ISSN 2502-0722Issue 26/ August 2017

ASEAN in an Era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution:

Prospects and Implications for Workers and Employment

Exploring ASEAN’s Commitment for

Women: Fifty Years of Evolution

Rethinking the Current ASEAN’s

‘War on Drugs’ Approach

Re-balancing ASEAN Integration Medical Tourism vs

Migrants’ Health?

A Note From the Editor

Articles

ASEAN in an Era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Prospects and Implications for Workers and Employment

Exploring ASEAN’s Commitment for Women: Fifty Years of Evolution

Rethinking the Current ASEAN’s ‘War on Drugs’ Approach

Re-balancing ASEAN Integration Medical Tourism vs Migrants’ Health?

ASEAN Round-Up

Indonesia’s Energy Deficit

Agreeing to…. Agree?

Infographic

Political and Economic Milestones of ASEAN

2

1

2

7

18

18

11

20

20

15

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Project Supervisors Rahimah AbdulrahimExecutive Director,The Habibie Center

Hadi KuntjaraDeputy Director for Operations,The Habibie Center

Editor in ChiefA. Ibrahim Almuttaqi

Thinking ASEAN Team Agustha Lumban TobingAskabea FadhillaFina AstrianaMuhamad ArifHana Hanifah BastamanRahma SimamoraTongki Ari WibowoVierna Tasya WensatamaWirya Adiwena

A note from the editorDear readers:

Welcome to the August 2017 issue of the monthly Thinking ASEAN!

This month we continue with the second part of our special edition to commemorate the 50th anniversary celebrations of ASEAN. While the socio-cultural pillar of the ASEAN Community is often the most neglected one, when compared to the two other pillars, it is arguably the most important one if the regional organisation is to ever realize a people-centred and people-oriented ASEAN. Indeed, it could be said that the ASEAN Community will either stand or fall on how much achievements can be carried out in this most vital pillar that touches on the affairs of every day people.

In this sense, we present our readers with four articles that covers issues such as ASEAN in an era of the Fourrth Industrial Revolution and what are its prospects and implications for workers and employment in the region. Our other articles look at evaluating what ASEAN has done for women rights in the region over the past fift years, ASEAN’s War on Drugs and whether a rethink is needed in our approach, and the important debate of balancing medical tourism and the rights of migrants to health coverage.

As usual, we present a summary of the goings-on in selected countries from around Southeast Asia for your perusal and an inforgraphic charting the milestones of ASEAN over the past 50 years..

Don’t hesitate to drop me a line at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have comments, input, or prospective submissions.

Happy reading!

Best regards from Jakarta

Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.

The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.

Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.

The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values.

The missions of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of human resources and the spread of technology.

habibiecenter.or.id

2Issue 26/ August 2017

Workers assemble a car at a Mitsubishi Motors Corp. plant in Laem Chabang, Thailand

Source: Japan Times

ASEAN in an Era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution:

Prospects and Implications for Workers and Employment

Alexander C. Chandra is an Associate Fellow of the ASEAN Studies Programme of The Habibie Center

Kartini I. Pouchous is an independent international development consultantA K

Introduction

A s the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) celebrates its 50th anniversary, the world is entering into what the

founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum (WEF), Klaus Schwab, refers to as the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ (4IR).2 Similar to the three that preceded it, the 4IR--also known as ‘Industry 4.0’, which is characterised by the emergence of digital systems, networked communications, machine learning and large-scale data analysis that paves the way for the advancement of technologies, such as autonomous vehicles, robotic, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, nano- and bio-technology, and quantum computing3--

carries with it major transformation that will change the way we live and work.

Although having the potential to address major global problems, such as poverty, climate change, and food insecurity, 4IR could also bring about risks if not handled properly.4 Notwithstanding its nascent state, this phenomenon already brings about significant changes to existing business and employment models across industries. Although its impacts on employment, both in terms of job creation and job substitution, are still heavily debated amongst scholars, there is increasing evidence that the latest wave of industrial revolution will lead to a pattern of skill-shift and create relatively fewer positions than in the past.

Pattern of automation, digitalisation,and robotisation in ASEAN

ASEAN, a politically and economicallydiverse region consisting of around 639million population and a strong middleclass with growing disposable incomeand increasingly educated workforce, isnot immune from the impact of the 4IR.Technology wise, ‘ASEAN is a very tech-savvy region’.5 As of January 2017, forinstance, the region had 339.2 millioninternet users (53 percent penetrationrate and 31 percent growth from theprevious year), 305.9 million active socialmedia users (47 percent penetration rateand 31 percent growth from the previousyear), 854 million mobile subscriptions (33percent larger than the region’s populationand 8 percent growth from the previousyear), and 272.6 million active mobile so-cial users (42 percent penetration rate and 36 percent growth from the previous year) (refer to Figure 1 and Fig-ure 2).6

Moreover, drawing on its excellenteducation system and the finance andindustrial communities to pioneeradvanced technologies in virtually allsectors of the economy,7 Singapore’srobotic research community is widelyknown be world class with its laboratoriesconsistently generating ingenious roboticsand other advanced technologies thatcomplement the robotics industry.8 ThePhilippines, which is projected to leadSoutheast Asia in terms of growth overthe next couple of years, already overtakesIndia as a major hub for information andtechnology (IT) industry and businessprocess outsourcing (BPO).9

Elsewhere in ASEAN, the use of roboticsis also prevalent. In Thailand, the use ofautomation and robotics in the country’sfood and processing industry has beenon the rise in recent years. Robots,reportedly, have also been used in theagricultural industry to promote smartfarming that will reduce the amount ofresources used and waste generated bythe sector. Meanwhile, in order to increasethe country’s competitiveness, Malaysia iscurrently focusing on the production ofcomplex and high-value products, or alsoknown as frontier products.10 Thoughlagging behind its immediate neighbours,robotics are becoming more prevalentin Indonesia’s automotive, rubber, andplastics industry.11

Despite these trends, gap exists in the useof advanced technologies across ASEANMember States (AMS). Indeed, when itcomes to implementing new technologies

Figure 1. Digital in ASEAN

Source: We Are Social (2017), ‘Digital in 2017: Southeast Asia Regional Overview’, retrieved from (accessed 18th July 2017): <https://wearesocial.com/special-reports/digital-southeast-asia-2017>

Figure 2. Digital growth in ASEAN

Source: We Are Social (2017), ‘Digital in 2017: Southeast Asia Regional Overview’, retrieved from (accessed 18th July 2017): <https://wearesocial.com/special-reports/digital-southeast-asia-2017>

in the workplace, ASEAN enterprises remain followers of technology adoption rather than innovation.12 Moreover, although focused on the wider Asia-Pacific region, a recent study conducted by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission of Asia and Pacific (UNESCAP) also shows that, despite phenomenal mobile expansion and proliferation of social media, connectivity still constraints not only the development of the information and communication technology (ICT), but also various socio-economic development opportunities in the region.13

A number of global measurement indexes confirmed the finding of the UNESCAP Report above. The WEF’s Networked Readiness Index, which measures the propensity for countries to exploit opportunities offered by ICT, put only one ASEAN countries, namely Singapore, in the top 20 countries in its 2016 publication, with Malaysia standing behind at 31st ranked and the rest were ranked below 60 (refer to Table 1).14 Elsewhere, the Business to Customer E-Commerce Index of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),

which measures countries- e-commerce readiness that is based on four indicators, including internet use penetration, secure servers per one million inhabitants, credit card penetration, and postal reliability, also finds that, despite the unparalleled promise of the digital economy, the main barriers in the Asia-Pacific region appear to be the low internet penetration, the relatively poor postal reliability, and the low number of secure servers, which are essential for online shopping services (refer to Table 1).15

Impacts of 4IR on employment in the ASEAN region

Similar to the previous industrial revolutions, the 4IR is raising a lot of debate on how the increasing introduction of digital technologies within the workplace will impact on tomorrow’s job market. Whilst some scholars and labour economists are still questioning the unique role of technologies in slowing down job creation, arguing that jobless growth is generally the result of a combination of various macroeconomic effects, such as globalisation, financial crises, and so on,16 existing literature on the subject

converge to recognise that the latest wave of technology far outpaces the rate at which new jobs and relevant skills are created to adapt to an increasingly low labour-intensive economy in a world that is at the same time experiencing dramatic structural demographic changes. Even if one acknowledges that the ‘future work will be less about technology displacing humans and more about complementarity between humans and technology in the workplace’,17 there is little doubt that, as technologies become more efficient, more affordable, and accessible, the very nature of employment will be considerably redefined, especially in terms of job availability, job access, and job quality.

Unless enterprises, governments, policy-makers, workers, and jobseekers proactively respond and adapt to these fast-encroaching and disruptive technologies, opportunities may be lost and numerous countries may find themselves unprepared for the wider socio-economic consequences that the 4IR phenomenon may entail. This would particularly be true for developing and emerging economies given their engagement in often singular, or less diverse, economic activities and reliance on a larger low-skill and cheaper workforce.18 Moreover, as a result of increased protectionism by key importing countries, which sees a likely phasing-out of manufacturing demand, partly as a result of ‘re-shoring’ attempts by main manufacturing companies, and increasing automation of Asia-based factories, the spectre of jobless growth in countries traditionally serving as the world’s manufacturing powerhouse is looming large19

Southeast Asia is in this regard no exception. Whilst the region reports one of the lowest unemployment rates in the world, the Southeast Asian job market, with the exception of Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia, is mostly dominated by informal economy that provides precarious work to an estimated 60 percent of the region’s economically active population, mostly low-skilled, with little or no social protection, nor financial certainty. Against this background, one could legitimatelly wonder how such labour landscape is and will be influenced by the increased introduction of 4.0 techonologies.

Although sound analyses on the subject remain so far limited, a recent ILO report sheds some light on possible impacts of 4IR on employment in ASEAN. The report predicts that approximately 56 percent of

Countries WEF’s 2016 Network Readiness Index ranking

UNCTAD’s 2016 B2C E-Commerce

Index ranking

ASEAN Member States

Brunei n.a. n.a.

Cambodia 109 119

Indonesia 73 93

Lao PDR 104 115

Malaysia 31 44

Myanmar n.a. n.a.

Philippines 77 89

Singapore 1 23

Thailand 62 69

Vietnam 79 n.a.

ASEAN Plus Six countries

Australia 18 12

China 59 64

India n.a. 90

Japan 10 5

New Zealand 17 10

Republic of Korea 13 7

Table 1. The standing of Asia-Pacific countries in the WEF’s 2016 Networked Readiness Index and UNCTAD’s 2016 2BC e-commerce index

Source: Baller, S., et. al. (2016), ‘The networked readiness index 2016’, in S. Baller, S. Dutta, and B. Lanvin, eds., The global information technology report 2016, Geneva: World Economic Forum, pp. 3-31; UNCTAD (2016), ‘UNCTAD B2C e-commerce index 2016’, UNCTAD Technical notes on ICT for Development, No. 7, pp. 21-25.

4Issue 26/ August 2017

Figure 3. Closing the gender gap at work

Source: Accenture (2017), ‘Getting to Equal: How Digital is Helping Close the Gender Gap at Work’, p. 3.

all employment in five ASEAN countries studied (Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam) is at high risk of displacement due to technologies over the next decade or two. Compared to the services sector, labour-intensive manufacturing sector, particularly the automotive, garment and electronics sectors, will be more impacted with the introduction of technologies like 3D printing, robotic automation and the Internet of Things. Women, in particular, will be more impacted as, due to their lower level of education, they tend to concentrate in low-skill jobs. Considering that most workers engaged in the manufacturing sector are most likely to be at the lower income end, this could have far reaching implications in terms of poverty reduction efforts, potentially forcing many more to take on precarious or unsafe jobs, or simply immigrate to escape unemployment at home.

Yet, poverty projections will need to be carefully considered, as digital technologies have also proven to be incredible empowering tools for individuals to access job markets, particularly for marginalised groups, such as women, or helping

many others to engage in self-employed activities, albeit at small scales. Indeed, as one global consulting firm, Accenture, argues, ‘if governments and businesses double the pace at which women are becoming digitally fluent, [the world] could reach gender equality in the workplace by 2040 in developed nations and by 2060 in developing nations’.20

Unlike the previous industrial waves, the present 4IR will also present challenges to middle-income white collar jobs engaged in service industries.21 Particularly relevant for the ASEAN region is the Business Processing Outsourcing (BPO) sector (calls centres, data-entry, etc.), which directly employs about 1 million workers in the Philippines, 30 percent of which are women.22 Many of the characteristics that make jobs in this sector ‘offshorable’ also make them more vulnerable to automation. Cloud computing and other new features such as Robotic Process Automation (RPA), fraud analytics, data integration, project management, research and development (R&D), mergers and acquisitions valuation, have paved the way for the emergence of so-called knowledge process outsourcing (KPO) system which offer clients more tailored services at a reduced price.23 These advantages make BPO services more accessible to micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) – a previously untapped market segment. Many BPO companies in the Philippines are already shifting to the KPO system, and, as a possible result, the ILO (2016b: xxiv) estimates that employment-wise, 89 percent of about 600,000 workers in call centres in the Philippines could face high risk of automation.24 Yet, as pointed out by another research done by consulting company, Horses for Sources (HfS), the impact of automation on the BPO sector will vary according

to the skill sets. Whilst HfS research also predicts a dip for low-skill repetitive jobs in Philippines’ BPO sector, this loss is nonetheless predicted to be offset by the demand for medium to high skills jobs in the sector.25

Thus, the 4IR is not just all about job destruction. Aside from facilitating job access, particularly for marginalised groups, and supporting entrepreneurship, 4.0 technologies are also predicted to positively impact on the job market, creating new employment opportunities, both in the ICT sector itself and non-ICT sectors. Compared to non-ICT sectors, the ICT sector is, nevertheless, predicted to remain a low-employing sector as it currently is, given the low labour-intensive nature and high skill requirement of the sector. Employment growth in the ICT sector largely depends on one countries’ digital agenda and supporting funding commitment to encourage ambitious ICT-related research and development (R&D) projects, themselves requiring top-of-the-range expert knowledge and skills. In this regard, Southeast Asia is still lagging far behind, except for Singapore where the government is hugely supportive towards the industry as it looks to accelerate the city state’s transformation to a digital economy as part of its Smart Nation initiative (refer to Figure 4).26

ICT R&D will, however, also be needed in numerous non-ICT sectors which are predicted to generate most of the job demand. It has been estimated that computer and mathematical job family is likely to experience very high growth, and this is mainly centred on data analysts and software and applications developers, not only within the ICT industry, but across a wide range of industries, including financial services and investors, media,

Figure 2. Digital growth in ASEANSource: We Are Social (2017), ‘Digital in 2017: Southeast Asia Regional Overview’, retrieved from (accessed 18th

July 2017): <https://wearesocial.com/special-reports/digital-southeast-asia-2017>

entertainment and information, and so on.27 Generally-speaking, tomorrow’s job market will see a shift towards employments that require high skills, such as critical thinking, complex problem-solving, data analysis, creativity, and expert communication.

Concluding remarks

With its large young workforce, increasing level of education and increasing consumption of digitalised services by consumers, Southeast Asia as a whole is in a good position to adjust to the major skill-shift demands of tomorrow’s job market, as long as countries speed up their efforts to enhance digital infrastructure, boost their R&D agenda, and reform their education and up-skilling programmes for the current and future generation of workers, including female workers. Countries in the region could enhance their efforts to upgrade workers’ skills or prepare future generations with adequate training and knowledge on the current sectors most likely to be impacted by automation. Yet, this will not be sufficient for countries to remain competitive globally. Ideally, countries should target niche sectors that respond to tomorrow’s future demographic and environmental challenges. With an increasingly ageing population and growing climate change threats looming on the region, the health and green economy sector can, in this regard, be identified as promising sectors that could unlock new jobs and provide pathways to growth.

Endnotes1 Alexander C. Chandra is an Associate Fellow of the ASE-

AN Studies Programme of The Habibie Center; Kartini I. Pouchous is an independent international development consultant.

2 K. Schwab (2016), ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What It Means, How to Respond’, World Economic Forum, 14th January, retrieved from (accessed 4th July 2017): <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/>.

3 S. Baller, A. di Battista, S. Dutta, and B. Lanvin (2016), ‘The Networked Readiness Index 2016’, in S. Baller, S. Dutta, and B. Lanvin, eds., The Global Information Technology Report 2016, Geneva: World Economic Forum, pp. 3-31, retrieved from (accessed 4th July 2017): <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GITR2016/WEF_GITR_Full_Report.pdf>.

4 Schwab, 2016.

5 J-H. Chang and P. Huynh (2016), ASEAN in Transformation: The Future of Jobs at Risk of Automation, Bureau for Employ-ers’ Activities of the ILO Working Paper No. 9, retrieved from (accessed 19th July 2017): <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actemp/downloads/publications/2016/asean_in_transf_2016_r2_future.pdf>.

6 We Are Social (2017), ‘Digital in 2017: Southeast Asia Re-gional Overview’, retrieved from (accessed 18th July 2017): <https://wearesocial.com/special-reports/digital-southeast-asia-2017>.

7 J. Edwards (2015), ‘Singapore Builds on Robotics Innova-tion’, Robotic Business Review, 8th September, retrieved from (accessed 19th July 2017): <https://www.roboticsbusiness-review.com/research/singapore_builds_on_robotics_in-novation/>.

8 Asian Robotics Review (2016), ‘Singapore: Seeking a Bridge Between’, March issue, retrieved from (accessed 19th July 2017): http://www.asianroboticsreview.com/home4.html>.

9 Asian Robotics Review (2016), ‘The Bounty of Promise of ASEAN: Food, Consumers, and Industry in Exchange for Investment and Automation Technology’, February issue, retrieved from (accessed 19th July 2017): <http://www.asianroboticsreview.com/southeast2.html>.

10 MIDA (2016), ‘MIDA collaborates with UM and UTEM to Embark on a Study on Future Manufacturing’, 2nd June, retrieved from (accessed 19th July 2017): <http://www.mida.gov.my/home/3187/news/mida-collaborates-with-um-utem-to-embark-on-a-study-on-future-manufacturing/>.

11 K. Roehricht (2016), Study on Emerging Markets, with Special Focus on Asia, retrieved from (accessed 19th July 2017): < https://eu-robotics.net/cms/upload/downloads/Rockeu1/2016-07-16_RockEU_Deliverable_412_v2.pdf>, p. 10.

12 ILO – International Labour Organisation (2016), ASEAN in Tranformation: Perspectives of Enterprises and Students on Future Work, Bureau for Employers’ Activities Working Pa-per No. 11, Geneva: ILO, retrieved from (accessed 19th July 2017): <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actemp/downloads/publications/2016/asean_in_transf_2016_r3_persp.pdf>, p. 12.

13 UNESCAP – United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2016), State of ICT in Asia and the Pacific 2016: Uncovering the widening broadband divide, Bangkok: Information and Communications Technology and Disaster Risk Reduction Division of the UNESCAP, retrieved from (accessed 5th July 2017): <http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/State%20of%20ICT%20in%20Asia%20and%20the%20Pacific%202016.pdf>, p. 42.

14 Baller, 2016, p. 16.

15 UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development (2016), ‘UNCTAD B2C E-Commerce Index 2016’, UNCTAD Technical notes on ICT for Development, No. 7, retrieved from (accessed 6th July 2017): <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tn_unctad_ict4d07_en.pdf>, p. 1.

16 D. Rotman (2013), ‘How Technology is Destroying Jobs?’, MIT Technology Review, July-August, retrieved from (accessed 8th July 2017): <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/515926/how-technology-is-destroying-jobs/>.

17 ILO – International Labour Organisation (2016), ‘ASEAN in Transformation: The Future of Jobs at Risk of Automation’, retrieved from (accessed 30th June 2017): <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actemp/downloads/publications/2016/asean_in_transf_2016_r2_future.pdf>, pp. 1-9.

18 Ibid., p. 1.

19 M. Saxers (2017), ‘The Future of Work in Asia: How Can India Create Livelihoods in the Digital Age?’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 17th June, retrieved from (accessed 12th July 2017): <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/indien/13226.pdf>.

20 Accenture (2017), ‘Getting to Equal: How Digital is Help-ing Close the Gender Gap at Work’, retrieved from (accessed 20th July 2017): <https://www.accenture.com/t00010101T000000__w__/ar-es/_acnmedia/PDF-9/Accenture-Getting-To-Equal.pdf>, p. 3.

21 World Bank (2016), ‘World Development Report: Digital Dividends’, retrieved from (retrieved 12th July 2017): <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/896971468194972881/pdf/102725-PUB-Replacement-PUBLIC.pdf>.

22 P. Fersht (2016), ‘Automation Impact: India’s Services Industry Workforce to Shrink 480,000 by 2021 – a decline of 14%’, Horses for Sources, retrieved from (accessed on 12th July 2017): <http://www.horsesforsources.com/indias-services-industry-set-to-lose-640000-low-skilled-jobs-to-automation-by>.

23 ILO (2016), ‘ASEAN in Transformation: How Technology is Changing Jobs and Enterprises’, retrieved from (accessed

30th June 2017): <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actemp/downloads/publications/2016/asean_in_transf_2016_r1_techn.pdf>.

24 Ibid., p. xxiv.

25 P. Fersht (2016), ‘Automation impact: India’s services industry workforce to shrink 480,000 by 2021 – a decline of 14%’, Horses for Sources, retrieved from (accessed on 12th July 2017): <http://www.horsesforsources.com/indias-services-industry-set-to-lose-640000-low-skilled-jobs-to-automation-by>.

26 QBE (2017), ‘Asia-Pacific ICT Trends 2017: the future of the information communication and technology market in Asia-Pacific’, retrieved from (accessed 16th July 2017): <www.qbe.com>.

27 WEF – World Economic Forum (2016), ‘The future of jobs: Employment, skills and workforce strategy for the fourth industrial revolution’, retrieved from (accessed 10th July 2017): <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs.pdf>, p. 15.

Ideally, countries should target niche sectors that respond to tomorrow’s future demographic and environmental challenges.

6Issue 26/ August 2017

Exploring ASEAN’s Commitment for Women:

Fifty Years of Evolution

A customer asks for the price of a bittergourd at Duri market on a railway track in Jakarta

Source: Beawiharta/Reuters

Hana Hanifah Bastaman is a researcher at The Habibie Center’s ASEAN Studies Program

A SEAN has been around for half a century, and yet half of its population are still discriminated, and often victimised, due to their

gender. Women in ASEAN still have a long way to break the glass ceiling in the economic sector. Their participation in the economic sector is persistently lower across all ASEAN countries, and their employment is concentrated in the low-skilled and informal sectors (i.e. agriculture, garment, tourism, and care services), with almost complete absence of access to benefits and social protection.1 It is also reported that various forms of violence against women (VAW) remains widespread and occurs at all levels – in the family, community, society, cross-regionally and transnationally. Domestic violence, sexual assaults, forced marriages, and trafficking in persons for the purposes of exploitation and forced labour are some of the most prevalent cases of VAW in the region.2 Have these problem been addressed by ASEAN? Are they even part of the ASEAN’s project?

In its fifty years of existence, ASEAN has developed a commitment to various agendas related to women and gender equality concerns. Broadly speaking, ASEAN’s commitment, at least on paper, to women and gender equality agenda has developed from simply a concern to include issues related women to a more complex acknowledgment of women’s agency, especially related to agency in development. This article explores the evolution of ASEAN’s commitment towards women and gender equality concerns. It examines the pattern of issue framing that has shaped ASEAN’s main focus on women and gender equality concerns.

Whither women?

Gender equality, specifically women’s empowerment, was not a key concern of ASEAN during its initiation. The founding fathers of ASEAN, not coincidentally all are male, did not include a specific agenda for women and adopted gender-blind language for the Association’s early declaration and treaty, such as the ASEAN Declaration adopted in 1967 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) adopted in 1976.3 In the ASEAN Declaration, for example, it was stated that some of the goals of the Association was to accelerate economic growth, social progress, as well as to promote peace and stability,4 without necessarily acknowledging the unequal

power relations that blocked women’s capacity to participate and benefit from the process of the goals’ attainment.

The development of women’s agenda in ASEAN happened gradually. In the beginning, it focused on the terms on how to best involve women in achieving ASEAN’s goals and how to include women’s related issues within the ASEAN framework. It was the establishment of the ASEAN Women Leaders’ Conference in 1975 that marked the first impetus to involve women in the process of ASEAN integration, and to include issues related to women as part of ASEAN’s agenda.5 The next year, as the ASEAN Committee on Socio-Cultural Activities formally established the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Women (ASW), ASEAN moved to promote and support “women’s activities,” especially in the fields related to health, nutrition, education, and employment in industrial as well as agricultural sectors.6 Implicitly, during its inception, ASEAN had framed its commitment to women’s concerns within the boundaries of the traditional gendered conception of what constitutes to be feminine roles in the field of family health and welfare, as well as in some specific sectors of industry. Other than that, by establishing the ASW under the ASEAN Committee on Socio-Cultural Activities, it also seems like ASEAN had structured women’s agenda within the socio-cultural framework.

In the next phase, ASEAN included women and development approach in its commitment for women and gender concerns. In 1981, the ASW was renamed as ASEAN’s Women’s Programme (AWP), and was given an official mandate as a forum to enhance the role of women in development under the ASEAN Committee on Social Development (COSD).7 AWP created the Clearinghouse on Women in Development, which published the Thesaurus on Women in Development in 1996 as a reference to explain the connection between gender and development.8 The momentum continued to build-on with the adoption of the Declaration on the Advancement on Women, which was signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers in July 1988. This marked the first significant milestone for women’s empowerment agenda in the region. The Declaration recognised the political dimension of women’s position as important agents and beneficiaries of development, and it also suggested the integration and harmonisation of women’s perspective and agenda in national and regional plans.9 The Declaration,

however, did not specify the definition of development, gender mainstreaming, as well as what kind of agency and benefits women could expect from ASEAN. The document only mentioned briefly that women’s role would be considered within their capacity as “productive force to attain the full development of the human personality.”10

The subsequent AWP’s annual meetings were generally focused on the suggestion to implement and operationalise the Declaration. In 1997, the AWP was renamed into ASEAN Sub-Committee on Women (ASW), and the first regional report on the Advancement of Women in ASEAN was published and distributed. Since then, ASEAN has published three regional reports on the Advancement of Women. The latest report was published in 2007. It was aimed mainly to enhance the understanding of the implications of globalisation and regional integration on women’s advancement and gender equality in ASEAN countries, and to identify policy options for ASEAN’s consideration.11

It is also interesting to note that after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, ASEAN pursued a regional reform to build “caring societies,” by shifting the focus of women’s advancement in development to the issue of violence against women as an impediment to the achievement of equality and development, and the enhancement of women’s protection and employability in the context of globalisation.12 Amongst all these, violence against women has been one of the priorities of ASEAN’s engagement with women’s issues. The Hanoi Plan of Action in 1998 framed three priority concerns specific to women, which were (1) trafficking in, and crimes of violence against women and children, (2) the full implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, as well as other international instruments concerning women and children, and (3) the efforts to enhance the capacity of disadvantaged women to enter the work force.13

In regards to this, there were two notable developments. The first was that the institutionalisation of women’s concerns in ASEAN continued to prioritise the protection of women against violence and crimes, especially human trafficking, and violence. Whilst it is true that specific attention must be given for women and girls who are more vulnerable to discrimination, violence and crime, the

8Issue 26/ August 2017

language of protection and the framing of women and girls as victims actually limit their sense of agency into an inherent vulnerable victims of violence who are in need of masculine protectors, such as the state. Secondly, whilst in 1992 the Eleventh Meeting of AWP expressed a concern, and even declined, the arrangements to include children’s issues under its mandate because it would potentially reinforce the idea that children are the sole responsibility of women,14 the Eighteenth Meeting of ASW in 1999 accepted the Hanoi Declaration and Plan of Action, which basically framed the issue of children as an inseparable part of women’s agenda. This seems to be the foundation of the integration of women and children’s agenda within ASEAN, and a pragmatic adjustment to allow for deeper institutionalisation of women’s agenda as it promoted the widely accepted traditional conception of women’s roles and responsibilities as caregivers.

In recent years, ASEAN’s commitment to women and gender concerns is translated into a complex institutional structure. In 2001, ASW was restructured into ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW), which not only oversaw the creation of the ASEAN Committee on the Rights of Women and Children, but also drafted the ASEAN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, adopted in 2004.15 The Declaration reaffirms the region’s framing of violence against women as an obstacle to achieve peace, development, and equality in ASEAN, as well as sets the issue of gender rights and their violations in the concentric circles of individual, familial, communal, and social contexts.16

Moving on, the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) was inaugurated in 2010 as the new main body to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of women and children in ASEAN that reports to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Social Welfare and Development (AMMSWD). It seeks to ensure complementarity with the Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which all ASEAN countries have signed and ratified.17 In the following year, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Women (AMMW) was established as part of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community pillar, further reinstituting the agenda related to women within socio-cultural pillar.18

In this latest development, ASEAN has included a specific conception of

women’s rights, as well as children’s rights. The ACWC Work Plan 2012-2016 has incorporated women’s access to education, political participation, and economic empowerment as women’s rights. Children’s rights are described to be heavily related with issues related to women, such as child rearing and child-caring in the family, and within the framework of protection against human trafficking.19 Other than that, notable development of women’s empowerment agenda in ASEAN can be seen in the terms of human trafficking prevention and solution. In 2015, the ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children was signed by the Heads of States at the 27th ASEAN Summit in November, which was then followed by the launching of the Regional Review on Laws, Policies, and Practices within ASEAN related to the Identification, Management, and Treatment of Victims of Trafficking, Especially Women and Children in 2016.

Three observations can be made from ASEAN’s recent progress in women and gender equality concerns. The first is that ASEAN seems to have pushed women’s empowerment agenda forward by framing women’s protection and participation as part of their human rights. Secondly, ASEAN has also further reaffirmed the link between children and women, which endorses the idea that children are the main responsibility of women. Thirdly, it seems that in ASEAN, framing women in terms of their instrumental value to the development agenda and their vulnerable position as victims has made it possible for deeper institutionalisation of women and gender equality concerns. Whilst this is a promising improvement, it also indicates that ASEAN still sees gender equality agenda mostly in term of women’s protection and participation by looking at women as a homogenous group with special needs that are not necessarily political.20 Furthermore, ASEAN also still looks at women within its traditional feminine notion, with specific characteristics and roles that constrain their full potential agency.

The Way Forward

Moving ahead, ASEAN needs to pay more attention to the danger of instrumentalisation, especially in promoting women and development agenda, because the inclusion of gender in programmes or strategies does not necessarily guarantee to serve the goals of gender equality and women’s well being, and might even hinder them.21 This

is especially relevant for ASEAN because, as recent research suggests, there is an asymmetrical correlation between gender equality and economic growth. Whilst the promotion of gender equality has shown to consistently result in better growth, economic growth in itself does not guarantee to deliver better gender equality on all fronts.22 Despite the impressive growth record, ASEAN women still lagged behind in terms of employment participation, both in numbers and in quality. The problem of the gender wage gap also persists, in which women in Southeast Asia are projected to continue to earn 20 percent less than men in 2025.23 Furthermore, women’s substantial contribution in the family through fulfilling household task and child rearing is still largely invisible and not valued in the calculation of economic development. There seems to be a gap between women’s significant contribution to the development and the achievement of gender equality. ASEAN should transform this by further promoting the fulfilment of women’s rights as part of human rights, not just supporting the use of women as an additional labour force to make growth statistics looks better.

In promoting women’s rights and gender equality, ASEAN must not ignore the intersection of other social identities that often serve as the basis of inequality, such as class, race, and ethnicity. ASEAN seems to have the tendency to frame women and men, not to mention children, as a homogenous group with little regard to the other social identities. This can result in inequality because whilst positive transformations have taken place for women who could benefit from new opportunities created by the economic and political dynamics, other women who have been excluded and marginalised due to their social identities have not gained the same advantages.24 Indeed, the progress of gender equality agenda in ASEAN is moving slowly and has not yet reached the point where ASEAN is allowed to frame gender equality outside the traditional binary construction of femininity and masculinity. This should not be the case because the overarching goal should be social equality, in which every person will have the freedom to actualise themselves despite the differences in gender identity, ethnicity, class, or race.

Additionally, ASEAN’s aim to mainstream gender across all pillars and activities, must be treated cautiously. The integration of gender issues into all programmes often resulted in simplification of gender

equality and women’s empowerment goals, and what should be a process of social transformation then turned into a technical process and became depoliticised. This means that the implementation of gender mainstreaming should not reduce a range of gender problems by naively seeking to empower women by simply giving out what is thought to be the missing elements (i.e. credit or certain skills).25 The unequal power relations within the structure of the society that blocked women’s capacity to influence and participate in development processes must be taken into account and gradually changed through campaign and education alongside the existing practical mechanism. All stakeholders – the government, private companies, NGOs or CSOs, and the wider public – must be involved to ensure the sustainability and transparency of gender mainstreaming programmes. It might take another fifty years for ASEAN to achieve this, but the region has the basic structure and on-paper commitment to realise this, if done properly.

Endnotes1 ASEAN Secretariat (2016), Projected Gender Impact of the

ASEAN Economic Community. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

2 UN Women (n.d.), “Violence Against Women,” UN Women Issue Briefs on Women’s Human Rights in the ASEAN Region, retrieved from: <http://unwomen-asiapacific.org/docs/cedaw/archive/issue_brief/Issue_Brief_Violence%20Against%20Women.pdf>.

3 Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (2013), An ASEAN Handbook for Women’s Rights Activists, Chiang Mai: Southeast Asia Women’s Caucus on ASEAN Secretariat, pp. 13.

4 ASEAN Secretariat (1967), “The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)”, retrieved from: <http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/>.

5 The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (2005), ASEAN Committee on Women 30 Years After, Manila: the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, pp. 5.

6 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

7 Ibid., pp. 11.

8 Davies, Matthew (2016), “Women and Development, Not Gender and Politics: Explaining ASEAN’s Failure to Engage with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 109.

9 ASEAN Secretariat (1967), Op. cit.

10 Ibid.

11 ASEAN Secretariat (2007), Third Report on the Advancement of Women in ASEAN, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, pp. 2.

12 Davies (2016),Op. cit., pp. 109-110.

13 ASEAN Secretariat (1998), “Hanoi Plan of Action,” retrieved from: <http://asean.org/?static_post=hanoi-plan-of-action>.

14 The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (2005), Op. cit. pp. 30.

15 LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security (2016), “ASEAN Committee on Women,” retrieved from: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/regional/southeast-asia/asean-committee-on-women/>.

16 Davies (2016), Op. cit., pp. 110.

17 ACWC (n.d.), “About ACWC,” retrieved from: <https://acwc.asean.org/about/>.

18 Davies (2016), Op. cit., pp. 110.

19 ACWC (2012), ACWC Work Plan 2012-2016 and Rules of Procedures (ROP), Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, retrieved from: <https://acwc.asean.org/about/the-acwc-work-plan-2012-2016/>.

20 See also Davies (2016), Op. cit.

21 L. Beneria, G. Berik and M. S. Floro (2016), Gender, Development, and Globalization – Economics as if All People Mattered, New York: Routledge , pp. 3.

22 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank (2011) World Development Report 2012 – Gender Equality and Development, Washington DC: The World Bank.

23 International Labor Organization (ILO) and Asian Development Bank (ADC) (2014), ASEAN Community 2015: Managing Integration for Better Jobs and Shared Prosperity, Bangkok, Thailand: ILO and ADB, retrieved from: <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/42818/asean-community-2015-managing-integration.pdf>.

24 L. Beneria, G. Berik and M. S. Floro (2016), Op. cit., pp. 4.

25 See for example Rai, Shirin (2002), Gender and Political Economy of Development: From Nationalism to Globalisation, Cambridge: Polity Press; Mukhopadhyay, Maitrayee (2004), “Mainstreaming Gender or ‘Streaming’ Gender Away: Feminists Marooned in the Development Business,” IDS Bulletin 35 (4): 95-103.

ASEAN needs to pay more attention to the danger of instrumentalisation, especially in promoting women and development agenda, because the

inclusion of gender in programmes or strategies does not necessarily guarantee

to serve the goals of gender equality and women’s well being, and might even

hinder them.

Issue 26/ August 2017 10

Rethinking the Current ASEAN’s ‘War on Drugs’

Approach

Police officers incinerating seized drugs at an event to mark International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, outside Yangon

Source: Global New Light Of Myanmar

Askabea Fadhilla is a researcher at The Habibie Center’s ASEAN Studies Program

T he year 2015 marked an important year for a Drug-Free ASEAN. The Declaration on Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 called on ASEAN Member

States (AMS) to ‘realize the vision and goal of a drug-free ASEAN Community by 2015 as a high-priority agenda of ASEAN.1 The launching of this Declaration reflects AMS’ seriousness in pursuing more effective anti-drugs campaigns and policy.

Furthermore, at the end of March this year, the Indonesian government transferred many drug-related convicts to the prison island of Nusakambangan, which is infamous for a place where the Indonesian government carries out executions for death row inmates. Around the same time, President Joko Widodo, who immediately restored the death penalty moratorium after he came into power in 2014, stated his inclination to reapply the death penalty if the Indonesian public supports it. A survey carried out in 2015 found that 85 percent of Indonesians showed great support of death penalty for drug traffickers. More recently, a statement by an Indonesian Attorney General suggested that the administration is likely to pursue the fourth round of execution soon.2

President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines echoed the same sentiment. Earlier this year, he proposed to the House of Representatives to bring back capital punishment after it was abolished back in 2006. The proposed bill covers nine types of drug crimes, including the import, sale, manufacture, cultivation, or possession of drugs, making it possible for small drug offenses to be easily punishable by death penalty. This move was, unquestionably, a major part of Duterte’s controversial war on drugs, which already took the lives of more than 6,000 alleged drug criminals since he took the office in June 2016.3

The Philipines’ campaign against drugs was met by the same enthusiasm from Cambodia. Following President Duterte’s footsteps, Prime Minister Hun Sen launched his government’s war on drugs initiative in December last year. Cambodian government officials stated that the rise of drug addicts to almost 30 percent last year was the major rationale behind the campaign.4 This tough on drug attitude resonates well amongst many Cambodians as many express increase concerns about the issue.

The Demand of Punitive Approach

There is no denying that drug related

crimes pose incredible threats to the society. The Southeast Asia region is home for the world’s second largest market of narcotics, especially opium. The Golden Triangle - an area formed roughly by the upland frontier areas of Thailand, Laos, Myanmar and China - together with Afghanistan serve as the major source of global opium supply.5 The lack of robust and effective border management, as well as regional maritime security enforcement capabilities contribute in making the region a crucial transit area for the distribution of drugs across the region and beyond.

ASEAN as an association has taken some serious measures to address the issue. The notion of a Drug-Free ASEAN can be traced as far back as 1976 when the Foreign Ministers of the then five AMS agreed on the ‘ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuse of Narcotics Drugs’ to address the region’s major concern on ‘…the health and welfare’.6 The principles enshrined in the said Declaration were further translated an annual Drug Expert Group Meeting to facilitate the exchange of information on effective legislation and law enforcement policies in the region. AMS also agreed to establish the ASEAN Narcotic Desk to provide information on drug-related issues, and organised joint activities and programs to enhance ASEAN’s ability in dealing with drug trafficking problems.7

In responding to drug-related cases as explained previously, AMS have the tendency to respond tough through punitive method in addressing the issue. Accordingly, it is not surprising that capital punishment and extrajudicial killing have become the most preferable approach in combating drug abuse for some ASEAN countries.8 They share the same belief that drug offense is the most serious crime that requires extraordinary measure to deal with.9 This is further backed by the support of the majority of population in each respective country.

For example, Malaysia applied the first capital punishment in 1975 and it became mandatory in 1983.10 In Singapore, meanwhile, mandatory death sentence for drug trafficking crimes has been considered as an appropriate method to deter drug-related crimes.11 Despite the condemnation from the international community, the Singaporean government insists that as one of the safest countries in the world, drug offenders have violated the right of the victims and the rights of community as a whole.12 Fortunately, authorities in Malaysia and Singapore

appear to be increasingly inclined to follow global trend in abolishing death penalty for drug offenses.13

Deterrent effect or deteriorating effect?

Many argue that ASEAN War on Drugs was a crucial decision taken in light of an increasing trend in drug-related cases, and which further required ASEAN countries to step up their collaborative efforts to realize a Drug-Free region. The existing punitive approach undertaken by many AMS today has been claimed to have deterrent effect towards drug dealers and traffickers. President Joko Widodo of Indonesia, for example, argued that the death penalty is as an important ‘shock therapy’ for the perpetrators, and that those involved in dealing and trafficking drugs ‘destroy … the future of the nation’.14 Duterte echoed this tough stance by affirming that only a harsh and punitive approach to drug use will bring a deterrent effect and reduce crime rates.15

The deterrent theory is basically based on the premise that, not only the object of punishment will not commit the crime for the second time, but it also sets an example for others who are inclined to commit the same crime.16 A study conducted by the Amnesty International, however, argued that there is a lack of evidence that deterrent effect will contribute significantly in decreasing the negative impacts of drug abuse. Drug trafficking rate in many AMS increases despite the introduction of punitive method for the crime. Since 1975, for example, there were 200 people executed in Malaysia. Despite this number, the 2004 report from International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) pointed out that there was an increase of heroin availability due to its rising demand.17

Evidence from Indonesia also shows heightened response towards this issue within a specific period of time. Since President Joko Widodo took office in 2014 and decided to execute 14 drug convicts in 2015 alone, the number of drug cases and drug offenders have not been declining. As of June 2015, data from the Indonesian National Narcotic Board showed that there were 4.2 million drug users in Indonesia. This number increased to 5.9 million drug users in November 2015. This increase occurs within the same year when the two rounds of executions carried out by the current administration on January and April 2015.18 Moreover, according to the Indonesian Coordinating

Issue 26/ August 2017 12

Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs, there was also an increase of 13.6% of drugs cases every single year. The increasing number of cases in 2015 was the highest since 2010.19

It is, therefore, clear that deterrent effect through punitive method does not necessarily yield a Drug-Free region. There are several reasons as to why this punitive approach is likely to cause more harm than good in realising the Drug-Free ASEAN. Domestic considerations, such as limited access to a just and fair trial, is a case in point. In the case of the Philippines, for example, President Duterte’s war on drugs campaign encourages and even orders citizens to take the law into their own hands, and shoot dead drug dealers themselves. Police force is also encouraged to carry out extrajudicial killings. This policy has left thousands of alleged drug criminals shot dead on the streets, two-third of which were murdered by unknown assailants.20

Whilst drug convicts in Indonesia still receive trials, The Institute of Criminal Justice Reform’s report show that many of them do not receive a fair one. ICJR disclosed that the Indonesian law enforcement officers allegedly torture or intimidate the convicts and witnesses. 11 cases of capital punishment between 2002 and 2013 also showed the absence of legal assistance to the defendants.

Another argument put forth by Amnesty International as to why capital punishment is no longer relevant is related with human rights issues.21 There is little doubt that capital punishment violates the convicts’ right to life, right to be free from cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment, as well as the right to standard of living and well being.22

Some would argue that the domestic

policies adopted by individual AMS are ineffective to eradicate drugs-related crimes. Evidences show that there are, indeed, problems with the current ASEAN’s approach in creating a Drug-Free region. Whilst the original focus of a Drug-Free ASEAN is the ‘health and welfare of humankind’, in practice, there has been an overwhelming focus on punishment, law enforcement and criminal justice.

Exploring Alternative Approach

Alarming concerns have been raised by regional and international human rights groups as the death toll in the region continues to rise. The Indonesian Government, for example, has been encouraged by these human rights advocates to pay attention to the United Nation’s request to abolish death penalty from its judicial system.23 Similar call has also been made by some prominent figure in Indonesia’s politic, such as the former President of Indonesia B.J. Habibie. Nearing the fourth round of execution that took place on July 2016, President Habibie, known for his firm stance against death penalty, sent a letter to President Joko Widodo, assured him that, It is possible to fight narcotics-related crime without imposing death penalty.24

Given vast amount of evidence showing the failure of capital punishment and punitive method to reduce drug-related offenses, what would be a better way to create a Drug-Free ASEAN?

To start with, ASEAN needs to consider a more humanist approach so as to enable the region’s drug policies to address core aspects of social welfare and public health. Southeast Asia’s punitive approach to drug use stands in stark contrast with softer approach used elsewhere that emphasises the provision of public health system, decriminalization of drug use, effective

prevention.The region’, for example, can take a lesson from Colombia who has been at the forefront of the global effort against War on Drugs. After having exhausted numerous approach to address chronic drug problem in his country, President Juan Manuel Santos proposed a call from international community to consider more humane solution to tackle the main roots of the problem, rather than focusing on punitive and prohibitionist method.25

Moreover, what can ASEAN do at the regional level to push the agenda forward, on the one hand, whilst avoid sacrificing lives of many, on the other? Through its own Drug Expert Group Meeting, ASEAN should be able to come up with more effective method to tackle drug problem by taking into account recent development that capital punishment is ineffective and implementing an evidence-based strategy to solve drug-related problems in Southeast Asia. It is understandable when some countries are eager to be seen as a champion in the War on Drugs. However, this should not jeopardise other important principles of human rights and dignity that the global community upholds.

Endnotes1 ASEAN Secretariat (2012), ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration

on Drug-Free ASEAN 2015’, retrieved from <http://www.asean.org/storage/archive/documents/Declaratin%20on%20Drug%20Free%20ASEAN_Endorsed%20by%20Summit_FINAL.pdf >

2 Margareth S. Aritonang (2017), ‘Govt refuses to implement moratorium on death penalty,’ The Jakarta Post,12th April, retrieved from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/12/govt-refuses-to-implement-moratorium-on-death-penalty.html>

3 Tomasito Villarin (2017), ‘Duterte Wants the Death Penalty Back,’ The New York Times, 29th January, retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/opinion/duterte-wants-the-death-penalty-back.html?_r=0>

4 David Hutt (2017), “In Duterte’s footsteps, Hun Sen launches a drug war,” Asia Times, 9th February, retrieved from <http://www.atimes.com/article/dutertes-footsteps-hun-sen-launches-drug-war/>

ASEAN needs to consider a more humanist approach so as to enable the region’s drug policies to address core aspects of social

welfare and public health

5 The Habibie Center, “A New Approach to a Drug-Free ASEAN,” ASEAN Briefs, Vol. 4, Issue 2, November 2016

6 ASEAN Secreatriat (1976), ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuse of Narcotic Drugs, retrieved from <http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-declaration-of-principles-to-combat-the-abuse-of-narcotics-drugs-manila-26-june-1976>

7 O’Hara & Salleh, “Recent Development in Legislative and Administrative Measures in Countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations to Counter the Illicit Traffic in Drugs,” Bulletin of Narcotics 39, 1987, pg 51–56

8 Leeichaianan & Longmire, “The Use of the Death Penalty for Drug Trafficking in the United States, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand: A Comparative Legal Analysis,” Laws 2013, 2, Laws 2013, pg 121

9 Ibid., 130

10 Ibid., 132

11 Michael Hor, “The Death Penalty in Singapore and International Law,” Singapore Year Book of International Law and Contributors, 8, 2004, pg 105–117

12 Leeichaianan & Longmire, op.cit, 128-130

13 Ibid., 119

14 The Guardian (2014), ‘Bali Nine: Indonesian president rules out clemency for inmates on death row,’ 10th December, retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/10/bali-nine-indonesian-president-rules-out-clemency>

15 Independent (2016), ‘Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte says he ‘doesn’t give a s*** about human rights’ as 3,500 killed in war on drugs,’ 17th October, retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-doesnt-give-a-s-about-human-rights-war-on-drugs-civilians-a7365156.html>

16 Hoyle & Hood, “Deterrence and public opinion,” Moving Away from the Death Penalty: Arguments, Trends and Perspectives, 2014

17 Sidney Harring, “Death, Drugs and Development: Malaysia’s Mandatory Death Penalty for Traffickers and the International War on Drugs,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 29, 1991

18 See http://icjr.or.id/data/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Update_Kondisi_Hukuman_Mati_di_Indonesia_2016.pdf

19 CNN Indonesia (2016), ‘Kapolri: Kasus Narkoba Meningkat 13,6 Persen Tiap Tahun,’ 25th February, retrieved from <http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160224201843-12-113306/kapolri-kasus-narkoba-meningkat-136-persen-tiap-tahun/>

20 Ted Regencia & Mohsin Ali (2016), ‘Philippines: Death Toll in Duterte’s war on drugs,’ Aljazeera, 15th December, retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/philippines-death-toll-duterte-war-drugs-160825115400719.html>

21 Sita Legac, “The Negative Impacts on the Global War on Drugs: Can International Drug Enforcement be Successful without Infringing on Human Rights?,” Albany Government Law Review, 3, 2010

22 Ibid.

23 Margareth S. Aritonang (2017), ‘Indonesia urged to heed UN call to abolish death penalty,’ The Jakarta Post, 10th April, retrieved from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/10/ri-urged-to-heed-un-call-to-abolish-death-penalty.html>

24 Ina Parlina & Margareth S. Aritonang (2016), ‘Convicts get executions stayed,’ The Jakarta Post, 30th July, retrieved from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/07/30/convicts-get-executions-stayed.html>

25 Sibylla Brodzinsky (2016), ‘After 30 years on the frontline, Colombia looks beyond the failed war on drugs,’ The Guardian, 18th April, retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/18/colombia-united-nations-assembly-war-on-drugs>

Issue 26/ August 2017 14

Imagine ASEANat your fingertipsthcasean.org

Re-balancing ASEAN Integration Medical

Tourism vs Migrants’ Health?

Dr. Khairul Bariah (center), an oral maxillofacial surgeon from Hospital Tengku Ampuan Afzan performs surgery on a patient with the assistance of U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Jeffrey Healy and U.S. Navy Capt. Craig Salt

Source: Wikimedia Commons

CHAN Chee KhoonUniversity of Malaya

T he Southeast Asian region is home to major labor-sending countries (Indonesia, Philippines, Myanmar) as well as labor-receiving countries

(Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, which also receive large numbers of labor migrants from Nepal, Bangladesh, India).

In Malaysia, about 1 in 4 employed persons are migrants. In Singapore, foreigners account for about 40% of the island’s total workforce (2012), while in Thailand (2010), there were 2.46 million low-skilled migrants from three neighbouring countries (Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia).

Host countries benefit from the enhanced economic growth that migrant labor makes possible (which may entail winners as well as losers), while migrants benefit from employment and livelihood opportunities (to the extent that decent working and living conditions are ensured for migrant as well as local workers).

The social dimension of ASEAN’s regional integration however seems to have taken a back seat to trade liberalisation and regional economic integration, judging by the glacial pace of progress towards a mandate (and instrument) for the enforcement of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (2007).1

Universal Health Coverage

In the Southeast Asian region, citizens of Malaysia and Singapore have long benefited from widely accessible tax-funded or subsidized government healthcare, and

Brunei nationals (who do not pay personal income taxes) enjoy wide-ranging health and social benefits at public expense. In Thailand, the National Health Security Act (2002) extended healthcare coverage beyond civil servants and their dependents, and employees in the formal (private) sector, to the majority of the population who hitherto had limited access to healthcare. The Philippines National Health Insurance Program (PhilHealth), established in 1995, reported that 79% of Filipinos were covered by 2013. Indonesia established a national health insurance scheme (Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional) in November 2014 with the ambitious target of enrolling 121.6 million citizens in the first year and achieving universal coverage for a projected 250 million citizens by 2019.

Universal Health Coverage (UHC), in a national context, often translates however into citizen entitlements, leaving migrant workers (documented and undocumented), refugees, and asylum seekers to fall through the cracks.

Not surprisingly, labor-sending countries favor more generous ‘quasi-citizen’ access to social benefits for migrant workers in their host countries:

“Our collective efforts are needed in the ASEAN to support reforms that will enable migrant workers to find safe, legal, and decent work and to work in dignity and with the support, not only of the government of their home countries, but also of the government of their host countries,” said Social Welfare Secretary Judy Taguiwalo, chair

of the ASCC pillar. During the meeting, Taguiwalo also urged the delegates to work together to protect all migrant workers and treat them as they would their own citizens when they are in need”.2

Trickle Down Regionalism?

The three labor-receiving ASEAN countries however (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand) appear more preoccupied with a different category of health-seeking foreigner, namely, ‘medical tourists’ which in Malaysia and Singapore may also include migrant workers with private insurance coverage. The Malaysian federal government, for instance, which controls the second largest listed healthcare provider in the world, IHH Healthcare, focuses more on an integrated regional health market than on regionally harmonized social policy.

On June 24, 2017, following its earlier public forums on regional labor migration, SEA Junction, in collaboration with the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, convened a panel (Jiruth SRIRATANABAN, CHAN Chee Khoon, Rebecca FARBER) to lead a discussion on Seeking Health Across the Border, at the Bangkok Art & Culture Centre.

It soon became clear that a very basic issue, viz. the lack of a uniform definition of a ‘medical traveler’ which had been demonstrably operationalised by reporting sources, remained problematical, whether in a regional overview (JS), or in national reports (CCK). The resulting patchy and quite ambiguous statistics allow for wildly diverging estimates and pronouncements.

Sarawak General HospitalSource: Wikimedia Commons

Issue 26/ August 2017 16

Citing an OECD publication by Lunt and colleagues (2011, “we can narrow down the number of medical tourists worldwide as lying somewhere between 60,000 and 50 million”)3, health economist David Reisman acknowledged that “speculation abounds… it is not even certain that the market is growing”.4

The reasons for this state of affairs are well known: the conflation, in reported statistics, of treatment-seeking travelers with treatment seeking episodes by migrant labourers, resident expatriates, foreign retirees, foreign students, vacationing tourists, multiple counting (and sometimes, under-counting), on top of the elastic boundaries of the category ‘healthcare’ as notions of etiology (causation of ill health, determinants of well-being) become more encompassing.

In 2011 for instance, the state of Penang, which accounted for 60-70% of foreign patients who traveled to Malaysia expressly for the purpose of seeking treatment, reported that 95% of these Penang-bound patients, were from Indonesia. By contrast, only 57% of the more encompassing category of foreign passport holders treated in Malaysia in toto, were Indonesian nationals.

Migrant Rights & Responsibilities

Unlike the medical tourists much welcomed in ASEAN member states, migrant workers are often perceived as an added imposition on overburdened public services, if not as freeloaders. In fact, migrants in Malaysia pay about four times the user charges levied on Malaysians at

government hospitals, under a mandatory hospitalisation and surgical insurance scheme that costs RM 120 annually with maximum reimbursements of RM 10,000 (USD 1 = RM 4.29).

Migrant workers in Malaysia also contribute significantly to public finances through annual levies (currently RM 640-1850) paid for by the workers, along with assorted administrative charges (and consumption taxes).

These levies and charges, amounting to RM 1121-2331 annually, translate into de facto income taxes which are quite regressive.

For example, migrants earning RM 1000/month would be paying a de facto income tax rate of 9-19%, which would put them in the same tax bracket as that of a mid-career academician in Malaysia, without the citizen entitlements of the latter. A Malaysian citizen earning the same minimum wage income as the migrant worker would be paying 0.6% of his or her annual salary as income taxes (more likely zero after tax deductibles).

Towards an ASEAN Social Charter?

Since regimes of taxation and social entitlements vary across ASEAN countries, a multilateral agreement among ASEAN member states on contributory options for migrants, which would entitle them and their dependents to designated ‘citizen-equivalent’ social benefits in their host country, should perhaps avoid a one-size-fits-all approach.

An approach customised to the (evolving)

taxation and social entitlement regimes of respective ASEAN member states may better accommodate, and build upon, the diversity of such regimes in the region.

The envisaged multilateral agreement for instance might adopt the generic principle that mandatory contributory regimes of the host country (including income taxes) could be extended to migrant workers, who in return would be entitled to (designated?) social benefits (on the same terms?) as are available to local citizens.

This, arguably, might have better political traction among the decision makers and general public of the host countries, than a narrowly rights-based discourse and approach to social benefits and entitlements for labor migrants.

This article is written as part of the “ASEAN People in FLux” etc.

Endnotes1 Moe Thuzar. ASEAN’s long road to protect migrant

workers The Myanmar Times 29 June 2017 http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/opinion/26599-asean-s-long-road-to-protect-migrant-workers.html

2 ASCC chair urges ASEAN leaders to set up re-forms for migrant workers http://www.asean2017.ph/ascc-chair-urges-asean-leaders-set-reforms-migrant-workers/

3 Lunt, N, Smith, R, Exworthy, M, Green, ST, Horsfall, D and Mannion, R (2011) Medical Tourism: Treatments, markets and health system implications: A scoping review. Paris: OECD

4 David Reisman (2014) Trade in Health: Economics, Ethics and Public Policy (p.6) Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

A S E A N R O U N D - U P

Issue 26/ August 2017 18

Once a cornerstone of the economy, Indonesia’s oil and gas sector is in a slump, even as the country’s appetite for energy soars. Hit by a drop in global prices, changing regulations and competition from neighbors that are proving more attractive to international energy companies, Southeast Asia’s biggest economy is facing a decline in oil revenue and steadily rising fuel imports.

Why it Matters?

It has been fifteen years since Indonesia has been a net oil exporter. Now it is importing its oil and its gas production -although still high- has been declining since its peak in 2010. If the current trend of sluggish oil production continues, Indonesia oil imports will increase to almost two million barrels a day by 2022, up from today’s 500,000 barrels a day, whereas if gas production keeps on declining, Indonesia will become a net gas importer by as soon as 2020.

This does not bode well for a country with a population growth rate of just above one percent per year, a GDP growth rate of slightly above five percent, and the population’s increasingly insatiable appetite for energy. Indonesia, with its many potential sites for oil and gas exploration and certainly for geothermal energy sources (look at our teeming volcanoes), must perforce find the political

and economic capacity to produce more energy.

The problem with oil exploration today comes both from uncontrollable external factors as well as the usual internal political dithering. Externally: some studies have shown that for oil production in Indonesia to be profitable, then prices must at least be US$ 95 per barrel; given that the current price of crude oil is slightly below US$ 50 per barrel after plunging from more than US$ 130 since the heady days before the Great Recession of 2008, it is quite understandable that investments for oil exploration has shrank from US$ 1.3 billion a year to its now measly US$ 100 million dollars.

But the problem comes from inside as well. More so than most things in Indonesia, the energy industry is rife with corrupt officials asking for fees to grant oil companies a superfluous number of actual permits and approvals. The current energy minister’s plan to cut some of the red tape is of course welcome, and the energy industry’s irritatingly redundant complaint that the new

cost-recovery policy of the government not paying companies for exploration should not be heeded. What is needed is a simplification of Indonesia’s energy institutions.

Currently, the law concerning the oil industry has the SKK Migas as the governing body of the upstream oil industry that has the power to grant contracts of cooperation with either PT. Pertamina -the state-owned oil and gas company privileged to operate at certain open area sites- or a host of foreign oil and gas company through a lengthy process of auctions. There are also the many regional governments obliged to give permits as well as receive some of the revenue from production done in their provinces. The number of permits that one must go through before one can start to produce the black gold is 341 permits spread across nineteen ministries and government agencies. The process of oil and gas exploration is expensive, time-consuming, and risky enough even without the equally resource-wasting process of getting all the relevant approvals signed by each of those institutions, not to mention all the backdoor agreements and payments such a complex structure and multiple approval levels inevitably brings about. No wonder investments in the oil and gas industry for 2017 is less than a fifth of the President’s target.

Indonesia’s Energy Deficit

Bloomberg News, August 15https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-14/whatever-happened-to-indonesia-s-mighty-oil-and-gas-industry

Agustha Lumban Tobing is a researcher at The Habibie Center’s ASEAN Studies Program

Ahead of the next round of Asian summitry led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) set for Manila later this week, reports have surfaced that, as expected, ASEAN countries and China will endorse a framework on the code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea that had first been agreed to in May.

Even though we ought to recognize any amount of diplomatic progress, however small, when it comes to the contentious South China Sea disputes, we also need to keep things in perspective by asking: what does the so-called ASEAN-China draft framework on a code of conduct in the South China Sea actually mean, and to what extent does it matter?

Why it Matters?

China agreed to a Declaration on the Code of Conduct ( D O C ) regarding the South China Sea (or whatever one is inclined to call it) back in 2002. Fifteen years later, back in May, China and ASEAN states

agreed again on a Framework on the Code of Conduct (FOC). In the intervening fifteen years, China has effectively militarized the Spratly Islands (which it took from the Philippines back in 1995), coerced Vietnam into dropping energy exploration ventures, and pressuring states -whether South China Sea claimant or not- not to ‘interfere’ in their sovereignty.

The agreement between ASEAN member states and China to (someday) agree to talk about a still-non-existent COC

is a continuation of ASEAN’s increasingly weak

determination to protect

t h e i r t e r r i t o r y and China’s duplicity of c y c l i c a l l y u s i n g c o e r c i v e maneuvers

w h i c h they then

calibrate with diplomatic charm and economic incentives to keep other claimants

silent to ultimately enlarge their territorial claims. Even

when China has lost the arbitral tribunal ruling to the Philippines, China has yet to

Agreeing to…. Agree?The Diplomat, August 5http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/will-a-china-asean-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct-really-matter/

soften their stance regarding the so-called ‘nine-dash line’, nor has ASEAN states become more aggressive in asserting their sovereignty in an embarrassing attempt to court much-needed Chinese investors. Whatever agreement the DOC concluded, it did not result in any meaningful understanding. Whatever ‘little diplomatic achievements’ (however hallucinatory) ASEAN officials claims the DOC to be, it has not resulted in any actual change in how China conducts itself in the disputed sea.

If no true progress is made in the South China Sea, it is only a matter of time before China effectively makes the whole of the South China Sea their own, say, by enforcing an Air Defense Identification Zone, a binding COC wouldn’t matter much as China would have already won. Diplomats have failed and are unlikely to not fail in the future.

Issue 26/ August 2017 20

Data Compiled by The Habibie Center2017 | Clarissa Jazzlyne & Tongki AW

ASEAN STUDIES PROGRAMThe Habibie Center

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The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the

development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same

goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.

The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also

to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the

establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.

Cover:Yasothon Rocket Festival 2013

Source: Wikimedia Commons