iranian revolution and its nemesis

7/27/2019 Iranian Revolution and its Nemesis

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The Iranian Revolution and its Nemesis:

The Rise of Liberal Values among Iranians

Mansoor Moaddel

he rise o revolutionary Shiism that led to the overthrow o the monarchy in 1979,

the establishment o theocracy in December o the same year, and postrevolutionary

development display two contradictory acets about the process o historical develop-

ment in twentieth-century Iran. On the one hand, the revolution in no uncertain term posed

a serious anomaly or the notion o universal history that projected an evolutionary process o

secularization and individuation. The overthrow o the monarchy was no triumph or secular

politics and democratic individualism. The zenith o the revolution marked by the establish-

ment o clerical absolutism and reinorcement o patriarchy in the amily was a low point or

the proponents o secular order. On the other hand, thirty years ater the overthrow o the

monarchy, the ruling clerics, despite their extensive nancial and organizational resources

and consistent brutality in eliminating their secular opponents, have ailed to create a reli-

gious order in the country. Iranians today appear to be less religious than the publics rom

other Islamic countries, and the trend in their value orientations is toward individualism,

gender equality, democracy, and national identity.

These postrevolutionary developments, while consistent with a secular view o history,cannot be explained in terms o the secular theory o values change. This is true because the

new secularism is dierent rom the secular trend unleashed by the constitutional revolution

o 1905. Many reormist critics o the clerical absolutism arrived at the notion o secular gov-

ernment through religious reasoning a secular orientation that is at variance with the overly

antireligious orientation o prerevolutionary secular intellectuals and policy makers. In act,

the intellectual leaders o the reormist movement are deending their democratic position

in terms o their reading o Islam; traditional liberal democratic discourse plays only a minor

role in legitimizing the demands or personal reedom and the rule o law. These two acets

are contradictory; the ormation o a massive bureaucratic administrative and military organi-

zation o the modern state and the impressive rate o economic development in prerevolution-

ary Iran did not produce a secular order, but the ormation o the repressive and administra-tive apparatus o the religious state seems to have given impetus to secular movements.

In this article, I argue that the rise o secular values is ar rom being an inevitable prod-

uct o historical development o capitalism, the development o modern social classes, or the

ormation o the modern state. It is rather an outcome o a specic social arrangement and

1. For analyses of the Iranian revolution, see Mansoor Moaddel,

Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1993); and Misagh Parsa, Social Ori-

gins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Uni-

versity Press, 1989).

2. See, e.g., Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar, Monaziri

darbar-ye pluralism-i dini[A debate on religion pluralism] (Teh-

ran: Salam Newspaper, AH 1378/1999); and Mohsen Kadivar,

Nazariyyeh Doulat dar Fiqh-i Shieh (Theory of the State in Shii

Jurisprudence) (Tehran: Nay, AH 1376/1997).


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T h e R i s e o f L i b e r a l V a l u e s

historical conjuncture. At the same time, the in-

stitutionalization o secular values also depends

on the existence o social support as well as

the behavior o secular intellectuals and policy

makers that may strengthen or undermine such

values. To support these arguments, I rst pre-

sent a theory o cultural change. Then, I speciy

the parameters o the conditions that promoted

secular values in Islamic countries in the past.

Next, I argue that such conditions have emerged

in postrevolutionary Iran. Finally, I present nd-

ings rom two major values surveys, carried out

in Iran in 2000 and 2005, to demonstrate that

the trend in values change among Iranians is

toward social and political individualism and

national identity.

What Is Cultural Change?

Cultural change is a complex process, involv-

ing changes in (1) peoples values, rituals, bases

o identity, and liestyle; (2) principles o social

organization; (3) arts and literature; and (4)

religious belies, institutions, and movements.

One way to manage this complexity is to con-

sider cultural change as resolutions o signi-

cant issues, when the existing societal model

is abandoned in avor o another one. For ex-

ample, the Iranian constitutional revolution

(1905 11) intended to resolve the problem o

politics; constitutional law replaced monarchi-

cal absolutism. The Iranian revolution o 1979resolved the same problem. This time the ab-

solutist rule o the clerics was substituted or

monarchical power. The rst step in explaining

change is thus to speciy the issues that domi-

nate the public discourse. The next is to identiy

the actors that shape the probable direction o

resolutions toward a religious or secular gov-

ernment, religious supranationalism or territo-

rial nationalism, individualism or collectivism,

democracy or authoritarianism, gender equality

or gender hierarchization, and peaceul or vio-lent methods in politics.

Issues resolutions are important or un-

derstanding cultural change. While the pro-

cesses and outcomes o cultural change in the

Islamic world have been diverse, the issues that

were the concerns o both intellectual leaders

and the public at large have remained remark-

ably invariant in the modern period. A mong

them are (1) the status o rational reasoning in

Koranic exegesis, (2) the orm o government,

(3) the relationship between religion and poli-

tics, (4) the nature o the Western world, (5)

bases o identity, (6) the status o women, and

(7) the proper orm o political activity. Diverse

ideologies such as Islamic modernism, liberal

nationalism, anticlerical secular ism, Arabism

and Arab nationalism, economic nationalism,

and undamentalism are thus dierent resolu-

tions o the same set o issues. In Islamic un-

damentalism, or example, constitutionalism

is abandoned in avor o the unity o religion

and politics in Islamic government, Western cul-

ture is portrayed as decadent, the institution o

male domination is endorsed and rigorously de-

ended, and a revolutionary method o change

is oten prescribed. In Islamic modernism, by

contrast, Islamic political theory and the idea

o constitutionalism are reconciled, Western

culture is acknowledged avorably, the construc-

tion o the modern state is endorsed, a eminist

exegesis o the Koran is advanced in order to

deend womens rights, and a revolutionary

method o change is proscribed while a reorm-

ist approach is recommended.

When issues are resolved, they oten lead

to sociopolitical and cultural movements, a new

orm o organizational hierarchy, a dierentliestyle (including style o dress), a resh way to

rame and address societal problems, and the

rise o a new set o sociopolitical attitudes all

bringing into relie a new historical pattern.

Explaining the Process of Cultural Change

as Issues Resolutions

A clue to understanding how issues wil l be re-

solved is to consider the dynamic context within

which they are discussed and debated among

diverse intellectual leaders, activists, and policymakers. In resolving issues, these individuals in-

voke the norms available in their culture, bor-

row ideas rom other cultures, or produce new

ideas. This context is structured by the distribu-

tion o political power and economic resources

as well as past historical practices and memories.

3. Mansoor Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, National-

ism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse (Chi-

cago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 151.


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For example, a society that has a stronger tradi-

tion o patrimonialism may more readily accept

patrimonial ideas repackaged in a new political

arrangement than will a society with a weaker

experience in this tradition. Alternatively, peo-

ples orientations toward signiicant religious

events in their adult lives may be a unction o

whether they were socialized in a secular or reli-

gious environment during their impressionable

years. However, the pertinent characteristics o

this context being pluralistic or monolithic,

the nature o state ideology and the extent o

the states intervention in cultural aairs, and

whether the state is national or oreign consti-

tute the proximate conditions that shape how

these issues will be resolved. For example, under

an authoritarian state, cultural issues tend to-

ward religious or secular resolution, depending

on whether the state has primarily a secularist

or a religious orientation, respectively. In this ex-

ample, state ideology orms a target in relation

to which oppositional ideas are invoked or pro-

duced to resolve the problem o political order.

Generally, this model explains the rise

o diverse cultural movements in the contem-

porary Middle East. Liberal and secular ideas,

or example, have arisen within the context o

and in opposition to an alliance between the

absolutist monarch and the ulema. Thus the an-

ticlerical secularism and liberalism o the Ira-

nian constitutional revolution was in responseto monarchical absolutism (hence, liberalism)

and ulema obstructionism (hence, anticleri-

cal secularism). Economic nationalism among

Iranians in the 1940s and 1950s was shaped by

British control o the countrys oil industry.

Likewise, the rise o liberal Arabism among Syr-

ian intellectual leaders in the late nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries was a response to

the Islamic despotism o Sultan Abdlhamid II

(1876 1908) and the subsequent rise o Turkish

nationalism. Pan-Arab nationalism arose in re-

sponse to the perception that Arab people were

commonly mistreated by colonial powers, as evi-

denced by the colonial partitioning o the Arab

lands into arbitrary states. In this new national-

ist discourse, Syrian and Iraqi ideologues like

Sati al-Husri (1880 1968) departed rom the

liberal views o Arabists such as Abdul Rahman

al-Kawakibi (1849 1903) to support the glori-

cation o the Arab people and the subordina-

tion o the idea o individual reedom to the

idea o sel-sacrice or the cause o national

liberation. The British occupation o Egypt in

1882 contributed to the rise o territorial na-

tionalism among Egyptians in the rst quarter

o the twentieth century.

Likewise, Islamic undamentalism origi-

nated in response to the secularism o the state.

The Egyptian liberal nationalist state o the

1920s and 1930s, the Nasserite Arab national-

ism, the socialist states in Algeria and Syria, and

the pro-Western state o the Pahlavis in Iran

all commonly ollowed a secularist ideology

that considered religion inimical to progress.

In all these countries, nationalist ideologues

and policy makers did not conne their activi-

ties to the realm o politics. They narrowed the

cultural and social spheres o religious institu-

tions; they rewrote history to t their national-

ist conception o the past and to overlook the

Islamic period, gloriying pre-Islamic kingship

and ancient history; and they reormed the edu-cational institutions to undermine the infuence

o religion, imposed eminism rom above, and

attacked religion and religious rituals in terms

o Western standards.

Trends in Values Change among Iranians

As evidenced in the examples above, the diverse

resolutions o sociopolitical issues by the intellec-

tual leaders in the Middle Eastern countries are

related to the nature o the ideological targets

they encountered. The absolutist states, religious

4. Mansoor Moaddel, Conditions for Ideological Pro-

duction: The Origins of Islamic Modernism in India,

Egypt, and Iran, Theory and Society(October 2001):

669731; Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, 125, 32043.

5. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolu-

tions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1982); Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolu-

tion, 19061911 (New York: Columbia University Press,

1996); Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, chap. 8.

6. William L. Cleveland,The Making of an Arab Nation-

alist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought

of Sati al-Husri(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1971); Adeed Dawisha,Arab Nationalism in the

Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair(Prince-

ton, NJ: Princeton Universit y Press, 2003); Rashid Kha-

lidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S.

Simon, eds., The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Israel Gershoni

and James P. Jankowski, Redening the Egyptian Na-

tion, 19301945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1995); N. Z. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Na-

tionalism (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1973); C. Ernest

Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism (Urbana: Univer-

sity of Illinois Press, 1973); Dawn, The Formation of

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years, Interna-

tional Journal of Middle East Studies 20 (1988): 6791;

Moaddel, Islamic Modernism.

7. Gershoni and Jankowski, Redening the Egyptian

Nation; Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, part 3.


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obstructionism, oreign occupation, and secular-

ist ideology o the authoritarian state gave rise to

ideological resolutions in the orms o constitu-

tionalism, anticlerical secularism, nationalism,

and religious undamentalism, respectively.

A similar dynamic may also explain trends

in values change among the Iranian public at

large. Under state authoritarianism, trends in

values change are also related in an opposi -

tional manner to the ideology o the state and

its policies. I argue that the regimes claims to,

and the consequences o, Islamicity have shaped

the process o values change among Iranians.

These claims provided the justication or the

regime to impose a monolithic religious order

on society rom above, invent the institutional

structures to support this order, sanction a sys-

tem o gender inequality, and promote religious

identity.

The regimes authoritarian rule and its

inability to eectively provide or the socio-

economic and cultural needs o Iranians con-

tributed to the expansion o social discontent.

Social discontent, while undermining the legiti-

macy o regime, does not explain the rise o al-

ternative values among Iranians, however. The

ormation or invocation o alternative values is

related in oppositional manner to the values

promoted by the regime. This process explains

growing support or individualism, democracy,

gender equality, and national identity amongthe Iranian public and less support or women

to wear the veil. It also explains why Iranians

attend mosques less oten than does the public

rom other Islamic countries.

Data

The data are rom two comprehensive national

values surveys conducted by researchers rom

the University o Tehran. The rst used a na-

tionally representative sample o 2,532 adults

and was carried out in all 2000, and the second

used a nationally representative sample o 2,667

adults and was carried out in summer 2005.

Both surveys used multistaged random sam-

pling procedures in dierent provinces, broken

down into urban and rural areas o the country

in proportion to their size, with roughly equal

male and emale respondents. The response

rate in both surveys was around 10 percent.

The interviews, which required approxi-

mately one hour on average to complete, were

conducted ace-to-ace in respondents resi-

dences. Importantly, they were conducted by ex-

perienced Iranian personnel. The 2000 sample

includes all provinces in Iran except Sistan va

Baluchestan and Kurdistan; the 2005 sample

covers all the provinces o the country.

Trends in Changes between 2000 and 2005

To assess how the ideology o the Islamic re-

gime in Iran has shaped the religiosity and the

value orientations o the public, I rst compare

religiosity o the publics rom ten Islamic coun-

tries and then consider and measure attitudes

toward dierent types o individualism and na-

tional identity.

Religiosity

In assessing the religiosity o the Islamic pub-

lics, I ocus on two measures: (1) mosque atten-

dance and (2) the importance these publics at-

tached to religious aith as a avorable qualityor children.

Table 1 compares mosque attendance

among ten Islamic countries. As shown, Ira-

nians and Saudis, who live under religious re-

gimes, attended mosques less oten than the

citizens o other Islamic countries. The mean

mosque attendance or Iran (1.86) and Saudi

Arabia (1.85) is lower than it is or Iraq (1.87),

Pakistan (3.15), Turkey (1.87), Indonesia, (2.71),

Egypt (2.09), Morocco (2.24), Jordan (2.20), and

Algeria (2.23).

8. A systematic analysis of economic conditions and

distribution of resources in prerevolutionary and

postrevolutionary Iran showed that these conditions

deteriorated in the postrevolutionary period and

that, although they began to improve in the 1990s,

these conditions have not reached the prerevolution-

ary level. See Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad,

Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter?

(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006).


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In terms o placing high importance on

religious aith as a quality or children, again

Iranians and Saudis give this quality less em-

phasis (72 and 71 percent, respectively) than do

respondents rom Algeria (81 percent), Egypt

(87 percent), Indonesia (93 percent), Iraq (92

percent), Jordan (85 percent), and Pakistan

(86 percent). Only respondents in Morocco (65

percent) and Turkey (41 percent) rate religious

aith or children lower.

Individualism

The recognition o the autonomy o the indi-

vidual is a principle eature o modernity. This

recognition or John Stuart Mill is a refection

o the level o cultural development, where in-dividuality which is to say, that orm o lie in

which persons realize their peculiar natures in

autonomously chosen activ ities is the single

most important ingredient in human well-

being. Individualism is considered a major

trait in Western cultural tradition. Again and

again, says Samuel P. Huntington, both West-

erners and non-Westerners point to individual-

ism as the central distinguishing mark o the

West.

Individualism has political, economic, andsocial dimensions. In politics, it means equal-

ity o all political voices. This concept is mea-

sured in terms o attitudes toward democracy

and gender equality. Economic individualism

supports the value o hard work and belie in

the work-reward nexus. Measures o economic

individualism include attitudes toward private

ownership o businesses, preerence or indi-

vidual responsibility over governmental respon-

sibility in providing or personal well-being, and

attitudes toward merit pay. Social individualism

presumes the primacy o individual choice in

social matters such as the selection o a spouse

in marriage and child-rearing philosophy.

Here, I ocus on measures o social and

economic individualism and in the ollowing

section discuss political individualism by ocus-

ing on democracy and gender equality.

An import ant mani estat ion o va lue

change toward individualism would be a change

in attitudes toward avorable qualities or chil-dren and the basis or marriage. To measure

these changes, the respondents were asked the

ollowing:

Here is a list o qualities that children can be encour-

aged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider

to be especially important?

1. Independence

2. Religious faith

3. Obedience

In your view, what is the basis for marriage: parental

approval or love?

Figure 1 shows the change in Iranian at-

titudes toward avorable qualities or children

between the 2000 and 2005 surveys. The per-

Table 1. Mosque attendance in a selected number of Islamic countries (%)

Pakistan TurkeySaudi

Arabia Indonesia Egy pt Morocco Iran Jordan Algeria Iraq

Once a year or less or

on special holy days

Once a month

Once a week

More than once a week Total , , , , , , , , ,

Mean . . . . . . . . . .

Standard deviation . . . . . . . . . .

Source: World Values Survey

9. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (1869;

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), xv.

10. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations

and the Remaking of World Order(New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1996), 72.


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centage o respondents who considered inde-

pendence a avorable quality increased rom 53

to 64 percent, while those who mentioned obe-

dience decreased rom 41 to 32 percent between

the two surveys. These changes are statistically

signicant, indicating a trend toward individual

autonomy. Iranian att itudes toward relig ious

aith as a avorable quality or children, however,

did not change between 2000 and 2005.

Att itudes toward the basis or marriage

may constitute an even stronger indication

o the extent o public support or individual-

ism. As shown in igure 2, 41 percent o the

respondents in the 2000 survey believed that

parental approval was the basis or marriage,while this value dropped to 24 percent in 2005.

The percentage o the respondents who men-

tioned love as the basis or marriage, however,

increased rom 49 to 54 percent between the

two surveys. In the 2005 survey, some respon-

dents volunteered their own views on marriage

instead o choosing between love and parental

approval. These included both love and paren-

tal approval (4 percent), having similar ideas/

goals/aith (15 percent), and having similar

social backgrounds (3 percent). Again, amongthese responses, the largest group (15 percent)

reerred to actors that are related to individu-

ality having similar ideas/goals/aith and

to personal choice in the selection o a spouse.

I this group is added to those who considered

love as the basis or marriage, one may conclude

that 69 percent o the respondents considered

individual attributes love or having similar

ideas/goals/aith as the most important cri-

teria in selecting a spouse. The steep drop in

support or parental approval over the survey

period, coupled with the sharp rise in support

or individual choice, suggest that Iranians may

be approaching their own Romeo and Juliet

revolution.

Economic individualism is measured by

three indicator variables as outlined below: atti-

tudes toward private versus government owner-ship o businesses and industry, attitudes toward

individual versus governmental responsibility,

and attitudes toward merit pay.

How would you place your views on this scale? 1

means you agree completely with the statement on the

let; 10 means you agree completely with the state-

ment on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in

between, you can choose any number in between.

1. Government ownership of business

and industry should be increased (1)versus private ownership of business

and industry should be increased (10).

(Privatization)

Figure 1. Percentage

of Iranians in

2000 and 2005

mentioning

favorable qualities

for children

11. The expression Romeo and Juliet revolution is

used in recognition of the freedom of the individual

to choose a spouse, which has as it s basis the human-

ism movement in Europe during the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries that gave priority to individual

choice over religious dogma and tradition. S ee W. Karl

Deutsch, On Nationalism, World Regions and the Na-

ture of the West, in Mobilization, Center-Periphery

Structures and Nation Building, ed. Per Torsvik (Ber-

gen, Norway: Universitetsvorlaget, 1981), 5193.


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2. The government should take more

responsibility to ensure that everyone is

provided for (1) versus people should take

the responsibility to provide for themselves

(10). (Individual responsibility)

Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practi-

cally the same job. One fnds out that the other earns

considerably more than she does. The better-paid sec-

retary, however, is quicker, more efcient, and more

reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it air or not

air that one secre tar y is paid more than the other?

(Merit pay)

1. Fair2. Not fair

Figure 3 summarizes the changes in at-

titudes toward privatization and individual re-

sponsibility between the 2000 and 2005 surveys.

On average, Iranian attitudes toward privatiza-

tion increased negligibly in this period (rom

5.34 to 5.42), while their attitudes toward indi-

vidual versus governmental responsibi lity de -

clined signicantly (rom 5.24 to 3.92). The lat-

ter change in particular may indicate a decline

in support or economic individualism among

Iranians.

The correlation coecient between privat-

ization and individual responsibility is signi-

cant and positive: r= .274 or the 2000 survey

and r= .091 or the 2005. That is, the more a-

vorable attitudes the respondents have toward

privatization, the stronger their support is or

the view that people should take responsibility

to provide or themselves. Because these two ac-

tors are positively correlated, although the cor-

relation coecients are relatively weak (particu-

larly in the 2005 data), one may argue that they

have a degree o validity in measuring economic

individualism. Nonetheless, one may argue that

given the countrys speciic conditions, the

stress on government responsibility may in act

be associated with avorable attitudes toward in-

dividualism. That is, given the situation that theIslamic government has extensive ownership o

businesses and industry, a rise in the expecta-

tion that the government should do more or

its people may refect a growing sense o indi-

vidual rights to the ruits o these enterprises.

This contrasts to Western countries, where an

expansion in government-sponsored social wel-

are would mean higher taxation. Thus people

may support economic individualism, at least in

part, to avoid higher taxes.

A better measure o economic individual-ism would be the commitment to merit as the

basis or the distribution o reward in society

and the belie that people ought to work hard to

provide or themselves. Figure 4 summarizes

attitudes toward merit pay. The percentage o

Figure 2. Attitudes

among Iranians

in 2000 and 2005

toward parental

approval versus

love as the basis

for marriage

(percentage)

12. Stanley Feldman and John Zaller, The Political

Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the

Welfare State,American Jo urnal of Po litical Sci ence

36 (1992): 268307; Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril,

The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public

Opinion (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1968).


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respondents who indicated that it is air or the

more ecient secretary to receive a higher wage

declined rom 73 to 71 percent and the percent-

age o those who said that it is unair went up

rom 19 to 23 percent. Although small, these

changes are statistically signicant.

On the whole, one may thus conclude that

while Iranians have displayed a sizable shit to-

ward socia l indiv idualism, economically, they

have become less individualistic.

Gender Relations and Democracy

The change in attitudes toward political indi-

vidualism and liberal politics may be measured

in terms o attitudes toward democracy and gen-

der equality. Iranians were asked the ollowing:

For the ollowing statements, can you tel l me how

strongly you agree or disagree with each. Do you

strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?

1. On the whole, men make better political

leaders than women do

2. A university education is more important

for boys than for girls

3. A wife must always obey her husband

4. Democracy may have problems, but it is

better than any other form of government

Attitudes toward the veil as a measure o

political individualism have also been included.

To be sure, wearing the veil may be an indi-vidual preerence or refection o social mores

among the Islamic publics in general and may

not be connected to social or political individu-

alism. Nonetheless, within the context o the

cultural policies o the Islamic Republic in Iran,

the veil is elevated to a major political and cul-

tural issue, and attitudes avorable toward the

veil have become a signier o support or the

regime and attitudes against it an indication o

Figure 3. Attitudes

among Iranians

in 2000 and

2005 toward

privatization

and individual

responsibility

Figure 4. Attitudes

among Iranians

in 2000 and 2005

toward merit pay

(percentage)


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support or personal choice and political ree-

dom. Respondents were asked:

In your opinion, how important is it as a trait or a

woman to wear a veil in public places?

1. Very important

2. Important

3. Somewhat important

4. Not very important

5. Not important at all

Figures 5 and 6 show the change in the

respondents attitudes toward these issues be-

tween 2000 and 2005. According to gure 5,

signicant declines occurred in the proportion

o Iranians who strongly agreed with the ol-

lowing statements: men make better political

leaders (rom 28 percent in 2000 to 22 percent

in 2005); university education is more impor-

tant or boys than or girls (rom 19 percent to

13 percent); and a wie must always obey her

husband (rom 24 percent to 17 percent). In

addition, the percentage o the respondentswho strongly agreed that democracy may have

problems, but it is better than any other orm o

government increased rom 20 percent in 2000

to 31 percent in 2005. These changes evidence

remarkable shits in attitudes toward liberal de-

mocracy and gender equality between the two

surveys.

Corresponding to these changes are

changes in attitudes toward the veil between

the two surveys, as shown in gure 6. Accord-

ing to this igure, in 2000, 70 percent o therespondents indicated that it is very important

or a woman to wear the veil in public places. In

2005, this value dropped to 34 percent. Within

the context o the Islamic regime in Tehran,

this dramatic decline is interpreted as indicative

o the shit in peoples attitudes away rom the

values o the regime and toward disregarding

veil wearing as a avorable trait in women.

Figure 6. Percentage of Iranians

in 2000 and 2005 expressing

that it is very important for

a woman to wear the veil in

public places

Figure 5. Attitudes

among Iranians

in 2000 and 2005

toward women

and democracy

(percentage who

strongly agree)


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1 3 5

MansoorMoaddel


National Identity

Another key component o political values is

how people identiy themselves. More speci-

cally, whether they base their identity on reli-

gion, ethnicity, or nationality. The change in

the basis o identity may imply a shit in peoples

political attitudes toward the government and

their perception o international and regional

politics. To measure this change, Iranians were

asked:

Which of the following best describes you?

1. I am a Muslim, above all

2. I am an Iranian, above all

3. Other (I am an Arab, Kurd, Turk, etc.,

above all)

Figure 7 shows the change in the respon-

dents conception o identity between 2000

and 2005. The percentage o respondents who

identied themselves as Iranian, above all in-

creased rom 34 to 42 percent, and the percent-

age who selected Muslim, above all declined

rom 61 to 50 percent. These changes may

imply that religion plays a less important role in

shaping Iranian political attitudes, while secular

actors related to Iran as a nation are gaining

signicance in shaping their orientation toward

outsiders.

Despite Iran having a religious regime,

these data indicate that Iranians appear to be

less religious than are the publics rom other

Islamic countries and that, in the time between

the two surveys, their political values have

changed in avor o social individualism, de-

mocracy, gender equality, and national identity.

They also expressed less support or the veil in

2005 than they did in 2000. This trend was not

refected, however, in economic terms, as Irani-

ans placed greater emphasis on the government

to provide or them and were less supportive o

merit pay in 2005 than in 2000.

Conclusion:

Religious Regimes and Liberal Politics

Findings rom the values surveys in Iran have

provided evidence indicating a shit in the pub-

lics value orientations toward liberal democracy

and secularism. More specically, this shit was

toward social individualism, liberal democracy,

gender equality, and nationalism. A trend away

rom economic individualism was also notedamong Iranians between 2000 and 2005, with

an increasing raction agreeing that the state

should take more responsibility or meeting citi-

zens needs. This latter shit may also be related

to the act that the Islamic Republic has exten-

sive ownership and control over the national

economy. As a result, Iranians are demanding

more that the regime provide or them.

I argue that this trend has been shaped

in reaction to the ideology and policies o an

increasingly illegitimate state. Because o theauthoritarian nature o the Iranian regime,

trends in peoples religious and political values

are shaped in oppositional relation to its ideol-

ogy and the values it has attempted to promote

in the postrevolutionary period. The ndings

provided evidence o this process: a low level

o mosque attendance in Iran as compared to

other Islamic countries and an increasing sup-

port or individual choice in marriage, gender

Figure 7. Percentage

of Iranians in 2000

and 2005 describing

themselves as

Iranian, Muslim, or

other (Arab, Kurd,

Turk, etc.), above all


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Comp

arative

Studie

sof

South

Asia,

Africa

andthe

MiddleE

ast

equality, democracy, and national identity.

There was also a decline in the importance Ira-

nians attached to the veil.

These ndings have implications or un-

derstanding not only the impact o the revolu-

tion on Iranian attitudes toward liberal values

and the uture o culture under the Islamic

regime but also the conditions or secularism.

Considering the relatively lower mosque atten-

dance among Iranians than among the publics

in other Islamic countries and the change in

Iranian attitudes toward liberal and secular val-

ues, one may reasonably conclude that the revo-

lution has ailed to engineer an Islamic order

based on the values and political attitudes pro-

jected by the ruling cler ics. To be sure, Irani-

ans have maintained a strong commitment to

undamental religious values such as a belie in

God and the existence o the soul, heaven, and

hell. Nonetheless, they increasingly have shown

little interest in the type o religious and cul-

tural values promoted by the regime. It may not

be too ar-etched to claim that the current and

uture sociopolitical and cultural movements in

Iran will be shaped largely by modern values.

The ndings also support the view that the

rise o secularism and liberal values is not auto-

matically connected to the process o economic

development and other objective changes such

as the development o new social classes and

the ormation o the modern state. Rather, theypoint to the signicance o social processes in

promoting such values and the role o histori-

cally specic conditions in shaping those social

processes. In act, historical conjunctures may

unction as countercultural liberators, tran-

scending cultural constraints on the rise o sec-

ular discourse/values and bringing into relie a

new historical pattern.

The connection between social processes

and values change is established, I believe,

through the resolution o sociopolitical issuesin response to immediate ideological targets.

In Iran, this target is an authoritarian religious

regime that has been promoting the values o

clerical absolutism, Islamic identity, and patri-

monial domination. In oppositional response to

this target, Iranians have arrived at modernity;

absolutism popularizes the values o democracy,

stresses on the Islamic identity o the public have

triggered nationalist awareness, and the promo-

tion o the institution o male domination has

encouraged the values and desirability o gen-

der equality, particularly among women.

In general, I argue that ideological tar-

gets orm the proximate conditions or the rise

o di erent sociopolitical discourses. These

targets may take the orms o governmental

regimes, religious institutions, social policies,

oreign occupation, or other monolithic social

orces. And resolutions may shit values along a

number o scales toward religious or secular

government, Islamic universalism/undamen-

talism or territorial nationalism, individual-

ism or collectivism, democracy or patrimonial

domination, and gender equality or a gendered

social hierarchy. Iranian intellectual leaders in

the early twentieth century, despite their coun-

trys much lower level o industrial and commer-

cial development as compared to that o Egypt

and Turkey in the same period, managed to

launch a successul constitutional revolution.

In this eort, the nature o their ideological

target ulema obstructionism and monarchi-

cal absolutism prompted them to resolve the

countrys political problem in an oppositional

(constitutional) direction. Today, Iranians are

acing a similar target the obstructionism o

clerical absolutism brought about by the revolu-

tion o 1979, and the data suggest they are mov-

ing in a similar oppositional direction, in this

case toward liberal democracy.

iranian revolution and its nemesis

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