international organizations as actors in world politics. a...
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The Graduate Faculties ofLong Island University
International OrganizationsAs Actors In World Politics.
A Comparative Study Of The Security Council Of TheUnited Nations And The Council Of The European
UnionCase Study: East Timor
BY
Michael Trinker
A Thesis Submitted ToThe Faculty of the Graduate Faculties in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements forThe Degree of Masters of Arts
APPROVED:
_________________________Chairman of the Committee
_________________________Dr. Michael Soupios
_________________________Dr. Stanley Klein
_______________Date
BROOKVILLE, NEW YORK
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1. Introduction ........................................... 7 1.1 Initial remarks...................................... 71.2 Foundations of the Thesis............................ 91.3 Hypothesis.......................................... 111.4 Organization of the thesis.......................... 121.5 Definitions......................................... 121.5.1 International Organizations ..................... 121.5.2 The member-state ↔ nation-state ................. 141.5.2.1 Sovereignty .................................. 15
1.5.3 Anarchy ......................................... 161.5.4 (Public) International Law ...................... 171.5.5 Supranationality ................................ 191.5.6 Actor ........................................... 19
2. Theories and Concepts ................................. 22 2.1. The rationalist, idealist and institutional approach........................................................ 222.1.1 Comment on the rationalist, idealist andinstitutional approach ................................ 25
2.2 The realist approach................................ 272.2.1 Comment on the realist theory ................... 30
2.3 The revolutionist approach.......................... 312.3.1 Comment on the revolutionist approach ........... 32
2.4 The functional and neofunctional/ integrationalapproach................................................ 322.4.1 Comment on the functional/ neofunctional approach38
2.5 The concept of the individual - the power of thecollective.............................................. 392.5.1 Comment on the concept of the individual - thepower of the collective ............................... 42
3. The Comparison of the Security Council and Council of theEuropean Union ........................................... 45
3.1 The Council of the European Union (CEU) and itsbackground.............................................. 453.1.1 The Composition of the CEU and its decision-making...................................................... 503.1.2 The different kinds of law and its enforcement .. 583.1.3 Comment on the CEU and the quality of an actor .. 60
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3.2 The Security Council of the United Nations (SC) andits background.......................................... 643.2.1 Composition of the SC and its decision-making ... 663.2.2 Law and its enforcement ......................... 753.2.3 Comment on the SC ............................... 79
4. Evaluation ............................................ 81
4.1. The SC and the CEU................................. 813.2. The goals of the EU and the UN..................... 843.3 Final remarks....................................... 85
5. Case study: East Timor and the role of the UN and the EU......................................................... 89
5.1 Introduction........................................ 895.2 The UN's role in East Timor......................... 945.3 The EU's role in East Timor......................... 975.4 Evaluation of the role of the UN and the EU........ 1005.5 Prospects and recommendations...................... 102
7. Conclusion............................................106
8. Literature ........................................... 110
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To my sunshine Esther - shining so bright from so far
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I also think a ruler will flourish if he adjusts hispolicies as the character of the times changes; andsimilarly, a ruler will fail if he follows policies that donot correspond to the needs of the times.
Niccolo Machivelli, The Prince
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Abbreviations
ACP.......African, Caribbean and Pacific (States)
CEU.......Council of the European Union
CFSP......Common Foreign and Security Policy
COREPER...Comité des Representants Permanents
ECSC......European Community for Steel and Coal
Ecofin....Council of economics and finance
EEC.......European Economic Community
EU........European Union
EURATOM...European Atomic Community
FAO.......Food and Agriculture Organization
GAC.......General Affairs Council
ICJ.......International Court of Justice
IGO.......International governmental organization
INGO......International non governmental organization
JHA.......Justice and Home and Affairs
NATO......Nord Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD......Organization for Economic, Co-operation and
Development
OSCE......Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe
SC........Security Council
RES.......Resolution
UN........United Nations
UNDP......United Nations Development Program
WEU.......Western European Union
WTO.......World Trade Organization
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1. Introduction
1.1 Initial remarks
The problems of today cross national borders more and
more. Be it AIDS (as recently discussed in the Security
Council of the United Nations1), the greenhouse effect, or
environmental protection. Besides these particular problems,
traditional cross-national concerns such as international
peace, security, trade etc. are also on the international
agenda. In other words, our social interdependence is all-
pervasive and all-embracing.2
How do the states deal with their cross-national
concerns? One way states may react is by creating
international organizations to tackle those problems and try
to solve them - or at least to bring some ease to the
situation. Presently, the Yearbook of International
Organizations 1998 has counted more than 40,000
international private and governmental institutions (INGOs3
and IGOs4), all dealing with different sorts of problems and
subjects. According to Brown, even this great amount of
international organizations has failed to “develop systems
of governance to keep pace with the expanding power of
1 For the first time, a health problem was addressed in the SecurityCouncil traditionally solely dealing with issues concerning security andinternational peace on the 10 January 2000 in New York, United NationsHeadquarters.2 Brent F. Nelsen (ed.); David Mitrany, The European Union. Readings onthe Theory and Practice of European Integration, Boulder: Lynne RiennerPublishers, 21998, p. 112.3 INGOs = international non-governmental organizations. In theliterature, the abbreviation NGO is equally used as INGO.4 IGOs = international governmental organizations
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humans to alter the natural world. ... this failure risks
even the extinction of the human species.”5
The proliferation of international organizations is
supported by the quickly expanding impact of international
trade and communications. This cross-national development
has constantly increased and spread to environmental,
social, economic and political issues.6
In this paper, two international organizations will be
analyzed that may be able to develop the necessary “systems
of governance” necessary to solve these issues: The United
Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Since these
organizations have a broad range of different organs and
field of activity, the focus will be on the most important
organs7, which are the Security Council of the UN and the
Council of the EU.
Why choosing these two organizations?
I want to compare a regionally acting body (EU) with a
globally acting one (UN) on an advantage/ disadvantage
basis. Both the European Council and the Security Council
can make supranational decisions. With respect to the EU,
supranationality exists in the areas of ECSC, EURATOM and
EC, where the European Union can directly intervene in
domestic law. With respect to the UN, supranationality
concerns international peace and security. If there is a
5 Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System,Boulder, 1992, p. 1.6 David Armstrong, The Rise of International Organization, Hong Kong:St. Martins’s Press, 1982, p. 3.7 Important organs = this term will be neatly clarified in a comingchapter. Important is here used in reference to the ability of therespective organ to produce enforceable law.
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threat to international peace and security, the Security
Council may make decisions, the so-called chapter VII
resolutions, and enforce its “supranational law”. In other
words, these international organs can regulate its member-
state(s). Therefore, they draw international attention to
them. Both organizations appear very often in the news, in
particular the UN. Commentaries suggest the EU is very
successful and a good example of a well functioning
international organization.8 The UN, however, is criticized
as being too lax and unresponsive in dealing with its tasks
as a use- and toothless paper tiger wasting money.9
1.2 Foundations of the Thesis
The questions framing the thesis are the following:
- Are these organizations really successful in reaching
their goals?
- How do and did they achieve their goals? How does this
development affect the nation-state as an actor in the
international arena?
- How did the UN and the EU develop with respect to
becoming an actor? Into what did the international
organizations grow? Have they already gained enough power,
so that one can label them as actors?
8 For instance, Cohen writes in his article about the successfulimplementation of the European Union both in the peoples’ mind and inthe national governmental system, which progress will further enormouslyprofit because of the single currency “Euro”. The Euro will replace thenational currencies of 11 member-states at the 1 January 2002: RogerCohen, A European Identity: Nation-state losing Ground, in: New YorkTimes, 14. January 2000 (internet edition).9 Maurice Bertrand, UNO. Geschichte und Bilanz, Frankfurt am Main:Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verl., 1995.
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After the fall of the Eastern Block and in the course
of the emergence of the new world order, people hoped that
the radius of action of international organizations would
increase. This anticipation is still alive today. The
necessity of a supreme authority overseeing international
peace or environmental protection is commensensically
perceived. Because of the new global situation of a
multipolar10 world, the reasoning suggests, ideological
impediments among the states should no longer hamper the
decision-making- (and law-making)-process in international
institutions as it did during the Cold War. Therefore, with
the end of the Cold War, the era of successful and powerful
international organizations should have started. Some events
in the international arena like the reestablishment of
Kuwait under the auspices of the UN after Iraq conquered it,
confirmed the strengthening of international organizations,
(namely the UN). But this incident seems to be an exception,
because in other parts of the world the insufficiency of
international bodies still persists (Rwanda, Kosovo,
Chechnya, and so forth).
Further questions posed by the thesis in analyzing this
“deadlock” are:
- Which roles do international organizations really play?
- How did the role of international organizations change
after the fall of the Soviet Union, into a more powerful or
less powerful one?
10 The question of a multipolar or unipolar world as America as the onlyreal power left in respect to its economic and military strength isstill disputed. I evaluate international politics as multipolar. Seealso: Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System,Boulder, 1992, p. 23: The natural configuration of internationalrelations – a decentralized, pluralistic, essentially anarchistic systemof competing states – appear to be returning.
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- What changes did occur in favor/ disfavor for
international organizations?
- In which way were/ are international organizations
strengthened in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet
Union?
1.3 Hypothesis
The Hypothesis is based upon the questions posed above,
in chapter 1.2.
The belief that in the course of the emergence of the
new world order (the end of the Cold War) the importance of
international organizations increased is not justified,
because this new world order has no effect on the concept of
the nation state and its sovereignty on which international
organizations are based. On the contrary, the number of
nation states grows constantly throughout the world.
Therefore, international organizations will be hindered even
more in becoming more efficient and powerful because a
greater divergence of interests will be produced and stated
by a greater number of independent states. The more states
(participants) are represented in the decision-making
process in an international body, the less efficiently the
body can act and reach its goals. So the efficiency of
regional organizations – because they are more homogeneous,
so to speak, and less divergent in interests - is better
than the one of global organizations. The membership in an
international organization is seen in the framework of a
cost-benefit analysis. States compare their input with the
output and then act more or less favorably for the
organization’s goal.
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1.4 Organization of the thesis
After the introduction with the definitions, the
structuring questions and the hypothesis framing the
research process, the theoretical concepts of international
organizations will be examined. Then, the Security Council
and the Council of the EU will be studied in respect to
their legal foundation, decision-making and their actual,
political power. The focus of this examination will be on
the decision-making process of both institutions as the
“vital” part of these organizations. Finally, the evaluation
will follow and their political power will be pointed out in
a case study.
1.5 Definitions
1.5.1 International Organizations
The different types of international organizations are
categorized by The Yearbook of International Organizations
as follows:
A = federations of international organizations;
B = universal membership organizations;
C = intercontinental membership organizations;
D = regionally defined membership organizations;
E = organizations emanating from places, persons or other
bodies;
F = organizations having a special form, including
foundations and funds;
G = internationally-oriented national organizations;
H = inactive or dissolved international organizations;
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J = recently reported or proposed international
organizations;
K = subsidiary and internal bodies;
N = national organizations;
R = religious orders, fraternities and secular institutes;
S = autonomous conference series;
T = multilateral treaties and agreements;
U = currently inactive non-conventional bodies.11
The types from A-D are the so-called “conventional
organizations”. These organizations are furthermore
categorized in governmental and non-governmental
organizations. Governmental organizations are described by
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in its
Resolution 288 (X) of 27 February 1950:
Any international organization which is not established
by intergovernmental agreement shall be considered as a non-
governmental organization for the purpose of these
arrangements.12
The conclusion of this statement is that any
organization is an international governmental organization
(IGO), where state authorities are involved in the founding
process and representing a constituent part of that body.
As already mentioned above, in this paper, two IGOs
will be examined: the United Nations (UN) and the European
Union (EU). According to the categorization above, the
former is categorized under B, a universal membership
11 http://www.uia.org/uiadocs/zapp2.htm12 http://www.uia.org/uiadocs/zapp2.htm
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organization, the latter under D, a regionally defined
membership organization.
1.5.2 The member-state ↔ nation-state
Presently, the world counts some 190 “sovereign”
nation-states, potential member-states of international
organizations. A nation-state may become a member-state of
an international organization by signing and/ or ratifying
the required treaties. At the moment, the UN has 188
members. Therefore, it can be called a universal
organization encompassing nearly all the states of the
Earth. The UN is open for every state. Just states may apply
to become a full member of the UN with all its rights and
obligations.13 In comparison to the UN, the EU counts 15
nation-states as members, and this number is most likely to
increase in the next coming years. 14 The EU is a regionally
defined membership organization and open to all European
states.
In the long term, also the number of the UN member-
states will increase. Many nations like the Kurds in Turkey,
or the Chechens in Russia will try to create their own
13 The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter II Article 4: “Membershipin the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states whichaccept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in thejudgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out theseobligations.”14 Currently, the EU negotiates with 13 applicant countries to join the“Club of the 15”. These countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the CzechRepublic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania,the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey. The European Commissionnegotiates with 6 countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) on the hypothesis that they will become amember of the EU in 2003.
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state. And most likely, if successful, these new states will
seek a membership of the UN.
1.5.2.1 Sovereignty
Sovereignty is an essential term of international law
and refers to the nation-state-system. Sovereignty means
“the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which
any independent state is governed.”15 It means “the power to
do everything in a state without accountability (to the
international environment, annot.) to make laws, to execute
and to apply them.”16 The features of a sovereign state are
a) a specified territory, which is also acknowledged by the
international community (by other states), b) a population,
and c) a governmental system, (where people may act as
official representatives).17
Supranationality undermines the principle of
Sovereignty. Consequently, there is a conflict between
international organizations and the sovereign nation-state.
In whom should the supreme authority be vested?
The UN stresses the importance of “sovereign equality
of all its members.”18 If international peace or security is
threatened, the Security Council may decide chapter VII
resolutions.19 With that, the Security Council can force
15 Henry C. Black, Blacks Law Dictionary, St. Paul: West Publishing,1991.16 Ibid.17 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood. The Basis of International Society,London: Allen & Unwin (Publisher) Ltd, 1986, p. 13.18 The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I Article 2 Section 1.19 The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII Article 41 and 42. Theformer article dealing with economic sanctions, the latter with militaryones.
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economically, if that is unsuccessful, also militarily the
member-states to comply with its rule. Concerning the EU-
member-states, sovereignty also undergoes some modifications
though in a different policy area. There is no traditional
sovereignty in the first pillar tasks of the EU, namely in
the area of the European Community (EC), the European Steel
and Coal Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Community
(EURATOM). The traditional sovereign rights of supreme
authority of the nation-state still exist in the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).20
1.5.3 Anarchy
The Blacks Law Dictionary classifies anarchy as
follows:
Absence of government; state of society where there is no
law or supreme power; lawless or political disorder...21
According to the realist scholars, the international
environment of states is anarchic. The states may interact
independently with each other, there is no rule forcing them
to behave in a certain way. In other words, states can do
whatever they want. For sure, states are bound to some
20 The composition of the EU and the legal consequences will bediscussed more detailed in a coming chapter.21 Henry C. Black, Blacks Law Dictionary, St. Paul: West Publishing,1991.
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limits, but hypothetically, the international environment is
lawless, therefore anarchic.22
There is nothing equivalent to a domestic government
which can enforce general compliance to laws or rules of
behavior on the part of the states.23
Actually, there are no effective instruments to enforce
international law. And even the (international) law-making
bodies are organizational and structural not very active.
Therefore, the lack of law-enforcing and law-making bodies
stresses the anarchic structure of the international
relations.
1.5.4 (Public) International Law
The traditional definition describes international law
as “the law that governs relations between states24.”25 The
modern definition of international law has a broader meaning
including other subjects of international law. Therefore,
international law is defined as “law that deals with the
conduct of states and of international organizations, and
with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their
relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.”26
In the UN-framework, an International Law Commission
was established by the General Assembly in 1947 to promote
22 The realist approach will be discussed more comprehensively in acoming chapter.23 Michael Nicholson, Formal Theories in International Relations,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 26.24 The term “state” refers to sovereign states or nation-states.25 Thomas Buergenthal; Harold G. Maier, Public International Law, St.Paul: West Publishing CO., 1985, p. 1.
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the progressive development of international law and its
codification.27 Presently, international law develops very
quickly in the form of international agreements, conventions
etc. Every international treaty or agreement has to be
announced to the UN.28
International law may, therefore, emanate from
bilateral agreements (an agreement between two states), from
international conventions (treaties) in force between
parties, international customary rules and may emanate
multilaterally from international organizations like Chapter
VII decisions of the Security Council or regulations of the
Council of the EU.29 The particular consequence of
international law is that the states not the individual
shall comply with it. In order for individuals to comply
with it, international law has to be transposed into
national law.30 The big problem of international law is its
lack of enforceability. For the time being, there are few
effective instruments to enforce international law.
26 Ibid., p. 2.27 http://www.un.org/law/ilc/introfra.htm28 The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XXVI, Article 102 Section1: “Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by anyMember of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into forceshall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat andpublished by it.”29 Thomas Buergenthal; Harold G. Maier, Public International Law, St.Paul: West Publishing CO., 1985, p. 25. And:Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 71991, p. 508.30 The development of international law on Human Rights, or the UNcourts, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia(ICTY) or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) indicatefurthermore, that not also states but also, under certain circumstances,individuals may have rights and obligations under international law.This development is still in its embryonic phase.
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1.5.5 Supranationality
“Supranational organizations have authority above the
state and are capable of dictating to it, within careful
defined limits.”31 A supranational organization is therefore
capable of producing binding law for the member-state(s).
For instance, the Security Council’s Chapter VII decisions
(under the UN-Charter) or the regulations of the Council of
the EU represent such binding (supranational) law.
Supranational law is part of international law.
Therefore, supranational law regulates the states and
diminishes the anarchic structure of international
relations.
In that regard, the UN and the EU may also be called
supranational organizations. But the term “international”
organization is still more appropriate because the
“supranational part” has a secondary significance.
1.5.6 Actor
In international politics an actor is a relatively
autonomous unit that exercises influence on the behavior of
other autonomous actors.32
According to this definition, the UN and the EU are
actors because they can positively influence the behavior of
31 Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations, New York:Harper Collins Publishers, 71991, p. 541.32 Raymond Hopkins; Richard Mansbach, Structure and Process inInternational Politics, New York: Harper & Raw Publishers, 1973, p. 4.
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the member-states and even the non-member-states.33 I
further determine the concept of an actor the ability to
produce binding law, on the one hand. On the other hand, he
has to be able to implement and enforce law or official
decisions. It is crucial not only to produce decisions or
law but also important to be able to implement and enforce
them. Once implemented and enforced, the next step to be a
viable actor is to be able to guarantee its implementation
and enforcement for a longer time period by appropriate
instruments like a judicial system and a “guardian” of the
decisions.
For instance, the Security Council and the Council of
the European Union represent the law-making body. The peace-
enforcement missions of the UN (like in Kuwait or East
Timor) and to some extent the Secretariat of the UN
represent the instruments to enforce and to implement the
decisions. The EU has nothing similar to the UN-peace-
enforcement instruments, although the Amsterdam Treaty34
continues to integrate more the Western European Union
(WEU),35 the military arm of the EU.36 Contrary to the
33 The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I Article 2 Section 6: Themember states have to commit themselves to the UN principles. Regardingthe EU, the enlargement process of it obligates the prospective membersto take over the “aquis communautaire” (the EU law, 100.000 pagesthick).34 Treaty on the European Union, consolidated version incorporating thechanges made by the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2 October 1997, inforce since the 1 May 1999 - Henceforth, the abbreviation “Treaty ofAmsterdam” appearing either in the text or in the footnotes shall referto the official name.35 The WEU was founded on 17 March 1947. A long time relativelyunimportant it was revived in the 1990s by the Maastricht Treatyincorporating the WEU in the EU as the military arm of it. The so-called“Petersburger tasks” allow the WEU to peacekeeping and peace-enforcementmissions. For more information visit website:http://www.weu.int/index.html
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relatively powerless Secretariat of the UN, the Commission
of the EU is a very powerful body incorporating both
legislative powers and executive powers. The Commission has
the sole right to initiate a law and at the same time it
acts as the “guardian of the treaties”. This is so that
every state complies with the treaties and decisions made in
the EU headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.
36 Treaty of Amsterdam, Title V, Article 17, Section 1, Section 3 andSection 4.The Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty of the European Union signed inMaastricht) introduced a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) andthe military component of the EU. The Maastricht Treaty was consolidatedby the Treaty of Amsterdam.
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2. Theories and Concepts
In this chapter, the question of why international
organizations are founded will be answered. Many
explanations exist, which try to describe ideally the
development of international organizations. According to
Cosgrove, there are three major types of schools: The
rationalist, the revolutionist and the realist.37
2.1. The rationalist, idealist and institutional approach
The First World War (1914-1918) showed that traditional
diplomacy, secret diplomacy and the system of secret
treaties were not able to guarantee international security.
Therefore, a new security system, which was pushed forward
by Woodrow Wilson, should be introduced. This system is
called “collective security,” and it should be based on the
following principles:
- the rule of law which will give protection to the
powerless against the powerful.
- and the new international system should be a “community of
power” not a “balance of power,” as it had been before World
War I. A rational, moral and political order, which can
analogously be found at the domestic level, should be
created in the international society transforming a society
of sovereign states into a community or “comity” of nations.
Every nation should have the right of national self-
determination. Every nation should get equal economic
opportunities. A global international organization provides
37 Carol Ann Cosgrove (ed.); Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), The NewInternational Actors. The United Nations and the European EconomicCommunity, Bristol: Macmillan St. Martin’s Press, 1970, p. 15.
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the framework for the realization of this order and applies
universally valid moral and legal principles.38
The adherents of this school argue that, in contrast to
the concept of the realist school, international order is
not necessarily anarchic, but can be organized by law like
individual behavior on the domestic level. A society of
sovereign states goes over into “a society of a community of
nations” into a “world community” banning war and
progressing international law. The world institutions in
possession of the collective power are able to apprehend the
law-breaker.39
38 Carol Ann Cosgrove (ed.); Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), The NewInternational Actors. The United Nations and the European EconomicCommunity, Bristol: Macmillan St. Martin’s Press, 1970, pp. 55-56.39 Carol Ann Cosgrove (ed.); Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), The NewInternational Actors. The United Nations and the European EconomicCommunity, Bristol: Macmillan St. Martin’s Press, 1970, pp.55-57.
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Diagram 1: International relations among states and the
stance of international organizations according to the
idealist approach
The diagram demonstrates ideally the concept of
international relations among states and international
organizations. This system has a hierarchical order. The
supreme power vests in international organizations.
International organizations acting as the super state
regulate the international relations among the federatively
organized states. If a (“community-“) law is broken, the
supranational body has the power to apprehend the
lawbreaker. The system of “balance of power” transforms into
a system of a “community of powers.” So powerless states do
not have to fear any threats from powerful states since the
supranational body may intervene on behalf of the powerless.
International organization regulating internationalrelations of the member-states
State d
State a State bState c
State e
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2.1.1 Comment on the rationalist, idealist and institutional
approach
As history reveals, the development of international
law does not necessarily mean that the actions of the
nation-states can be regulated in such a simple way. It is
not enough just to introduce rule-producing organs on an
international level. The misconception is that the
international judicial system does not have the same
premises as the domestic judicial system. Qualitative
factors, such as loyalty and identity of the people in
regard to the rule-producing international bodies are
necessary in order that such an organization can be
effective in all its areas of activity. Besides the
importance of these qualitative factors, the decisions made
in international bodies also affect people (and not
exclusively states). This is one big problem of
international organizations like the UN and EU. There is
hardly any interaction between the people affected and these
bodies. International organizations have to be founded on an
understandable idea, which may correspond with the people.
People have to know what is going on in the political
process. The political system has the obligation to
integrate the population in as many aspects as possible.40
This critique of the rationalist approach again can be
criticized. If one thinks it through, the concept of a world
40 Not only the international political (governmental) system isjeopardized but also the (democratic) political system on the domesticlevel. Political frustration diminishes the participation of thepopulation. Voter turnouts show that after each election fewer people goto elections. What is the cause that people refrain from elections? Whyare people frustrated with the political system? - because of the loss
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institution outlined in the rationalist approach, in its
end, would result in a super state ruling, on a federative
basis, over all the other states. This development seems to
be very unlikely. The question of to what extent an
international organization should develop to has yet to be
answered by the governments of the nation-states. Should an
international organization just be a consultative organ?
Should it be empowered to make supranational decisions? The
answer to these questions can be found in the respective
constitution of the international bodies. (A detailed
examination will follow in the third chapter)
According to the UN-Charter, the nation-state system
prevails over a global regime. The UN is responsible for
international peace and security but does not question the
principle of sovereignty.41 Just on very special occasions,
when international peace or security is in danger, the
Security Council may act. The problem with these tasks is
that peace and security are traditional fields of activity
of sovereign states. As it will be shown later on, states
are very unwilling to cooperate in these areas.
However, for the EU, economic cooperation is the main
task. Economic wealth is very much dependent on
international cooperation concerning export, transportation
etc. In this field, states are more willing to give up
sovereign rights and cooperate.
of the unifying idea, lack of communication, alienation and/ orlegitimacy?41 The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I Article 2 Section 1.
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Another very critical issue of the rationalist approach
is the lack of enforceability of the (international) law
either produced multilaterally (by international
organizations) or bilaterally by states. International law
scholars criticize the deficient law-producing bodies and
especially the lack of law-enforcement instruments. But, as
Machiavelli points out, a well functioning governmental
system is dependent on good laws and good armies.42
For if the international community lacks both good laws
(an important international parliament) and good armies (an
international law enforcement force), the international
governmental system fails.
2.2 The realist approach
According to this approach, states tend to act on the
international level in a lawless manner, in an anarchy prone
environment. The international sphere is characterized by
lawlessness and by the absence of legal authorities
evolving, executing and sanctioning laws. On the
international scene, every state “struggles for power
regardless of time, place, political ideology or form of
government”. States are characterized by “a perpetual and
restless desire for power”. International institutions are
jammed in the struggle of states for power. Therefore, the
world order is rather a “balance of power” than a “community
of power.”43
42 Niccolo Machivelli, The Prince, Indianapolis: Hackett PublishingCompany, 1995, p. 38.
28
But if the state is an end in itself and relates to
itself, for what reason are states founding international
organizations?
The task of world institutions is to add stability to the
balance and to facilitate the adjustment of shifting power
relationships without resort to large-scale or unlimited
war.44
In other words, a state behaves selfishly, has no moral
obligations and just relies on itself. It joins
international organizations, because it anticipates personal
gains to promote its own particular national objective
(“national interest”). International organizations are seen
to be the means for the state’s intended end.
... they (states, annot.) seek to pursue their
independence and to increase their power without regard for
the more cosmopolitan considerations of an international
political order.45
According to the realist thesis, international
organizations have no independent role or function in
international affairs, but are simply extensions or
instruments of state power. International organizations are
artificial creatures, in contradiction to the “naturally”
developed political communities such as the state, set up by
states and governments solely for the purpose to serve as
43 Carol Ann Cosgrove (ed.); Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), The NewInternational Actors. The United Nations and the European EconomicCommunity, Bristol: Macmillan St. Martin’s Press, 1970, p. 62.44 Ibid., p. 63-64.45 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: First Touchstone Edition, 1995,
29
fora for international cooperation between states and to
assist them in the management of international affairs.
International organizations have no political will and
therefore effectively no political independence. As a result
of this assumption, one is wrong, if one focuses too
excessively on international organizations and their
internal structures, because the appropriate focal point has
to be on states and governments, the entities ultimately
responsible for international relations.46
Diagram 2: The realist approach - states and the
international system
p. 805.46 Closing Seminar of a United Nations University Research Project,Legitimacy of International Organizations, on the 25 February 2000, NewYork (UN-Headquarters) USA.
State a
State4r
Stated9
Statex
State t
State g
Stateb
Statez
State r
State v
30
The different thickness of the circles indicates the
different power-status of the state. The thicker the line
the more powerful is the state. The “realist” world of
international relations is anarchic and volatile without any
order. The balance of power may change quickly, e.g. through
new alliances between states. There is no central authority
in the international system regulating the behavior of
states.
In a meeting with the Security Council members, US-
Senator Jesse Helms verified the soundness of the realist,
the state-centric theory of international relations. He
pointed out that the United Nations should not dare to
impose its decisions upon the American people. If the UN
does so, the United States will withdraw and eliminate its
contribution to the UN.47
2.2.1 Comment on the realist theory
According to the realist theory, states have the
supreme power in international relations and passionately
pursue their national interests. Emphasizing the national
interest of the state’s conduction of foreign policy, the
realist theory cannot clearly define national interest and
just offers an inappropriate speculation. The concept of
national interest is left in some mystic sphere of the evil
nature of human beings based upon the assumption and
concepts outlined by Machiavelli and Hobbes. What exactly is
47 United States Senator Jesse Helms (Foreign Relations CommitteeChairman), Special meeting in the Security Council Chamber on UnitedStates and the UN, on the 20 January 2000, New York (UN-Headquarters)USA.
31
the “struggle for power?” Of what does power consist?48
Furthermore, the principle of power as the core motivation
for political behavior is overstressed. Other values (e.g.
moral values) also intervene.
Although some state behavior can be well defined, the
realist approach is not able to describe sufficiently the
development of some international organizations such as the
EU, the “loss of power” and the limitation of the margin of
maneuver of its member states. In certain areas of the EU,
namely in the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM, the supreme power is
not vested in the nation-state but in a supranational organ.
The realist power-system cannot explain why nations
cooperate in this intense way.
2.3 The revolutionist approach
The premise of this approach is not to emphasize the
rule of law; it is the rule of justice that the
revolutionists seek. In order to obtain justice, the ends
justify the means. “The world institutions have to eradicate
the last vestiges of Western colonialism and racial
discrimination.” If these institutions are malfunctioning,
then they have either to be rebuilt or, if necessary,
demolished in order to get rid of Western colonialism so as
to establish the “global proletarian society.” The final
goal of the revolutionist concept is a monopoly of power as
48 James Doughtery; Robert Pfaltsgraff, Contending Theories ofInternational Relations. A Comprehensive Survey, New York: Harper & RawPublishers, 1981, pp. 126-127.
32
the final stage in the transition to proletarian
cosmopolitanism.49
2.3.1 Comment on the revolutionist approach
The revolutionist approach is similar to the
rationalist concerning the aim of creating a central
authority with supreme power. Both approaches deal with the
problem of what ought to be. The major difference is that
the “rationalists” are reformist that means gradually, step
by step, through the evolution of international law a world
order will be established. Contrarily, the “revolutionists”
suggest the need to use force in order to reach the goals.
2.4 The functional and neofunctional/ integrational approach
“The functional approach emphasizes the common index of
need”.50 States seek functional cooperation in different
policy-fields. They actively exclude policy-areas of
controversy like defense and/ or security. Controversial
areas are biased and just generate conflicts. According to
the functional approach, states try to cooperate in social
areas to promote general welfare. Many conflicts have their
roots in social and economic areas, and functional
cooperation may ease these problems and contribute to a more
peaceful environment.51
49 Carol Ann Cosgrove (ed.); Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), The NewInternational Actors. The United Nations and the European EconomicCommunity, Bristol: Macmillan St. Martin’s Press, 1970, p. 57-58.50 Carol Ann Cosgrove (ed.); Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), The NewInternational Actors. The United Nations and the European EconomicCommunity, Bristol: Macmillan St. Martin’s Press, 1970, p. 65.51 This function and goal of international organizations is confirmed byNafis Sadik, Executive Director of UNFPA, Panel discussion on theContribution of the United Nations System and the Global Conferences of
33
The development of functional cooperation among states
will be a slow process, but it is a sure one. As already
mentioned, the reasons for conflicts lay very often in the
social and economic disparities among the different states.
Functional cooperation should diminish these disparities and
generate an “equal” world society, where nobody has to fight
for resources and the like.52 Finally, functional
cooperation in international organizations ought to lead to
a world unity.53
Gradually cooperation in economic, social, and other
nonpolitical spheres will wear down sovereignty and produce
amore homogenous and a more manageable world society in
which political unity, perhaps in the form of world
federation, can be set up and enabled to thrive. The organs
of peace will be created by gradual evolutionary process,
not by the quick writing of a constitution.54
The neofunctional or integrational approach focuses on
regional integration like that of Europe. The starting point
of this school is a certain zeitgeist, which aims to imply a
“new way of life”. New governmental services are demanded;
the old established structures cannot satisfy the needs of
the population. The zeitgeist has to be shared with other
nations in order to be effective. If additionally some
premises are existent such as “complementary values, a skill
the 1990s in the combating poverty, and the role of the Economic andSocial Council (ECOSOC), 26 January 2000, New York.52 Norman Hill, International Politics, New York: Harper & RowPublishers, 1963, p. 404-405.53 Arno Mohr (Hg.), Theorien Internationaler Politik, München, 1996, p.161-162.
34
for compromise”, expectation of “specific financial or
economic rewards” and a similar level of development, then
states will start to integrate.55
This slightly modified school of thought supposes that
economic integration will finally lead to political unity.
During the integration process, parts of national
sovereignty are transferred to “higher,” supra-national,
authorities (“spill over effect”), until a “point of no
return,” a political union is reached.56
Diagram 3: Functional approach – integrating states
54 Norman Hill, International Politics, New York: Harper & RowPublishers, 1963, p. 405.55 Carol Ann Cosgrove (ed.); Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), The NewInternational Actors. The United Nations and the European EconomicCommunity, Bristol: Macmillan St. Martin’s Press, 1970, p. 79-82.56 Heinz Gärtner, Modelle europäischer Sicherheit, Wie entscheidetÖsterreich, Wien, 1997, p. 23.
First area of integration (e.g.coal and steel)
Advanced area of integration(e.g. common market)
Further advanced area ofintegration (e.g. single currency)
Further advanced area of integration(e.g. common foreign policy)
Final area of integration (e.g.military/ defense policy)
States integrating the differentareas of activity
Interdependent areas of theinternational society
35
Diagram 3.1: Very advanced integrated system
Diagram 3 shows states starting to functionally
integrate the different areas of policy. In this particular
case, the economy is the first “ring” of integration, the
starting point of international cooperation. (As the system
of international cooperation reveals it seems that economic
cooperation between states is the most likely of being the
first sector of cooperation/ integration.) Each ring may
more or less function as an own regime representing the
participating member states to the outside. The longer
states successfully cooperate, the further states penetrate
into different policy areas. Gradually, as the diagram
shows, areas such as currency and complex social issues
become integrated. The core centers of the integration are
typically the so-called traditional sovereign prerogatives
of the nation-states such as security, military and defense
policy. Consequently, these areas are at the very end of the
integration process.
Integrated states –cooperation in allareas
Supra-national system
36
What does this mean for the EU and the UN? The EU is
deemed to be a successful international organization,
because its integration process started with the “easiest,”
most acceptable area of integration, economic cooperation.
Gradually, this functional cooperation moves forward to
other areas as the history of European integration
exemplifies. With regard to the UN, the horse was put before
the cart. The UN seeks functional cooperation in
international peace and security, the most critical,
controversial and sensitive areas of integration, as we see
from the diagram 3. According to this approach, the UN
should have first started to seek functional cooperation in
economic areas in order to be successful. As a matter of
fact, illustrating the difficulties of integrating sensitive
policy areas (defense policy) was the plan in the early
1950s of the ECSC-member states to establish a European
Defense Community. This project failed.57
An example of a relatively successful functional
cooperation in the problematic areas of military and defense
is represented by the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) renamed to OSCE. It is a functional
cooperation in security matters and has extended its
importance during the last decade and leading to an
institutionalization (OSCE = Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe). In the 1970s, the CSCE was able to
successfully ease tensions between eastern and western
hemisphere with confidence-building measures. In the 1990s
it got involved in many peacekeeping and peace-building
activities from Kosovo to the Caucasian Republics. The OSCE
57 The French National Assembly voted against this new type oforganization and stopped it.
37
summit in Istanbul, Turkey, in November 1999 issued a new
legally binding charter concerning the further reduction of
military forces with procedures for inspection and
verification. The charter also tries to learn from the
conflicts occurring within the states. It envisions a new
role of the OSCE in easing tensions before they explode into
war, including the possibility of intervening not just in
conflicts in states but within. Furthermore, the document
envisions rapid-response teams that could be deployed
quickly to manage crises. Opinions say the adapted treaty
will enhance peace, security and stability throughout
Europe.58
Actually, there is a deadlock within the UN-system and
its influence on the world. Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the member-states of the UN have been discussing,
among other things, the reform of the UN-Security Council,
which is deemed to be absolutely necessary to cope with the
problems the UN has to face today. These discussions are
still going on, but as this process shows, nothing
substantial has been achieved so far. Therefore, not
astonishingly, the UN is criticized for not being able to
fulfill its duties guaranteeing international peace and
security. But interestingly, while the UN is fighting for
its place in international affairs, the economical
international organizations like the World Trade
Organization59 (WTO) are able to impressively extend their
margin of maneuver.
58 Marc Lacey, Summit in Turkey Places New Limits on Europe’s Arms, in:New York Times, 11.20.1999 (internet edition).59 The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs was the predecessor of theWTO. The transformation of the GATT into the WTO simultaneouslyintroduced a new judicial power (organ) the Appellate Body. In other
38
As it will be pointed out in a coming chapter, the
functional approach is a very interesting model for European
integration. The European integration process started with
cooperation in the heavy industry sector (ECSC60). After
that, further economic areas were included. One result of
this integration process will be the introduction of the
single currency “Euro” in 2002 that will replace the
national currencies of 11 EU-member states.61 Another
significant result of the integration process, which has
been already mentioned above, is the incorporation of
military and security issues into the integration process in
the Treaty of Maastricht.
The diagram 3.1 shows a completed integration process
of several states in all policy areas. The circle
(supranational authority) around the triangles (states)
represents this community of states to the outside (having
taken over all the sovereign rights of the nation-states).
The states may act relatively independently under the
supervision of the supranational authority within its
borders.
2.4.1 Comment on the functional/ neofunctional approach
The explanatory force of these approaches is quite
convincing, but there are still some pending questions. For
words, the power (margin of maneuver) of the WTO and other economicinternational organizations as an actor increases, whereas the power ofother international actors stagnate.60 Founded in 195261 Member states introducing the Euro are Austria, Belgium, Finland,France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, andSpain.
39
instance, the approach does not answer the question, whether
there is the possibility of a “spill back effect”
(disintegration) like what happened in Ex-Yugoslavia? When
do we reach the “point of no return”, if there is anything
like that? When exactly does the spill-over-effect come into
effect? And does functional cooperation really minimize
tensions between states and generally promote peace? As the
economic crises of 1999 in Russia and Asia showed,
international economic cooperation does not necessarily ease
tensions; on the contrary, it can even lead to conflicts.
Globalization, the present economic world order and in
general economic interdependence, are seen by several states
to represent serious threats to international peace.
2.5 The concept of the individual - the power of thecollective
This school of thought is not established as a sound
theory of international organizations. Nevertheless, it will
be discussed, because of the new perspectives it offers
towards international organizations.
According to this concept, the focal point is the will
and the power of the individual. Just the individuals, the
peoples of the states, have the final power to grant the
right of existence to social entities, social organizations.
Ultimately, everything goes back to and relies upon the
individual. In order that social entities can live, at a
minimum, the passive consent of the people is necessary.
States and international organizations are those kinds
of social entities. In general, states are considered to be
40
very successful organizations in organizing and structuring
the population, division of labor and so forth. Therefore,
the majority of the states seem to be very constant and
meaningful both within the state and in the international
arena. Contrary, international organizations are deemed to
be unsuccessful and meaningless. This “success” of states
goes back to the “special” relationship between the state,
or the government, and the people/ individual. International
organizations are meaningless and volatile because they do
not reflect the will of the people. International
organizations (INGOS) like the UN and EU are created by the
governments to serve as an instrument for a desired aim.
International organizations have no independent role or
function in international affairs, but are simple extensions
or instruments of state power. States use international
organizations for their purpose as fora for international
cooperation and to assist them in the management of
international affairs. There is no civil (global) society
yet which builds up a “special” relationship to
international organizations to grant legitimacy and
meaningful life to these bodies.62
Additionally, international organizations suggest
treating the people of the various member states as a
unified group disregarding the economic, social, political
and cultural differences between them and also within them.
This assumption does not match the social and political
world (and state) reality and amplifies the impotence of
international organizations.
62 Closing Seminar of a United Nations University Research Project,Legitimacy of International Organizations, on the 25 February 2000, NewYork (UN-Headquarters) USA.
41
As the relationship between international organizations
and the people remains indirect, being mediated by the
representatives of member states and governments, ordinary
people or citizens have normally no access to, and
consequently no role to play in, the international arena.
This indirect, representative relationship between people
and international organization means, effectively, that the
international community created by the constituent documents
of international organizations, such as the Charter of the
UN, is not an international civil society consisting of
peoples and individuals, but an exclusive community of
political and diplomatic representatives of states and
governments.63
In other words, legitimacy is absolutely necessary for
international organizations to work. It is suggested that
people have to be directly involved in international
organizations not just exclusively governments as it is
today. This situation is also labeled as “the dilemma of
modern democracy” in the era of globalization. It is argued
that democratic polities are essentially territorially-
bounded communities, whereas the world beyond the nation-
state, the international arena, is a Hobbesian state of
nature, so to speak a theater of power politics, where
democracy and its principles have no room.64
63 Closing Seminar of a United Nations University Research Project,Legitimacy of International Organizations, on the 25 February 2000, NewYork (UN-Headquarters) USA.64 Closing Seminar of a United Nations University Research Project,Legitimacy of International Organizations, on the 25 February 2000, NewYork (UN-Headquarters) USA.
42
In recent years, even states turned out not to be able
to totally satisfy the will of the people. The states have
difficulties to manage the transnational and international
problems. They seem incapable of handling the troubles
coming along with globalization, AIDS or environmental
pollution. So people start to organize themselves in
founding INGOs, international associations and the like and
unhinge the (traditional) rights of the state.
2.5.1 Comment on the concept of the individual - the power
of the collective
Indeed, the power of the individual in international
affairs is, to a certain extent, existent, be it in the form
of thousands of NGOs or be it the world public opinion
forcing the international (state) community to act in their
“interest”. For instance, the pressure from the world public
opinion propelled the signing of the land mine convention.
This concept demonstrates, in an accurate and plausible way,
why international organizations have some deficiencies, but
it does not answer the question thoroughly of why states
cooperate. The emphasis of this approach on democracy,
direct representation of the individual and legitimacy is
also doubtful. People are certainly capable to transfer
their will and legitimacy into international bodies without
direct representation. International organizations do not
work in that way because states too often insist on the
right of sovereignty and non-interference. The concern of
the citizens is a minor role, sovereignty is the crucial
point.
43
Another interesting point underlining the current
extraordinary stance of the individual is the new strategy
of poverty eradication. The new promising concept to ease
the suffering from poverty is the micro credit-system,
which, until now, produces promising results. Under this
plan, small credit loans are preferably granted to
individuals instead of giving large amounts to governmental
institutions. Also the Vice President of the World Bank,
Mats Karlsson, agrees that the micro credit system is very
advisable in the fight against poverty because it starts at
the local level. 65
This is a totally different approach to poverty
eradication than existed in the previous 50 years. The
individual became the direct partner for development aid.
This considerable change indicates the present extraordinary
stance of the individual compared with the decades before.
Furthermore, this change of paradigm indicates the
insufficiency of the stigmatized states to cope with the
problems of today. The states cannot any longer perform the
necessary tasks for their constituents, so they organize
themselves and take over these particular tasks.
As already mentioned, world public opinion is a very
important factor in the present international affairs
capable of driving governments and/ or international
organizations to act. Bishop Diarmuid Martin states that the
citizens are the driving force in politics. This is the
65 Mark Malloch-Brown, Administrator of UNDP; Mats Karlsson, VicePresident of World Bank, Panel discussion on the Contribution of theUnited Nations System and the Global Conferences of the 1990s in thecombating poverty, and the role of the Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC), 26 January 2000, New York.
44
place where the political will is based. A civil society has
to be formed and empowered.66
The power of the individual is a very idealistic
concept. Bearing this in mind, Bishop Martin stated, that it
is not wrong but rather necessary to be idealistic,
otherwise the world would not have the UN and its precious
work for international peace and security. The power is
finally in the hands of the individual.67
66 Bishop Diarmuid Martin, Secretary of the Pontifical Council forJustice and Peace, Panel discussion on the Contribution of the UnitedNations System and the Global Conferences of the 1990s in the combatingpoverty, and the role of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 26January 2000, New York.67Bishop Diarmuid Martin, Secretary of the Pontifical Council forJustice and Peace, Panel discussion on the Contribution of the UnitedNations System and the Global Conferences of the 1990s in the combatingpoverty, and the role of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 26January 2000, New York.
45
3. The Comparison of the Security Council and
Council of the European Union
3.1 The Council of the European Union (CEU) and itsbackground
The Rome Treaties of 1957 – the constitutional
framework of the EC – established the Council as the
ultimate locus of Community decision-making on all major
issues, whether budgetary, legislative, or treaty-making.68
The strong institutional framework of the EU did not
exist from the very beginning of its foundation but evolved
gradually and particularly during the last decade. In 1987
with the coming into force of the Single European Act (SEA),
the member states tried to give the European integration a
new impetus. A clear stated goal plus firm political will,
the single market, and new institutional adoptions propelled
the integration process into new policy areas. In addition,
the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet
Union spurred the political integration process. The Treaty
of Maastricht is based on this new political situation
introducing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Furthermore, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
fourth accession wave with Austria, Finland and Sweden was
possible. Austria and Finland are neutral and this
neutrality was more or less tied to the Soviet Union. During
the accession negotiations of Austria, which started in
1987, the Soviet Union under Michail Gorbatchev expressed
68 Robert Keohane (ed.); Wolfgang Wessels, The New European Community.Decision-making and Institutional Change, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991,p. 133.
46
deep concerns about the possibility of Austria joining the
EU. However, after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the
new Russia did not react to Austria’s EU-ambition.
The simple term CEU does not reflect the institutional
and political complexity of this organ. In fact, it is full
of twists and turns. The CEU is also called the Council of
Ministers because it consists of the national ministers of
the member states. The Council is the major decision-making
branch of the EU and arguably the most “powerful” organ.
Although it must work closely with the other institutions
(especially with the European Commission and the European
Parliament69), it has the final say on what will and what
will not become EU law.70 The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced
the system of “co-decision.” This new legislative procedure
grants more power to the European Parliament in offering
more possibilities to intervene in the legislative process.
This reform made the parliament into a co-legislature
together with the Council.71 Before this reform, the
European Parliament asserted primarily consultative
functions and could just put pressure on the European
Commission and Council in approving or disapproving its
budget. Despite the new reform, the Council still plays a
key role both in the community legislation and in the
69 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 218: The Council and the Commissionshall consult each other and shall settle by common accord their methodsof cooperation. See also: Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 249: In order tocarry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of thisTreaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council and theCommission shall make regulations and issue directives, take decisions,make recommendations or deliver opinions.70 John McCormik, The European Union. Politics and Policies, Boulder:Westview Press, 1996, p. 124.71 The European Parliament showed its strength and the increase of itsmargin of maneuver in sacking the European Commission in March/ April1999.
47
integration process of the EU because it still can, in some
cases, overrule the Parliament.72
The Council of Ministers is a forum in which incumbent
national government ministers meet to negotiate, build
consensus and finally make decisions, producing on the one
hand Community-law and determining on the other hand EU-
policy. Formally, the CEU is a single body, but its meetings
are organized into many specialist components. There is not
one Council composed of one group of ministers but a large
number of sectorally organized councils. Presently, 21
different councils exist for different issues.73 Each
national ministry deals with one or more councils at the
European level. The most important Councils are the General
Affairs Council and Agriculture. (Agriculture consumes more
than 40% of the EU-budget.) Exempted from these council
meetings are odd ministries like religion and the like.
Councils dealing with defense issues also used to be
exempted.74 Under the Austrian EU-Presidency from 1 July
1998 to 31 December 1998, the minister of defense, Werner
Fasslabend, called an informal meeting of the EU-defense
ministers for the first time. (This initiative was not
repeated by other Presidencies.)
72 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 251 and 252.73 COREPER I issues: Internal market, Telecommunications, IndustryEmployment/Social Affairs, Education, Youth Culture/audiovisualResearch, Energy, Transport, Environment, Consumers Health, Fisheries ,Tourism;COREPER II issues: General Affairs, Economic and Financial Affairs,Justice and home affairs, Development, BudgetAgriculture (prepared by the special committee on agriculture)74 Robert Keohane (ed.); Wolfgang Wessels, The New European Community.Decision-making and Institutional Change, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991,p. 134.
48
With which issues does the Council deal? The Treaty of
Maastricht (amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam75) introduces
three areas of EU-lawmaking. It sets up the European Union
(EU) as the roof-organization for the three core pillars of
the EU. The Council sessions are divided up in that
particular threefold way:76
1. Pillar: European Economic Community (EEC), European
Community for Steel and Coal (ECSC) and European Atomic
Community (EURATOM)
2. Pillar: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
3. Pillar: Justice and Home Affaires (JHA)
75 In force since 5.1.1999.76 http://ue.eu.int/en/info/frame1.htmSee also: Andrew Duff (ed.); John Pinder (ed.); Roy Pryce (ed.),Maastricht and Beyond. Building the European Union, London; New York:Routledge, 1994, p. 3.
49
Diagram 4: The European Union and its agendas
The Council applies different voting procedures for
each of the different pillar issues. Dealing with issues
related to the second and third pillar (CFSP and JHA), the
Council convenes intergovernmentally. Intergovernmental
means, in this case, decisions must be unanimous. To put it
in other words, in the “second and third pillar-councils,”
every member-state must agree in order that a proposal may
pass. One dissenting vote can halt the decision-making.
Councils dealing with first-pillar-issues are the EC, ECSC
or EURATOM and they apply majority voting. The first pillar
is the most famous and interesting one because of its
decision-making procedure. In the first pillar, decisions
EECECSC
EURATOM
JHA
CFSP
50
can be made by simple or qualified majority.77 Consequently,
one or more states can be overruled by the majority.
Therefore, people call this organ supranational.
However, some scholars dispute the accuracy of the term
“supranational” because of the lack of sound data. It is
very difficult to follow the decision-making process in the
Council, which is strictly secret, and to determine the role
of the Council as either a genuine supranational organ or
rather being a platform of competing governments.
3.1.1 The Composition of the CEU and its decision-making
The Council shall consist of one representative of each
member-state at ministerial level, authorized to commit the
government of that member-state.78 Besides the
representatives of the member-states, functionaries of the
European Commission also participate with specific rights in
the Council meetings.79
The cooperation between Council and Commission is very
important because one cannot act without the other. The
Commission has the sole right of initiative. That means the
Council can just act on the proposals of the Commission.
Without the Commission’s motion, the Council would not have
anything to do.80 Furthermore, the powerful position of the
77 http://ue.eu.int/en/info/frame1.htm. See also: Treaty of Amsterdam,Article 205: Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Councilshall act by a majority of its members.78 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 203.79 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 204: The Council shall meet whenconvened by its President on his own initiative or at the request of oneof its members or of the Commission.80 John McCormik, The European Union. Politics and Policies, Boulder:Westview Press, 1996, p. 135.
51
Commission in the EU-institution structure is underlined by
an article of the Treaty of Amsterdam saying that as long as
the Council has not acted, the Commission may alter its
proposal at any time during the procedures leading to the
adoption of Community act.81 In other words, all the EU-law
emanating from the Council stem originally from the
Commission’s proposals and do also reflect the Commission’s
approval.
The Council may request the Commission to undertake
any studies the Council considers desirable for the
attainment of the common objectives.82 As an internal paper
in the Commission reveals, the Commission exerts barely its
right of initiative, but rather reacts on requests of the
member-states, the Council or the Parliament. Just about
five percent of the Commission’s proposals originate from
the Commission itself.83
The voting procedure of the Council is, like its
composition, very complex. In the Council, the one state one
vote principle, as it is practiced in the General Assembly
of the UN, is also applied but only when the voting
procedure requires simple majority or unanimity. If
qualified majority is required, the votes are distributed
differently among the states, whereby the larger states get
more votes (maximum of 10 votes) than the smaller states
(minimum of 2 votes).
81 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 250 Section 2.82 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 208.83 This internal paper was studied by the author, but unfortunately, heis not able to provide the reader with further details about thisdocument.
52
Diagram 5: The distribution of votes in the CEU
Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom 10 votes
Spain 8 votes
Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal 5 votes
Austria, Sweden 4 votes
Denmark, Finland, Ireland 3 votes
Luxembourg 2 votes
Source: Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 205, Section 2.
53
Diagram 6: Number of votes in the CEU in comparison to the
citizens of the respective member-state84
Germany 10 10 8.09
Britain 10 10 5.82
France 10 10 5.77
Italy 10 10 5.71
Spain 8 8 4.89
Netherlands 5 5 3.04
Greece 5 5 2.06
Belgium 5 5 2.02
Portugal 5 5 1.97
Sweden - 4 2.18
Austria - 4 1.98
Denmark 3 3 1.73
Finland - 3 1.68
Ireland 3 3 1.17
Luxembourg 2 2 0.12
Total 76 87 4.24
Qualified majority 54 62
Blocking minority 23 26
84 Diagram taken from: John McCormik, The European Union. Politics andPolicies, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, p. 137.
Member State
Number ofvotes
throughDecember
1994
Number of votessince thefourth
accession waveJanuary 1995
Number ofcitizens per
vote(millions)
54
A qualified majority is reached by 62 votes out of
87.85 The blocking minority of 26 votes serves as a
safeguard for smaller states (or three or more states) to be
able to stop a motion of the bigger states. The majority
vote is applied when the Council has failed to reach a
consensus (for a first pillar issue). In this case, the
votes of the Council members are split up as shown in
diagram 6. Nevertheless, the Council tries to obtain the
largest support among the member states for its decisions,
because a large support guarantees the best implementation
of the decisions.86 Simple majority is used, when the
Council deals with procedural issues or working under treaty
articles, with each minister having one vote. Unanimity is
applied when deciding on issues concerning the second and
third pillar, or when the Council wants to change a
Commission proposal against the wishes of the Commission.
Also if the European Parliament has rejected the Council’s
common position, unanimity shall be required for the Council
to act on a second reading.87 In the case of unanimity, each
minister has one vote.88 Abstentions are foreseen in the
Treaty in order not to block an adoption of a proposal,
which requires unanimity.89 Since the Luxembourg compromise
of 1966, after France had given up the policy of “the empty
chair,” the option of a veto may be employed, when a vital
national interest of a member-state is at stake.90 Although
85 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 205 Section 1.86 http://ue.eu.int/en/info/frame1.htm87 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 252.88 John McCormik, The European Union. Politics and Policies, Boulder:Westview Press, 1996, p. 136.89 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 205, Section 3: Abstentions by themembers in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption by theCouncil of acts which require unanimity.90 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 11, Section 2: If a member of theCouncil declares that, for important and stated reasons of nationalpolicy, it intends to oppose the granting of an authorization by
55
it is rarely used, the very existence of the veto can be
employed as a threat, and governments can use it to convince
their citizens that national sovereignty has not been
compromised by EU membership.91
The possibility of a veto is much criticized.
Therefore, opinions demand, like the one of Romano Prodi,
the current President of the European Commission, to favor
simple majority voting so that the work of the EU proceeds
more easily and faster in order to cope better with
globalization and the present international challenges. Also
importantly, the work of the EU could not be obstructed by
any member state.92
The Headquarters of the Council is located in the
Justus Lipsius building in downtown Brussels. The Council
shall meet when convened by its President on his own
initiative or at the request of one of its members.93 As the
meeting practice shows, the Council is in session for two or
three days per normal week.94
A committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives
of the Member-States shall be responsible for preparing the
work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned
qualified majority a vote, shall not be taken. The Council may, actingby a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to theCouncil, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government,for decision by unanimity.91 John McCormik, The European Union. Politics and Policies, Boulder:Westview Press, 1996, p. 137.92 Peter Norman, Europe: Prodi wants more radical reform, in: FinancialTimes (Internet edition), 02.10.2000. See also: nn, Mr. Prodi’s bigIdea, in: Financial Times (Internet edition), 02.10.2000.93 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 204.
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to it by the Council.95 The abbreviation of this committee
is COREPER. There are two types of these committees, COREPER
I and COREPER II. The former consisting of deputy permanent
representatives deals with common issues, whereas the latter
consisting of ambassadors deals with the more “prestigious”
areas like General Affairs Council (GAC), or Council of
economics and finance ministers (Ecofin).96 The COREPER I
and II meetings also take place in the Justus Lipsius
building. Usually, COREPER II meetings are scheduled on
Wednesdays and Thursdays, whereas COREPER I meetings are
preferably held on Thursdays.
The meetings of COREPER II are prepared by senior
members of the national delegations, known as the Antici
Group.97 The meetings of COREPER I are again prepared by the
so-called Martens Group.
The working groups and committees of the Council are
also very important for the work and functioning of the
Council. The working groups are located at the very
beginning of a proposal, and they formulate more or less a
raw draft of the respective project. The difference between
the Antici and Martens Group and the working groups is that
the former “just” prepare the final draft and they “fight”
mostly for minor corrections and the latter draft a proposal
from the very beginning. If there is no agreement on a
94 Robert Keohane (ed.); Wolfgang Wessels, The New European Community.Decision-making and Institutional Change, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991,p. 139.95 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 207 Section 1.96 John McCormik, The European Union. Politics and Policies, Boulder:Westview Press, 1996, pp. 128-129.97 John McCormik, The European Union. Politics and Policies, Boulder:Westview Press, 1996, p. 129.
57
specific matter, it may go to the next higher institution,
until the Council of Ministers makes the final decisions.
In all these subsidiary organs, the Commission is
represented and actively participates in the negotiations.
(For instance, in the Antici meeting, the European
Commission is represented by the Director of Directorate D
dealing with the relations to the Council of the Secretariat
General [of the Commission].)
A Secretariat General (of the Council) with a
secretary-general, who acts simultaneously as High
Representative for the CFSP (present incumbent is Javier
Solana), is assigned to the Council. The Secretariat General
is responsible for the correct running and organization of
the different meetings and assisting the Presidency.98 The
Secretariat General is also located in the Justus Lipsius
building.
In a paragraph above, the Presidency of the Council has
already been mentioned. The President presides over the
Council meetings and all the other meetings of the Council’s
subsidiary organs like COREPER, Antici and Martens Group and
work group meetings. The incumbent of the Presidency is not
a person, but a member-state. The office of the President
shall be held in turn by each Member State in the Council
for a term of six months in the order decided by the Council
acting unanimously.99 The Presidency with the help of the
Secretariat General of the Council sets up an agenda of
98 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 207, Section 2.99 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 203.
58
priorities and determines the work of the Council for a half
year.
An informal organ of the CEU is the EU-Troika100
consisting of three parts: the incumbent president, the
future president sitting on the right and the previous one
sitting on the left of the president. This institution shall
guarantee continuation of the work of the Council. Another
task of the EU-Troika is to represent the Union to the
outside. The office of the Presidency is very prestigious
for the incumbent member state. The incumbent member states
try to be as successful as possible in resolving the pending
issues and their own agenda in order to get a domestic gain
out of it.
3.1.2 The different kinds of law and its enforcement
The Council of the European Union produces different
forms of legal actions, which are the following:
- A regulation shall have the general application. It shall
be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all
Member States.101
- A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed,
but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of
form and methods102 to implement it (annotation).
100 The EU-Troika is not mentioned in the Treaties but neverthelessbecame established.101 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 249.102 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 249.
59
- A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to
whom it is addressed.103
- Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding
force.104
EU-law is difficult to comprehend and also the
enforcement procedures of it are very complex. The member
state has to transpose EU-law (regulations, directives and
decisions) into its national law-system. So the nation
state’s executive branch (but also to a smaller extent the
national parliament as the body transposing the EU-law) is
the core actor in enforcing the EU-legislation.105
The European Commission, similar to the Secretariat-
General of the UN as we will see later on, is an important
organ to watch over the implementation of the EU-law. The
Commission is the “guardian of the Treaties” and of the
Community’s interests and observes that the nation states
act in accordance to the Treaties.106 Concerning the
implementation of EU-Law, the Commission is very much
dependent on national reports. It therefore cooperates very
closely with the national executive authorities.
Last but not least, the Court of Justice also
contributes its share to the EU-integration process. It
ensures that the law in the nation state is observed in the
process of Community integration.107 Furthermore, it is also
important to mention here the ruling of a court in Germany,
103 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 249.104 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 249.105 See: Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 256.106 See: Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 213 Section 2.107 http://curia.eu.int/en/pres/qce.htm
60
which stated that Community legislation overrides national
legislation.
In conclusion, the Court of Justice has an outstanding
position in the Community legislation on the one hand for
the individual and on the other for the Community. First,
the individual has the right to appeal to the Court and
secondly, the primacy of Community law over national law is
asserted.108
3.1.3 Comment on the CEU and the quality of an actor
The goals stated in the Treaty of the European Union
are very ambitious and far-reaching. The treaty imposes to
move forward the European integration to a new stage (ever
closer union), where both the traditional basic rights, like
liberty and democracy, and social rights shall be promoted.
In addition to the economic integration of the member
states, the integration of the areas of CFSP and JHA is
especially emphasized.109
The preamble to the Maastricht Treaty states that the
objective of the EU-member states is to reinforce European
Identity and independence in order to promote peace,
security and progress in Europe and in the world.110
The statement is remarkable because the EU tries to
extend its influence to third countries, beyond its borders.
108 http://curia.eu.int/en/pres/cjieu.htm109 Treaty of Amsterdam, Preamble. See also: Treaty of Amsterdam, Article2.
61
Be that as it may, the intended goals of an impact beyond
the borders of its member states seem to be more a lip
service than actual engagement in real political action. The
EU demonstrates rather un-concerted and uncoordinated
policies towards third countries as shown in Ex-Yugoslavia.
According to my definition of an actor in chapter
1.5.6, the EU is certainly an actor when it deals with the
first pillar tasks, with economy. Economically, the EU
extensively determines the national policy of its member
states (Maastricht goal: Economic and monterian Union, EMU).
Furthermore, the EU exerts great economical influence not
only within its borders, but also to the outside by
negotiating economic treaties with third countries. For
instance, the EC signed special trading rights and
agreements (Lomé-agreements) with the African, Caribbean and
Pacific States (ACP-states) including a stabilization fund
for some of their basic products and technical and financial
assistance. For that reason, the European Community (first
pillar) has an important and “creative” role as an actor on
the world (economic) stage.111
Furthermore, the EU has an immense impact on the
Eastern European states, which want to join the EU. In this
case, the influence is not just of economic but also of
political nature. The prospective member-states of Eastern
Europe have to adjust their economies and their political
110 Andrew Duff (ed.); John Pinder (ed.); Roy Pryce (ed.), Maastricht andBeyond. Building the European Union, London; New York: Routledge, 1994,p. 6.111 Andrew Duff (ed.); John Pinder (ed.); Roy Pryce (ed.), Maastricht andBeyond. Building the European Union, London; New York: Routledge, 1994,p. 7.
62
and legal systems to the standards of the EU.112 This
transposition of EU-law is definitely a great influence on
those countries, but in all the other parts of the world,
the EU plays a minor political role. Actually, the influence
of the EU is very limited in political respects. As the
different crises in the world reveal, the EU can hardly
agree on one guideline when it comes to dealing with third
countries. The EU was unable to find a common denominator at
the beginning of the Yugoslavia crisis. It was generally
perceived that the EU reacted too late to the situation in
Yugoslavia. Even after the war in Slovenia broke out at the
end of June 1991 and spread to Croatia in July, the EU was
not able to find a common position and to provide adequate
conflict management. The members reacted on the 15 January
1992 acknowledging the independence of the new Balkan
states. This incident positively demonstrated the lack and
the need of an efficient common foreign and security policy.
However, bearing this situation in mind, the EU does not
represent a unified actor and is (still) relatively
meaningless, although the member states tried to integrate
security and foreign policy issues.
But while the Community in its internal organization
has progressed far along the path towards a political union,
this has not yet been full reflected in the non-economic
aspects of its relations with the rest of the world. So far
the EU has rarely been able to take effective initiatives in
112 The “aquis communautaire,” the EU-legislation, is more than 100.000pages thick.
63
the field of general foreign policy, and has more often
found itself reacting to events.113
The EU was a global actor, a leader in trade, aid and
finance and yet not fully represented in international
financial institutions or United Nations agencies.114
The policies of the EU are administered by strong
institutions like the Council of the European Union or the
European Commission. Seemingly strong institutions,
nonetheless opinions complain about the ponderousness
especially of the Council. The decision-making of this organ
should be reformed, for instance to abolish the requirement
for unanimity and to scrap direct representation and create
five constituencies to nominate representatives.115
The final conclusion of this chapter is that the EU, in
economical terms, represents a real actor, and is also
meaningful on the global scale. Although the EU is able to
exert enormous centripetal forces on the Eastern European
countries, politically the EU is insignificant. The EU seems
to be capable to adapt to new situations because of the
continuous reform of its treaties. Therefore, the EU has the
potential to extend the “quality of an actor” not only in
economic matters, but also in political ones.
113 Andrew Duff (ed.); John Pinder (ed.); Roy Pryce (ed.), Maastricht andBeyond. Building the European Union, London; New York: Routledge, 1994,p. 8.114 Peter Norman, Europe: Prodi wants more radical reform, in: FinancialTimes (Internet edition), 02.10.2000.115 John Bruton, Lost in the Crowd, in: Financial Times, 9.7.1999(internet edition).
64
3.2 The Security Council of the United Nations (SC) and itsbackground
The big powers designed the Security Council as the
paramount organ of the United Nations. Under the great power
supervision, the SC should watch over international peace
and security.116
According to the UN-Charter, the SC has primary
responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace
and security.117 The SC is the only organ of the UN, which is
able to produce binding international law for all the member
states. Member states are obliged to accept and carry out
the Council’s decisions.118 The General Assembly or other
bodies of the UN may just decide on recommendations, but
cannot directly issue binding law. Recommendations do not
have the mandatory force the decisions of the SC have.119
Unlike its institutional counterparts, the Council of
the EU and the “Constitution” of the EU, the SC and the UN-
Charter just underwent minor reforms since their coming into
force. In 1963, the General Assembly of the UN amended
Article 23 enlarging the number of the SC-members from
eleven to fifteen. This reform was deemed to be necessary
due to the growing number of the UN member states. The
amendment of Article 27, also concerning the SC, determines
that from now on decisions on procedural matters shall be
made by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven)
116 A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations. Principles and Issues,Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 51991, pp. 62-63.117 The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V Article 24 Paragraph 1.118 See also: The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V Article 25.119 United Nations, Basics Facts about the United Nations, New York:United Nations Department of Public Information, 1998, p. 68.
65
and on all other matters an affirmative vote of nine members
(formerly seven) including the concurring votes of the five
permanent members of the SC.120 Nevertheless, these adoptions
indicate unimportant or indecisive changes in the structure
of the SC. The SC works in the same way like it did more
than 50 years ago, except the number of the SC-members
increased. Nonetheless, the Security Council is arguably the
most powerful organ of the UN-institutions because it is the
only organ entitled to produce binding law.
In comparison to the CEU, the SC is not so multifaceted
in its composition and working. Although in the UN-charter,
social obligations are mentioned,121 the main task of the UN
and the SC respectively is to guarantee international peace
and security. This emphasis is underlined by the structure
of the UN-constitution mentioning first the security issues
and later on the economic ones. Primarily the UN tries to
functionally cooperate in the field of international peace
and security in introducing the system of collective
security. The UN’s role in respect to the economy, is to
grant development aid via its special organs and programs
such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) or via
its specialized agencies such as the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO). It does not intend to establish a global
economical regime. The global economical regime is
represented by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has
gained more power in the passing years, but acts totally
independently from the UN.
120 http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/: The reform came into force on the12 June 1968.121 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble; and: Chapter IX Article 55.
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3.2.1 Composition of the SC and its decision-making
The SC consists of fifteen members. Five of the fifteen
members have a permanent seat and ten members are elected
biannually to the SC’s non-permanent seats. The five
permanent members are: The Republic of China, France, the
Russian Federation,122 the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.123
Each SC-member has one vote.124 On procedural matters, a
majority of 9 affirmative votes is necessary in order to
pass a proposal.125 Decisions on all other areas need 9
affirmative votes including the 5 permanent members.126 In
other words, the permanent members have to always agree
except for decisions on procedural matters in order that a
decision passes. The veto power is the most crucial part of
the voting structure in the SC. Without any cooperation
among the great powers in the SC, without the so-called
“great power unanimity,” solutions are almost impossible to
be achieved.127
122 United Nations Department of Public Information, Basic Facts aboutthe United Nations, New York: United Nations Publication, 1998, p. 9:The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an original Member of theUnited Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter dated 24 December 1991,Boris Yeltsin the former (annotation) President of the RussianFederation, informed the secretary-general that the membership of theSoviet Union in the SC and all other UN-organs was being continued bythe Russian Federation with the support of the 11 member countries ofthe Commonwealth of Independent States.123 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V Article 23 Paragraph 1: Theten countries (non-permanent members, annotation) of the UN shall beelected by the General Assembly to non-permanent members of the SecurityCouncil.124 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V Article 27 Paragraph 1.125 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V Article 27 Paragraph 2.126 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V Article 27 Paragraph 3.127 A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations. Principles and Issues,Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 51991, p. 63.
67
To ease decisions in the SC, the practice of vote-
abstentions has developed. Unlike the treaty provisions of
the CEU, where abstentions of member-states are foreseen,128
in the UN-Charter, abstentions are not mentioned.
Nevertheless, this voting behavior has become informally
institutionalized in the SC. Permanent members are not
obliged to cast a concurring vote and may abstain not
blocking the decision-making.129
Diagram 7: Example of the splitting up of votes
Excerpts from press release SC/6469 containing (in unofficial form) thefull text and the voting record of resolutions adopted by the SecurityCouncil in 1997
(...)S/RES/1134Intention to restrict Iraqi officials' travel if UN Special Commissiondenied accessDate: 23 October 1997
Meeting: 3826Vote: 10-0-5(...)
Vote on resolution 1134:
In favor:Chile, Costa Rica, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Republic ofKorea, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.
Against:None.
Abstaining:China, Egypt, France, Kenya, Russian Federation.
(...)
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scvote.htm
128 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 205 Section 3: Abstentions by memberspresent in person or represented shall not prevent an adoption by theCouncil of acts, which require unanimity.129 United Nations Department of Public Information, Basic Facts aboutthe United Nations, New York: United Nations Publication, 1998, p. 9.
68
The SC may investigate any dispute or any situation,
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a
dispute endangering the maintenance of international peace
and security.130 A complaint of the General Assembly, the
secretary-general, or a member-state concerning a threat to
peace may also be brought to the Council’s attention, if it
has not yet seized it. The Council’s first action is usually
to recommend that the parties should try to reach an
agreement by peaceful means.131
The SC calls the parties to seek solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional organizations or
agreements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.132
For instance, the SC prefers first to encourage regional
organizations to tackle the problem than to impose its own
ruling.133 An important part of the pacific settlements of
disputes may also play the special representatives and the
good office services of the secretary-general. If there
continues to be no progress to end the threat to
international peace, the SC may decide to make specific
recommendations or to take measures. The Council may call
upon the parties concerned to comply with these measures.134
In a further step, the SC may decide peaceful measures
to give effect to its decisions not involving the use of
armed forces. Such measures would be complete or partial
130 UN-Charter, Chapter V Article 34.131 United Nations Department of Public Information, Basic Facts aboutthe United Nations, New York: United Nations Publication, 1998, p. 10.132 UN-Charter, Chapter VI Article 33 Paragraph 1 and 2.133 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI, Article 33.
69
interruption of economic relations and or rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of
communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations.135
If all these efforts fail, the “final” step of the SC would
be the decision to take action by air, sea, or land forces
to maintain or restore international peace and security.136
These measures are the so-called Chapter VII Resolutions,
where the SC acts supranationally and employs, in a last
step, armies (enforcement contingents) to enforce its
ruling.
One has to bear in mind, that such enforcement measures
are actually rarely decided because of the lack of consent
in the SC. And even if the SC is able to pass a decision,
there may be no way to enforce it because the SC does not
elaborate specific enforcement measures.137 Another much
criticized point of the SC is that when a resolution is
decided the mandate deriving from it is often unclear and
may be differently interpreted by the international
community, according to their respective national interest.
The enforcement of the decisions depends on a great
power or preferably on a willing coalition of states, which
exercises much more international credibility than a single
state enforcement action. The enforcement action is the last
step of the UN escalation-scenario.
134 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII Article 39 and Article 40.135 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII Article 41.136 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII Article 42.137 This happened in the 1970s in East Timor. The SC officially condemnedthe invasion of Indonesia in East Timor but did not elaborate furthermeasures to hold back Indonesia. (More details about the case East Timorwill follow in chapter 5.)
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It may be possible because of a veto of a permanent
member, that an issue threatening international peace and
security cannot find a decision in the SC. Therefore, under
the “Uniting for peace” resolution adopted by the General
Assembly in November 1950, the Assembly may take action if
the SC, because of lack of unanimity of its permanent
members, fails to act in a case where there appears to be a
threat to international peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression. The Assembly is empowered to consider the matter
immediately with a view to making recommendations to Members
for collective measures, including, in the case of a breach
of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force
when necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security.138 However, as long as this resolution has
already existed, the General Assembly has never been able to
take action under this particular resolution, and therefore
it may be considered obsolete.
The SC is so organized to function continuously
(periodic meetings), and a representative (at ambassadorial
level) of each of its members must be present at all times
at United Nations Headquarters.139 But also the Head of
Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of
the SC is entitled to sit on the SC.140 On 31 January 1992,
the first ever Summit meeting of the Council was convened at
138 United Nations, Basic Facts about the United Nations, New York:United Nations Department of Public Information, 1998, p. 7.139 UN-Charter, Chapter V, Article 28 Paragraph 1 and 2.Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, Chapter I.
Meetings, Rule 1: Meetings of the SC shall, with the exception of theperiodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of thePresident at any time he deems necessary, but the interval betweenmeetings shall not exceed fourteen days.140 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, Chapter I.Meetings, Rule 13.
71
Headquarters (New York City, annotation), attended by Heads
of State and Government of 13 of its 15 members and by the
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the remaining two.141
That the heads of government met for the first time
after 47 years of the UN’s foundation may indicate how high
the governments rated the importance of the UN. (Summits at
EU-level are held very often, at least twice a year.142 These
frequent meetings increased not only multilateral contacts
on the EU level, but also simultaneously their bilateral
contacts in respect to both political and economical terms
propelled.143) These summits could be important because they
may have the potential to revive the UN-process.
The SC sessions are presided over by a president, who
represents the SC as an organ of the UN.144 In contrast to
the full year term of the General Assembly’s President, the
presidency of the Security Council rotates monthly,
according to the English alphabetical listing of its member
States.145 The president may influence the agenda, the
calling of the meetings, and Council debate, but his rulings
141 http://www.un.org/Overview/Organs/sc.html142 These meetings are the so-called European Council meetings, where theHeads of government meet. The European Council is a different organ fromthe Council of the EU and just recently started to getinstitutionalized. See: Treaty of Amsterdam: Article 99 Section 2;Article 113 Section 3 and Article 128 Section 1,2 and 5.143 Michael Trinker, Oesterreichisch-franzoesische Beziehungen in den 90-er Jahren, Wien, 1998 (Thesis), p. 77.144 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, Chapter III.Representation and Credentials, Rule 19.145 http://www.un.org/Overview/Organs/sc.html#MEMBERS.See also: Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council,Chapter III. Representation and Credentials, Rule 18: The presidency ofthe SC shall be held in turn by the members of the SC in the Englishalphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office forone calendar month.
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are subject to challenge of the Security Council.146 From the
short period of the Presidency (one month), one can conclude
that this institution is not essential and vital for the
work of the SC because of the lack of time the president is
offered to push through his agenda. Therefore, the margin of
maneuver the president has is very small. In fact, it is too
small to develop substantial initiatives.
Also “meaningless” (like the presidency) is the
Military Staff Committee (MSC),147 which should give advice
and assistance to the SC on all questions relating to the
SC’s military requirements for the maintenance of
international peace and security, the employment and command
of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of
armaments, and possible disarmament.148 According to the
Charter, the MSC is to consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the
permanent members of the SC, or their representatives.149
Until now, the MSC has never had to command military forces.
UN-forces remained always under the national military
command.
The preparatory work of SC is made by the standing
committees and ad hoc bodies. The SC may appoint a
commission or committee or rapporteur for a specified
question.150 The SC may establish such subsidiary organs as
it deems necessary for the performance of ifs functions.151
146 A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations. Principles and Issues,Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 51991, p. 64.147 Roger A. Coate, U.S. Policy and the Future of the United Nations, NewYork: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994, pp. 82-83.148 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII Article 46 and 47.149 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII Article 47.150 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, Chapter VI.Conduct of Business, Rule 28.151 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V Article 29.
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More institutions of the SC include the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the United Nations Special
Commission (Iraq) (UNSCOM).
Diagram 8: The SC and its organs
As we see in Diagram 7, the organizational and
institutional structure of the SC is quite simple.
Presently, two standing committees and eight ad hoc
SECURITYCOUNCIL
•••• UNSCOMUnited Nations Special Commission (Iraq)
•••• International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda
•••• International Tribunal for theformer Yugoslavia
•••• Standing Committeesand ad hoc bodies
•••• Military Staff Committee
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committees prepare the work of the SC.152 It neither amasses
the large numbers of work group meetings like those of the
CEU, where presently more than 150 working groups are
scheduled, nor does it interlink the inter-institutional
relations like those of the CEU.
The role of the Secretariat-General, the expression of
the supranational nature of an international organization,153
is relatively weak in comparison to its institutional
counterpart the European Commission. The Secretariat’s work
is primarily organizational, consultative and informative in
nature. It is not an organ, which can genuinely initiate
like the European Commission. The UN-charter describes this
organ very briefly without specific rights.154 The
Secretariat General has to disseminate information and to
draw with the presidency the agendas of the SC-meetings.155
Although the Secretariat-General experienced some “off
charter” modifications especially in the 1990s through the
good office services of the secretary-general and although
it is the communication center between the states and the
SC, its margin of maneuver is very limited.156
152 For detailed information about the nature of the committees visitwebsite: http://www.un.org/Overview/Organs/sc.html153 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XV Article 100: The employeesof the Secretariat General are international officials and responsibleonly to the Organization. They shall not seek or receive from anygovernment or from any other authority external to the Organization.154 See: Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XV.155 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, Chapter II.Agenda, Rule 7, 8 and 11.156 See: Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, ChapterII. Agenda, Rule 6.
75
The Secretariat General under its secretary-general157
shares the right to address the SC with the states158 and the
General Assembly.159 He may express any peace threatening
concern to the SC. The task of the secretary-general is all
encompassing from chief administrative officer to diplomat,
from conciliator to advocate. An additional point
jeopardizing the “success” of the work of the chief
administrative is the dilemma of being committed to peace
and working for international security (charter obligations)
on the one hand; on the other he would fail if not taking
into consideration the concerns of the major powers and
regional groups of the member states.160
3.2.2 Law and its enforcement
The SC employed enforcement measures (under Article 42:
“all necessary means”) only in a few cases: in 1950 in the
Korean War; in 1960 in Congo; in 1991 in response to the
Iraq invasion to Kuwait; in 1992 to permit humanitarian
relief operations in the midst of civil war in Somalia; in
1994 to restore the democratically elected government in
Haiti; in 1997 to protect humanitarian operations in
Albania; and in 1999 in East Timor because of the violent
turmoil after the independence referendum.161 These actions,
157 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XV Article 99. See also:Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, Chapter V.Secretariat, Rule 22: The secretary-general or is deputy acting on hisbehalf, may make either oral or written statements to the SC concerningany question under consideration by it.158 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI Article 35.159 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter IV Article 11.160 United Nations, Basic Facts about the United Nations, New York:United Nations Department of Public Information, 1998, p. 16.161 Enforcement measures concerning East Timor see: United NationsSecurity Council Resolution of the 15 September 1999, S/RES/1264 (1999).Enforcement measures concerning Korea and Iraq see: Walter Jones, The
76
though sanctioned by the SC, were entirely under the control
of the participating states. They were not UN peacekeeping
operations, which are established by the SC and directed by
the Secretary-General.162
The number of these enforcement decisions of the SC is
very small considering its 55 years of existence. The
performance of the SC has been less than fully encouraging
in enforcing international peace and security.163 Coate
criticizes the approach of authorizing individual member
states to undertake enforcement actions, which, in the long
term, turn out to be ineffective. The dependence of the
United Nations on a great power to back up and enforce its
decisions demonstrates that the international community
neither has the authority nor the legitimacy to guarantee
world peace. The UN can serve only as the instrument of the
great military powers. Therefore, breathing life in to the
MSC would be very desirable and creating a far more serious
military planning and command capability within the UN with
a standing contingent.164
In general, the SC’s actions under chapter VII are
deemed to be an unsuccessful tool of the UN because of being
dependent on a great power. However, while not specifically
Logic of International Relations, New York: Harper Collins PublishersInc., 71991, p. 552. Enforcement measures concerning Rhodesia andSomalia see: Roger A. Coate, U.S. Policy and the Future of the UnitedNations, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994, p. 81. Allother enforcement measures see: United Nations, Basic Facts about theUnited Nations, New York: United Nations Department of PublicInformation, 1998, p. 76.162 United Nations, Basic Facts about the United Nations, New York:United Nations Department of Public Information, 1998, pp. 76-77.163 Walter Jones, The Logic of International Relations, New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 71991, p. 552.
77
envisaged in the Charter, the SC was able to create an
important institute to work for international peace and
security, namely the peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping
operations are authorized to be deployed by the SC with the
consent of all parties involved. These operations may
consist of military, police and/ or civil personnel.165
As mentioned above, the peacekeeping missions were not
literally foreseen in the UN-charter. The legitimacy of the
UN-peacekeeping missions derives from chapter VI of the UN
Charter.166 The SC increased its importance in acquiring
international peace and security by means of peacekeeping
missions (especially in the 1990s). As table 9 shows, 32
peacekeeping missions were decided in the SC in the 1990s, a
real explosion if one compares the numbers of previous
peacekeeping missions: five in the 1980s, three in the
1970s, six in the 1960s, two in the 1950s and two in the
1940s.167 Apart from the 1940s and 1960s, which were
exceptional decades, a continuous growth of peacekeeping
missions is observable. This development underlines the
growing importance of the SC in present and anticipates a
great opportunity for the UN in the future to increase its
margin of maneuver and to contribute more to world peace via
peacekeeping.
164 Roger A. Coate, U.S. Policy and the Future of the United Nations, NewYork: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994, p. 81.165 United Nations, Basic Facts about the United Nations, New York:United Nations Department of Public Information, 1998, p. 71.166 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI: Pacific Settlements ofdisputes.167 Figures from: United Nations Department of Public Information, BasicFacts about the United Nations, New York: United Nations Publication,1998, p. 301-304.
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Diagram 9: The number of Peacekeeping Operations from the
beginning of the UN until 1999
The peacekeeping missions not only have changed in
quantitative respects but also qualitatively in doing peace-
building work. The UN broke new ground in 1989, when it
supervised the entire election process which led to the
independence of Namibia. Since then, the UN has been
involved in lots of different aspects starting with
monitoring elections, registering voters, counting votes,
teaching police forces, to administering states in
transition and so forth. But the degree of UN involvement
depends upon factors such as the requests received from
Peacekeeping Operations:Past and Present
010203040
1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990sDecades
Numberof
Peacekeeping
Operations
startedinthe
decade
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Governments, peace agreements between the parties in
conflict, or mandates from the SC.168
The peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace–building and
peace–making missions enforce the resolutions of the SC. The
decisions of the SC are bound to the member-state and do not
oblige the individual.169 The jurisdiction over the member-
states exerts the International Court of Justice (ICJ). That
is the place where international law disputes are fought.
Only states may be parties to cases before the Court. A case
can only be submitted to the Court with the consent of the
states concerned.170
If the court does issue a sentence, the effectiveness
of this sentence is determined by the voluntary willingness
of states to comply. The opinions and sentences of the ICJ
are unenforceable. There are no institutions empowered with
force, which are able to sanction the sentenced.171
3.2.3 Comment on the SC
The goal to guarantee international peace and security
on a global scale is very ambitious. The evaluation of how
successfully the SC performs its job is quite tricky. It is
easy to find examples where the UN did not work. To get a
more substantiated judgment, one has to pose the question of
168 United Nations Department of Public Information, Basic Facts aboutthe United Nations, New York: United Nations Publication, 1998, p. 77.169 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V Article 25.170 http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htmStatute of the International Court of Justice, Chapter II, Article 34Section 1 and Article 36171 Walter Jones, The Logic of International Relations, New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 71991, p. 552-553.
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what would have happened to international peace and security
without the UN. The UN is toothless and has no effective
means to actually guarantee international peace. The UN may
“show its teeth” via the world public opinion, on which the
success of the UN-missions is very much dependent. The
conclusion of this situation is that the UN’s work is
volatile and inconsistent; sometimes it works, sometimes it
does not.
The terms “international peace” and ”security” have
also to be defined more clearly to be able to evaluate the
work of the SC. Do these terms mean just the absence of
deadly conflicts or do they also include factors such as
social peace or development, and, if yes, how far does this
go? The meaning and implications of international peace and
security have changed over the years and encompassed many
different aspects of life. (As already mentioned above in
January 2000, for the first time a health issue, namely the
problem of AIDS and its threat to international peace were
discussed in the SC, which indicates the “new concept of
security.”) In the second millennium, it will be crucial for
the SC to adapt to the new situations and to look at
international peace and security in a multidimensional way.
To conclude, the SC does not have the premises of an
actor as defined in chapter 1.5.6. The SC’s actions are of
accidental character and do not follow consistent patterns.
Although the SC is able to produce binding law, it cannot
guarantee its enforcement because it does not have its own
organs enforcing its rulings.
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4. Evaluation
4.1. The SC and the CEU
The CEU represents fifteen states and the SC 188.
Fifteen members both in the CEU and the SC negotiate and try
to achieve decisions. In both institutions states are not
equal by voting. In the SC, every state has one vote indeed,
but five permanent members have a veto power and may
obstruct decisions with a negative vote. In the CEU, states
with the largest number of inhabitants are favored in the
voting process as their votes count more; e.g. France has 10
votes and Austria 4 (applied by majority voting). Certainly,
in the CEU there are also decisions, which require unanimity
but the development of the decisions-making procedure shows,
that majority voting is favored.172 Taking this into account,
one realizes that the bigger states (with economic and some
military power) have greater influence in the decision-
making process than smaller ones both in the SC and in the
CEU. National interest still plays a big role in these
international organizations, but national interest is more
decisive in the SC than in the CEU because of the different
172 Peter Norman, Europe: Prodi wants more radical reform, in: FinancialTimes (Internet edition), 02.10.2000.The more EU critical and reluctant partner Britain under Tony Blair iscoming forward with some interesting propositions to reform the EU-institutions. A European summit will be held in Nice (France) at the endof the year 2000. The Nice summit will once again amend Europeantreaties to prepare the union to take in new members from EasternEurope. The EU-members know, that if the integration process shallcontinue to be successful, the EU has to change in order to manage theproblems entailing the enlargement process in political, economic andinstitutional terms. The English Prime Minister Tony Blair suggests,that the European Commission should be strengthened and should get moreintegrated in the decision-making of the CEU with the power to votethere. Furthermore, he suggests, that majority voting should be extendedto more issues. See: Summary of an interview with Tony Blair: nn,Blair’s plan for Europe, in: The Economist, 2.20.2000 (internetedition).
82
voting system. (Through majority voting in the CEU, some
states may be voted down.)
The concept of sovereignty does change. Both in the SC
and in the CEU states are not equal (in the decision-making)
as the concept of sovereignty implies. (Not to mention other
factors such as transport, communication, environmental
pollution etc. and their implication for the concept of
sovereignty) To use an Orwellian expression, some states are
more equal than others. Undoubtedly, the concept of
sovereignty is changing but how does it change and into what
will it change?
Sovereignty is a very essential part of the
international environment. If the concept of sovereignty
does not change more decisively and take into account the
challenges of today, cooperation among states will be very
difficult to achieve and institutionalize as the UN-model
shows. It is very hard for decisions to gain the approval of
the SC because every motion of the SC finally comes down to
sovereignty and non-interference. The UN-charter is an
interesting document, which has been ratified by 188 states
until now. Only two states, the Holy See and Switzerland,
are not members. Although the UN encompasses 188 states, it
could not develop integrational power. It seems that the
states are just members of the UN to get internationally
recognized as independent sovereign entities because these
rights are granted in the UN-charter173 - the UN functions as
a special club confirming the status quo of the nation
state.
173 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I Article 1 Section 2 andChapter I Article 2 Section 1.
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Like the UN, the EU also attracts other states willing
to join the EU and its institutions. This despite the fact,
that the states have to hand over substantial powers to the
EU. The process of accession necessitates a lot of effort on
the part of the applicant. For instance, the applicant state
has to prove the transposition of the EU law (acquis
communautaire) and is screened to this respect by the
European Commission, which reports back to the CEU about the
achievements and the deficiencies of an applicant state. The
applicant’s ambassadors negotiate with the members of the
CEU about details of the rules to transpose and try do get
some “bargains.” The accession negotiations are long lasting
and comprehensive. The accession procedure of the UN is
simple, not too formalized and intense (e.g. not involving
the kind of screenings procedures followed by the EU).174
The EU has constantly changed and reformed itself while
responding to the needs resulting from new situations.
Different from the EU, the SC has never significantly
changed. The collapse of the Soviet Union had a great impact
on the EU propelling the efforts of a political union of the
EU. The Treaty of Maastricht and Amsterdam contributed
substantially to the new era of the EU creating a new kind
of actor within its borders and partly also on the
international scale (in respect to the economic strength of
the EU). The accession of six former Eastern Block
countries,175 which is scheduled for 2003, will change
totally the political landscape of Europe and the EU. Just
174 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter II: Membership.175 Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estland, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
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recently (13 October 1999), further accession negotiations
were opened with other countries from Eastern Europe.176
The UN did not change at all; it is the same
international body it has been for 55 years. The SC still
represents the major powers resulting from the Second World
War. It still represents the old model of sovereignty. It is
an institutional dinosaur and in danger of losing its
credibility as a safeguard of international peace and
security. The UN-charter has to be reformed taking into
account the new situation that one state cannot act
independently because it is part of the global network; may
it concern economy, environment, health or international
peace. A decision supporting peace must not be hindered by a
veto.
3.2. The goals of the EU and the UN
The primary goal of the EU is to push forward economic
integration among its members. In the course of this
progress new areas of integration (CFSP, JHA) have evolved
and are starting to trickle down into the decision-making of
the EC.
By now much has been achieved in the field of economic
integration and little in the other areas (especially CFSP).
The lack of the integration of other policy areas apart from
the economy is expressed by the institutional structures
favoring the decision-making process in economic matters
176 These countries are: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, theSlovak Republic, and Turkey.
85
(majority vote), but rendering it more difficult in all
other spheres of the EU (unanimity).
The SC’s task is to promote international peace and
security on a global scale. The decision-making is hampered
by the possibility of a veto of one of the five permanent
members. At first sight, the work of the SC seems to be
failing. However, on taking a closer look, one realizes that
the role of the SC’s and the UN in general have slightly
“unofficially” changed in the course of the passing years.
The traditional peacekeeping missions are replaced by peace-
making and peace-building missions, whose number has largely
increased in the 1990s (see diagram 9 p. 72). Therefore, the
role of the SC became more important in the last year,
though ardent discussions are still going on to reform this
institution in order to ease its much-criticized decision-
making process. Despite these new developments, the UN
cannot be called an actor because its involvement in
international affairs is volatile and very much dependent on
the willingness of the great powers to cooperate. The UN may
partly fulfill its goals, but is not as successful as the EU
in reaching its goals.
3.3 Final remarks
The EU and the UN are two quite different international
organizations. The UN seems to petrify the nation-state
system and the “equal sovereignty” of its members. Actually,
many UN-peacekeeping operations were/ are deployed in order
to protect a nation state, to restore its status, or to give
a hand in the nation-state-building process, but it never
seriously questioned the supremacy of national sovereignty.
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The UN-functionaries complain that the UN can just do what
the members want it to do.
With respect to the CEU, the notion of sovereignty
underwent some changes revising the concept in the process.
Already from the beginning of the first integration project
in the early 1950s, the ECSC, one tried to overcome the
traditional nation state system. Today, the EU can be called
an actor in the field of economy because its institutional
power is strong enough to impose its ruling on the nation
state. The European Commission and the European Parliament
represent the supranational, strong and versatile
institutional framework. If other areas of integration with
such a strong institutional power follow such as the field
of CFSP, remains to be seen. As efforts show, the EU-members
seem to be determined to also extend integration into these
controversial areas.177
The achievement of goals, the procedure of the
decision-making process and the implementation of the
decisions (free market, free travel in eleven EU countries,
one currency in eleven EU countries, no deadly conflicts
177 Associated Press, NATO Meets on European Plan for Strike Force, in:New York Times, 12.16.2000 (internet edition): According to thisArticle, the EU-members create until 2003 a rapid-reaction corps of50,000 to 60,000 troops.See also: Robert Graham, France: Paris urges action on EU security role,in: Financial Times, 9.24.1999 (internet edition): As the titleindicates, Paris wants to strengthen the EU defense co-operation withthe creation of two committees dealing with military and foreignpolicy/security issues, alongside with a military command that would beseparate from, but co-ordinated with, NATO.See also: Laurent Zecchini, Les Quinze s’accélère la mise en place del’Europe de la défense, in: Le Monde, 2.28.2000, (internet edition):This article deals with the same topic as the one right above, butadditionally focuses on the relationship EU-WEU-NATO and on the possibledeployment of EU-peacekeeping missions.
87
among the members) demonstrate that the CEU is more
successful and promising than the SC in achieving its goals.
A big problem for the SC is the diversity of the five
permanent members, their political, economical, cultural and
social heterogeneity. Thus, it is very hard to find a common
and acceptable denominator for everybody. In addition to the
differences among the countries, the areas of peace and
security are still the sanctuaries of the nation state.
These are typical areas of national sovereignty. A state
cooperates more easily in somewhat less contentious fields
like economies than in security or foreign policy.
In this line of reasoning the development of regional
organizations should be favored, because they develop in a
more homogeneous field, and therefore can more easily
integrate typical sovereign areas such as foreign policy.178
Collective security should be altered to emphasize a
regional concept of security. The approach of “broader focus
for” collective security does not work. Regional bodies
should watch over regional security. The EU model seems to
be a good example of how to start integration. Regional
organizations seeking integration in economy could develop
centripetal forces and integrate security issues.
Therefore, the proposal is to create regional bodies
encompassing all areas of policies (from economy and culture
to military and security issues). In replacing the UN system
as it exists today with segregated policy fields
178 Although the EU does not show a lot of progress in CFSP,nevertheless, it will be a matter of time, that also these areas willdevelop the same as the EEC.
88
administered globally. The UN could work as a framework of
coordination and cooperation of the regional bodies. It
should also continue with the peacekeeping missions to
provide impartial support. Furthermore, the UN will be
important to give aid to the new evolving nations in
building their states like it happened in Namibia and
recently in East Timor.
Undoubtedly, people sense an unexplainable need for a
global organization, but with which tasks? European
integration has achieved a lot in the previous decades and
will predictably continue the work of integration in the
coming 50 years because of a great advantage: the
homogeneity of the integrating countries, the functionally
integrative approach and the political will of cooperating
societies and states. Regarding the UN and applying the
functional explanation, it seems that the cart was put
before the horse. The SC as a “high”179 political institution
fails, because functional cooperation has to start in the
field of economy, culture or in another “trans-capable”
network, eventually, followed by political integration. This
is the exact opposite of the SC’s situation.
179 “High” refers to the realist definition distinguishing between “highpolitics” (military, security, foreign policy) and “low politics”dealing with economy, culture etc.
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5. Case study: East Timor and the role of the UN
and the EU
5.1 Introduction
Some basic facts about East Timor and a geographical
description:
Map retrieved from: http://www.ciss.ca/moreinfo.htm
East Timor occupies an area of land of 5,743 square
miles (14,874 square kilometers) slightly larger than
Connecticut (4,846 mi2 or 12,550 Km2). The population today
90
is about 800,000 - 78% Timorese, 2% Chinese, 20%
Indonesian.180
To be able to understand the UN’s role in the issue of
East Timor, it is necessary to present a short historical
outline of the events that occurred there:
Portuguese Timor, today’s East Timor, was part of the
Portuguese colonial empire. After the “Carnation revolution”
in Portugal, finishing the dictatorship of Caetano in 1974
and leading to democratization, these events led to
decolonization of Portuguese possessions. With a new
government committed to democratic values and acknowledging
the right of self-determination, Portugal tried to establish
democratic institutions, such as political parties in East
Timor. The major parties of East Timor are:
- UDT (Democratic Union of Timor) advocating a progressive
process of autonomy under Portugal
- ASDT (Timorese Social Democratic Association) renamed
later on to FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an
Independent East Timor), demanding total independence.181
A minor party, APODETI (Timorese Democratic People’s
Union), seeking the integration to Indonesia, was a
construct of the Indonesian government and exerted no
political influence.182
Local elections in 1975 confirmed the strong position
of the two party system. The third party APODETI just got a
180 http://www.easttimor.com/history/history.html181 http://www.easttimor.com/history/decolonization.html182 http://www.easttimor.com/history/decolonization.html
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small number of supporters on the ballot. Indonesia,
interested in the rich oil reserves off the coast of East
Timor, for that reason seeking influence there, started to
interfere in the two party system in manipulating the UDT.
An Indonesian special command called Operasi Komodo should
destabilize East Timor and justify a deployment of
Indonesian troops. The plan worked out to some extent;
leading to a civil war, where 2000 people were killed. Pro-
independentist (Fretilin adherents) and contra-
independpendists (UDT adherents) fought each other. But
Fretilin prevailed and was successful in preventing the coup
of the UDT, though they received substantial support from
Indonesia. The Fretilin movement was also doing well in
restoring order and implementing a relatively smoothly
functioning administration after the Portuguese left East
Timor in a rush in August 1975.183 On the 28 November 1975,
the Fretilin party proclaimed the independence of East Timor
from any colonial rulers and (...) declaring the state of
the Democratic Republic of East Timor, anti-colonialist and
anti-imperialist.184
Because of the success of Fretilin, Indonesia began to
deploy its military forces in East Timor on the 7 December
1975, and started to forcefully integrate it as its 27th
province.185 On the 22 December of 1975 the SC of the UN
183 http://www.easttimor.com/history/decolonization.htmlIn the Security Council Resolution S/RES/384 (1975) of 22 December 1975,the Council “calls the Government of Portugal as administering Power toco-operate fully with the United Nations so as to enable the people ofEast Timor to exercise freely their right to self-determination.”184 Paul H. Salim, How come Indonesians can forget their history?, 9December 1996: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/54b/049.html185 An interesting contradiction between political reality andconstitutional provisions: The Constitution of the Republic ofIndonesia, Preamble to the Constitution: Whereas freedom is the
92
reacted in form of a Security Council Resolution, demanding
the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the territory of
East Timor.186 This resolution officially recognized the
right of the East Timorese people to self-determination. The
second Security Council Resolution concerning East Timor was
decided on the 22 April 1976 and called upon Indonesia to
comply with the SC resolutions; but Indonesia did not
comply.187 After 1976, the Council did not react officially
to the situation in East Timor and just resumed the case in
1999.
Interpreting the Security Council resolution, the
occupation of East Timor by Indonesia was illegal. The
international community never legally acknowledged the
invasion of East Timor by the Indonesian army.188 However,
politically East Timor was considered as an integral part of
Indonesia.
In 1978, the Indonesian army was able to drive back the
Timorese forces and gained control over the largest parts of
East Timor. Indonesian squads also killed the Timorese
President Nicolau Lobato. Since then, aside from some
skirmishes in the Timorese mountains, the resistance has
crumbled away because on the one hand the Indonesian troops
outnumbered Timorese forces by far and on the other hand
Indonesia was provided with much better military technology.
inalienable right of all nations, colonialism must be abolished in thisworld as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice.186 United Nations Security Council Resolution of the 22 December 1975 onEast Timor, S/RES/384 (1975).187 United Nations Security Council Resolution of the 22 April 1976 onEast Timor, S/RES/389 (1976).188 Portugal’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, AmbassadorWakarim Wibisono, Press Conference about the anarchic situation in EastTimor and the involvement of Portugal and Indonesia, 9 September 1999.
93
From then on, East Timor has been ruled as a military
colony. The military command possessed the supreme authority
on all decisions. All public powers the legislative,
executive and judicial, were vested in the Indonesian
military.189
In a public statement on the 27 January 1999 the
Indonesian President Habibie indicates that his government
might be prepared to consider independence for East Timor.190
This move of Indonesia opened the door for an independence
referendum.
On the 30 August 1999, 95 percent of the registered
East Timorese voters cast their ballots in the popular
consultation voting whether to remain under Indonesia’s rule
or to become independent. UN-Secretary General, Kofi Annan,
announced four days later on the 3 September 1999 that
94,388 (21.5 percent) voted in favor of the special autonomy
proposition; the remaining 344,580 (78.5 percent) voted
against it. The East Timor people rejected the proposed
special autonomy under the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and
opted for total independence.191
189 http://www.easttimor.com/history/indonesia_invades.html190 http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/chrono/chrono_frame.html191 Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, Statement in theSecurity Council, 3 September 1999.
94
5.2 The UN’s role in East Timor
East Timor “appeared” on the UN-agenda in 1960 for the
first time, when the United Nations General Assembly placed
the territory on its list of non-self-governing-territories.
The United Nations had never recognized Indonesia’s
occupation of East Timor and demanded a withdrawal several
times. Since 1982, upon the request of the General
Assembly,192 the UN-General Secretaries were requested to
offer their good office services to entertain regular talks
with the two countries to resolve their dispute and to stop
the ongoing atrocities. The first promising progress in the
East Timor case was attained when the new President, Habibie
took over the Indonesian government in 1998. At this point,
a new form of dialogue between Indonesia and East Timor was
established, leading to an offer of a limited autonomy for
the Timorese people. He did not even exclude a possible
separation of East Timor from Indonesia, as the people
wanted. In light of this proposal, the revitalized talks
made rapid progress. On the 5 May 1999 Portugal, Indonesia
and the UN agreed to delegate the right of organizing a
popular consultation to the UN under its Secretary General.
In this referendum, the East Timorese people were asked
either to accept or to reject a special autonomy of East
Timor within the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and to become
totally independent.193
According to this agreement, Indonesia has to guarantee
law and order during the UN’s preparation of the popular
consultation. With the Security Council Resolutions on the
192 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the 23 November 1982,A/RES/37/30,
95
11 June 1999, the Council establishes the United Nations
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organize and conduct the
popular consultation.194 Furthermore, the Secretary General
establishes a Trust Fund to enable Member States to make
voluntary contributions to assist in the financing of the
United Nations presence in East Timor.195
UNAMET’s duties concern humanitarian, political,
judicial, and police matters. A very important task was the
registration of voters and the monitoring of the referendum
itself. UNAMET was established on the 11 June 1999 and ended
on the 25 October 1999.196
In the months before and the weeks after, the popular
consultation was characterized by bloodshed. Indonesia
reacted reluctantly in guaranteeing law and order and proved
to be totally unable to stop the slaughter.197 Because of the
continuing carnage, the need for an international
intervention force seemed to be necessary. The international
community pleaded Indonesia to act and to allow an
international force to enter East Timor.
Although the case, “East Timor,” in respect to legal
matters was clear, the SC could not act because of the lack
of unanimity. According to international law, Indonesia has
193 http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/Qna_frame.html194 United Nations Security Council Resolution of the 11 June 1999,S/RES/1246 (1999).195 United Nations Security Council Resolution of the 7 May 1999,S/RES/1236 (1999).196 http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/Qna_frame.htmlSee also: http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/etimor.htm197 http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/Qna_frame.htmlSee also: Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, Pressbriefing about the failure of Indonesia to maintain law and order, 9September 1999.
96
nothing, no right over East Timor. East Timor is a non-self-
governing territory. Theoretically, the UN could have just
dispatched an authorized UN-force (presupposed unanimity in
the SC) and impose its law. In order to minimize the
tensions and to keep possible conflict down, the UN tried to
get a consensus also from Indonesia. It was crucial to find
a common denominator with all parties involved; especially
with Indonesia, and the SC members, otherwise the peace
process would not have been successful in the long-term
sight.198
In the case of East Timor, the UN was caught in a
dilemma. On the one hand the UN had the theoretical right to
intervene; but, on the other the UN had to look for the
broadest consensus in order for it to work most
successfully. There would have been no decision in the SC,
unless all parties involved had had not agreed to the UN’s
role. China’s ambassador stressed the importance of
Indonesia’s consent for such a UN-action.199
Finally, on the 12 September 1999 Indonesia’s President
Habibie announced that his government will accept
international assistance to restore peace and security in
East Timor.200
The Security Council Resolution of the 15 September
1999 allows a Chapter VII action, peace enforcement, and
198 Portugal’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, AmbassadorWakarim Wibisono, Press Conference about the anarchic situation in EastTimor and the involvement of Portugal and Indonesia, 9 September 1999.199 China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, AmbassadorShen Guofang, Press Conference answering questions of journalists aboutthe Chinese agreement to a multinational force, if Indonesia agrees toit too, 10 September 1999.
97
authorizes the establishment of a multinational force under
a unified command structure. The multinational force
(International Force East Timor INTERFET) under the command
of Australia should be replaced as soon as possible by a UN-
peacekeeping contingent. Furthermore, the Secretary General
has to prepare a transitional administration for East Timor,
incorporating the peacekeeping mission.201
On the 25 October 1999 the SC installs under Chapter
VII of the UN-Charter a new mission the so-called United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET),
which will be endowed with overall responsibility for the
administration of East Timor and will be empowered to
exercise all legislative and executive authority, including
the administration of justice.202 In February 2000, the
multinational force (INTERFET) under the command of
Australia has left East Timor, and the UNTAET peace-mission
is in full control and has now, among other things, to
guarantee security, law and order in the territory of East
Timor.203
5.3 The EU’s role in East Timor
The EU’s role in East Timor (and in general if matters
beyond the EU’s borders are concerned) is rather limited. It
is difficult for the EU to extend the political influence
beyond the EU’s borders because of the question of the legal
basis, (although the legal and political sphere do not
200 http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/chrono/chrono_frame.html201 United Nations Security Council Resolution of the 15 September 1999,S/RES/1264 (1999).202 United Nations Security Council Resolution of the 25 October 1999,S/RES/1272 (1999).203 http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetM.htm
98
necessarily match each other). In the framework of the CFSP,
the EU is able to respond legally in an appropriate way to
concerns outside of the EU-area. In contrast to the EC, the
CFSP does not have the same integrationally highly developed
character and is relatively “young” in comparison to the EC.
The CFSP does not dispose its own (enforcement) instruments
and is financed by the EC. When decisions204 are made under
the umbrella of the CFSP, the implementation is often
accomplished via measures of the EC.
In a common position (CFSP) on the 25 June 1996, the
CEU tried to pursue the aim to contribute to the achievement
by dialogue of a fair, comprehensive and internationally
acceptable solution to the question of East Timor, which
fully respects the interests and legitimate aspirations of
the Timorese people, in accordance with international law.205
The EU urged the Indonesian government to adopt effective
measures leading to a significant improvement in the human
rights situation in East Timor, in particular by
implementing fully the relevant decisions adopted in this
connection by the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights.206
On the 16 September 1999, the Council adopted a further
common position in the CFSP-framework. An embargo on the
export of arms, munitions and military equipment shall be
imposed on the Republic of Indonesia.207 Another interesting
point of the common position was that in order to maximize
204 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 12: The Treaty lists all the specificdecisions under the CFSP such as joint actions and common positions.205 Common Position of 25 June 1996: 96/407/CFSP, Article 1 Section 1.206 Common Position of 25 June 1996: 96/407/CFSP, Article 2 Section 4.207 Common Position of 16 September 1999: 1999/624/CFSP, Article 1.
99
the impact of the above measures, the European Union shall
deploy efforts to encourage other countries to adopt
restrictive measures similar to those contained in this
Common Position.208 The “problem” with the common positions
(in the CFSP-framework) is that they do not have the same
strong legal force as a regulation.209 So, in order to
effectively implement this common position, on the 11
October 1999, a council regulation (EC) No 2158/1999 based
on the Council common position (1999/624/CFSP) (mentioned
above) was issued concerning a ban on the supply of
Indonesian equipment, which might be used for internal
repression or terrorism. The council regulation was
immediately effective for all member states on the day of
its publication in the Official Journal of the European
Communities. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States.210
Certainly, the council regulation elaborates
specifically the embargo measures on Indonesia, but it is
important to call attention to one particular article of the
regulation, which is of greater interest. Article 5 says,
that among other bodies, the Regulation shall apply to any
person elsewhere who is a national of a Member State
(...).211 This means that not only states but also
individuals are bound to the EC-regulation. This implies
208 Common Position of 16 September 1999: 1999/624/CFSP, Article 4.209 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 15: Common positions shall define theapproach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical orthematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policiesconform to the common positions.210 Council Regulation (EC) No 2158/1999 concerning a ban on the supplyto Indonesia of equipment, which might be used for internal repressionor terrorism, Article 6.211 Council Regulation (EC) No 2158/1999 concerning a ban on the supplyto Indonesia of equipment which might be used for internal repression orterrorism, Article 2 and Article 5.
100
furthermore, that individuals can sue or can be sued before
the national or the European court. In contrast to this, UN-
decisions are bound just to the member states, and only in
very special cases may an individual sue before a UN-
court.
Despite these facts, decisive actions of the CEU
concerning CFSP-issues have never been taken. The policy of
the EU-members concerning these issues seems to be first to
wait and watch the international reaction and then to act.
So, the EU rather reacts than actually acts. Politically,
the EU is still in the embryonic phase, although efforts try
also to push forward the CFSP-area and integrate it faster
in the EU-majority decision-making.
5.4 Evaluation of the role of the UN and the EU
The UN played a very essential role in the issue of
East Timor and contributed a great deal to international
peace in cooling down a boiling pot. The UN was able to
constitute itself as an important influence for
international peace and security by providing adequate
conflict management. The example of East Timor reveals how
important the UN can actually be and what potentials it has
and can deploy, if governments will allow it. In comparison
to the UN, the role of the EU was insignificant and did not
influence this crisis in any special manner.
East Timor has been on the UN agenda since 1960. It
took a long time for the UN to actually get involved. The UN
was just able to address this issue in the 1960s and 1970s
and to express some concerns, but it could not decide on
101
actions because of the lack of consent. The UN is limited
to the will of its members and cannot achieve more than its
members are willing to do. East Timor however was not
legally (according to international law) but politically
part of Indonesia. This situation was acknowledged more or
less by the international community. In any case, no motion
in the SC would have been passed to support East Timor
militarily because of the requirement of unanimity for such
a measure. Some SC-members had the opinion that the UN has
no right to intervene in domestic affairs and therefore it
was inappropriate of the SC to take any actions on this
matter.212 Nonetheless, the organs of the UN were aware of
the repressive situation and addressed it, but nothing
important could develop.
As the political will of Indonesia crystallized to
solve the East Timor issue and eventually accepted a UN role
in this process, the radius of action of the UN increased.
From then on, the UN was able to start its peace-building
work. It initiated peace-building actions and provided
administrative, judicial and electoral support. As violent
conflict with a large number of deaths occurred, the UN sent
in peace-enforcement troops after Indonesia allowed it. The
UN-force had to separate the parties in conflict. As soon as
the mandate of the peace-enforcement mission was
accomplished, a UN-peacekeeping contingent took over to
control the peace-process.
212 According to international law, East Timor has never been a part ofIndonesia. But, East Timor was actually seen as a province of Indonesiaby some members of the SC.
102
Without the UN, the East Timor problem would still be
an internal problem. There was no other conflict-management
institution that was able to address this crisis. Without
UN-intervention, the East Timorese people would have
continued to suffer from repression by Indonesia, and they
would have had no chance to become independent in the near
future. Neither a single state, nor a coalition of states,
nor a regional organization would have been able to
intervene in East Timor. The UN was the only body that was
able to manage this crisis.
The conclusion of the East Timor incident is that the
UN might be a viable factor for conflicts destabilizing
states, if states agree on the involvement of the UN.
The case “East Timor” is both encouraging and
frustrating; encouraging because finally the UN could tackle
the problem and frustrating because it took such a long time
and so much suffering for the UN to get involved. East Timor
should be seen as a lesson for the international community
of how to help emerging nations to reach self-determination.
The case “East Timor” demonstrated that the UN is not a
genuine actor but very much dependent on the will of the
states.
5.5 Prospects and recommendations
The UN is facing a fundamental change in its duties.
The new tasks of the 1990s changed the total nature of the
SC and the UN, which is; according to the Charter solely
concerned with cross-national disputes rather than with
internal problems. The UN is not designed to deal with these
103
new challenges. Therefore a reform of the UN as a whole, the
SC and the Charter would be necessary to cope with today’s
problems.
This reform seems more urgent than ever, because many
nations will follow the example of the East Timorese people
in the struggle for independence and challenge the role of
the UN. The new emerging nations need help in order to
organize their state-building peacefully and in a controlled
and organized manner. But from whom will they get help, if
the SC is unable to take action? Even though Bill Clinton
announced that the United States did not want the world
divided into countless entities, this cannot stop a nation’s
belief in its right of self-determination or the attempted
establishment by a nation of its own state. As long as
people are suppressed, they will tend to separate. For
instance, if Turkey continues to violate the human rights of
the Kurds, the independence movement will continue. If
subcultures in a dominant culture cannot pursue and enjoy
their traditions, their way of life, this subculture is
likely to break away, in order to claim their rights. Either
the dominant culture in a state tries to integrate
minorities or subcultures, for instance in granting federal
rights, or these socially disadvantaged parts try to get
independent.
Most likely the UN will prove unable to change. As a
result, the work of the UN will continue to function as
usual; a volatile organization unable to take needed
initiatives. Member states seem to be reluctant to accept
any reform proposals. The formation of an effective
international civil society might provide necessary impetus
104
to convince the decision makers to reform and revolutionize
the UN.
The EU is a very powerful regional organization but
presently inconsequential beyond its borders – at least in
political terms. As the steadily ongoing reform process of
the EU shows, the great advantage of the EU is the
continuous reform process of its institutions as it becomes
more flexible, active and responsive to the challenges of
today. Regionally, the EU today is definitely an important
actor and has the potential to also develop its importance
globally in political respects. This prospect will take many
years, but it is more likely to emerge than the development
of the UN as an actor.
International Organizations are on the verge of growing
more and more important in world politics because many
problems of today often exceed the state’s managerial
capabilities and tools. Global issues need global
institutions, as statement by a UN document, and the UN-
responsibilities carry ever-wider implications.213 The global
issues are the “new security” concerns such as international
terrorism, ethnic strife, environmental degradation, food
and energy scarcities, drug trafficking, population growth
etc. These global concerns are now on the national agendas
worldwide because of their potential impact at the national
level.214
213 United Nations, Global issues need global institutions, in: Studentbriefing paper #3, January 1999. (Not an official document)214 Paul B. Stares (ed.), The New Security Agenda. A Global Survey,Tokyo; New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998, p. 7.
105
Therefore, states should start to work closely with
international organizations, as only these institutions can
develop the necessary tools to tackle these specific
problems. States have to remodel their concept of
sovereignty and to delegate some of the rights implied in
the concept of sovereignty to international bodies. Pure
sovereignty – absolute self-determination - has never
existed and is an illusion. The states should acknowledge
this fact and not play the sovereignty card.
Additionally enhancing the importance of international
organization is the fact that the different policy areas are
becoming more and more integrated. This means that sooner or
later economical policy cannot be led without an implication
on foreign policy; consequently, foreign policy cannot be
led without any implications on military and/or defense
policy and so forth.
Undoubtedly, the importance; but not necessarily the
power, of international organizations increases. There is a
gap between the necessity of an effective governance of
global issues and the actual insufficiency of global
governance.215 For the sake of world peace and justice this
gap has to be closed. This certainly does not mean, that
states are no longer needed. On the contrary, states are
very important in administrating and organizing their
societies. States will continue to play a significant role,
however their roles and responsibilities will change.
215 According to the opinion of the author, global governance shouldpreferably be exerted by regional organizations under the supervision ofa global organization.
106
7. Conclusion
The essay successfully demonstrates that the EU is a
very significant actor in world politics because the EU is
actually able to influence the behavior of its members. The
strong institutional framework with the Council of the
European Union as the center of it represents the basis of
this success. On the one hand, the Council acts quickly and
decisively to the political challenges of today. On the
other hand, it executes accurately the obligations deriving
from the EU-treaties. It is a meaningful institution dealing
with all sorts of different problems, from economic and
cultural matters to foreign policy and security issues. The
goal stated in the EU-treaties to promote economic
integration was and is very successfully pursued. Economic
interdependence among the 15 member states has advanced
enormously so that a disintegration of one country or of the
Union itself seems to be most unlikely. The majority voting
in the Council (in economic matters) certainly contributes
much to this success story. Because of majority voting, the
negotiations among the member states are very dynamic. The
representatives in the Council are literally forced to reach
agreements because there is no veto they can apply, if a
decision is not in their interest. The successful
enforcement of the Council decisions is guaranteed by other
powerful EU-organs such as the EU-Commission, and the EU-
Court of Justice.
The UN is a weak actor because it hardly influences the
behavior of its members. The UN cannot influence the
behavior of states in such a significant and decisive way as
107
does the EU. As shown in chapter 3.2 on p. 64, the Security
Council rendered Chapter VII resolutions (binding law for
all member states) on very rare occasions. The SC’s success
in guaranteeing international peace and security is rather
limited. A main problem of the SC is the possibility of the
five permanent Council members vetoing a decision thus
hindering the UN’s ability to take action. This is one
reason that prevented the UN from successfully fulfilling
its responsibilities deriving from the UN-Charter.
However, via peacekeeping missions, the UN tries to
break out of the paralysis and function effectively. The UN
enormously increased the number of peacekeeping missions in
the 1990s (see diagram 9, p. 78). However, this considerable
growth does not indicate a better cooperation among the
members of the UN. Partly, this development is a result of
the implosion of the former Soviet Union and its impact on
the international environment. Partly, it is the result of
an increase of technical capabilities, political will and
public opinion. Furthermore, UN-involvement in peacekeeping
missions is arbitrarily decided upon depending on many
issues including the ones named above rather than simply on
the need to resolve conflict.
The concept of European integration has been realized
in practice. The EU started the integration process with
non-conflict related areas such as less controversial
economic aspects (e.g. ECSC in 1952). In contrast, the UN
has tried to address highly debated and controversial areas
such as peace and security. Clearly, the EU made great
progress in pursuing integration, whereas the UN, in
108
contrast to the EU, seems to be in a constant state of
deadlock.
Another main problem for international organizations is
the concept of sovereignty and its impact on international
organizations and their decision-making. Sovereignty and
non-interference is a crucial part of the UN-Charter. Non-
interference in internal affairs handicaps the UN,
especially the SC, in its efforts to effectively safeguard
international peace and security. The problem of sovereignty
and non-interference is amplified by the nature of many
recent conflicts. Most significantly, the number of cross-
national conflicts seems to be diminishing. Today, conflicts
occur more often within states. The UN, bound by its
principle of non-interference in internal affairs, is not
able to take action in such events. Consequently, the SC
will likely continue to lose its importance as a guardian of
international peace and security.
With respect to the EU, sovereignty has a different
aspect. As pointed out, the nation state as a member of the
EU is not sovereign anymore when dealing with European
Community (EEC, ECSC, EURATOM) -matters (see diagram 4, p.
49). In these areas, the member state depends on decisions
from the CEU.
The case East Timor demonstrates how important and
vital the international (nation) state-system still is. The
EU was only able to react to this incident via the second
pillar (CFSP). As stated above, nothing substantial was
decided in the EU-framework. Although there are several
provisions in the EU-treaties concerning common foreign and
109
security issues to tackle such problems in an EU-way, the
EU-members may still pursue their own national interest,
because these provisions are very weak and hardly
enforceable. Regarding the UN, action was also difficult to
take. Although Indonesia is a treaty-member of the UN, which
should abide to the rules set out in the UN-charter, the UN
was only able to gain influence as Indonesia detached and
handed over the responsibilities of resolving the conflict
to the UN.
The conclusion of this essay is that the EU is an
important and successful actor within its borders.
Furthermore, it develops an increasing potential to extent
its influence beyond its borders. The UN is a weak actor.
Only sporadically, the UN is able to fulfill its duties
enshrined in the UN-Charter. Because of this non-successful
past, it is very doubtful, that the UN is able to
appropriately manage future challenges.
110
8. Literature
Primary Sources
Charter of the United Nations
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council
Treaty of Amsterdam
Council of the European Union decisions:
96/407/CFSP : COUNCIL COMMON POSITION of 25 June 1996
defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 Treaty on
European Union,216 concerning East Timor
1999/624/CFSP: COUNCIL COMMON POSITION of 16 September 1999
concerning restrictive measures against the Republic of
Indonesia.
Council Regulation (EC) No 2158/1999 of 11 October 1999
concerning a ban on the supply to Indonesia of equipment
which might be used for internal repression or terrorism.
216 According to the Treaty of Amsterdam, this article J.2 is nowarticle 12.
111
United Nations Security Council Resolutions:S/RES/1272 (1999)
S/RES/1264 (1999)
S/RES/1246 (1999)
S/RES/1236 (1999)
S/RES/389 (1976)
S/RES/384 (1975)
United Nations General Assembly Resolution:
A/RES/37/30
News Agencies, Newspapers and Magazines
Economist
Financial Times
Le Monde
New York Times
United Nations Public Information
112
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slaughters and the possible actions of the international
community, 6 September 1999. (Audio file retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/Radio/news/statements/990906_sgstakeout.ram)
Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, Press
briefing about the failure of Indonesia to maintain law and
order in East Timor, 9 September 1999. (Audio file retrieved
from: http://www.un.org/Radio/news/statements/990908_sgstakeout.ram)
Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Ambassador Wakarim Wibisono, 9 September 1999. (Audio file
retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/Radio/news/statements/990909_1100indonesia.ram)
Portugal’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Ambassador Antonio Monteiro, Press Conference about the
anarchic situation in East Timor and the involvement of
Portugal and Indonesia, 9 September 1999. (Audio file
retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/Radio/news/statements/990909_1100indonesia.ram)
China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Ambassador Shen Guofang, Press Conference answering
questions of journalists about the Chinese agreement to a
multinational force, if Indonesia agrees to it too, 10
September 1999. (Audio file retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/Radio/news/statements/9909010_1215china.ram)
Bernard Miyet Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping
operations, Press Briefing following the Security Council's
decision to establish the United Nations Transitional
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Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 25 October 1999.
(Audio file retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/Radio/news/statements/2511unsgstkout.ram)
Meetings, Conferences (chronological order)
United States Senator Jesse Helms (Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman), Special meeting in the Security Council
Chamber on United States and the UN, on the 20 January 2000,
New York (UN-Headquarters) USA.
Panel discussion on the Contribution of the United Nations
System and the Global Conferences of the 1990s in the
combating poverty, and the role of the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC), 26 January 2000, New York. (Panelists:
George W. Odlum, Minister of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, St. Lucia; Bishop Diarmuid Martin; Mark
Mallock-Brown, Administrator of UNDP; Mats Karlsson, Vice
President of World Bank; Jean-Claude Faure, Chairman of
DAC/OECD; Nafis Sadik Executive Director of UNFPA.)
Closing Seminar of a United Nations University Research
Project, Legitimacy of International Organizations, on the
25 February 2000, New York (UN-Headquarters) USA.