is russia friend or foe?

8/8/2019 Is Russia Friend or Foe?

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PAPER SERIES

IS RUSSIA FRIEND OR FOE?

FEARING A WEAK,EMBRACING A STRONG RUSSIA

THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO ENGAGEMENT WITH MOSCOW

NIELS ANNENGERMAN BUNDESTAG

WORLDVIEW MATTERSTHE KREMLINS BEHAVIOR LIMITS THE SCOPE OF WESTERN ENGAGEMENT

JOSEPH WOODTHE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES


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Is Russia Friend or Foe?

Brussels Forum Paper Series

March 2009

F W, E S RThere is no alternative to engagement with Moscow

N A

G B

W M

The Kremlins behavior limits the scope of Western engagement

J W

T G M F U S


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Fearing a Weak,Embracing a Strong Russia

There is no alternative to engagement with Moscow


March 2009

N A*G B

* N A G B Ex C S D Py. H G E, M E, M B, D Szy . S I W .

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A R F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17NATO E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

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C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38


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Fearing a Weak, Embracing a Strong Russia

There is no alternative to engagement with Moscow5

The question

of how Russia

will behave in

the future has

a considerable

bearing on foreig

policy planning

for Germany and

the EU.

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y E y U S F E y , R . T y .

Introduction

1


6/39

The German Marshall Fund of the United States6

Russias

own internal

perspective on

recent history is

key to analyzing

this problem.

A yvis--vis R y . I R y, . R y y yz .O E Cy, y Gy R 1. T y Gy .I y R

Gy . R qy Gy , the , z.D 1, Gy R j .

T x R.W G , New York Times

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y, y U S IMy F (IMF). I y, IMFz z

The Russian Question

According to Moscow2


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It is not just

Russias growing

authoritarianism,

but also its

marginalization b

the West that ha

been key factors

in the countrys

alienation.

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), W x E .B y E , S U .7 I y, , y .

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5 S S, D K F W R. S G F,SWP-S 8/8, B, .1.

6 S S, W H M D RU.S.-R R, Foreign Affairs, N./D. 8, . 1-8, 4.

7 D ., .6.


8/39


: W y. W .I y, , y . D , y . A yy NATO, xy . W y, . Uy, y.


9/39



It is not Russias

strength that we

should fear, but

its weakness.

It is for the

United States to

recognize this

fact just as the

EU already did.

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8 C G. Gy, D R, I., The 2008/2009Top 10 Global Economic Challenges, B G Ey D, . 1-1.

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Competitor, aggressor, or teammate?

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1 L, .11.11 E K, K Sz M: DR , B, 8, .78.1 F Fy: W A DIE ZEIT,3/, . 37.

Russias Weaknesses:

Aspects of a Common Analysis3


10/39


In the face of

increasing global

threats, we

should therefore

step up pressure

internationally

in terms of what

is expected of

Russian crisis

management.

A 31, 8, G. T M D13 :

R y .

A y.

P y R z.

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A y E, U S, .14

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W O y R j y , D T .15

M y y R y. Y , C I S (CIS), y . A M

13 D ., .4.

14 I y Dy M R TV, CO, Ry, NTV, A 31, 8.

15 D T, R L W, Foreign Affairs 85(6), 4, . 87-6, 5.

C, U S, EU y .

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A xR . T W y y . O E y.16

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, y R .

I R y y. W

16 D ., . 6.


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In many conflict-

ridden regions

in the Black Sea

area, the Baltics,

the Middle East,

and Southeast

Europe, it is

almost impossibl

to imagine long-

term solutions

that leave out,

let alone are in

opposition to,

Russia. We share

these problems

with Russia, and

neither of us can

resolve them

alone.

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, y W M E . R FDy P M S I j R y M E.


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R. M, Gy .

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18 J H G ySddeutscheZeitung, Fy 4, .1 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Fy , 8.

Ax R, Gy R: A S R-, The Washington Quarterly, S 7, . 137-145, .138-13.

1 V K, . 6.

Europes Strategic Partnership

with Russia4


13/39



With astonishing

continuity and

supported

across party

lines, German

foreign policy ha

rejected Russias

occasional offer

of a special

relationship.

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C U S] y y. Ey j , . W , R EU . TEU j R, 8 . ()T EU y R j W TOz.

I R E,

A S, B R C, The National Inter-est, M/A 7, . 46-51, 51.


14/39


Successful

strategy cannot

be based on

selective

cooperation.

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5 G E,Mission WeltfriedenDeutschlands neue Rolle inder Weltpolitik, F, .


15/39



For all of us,

however, the

solution lies in

reducing our

dependency on

fossil energy

sources.

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6 R Gz, D RP, APZ 11/6, . 14-3, 17.7 M S, A S R T GPy Ey Sy EU I R, Dealing with Dependency: The European Unions Quest

for a Common Energy Foreign Policy, F Py D8(7), . 16-4, 3-4.

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U S,

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16/39


y (18.8 ) U S (4.7 ).31Iy, Gy y . S 1, y . T, y Gy Ry , , .

31 BP Statistical review of World Energy, 8.


17/39



Our policy toward

Russia must

be embedded

not only in the

EU framework

but also in the

transatlantic

framework, if it is

to be successful.

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U S y . EU-R W-R. T y y U.S. , y R,

Approaching Russia in the Future

5


18/39


Yet, Russia has

to live up to the

human rights

standards it

subscribed to by

joining the Council

of Europe and

the OSCE.

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j C E OSCE.

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3 S y S, . 6.

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33 H A/F K, R NATO. K P , SWP-S 1/8, . 16.

34 S C. S, D R z P Kz, EV Px, A 16/7, K-A-S, . 54.


19/39



Russia cannot

be compelled

to reforms by

external forces;

the will for chang

must come from

within.

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EU R EU R. W y y y x .D j j B , y, x. T C B S S ND .

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, -y

35 J F, R NATO, Sddeutsche Zei-tung, Jy 1, .

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y E E. T , , y y.

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W x z R. T . G yy R W

y , R E . T , , y . V q


20/39


We need to define

common fields

of policy and

projects, including

the energy

sector, drug

control, dealing

with Islamic

fundamentalism,

and the urgent

need to stabilize

Afghanistan.

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y y .T, x R . R . I K T , R y q, y x y

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y y R .

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36 S, . 6.37 R 7, . 13; K, . .

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E. T, y y R NATO. T , R z y, q .

I y R . Ty y . R NATO x G

U j R, y E . U.S.Sy S Hy C, U.S.S Jy ,x R y A . () W R C, y

, , , .T , Gy, .

38 F-W S, P , V, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, D 4, 8.3 V K . .


21/39



NATO needs a

new Harmel

report. In

other words, a

fundamental

agreement on

the way ahead.

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- y : A N-P Ty (NPT) y 4 y, .W NPT , y y q .B U S R , y y

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q. I x, EU, Oz Sy C- E (OSCE), NATO E y. B M y R q . T q

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y. W R y , j .

41 J Gy, T G. W KK , Sddeutsche Zeitung, S 1, 8.


22/39



23/39

Worldview Matters

The Kremlins behavior limits the scope of Western engagement


March 2009

J W*

T G M F U S

* J W G M F U S (GMF). H E, E, . F 5 GMF, M. W y V P N Sy A W H.

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

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F M V R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

T E M W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

W G A D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

NATO E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

T R Ey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38


24/39


H G A Ry T R y y y Gy U S. A , U S xyy y Iq, A, P, I, M E, R, C j . T Gy R y

. W

y y R y y G-A . T , y x G A R.I x R x y R . A y Gy U S, x y y

R.

Introduction

1


25/39

Worldview Matters

The Kremlins behavior limits the scope of Western engagement25

Views in

Washington and

Berlin, within

each governmen

and among

Russia analysts,

vary on how to

calibrate politica

statements and

responses in

answer to Russia

rhetoric and

actions.

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. B y. B , . W y , A G y x R.

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Iq) R y P Cz R . V W B, R y,

y R .

O W , y y M, , y U.S. V P J B, x. T B R y M Kyyz M ( U.S. A; y y)

C I S (CIS)y y.

N, ,y W B y y . T , , U S Gy y, R. D Iq A y y

, Gy ( US) y y E R. Ay, , , M -,, .

M, R y, M

y . T U S Gy R G E (G8), j M. O I , M y, U S E,

Where Germans and

Americans Agree2


26/39


Leaders of the

United States

and Germany

continued to

engage on

friendly terms

with President

and later Prime

Minister Vladimir

Putin, despite

extraordinary

rhetoric that

was matched by

threatening action.

G, . TU S y R G E, Gy, y E . D R, U S E, Gy, K . L US Gy y P PM V P, xy

y .V M R Az SO . S,

R y x, y .

T j y , , B W. T Gy NATO M A P (MAP) U G, j U.S. . T y yy

B y . B , B W, .


27/39

Worldview Matters


W R T y R .

T R barely a state atall. T j ( y) K.C Rz y R , M

.A x R y, K . I R yz .

T R difficult partner.T R y S U, .I , R PDy M x yy , . T Gy U S y R, y. S ,y y, R W W R. T

M y , . O, , x. T

Gy. T B, , U.S. y , S FA R 7 y8. T y U.S.P B O , y .

A R y 19th century power y 1 y . T R

, , .M R R , R , . T A 8 G-R q SO Az x, R P CzR y U.S. y. A x, R K

S S. T B S G P Cz R M . M , y , , .T xy j y U.S.Sy S Czz R yj y y z S O Az. T R

y K .S B , y R. My E NATO EU R .

Four Models of Viewing Russia

3


28/39


The 2007 cyber

attacks against

Estonia and

Georgia provided

a vivid example of

how less formal

mobilization of

young talent in

pursuit of state

aims can serve

the regime. Loyalty

to that regime,

rather than to

broader principles

of service or to

pluralistic politics,

marks these

groups.

A y R 20th century authoritarian, or even totalitarian,states M . T-P V P 5 S U [] y, KGB , . S M : ,

y , y , y.I P R, , y.B y S U, Iy Gy 13. T

. F y y . P j , x,

( j , )y y . H y(, , ), R x-y y y .

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, ) y . T , , ( y j)

, y . T x M y . Ey y R y, y y . T z y y . T 7

y E G x z y . Lyy , , . T . Ry, y, jy R y W 1, y W R

R . F .R y R .

M, y y R.T I Iy, S x y, xy y y P R . P Iy R . Iy

S , y KGB . Iy yy . H S U, y W- y R y,


29/39

Worldview Matters


The experience

of the 1990s has

soured Russia

even on the

unqualified word

democracy. And

Russia seems

to blame the

apparent chaos

and poverty of th

1990s not just

on the concept o

democracy, but

on democracies

themselves,

especially the

United States.

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T y R y. B R y :W y. T x 1 R q y. A R y 1 j y, , y U S. W

R z jy x S , y y S , R W . I , R EU NATO .T R y EU NATO , W ( j W )

R. A y, R j y W , j y j y W ,

j x Wz W (, y U S). T M .


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For Russias

closest neighbors,

respect has often

been demanded

in the form of

brutal obeisance.

In Western

institutions

and nations,

the demand is

often registered

as boorish and

crude, sometimes

excused and

sometimes

rejected.

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A , R , , , y - R , , . T -

. F R , . I W , , x j. B R , M y , . W R x ,

.

W y R , x Iy R:

W . W y y, y C . T ; y R , y R . Ty R q R y, y R OxC I R

y y y . C, x. B y R

C B Gyz , R S D:

O y y qy y . T x NATO .W y

. W y z y y. Oy .

S q ( ) Wz. T R xy

, x y . I , R q , W, W A , R W xy y q.

R, , W, , y. T :

q R y y , R E q x R y . My

The Elements of Moscows Worldview

4


31/39

Worldview Matters


But, unlike the

Soviet approach,

military power is

now secondary

to economic or

resource power i

achieving Russia

goals.

E R y y . B P y y S U. R P T B Gz R Ay.T P y x . A , P y x .

P y x

R . W y x M, . R y C A, C, G, , , A L A. T y R y , y . My y ,

I Vz R- x y (, , G). B, S , y y R . T x y : - U y - U 6, - B S, Cz R y

y U.S. y. W R , P S , ,

R y R y W y y. A x, TNK-BP.

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Ox C y , K I, y y R Ox C x .H , , y K , P. F , P y E P I, y y T .

T Ox C R y ( S ) y W . B R , , x, U


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R. I y R y, Ox R (R M R, R Byz, , y, Oxy R y). I R Ox y, G.


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Worldview Matters


While both

American and

German leaders

searched for

policies that

would reduce

the possibilities

of a hot war,

Germany took

this search to a

further dimensio

with the policy

of Ostpolitik.

The differences

stemming from

this effort to

reduce the risks

set by simple

geography have

implications toda

W R R , G A R. W G A , y y y y. B y , R.

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A R. A A A, R . G xy R , y . Pyy, B M W.

T Gy C W xy . G , ,

E NATO W P, y . T , U S S U, E y . W

A G ,Gy y Ostpolitik. T y y y. GF M F-W S Ostpolitik C W, U S j. A , U S Gy, y ,

C W x y.

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R y W, Gy.T G R U S.

Where Germans and

Americans Disagree5


34/39


Germany appears

willing to accept

a limit on NATOs

enlargement as

determined by

Russia. This is

tantamount to

German readiness

to grant Russia

a sphere of

influence. For the

United States,

such a move

signals an end

to the eastward

expansion of

liberal Western

institutions and,

thus, European

integration as

viewed from the

Western side of

the Atlantic.

T NATO q B y F non y G nein. Gy y . W Gy A , Gy NATO MAP U G.

T -C W NATO C US. I y,

R . F U.S., U.S. P G H.W. B Gy. B A, R. By , y. T j NATO P y . B x A V . By 8, y

A 3 (M, A, C) y, y , ()G j M .

T y U G.B MAP NATO, y M A. T y A V . T U S, B

, MAP . Gy, C AM , .

G MAP

G U. Y NATO MAP. T y x MAP y y , , NATO , , EU . O qy : y W ( A Gy W); y ( F R Gy

154 j NATO, C y); MAP ( j , q y; y MAP y U G); Gy MAP ( y).

F G y ( , ) y

G j MAP U G y R, j y . T- q G A R . T - .

Gy NATO y R. T G R

. F U S, x W , , E W A. T . I

NATO Enlargement

6


35/39

Worldview Matters


G y y A NATO. I G R.

W F, , y q. S, R NATO Gy

, y, . T, j E W , R , - y, G nein R.


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Although the

success of North

Stream would not

inherently rule

out an alternative

to Russian-

controlled transit

routes, it would

do so in practice.

In so doing,

Chancellor Merkel

has apparently

sided with those

who argue

that European

dependence

on Russian gas

is actually an

interdependence

that ensures

Russia must play

by reasonable

rules in energy

relations.

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B - Jy , y R

y , G (y G C G S) . A RR G W. B x G y.

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T U S E, y y -

Azj , y T I, W E. T Gy. I Jy ,M, , R- NS , -

R U. S Gy F R G, R yF P N Szy EU .A N S y R- , .I , C M y E R y

R y y y .

T y Gy R y. R y , y . B E Gy.F, Gy y .T y y

y- W , q

, - - y K, .

Ey j y E. T E , . T y

j U S E R, y y R WE. R y , E . A

The Role of Energy

7


37/39

Worldview Matters


M N S,O y y y U S. T y , j U.S..


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We are at a

moment when

differences

regarding

Russia have the

potential to open

major strategic

divergences

between the

United States

and Germany.

W R j U S Gy. S E, y Iy P M S B, y Gy. O q .

T . T U.S. xy . A E,

Gy , y . T -WW II R y M, y q -

, W B. T y .

Conclusion

8


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OFF I C E S

is russia friend or foe?

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