is political sociology informed by political science (1)

Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press

Is Political Sociology Informed by Political Science?Author(s): Alexander HicksSource: Social Forces, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Jun., 1995), pp. 1219-1229Published by: University of North Carolina PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2580443 .Accessed: 22/02/2011 17:04

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Is Political Sociology Informed by Political Science?*

ALEXANDER HICKS, Emory University

Abstract

T7his article maps out some interdependencies between political science and political sociology. It then details some lessons that political sociologists might take from four contemporary literatures in political science: (1) rational choice work on rational individual action in institutional context; (2) the "nonlinear social systems" literature on the contextual determination of intensely embedded social actions; (3) the game- theoretic literature on strategic interactions among large emergent class and state actors; and (4) a more qualitative, inductive, and contextualized approach to the analysis of class and state action extending the tradition of Barrington Moore. The four literatures share a commitment to social action that is decreasingly common among sociologists. Yet they address questions of institutional constraint, contextual dynamics, and macrosocial history akin to those that are engaging their sociological contemporaries. T7his balance of attention between action and its constraints is the common element drawn from the several instructive political science literatures.

Political sociology and political science are deeply interdependent. Thus, there is much relevant work in political science that should and does inform political sociology. I will start out by mapping the interdependence between these two disciplines. Then, I will detail some particular lessons that political sociologists would be wise to take from political science.

Few differences in metatheory and method separate political sociology and political science. A decade ago, the influence of rational choice theory appeared so much greater within political science than within political sociology that this influence alone might have served to sharply distinguish the two. However, with the sociological assimilation of the rational choice perspective, this is no longer the case. Indeed, the metatheories and methods of the two are almost precisely the same: institutional and neoinstitutional; behaviorist and behavioral- ist; neofunctionalist and neo-Marxist; elite/managerial and pluralist and neo- pluralist; hermeneutic and postmodern; and multivariate, historicist and comparative historical.

* I would like to thank Courtney Brown, Timothy Dowd, Walter Gove, Thomas Lancaster, and Darren Sherkatfor their suggestions. Direct correspondence to reprints to Alexander Hicks, Department of Sociology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322.

? The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, June 1995, 73(4):1219-1229

1220 / Social Forces 73:4, June 1995

One of the principal reasons for such great similarities should already be apparent: political science relies heavily upon sociology for much basic theory and method. For example, during the 1960s, Michigan social psychologists and Harvard Parsonsians fundamentally shaped political science agendas in political behavior and political development, respectively. More recently Theda Skocpol (1992) has crucially impacted upon the ongoing historicist turn in political science. A second reason is that our two focal specialties draw upon similar third parties: economics and history, biometrics and econometrics, psychology and anthropology. Indeed, many importations from third parties into political science - path analysis, "thick description" and the like - flow through sociological intermediaries before entering the political science market.

So far my model of the interdependencies of the two disciplines is too heavily tilted toward a sociological subordination of political science, but political sociology also depends on political science. First, despite a paucity of basic theoretical contributions from political science to political sociology, it may be claimed that political sociologists live off political scientists' reprocessings of politically raw sociological materials. For example, years ago Michigan attitude- behavior theory came back to us as The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) while today, as we shall see, the Columbia School voting model of Berelson, Lazersfeld, and McPhee (1954) retums to us as Brown's (1991) Ballots of Tumult. Secondly, many influences from such disciplinary third parties as history and economics come to us reprocessed by political science as well. For example, political scientist Stephen Skowronek's (1982) history of American public administration appears to have been an important conduit for the flow of historiographic information on the American state to Skocpol. To give a second example, Douglas A. Hibbs's (1977) popularization of ARIMA was to sociologists what Otis Dudley Duncan's (1966) introduction to path analysis was to political scientists. Finally, political scientists do regularly produce contributions to the study of politics that must, from the perspective of political sociology as a subfield, if not sociology as a field and metatheory, be considered basic. These contributions range from Truman (1951) and Dahl (1961) on pluralism to Przeworski (1985) on class compromise. If political science is disproportionately dependent upon sociology for basic theory, it is also true that the 500 members of the Political Sociology section of the American Sociological Association (ASA) are heavily dependent upon the 16,000 members of the American Political Science Association (APSA) for much of their scholarly knowledge of politics.

But is political sociology informed by the relevant work in political science? More specifically, are we abreast of what political science has to offer us today? Without trying to sample our two specializations extensively and systematically enough to answer this question definitively, I shall examine four domains of political investigation chosen for their relevance to sociology across a range of specific subject matters and general theoretical approaches.

Lesson from a Sibling Discipline Specifically, I address four types of inquiry displayed in Table 1. These types are defined by the cross-classification of two simple distinctions. One is the distinction between relatively individual and relatively emergent levels of

Political Sociology and Political Science / 1221

analysis. The other is the distinction between economistically oriented - or rational choice - approaches on the one hand and more thoroughly sociologi- cally orie4xted theoretical approaches on the other hand. In using the individual/emergent (or micro/macro) distinction, I arbitrarily allocate concerns with micro-macro linkages and meso levels to the micro side of the divide. In distinguishing between rational choice and more distinctively sociological modes of theorizing, I recognize the great prominence of rational choice within political science. By cross-tabulating these distinctions, I arrive at the political science literatures in the four cells of Table 1.

The four literatures are these. In cell A of the Table I have placed rational choice work on individual action in institutional context - principally the work of Kenneth Shepsle (1979) and collaborators on legislative institutions. In cell B is the so-called nonlinear social systems literature associated with John Sprague and his students (Huckefeld, Brown, and others). In cell C is macrorational class analysis - principally the mathematical models of Przeworski, Wallerstein, and collaborators (1988) on strategic interactions among large emergent class and state actors. In cell D is work stressing more qualitative, inductive, and contextualized conceptions of class and state action - conceptions curiously now more alive in political science than in sociology.

The New (Rational Choice) Institutionalism A "new institutionalism' now thrives in political science that is curiously opposite in key regards to the new institutionalism in sociology. EI sociology, the new institutionalism typically has tended to eschew social actors, individuals above all, by subtending them to "institutional rules" and "scripts" that, by shaping ritual and routine forms of behavior, determine all action (see Meyer, Boll & Thomas 1987). Less often, if more recently, it has tended to emphatically stake out a place for the actor, only to leave this place, in most instances, a thinly articulated and marginal locale (see DiMaggio & Powell 1991; but also see Dobbin 1994). In political science, the new institutionalism has sustained a place for the individual actor that resembles the central one allotted this actor in orthodox microeconomics, but it has done so while systematically embedding individual action in institutional context. In particular, it has stressed the instrumental behavior - perceived as semiautonomous - of rational individuals under institutional constraint.

The key literature is the literature on how legislators provide benefits for the constituencies back in their home districts. This problem is central to legislative systems for reasons well attuned to a rational choice solution. All legislators are under pressure to provide benefits to those who elect them. This is especially true of legislators, like U.S. legislators, who represent winner-takes- all electoral districts and who also belong to relatively undisciplined political parties. Despite the pressure for "constituency service," as it is called, many governmental goods wanted by local constituents are so specific to and heterogeneous across electoral district that they have no "natural electoral majorities" that favor them. Of course, elaborate "logrolling" exercises provide a possible solution to the problem of attending to specialized local interests.


TABLE 1: Some Innovative Areas in Contemporary Political Science

Metatheoretical Perspective

Economic Sociological

A B Micro (and New Nonlinear

Micro/Macro) (Rational choice) Contextual Institutionalism Modeling

Level of Analysis C D

Macro Macro-Rational Macro Historical Class Analysis Comparative

Social Action

However, logrolling arrangements - often dauntingly complex for even small numbers of actors - are far easier to propose than to enforce. Bills for which support is exchanged in the process of logrolling must be voted upon in some sequence, so beneficiaries of early votes may be inclined to defect from those who hope to benefit from votes coming later in the sequence. Moreover, for any group of legislators with interests in a set of bills planned for passage via logrolling, there may be a larger group of other legislators who not only are indifferent to logrolling because it offers them no benefits but who are actually opposed to logrolling because it imposes tax burdens on them.

One solution to the dilemma of logrolling has been proposed and, to a considerable extent, found to hold. This resides in the constraints and incentives facing legislators in the form of the rules of the committee organization of the legislature. For example, for the case of the U.S. House of Representatives, the rules for self-selection to committee type and the rules for seniority assignment to committee rank assure that some institutionalized reputations, resources, sanctioning power, and expertise will be mobilized for at least as many issues as there are committees, indeed as there are subcommittees. Under the brilliant theorizing of Kenneth Shepsle (1979,1989), Barry Weingast (1979), John Ferejohn (1974) and others, mathematical models of the policy making actions of individual legislators have been developed in the rather general terms of the so- called "theory of structurally induced equilibria" (also see Krehbiel 1991; Shepsle & Weingast 1981,1987; Weingast & Marshall 1988). Pursuing this theory and a kindred one that George Tsebelis (1990) has called the theory of "institutionally embedded games," political scientists have devised explanations of questions of political actions in a wide range of institutionally embedded game- like situations. Indeed, from the perspective of rational choice theory, which claims prescriptive as well as descriptive value for its formulation, these theories have allowed political scientists to tackle the riddle of individually motivated effective collective action in a potentially extensive range of situations. The literature in question offers political sociologists formal models of behavior in


social context, of micro-macro linkages, and of actors effective enough to devise and create routines and rituals as well as reenact them. Indeed, in its latest incarnation, it offers theorizing on the origins, and not just the consequences, of institutions (Shepsle 1989). In short, it offers us instructive models for the study of individual action in social context, as well as for the study of institutional structure as the outcome of collective behavior.2

Nonlinear Social Systems

The literature on nonlinear social systems provides a second contrast from political science to the sociology's virtually actorless 'new institutionalism." Like "rational institutionalism," this approach addresses social institutions with one foot at the individual level of analysis. Unlike it, this theory tends toward a stress on the orienting or energizing role of the social - or, at least, of other individuals - rather than stressing the causal exogeneity of ego. With its center of gravity shifted outward into the social context, rationality becomes difficult to incorporate and is marginalized when it is not eschewed. The focus here is on each individual acting in the context of a field of social forces that impinges on his or her action. Indeed, the focus is on each individual also acting back on the impinging social field in ways that impact on the constitution of the field. The lens is a compound of two varieties of raw material, one sociological, the second biological - both notably mathematical. Among the theory's sociological elements, we have the work of Bill McPhee entitled Formal Theories of Mass Behavior (1963) and of James Coleman entitled Introduction to Mathematical Sociology (1964). Among the biological elements, we have, foremost, the recent nonlinear modelling frameworks and estimation techniques of biologist Robert May's Stability and Complexity in Model Ecosystems (1973). The keywords of the approach, viewed substantively, are actor, higher-level organization, and embedded- ness, while, viewed more formally, they are interdependence, complexity, and nonlinearity.3

To radically condense matters, the approach frames the specification and estimation of nonlinear (and multiplicative) models that can represent some of the complexity of interdependencies between actors and higher level systems. It is able to do so thanks, in good part, to recent developments in high-speed computing, as well as May's modelling innovations. The approach yields both down-to-earth solutions to longstanding problems and novel conceptualizations of social reality. Courtney Brown's (1987) article on the perennial question, Who voted for the Nazis in 1930 and 1932? provides a fine example of the approach cracking an old nut. It indicates that Nazi voters come principally from former partisans of Germany's non-Catholic centrist parties - but contingently. Nazi voters come from rural Protestant contexts in 1930 and urban Protestant ones in 1932. Brown's (1993) recent "Nonlinear Catastrophe Theory in the Fall of the Weimar Republic" provides a memorable example of a novel conceptualization. Specifically, it constructs a new puzzle for historical investigation: what confluence of forces describes the highly complex, nonlinear surfaces across which (Brown shows) Weimar voter zoomed and plummeted during the period from 1928 to 1932?


This new literature on nonlinear social systems offers political sociologists an operationally viable return to the social systemics of such classic works as McPhee's Formal Theories of Mass Behavior (1963) and Coleman's Introduction to Mathematical Sociology (1964). Moreover, the offer comes in such engaging contemporary packages as Przeworski and Sprague's (1986) magnificent reconstruction of the dynamics of a half century of Social Democratic voting in Paper Stones and Courtney Brown's (1991) enthralling summary of U.S. electoral history in Ballots of Tumult. Indeed, it offers a general framework for modeling behavioral change in social context when theory stresses the causal force of context over agent.

Macrorational Class Analysis

This specialization builds on a dual foundation. One part of this consists of substantive insights for the neo-Marxist literature on the state. The second half consists of formal analytical methods from orthodox economics, game theory in particular. At its core, the approach involves game theory about strategic interactions among capital, labor, state and mass electorates under constraints imposed by their encompassing political-economic systems. Neo-Marxist insights are wedded to rational choice modes of formal theorizing by means of simplifications of key actors into manageable number of game-theoretic players and the nesting of action within macroeconomic models. In particular, capitalists and workers (typically in the form of unified employer or union confederations) are viewed as unitary actors, while unitary state action is attributed to unified governments. Rational choice analysis is accommodated to neo-Marxist and neoclassical economic insights by means of an analytical shift. This switches attention from models of N-person cognitive markets in which individual actors react to seemingly impersonal market mechanisms - the situation most commonly studied by economists - to models of two-to-four person games in which the strategies of collective actors prevail.

Key works are Przeworski and Wallerstein's (1982) "The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist-Societies" and their "Structural Dependence of the State on Capital" (1988). The former presents a model in which unitary and encompassing organization of capital and labor seek to maximize their temporally discounted long-term income flows; and it identifies conditions for positive-sum, as well as of zero-sum, relations between capital and labor. For example, pitched battles over income shares occur in societies where capitalists consume profits, but a growth-oriented equilibrium results from worker wage restraint and capitalist investment of profits, reinforced by governments disposed to enforce equitable redistribution of any aggregate gains from investment out of forgone wages. The "Structural Dependence" article examines the argument that the state is structurally dependent on capital to avoid redistribution from capitalists to workers. 'This argument assumes - or hypothesizes - that such dependence obtains in the sense that no government can simultaneously redistribute income from capital and contain prices, sustain profits and buoy investment. This article finds that such strictly structural dependence does not hold when a government redistributes only money raised


through taxes on uninvested profits.4 Elaborations of such modelling exercises in open economies are the latest developments in this literature, which weds many of the problems and conceptualizations of the Marxist theory of the state to methods (e.g., game theory) and theoretical formulations (e.g., open-economy macroeconomics) from orthodox economics.5

Historical Comparative Social Action

Finally, I turn to a fourth literature, and a second macromodel, of actors in context, to macro historical-comparative social action. This literature is one that substantially bridges the political science/political sociology divide, but that may be slipping off the sociological map at just the time that it is coming to fruition in political science. Here, I refer to works in the tradition of Barrington Moore's The Social origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966). Like macrorational class analysis, this approach focuses on the strategic pursuit of interests by class actors in institutional context. However, its methods are not formal modeling but comparative and historical induction. These methods permit consideration of endogenous, temporally evolving actor identities and interests, rather that positing exogenous ones. They are open to the contingencies of history and to the revelations of the historical record.

Perhaps the most distinguished recent work in this tradition is Ruesche- meyer, Stephens, and Stephens's (1992) Capitalist Development and Democracy. This work transcends Moore's seminal effort along these lines by means of its scope and thoroughness. In particular, it expands Moore's trio of peasant, high bourgeois and landed-aristocratic actors into a sextet of determinants by adding three new social forces: the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, and the state. This approach, furthermore, expands Moore's cases from the large Western European states, the U.S., Russia and China by dropping the last two but adding all the small nations of Western Europe and the bulk of the British and Iberian settler colonies. Then, by means of literally dozens of meticulous case studies and an unprecedented number by systematic comparison, it clarifies such matters as the origins of full-male-franchise democracies throughout the Western European and Anglo-Iberic world, the fates of the European democracies between the World Wars, and the century's cycles of democratization, de- democratization and re-democratization in Latin America and the Caribbean.

True, the three authors of Capitalist Development and Democracy have spent about half of their professional lives within departments of sociology. However, the other contemporary works that are closest to theirs in approach - Lange, Ross and Vanicelli's (1982) Union, Change, and Crisis, Alexis Peter Gourevitch's (1986) Politics in Hard Times, John R. Freeman's (1989) Democracy and Markets, Fritz Scharpf's (1991) Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy and Geoffrey Garrett's forthcoming Partisan Politics in the Global Economy - are the products of clear-cut political scientists. They signal a migration of ambitious cross- national historical comparative class analysis to political science. Perhaps this migration is due to the push of sociology's recent turns in institutionalist, historicist, and cultural directions which increasingly point to nonclass foundations for social action when they do not, indeed, ignore the actor entirely.


Perhaps it is also due to the pull of the recent class analytical turn and the recent comparative-historical resurgence in political science. Whatever, the case, although the changes flatter sociology as the more au courant discipline, they transfer the maturation of a valuable tradition away from sociology, unless we begin to claim a larger share of the tradition of Barrington Moore.'

The broad outlines of an explanation for this shift or transfer are suggested by my overall sketch of four political science literatures relevant to political sociology. Indeed, explanation of the class-analytical shift to political science and the sociological neglect of the four literatures that I have reviewed strike me as interlinked. Above all, as political scientists have assimilated the latest emphasis on institutions, culture and historicity, they have done so without throwing out the actor. Perhaps because of their substantively defined mission, their stress on a particular political domain of inquiry rather than a particular mode of theorizing - sociological, economic, psychological, or whatever - political scientists have tended to gain rather than lose balance as they have come under the influence of the new supraindividual approaches to social science. Perhaps because of the focus of their large numbers on a specific political area of inquiry, their traditional susceptibility to theoretical influences from all the social sciences and their very extensive applied pressures and responsibilities, political scientists have tended to respond temperately to such theoretical vogues as the structuralist and poststructuralist rejection of the actor.7 I think that the literatures highlighted here make exemplary progress on two fronts: one balancing the general and the concrete and the second balancing social structure and social action. For these reasons - not to speak of their deep immersion in their subject matter - I recommend these literatures not only to political sociologists but to all sociologists.

Notes

1. Within the discipline of political science, only the large and influential political science subfield of international relations with its origins in the political realist tradition of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz, Morgenthau, and Kissinger may be unique to the political science discipline - despite realist interpretations by such sociological forebears as Pareto and Mosca. True, political science differs dramatically from sociology in the prominence of its explicitly normative strand - devoted to theorizing about what ought to be rather than what is. However, this difference recedes from view if we focus attention on the scienti.pc cores of our two contrasted groups of scholars.

2. Sociological work that attempts to treat rational action in social context is increasingly common, but seldom theorizes rigorously, much less formally, about the actual rational calculations that tie context to choice and choice to action. However, some work of clear formal rigor with regard to actors' calculations is being done (e.g., Coleman 1990; Heckathorn 1990), as well as work of rigor and inventiveness in its consideration of context (Hechter 1987,1992; Oliver & Marwell 1988). 3. Note that I am referring to the Coleman of Introduction to Maathematical Sociology (1964), who is not the rational choice advocate and revisionist of Foundations of Sociological Theory (1990) but who is, instead, a Columbia school formalizer and innovator of an earlier era (see' Berelson, Lazersfeld & McPhee 1954; McPhee 1963). Contemporary sociological work with close theoretical affinities to the nonlinear social systems literature can be found in ecological


demography (e.g., Namboodiri 1988). In addition, some action-oriented works that use network theories stressing nodes and actors over relations, and that also have clear substantive relevance to the nonlinear social systems literature can be found (e.g., Mizruchi 1992; Oliver & Marwell 1988). 4. This seemingly utopian arrangement actually approximates the German political economic system, although that system's Bundesbank perhaps eliminates any capitalist need for structural control of the state (Przeworski 1985). 5. I am not aware of any work by sociologists that is sufficiently involved in the rational calculations of macroactors to qualify definitively as macrorational class analysis, but applications of Heckathorn (1990) to macroscopic class actors might qualify. 6. I do not mean to imply that the shift in the balance of macrocomparative studies of class action from sociology to political science has led or will lead to a complete evacuation of class- centered studies by sociologists. Excellent class-centered, macrocomparative studies of class social action are stil done by sociologists, albeit seldom without strong statist and cultural thrusts (e.g., Steinmetz 1993). Moreover, actions of classes and class segments still appear on stage in works that are as emphatically non-class-analytical as Skocpol (1992), even at stage center (Mann 1993). Needless to say, excellent studies by political scientists often marginalize class, not to speak of social action (see Weir 1993; and Skowronek, 1982, respectively). The shift of emphasis on comparative-historical class action from sociology to political science is perhaps less pronounced if fundamentally quantitative works are allowed to qualify as such studies (cf. Huber, Stephens & Ragin 1993; Westem 1993). However, even for quantitative works a "perhaps" is essential in light of the considerable recent rate of increase in quantitative studies of cognitive-historical class action by political scientists (e.g., Alvarez, Garrett & Lange 1991; Swank 1992). 7. 1 do not censure complications or even diminutions of the roles of actors here, only rejections of actors.

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Issue Table of ContentsSocial Forces, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Jun., 1995), pp. 1197-1654Volume Information [pp. 1645-1653]Front Matter [pp. 1230-1644]Is Sociology the Integrative Discipline in the Study of Human Behavior? [pp. 1197-1206]Sociology and Economics: Crossing the Boundaries [pp. 1207-1218]Is Political Sociology Informed by Political Science? [pp. 1219-1229]Social Psychology: The Interplay between Sociology and Psychology [pp. 1231-1243]How Is Sociology Informed by History? [pp. 1245-1254]Is Sociology the Core Discipline for the Scientific Study of Religion? [pp. 1255-1266]Sociology and Biology: What Biology Do Sociologists Need to Know? [pp. 1267-1278]Nations and Novels: Cultural Politics and Literary Use [pp. 1279-1308]The Construction of Nonpersonhood and Demonization: Commemorating the Traitorous Reputation of Benedict Arnold [pp. 1309-1331]Organization Building in the Wake of Ethnic Conflict: A Comparison of Three Ethnic Groups [pp. 1333-1363]Pacific Islander Americans and Multiethnicity: A Vision of America's Future? [pp. 1365-1383]White Backlash to Workplace Affirmative Action: Peril or Myth? [pp. 1385-1414]The "Semi-involuntary Institution" Revisited: Regional Variations in Church Participation among Black Americans [pp. 1415-1437]Organizations and Fraud in the Savings and Loan Industry [pp. 1439-1463]Feeling the Pinch: Child Spacing and Constraints on Parental Economic Investments in Children [pp. 1465-1486]Contextual Determinants of Children's Responses to Poverty [pp. 1487-1516]Women's Return to School Following the Transition to Motherhood [pp. 1517-1551]Community Orientations of Higher-Status Women Volunteers [pp. 1553-1571]When Experience Counts: The Effects of Experiential and Structural Similarity on Patterns of Support and Interpersonal Stress [pp. 1573-1588]The Impact of Homeownership on Political Beliefs [pp. 1589-1607]CommentaryWho Are the Morenas? [pp. 1609-1611]A Reply to Telles [pp. 1613-1614]

Book ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 1615-1617]Review: untitled [pp. 1617-1618]Review: untitled [pp. 1618-1619]Review: untitled [p. 1620]Review: untitled [pp. 1621-1622]Review: untitled [pp. 1622-1623]Review: untitled [p. 1624]Review: untitled [pp. 1625-1627]Review: untitled [pp. 1627-1629]Review: untitled [pp. 1629-1630]Review: untitled [pp. 1630-1631]Review: untitled [pp. 1631-1632]Review: untitled [pp. 1632-1633]Review: untitled [pp. 1633-1635]Review: untitled [pp. 1635-1636]Review: untitled [pp. 1636-1637]Review: untitled [pp. 1637-1638]Review: untitled [pp. 1639-1640]Review: untitled [pp. 1640-1641]Review: untitled [pp. 1641-1642]

Erratum: More on the Uneasy Case for Using Mill-Type Methods in Small-N Comparative Studies [p. 1654]Back Matter

is political sociology informed by political science (1)

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