in therespective country reports.

The lack of legitimacy and thegeneral inertness of enforcement arefurther compounded by the apathy ofthe judiciary. The disposition of thecourts is to vindicate personscharged with the violation of fishingregulation s because of the difficultyin clearly establishing the case. AsDerham observes:

«There appears to be no immutabledefinition of «fishing» and prosecutioncases have been lost because theprosecuting authority failed toconvince the court that fishing per sehad taken place even though the

defendant vessel had her gear in thewater and was towing it.»

(Derham, P.J. op. cit.)

The violators of fishing regula-tions seem to be aware of thedisposition of the court and,therefore, the regulations cannoteven function as a deterrent.Contrarily, the deterrent influenceseems to be replaced by an incentive(Scwartz, R and Orleans, S. 1973).

Considering the poor legitimacyof fisheries regulations, an efficaciousimplementation of these regulationsis only possible through enhance-ment of the fear of apprehension andpunishment. This would presupposethe beefing-up of the enforcementmachinery. Considering the three-dimensional nature of the sea, thefluidity of the medium, the mobility ofspecies, etc., an adequate enforce-ment machinery would mean phe-nomenal investment in men andmaterial which few countries canafford. This situation is further compli-cated by the question of political willin the respective countries.

An alternative approach toconflict management

In the absence of concern forequity, the State is unlikely to ensuredistributional justice. In such apredicament what is the way out?

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Japan seems to offer a solution. Itsfisheries management is structuredin such a manner that intra-sectoralconflicts can be mediated within thesector. According to Ruddle:

«In the Japanese case, at all levels,they involve much face-to-facecontact and prolonged discussion,and they appear to be governed lessby the rule of the inflexible law towhich most westerners areaccustomed».

(Ruddle, K op. cit.)

In other words, there does notseem to be any insularity betweendifferent gear-groups and thereseems to be enough room fordialogue. (Sri Lanka is anothercountry where inter-gear conflicts areresolved through dialogue. (1) Butthe difference between Japan and SriLanka is that, in the latter it is theState that facilitates the dialogue as alast resort). Complementing this, isthe nature of the Japanese fisherieslaws (1901 and 1949) which areessentially a codification of localcustoms (Kada, Y. 1984) and,therefore, the fisheries law is kind ofa «legitimation logic on a large formallevel» (ibid.). This is the centraldifference between Japanesefisheries law and that of other

Southeast Asian countries).(2)Further its final interpretation restswith the village-level co-operativesand not with the State.

As Ruddle points out, the viabilityof any formal corpus of legislationdepends on the behavioural norms ofeach society. Law as legitimation logicis possible in Japan mainly because ofthe uniqueness of Japanese society.(3) The consensual decision makingand obedience to law evolved overcenturies. So too, integration of valuesand a certain degree of homogeneity.

Cultural traits vary from regionto region and country to country.Thus, the case of Southeast Asia isin sharp contrast to that of Japan.There are sharp differences withineach country particularly alongcommunal or ethnic lines. Thecontent of legislation exhibits certainad- hocism and is more or lessadministrative in origin, thuscontributing to its poor legitimacy.

Still, it may be worthwhile toorganise the fishermen on the basisof different gear and to facilitate face-to-face dialogue for resolving (oravoiding) conflicts. As Matsuda andKaneda observe:


(1) Personal communication with Dr. Christy.(2) And, therefore, the connotation of ‘law’ itself is different in Japan vis- a- vis other countries in our study.(3) According to Noda, Y (1976), the aim of law in the Far East is to prevent disputes, unlike the Roman law, theforbearer of all Western law which tries to resolve disputes. He quotes Confucius: « If I judge a dispute I cannot doother than what others do, but what I sincerely want is to do my best to see that there is no dispute».

«Illegal conduct can be reduced whenan agreement between or amonginterest groups results from thoroughdiscussion about and a completeunderstanding of the issues. Opendiscussion is the key to successbecause it provides an early warningof conflicts or potential conflicts».

(Matsuda and Kaneda, 1984)

Perhaps the State can take theinitiative to bring different gear-groups with conflicting technologiesand world-views to evolve a modusvivendi. However, care should betaken to ensure that dominantgroups do not, subtly, force theirinterests upon others in connivancewith the State machinery. In such fora aiming at a consensus to resolveconflicts, emphasis should also beplaced on conservation ofresources. An important point toremember here is that, in spite ofevolving a modus vivendi, the stateof marine resources in Japan isfragile because of little emphasis onconservation. Attempts at controllingfishing effort in Japan is mainly withthe idea of regulating supply to themarket, not necessarily forpreventing overfishing. In fact this isa major lacuna of Japanese fisheriesmanagement. Considering thepressure of population on ashrinking resource-base, emphasis

must be placed on conservation ofresources, particularly in countrieswhere such contingencies arealready felt.

However, a viable managementprogramme will not be easy as longas the opportunities of employmentand income are limited. Only overalleconomic development will lessenthe pressure on fisheries. This isalready happening in somecountries, e.g., Malaysia.

The state of conflicts inSoutheast Asia is very different now.This is in spite of poor enforcement.The incidence of conflicts hassubsided. There are no incidents ofburning of boats or open fightsleading to lose of life in Malaysia orIndonesia. This amelioration resultsfrom different causes in differentcountries: in Indonesia, the ban; inMalaysia, economic developmentand the relocation programme offishermen; in the Philippines,depletion of coastal related andfishery-independent factors in thede-escalation of conflicts in thesecountries would make an interestingand useful study. In the finalanalysis, the most meaningfulresolution of conflicts lies both withinand without the fishing sector.

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B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Indonesia

1. ADB, IBRD, 1983. Indonesia Fisheries Sector Study.2. Bailey, C. et al. 1987. Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries, ICLARM Manila.3. Chong, Kee-Chai. et al. 1987. Some experiences and highlights of the

Indonesian trawl ban: Bioeconomics and socio-economics. In Theproceedings of Indo-Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC) Darwin, Australia, 16to 19 February, 1987.

4. Darmoredjo, S. 1983. Fisheries development in Indonesia: A case study. InCase Studies and Working Papers Presented at the Expert Consultations onStrategies for Fisheries Development, 10-14 May, 1983, FAO, Rome.

5. Director General of Fisheries. 1976. Fisheries Statistics of Indonesia, DGF,Jakarta.



8. HNSI. 1988. The All Indonesian Fishermen’s Association and its Role inDeveloping Fishermen, Jakarta.

9. May, B. 1978. The Indonesian Tragedy. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.10. Ministry of Agriculture, Director General of Fisheries, Asian Development Bank.

1988. Final Report. Indonesian Fisheries Economy Study. (Main Text). RobertR. Nathan Associates Inc., Hawaiian Agronomics International, Pt. UnisystemUtama (Ltd).

11. Naamin, N. 1984. The banning of trawl fishing in Indonesia. Workshop on theManagement of Penaeid Shrimp/Prawns in the Asia-Pacific Region, 29thOctober to 2nd November, 1984, FAO, Australia.

12. Naamin, N. 1987. Consequences of excessive fishing effort on fisheryresources in Indonesia. In The Proceedings of Indo-Pacific FisheryCommission, Darwin, 16 - 19 February, 1987.

13. Palmier, L. 1985a. Introduction. In Understanding Indonesia, Leslie Palmier(ed), Gower, USA.

14. Palmier, L. 1985b. National integration In Understanding Indonesia, LesliePalmier (ed), Gower, USA.

15. Sardjono, I. 1980. Trawlers banned in Indonesia. ICLARM Newsletter 3(4):3. 16. Thoolen, H. 1987. (ed) Indonesia and the Rule of Law, Twenty Years of New

Order’s Government. Frances Pinter, London.17. Yamamoto, T. 1977. Development of otter trawl fishery in Indonesia. Seminar

Ke II Perikanan Udang, 15-18 March, 1977, Jakarta.

Malaysia

1. Abu Bakar, H.S. & Looi, Ch’ng Kim. 1987. Licence limitation: An approach to theregulation of fishing effort in Peninsular Malaysia. In Proceedings of Indo-Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC) Darwin, 16-19 February, 1987, RAPAReport: 1987/10.

2. Department of Fisheries. 1987. Annual Fisheries Statistics. Ministry ofgriculture, Kuala Lumpur.

3. Fisheries Act 1963 (Revised 1978) Jabatan Perikanan, Kuala Lumpur.4. Fisheries Act 1985.5. Fredericks, L.J. & Wells, R.J.G. 1980. Marine fisheries policy planning in West

Malaysia, Journal of Developing Areas, October 1980: 3-20.6. Gibbons, D. 1976. Public policy towards fisheries development in Peninsular

Malaysia: A critical review emphasizing Penang and Kedah. In Fredericks,L.J. (ed) Proceedings of the Seminar on the Development of the FisheriesSector in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.

7. Hotta, M & Wang, L.T. 1985. Fishermen’s Relocation Programme in PeninsularMalaysia, FAO.

8. Kesteven, G.L. 1949. Malayan Fisheries: A Handbook Prepared for theInaugural Meeting of the Indo-Pacific Council, Singapore.

9. Ling, Y.C. 1976. Fishery policies and development with special reference to thewest coast of Peninsular Malaysia from the early 1900s. In Fredericks, L.J.(ed) op. cit.

10. Memorandum of the Fishermen’s Network of Malaysia, 1988.11. SEAFDEC. 1988. Fishery Statistical Bulletin for South China Sea Area 1986,

Bangkok.

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12. Selvanathan. ud. Some aspects of the Malaysian fisheries law with regards tofisheries management and conservation. Ministry of Agriculture, KualaLumpur.

13. Shari, I. 1985. Problems and prospects of Malaysian fishermen. Seminar onproblems and Prospects of Rural Malaysia, 22-26 November, 1985,Consumer’s Association of Penang, Penang.

14. Star 15 May, 1985.15. Teik, G.C. 1976. The fishing conflict in Penang and Perak: Personal memoir. In

Fredericks, L.J. (ed) op. cit..16. Working Group 2. 1979. Report on Legal Aspects and Enforcement (Inclusive

of State Legal Boundaries ) and EEZ, Pejabat Perikanan, Kuala Lumpur.17. World Bank. 1983. Malaysia: A Review of Fisheries Policies and Programmes,

Agriculture Division 5, East Asia and Pacific Projects Department.18. Yahaya, J. 1984. A critical evaluation of polcies and programmes affecting

fishery management and regulation in Peninsular Malaysia. Workshop onMarine Resource Economics: South East Asian Seas in Transition, East-WestCentre, Honolulu.

19. Yahaya, S. 1988. Fishery management and regulation in Peninsular Malaysia:Issues and constraints, Marine Resource Economics, Volume 5, pp 83-98.

20. Yahaya, S. & Yamamoto, T. 1988. A Socio-Economic Study of FisheriesManagement and Conservation with Particular Reference to Two ArtisanalFishing Villages in Penang, Peninsular Malaysia, College of Economics,Nihon University (CENU International Publication Series No.1).

The Philippines

1. Bailey, C. 1982. Small-scale Fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Philippines: SocialAspects of Production and Marketing, ICLARM, Manila.

2. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), 1982. Updated Index toPresidential Decrees on Fisheries, BFAR, Quezon City.

3. BFAR, 1988, Position Paper on Illegal Fishing, BFAR (Unpublished).4. Compilation of Presidential Decrees (ud) BFAR (Unpublished).5. Genaden, R.A. & Dalzell, P. 1987. A Review of the Fisheries for Small Pelagic

Fishes in Philippine Waters. BFAR, ICLARM, Manila.6. Letters of Instructions 1328, 929, 550. BFAR.7. Lotilla, R.P.M. 1988. State policies and the law on fisheries and living aquatic

resources. National Agricultural and Fishery Council Seminar — Workshop, 7October, 1988, Manila (Unpublished).

8. Memorandum of Agreement on the Joint Implementation and Enforcement of allFishery Laws, Decrees, Proclamations, Memorandum Circulars, General


Orders, Letters of Instructions and all Rules and Regulations promulgatedthereunder, 1976. (Unpublished).

9. Republic Act No.3048. 1961. An Act Prohibiting the Operations of Trawls inFishing Areas 7 Fathoms Deep or Less.

10. Santos, A.B. 1982. Relevant Laws on Municipal Fisheries, BFAR, Quezon City.11. Smith, I.R. et al. 1980. Philippine Municipal Fisheries: A Review of Resources,

Technology and Socio-economics ICLARM, Manila.12. Smith, I.R. et al. 1983. Small-scale Fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Philippines:

Options for Management and Research, ICLARM, Manila.13. Smith, I.R & Pauly, D. 1983. Resolving multigear competition in nearshore

fisheries, ICLARM, Manila.14. Spoehr, A. 1984. Change in Philippine capture fisheries: An historical over-view.

Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society 12 (1984): 25-56.15. The Philadelphia Inquirer August, 11, 1986. With cyanide and dynamite,

Filipinos kill fish — and the sea.

Thailand

1. Fisheries Act B.E. 2490; Fisheries Act (No.2) B.E. 2496; Fisheries Act (No.3)B.E. 2528. Department of Fisheries, Bangkok.

2. Fraser, T.M. 1966. Fishermen of South Thailand. Holt, Rinehart and WinstonInc.

3. Hinton, P. 1985. An approach to the study of traditional systems of coastalresources management in Thailand. In Ruddle, K. & Johannes, R.E.(ed). TheTraditional Knowledge and Management of Coastal Systems in Asia and thePacific, UNESCO, Jakarta.

4. Insor, D. 1966. Thailand. In Guy, Wint (ed). Asia Handbook, Penguin.5. Isvilanoda, S. et al. Thailand Capture Fisheries Management Practises: Their

Development and Constraints (In Press).6. Moore, G. 1978 a. Legal and Institutional Aspects of Fisheries Management: A

New Licensing System, South China Sea Fisheries Development andCoordinating Programme, Manila.

7. Moore, G. 1978 b. Legal and Institutional Aspects of Fisheries Management andDevelopment —- A Second Interim Report (ibid.).

8. Nagalaksana, C. 1987, Social consequences of excessive fishing effort inThailand. In The Proceedings of Indo-Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC),Darwin, Australia, 16-19 February, 1987. RAPA Report: 1987/10.

9. National Statistical Office, 1987. 1985 Marine Fishery Census of Thailand, NSO,DOF, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Bangkok.

10. Panayotou, T. 1979. Economic conditions and prospects of small-scale

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fishermen in Thailand: A bleak chapter in a success story. Staff Paper No.35Department of Agricultural Economics, Kasetsart University, Bangkok.

11. Panayotou, T. & Jetanovanich, S. 1987. The Economics and Management ofThai Marine Fisheries, ICLARM, Manila.

12. Sakiyama, T. 1984. Fisheries cooperatives in South East Asia, An institutionalperspective In Senri Ethnological Studies No.17 (ed). Ruddle, K. & Akimichi,T. Maritime Institutions in the Western Pacific, National Museum of Ethnology,Osaka.

13. SEAFDEC, 1988. Fisheries Statistical Bulletin for South China Sea Area 1986,Bangkok.

14. Smith, H.M. 1925. A Review of the Aquatic Resources and Fisheries of Siam,with Plans and Recommendations for their Administration, Conservation andDevelopment. Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, Kingdom of Siam. Reprintedby The Secretariat, SEAFDEC, 1983. Bangkok.

15. Teresa Sofia. 1988. Coastal Fisheries in Thailand: The Case Study of Ao Cho,A Fishing Community in the Eastern Coast. Dissertation submitted toFaculdade de Ciencias, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal (Unpublished).

16. Thomas, M.L. 1975. Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of SouthernThailand. Occasional Paper 28, Institute of South East Asian Studies,Singapore.

Japan

1. Comitini, S.1967. Economic and legal aspects of Japanese fisheries regulationsand control, Washington Law Review 49: 179-194.

2. Culland, A. 1984. Sea tenure in Tokugawa Japan: The case of Fukuoka domainIn Senri Ethnological Studies No. 17, Ruddle K. & Akimichi, T (ed). MaritimeInstitutions in the Western Pacific, National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka.

3. Iwakiri, S. 1979. Recent Socio-economic Trends in Japanese Fisheries. Lecturenote for the Seminar on Fisheries Technology Education, JICA-KagoshimaUniversity, Kagoshima.

4. Japan Fisheries Association. Fisheries of Japan 1988.5. Matsuda, Y. and Kaneda, Y. 1984. The seven greatest fisheries incidents in

Japan. In Senri Ethnological Studies No. 17, Ruddle, K & Akimichi, T (ed)Maritime Institutions in the Western Pacific, National Museum of Ethnology,Osaka.

6. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 1986. The Seventh FisheryCensus of Japan 1983.

7. Polunin, N. 1984. Do traditional marine <<reserves>> conserve? A view ofIndonesian and New Guinean evidence. In Ruddle, K. & Akimichi, T op. cit.


8. Ruddle, K. 1987. Administration and Conflict Management in Japanese CoastalFisheries. FAO Fish. Tech. Pap.(273), Rome.

9. ZENGYOREN ud. Fisheries Cooperatives in Japan, Tokyo.10. ZENGYOREN. 1988. Fishing Industry and Fisheries Cooperatives of Japan,

Tokyo.11. ZENGYOREN. 1988. The Fisheries Law. Law No.267 of 1949, Revised Latest,

in Law No.63 of 1975.12. ZENGYOREN. 1988. The Fisheries Cooperative Associations Law.

Conclusion

1. Aubert, V. 1972. Researches in the Sociology of Law in Barkun, M. (ed) Lawand the Social System. Lieber-Atherton, NY.

2. Derham, P.J. 1987. The implementation and enforcement of fisheries legislationIn Ulfstein, G. et al. (ed) The Regulation of Fisheries: Legal Economic andSocial Aspects, Division for Higher Education and Research, Strasbourg.

3. Jentoft, S. & Kristoffersen, T. 1988-89. Fishermen’s co-management: The caseof the Lofoten fishery, In Human Organisation.

4. Matsuda, Y. & Kaneda, Y. 1984. op. cit.5. Noda, Y. 1976 (trans.) Angelo, H.A. Introduction to Japanese Law, University of

Tokyo Press, Tokyo.6. Ruddle, K. 1987. Administration and Conflict Management in Japanese Coastal

Fisheries. FAO Fish. Tech. Pap., (273), Rome.7. Schwartz, K.D. & Orleans, S. 1973. On legal sanctions. In Barkun, M.(ed) op. cit.8. Smith, H.M. 1925 op. cit.

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THE INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVEIN SUPPORT OF FISHWORKERS

The International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) is an internationalnetwork founded in India in 1986, with the objective of providing fishworkers (men,women and children) with a platform to make their voice heard at the internationallevel so that the numerous problems they face both at land and at sea may betaken into consideration by their governments and the international organisations.

In its search for cooperation and solidarity, the Collective joins hands withfishworkers’ organisations and unions. Its characteristic feature lays in its closecooperation between scientists and social workers on the one hand and fishworkers,both from Southern as well as from Northern countries, on the other.

The goals of the Collective can be considered as providing the basis of fourlongterm programs..

Montoring and research programsThis program will provide the basis for various development studies in close

collabration with scientists and workers of the fishing profession.

Training and exchange programsThis program will undertake the essential task of exchanging experiences and

culminated knowledge. This will include the sharing of findings on new andappropriate technologies, learning from new organisational structures andinteraction between the scientiic community and workers, with the objective ofdemarginalising artisanal fisheries. the interaction is twofold: on the one hand theexchange between fishworkers and scientists and on the other hand thecommunication between fishworkers of various countries.

Action and campaignsICSF decided to support, at their request, fishworkers organisations facing troubles.

CommunicationThe collective has devised various means of communication: SAMUDRA Report

SAMUDRA Dossier, SAMUDRA Monograph (*); a collection of video tapes, etc...

(*) The word «samudra« signifies «ocean» in many Asian languages and thus evokes thevastness of the problems that face the fishworkers

Fishermen village in Zummaraga island, The Philippines.(photo François Bellec)

FISHING LEGISLATIONAND GEAR CONFLICTS IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

The International Collective in Support of Fish-work-ers (ICSF) has an ongoing monitoring programme.Thisprogramme consists of studies undertaken to enhance ourunderstanding of the status of the fishworkers, the dynam-ics of external assistance to the fisheries managementschemes.

This study concentrates on the latter aspect. Itexamines the history and politics of fisheries managementin five Asian countries. It attempts to show how the specif-ic management measures came into being; what the tech-no-ecological and socio-politica factors were that influ-enced the conceptualisation and implementation of thesemeasures; and how these measures are perceived by thefishworkers and the bearing it has on their livelihood.

The study was undertaken by Sebastian Mathew, ayoung freelance fisheries researcher from Kerala State,India, who is associated with the fishworkers’ organisa-tions in India. His earlier studies include assessmentsabout the technological change in fishing and its impact onfishworkers.

The opinions and views expressed in the study arethose of the author and do not represent the official posi-tion of the ICSF on these issues.

SAMUDRA Dossier n° 1

international collective in support of …aquaticcommons.org/245/1/gear_conflicts.pdfinternational...

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