is the euro compatible with democracy

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Is the Euro Compatible With Democracy? Berlin doesn't seem to think so. MARCH 6, 2015 BY PHILIPPE LEGRAIN “New elections change nothing,” asserted Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, ahead of the Greek vote in January that swept into office a radical-left government pledging an end to austerity and demanding debt relief from its eurozone creditors. The new Greek administration, Schäuble insisted, must accept the terms struck by its predecessor. By and large, Greece’s new government has done so, despite its electoral pledges. How, then, can the destructive policies imposed by the likes of Schäuble really be changed? Is membership in the eurozone compatible with democracy? This is more than just a Greek issue. Elections are due in Spain at some point later this year, and the radical leftists of Podemos are leading in the polls. Indeed, in almost every election since the crisis, voters have thrown out their government, only to be told by Schäuble and his eurozone minions that the new administration must stick to the failed policies that the voters have just rejected. In 2012, for instance, François Hollande won the presidency of France on a pledge to end austerity, but was soon forced to back down by Berlin. Last year, with a mandate from his resounding victory in May’s European elections, Italy’s reformist prime minister, Matteo Renzi, demanded changes to the eurozone’s fiscal rules that would enable the Italian government to invest more. He was rebuffed. Of course, politicians often junk loose election promises when confronted with the hard facts of governing. That is a (regrettable) feature of democracy, rather than proof of a lack of it. But the constraints on democracy in the eurozone are very real. In 2011, eurozone authorities even forced out of office the elected prime ministers of Italy and Greece — the latter for having the temerity to offer Greeks a referendum on the unjust conditions imposed on them by Germany — and replaced them with pliable, unelected

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  • Is the Euro Compatible With Democracy?Berlin doesn't seem to think so.

    MARCH 6, 2015BY PHILIPPE LEGRAIN

    New elections change nothing, asserted Germanys finance minister, Wolfgang Schuble, ahead of the

    Greek vote in January that swept into office a radical-left government pledging an end to austerity and

    demanding debt relief from its eurozone creditors. The new Greek administration, Schuble insisted, must

    accept the terms struck by its predecessor. By and large, Greeces new government has done so, despite its

    electoral pledges. How, then, can the destructive policies imposed by the likes of Schuble really be

    changed? Is membership in the eurozone compatible with democracy?

    This is more than just a Greek issue. Elections are due in Spain at some point later this year, and the

    radical leftists of Podemos are leading in the polls. Indeed, in almost every election since the crisis, voters

    have thrown out their government, only to be told by Schuble and his eurozone minions that the new

    administration must stick to the failed policies that the voters have just rejected. In 2012, for instance,

    Franois Hollande won the presidency of France on a pledge to end austerity, but was soon forced to back

    down by Berlin. Last year, with a mandate from his resounding victory in Mays European elections, Italys

    reformist prime minister, Matteo Renzi, demanded changes to the eurozones fiscal rules that would

    enable the Italian government to invest more. He was rebuffed.

    Of course, politicians often junk loose election promises when confronted with the hard facts of governing.

    That is a (regrettable) feature of democracy, rather than proof of a lack of it. But the constraints on

    democracy in the eurozone are very real. In 2011, eurozone authorities even forced out of office the elected

    prime ministers of Italy and Greece the latter for having the temerity to offer Greeks a referendum on

    the unjust conditions imposed on them by Germany and replaced them with pliable, unelected

  • technocrats.

    As for France, its not markets that are preventing the government from engaging in a fiscal stimulus on

    the contrary, investors are falling over themselves to lend to Paris for free its Berlin and Brussels. And

    its Angela Merkels chancellery, not economic reality, that is preventing Italy and others from sensibly

    borrowing to invest, which would strengthen current demand and future supply as well as public finances.

    When challenged, Schubles response is that agreements must be respected: Rules are rules. But the claim

    that eurozone rules are set in stone is not only undemocratic; its untrue. Berlin has repeatedly abused its

    clout in EU institutions to rewrite the eurozones rules, and it continues to violate them with impunity.

    German banks lent too much to an insolvent Greece? No problem! Well breach the legal basis on which

    the eurozone was formed the Maastricht Treatys no-bailout rule, which bans member government

    from bailing out their peers and covertly bail out those banks by lending European taxpayers money to

    Athens. German banks also lend too much to insolvent Irish, Portuguese, and Spanish ones? Kein

    Problem! In collusion with corrupt national elites, well lend to those countries governments so they can

    bail out local banks and thus their German creditors. German taxpayers start worrying that they may end

    up on the hook for all of Southern Europes debts? Then lets rewrite the fiscal rules, under duress of a

    financial panic that Merkels mistakes have created, and impose a new fiscal straitjacket that gives Berlin

    and Brussels greater control over other countries budgets.

    Germanys vast current account surplus the excess savings generated by its beggar-thy-neighbor policy

    of suppressing wages to subsidize exports was the fuel for German banks bad lending that caused the

    crisis in the eurozone. Now its the vehicle through which Germany is exporting deflation. In short, its the

    biggest, most destabilizing imbalance in the monetary union. And it falls afoul of the eurozones rules on

    macroeconomic imbalances. But is that a problem for Brussels? Of course not. The Germans lean on

    eurozone authorities to get off the hook, and the European Commission bows to Berlin. But voters

    elsewhere want to change things, even just in their own countries? Nein, nein, nein: There is no

    alternative.

    In the Greek case, the German government has come up with an even more disingenuous argument. There

  • is nothing undemocratic about forcing the Greek government to bend to Berlins will, Schuble asserts: On

    the contrary, Athens must also respect the wishes of voters in other eurozone countries. And it is true that

    taxpayers in Germany and across the eurozone would unfairly lose out if Greece obtained the debt

    relief it needs to recover. But why is that? Because Merkel violated the no-bailout rule in the first place,

    putting the interests of German banks ahead of those of European citizens including Germans and

    setting Europeans against each other. If only German voters realized that Merkel and Schuble have lied to

    them and sold them out, they wouldnt fall into the nationalist trap of blaming the Greeks for their own

    banks and governments misdeeds!

    To obtain debt relief, Greece will need to call Germanys bluff, as I argued two weeks ago and be

    prepared to issue a parallel currency. The four-month bailout extension Athens accepted from its EU

    creditors last month gives the new Greek government time to think through its strategy. But more broadly,

    how could fiscal democracy be restored? Such is the anger and mistrust created by the crisis

    mismanagement that steps toward democratic federalism are politically inconceivable for now. A better

    option would be to restore the no-bailout rule and with it governments freedom to respond to changing

    economic circumstances and political priorities constrained by markets willingness to lend and

    ultimately by the risk of default. (The European Central Bank would also be mandated to be a proper

    lender of last resort to illiquid governments.) Or the euro might break up.

    Stripping voters of the right to make legitimate economic and political choices is unsustainable. And as

    Weimar Germanys tragic history shows, the imposition of unbearable payments to hated foreign creditors

    leads to political extremism. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times has observed that the eurozone is meant

    to be a union of democracies, not an empire. Merkel and Schuble should remember that.

    Photo credit: Sean Gallup/Getty Images