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2003 24: 13International Political Science ReviewCharles F. Doran

Expectations, Competition, and StatecraftEconomics, Philosophy of History, and the ''Single Dynamic'' of Power Cycle Theory:

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Economics, Philosophy of History, and the “SingleDynamic” of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations,

Competition, and Statecraft

CHARLES F. DORAN

ABSTRACT. What matters in the structural dynamics of any political oreconomic system is the contradiction between absolute and relativetrends. The “single dynamic” of power and role, of state and system,encodes the “perspective of statecraft” in the trends and shifting trendsof relative share. The “tides of history” shift counter-intuitively, creatingenormous uncertainty, inverting future expectations about role andsecurity, and disrupting the normal stability of statecraft. Power cycletheory reconciles realism and idealism in conceptualizing foreign policyrole as coequal in significance with power in a legitimate world order. A“dynamic equilibrium” requires reciprocal adaptation to structuralchange, and it is explicitly non-hegemonic. This article establishes thephilosophical foundations of power cycle theory as a theory ofcompetition actualized in productive interaction.

Keywords: • Competition • Dynamic equilibrium • Power cycle• Role • System structure • World order • War

To understand power is to understand its limits (the bounds on relative growth), itsissues (the legitimacy and adjustments of systemic role), its surprises (discontinuousexpectations at points of non-linearity), and hence the shocks and uncertaintiesand sense of angst (or “injustice,” albeit often contrived) conducive to violence.Structures, and changing structures, of the international system establishopportunities and constraints for statecraft. These constraints place a real andunavoidable limit regarding the possible and the likely in world politics, a limit tothe degree of structural disequilibrium any system can tolerate without causingstatecraft to fracture. Power cycle theory unites the structural (state and system) andbehavioral (power and statecraft) aspects of world politics in its “single dynamic” of

International Political Science Review (2003), Vol 24, No. 1, 13–49

0192-5121 (2003/01) 24:1, 13–49; 028609 © 2003 International Political Science AssociationSAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

I. POWER CYCLE THEORY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE


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power and role. It explains the evolution of systemic structure, and the concerns ofstatecraft, via the cyclical dynamic of state “relative” rise and decline.

Whether a state has yet to develop economically or is already developed,whether a state is an importer of security or a great power, whether a stateprimarily views the system through a regional or a global lens, whether a state is anew entry into the global trading system or an experienced participant inglobalization—it is traversing a “cycle of relative power and role” vis-a-vis a systemof states, both regionally and globally.

Introduction: The Concerns of StatecraftPower cycle theory addresses, within a single conceptual framework, thepreoccupations and uncertainties of the post-Cold War world with implications forboth international security and the international political economy. The “singledynamic” of changing systems structure encodes the “perspective of statecraft” inthe trends and shifting trends of the component state power cycles. Tied tochange on a state power cycle are the state’s expectations and anxieties regardingits future security and foreign policy role. Asia is undergoing tumultuousstructural change similar to that which Europe experienced a century ago: faster-growing China and India may force Japan to peak in relative power, perhapsleaving Japan with foreign policy expectations yet unfulfilled, certainly altering thesecurity framework. Russia is slowly trying to climb out of the abyss, while Europebuilds a supranational economic entity around itself, each exploring foreignpolicy options appropriate to the new structural reality. A coherent understandingof structural dynamics is imperative if statecraft is to navigate peacefully throughthe shifting tides of history at the regional and systemic levels.

As a foundation for analysis, power cycle theory is open and receptive toelaboration by other theories such as international and domestic regime theories(Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Ruggie, 1992), the democratic peace (Doyle, 1986;Russett, 1993), rational choice (Powell, 1994; Friedan, 1999; Monroe, 2001),bounded rationality (Anderson and McKeown, 1987), and prospect theory(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Cashman, 1997; James and Hebron, 1997).Grounded in the approach to world politics known as realism, power cycle theoryalso incorporates elements of idealism and constructivism, and rejects some realistassumptions and arguments. While power cycle theory is innately a theory ofinternational relations (IR), it draws upon and at the same time provides a bridge(Kratochwil, 1994; Halliday, 1996; Moravcsik, 1997) to the study of both historyand economics.

Foreign Policy Role: The Coordinate Concept that Amends RealismWhat are the concerns of statecraft? Weber (1954) always placed his concernregarding power relations in the context of political legitimacy. As Toynbee (1961)noted, past civilizations collapsed because the governing elite lost its sense ofpolitical legitimacy and tried to rule by domination alone. So world order fromthe power cycle perspective is based on the principle of legitimacy associated with apluralistic understanding of a dynamic equilibrium encompassing both power andforeign policy role.

Power cycle theory reconciles realism and idealism in conceptualizing foreignpolicy role as coequal in significance with power in matters of statecraft. Both role

14 International Political Science Review 24(1)



and power are necessarily relative (systemic); but role exists only if legitimizedthrough systemic acceptance, whereas power expresses itself through unilateralaction and as control. A liberal concept of legitimate world order requires reciprocalrather than one-sided adaptation of foreign policy roles to the rise and decline ofstate power (Doran, 1971: 21, 31).

Lacking such a coordinate concept of foreign policy role, classical realism couldnever resolve the problem of peaceful change in terms of a dynamic equilibriumbecause, to the realist, ultimately what is always being bargained, and balanced, ispower itself. Yet, foreign policy role (encompassing both participation and status)is the medium of exchange or bargaining substance whereby structural changecan be assimilated and world order legitimized. Role is the behavioral componentof statecraft over which governments both fight and may find compromise. Whenstatespersons contemplate the future trend of state power, they form expectationsregarding the state’s entire future foreign policy role, not only its security (whichis non-negotiable). The trajectory, dynamic, and meaning of history thus cometogether in the dual character of its single dynamic—of state and system, of powerand role—expressing the reality of statecraft.

The Quintessential Problem of International RelationsWorld War I and its aftermath made conscious the need for IR as an entirely newfield. In terms of causation, the Great War seemed to be overdetermined in theprior historical context: the imperialist grab for colonies, machtpolitik, Germany’smeteoric industrial and military growth and the fears it created throughoutEurope, the increasing ineffectiveness of both Austro-Hungarian and Ottomanorder maintenance in the Balkans, Germany’s intense ambitions for Geltung,Annerkennung, Gleichberechtigung, and yet its Gefahr, its fear of impending Russiangrowth, encirclement, and attack. But there was something more fundamental atwork in that period of history. Underlying all of these causal factors—from theperspective of conservative, liberal, and Marxian scholars alike—were thedifferential rates of economic growth that had altered the structure of the system.

Mackinder (1919: 1–2) observed that “the great wars of history . . . are theoutcome, direct or indirect, of the unequal growth of nations,” and Lenin (1917)condemned these differential growth rates as causally destructive (Gilpin, 1981:93, 76). Economic and political analysts knew they must examine economicgrowth itself to understand what impels change in relative strength and why thesestructural changes are so traumatic. Liberal thinkers asked what kind ofadjustments would resolve the foreign policy strains and antagonisms created byrapid and monumental changes in power relationships.

Kuznets: “Levels and Variability of Rates of Growth”For the economist (Kuznets, 1930: 3–4), the task was to understand what causesnon-uniform acceleration and retardation of industrial growth “within singlecountries or within single branches of industries (on a world scale).” Such veryfocused economic questions guided Kuznets’ 1930 analysis of the statistical datafor individual nations in the “historical records” on production and trade,suggesting “significant leads as to the study of comparative rates of growth” (49),which over two decades later he put forward in a series of articles entitled“Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations.” In the first installment,

DORAN: Economics and Power Cycle Theory 15



“I. Levels and Variability of Rates of Growth” (Kuznets, 1956: 1–94, 27; referencedin Doran, 1971: 177), he showed that large absolute differences in rates of growthamong countries can lead to “displacements in relative magnitude amongcountries . . . within rather short periods,” altering their rankings.

Continuing this line of argument about change in relative magnitude, Kuznets’remarks indicate that at least by 1956 he was not unaware of the implications ofthis finding for international politics.

Since international relations are greatly affected by shifts in the relativeeconomic magnitude, and hence in power, of countries, one can argue that thevery rapidity of modern growth is in a sense a cause of the rapidity with whichrelative power positions of countries change; and hence possibly of difficulties inadjusting international relations to these shifts in underlying economic power . . . . It willnot be long before the political and power relationship based on this initialinferiority begins to show signs of strain . . . . In short, one may argue that whengrowth is rapid and the pace of human history, itself a cause of rapid shifts, isfast, adjustments are more difficult than when rates of growth are moderateand the whole pace of change, internal and external, is slower (Kuznets, 1956:27, emphasis added).

Kuznets showed theoretically and empirically what Mackinder and others hadclaimed—how the differing levels and rates of growth of states ultimately causedtheir relative power rankings (one aspect of systems structure) to change. LikeRostow and other economic historians, he emphasized the utility of quantitativeeconomic history for the broader issues of historical change.

But Kuznets was ever the economist, examining only how the absolute capabilitydynamics for each nation cause, and are impacted by, the changes in thoserankings. Hence, his measure of relative is sensitive only to the absolute gapbetween the economic magnitudes of two nations (the absolute gains representedin Figure 1B(b)), and whether the absolute trajectories are converging ordiverging. (There is no critical behavior in the dynamics of that measure overtime.) Relative power in international relations is a conceptual sphere removedfrom the absolute output of interest to the economist. Yet only the dynamic ofsuch IR-sensitive relative power (Figures 1A and 1B(a)) speaks to the issues ofinternational politics to which he alluded: the changing structure of the systembounding international relations and, in particular, the quintessential problem of“adjusting international relations” to “shifts in relative economic magnitude.”

“Systems Structure” and the Dilemma of Peaceful ChangeAttempting to learn from the failure to “adjust international relations” tochanging systems structure prior to World War I (when declining France, Britain,and Austria-Hungary refused to yield status and diplomatic perquisites toascendant Germany, much less a legitimate participatory role), the nextgeneration of European and American leaders made the opposite mistake intrying to correct for their earlier errors of statecraft (see section VI). At the heightof global crisis in the 1930s, concerns about morality and justice and the “dilemmaof peaceful change”—when to accommodate and when to oppose—became thefocus of international lawyers and foreign policy analysts, who watched in horroras policies of appeasement fed the fuel of aggression that culminated in WorldWar II. The debate about norms and legal regimes was overtaken by events,




because the underlying structural problem—how to reconcile changing powerwith legitimate interests—was never solved.

The field of IR continued this historically sensitive study of the dynamics ofinternational relations in what might be called the “structural” mainstream(Kaplan, 1961). Alker (1966: 627) emphasized the need to combine “inductivehistorical sociology” and “scientific theorizing,” quoting the philosopher ofscience Ernest Nagel (1963): “[The] mere fact that a system is a structure ofdynamically interrelated parts does not suffice, by itself, to prove that the laws of such a system cannot be reduced to some theory developed initially for certainassumed constituents of the system” (Alker, 1966: 645). The conceptualization ofthe “single dynamic” amidst a study of diplomatic history in 1964 proceeded intandem with the broader efforts in the field of IR to understand system as a“structure of dynamically interrelated parts.”

Systems structure was defined as “the distribution and hierarchy of power” byHoffmann (1968: 17), or equivalently as “the distribution of capabilities across theunits” by Waltz (1979: 60), operationalized as “percentage share of systemicpower” by Choucri and North (1971) and by Singer and associates (1972). Waltz (69) recognized that this definition of systems structure—expressedinterchangeably as distribution of capabilities, systemic shares, and relativepower—is necessary “to bring off the Copernican revolution” of systems levelunderstanding (Hoffmann, 1960: 4). Keohane (1989: 61) emphasized thatstructural theory provides “an irreplaceable component for a thorough analysis ofaction,” forming the basis for the emergent paradigm shift even if a theory of IRmust go beyond structural realism. Structure binds the present to the past withoutforeclosing agency from exercising the autonomy of which it is capable (Dessler,1987; Krasner, 1999).

Philosophy of History and the “Single Dynamic”A study of diplomatic history provided the impetus to power cycle theory, for itraises the question: What are the “shifting tides of history” that are so traumatic instatecraft? Preoccupations with the philosophy of history established thefoundations of the single dynamic of structural change (Doran, 1969, 1971).

Trajectory of Statecraft: Basis of Change (Evolving Power Potentials)After Kant and Hegel, westerners, already disposed to think in non-cyclical termshistorically, found faith in a positive, progressive, incremental, and cosmopolitantrajectory for history appealing indeed. The argued inevitability of progress,despite war and outbursts of inhumanity, is what drives liberalism and democracy.

To discern a trajectory of history and its meaning requires multiple timeperspectives (Doran, 1971: 3). Braudel (1949), building on the expansive visionsof Febvre and Bloc, was preoccupied with temporality in history. He identified“the event” as a journalistic short span very much on the narrative surface ofhistory, “conjuncture” as an interval of 20 to 50 years that could be genuinelycyclical and that lay at a deeper interpretive level, and “the longue durée” as a spanof several centuries—the deepest interpretive level where the structures thatpropel history, like the deep undercurrents of the ocean, may be discerned.

The work of Max Weber and historical sociology was most central, in particularthrough protégés like Carr, Aron, and Dehio, for stimulating a conceptualization




that placed power at the core of historical trajectory. Power associated with thestate was subject to systematic inquiry. During the 1950s, as Kuznets was explainingand justifying the nation state as the unit of economic analysis, and GNP as theyardstick of economic growth, IR scholars were confronting the same issues ofscope and indexation in conceptualizing appropriate yardsticks (and alternativemetersticks) for power in international politics (Doran, 1991: 47–58).

Acknowledging that national power must include national will, strategic skill,and political coherence, Knorr (1956) argued that it is largely derived from thestate’s resource base, without which there is no power or role. Thus, both actualizedand latent capabilities are necessary to create and sustain a nation’s long-termgrowth in power and role. Encompassing state security and welfare, nationalcapability can be effectively indexed with a bundle of indicators robust acrossstates and, properly qualified, across time (Singer and Small, 1972). Indicators ofpower must reflect the size and development of the state on economic and military variablesappropriate to the given system and interval of history. Although experts disagree indefining power, they are able to rank states consistently and independently in termsof how powerful the states are perceived to be. Without such intuitive ranking ofperceived power, policy-makers could not plan and implement policies rationally.These perceived rankings of “who has power” are stable across cultures and arehighly correlated with national capability (Doran, et al., 1974, 1979; Stoll andWard, 1989).

How does the material resource base of power change over time? Economistsand economic historians have addressed extensively the dynamics of absoluteeconomic growth both theoretically and in comparative historical terms (seereferences in Doran, 1971). Already generalized across states and periods ofhistory by Kuznets (1930), Rostow (1960), Cameron (1961), and Kindleberger(1964) was the fact that the “trajectory” of absolute economic output follows theso-called S-curve traced by the logistic function. But power is relative, and lackingwas any assessment of relative growth dynamics.

Here the field of IR had to confront the fact that the term relative denotes acomparison which can be either a signed difference or a ratio of the thingscompared, and the further complication of determining the appropriate referencegroup: “Relative to whom?” is the essential question. As indicated above, structuraltheorists rejected the dyadic measure—both the absolute gap important in balance-of-power calculations, and Kuznets’ ratio important in economic growth (also usedin transition theory)—as too coarse (unprocessed) to measure interstate relations,instead defining systems structure in terms of distribution and percentage share.

But the question remained: If the systems structure truly affects the reality ofinternational political behavior, some IR-sensitive measurement involving the relativepower scores should register this unique effect by some clearly identifiabledifference from what one would expect when examining the absolute scores inisolation. Position in the hierarchy, transition, and deconcentration processes arejust as easily attainable from the absolute scores, and thus give no clues to howsystems structure affects the foreign policy behavior of its member states. On theother hand, when relative power is considered dynamically over lengthy time periods, theunique effect of systems structure on the nature and behavior of the units is finally able to bemeasured. The dynamic of relative power over lengthy time periods is the onlymeasuring stick able to capture that which is unique and determinative aboutsystems structure. The true impact of systems structure on international politicalbehavior lies in the full dynamic of the state power cycle (Doran, 1991: 54–58).




In capturing the appropriate intervals of history, the dynamic of relative powercan be theoretically conceptualized, quantitatively indexed, and empiricallytested. Both cyclical and evolutionary notions of historical trajectory are intrinsicto the single dynamic of changing systems structure (see section IV). An importantinfluence on the power cycle understanding of statecraft, the study of diplomatichistory under Rodolfo Mosca in Bologna in 1964 provided this author with theContinental perspective of European diplomacy and how it evolved since theorigins of the modern state system, an important complement to the “governance”perspective prevalent in the writings of English-speaking analysts following E.H.Carr.

History’s Dynamic: Mechanisms of ChangeThe historical dynamic of statecraft confronts the question whether war was anecessary instrument to restructure world power in the historical periods ofsystems transformation. The thesis that systems transformation is a structuraldiscontinuity caused by major war is at the heart of much IR theory. According toLiska (1968: 59), “the evolution of a European or any other international system isthe story of conflicts which create the system and then later lead to itsdestruction.” Thompson (1988: xii) states that “global war emerged as a systemicmechanism for resolving policy-leadership disputes in the later fifteenth century.Since then, the mechanism continued to evolve.” Hegemonic stability (Gilpin,1981), power transition (Organski and Kugler, 1980), and long cycle (Modelski,1978) theories also identify major war as the vehicle whereby a new systemichierarchy is born.

According to power cycle theory, causation went in exactly the oppositedirection, from structural transformation to war. A discontinuity of structure(inversion in the prior trend) and associated foreign policy expectations causedthe massive warfare. War is not necessary for systemic change—and hence powercycle theory could not be based philosophically either on existing cyclicalconceptions of history or on the Marxian negation of opposites, each of whichposits that peaceful change is not possible.

Attempting to formulate an historical dynamic which did not require war as themechanism of systemic change (so that peaceful change is possible) and yetadmitted evolutionary and cyclical change, power cycle theory (Doran, 1969; 1971:2–11) postulated two general “mechanisms of change in the international system”that could “effect evolutionary developments” (complementarity and competitiveness)and two that could “lead to cyclical repetition” (cooperation and competition). Theseprinciples of change were “drawn from the sociopolitical behavior of individualsand groups . . . which underlie the historical process” (1971: 2n).

Complementarity is a process in which governments interact, each contributingsomething the other does not possess, or does not possess in sufficient quantity orwith sufficient fit. Combination of these separate infusions of idea or substancemoves the process forward. Competitiveness is a process in which governments clashbehaviorally or attitudinally in such a way that something is negated oreliminated—something perceived to be inefficient or unjust, unhelpful orredundant, or otherwise an obstacle to the forward movement of joint enterprise.Competitiveness makes use of the opposing strengths of another actor toeliminate the problematic nature of one’s own institutions, laws, or behaviors.Member states may at times have to “raise the status of justice” and “lower that of




efficiency” as elements in this process (Doran, 1971: 6). Operating side by side,complementarity and competitiveness facilitate the progressive dynamic of history.

In contrast, cooperation is alone not very productive of change. Just as Carrcriticized the notion of the “harmony of interests” as dangerously misleading andunproductive of useful change, so cooperation where there is no possibility ofmutual additions or eliminations from the interaction (for instance, the repeatedattempts at collective intervention in the 17th through 19th centuries) is bound tobe disappointing. Likewise, competition where there is no possibility of eliminatingcontradictions within the institutions, laws, or behaviors of either actor is merelydestructive rivalry. This is the kind of rivalry that existed prior to the middle of the17th century on virtually an annual basis between the noble factions of rival city-states and principalities. No useful accommodation emerged from these emptyclashes of ritualized violence.

Nor is anything “gained” for the system’s forward and upward trajectory fromthe “competition for share” that merely redistributes proportions of the whole. Butcomplementarity and competitiveness make the resulting cyclical path of state riseor decline (reflecting the state’s competitiveness in the system), the very essenceof systems structure, and of structural evolution—and hence at the very heart ofthe historical trajectory of international politics and statecraft (again, Figures 1and 2). Doran (1971: 59–61) explains how these “long-term organic changes(essentially cyclical with respect to the system)” have vital evolutionaryconsequence: for the rise of potential hegemonies, for the emergent systemicthreat, and (ideally) as a guide to policies of “systemic adjustment” to alleviatestrains arising from changes on the cycles.

History can thus be seen as a composite of the two types of manifested reality,the cyclical and the evolutionary, one driven by competition and cooperation,the other propelled by competitiveness and complementarity. Neither type ofreality exists in isolation, just as neither principle (nor its corrupted subform)has a pure embodiment in the normal behavior of states. Yet one can conceiveof cyclical and evolutionary manifestations graphically as a periodic curve(representing cyclical movement) located on an oblique line (representingevolutionary development) extending away from the origin at an angle greaterthan zero degrees but less than ninety degrees (Doran, 1971: 11).

Thus, complementarity and competitiveness conjointly explain the movement ofhistory along its trajectory, including the absolute economic growth patterns of states comprising the system—the differential absolute levels and rates ofeconomic growth which together comprise the aggregate system. Their subforms,cooperation and competition for share (proportion)—regardless of whether theaggregate is increasing (as in Figure 1A, top right), constant, or decreasing—yieldthe resultant cyclical redistribution of these shares (proportions) in history (Doran,1991: 63–64). Together these four mechanisms of change account for the “singledynamic” of world politics that brings together cycle and linear change in apositive, upward, reinforcing direction. They are the underlying processes drivingmovement on the state power cycles (changing systems structure).

The power cycle thus combines both kinds of historical trajectory, theevolutionary and the cyclical, in a complex single dynamic of changing systemsstructure in which component states pass through a generalized cycle of rise,maturation, and decline in relative power—a cycle that establishes the context forthe state’s foreign policy behavior in history. What sets the cycles in motion?




Principles of the “Single Dynamic” of Power Cycle TheoryThe principles of the power cycle reveal the unique perspective of statecraft in theexpectations, and unexpected non-linearities, of relative power change in contrast tothe perspective of absolute trends.

Deduced from “thought experiments” in 1964 about what drives systemicchange, the principles of the power cycle explain how absolute growthdifferentials in the system create the rise and decline of states. Differing levels andrates of absolute growth among the states in the system set in motion a particular non-linearpattern of change on each trajectory of relative power. At base, shown schematically inFigure 1A, a state’s competitiveness in a system—the direction of change on itspower cycle—is a function of how its absolute growth rate compares with theabsolute growth rate of the system (the systemic norm).

Two principles underlie this dynamic. (1) A state’s systemic share will increasewhen its absolute growth rate is greater than the systemic norm. Moreover, a singlestate growing faster than the systemic norm will initiate momentum of change onstate power cycles throughout the system. (2) Even when the differing absolutegrowth rates remain unchanged, a state’s relative power growth will accelerateonly for a time and then (at inflection point F) begin a process of deceleration,due to the bounds of the system (finiteness of systemic share), which brings aboutpeaking (Z) and a turn into relative decline. Similarly, accelerating decline will (atinflection point L) begin to decelerate to a minimum level.

Observe in Figure 1B(a) that even for a state with a constant absolute growth rate(hence a trend of ever increasing absolute gains), the very nature of relative share(between 0 and 100% of the system) forces the relative power trajectory (depictingrelative gains) to shift from accelerating rise to deceleration towards a peak. Inparticular, after the inflection point, there is a qualitative shift in the systemsstructure that belies naive expectations drawn from the ever-larger absolute gains.Figure 1B(b) illustrates a yet more profound difference between absolute andrelative power dynamics. A large state sees absolute gains that are much greaterthan the absolute gains of a smaller, faster-growing state—but the small state isincreasing its relative share, pulling the larger state into relative decline (althoughstill diverging in absolute terms).

On the state power cycle, there are five critical points of sudden, unanticipatedchange at which the projection of future relative power, and hence of future securityand foreign policy role, changes abruptly. Each of these critical points in the powercycle corresponds in the state’s experience to a time when the tides of history haveshifted in the international system of interaction (Doran, 1991: 104–106):

• birth throes of a major power (lower turning point beginning the cycle)• trauma of constrained ascendancy (inflection point on the rising trajectory)• trauma of expectations foregone (upper turning point)• hopes and illusions of the second wind (inflection point on the declining

trajectory)• throes of demise as a major power (lower turning point at end of the cycle).

Together the relative power changes on these component power cycles map thechanging structure of the system. Recall that systems structure is a ratio of “state”relative to “the system of competitors for power share.” Over time, the changingsystems structure reflects each state’s rise and decline in systemic share.

According to the principles of the power cycle, this single dynamic of changing




systems structure (roughly sketched in Figure 2 for the post-1500 historical statesystem) will reflect the “trends of history” and “shifting balance of world forces”experienced by statesmen and assessed in economic and diplomatic history. The“tides of history” follow the paths of ascendancy and demise and the shiftingtrends at critical points of non-linearity on the component state power cycles.Power cycle theory thus discloses the reason for the shocking surprises that ensuefrom differential growth and that periodically traumatize history.

At each time point in history, the single dynamic “records” each state’s clearlydefined past trajectory, and its likely but yet-to-be-determined future trajectory, ofpower and role vis-a-vis that system. It thus reveals at each step how statesmenwould perceive the state’s past and future evolution as a major player in thesystem. The power cycle is a state “image” in the sense of Boulding (1956) andKelman (1965: 25), a conception encompassing “specific memories and


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1A. The Dynamics of Absolute and Relative Capability: Principles of the Power Cycle(Changing Systems Structure).* Curves of absolute growth rate (depicted is an accelerating system):

A: major power system; B: state B; C: entire system* Critical points: F: first inflection point; Z: zenith; L: last inflection pointSource: Doran (1971: 193). This figure appears as figure 3.1 in Doran (1991: 63).

FIGURE 1. Limits of Power: Bounds on Relative Growth



expectations” as well as perceptions of the present.1 It also thereby meetsCollingwood’s (1956: 282) requirement that the analyst of history “achieve somekind of contact with the mind of those about whom he is writing.” With futureprojections of power and role embedded at each historical point in the cycle, thisuniquely international political dynamic captures the concerns of statecraft—theexpectations, and unexpected non-linearities, of relative power change that so greatlyimpact state behavior. Power cycle theory is thus a decision theory responsive tostructural change (Levy and Collis, 1985; Levy, 1987; Cashman, 1993: 269).

What happens at a critical point is a profound change in foreign policyexpectations, indeed a complete inversion in the trend of expectations (a change inthe “slope” of the relative power curve, depicted for the first inflection in Figure3A). This inversion in thinking marks a sharp break with the past, a discontinuityin how the state views future options. The first inflection and upper turning pointstrigger doubt as to whether the state can assume all of the foreign policy goals itmay have envisioned for generations (Figure 3B). This inversion in the trend ofexpectations comes as a shock to the foreign policy elite, who must suddenlyconfront both ineluctable limits and monumental uncertainty. The further thestate looks into the future, the larger the disparity between future reality and its priorforeign policy expectations (Figure 3C). The more far-sighted the policy planning,the greater the error of judgment that suddenly confronts decision-makers.


Largest State: Absolute Growth

(Trend of Absolute Gain in Level)

Corresponding Relative Growth

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Large State

Small State

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a) Conflicting Messages of Absolute and

Relative Growth after Inflection Point.

b) The Tiny Absolute Gains that Win

"Relative Share"

1B. Delusions of (a) Huge Absolute Gains and (b) Absolute Divergence.Assumes constant rate of absolute growth (no decrease or increase in % growth rate), sothat the trend of absolute gain shows continuing increase in gain, but the trend of gain inrelative share shifts from increasing to decreasing gain.

FIGURE 1. (continued)

(a) Conflicting Messages of Absolute andRelative Growth after Inflection Point

(b) The Tiny Absolute Gains that Win“Relative Share”



24International Political Science R

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United States

Russia/Soviet Union

Hapsburg Empire

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NetherlandsSweden

Britain Prussia/Germany Japan China

1500 1575 1650 1725 1950 19931800 1875

Ottoman Empire

Percent Shares of Power in the Central System for Leading States (the decline of the Venetian Empire during the 16th century is notdepicted).

Source: Conceptualized by Doran (1965; updated 1981; 1989; 1993), based on estimations for the period 1500–1815, and data for the years 1815–1993.

FIGURE 2. Dynamics of Changing Systems Structure 1500–1993

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Three processes underlie the causal impact of the critical point on major war.First, the cognitive shock of a critical point is itself destabilizing. With the tides ofpolitical momentum suddenly shifting, proving the state’s future securityprojections dangerously misguided, the critical point becomes a wrenchinginvitation to anxiety, belligerence, and overreaction. Gone are the familiar foreignpolicy anchors for state and system. Second, adjustment to structural change at the critical point is strained by existing power–role gaps, which are suddenlysqueezed to the surface of foreign policy consciousness and appear formidable


Rel

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time time

time t1 t2 t3 time

Before C.P.

After C.P.

A. Inversion in the Prior Trend of Future

Foreign Policy Expectations: From

Ever Increasing to Decreasing

B. Shock of Sudden Discovery of

Inverted Trend: Trauma of

Constrained Ascendancy

C. Shock of Foreign Policy and Security

Re-evaluation: Continuing Reductions

D. Lag of Role behind Power: Ricocheting

Concern for Systemic Adjustment

Power

Role

Source: Figures A and D in Doran (1989: 376), and Doran (1991: 98–99). Figure C in Doran (1991: 98).

FIGURE 3. Crisis of Foreign Policy Expectations at First Inflection Point

A. B.

D.C.



indeed as the state and system try to cope with the shifting tide (Figures 3D, 4A).Power–role gaps aggravate the tension and uncertainty at the critical pointbecause they raise the stakes. Third, increased inelasticities regarding futuresecurity and role lead to an inversion of force expectations that accelerates themovement to war.

Figure 4A depicts bargaining between state and system in terms of the power astate attains (in rough analogy to “supply”) and the role that the system is willing toascribe to the state (“demand”), where the “price” is the probability of war (Doran,1972, 1974). [But beware extending the analogy: for example, equilibrium occursif and only if price (the probability of war) is zero.] In a critical interval, thediplomatic environment hardens; attitudes rigidify (inelasticities steepen),increasing the probability of war for a given power–role gap. The normal andanticipated outcome is for equilibrium to be restored in terms of cooperativeactions and responses. If impediments to adjustment emerge, freezing interestdeficits and surpluses throughout the system, rational decision-making breaksdown (Figure 4B). The uncertainties and shocks to foreign policy sensibility at acritical point cause both potential deterrer and aggressor to find acceptable ornecessary a use of force previously considered unthinkable (Doran, 1991: 36–42,107–112). This transmutation of mentality is analogous roughly to the inversion ofdemand and supply expectations in so-called inverted markets such as during the1929 stock market collapse and the 1979 oil price run-up (Doran, 1980, 1991:172–176). Expansion to major war follows the Jervis (1976) and Mansbach–Vasquez (1981) model of a conflict spiral via a cobweb process (Doran andMarcucci, 1990).

Thus, in a critical interval, the short-term response to the loss of “normalcy” inthe environment is a behavioral mechanism that is “counter-intuitive” (does notapply under normal conditions). States struggle for comprehension amidstdiscordant and seemingly contradictory realities. In these existential moments,with the ingredients necessary for rational choice absent, strategy is flawed. Powercycle theory exposes the dilemma that arises for rational choice when the agents—long accustomed to rational decision-making—suddenly are unable to meet thecriteria for acting rationally, a condition labeled “nonrationality” (Doran, 1991:25–43; 2000c).

In confronting the principles of the power cycle, the analyst discovers that the“perspective of statecraft”—of relative (systemic structural) change—is indeedidiosyncratic, evoking a paradigm shift in understanding foreign policy behavior.Like the statesman, the analyst grasps the most important difference betweenabsolute and relative capability—the nature of their paths over long timeperiods—and hence the full significance of systemic bounds. At critical points ofunexpected non-linearity, where the tides of history suddenly shift, theexpectations induced by continuing absolute trends no longer match the shiftedtrend in relative power. It is traumatic when a very small change on the state’s power cycle alters completely the direction of future expectations. It istraumatic when a meteoric rise in relative power suddenly peaks even as absolutecapability makes its greatest gains. No theory of international politics can ignore thisfundamental difference in trends and expectations, the conflicting messages and shockingsurprises. No explanation of major war can dismiss this discordance in perspectives as aprobable cause.





Ascribed Role

(System)

AR

Achieved Power

(State A)

AP

ARAP

R E P

P E R

Interest Surplus

Interest Deficit

Percentage of Systemic Power and Role at Time t

pt > 0

p = 0

p = 0

pt > 0

pt > 0

pt > 0

p = 0

AR

AR'

"

AP

AR

a. Normal Operation b. Increased Inelasticity

of Role Ascription

c. Abnormal Operation:

Inversion of Expectations

4A. Equilibrium on the Power Cycle for State A and the System.

Source: Doran (1991: 37), based on Doran (1972, 1974).

4B. From Disequilibrium of Structure to Disequilibrium of Decision Process: TheMechanics of Crisis During Systems Transformation.

Source: Doran (1991: 38), based on Doran (1972, 1974, 1980).

FIGURE 4. The Crisis of Systemic (Mal)Adjustment: Inversion of Force Expectations

(a) Normal Operation (b) Increased Inelasticityof Role Ascription

(c) Abnormal Operation:Inversion of Expectations



Power and Role, Structure and AgencyThe principles of the power cycle, and their predictions, are quite in contrast tothose of other structural theories (Figure 5). A crucial empirical test regarding thedynamics of change prior to World War I validates power cycle theory andunderscores the paradigm shift in understanding that the theory entails. In othertheories, expectations about the changing structure of the system precisely matchextrapolation of the absolute capability trends (Mastery of Europe thesis). Only fromthe power cycle perspective, do the perceptions and concerns of contemporaneousstatesmen look neither distorted nor incongruous (Doran, 1991: 79–89).

Paradigm Shift: Seeming Puzzles of History ResolvedThe empirically determined power cycles for Germany and Russia (Doran andParsons, 1980) triggered much theoretical discussion among political scientistsand historians. Substantively, the debate centers around “the almost universal pre-1914 belief in inexorably increasing Russian power” (Wohlforth, 1987: 380).Why did European decision-makers foresee great relative gains for Russia? Werethe statesmen correct? What were the implications of rising Russian power forGermany, and hence for German behavior?

These curves were provocative because, while they accurately captured the pre-war trend (perceived and real) of Russia rising from its low point and Germanynear its peak, they show Germany peaking in relative power well in advance of thewar (Figure 5A), counter to accepted historical interpretation and “commonsense.” The power cycle argument that expectations, and hence behaviors, arebased on an extrapolation of existing trends became a focus of debate. Wohlforthemphasized the need to combine perceptual and structural explanations. But, justas he seemed ready to accept the full implications of his findings—namely, thatcontemporaneous statesmen realized Germany’s leveling out of relative growth—he did a volte face, accepting the arguments put forth by Kennedy (1984) that thecontemporaneous perceptions of rising Russian power were “misperceptions” andthat Germany was still a rising power prior to the war.

Kennedy supported his arguments with the “giant–pygmy” thesis. Germany’spower was so much greater than that of Russia, and its yearly increments were somuch greater, that surely Germany did not consider Russia a threat. Kennedyexamined production data on steel, coal, and other manufactures. So obvious wasGermany’s superior strength, and so obvious did the continued rise in Germany’srelative power seem, that the statesmen must somehow have “misperceived”reality. He thus posed two puzzles that historians must seek to explain.

• Puzzle 1: “Why was Russian power before 1914 so absurdly overrated? ... Did theynot see that Russia, despite its lurch towards industrialization, was a militarycolossus but an economic pygmy?”

• Puzzle 2: “Which power, Russia or Germany, was objectively the most likely to alterthe existing order in Europe?”

(Kennedy, 1984: 28–29)

Accordingly, regarding the implications for Germany of Russia’s rapid growthfrom such a low level, Kennedy’s answer was A. J. P. Taylor’s “Mastery of Europe”thesis that Germany’s fears of Russia “were exaggerated . . . In fact, peace musthave brought Germany the mastery of Europe within a few years” (1984: 29).




The dual schematic (Figure 5B) reveals that historical interpretation of Germany’spre-war trajectory involves deeper conceptual issues and the dynamics ofinternational politics. In other theories and “common sense” expectations about the changing structure of the system (center schematic) match those


Absolute Trajectories

in Pre-1914 Period Transition Theory Power Cycle Theory

Expectations of Future Relative Power

In Pre-1914 Period

Germany

Britain

Russia

Germany

Britain

Russia

Germany

Britain

Russia

Germany to reign

as new topdog

(Master of Europe)

Germany's shock of

"shifting tides"

(peak and enter

relative decline)

"Mastery of Europe" Thesis

Power Cycle Theory(Perceptions of Contemporaneous

Statesman)

19

13

19

14

19

07

5A. Contrasting Interpretations of Germany’s Relative Power Trajectory in the EuropeanSystem 1870–1914.

Source: Doran (1991: 81).

5B. Dyads in a Systemic World: Confronting the Principles of the Power Cycle.

Source: Doran (2000: 362); and Doran (1992).

FIGURE 5. Paradigm Shift: Resolving “Puzzles of History” by Confronting thePrinciples of the Power Cycle

“Mastery of Europe” Thesis

Germany’s shock of“shifting tides” (peak and enterrelative decline)



induced by extrapolation of the absolute trends (far left). Up until 1900,perceptions of the absolute trends projected continued rise in German relativepower for over three decades into the 20th century (Doran, 1991: 112). In contrast(schematic far right), the principles of the power cycle reveal how the “bounds ofthe system” suddenly and unexpectedly forced Germany to peak in relative powera decade prior to the war. Statesmen saw ever greater increments of absolutegrowth for Germany; but they also saw a sudden halt in its prior rapid gain inrelative share. In the power cycle assessment, what most triggered German angst in1914, and German bellicosity, was the sudden discovery that the tides of historyhad shifted against it.

Accounts of diplomatic historians support the power cycle assessment. “With nohistory behind it save forty years of unchallenged success in an undeviatingadvance to greatness” (Seaman, 1963: 143), and “trust[ing] in a current thatwould carry [them] to [their] goal” (Dehio, 1962: 233), the German ForeignOffice and General Staff were shocked to discover that German relative power hadpeaked. Despite its greatest absolute increases ever, its relative power was locked ina structural vise. Germany and all of Europe were aware of the “underwatercurrent,” so counter-intuitive, that shattered expectations of a continued Germanrise on its power cycle. The tiny absolute increments of Russia, in acceleratingeconomic take-off at the bottom of the system, were sufficient to halt Germany’sascent and force it onto a declining path. The problem for Germany was notmisperception of its power level, but very clear perception of a sudden andcompletely unexpected and even counter-intuitive shift in history’s prior trend ofrelative power change in the system. This terrible period of history begins to makesome sense when the analyst experiences the conflicting messages and shockingsurprises with which statesmen had to contend as Germany suddenly bumpedagainst the upper limit of its relative power growth. In the hour of its greatestachievement, Germany was driven onto unexpected paths by the bounds of thesystem.

The structural, perceptual, and behavioral aspects of causation must be assessedholistically for a full paradigm shift to the dynamic systemic view. When examinedfrom the perspective of long-term changes in relative power, the giant–pygmyargument and the mastery of Europe thesis are shown to be wrong. From thepower cycle perspective, the perceptions of contemporaneous statesmen areneither distorted nor incongruous, but accurately reflect the reality of power trendsand the unique concerns of statecraft.

Role, Power, and Power–Role GapsAs explained above, role is coequal with power regarding what matters instatecraft, both national security and the liberal concept of a legitimate worldorder. While power constitutes the means, foreign policy role involves the concernsand ends of statecraft. Based in the reality of the push and shove of world politics,foreign policy role indexes the behavior and position of the state manifested inexternal relations. Distinct from power, role is in the long term affected by thetrajectory of power. Like power, role is necessarily systemic: although determinedprimarily by what a government itself does, a role exists only if the othergovernments accept its exercise of that role. Strategy and bargaining (Figure 4)greatly impact this informal legitimization process.

Consider the nuances and significance of foreign policy role involving Russia,




France, and Austria in 1852. Russia traditionally enjoyed the role of protector ofthe Balkan Slavs. Napoleon III of France pressed claims in the Ottoman asprotector of Latin Christians. When Russia’s attempt to get equal acknowledgmentof its position and claims was rejected by the Sultan, it suspended diplomaticrelations with the Ottoman and expanded its territorial claims by occupyingMoldavia and Wallachia. These actions led directly to the outbreak of the CrimeanWar. France had tried to usurp the Russian role. Other governments whoseinterests were threatened, especially Austria, were unable to salvage the Russianrole, discourage the French acquisition of that role, smooth the transfer of therole, or prevent the relatively weakened Russia from expanding its role throughaggression.

Role thus is foreign policy behavior that the system has allowed the state toachieve (Holsti, 1991). Foreign policy role involves an acknowledged niche inwhich a country can use its power to obtain additional ends, in particularenhanced security. These behavioral niches change slowly over time in response tostate purpose, strategy, capability, and the permissiveness of other actors in thesystem.

How does foreign policy role change as power changes over broad periods of history? Astate’s foreign policy expectations are tied to change on its power cycle, but powerand role get out of sync because actors and system do not adjust readily to changesin relative power (Doran, 1989, 1991: 100–103). On the upside of the power curve,the increase in power tends to exceed acquisition of role. The system is reluctantto yield role to the ascendant actor, or the rising state may prefer to postpone rolegratification and responsibility until it could do so more easily (with greaterconfidence) and on its own terms (with less competition). On the downside of thecurve, there is a tendency for role to exceed power, leading to overextension.Allies and dependent client states do not want the once-ascendant state to stepaside, and elites accustomed to the benefits power bestowed do not want to yieldrole and face a different, more constricted, foreign policy setting. Long latent instatecraft, these power–role gaps are shoved to the fore of diplomatic awarenessand priority in critical intervals of suddenly altered security circumstance, greatlyescalating the tension. They then abruptly demand adjustment.

Within the dynamic context of power cycle analysis, the tension between powerand role attains its fullest meaning and causal specificity regarding major war.Russia and Austria in 1852 were undergoing critical change in foreign policyoutlook: Russia was experiencing the second inflection, and Austria had passedthe upper turning point within the decade. When France sought to alter the statusquo in the Ottoman, it thus unsettled two governments already attempting to copewith history’s shifting tides. Under these circumstances of massive structuralchange and foreign policy reorientation for Russia and Austria, a role challengeaccompanied by the shock of relative power loss provided the sparks that ignitedwar.

The strain between power and role goes to the heart of the capacity to act in foreign policy.It is a structural disequilibrium conceptually distinct from (yet related to) themany variants of rank disequilibrium—aspirations/achievements, power/status,achieved/ascribed power, hierarchic equilibrium (Midlarsky, 1988). The power–rolegap involves means (achieved power) versus attained interests or ends (ascribedrole), and the adjustment between power and role is necessary to establish systemic equilibriumamong all of the members (Doran, 1989, 1991: 134–138). The rank models also lackspecificity regarding timing of a conflict outcome. But, by assessing the many




sources of disequilibrium in the context of the power cycle dynamic, one canobtain a more encompassing notion of the requirements for equilibrium (Doran,1974, 1980, 1989, 1991: 34; Doran, with Ward, 1977). The aspirations–achievement disparity in Anderson and McKeown (1987) involves the inversion ofexpectations (trends) occurring at critical points on the power cycle itself; and thedisequilibrium between power and role subsumes the power–status gap.

Systems Transformation: Historical Origin and ImpactWhen a number of states pass through critical points at about the same time inhistory (a period of systems transformation), long-standing contradictions in thesystem are exposed, and states throughout the system seek redress of their ownperceived condition of internal disequilibrium. Assisted by Figure 2, consider thepattern of abrupt structural change and systemic tension in several historicalexamples of world war (Doran, 1971, 1991, 2000a). The tension came not so muchfrom upward or downward mobility, but from a government’s sudden discoverythat its projected future security and foreign policy role had dramatically changed.

Contrast the outlooks of Charles V and Philip II of Spain in the 16th century,following the Spanish Hapsburg peak in relative power circa 1580 (Doran, 1971:65–105). Although the Spanish-Austrian Hapsburgs remained the dominantpower in Europe for decades, Philip II suddenly interpreted foreign policy quitenegatively, expressing both paranoia and belligerence. Long-standing economicand financial policies had undermined Spain’s power base from within,accelerating its relative demise as much smaller states began to consolidate power.Only 8 years after this peak, in 1588, Spain struck out against the British fleet, andthe fateful “Protestant wind” defeated its Armada. After a half-century of warfare,the Peace of Westphalia (1648) broke up the Hapsburg Complex, permitting thetoo-rapid rise of France on the world scene. Also problematic was the tardytransfer of prestige and role from the Hapsburgs to Sweden and Holland, whoenjoyed a meteoric rise, and to France, consolidating its power under Richelieu.The massive changes in structure and challenges to role eventually strained thesystem at its core, resulting in the Thirty Years’ War.

By ignoring the early 17th-century disparity between excess Hapsburg role anddeclining Hapsburg power, the system only encouraged an assertive Louis XIV toattempt to take by force what French ascendancy had not yet obtained throughmore benign means (109–144). In the mid-17th century, passage of Louis XIV’sFrance through a first inflection point, abruptly threatening slower relativegrowth, led to confrontations with Sweden (an erstwhile ally) and Holland(exhausted politically), each discovering that its relative power had peaked,creating severe problems of overextension. Meanwhile Prussia was rising in theheart of the central European system, and Britain, reconstituted, was enjoying arenaissance of power growth by the end of the 17th century, stimulating it toconfront France directly with an army on the Continent. The wars of Louis XIVonce again resulted from a systemic transformation that saw each of Europe’smajor players viewing its own foreign policy role in highly altered and moretroubled fashion.

French power peaked sometime during the latter 18th century in the face ofgrowing British industrial and naval strength. This transformation of the system—which came on the heels of startling declines in power in northern and centralEurope as well, and for the same reasons of lagging industrialization—saw a




belligerent France resisting its systemic fortunes under Napoleon (177–188). Thecontrast between the sense of systemic responsibility (role) on the part of thedeclining Russians as expressed by Alexander I, and the belligerence (role) of thedeclining French under Napoleon, was an acknowledgment of the failure of Europeto assimilate dramatic structural change without major war.

In these three world wars, the existing system of maintaining order collapsedunder the weight of arrangements whose foundations had long since been erodedaway (Doran, 1971). By 1885, the tides of history once again created a crisis forsystemic adjustment.

As argued in Doran (1989, 1991), the period 1885–1914 was a disequilibratedsystem in crisis, a system that finally collapsed in world war because an injuriouscombination of critical changes obscured the need for vertical corrections of role while itunduly increased confidence in short-term power balancing. The historical record interms of “what statesmen saw and how they reacted” (Doran, 1991) ischaracterized by concerns about growing imbalances in power and role involvingmany states in the system (Figure 6A). World War I arose from an attempt by the systemto constrain rising power rather than adjust to it.

Faced by the rapid ascendancy of German power in the late 19th century, theother members of the European system banded together to try to offset theGerman advances in relative power. So meteoric was this vertical change that fearblinded the declining states to the need for a transfer of role and status. Whilethey denied intent, the effect was to encircle Germany according to the traditionalconception of the balance of power. It also made Germany increasingly restlessand distrustful, and strained the system into excessive disequilibrium. War was feltto be “unavoidable” because the disequilibrium was endemic, and governmentswere not willing to make the necessary role adjustments (134–140, 151–153,160–165). Analysis of the type of critical point, the nature of the power–roleequilibrium, and whether or not the gap was being addressed (Figure 6B) revealsboth the apparent rationality and yet the actual illusionary nature of many of theseperceptions (Doran, 1991: 137–138). Bent upon a larger international politicalrole, Germany became a very dissatisfied actor, but it could “wait” for greater statusand role so long as it could anticipate future relative power growth. Acceleratedgrowth for Britain, Austria-Hungary, and France lessened their rate of decline(second inflection), supporting the illusion that adjustment was not necessary.Germany’s rise bumped against the upper limit to its relative growth and, by 1914,was suddenly pulled into decline by Russia’s rapid growth rate. The tides of historyhad shifted against it while it was still severely role disequilibrated. This confluenceof shifting tides exposed and tested the contradictions in the system; war becameby default the only apparent instrument to release the severe structural strains.

World War II followed from the allies’ attempt to learn from their past mistakes,and to correct the deficiencies of the balance of power, but it was a tragicmisunderstanding of the dynamics of equilibrium (151–165). They sought tocorrect the “wrongs” done to Germany prior to World War I by yielding positionand role to Hitler. But by 1936, Germany was in aggravated decline in relativelatent capability, notwithstanding its great absolute strength and lessened rate ofrelative decline. Germany could make no further “claims” on the system for alarger role or greater status. Moreover, Hitler’s territorial demands were inherentlyaggressive and had to be confronted on these grounds alone. The correct strategicresponse to Hitler, evident from a larger concept of equilibrium, was a firm policy ofbalance and opposition. Appeasement was exactly the wrong policy.




World War II showed that states ignore the balance of power at their peril (Lieber, 1991:162–163) and that illegitimate interests must never be appeased. World War I showedthat states ignore power–role equilibrium at their peril and that rising power cannot behalted. The bounds of the system constrain relative growth and future roleopportunity, and when expectations long deferred suddenly are foreclosed, theurgent demand for redress of this “injustice,” and to relieve the structuraldisequilibrium, provokes the tragedy of world war.


Po

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–R

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Dis

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Role

Role Role

Role

Role Role

Role RoleRole

GA

PG

AP

GA

P

Power

Power

Power Power

Power

PowerPower Power

Power

Power Power Power

Feared:

Role loss

Attempted:

Power growth

*Inflection pt.

*Low pt.

*High pt.

Illusion: Success

Feared:

Declining power

Attempted:

Role redress

RoleRole

Feared by G,

Attempted by Sys.

Attempted by G,

Feared by Sys. Reality of Systemic Illusions:

Only war can redress its gap

Illusion: More redress needed

Projection Before Critical Pt. Possible Adjustments to Eliminate Gap Trauma of the Critical Pt.

Ger

man

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Def

icit

(Asc

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Pea

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Figure 6 A. Power and Role Projections, Adjustment Delusions

Source: Doran, "Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle,"

Journal of Conflict Resolution (1989), p. 395

6A. Power and Role Projections, Adjustment Delusions.


1882-871884-891894-991900-051902-071907-121910-141910-151911-16

Year ofCrit. Pt.

Type ofCrit. Pt.

Relativegrowthadvantage

Post-crit. pt.trajectory

Nature ofdisequilibrium

Gap being redressed

Apparent RealNation

Austria-HungaryItalyRussiaBritainGermanyItalyAustria-HungaryUS

France

I2

I2

LI2

HLLI1

I2

YesYesYesYesNoYesYesNoYes

DeclineDeclineRiseDeclineDeclineRise(Exit)RiseDecline

Role surplusPower surplusPower surplusRole surplusPower surplusPower surplusRole surplusPower surplusRole surplus

YesYesYesYesNoYesYesNoYes

NoNoYesNoNoNoNoNoNo

6B. Critical Points, Power–Role Gaps, and Adjustment Delusions.


FIGURE 6. Disequilibrated System in Crisis, 1885–1914



World War I did not cause the relative decline of Germany any more than ittoppled British dominance, structural changes long in the making. Thus, thenotion that war was necessary to restructure world power in 1914 belies historicalfact. Restructuring of power relationships was already ongoing. Role admittedlywas more dilatory, and the war accelerated role change—but not in the directionthe parties intended. Role shifted to the Soviet Union and the United States ratherthan to either the initial belligerents or the defenders of the old order. Major warneither precipitated the important changes in power nor was a reliable purveyor of role.

The Bounds on Machtpolitik: Equilibrium and Systemic AdjustmentThe Great War was an aberration, not only not essential to structural change, but aconsequence of the failure to adjust to the rapid structural changes in time. Thecause of the war was failure to accommodate Germany’s rise with legitimate roleadjustments before it was too late, before the bounds of the system shattered itsexpectations of continued rise and future opportunity for role gratification.Kupchan (1994: 14) describes this failure as elite “vulnerability.” To understandthe limits and surprises of power change is to recognize that a legitimate and justsolution to the dilemma of peaceful change is possible. Governments mustunderstand that the bounds of the system, competition from even the smallestcompetitor for share of power and role, will force even the most vigorous risingstate to peak in power share and, ultimately, to enter relative decline. Then, risingstates will avoid fantasies (based on “obvious” absolute trends) of unlimited growth andeventual dominance, and they will not defer role gratification on the mistaken assumptionthat they will be able to make it up in the future. Declining states will resist the temptation ofpre-emptive attack to halt that rise (a so-called preventive war that is illegitimate and will failin the long run), and they will not deny increased role to the rising state out of fear that itwill overwhelm and dominate all. Power–role gaps can remain hidden under thecloak of statecraft for quite a long time; in consequence they are the moreexplosive when they are revealed. Machtpolitik can be contained, and securityensured amidst structural change, by a dynamic equilibrium involving both balanceand accommodation of legitimate contributory roles, properly timed to changingpower cycles (Doran, 1991: 166–190).

Dynamic EquilibriumPower cycle theory is one of many efforts to conceptualize a dynamic equilibriumin the context of rising and declining states, but the mechanisms of equilibriumare quite different.

Gilpin (1981), in line with Carr (1939) and Bertrand Russell (1952: 106), offers aconcept of equilibrium that focuses upon “governance” and requires a benevolenthegemon. Equilibrium for Rosecrance (1963: 220–232) involves a homeostatic“regulator” that varies with the type of international system, but provides the stabilityinherent in each system. Liska (1957) conceives of equilibrium as the “unilateral”effort by each state to achieve a type of Pareto-optimal relationship between itsrelative power and certain values such as security, welfare, and prestige. Equilibriumfor Mandlebaum (1987) is achieved by a “cartel” (Concert) of leading states whocollude by constraining output (power share) so as to raise price (mutual security).

The assumption that an organization of great powers could work out theconditions of balance through negotiation, rather than through the rough and




tumble of competition, is appealing. But states are unable to constrain change inpower share, let alone negotiate such change, except regarding actualized militaryvariables. Moreover, the cartel model necessarily considers the rising state as a“price cheater” which will not cooperate with the other oligarchs in manipulatingmarket share in the interest of higher profits. Such a model thus seems to denythe system’s responsibility to adjust to the natural rise and decline of states.Potential rising states like Germany were expected to brake their desire for alarger role in the system, just as states like France, Britain, and Austria-Hungarywere expected to hang onto theirs regardless of how the structure of power mightbe changing.

In contrast, power cycle equilibrium prescribes a dual approach to ordermaintenance. Assimilation to structural change involves adaptation which is“reciprocal rather than one-sided political change” (Doran, 1971: 21). Both the system(declining states) and the rising state (potential aggressor) are expected to adapt.Both foreign policy role and power are expected to be involved in themaintenance of equilibrium.

To ensure stability amidst structural change, dynamic equilibrium must “precedeand complement” the balancing process (Doran, 1969: 2). The balance of power isstatic, operating on a “flat chessboard” where the number of players, the rules, andthe moves are all known: any attempt to upset the balance (aggression) will beoffset by short-term shifts among the other players. But the rise and decline ofstates twists and distorts the chessboard such that the game can no longer beplayed. If attempted amidst such structural distortion, the balance of power would send offthe wrong signals, attempting to bolster long-term decline in power and to halt long-termascendency—in effect, resisting rather than adapting to the structural change. Hence, thebalance of power alone was inadequate to ensure peaceful change. By establishingforeign policy role as coequal in significance with power in matters of statecraft,and as evolving as part of the “single dynamic” of structural change, power cycletheory makes possible a broader concept of dynamic equilibrium keyed tostructural change.

Dynamic equilibrium exists when foreign policy roles have been able to adjust to the warpsin the power relationships caused by changes on the state power cycles. Conversely, failure offoreign policy roles to adjust to power changes creates a structural disequilibrium, a strainbetween power and roles throughout the system that goes to the heart of the capacity to act inforeign policy. A dynamic equilibrium involves learning to apply the correct strategyof balance and opposition, or of adaptation and accommodation, depending onstructural trends, the nature of demands on the system, and power–role gaps(Doran, 1991: ch.7; Stein, 2001). Would-be aggressors must always be balancedand opposed regarding aggression and illegitimate interests. The system must alsobe prepared to adapt and accommodate to the legitimate, non-aggressiveexpectations of a rising state for enhanced roles and responsibilities, whichrequires the declining state to be willing, and allowed, to reduce responsibilities.

This is not to say that systemic adjustment will be easy. Inertia of role change iseven greater than that of power, and it can confound even the most accom-modating system of states. Since structural change is usually “linear,” continuingprior trends, the presence of power–role gaps does not become an issue until thegaps are quite large and/or one or more states experience a sudden inversion inthe trend of future security expectations (critical point). Since enhanced securityis always at the heart of strategy and bargaining whereby states seek a legitimizedrole, role gaps can be ignored if security is not threatened. Conversely, equilibrium




is most difficult to achieve, and most necessary, when structural change is suddenlynon-linear, sharply altering future foreign policy roles and security for all states inthe system. The lesson of history is that by then it may be too late.

Rational Choice and Strategic BargainingAs argued above, power cycle theory exposes the dilemma that arises for rationalchoice when agents, long accustomed to rational decision-making, are unable tomeet the criteria for acting “rationally.” The dilemma is not that the agents choosenot to be rational, but that the agents suddenly confront a situation in which thecriteria for being rational are not present (Monroe, 2001). A condition in whichstrategy is necessarily flawed because the ingredients essential for “rational” choiceare absent has been labeled “nonrationality” (Doran, 1991: 25–43; 2000c).

Criteria which give rise to such conditions of nonrationality are intrinsic to the“single dynamic.” At a critical point, a sudden and ineluctable discontinuity ofstrategic expectations may outweigh the struggle to act rationally. The conditionsthat have long guided rational foreign policy strategy are no longer valid. Thestate’s entire future foreign policy outlook has changed direction. States strugglefor comprehension amidst discordant and seemingly contradictory realities. Inthese existential moments, the ingredients necessary for rational choice are absent,and strategy is flawed. The abnormal mechanism of inverted force expectationsinitiates a conflict spiral and the consequence again and again has been major war.

The single dynamic thus confronts rational choice models of major war and,inevitably, those models confront the single dynamic. For example, Fearon (1995)and Powell (1996) assumed that, prior to the war, Germany was aware of its peakingin relative power and fearful of Russia’s rising power. Fearon deduces that “privateinformation” is key to the decision for war. The principles of the power cyclereveal that the assumed “knowledge” of relative decline was in fact an “abrupt,immense, and shocking surprise”—after a decade of conflicting messagesregarding the future trend of relative power, and amidst the greatest absolutegrowth in its history. As late as 1905, expectations were that German relative powerwould continue to rise for at least another 30 years (Doran, 1991: 112). Thevigorous prior trend of relative power increase was so discordant with the abrupthalt of that trend, and in contrast to the continuing dynamism in absolute growth,that this puzzle of history challenges historians and political scientists to this day(Doran, 1991: 79–89). Another rational model, for instance, argued thesuperiority of its index of power because it agreed with the Mastery of Europethesis that Germany had not peaked, in contrast to data on Germany’s power cyclethat “deviate inexplicably from the trend at the end of the period” prior to the war(Nieu, et al., 1989: 301). How can rational models and strategic bargaining assessthese discordant realities experienced by decision-makers as they confront theshifting tides of history (Morrow, 1989; Nicholson, 1992; Lake and Powell, 1999)?How can Powell’s formal model account for the fact that expectations are alteredabruptly at the critical points when awareness of decline suddenly dawns, sounexpectedly and counter-intuitively (Doran, 1999), and what are the implicationsfor appeasement in that model?

Similarly, Kim and Morrow (1992), assessing the setting of a rising state and adeclining state moving toward and beyond transition, conclude that the likelihoodof major war is greatest “as the challenger’s rate of relative growth declines”(Bueno de Mesquita, 2000: 467). This point is the rising state’s first inflection




point! As argued in Doran (1989), there is nothing perceptually or mathematicallyunpredictable about the movement of a dyad toward transition—so that Bueno deMesquita’s (1978, 2000) scepticism about the existence of structural change that isnot predictable does apply to the claims of transition theory—with the sole exceptionof the occurrence of a critical point on the power cycle of one (or both) of the states in the dyadprior to transition (hence that scepticism is unwarranted regarding the structuralchange posited in power cycle theory). Houweling and Siccama (1991) confirmthe finding that a transition predicts to major war only in the presence of a criticalpoint, so that the transition theory is misspecified; it is the sudden inversion in thetrend of the rising state’s relative power trajectory that explains the war outcome.

Powell’s (1996) assessment of systemic disequilibrium treats states as bargainingover territory as in classical realism (rather than role, as in power cycle theory),but his conclusion that the initial beliefs and initial offers are determinative of thewar outcome demonstrates the importance in the single dynamic of the suddendiscovery of an altered future security environment. Rational decision-making mustconfront again the bounds of the system, the shifting tides and the undercurrentsrunning against the absolute trends. Again, the principles of the power cyclecontain the causal mechanism underlying the decision for war.

The Power Cycle and Kindleberger’s “National Cycle”Kindleberger (1996: 25–26) speculates about the existence of a “national cycle” ina book entitled World Economic Primacy 1500–1900. What is the relationshipbetween the hypothesized “national cycle” and the relative “national power cycle,”which he also mentioned but did not discuss? Kindleberger states that the“national cycle” reflects the general process of change in absolute growthindicated roughly by the S-curve, where “decline” reflects the “diminishing marginalreturns” of a large or aging economy. The economic indicators he examines are verybroad, including GNP, per capita income, technological change, productivity,demographic variables, and military variables. Even for GNP alone, variations in theheight and length of the diminishing marginal returns of the national cycles areprofound.

Kindleberger’s “national cycle” thus does not itself reflect the relative powertrajectory of power cycle theory. Confusion arises because he addresses thequestion of which state has economic “primacy” at any given time, and thequestion of how such economic primacy passes from one state to another inhistory. These are questions about relative position and change, and Kindleberger’sassessments are based on an intuitive comparison of the absolute growth patternsof the states. Hence, when Kindleberger speaks comparatively, he is speaking about“relative power” as reflected in the state power cycle. Given the huge variation inthe national cycles of absolute growth, those less knowledgeable would havedifficulty indeed trying to derive the implications for relative power change eventhough all the “data” required are contained in the absolute scores on the“national cycles.” Power cycle theory enables analysis to compress all of thisinformation into the various state power cycles comprising the system. And thetheory warns analysts of the conflicting messages and surprises inherent in the relative power trajectory, of the structural undercurrents which confound eventhe strongest absolute growth.

Logically, one can pass from Kindleberger’s national cycle to the state powercycle if the analysis (1) encompasses all the basic economic plus military variables,




and (2) considers each country relative to its principal competitors at each time-point in history. It was in assessing the patterns of population, industrial, andmilitary growth for European countries in the 17th through the 19th century thatpower cycle theory found its first empirical support, the first indication empiricallyof the contradiction between the vigor of absolute growth and the onset of relativedecline (Doran, 1971: 127–133, 176–179), namely France’s turn into relativedecline in population during “the greatest population expansion in her history” inthe late 18th century.

The “Single Dynamic” in Economics and Political EconomyIn its theoretical assessment of the absolute and relative dynamics of economicgrowth, power cycle theory advances understanding of both the dynamics ofcompetition and the behavioral responses to its discordant realities and suddennon-linearities. All the analytic paths of research in a field ultimately accumulatearound a “limit point” of understanding, at once more focused, more encompassing,and more nuanced (Doran, 1991: 15–16). In this age of globalization, the ability todiscern nuance is ever more important as the security and welfare concerns withinmultiple regions increasingly ratchet to the top of the international system and tothe top of strategic priority (Alt and Chrystal, 1983; Caporaso and Levine, 1992;Gilpin, 1987).

(1) The principles of the power cycle express the dynamics of competition, withbroad applicability. They are principles of change in any finite system, explaininghow absolute growth patterns in the component parts change the structuralrelations of the whole. Equivalent descriptors for the “power cycle dynamic”include “changing relative power,” or “single dynamic,” or “competition in a finitesystem,” or “logistic growth in a finite system,” or “competition for percent share,”or “structural bounds on statecraft” (Doran, 1991). To confront the principles ofthe power cycle is to confront the principles of competition for share. The trend line(slope) reflects current competitiveness. Expectations regarding future sharechange abruptly and irreversibly at critical points in the dynamics of competition.Thus, the shocks and surprises of non-linear change, the counter-intuitive effect of systemicbounds, are likewise experienced by firms, industries, and any entities competing for “marketshare.” These non-linearities and shocks are not apparent in—can even contradict—the patterns, trends, and growth cycles discernible in absolute output; and theywould likely cause similar problems of adjustment.

Moreover, the power cycle theory notion of competition rejects the destructivemechanism of zero-sum behavior and social-darwinism (Pearl, 1924) wronglyattributed to power relationships. Competition for share is guided by principles ofcompetitiveness and complementarity, the dynamic elements of productiveinteraction that shape changing structure in any social system (see section III). Inlikewise rejecting social-darwinism as pernicious, theories of cooperation some-times reject the notion of competition itself. But even though firms in jointventures can and do cooperate, can there be a successful general economic theoryof cooperation? Such cooperation, as has been pointed out (Lipson, 1984; Stein,1990; Milner, 1992), when generalized, always leads to collusion. Collusion causesinefficiency—and rigidity. In contrast, competition (power relationships) can besalutary and productive as well as descriptively valid. Joseph Nye, in a brilliantinsight about world politics, observed that in US–Canadian relations, althoughpower exists in the relationship, the use of force does not (1976: 399). Hence,




interdependence is not the absence of power relationships so much as the absenceof force relationships, across a prodigious range of issues, between certaingovernments, as the concept of the “democratic peace” has more broadlycontended (Doyle, 1986; Russett, 1993). A theory of competition guided bycompetitiveness and complementarity undergirds a framework of productiveinteraction in economics and world politics.

This pluralistic conception of international political economy is at odds withthe “hegemonic” model (Katzenstein, 1983). Consider the creation of the euro. Inthe hegemonic view, each European currency was being “Germanicized,” and theBundesbank had become the European central bank. In the power cycle view,each individual currency, including the deutschmark, was being Europeanized. Agreater share of the EU-member GDP exists outside Germany than within. This is adistinction with a difference, as the individual European finance ministerssupporting the euro-project would attest. Consider arguments linking usage of akey currency to the “dominant” trader-investor in a region. Institutionalaccessibility and common usage may make a currency appear dominant locally,but much more determines currency usage patterns than the locus of trade. On aglobal basis, there will be a multiple of key currencies used. In the world ofinternational finance, the flexible and multiple character of key currency usagewill be even more evident as “bundles” of currencies are commonly exchanged.

(2) Power cycle theory discloses many counter-intuitive aspects of relative powerchange. A large state (firm, industry) whose absolute growth rate is smaller thanthat of its competitors so weights the systemic norm that it (a) increasingly is “competingagainst itself” for share much more than against other states (firms, industries); thisexplains how relative share can drive absolute growth behavior, which in turn canerode competitiveness and impact the future trajectory (Doran, 1991: 220–226).Recall the economics of America at “high noon.” Since greater increments inabsolute output provide very little or no gain in market share, this change inexpectations leads the state (firm, industry) to abandon the strategy ofmaximizing competitive edge. Not able to expand market share, it shifts to amentality of trying to protect that share or to extract monopoly rents from thatshare. It becomes oligopolistic not so much by choice as by circumstance.

At the same time, that large state (firm, industry) so weights the systemic norm thatit (b) can long maintain systemic share; this explains the complacence that longattended diminished US economic competitiveness. But once relative decline setsin, the same absolute growth rate differentials will yield accelerating decline, explaining theimperative for US economic resurgence. Similarly, expectations that Japan wouldcontinue to rise on its power cycle, replacing US “leadership,” were based on extrap-olation of absolute trends, reminiscent of the Mastery of Europe expectationsregarding Germany in the early 20th century. But the principles of the power cycleshow that the expectations induced by absolute trends do not hold. The tiny incrementsof a faster-growing small economy, Russia vis-a-vis Germany circa 1900 and Chinavis-a-vis Japan today (Figure 7), are sufficient to force the much larger economytoward its peak in relative share (Doran, 1991: 232–236). Nonetheless, Japan’s rolein dynamic equilibrium continues to be pivotal (see Inoguchi, this issue).

(3) The logistic of absolute growth for a given state does not underlie and doesnot explain the logistic relative power dynamic of that state (Doran, 1991: 10–14 andch.3). Even as a state is experiencing very rapid absolute growth on a givenindicator (product sector) so that its absolute trajectory is nowhere near the upperend of the logistic, the state may have peaked and entered decline in its relative





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Source: Doran (1991: 235). Rosecrance (1990: 39) provided the starting values and growthrates (2.5% for US).

FIGURE 7. Systemic Bounds on Japanese Growth: Competitor Taking Sharesis China, Not US

Trillions (1986 US dollars)





trajectory on that same indicator. This was precisely the situation of Germany inthe decade prior to 1914 on a number of key economic indicators. And it was thereason for choosing the accelerating absolute growth rate curves (Figure 1)depicted in the first publication of power cycle theory (1969, 1971). Hence,although “rapid shifts in comparative advantage give rise to intense economicconflict between rising and declining economies” (Gilpin, 1987: 112, 56), focus onthe logistic effect of absolute growth can distort the issue of where on the logistic of relativepower each economy really is. Declining rate of absolute industrial growth mayaccount in part for Britain’s decline in relative power at the end of the 19thcentury (Yoon, 1990), but it cannot account for Germany’s logistic peak in relativepower well before the war. How the accelerative phase of economic growth willaffect a state’s power cycle trajectory depends greatly on its timing vis-a-vis the setof competitors for share. In the Asian subsystem today, the huge variation in sizeand wealth of the major states suggests that their rates of growth in per capitaincome and economic productivity will have significant differential effects on theirpower cycles (Doran, 2000b: 19–24).

(4) Thus, the principles of the power cycle help focus and clarify the debateregarding absolute and relative gains (Stein, 1990; Grieco, 1993). In addition to theobvious discordance between ever increasing absolute gains and ever decliningrelative (market share) gains to a logistic asymptotic level (the systemic bounds onits relative growth), Figure 1B marks the first inflection point where the trend ofrelative gains first begins to counter the trend of absolute gains (where the boundsof the system first impact the growth of relative gains). The tremendous strength ofsystemic bounds in constraining relative growth after the first inflection point cannot beoverstated. Consider Germany (Prussia) at an earlier interval on its power cycle,enjoying soaring absolute gains and ever increasing relative gains in the Europeansystem until it inflected just before the Franco-Prussian war. After the war, thePrussian gain relative to France continued to lessen, notwithstanding the fact thatPrussia had gained and France had lost resources of increasing importance toFrance’s industrial development! In the prior decade, Alsace-Lorraine hadquadrupled its output of iron ore, its share of French production growing fromabout 10 to over 30 percent (Landes, 1969: 226–227). Bismarck attacked Franceand acquired new resources, but these huge absolute gains could not haltGermany’s declining relative gains (Doran, 2000a: 359–361). Power cycle theoryshows not only that absolute and relative gains are ineluctably tied to each other.Even success in maximizing absolute gains cannot guarantee commensurate relative gains,or relative gains at all.

(5) Such discordant messages between absolute and relative gains (losses), and the suddenshifts in the trend of market share, create a widespread and deepening sense of insecurity,perhaps never so great in history as for the disequilibrated European system of1885–1914. Consider the behavioral response to the complexities of absolute andrelative gains when the tides of history are shifting and the system reverberateswith demands for systemic adjustment. What takes hold is the logic of inverted forceexpectations, a counter-intuitive behavioral mechanism (that does not apply undernormal circumstances) leading to aggressive competition as actors exaggerate thegains from force use and depreciate the costs. Attitudes rigidify as fear anduncertainty preclude a return to the rules of normal behavior that prevailed in thelong prior interval of more muted structural change.

Power cycle theory divides history into two totally different decision environmentsdetermined by the nature of structural change. In “normal periods,” when structural change




is essentially linear, a sense of assuredness about the direction of power trends(future expectations) creates a sense of political predictability and calm, a rathercertain political environment in which firms can make investment and productiondecisions with comparative trust and confidence. In “critical periods” of abrupt non-linear change, when governments and firms are no longer able to project trendsreliably, they look inward, become wary and defensive about the externalenvironment and prone to risk-aversion. Amidst severe uncertainty and strain, acognitive concern with relative gains would affect strategic logic in much ofcommerce as well as politics (Aggarwal, 1985), possibly inducing protectionistactivism or even trade wars (Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Roy, 1998).

The “relative gains” at issue here are not only the market share gains of thestate (firm, industry) compared with its own absolute gains from the political orcommercial transaction. Here the full range and complexity of the absolute andrelative dynamics throughout the system of interaction must come into play—asindicated in Doran (1971: 47) and in the model encompassing the absolute andassociated relative levels, trends, and gaps for the set of units within a singlefunctional relationship (Doran, 1974). There are many types of “relative gains” aboutwhich justice must equilibrate. Here the “signed difference” definition of relativebecomes just as important as the “ratio” meaning of relative in systems share,especially when the absolute trajectories continue to diverge as in Figure 1B(b)(Doran, 1991: 54): Absolute differences do matter for the great concerns of welfarealso tied to differences in absolute levels and rates (Snidal, 1991; Landes, 1998).Thus, the rich–poor gap model, so subject to confusion regarding growth rates,gaps, and “gains,” can be clarified in the context of the single dynamic.Globalization highlights the conflicting messages of absolute and relative growthdynamics.

Additional Research QuestionsLateral Pressure. Choucri, North, and Yamahage (1992) theoretically andempirically show how lateral pressure extends influence outward beyond theterritory of the state. How is this “horizontal dimension” of state power and rolelinked to the power cycle dynamic across time and across countries? When is suchextension of influence legitimate (systemically accepted and non-coercive, guidedby reciprocally beneficial principles of complementarity and competitiveness)“foreign policy role” rather than “power expressed in control”?

Dynamic Equilibrium in the Latter 20th Century. To what extent does the struggle todefine new roles (Doran, 1991, 1996; Schmidt and Doran, 1996; Schmidt, thisissue) amidst structural change, via principles of complementarity and com-petitiveness, explain the successful maintenance of world order in the generationof a new system?

Deterrence. Perhaps allies (Huth, 1994) at critical points are most vulnerable toexternal challenge and least successful there in deterring aggression. Perhaps thelocation of aggressors on their power cycles may explain when they are more orless likely to yield in the face of a deterrence effort (Doran, 1991: 176).

Changing Industrial Structure, Trade and Corporate Alliances. Yoon (1990) examinesthe relative impact on industrial structure, late in the cycle, of home industry




investment migrating abroad to seek greater trade opportunities. Sands (2003)applies power cycle theory to assess the changing structure of the automobileindustry and its impact upon commercial and trade policy advocated by the NorthAmerican automobile companies. Kozintseva (2003) explores the implications ofthe principles of the power cycle (competition for share) for the alliance behaviorof high technology and information technology firms.

Alliance. Chiu (this issue) reinforces the findings of Siverson and Starr (1991) ondiffusion. But how does the power cycle help unravel the puzzle regarding whenalliances contribute to peace (Walt, 1987) and when they only contribute toterritorial security? Findings by Vasquez (1993) suggest that alliance behavior ishighly differential. Equilibrium strategy is likely to be central to this conundrum.

Replications and Other Extensions. Houweling and Siccama (1988, 1991) initiated avery important chain of research that confirmed the finding that transitionspredict to major war only in the presence of a critical point. Anderson andMcKeown (1987), Spiezio (1993), and Schampel (1993), examining militarizeddisputes, and James and Hebron (1997), using disputes and international crisisbehavior data, expand the application of the theory to a wider range ofinternational conflict. In this issue, power cycle theory is applied to regionalsystems by Parasiliti (Middle East), Kumar (Asia) and Geller (nuclearized Asia).Needed is an international regime based on moderate realism which allows forpeaceful change.

Structural Change and Dynamic Equilibrium in 21st-century AsiaPower cycle theory claims that the nature of dynamic equilibrium must change asthe contours and membership of the central system change. Asia is the regionwhere the greatest movement on the power cycles of leading states will take place,and where some of the greatest structural shocks will occur. It is thus in Asia, in the21st century, where power cycle analysis holds perhaps its greatest implications forfuture world order.

A dynamic equilibrium is necessary to ensure security amidst so much structuralchange, and such lethal weaponry. This dynamic equilibrium does not just rely onthe flat “balance of power” chessboard of alliance behavior, such as that in SouthAsia between Pakistan and China or between India and Russia. A dynamicequilibrium internal and external to South Asia must take into account themovement up and down the power cycles of each state and the impact suchmovement has on the foreign policy role each government is attempting to play.Just as India and China would like to play larger roles outside the region, Pakistanwould like to play a larger role within the region. While defending territorialsecurity, can order management internal and external to South Asia arrange forsuch adjustment and adaptation in terms of foreign policy role?

What happens to Russia’s and to Japan’s power and role (Inoguchi) mattersgreatly to dynamic equilibrium. Will Russia recover as spectacularly as did Japan inthe 1945–60 interval (Schmidt)? Long sensitive to concerns about too much or toolittle Japanese power, governments like Indonesia find that with an increase inChinese relative power and the possible peaking of Japanese relative power, thematter of a dynamic equilibrium of power and role within the region carries newand immediate policy implications. Issues such as the reunification of Korea, and




the peaceful coexistence of Taiwan and China, at present are not primarily thepreoccupation of the regional balance between China and Japan. US involvementis a kind of safety-valve for regional tensions. But were Chinese power to increaserapidly at the cost of that of Japan, or were China’s rise to be slowed by fastergrowth of India and Russia, both the regional and global equilibrium wouldsuddenly change.

According to power cycle theory, such a structural situation is not unlike that inEurope a century ago. So long as the US, Japan, the EU, and Russia are careful notto neglect their own security, the system can assimilate the rise of China by givingit a benign, constructive role in international organizations, allowing integrationand exposure to democratization to have its ameliorating internal effects, andyielding to China some of the status that it so relishes. On the other hand, as wastrue for Germany before 1914, a tight alliance around China would feed its senseof paranoia regarding “encirclement” and could not halt its incipient rise. Thebounds of the system will do that—and will make purposeful exclusion from aconstructive role a recipe for catastrophe.

Note1 In Kelman (1965) see, in particular, essays by Kelman (quoted), by Deutsch and Merritt,

and Scott.

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Biographical NoteCHARLES F. DORAN is the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations,Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS),Washington, DC, directing both the International Relations Program (GlobalTheory and History sub-field) and the Center of Canadian Studies. A SeniorAssociate at the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CISS), he is amember of the Council on Foreign Relations and the North AmericanCommittee. ADDRESS: SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts AvenueNW, Washington DC, 20036, USA [email: [email protected]].




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