BRIEFING

THEMYTHOFGLOBAL ISLAMICTERRORISM AND LOCAL CONFLICT IN

MALI AND THE SAHEL

CAITRIONA DOWD AND CLIONADH RALEIGH*

IN THE WAKE OF THE RAPID escalation of the conflict in Mali, ana-lyses and articles seeking to make sense of the situation and its actors haveproliferated.1 Nevertheless, political figures, policy makers, and researcherscontinue to fall back on simplistic narratives in their attempts to explain theintensification of violent Islamist activity in the region. Without a finelytuned understanding of diverse groups – their structures, objectives, andmodalities of violence – analysts risk recycling dangerously misleading nar-ratives about Islamist violence in Africa and its consequences.

This briefing draws on empirical evidence of violent Islamist activity,strategy, and structure to highlight the differentiated nature of groups oper-ating in the Sahel region and further west, in what has come to be known asAfrica’s ‘arc of instability’.2 It contends that violent Islamist groups emergein and are shaped by distinct domestic contexts and issues, a feature that isobscured by a totalizing narrative of global Islamic terrorism. In turn,leaders seek to cast opposition threats as extreme and associated withAl-Qaeda in order to locate the blame for violence elsewhere, away frompoor records of governance, state capacity, and representation.

With remarkably few exceptions, discussions of the escalation of conflictin northern Mali, the dramatic hostage scenario which took place at the InAmenas facility in Algeria, and the possible spill-over effects of these devel-opments in the region have been framed in terms of a three-pronged,

*Caitriona Dowd (nidhubcm@tcd.ie) is a PhD candidate at Trinity College Dublin. ClionadhRaleigh (raleighc@tcd.ie) is Associate Professor in Geography at Trinity College Dublin.1. See May Ying Welsh, ‘Making sense of Mali’s armed groups’, Al Jazeera, 17 January 2013,<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.html> (14 February2013); Susanna Wing, ‘Making sense of Mali’, Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138767/susanna-wing/making-sense-of-mali> (14 February 2013).2. Yonah Alexander, ‘Special update report: terrorism in North, West and Central Africa:from 9/11 to the Arab Spring’, (International Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institutefor Policy Studies, Arlington, 2012).

African Affairs, 1–12 doi: 10.1093/afraf/adt039

© The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved

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interrelated narrative about Islamist violence in Africa.3 First, it is pur-ported that violent Islamist groups on the continent form part of a single,monolithic, globalized Islamist threat. Second, the globalized Islamistthreat is taken to be a danger for the West and Western interests primarily,and African stability only secondarily. Third, ungoverned territories areassumed to provide a safe haven for extremism, and Africa is seen as set tobecome the new theatre in which violent Islam will flourish. Commentingon the incident at In Amenas, British Prime Minister David Camerondeclared that ‘This is a global threat and it will require a global response’,drawing parallels between developments in Algeria and those in Asia –

‘What we face is an extremist, Islamist, violent Al-Qaeda-linked terroristgroup, just as we have to deal with that in Pakistan and in Afghanistan.’4

The following day, Cameron framed the developments in terms of ‘a gener-ational struggle’ against an extremist ideology, and the need to ‘close downthe ungoverned space in which [terrorists] thrive’.5

Elsewhere, op-eds have been published on the ‘Taliban of Timbuktu’,6

while an impassioned plea to ‘Save Mali before it’s too late’maintained that‘life in northern Mali before the rebels and Islamic extremists arrived wascalm; we lived together harmoniously in a community of various languagesand backgrounds’.7 This description is offered in relation to a region thathas a longstanding history of underdevelopment and marginalization; hasexperienced sporadic violent uprisings by separatist-oriented groups overthe past two decades; and has hosted, for what some reports estimate to bea decade, violent Islamist militants who have sought to integrate into localcommunities and the economy (see Figure 1). This flawed description ispart of a misleading narrative. Responses to the situation in Mali are em-blematic of the de-contextualized approach analysts, politicians, and policymakers have taken in assessing violence in Africa. The rapid deteriorationof conditions in Mali does not constitute a discrete phenomenon, whichcan be wholly divorced from the political and social context of that or anyother African country.

3. See Christina Hellmich, ‘Mali/Algeria: threat of AQIM to Europe has been overstated’African Arguments, <http://africanarguments.org/2013/01/22/malialgeria-threat-of-aqim-to-europe-has-been-overstated-by-christina-hellmich/> (23 January 2013).4. The Guardian, ‘David Cameron’s statement on the Algerian hostage crisis’, 20 January2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/20/david-cameron-statement-algeria-hostage-crisis> (13 February 2013).5. BBC News, ‘UK to consider boosting French Mali operation support’, 22 January 2013,<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21136882> (28 January 2013).6. Karima Bennoune, ‘The Taliban of Timbuktu’, New York Times, 23 January 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/opinion/the-taliban-of-timbuktu.html?_r=0> (13 February 2013).7. Oumou Sall Seck, ‘Save Mali before it’s too late’, New York Times, 28 December2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/29/opinion/save-mali-before-its-too-late.html>(13 February 2013).

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THEMYTHOFGLOBAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM AND LOCAL CONFLICT INMALI 3

We review the tenets of the ‘globalized threat’ narrative here, consideringthe evidence for the impression of a growing and diffuse Al-Qaeda network,Western targets, and dangerous ungoverned spaces. Using empirical evi-dence of activity within the Sahel and Maghreb, we dismiss the notion thatall violent Islamist groups are operating towards a regional or globally coor-dinated jihad, and instead find that groups – even those formally affiliatedwith Al-Qaeda – operate within the local and national contexts of theirorigins.

The global threat

Recent developments in sub-Saharan Africa have reinforced a tendency toconceive of almost all violent Islamist groups as local manifestations of asingle, global jihadist ideology or, in extremis, as individual cells in a single,though amorphous, Al-Qaeda network. There are obvious political reasonsfor treating these groups as an undifferentiated, homogeneous unit, andthese resonate on all sides of the evolving conflict. For combatants, Islamistmilitia and rebel groups benefit from the impression of a unified globalmovement, and can choose strategically to locate themselves within thisnarrative in an attempt to magnify the impact of their actions and their po-tential threat. In turn, regimes that witness the emergence of violentIslamist activity within their territory are well positioned to present them-selves as bulwarks against a globally significant movement with transnation-al linkages and security implications, rather than localized movementsemerging in response to specific conditions. Finally, those internationalforces that favour military intervention as a response to the emergence andactions of such groups benefit from framing this response in terms of aclash of worldviews.Analytically, obscuring the fractious nature of diverse Islamist groups

using force to achieve (often vaguely specified) goals is problematic. Thiscollection of groups is highly variegated and fragmented not only in termsof the general absence of unity but also in its tendency towards splitting,splintering, and turning on itself. Imposing conceptual and analytical orderon these formations requires us to refine our interrogation of their struc-tures and their actions. Structurally, many commentators have character-ized the links between various reportedly Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups andthe central organization as tenuous.8 What is obscured by this labelling is

8. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Qaeda’s senior lead-ership’, 19 January 2013, Gunpowder and Lead <http://gunpowderandlead.org/2013/01/Al-Qaeda-in-the-islamic-maghreb-and-Al-Qaedas-senior-leadership/> (13 February 2013); MaxFisher, ‘Is the Algeria hostage crisis really Al-Qaeda?’, Washington Post, 17 January 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/01/17/is-the-algeria-hostage-crisis-really-Al-Qaeda/> (14 February 2013); James Blitz and Roula Khalaf, ‘Al-Qaeda: the jihadi hydra’, Financial

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the disparate nature of these relationships: we know that Africa hosts twoformally affiliated Al-Qaeda franchises – Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM) in Algeria, and more recently, Al-Shabaab in Somalia.Intelligence shows that AQIM had contact over a period of years withcentral Al-Qaeda leadership, through which the franchise providedupdates, and instructions and guidance were issued in return.9

Lea Farrall argues that Al-Qaeda’s subsidiaries need to be taken intoaccount in evaluating the strength and threat potential of the central organ-ization.10 But even the existing intelligence on the linkages between thesegroups and the central Al-Qaeda organization cannot ignore the fragmen-ted nature of these franchises. Not only are Al-Shabaab and AQIM dividedinternally, but they have divided and split on precisely the question of affili-ation with Al-Qaeda. The AQIM splinter, Movement for Oneness andJihad in West Africa (MUJAO), has defined itself explicitly in terms of a re-gional (rather than globalized) agenda. Similarly, AQIM’s recent split fromits former senior official, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and the emergence of asplinter group under Belmokhtar’s leadership can be read variously aseither a rejection or a reaffirmation of the primacy of Algerian internal con-flict over a global agenda.11

Similarly, Al-Shabaab officials have openly criticized the globalization ofthe organization’s agenda.12 This factionalism ultimately led to reports of asplit between Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab and a declaration from theformer that while it still sought the departure of African Union troops fromSomalia, it considered the new President and Parliament to be a ‘positivedevelopment’.13

This kind of potential engagement with national regimes is directly atodds with the hard-line ideology of Al-Qaeda, and is echoed in the actionsand statements of Mali’s Ansar Dine. Even prior to the latter’s split and es-tablishment of the breakaway Islamic Movement for the Azawad, AnsarDine had been divided, issuing ambivalent statements on its willingness toengage with the national government, and rejecting ‘all forms of extremism

Times, 3 February 2013, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ce19f802-6c5e-11e2-b774-00144feab49a.html#axzz2KsDkFb28> (14 February 2013).9. Gartenstein-Ross, ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’.10. Leah Farrall, ‘How Al Qaeda works: what the organization’s subsidiaries say about itsstrength’, Foreign Affairs 90, 2 (2011), pp. 128–38.11. Andrew Lebovich, ‘What’s old is new again: the legacy of Algeria’s civil war in today’sJihad’, 21 January 2013, Jihadica <http://www.Jihadica.com/what%E2%80%99s-old-is-new-again-the-legacy-of-algeria%E2%80%99s-civil-war-in-today%E2%80%99s-jihad/>(29 January 2013).12. Garowe Online, ‘Somalia: tensions grow between senior Al Shabaab officials’, 1 April2012, <http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Tensions_grow_between_senior_Al_Shabaab_officials.shtml> (13 February 2013).13. BBC News, ‘Kenyan Amisom soldier kills six Somali civilians’, 24 September 2012,<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19698348> (13 February 2013).

THEMYTHOFGLOBAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM AND LOCAL CONFLICT INMALI 5

and terrorism’.14 This engagement runs contrary to the pursuit of a global,jihadist agenda akin to that of Al-Qaeda.The distinction between global and national goals is an important one,

because it reveals fundamental differences in the orientation of thesediverse groups. Many violent Islamist groups do not seek to be actively orexplicitly linked to Al-Qaeda precisely because this affiliation puts thembeyond the realm of engagement. Up until Al-Shabaab formally affiliatedwith Al-Qaeda, the possibility of a negotiated solution to conflict inSomalia was still being entertained in many quarters. Groups such as AnsarDine and others are seeking a position that locates them within a strategical-ly significant global Islamist discourse. But they simultaneously seek to dis-tance themselves from the pariah status of openly Al-Qaeda-affiliatedgroups in order to allow for potential engagement at the national level.These divergences are also evident at the level of group action. While

they may be active in overlapping spaces, these organizations are not operat-ing in the same way. A much greater proportion of activity by Ansar Dineand MUJAO has focused on targeting civilians over engaging with securityforces, which is a strategy that characterizes the conflict profiles ofAl-Shabaab and AQIM. Within this, MUJAO has focused to a greaterextent on Western targets and high-profile civilian kidnappings, whileAnsar Dine has concentrated on the imposition of force among civilianpopulations in northern Mali. Hence, on structural, political, or activitygrounds, aggregating distinct violent groups to a single, homogeneous andmonolithic entity is misleading, and confounds our understanding of theirtargeted actions and the differential vulnerability of civilians in their areas ofoperation.

African stability

The second emerging element in the dominant narrative of Islamist vio-lence in Africa relates to the perception that such groups are focused trans-nationally, and primarily, on Western targets. This claim is not empiricallysupported. As we have argued, even where groups are structurally alignedto a central Al-Qaeda network, evidence of their ideological unity is farmore questionable. As franchises, both AQIM and Al-Shabaab wereformed and established their goals and objectives many years prior to theformal affiliation with Al-Qaeda. These pre-formed agendas continue toshape their actions in ways that set them apart from the central organiza-tion’s goals. As Thomas Hegghammer notes, broad characterizations of

14. Agence France Presse, ‘Mali Islamist rebels urge dialogue, halt to hostilities’,6 November 2012, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gZh-xUrcRcBTPevdWMV-o5yqHo1w?docId=CNG.63e373b4d3d812971887b6ca2894ca3d.341>(4 February 2013).

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organizations as Jihadi-Salafi, or similar entities, obscure ‘arguably the mostsignificant political rift in the world of militant Islamism… namely the ques-tion of whether to focus the struggle on the near or the far enemy’.15

Even within the formally aligned, there is ample evidence of a localagenda shaping the actions of these groups. Over 88 percent of AQIMviolent activity has been concentrated in Algeria to date; and 79 percentof all violent activity is targeted at state security forces. While AQIMhas become infamous for a number of high-profile attacks on Westerntargets and interests, its daily actions reveal a nationally oriented agenda.Similarly, Al-Shabaab is nationally focused: over 95 percent of activity isconcentrated within Somalia itself, with only limited transnational activityin northern Kenya and Nairobi.16 This concentrated activity is significantas – particularly at a time when transnational linkages and movement arebeing emphasized in the context of Sahelian violence – it is clear that bothgroups continue to be shaped by their national context and goals.

Beyond these formally aligned groups, evidence of a global agenda iseven more tenuous. Jamaatu Ahlis Sunnah Laddaawatih Wal-Jihad, betterknown as Boko Haram – the extremely active Islamist militia group wide-spread in neighbouring northern Nigeria – is exclusively focused on ahighly localized agenda, mainly revolving around northern Nigerian polit-ics. What speculation there has been on linkages between the Nigeriangroup and neighbouring violent Islamist factions has been focused on logis-tical resource sharing (training and equipment), rather than collaboratingon actions with a transnational or global orientation. Boko Haram alsoappears divided, with at least a significant component of the group willingto entertain the idea of peace talks and a unilateral ceasefire in its engage-ment with the Nigerian state,17 although the apparent proliferation of local,unauthorized units of the group has led to warnings of ‘impostor’ factionsin the past.18

These distinctions are significant not simply on the semantic level of‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies: they are important because it is precisely the loca-lized nature of these smaller groups that can help explain their emergenceand the drivers of the conflicts in which they are engaged. Indeed, much of

15. Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Jihadi-Salafis or revolutionaries? On religion and politics in thestudy of militant Islamism’ in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s new religious movement(Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2009), p. 256.16. Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), which col-lects daily reports of conflict events and codes according to location, event type, actorsinvolved, and other characteristics (see acleddata.com).17. Reuters, ‘Boko Haram commander declares Nigeria ceasefire’, 28 January 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/28/us-nigeria-islamists-idUSBRE90R0V020130128> (13February 2013).18. Ali Adoyi, ‘Boko Haram rule out dialogue with government, warns media houses andimpostors’, Daily Post, 23 August 2012, <http://dailypost.com.ng/2012/08/23/boko-haram-rule-dialogue-government-warns-media-houses-impostors/> (13 February 2013).

THEMYTHOFGLOBAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM AND LOCAL CONFLICT INMALI 7

the strength and appeal of these groups is associated with their local embed-dedness: grassroots militant groups emerge with traction in communitieswherein these agendas are shaped. Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, and otherscan position themselves strategically within a globalized discourse con-cerned with violent Islamist groups, but understanding them in these glo-balized terms divorces them from the context in which they emerge andoperate.Understanding the localized drivers of conflict and the circumstances in

which these groups emerge also helps us address and challenge enduringnarratives about the nature of governance, ungoverned spaces, and failurethat continue to dominate discussions on African conflict. Not only dosuch perspectives misread the political situation of individual states, butthey also mistake the nature of conflict across sub-Saharan Africa, which isoften orchestrated by political elites in urban spaces. Hence, instead oftrying to explain the complex realities of African domestic politics as func-tions of the ‘arc of instability’ or ‘failed statehood’, it is far more useful tounderstand how violent groups emerge from the strategic use of competingand fragmented political elites, co-option of marginalized youth, internalmilitary fractures, or foreign/neighbouring support. Further, in castingtroubles with opposition violence as part of a globalized threat frommilitantIslam, leaders can deflect attention away from poor governance and insuffi-cient capacity. Yet, despite the focus here on violent Islamist groups, thecontinued rise of organizations, political parties, and militants using‘Islamism’ is, in part, due to its perception as an anti-corruption platform,often in countries where ethno-regional groups are the basis for both the al-location of, and marginalization from, power. Such limited political envir-onments present excluded or dissident people with few alternative politicalidentities, of which ‘Islamist’ is one.

Ungoverned territories and apocalyptic futures

The frequent suggestion that violent Islam is diffuse and widespread acrossAfrica is part of larger conjectures around violence, ‘ungoverned space’ andthe predicted collapse of states where democracy and globalization have lesstraction. Many security analyses regard the proliferation of Islamist groupsand their actions as inevitable in any large country with a significantMuslim population,19 considering such states are indicative of ‘gap’ coun-tries where governance is lacking and terrorism may flourish.20 This

19. James Traub, ‘Think again: failed states’, Foreign Policy 187 (2011), pp. 51–4; StewartPatrick, Weak Links: Fragile states, global threats, and international security (Council of ForeignRelations, Washington, DC, 2011).20. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (Putnam Publishing Group, New York,NY, 2004).

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promotes the idea that ungoverned spaces are synonymous with failedstates, and both underlie an African ‘apocalyptic’ geopolitics. Howeverlarge and misgoverned (rather than ungoverned) the Sahel and Maghrebremain, several states therein were, until recently, considered quite stableexamples of poor democracies.21 Indeed, maps of ‘failed statehood’ fre-quently assign African countries a ‘dangerous’ rating simply by virtue ofbeing large and African, regardless of the amount of violence experiencedwithin them (for example, the Foreign Policy Failed State Map notes thatChad is ‘critical’ and Tanzania ‘in danger’ in their failure ratings, despitevery low violence in 2012).

Yet it is not only external observers who seek to recast the complex polit-ics of the Sahel and Maghreb as a function of ‘ungovernable territory’,failed statehood, or militant Islam. African leaders adopt these stanceswhen useful: national governments seek to locate themselves as ‘with us’ inthe ‘with us or against us’ – George Bush doctrine of foreign policy. Indoing so, many African leaders will fully agree, when it suits them, that thelarge ‘ungoverned’ territories are a problem, yet no efforts are taken toextend presence there. Indeed, the governance of peripheral areas is oftenleft in the hands of local associates, and governments may thus collude withviolent agents. Seen from this perspective, the situation that has arisen inseveral Sahel and Maghreb states is the result of state policy, not statefailure. For example, there are repeated reports that the former Malianregime profited from AQIM’s presence in their northern areas throughtaking a cut of the immense kidnapping income of that region.22

The second component of the African ‘apocalypse’ proposes that thefutures of African states will resemble Mali if pre-emptive intervention is notundertaken. The Malian situation was due to a ‘perfect storm’ of factors:AQIM operatives were active in northern Mali for many years, yet a series ofunlikely factors led to the complex outcome in 2013. These include the fall ofGaddafi due to the Arab Spring, the return from Libya of marginalized andheavily armed Tuaregs, the inability of the Malian government to harness thelimited but necessary power to suppress a small domestic Tuareg rebellion,the coup in March 2012, the splintering of rebel groups that led to the emer-gence of the opportunist Ansar Dine, and the cooperation of that group withAQIM, who correctly saw opportunities to harness support and alliances.

The speed at which the stakes of a previously low-grade, geographicallycontained, separatist rebellion were raised to international significance hasadded to the sense of confusion around Mali’s fate, and contention thatthese conditions might be replicated across the continent. The reality,

21. See Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’ reports for Mali, 2002–11, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports> (18 February 2013).22. Welsh, ‘Making sense of Mali’s armed groups’.

THEMYTHOFGLOBAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM AND LOCAL CONFLICT INMALI 9

however, is that while the deterioration of security conditions in 2012 wassudden, the underlying basis of instability in northern Mali has been emer-ging over years, if not decades.23 Earlier Tuareg uprisings have fed into thecurrent security situation in multiple direct and indirect ways: the 2012 rebel-lion directly set the scene for the subsequent military coup and swift ascen-dance of militant Islamists, while Tuareg separatist militancy was also thebackdrop against which Iyad ag Ghaly (leader of the Islamist Ansar Dine)first came to prominence.24 Moreover, AQIM has been operating in theregion quite openly for several years, and has sought to integrate itself notonly into the economy through criminal activity, but also socially through anactive strategy designed to deepen its linkages in local communities.25

Despite the unique sequencing and factors, several popular perspectivessuggest that this outcome may be repeated across the Sahel. In this world-view, Kenya, Tanzania, Niger, and other states with Islamist politicalparties, who may or may not use some violence to promote these agendas,are considered ready and dangerous potential allies of Al-Qaeda. However,the constellation of factors that combined in Mali’s present crises are highlycontext-specific and embedded in longer-term political, social, and eco-nomic processes. The processes which led to this escalation in conflict arenot broadly generalizable in the region, nor are they sudden and discreteruptures in the history and development of an otherwise stable state. If andwhere the potential exists for comparable escalation of conflict in neigh-bouring regional states, it too would be driven to a greater degree by localand national processes.The ‘inevitability’ of widespread Islamist violence is built on the simplis-

tic understanding of African political and social contexts; the presumptionthat a national government absence suggests a power vacuum; and apointed misinterpretation of how violent groups ‘brand’ themselves in amulti-actor environment. All serve to underscore the stated imperative ofactions by external powers, such as France, or a continued presence byAfricom, which has been clear that its objective is not to engage in military

23. See Susanna Wing, ‘Briefing: Military (mis)adventures in Mali’, African Affairs, 112, 3,in press.24. See Wing, ‘Briefing: Mali’; and Radiodiffusion-Television Malienne, ‘Mali meeting onimplementing Tamanrasset Accord held in Gao’, 8 March 1991, via BBC Summary of WorldBroadcasts; Radiodiffusion-Television Malienne, ‘West Africa: Mali: President Konarereceives Tuareg rebel leader’, 12 May 1993, via BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; AgenceFrance Presse, ‘Last chance for peace with Tuaregs’, 23 December 1994, <http://www.afp.com/en/home/> (30March 2013); Agence France Presse, ‘Ex-rebel attempting to free hostagesin northern Mali’, 3 September 2007 <http://www.afp.com/en/home/> (30 March 2013);Libération, ‘Ex-Malian Tuareg rebel said to be involved in AQIM hostage release talks’, trans-lated via BBC Monitoring Europe, 4 October 2010 <http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/index.htm> (30March 2013).25. Modibo Goïta, ‘West Africa’s growing terrorist threat: confronting AQIM’s Sahelianstrategy’ (Africa Security Brief, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 2011).

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operations, but to pre-empt situations like Mali by securitizing underdevel-opment, climate change, democratic change, and territory itself.26 In suchcases, the local and national contexts and mechanisms that promote vio-lence within a state are ignored in favour of previously determined causessuitable to external powers.

Unpacking such externally driven narratives is integral as they underscorea series of likely policy outcomes that may contribute to the continuation ofthe very conditions we criticize here. For example, to deal with the Malicrisis, external powers offered two solutions: hold elections, thereby legit-imizing the government in Bamako, with little effect on the northern crisis;or intervene with short-term French military presence. The result of thesecond was a scattering of the Islamist threat, not an eradication, followedby a hasty replacement of the French with United Nations African Uniontroops.27 A July 2013 election is designed to establish a more stable solutionbetween military and civilian powers in the south, but without significantchange or attention to the underlying marginalization and exclusion ofnorthern groups. This is largely in line with historical trends of externalsupport for weak governments across the continent, which privileges alli-ances in the ‘War on Terror’, open markets, and slow, if unstable, ‘demo-cratic’ transitions. In turn, characterizing African conflict and chequeredgovernance issues as functions of climate change, poverty, or resource com-petition depoliticizes the very conditions which are inherent to the practiceof politics across the continent.

Conclusions

To date, attempts to make sense of recent Islamist violence in Africa havebeen shaped by a narrative centred on the development of a unified, globalthreat to Western interests, and characterized by a general lack of empiricalevidence to support these claims. We have addressed both these issues bydrawing on recent disaggregated data to highlight the differential nature of adiverse range of violent Islamist groups operating across Africa, and thelocalized nature of the conflicts in which many of them are engaged.

Islamist violence is a growing concern for policy makers, analysts,researchers, and general populations alike, but the nature of this threat ishighly varied: groups are structurally, politically, and empirically different,

26. Robert G. Berschinski, ‘AFRICOM’s dilemma: the “global war on terrorism” “capacitybuilding”, humanitarianism, and the future of US security policy in Africa’ (Strategic StudiesInstitute, US Army War College, 2007); Betsy Hartmann, ‘Lines in the shifting sand: the stra-tegic politics of climate change, human security and national defense’ (paper prepared for thesession on ‘Rethinking security in a changing climate’, GECHS Synthesis Conference,University of Oslo, Norway, 22–24 June 2009).27. See Roland Marchal, ‘Briefing: Military (mis)adventures’ African Affairs, 112, 3, p. 9, inpress.

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and each is located within discrete national contexts and struggles. Anyanalysis which fails to take into account the diverse nature of these actorsrisks not only mislabelling the structural and organizational linkagesbetween distinct groups, but also misdiagnosing the underlying drivers ofconflict at a local level.Further, and perhaps more damaging to future engagement with the dis-

enfranchised and marginalized across states, in aggregating such a broadrange of groups into a single, homogeneous threat, we fail to engage withthe more fundamental crises of governance in which such groups emerge,and unwittingly support strategic efforts to obscure these issues through theconstruction of an all-encompassing Al-Qaeda amalgam.The contexts in which these groups emerge, and the issues shaping their

agendas, are significant in that they have a direct impact on the relevanceand applicability of policy – both national and international – that seeks topre-empt their formation. Policy makers appear to date to have neglectedthe scalar nature of the Islamist violence we see on the African continent:many of the groups that have been described in transnational, global termshave much more localized agendas. A finely tuned understanding of theseagendas, and how they are reflected in structure and action, is required toengage more meaningfully with the causes and manifestations of this threat.

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