james monroe and the three to five clause of the northwest ordinance

8/8/2019 James Monroe and the Three to Five Clause of the Northwest Ordinance

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James Monroe and the Three-To-Five Clause of the Northwest Ordinance

By Jorge M. Robert

In recent years, early American historians have re-examined the pervasive influence of American

expansionism on the life of the American republic, and the harshly criticized Turner's frontier thesis of a

century ago (1).

The expansion of the English colonies in North America was a continuous process which began as early

as the time of the first settlers' arrival in the New World. The constant influx of immigration and the

never ceasing westward migration brought up the need for more territory which in turn would admit

always more population, and so on. Paraphrasing the Turnerian dictum, the existence of an area of open

land, and the advance of American settlement causing its continuous recession, explain American

development(2).

The 1780's was a decade of fruitful institutional creation for the United States. During those crucial years

the young confederation laid down the foundations of its political system and set in place institutional

mechanisms which regulated and controlled the future expansion of the American nation.

More than a century ago, Jay Amos Barrett, a Nebraskan historian, wrote a monograph on the legislative

evolution of the Northwest Ordinance (hereafter NWO). One of the many intriguing issues discussed in

Barrett's monograph is James Monroe's influence and role in designing a policy of fewer and larger

states for the Northwest Territory which was finally enacted in the Northwest Ordinance as the three-

to-five clause (3).

Barrett said that in 1785 Monroe toured the West as an observer and went back to Congress convinced

from what he saw that the existing policy for the Western territory embodied in the ordinance of 1784,

was impolitic due to smallness of the states projected. In effect, the first successful attempt to regulate

the territory North-West of the Ohio river was the so-called Ordinance of 1784 attributed mainly toJefferson but never actually applied. Therefore, Monroe motioned in Congress for a reduction in the

number of states to be created out of the Northwest Territory (hereafter NWT).

Barrett also asserted that Monroe's proposal was finally approved in the July 7, 1786 Congressional

resolution(4). The image created by Barrett's monograph was that of Monroe visiting the land, the Old


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Northwest, inspecting its physiographical features, and obtaining thus a clear vision of what should be

the most convenient size and quantity of new states to be created in the NWT. This interpretation which

has had a lasting influence, was soon adopted with minimal variations by the subsequent scholars of the

subject (5).

This essay shall attempt to show that during the years 1785 and 1786 Monroe's role on the changes

proposed -larger and fewer states for the NWT-, finally adopted in the NWO as the three-to-five clause,

was rather minor. That his trip to the West had little if anything to do with the revision of the ordinance.

That Monroe's participation in the legislative action leading to the July 7, 1786 resolution was rather

obscure. And, that the reduction in the number of states to be created out of the NWT, and,

consequently, the size of the future Western states was the result of a very complex set of

circumstances not depending on the clear vision of any particular individual.

First, Monroe's trips to the West will be examined to determine to what extent he became acquainted

with the NWT. Secondly, attention will be given to Monroe's legislative accomplishments. And, finally,

some of the factors and circumstances connected with the "new" policy of fewer and larger states for

the Old Northwest will be explored.

I. MONROE'S "ROUTS WESTWARD"

Monroe took his seat as delegate to the Continental Congress on December 13, 1783, serving for three

years until October of 1786. He reached Annapolis, the seat of Congress, when the ratification of the

Treaty of Peace and the acceptance of the Virginia cession were pending. In April 23 1784 an ordinance

for the government of the Western territory passed, and two months later Spain closed the lower

portion of the Mississippi river to American navigation. Monroe made at this time two trips to the West,

one in 1784, and one in 1785.

Tour of the Lakes (1784)

On the 22th of July 1784, Monroe undertook his first tour to the West. Jefferson planned to accompany

Monroe, but he then had to depart for France. Monroe's original plans were to enter the West via

Pittsburgh, but he was offered to accompany the Indian commissioners bound for Fort Schuyler in New


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York. Thus, the trip commenced in Albany. The plan was to pass through the lakes, visit the posts, and

come down to the Ohio and thence Virginia (6). Harry Ammon, Monroe's biographer, said that "the tour

was a logical outgrowth of Jefferson's general interest in the West and Monroe's own involvement in

land speculation. Both realized that firsthand knowledge of the region was necessary to frame sound

measures for its future development. "(7)

Monroe sailed from New York with the Indian commissioners in a sloop bound for Albany. In Fort

Schuyler, he was an observer at the conferences between the commissioners and the Indians. Fron

there he continued his journey with a party bound for Detroit by way of Canada. They embarked in a

"batteaux" at Oswego, and reached Fort Niagara. Accompanied by an Indian guard he continued on the

American side of the lake to Fort Erie, but, because of Indian disturbances, Monroe went back to Fort

Niagara, where he embarked in a British sloop bound for Montreal. From Montreal he went to Lake

Champlain, and then to New York by way of Albany. On October 19, 1784, he was back in Trenton where

Congress was to meet late in October after its move from Annapolis.

Monroe's itinerary was then New York-Albany-Fort Schuyler-Oswego-Fort Niagara-Fort Erie-Fort

Niagara-Montreal-Lake Champlain-New York-Trenton. In a 7-20-84 letter to Jefferson, Monroe said that

the purpose of the trip was to acquire a better knowledge of the posts which should be occupied, the

cause of the delay of the evacuation, the temper of the Indians toward the Americans, as well as the

temper of the soil, waters and in general a view of the country (8). This 1784 trip seems to be justified

by Monroe's stand and proposed policy concerning the recovery of the posts. However, it is clear that he

did not get even close to the NWT (9).

Tour of the Ohio (1785)

Monroe's second tour took place in 1785. Ammon said that Monroe departed for a well-earned vacation

in August 1785, combining personal as well as public interests. In Kentucky, he checked on his land

holdings, and he also planned to attend the federal court at Williamsburg (10). Monroe accompanied,

unofficially and for his own convenience the commissioners sent to the Ohio by Congress to make a

treaty with the Swanees, Delawares, and Wyandots. Their negotiations crystallized in the treaty of FortFinney signed on January 31, 1786. He intended "to see the country lying between Lake Erie and the

Ohio." (11).

Monroe left New York in August 25th and was back in the city in December 12th. They traveled by way

of Pittsburgh and then down the Ohio to Limestone where Monroe parted from his companions to go on


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to Kentucky to have his lands surveyed, returning to Richmond by way of Lexington and the Wilderness

Trace. Monroe's itinerary went like this, New York-Lancaster-Carlisle-Pittsburgh-down the Ohio-

Limestone-Lexington-Wilderness Trace-Richmond-NewYork (12).

In his letter to Jefferson of January 19, 1786, Monroe said that "the danger from the Indians made it

imprudent for me to pass the river, and the delay at Fort Pitt, and upon the Ohio, the water being low,

consumed so much of the time allotted for this excursion, that I was forced to leave the commissioners

at Limestone and take my course directly through the Kentucky settlements and the Wilderness to

Richmond, so that I was neither gratified with the view of the treaty, or to such a degree with that of the

country as I had proposed." (13) Monroe's observations resulting from this trip might have covered the

country on his way to Pittsburgh, the Ohio river from that point to Limestone, and the Kentucky country

through Lexington and the Wilderness road, but not the NWT itself.

Traditional Account

The traditional account explaining the enlargement of the states projected in the ordinance of 1784 has

been based mainly on the knowledge acquired by Monroe in his trips to the West and his 1786

legislative proposal. The often cited evidence is a passage of his 1-19-86 letter to Jefferson, where he

said: "A great part of the territory is miserably poor, especially that near lakes Michigan & Erie & that

upon the Mississippi & the Illinois consists of extensive plains which have not had from appearances &

will not have a single bush on them, for ages. The districts therefore within which these fall will perhaps

never contain a sufficient number of Inhabitants to entitle them to membership in the confederacy."

(14)

On this evidence, historians have found that Monroe was the main influence in bringing about a

fundamental change to territorial policy for the Northwest: fewer and larger states and, consequently,

the elimination of the boundaries enacted it 1784. In the January 19, 1786 letter to Jefferson, Monroe

also said that the ordinance of 1784 had made the northwestern states strong instead of subservient to

the purposes of the Atlantic states. Moreover, Monroe stated that by reducing the number of

northwestern states two purposes would be served, one detrimental to them and one beneficial: first,to weaken their power, and, second, to help them to attained the population requirement of the

ordinance sooner, because part of the territory was poor, and other parts were extensive plains without

bushes (15).


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The two regions or areas which Monroe said would never have enough inhabitants to qualify for

statehood were, first, "that near lakes Michigan & Erie," and second, the area located "upon the

Mississippi & the Illinois" rivers. Pattison, in his masterly work on the American Rectangular System says

that in his letter to Jefferson, Monroe "doubtless had in mind the extensive swamps and marshes of the

former area [that near lakes Michigan and Erie]. As to the latter [that upon the Mississippi and Illinois

rivers], he was referring to prairies." Pattison says that this last opinion of Monroe was "pardonable,

because widespread belief about the fertility of the prairie." (16).

Thus, the two areas of Monroe's concern were the swamps and marshes, and the prairies. The swamps

and marshes were known as the Black Swamp on the lake Erie shoreline which extended around the

mouth of the Maumee and to the north, isolating Detroit from central Ohio, and surrounding Toledo

(17). The second was the prairie region extended from Illinois to about the 98th meridian with small

patches in western Ohio and northern Indiana (18). Monroe's argument was that these areas were poor

and would slow down settlement in the projected states which would in turn never reach the population

requirement of the ordinance.

It seems proper to consider what districts were affected by these poor areas. At lake Erie, the Ordinance

of 1784 projected one state which Jefferson had christened in the original version of the ordinance,

Metropotamia. Thus, the swamps fell within this projected state. On the Ill inois and Mississippi, the

prairies affected two states, Assenisipia and Illinoia (19).

Eight districts or states were planned by the ordinance of 1784 in the NWT. The poor areas overlapped

the territory of three out of the eight states. The Virginia proposed alternative to the 84 plan was at the

beginning of 1786 to establish from two to five states not indicating boundaries. Later, on July 7, 1786,

Grayson motioned for the division of the NWT by a parallel running through the southern tip of lake

Michigan. Below this line he proposed three states and above it two more. It seems that the eastern

extension of the line left most of the Black Swamp within the northern district, the future state of

Michigan. Therefore, in both plans the swamp affected only one district or state (20).

As to the prairies, they extended east to west, so that, the apportioning of 1784 was more effective in

minimizing its impact within one particular district than the 1786 scheme (21). In sum, Monroe was not

justified in saying that the entire division of the NWT was impolitic due to the location of these two

"poor" areas, because they affected portions of only 3 out of 8 districts. Even if we do not consider

Virginia's new scheme, larger states were going to be more inclusive, so that, the chances of locating the

"poor" areas in different states decreased.


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Because there is no evidence to support the statements that, first, Monroe knew the NWT first hand,

and, second, that he, based on that sort of expert knowledge, came up with a solution to the "problems"

of the ordinance of 1784, an inference may be drawn in the sense that he may have utilized the

"unfertile lands" argument as a physiographical excuse to justify the modification of the plan. Monroehimself explicitly mentioned first political reasons and secondly as an additional justification to reinforce

his reasoning, the physiographical argument which did not amount to much, but received primary

attention in Barrett's monograph.

In the January 19th letter, Monroe says "[M]y several routs westward with the knowledge of the country

I have thereby obtained, have impressed me fully with a conviction of the impolicy of our measures

respecting it." This is the same letter where he begins informing Jefferson of the disappointing results of

his 1785 tour. His several routs westward were actually two, and the knowledge of the country cannot

embrace the NWT, unless he is referring only to a hearsay knowledge. During his first trip -1784- he

reached only Fort Erie on the eastern side of the lake, and during the second, he navigated the Ohio

river turning South at Limestone. In other words, he neither traveled North through the "west side of

the river Ohio" nor toured the Old Northwest which actual extension is about a quarter of a millon

square miles. Therefore, he never indeed saw in the 1780's that country, let alone the "unfertile lands."

Barrett's account of Monroe's vision of the NWT never took place. The assertion concerning his expert

knowledge of the Old Northwest and therefore his authority on the subject of state making has been

always taken for granted. It may have been so perhaps due to the simplicity of the explanation, and theapparent documentary support provided by the 1-19-86 letter. What can be more convincing than "go

and see with your own eyes"? That is implied in the traditional account, that Monroe went to see by

himself whether the plan of 1784 was fitted to the geographical reality of the territory. This is nonsense

if one considers the extent of the area and the obstacles created by the "temper of the Indians."

There is a last intriguing point, the one concerning the source of Monroe's second hand opinion

regarding the unfertile lands argument. Where did it come from? It seems clear enough that his

geographical knowledge was just hearsay knowledge. Somebody familiar with the NWT informed him

about those areas, and he used the account without qualification.

On his way to the Ohio, Monroe stayed in Fort Pitt for some time because the river was low and the

Indians were restless (22). There, at that time, was Thomas Hutchins, the U.S. Geographer who arrived

on September 3 1785. Monroe called on him between September 22nd and the 30th (23). It is probable

that Monroe may have had conversations concerning the NWT with Hutchins who was well versed on


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the geography of the region. In fact, he had published a map of the NWT along with a topographical

description in 1778 (24).

Thus, it is conceivable that Hutchins may have been the source of Monroe's knowledge. Another

probable source may have been George Rogers Clark. Ammon says that Monroe established a friendship

with him since the time Monroe served as councilor in 1782 (25). The conqueror of Kaskaskies and

Vincennes was certainly familiar with the prairies of Il linois and the surroundings of Detroit.

It is interesting to note that none of the contemporaneous statements concerning the NWT and its

future mention the "unfertile lands." (26). Monroe's motivation for using the argument may be viewed

in the context of his relationship with Jefferson who was his senior political mentor and virtual author of

the geographical plan of 1784. He could not put down the plan without adducing some tangible hurdle.

Kentucky Lands

On his 1785 trip to the West Monroe visited the Kentucky settlements and inspected his own lands.

Samuel McDowell, a Kentucky resident, in a letter to William Fleming of November 11, 1785 said that

they "had had a certain Colonel Monroe with us, a member of Congress who is gone to Richmond, he is

violently opposed to our separation from Virginia; and that forever, he has left .. . arguments against it

(in writing) in this Country, I have seen them, but they appear to me such as have not great weight, I

wish you saw them, I am persuaded you would be of the same opinion, they are such as, a separation

will lessen the [consequence] of Virginia in the scale of the Continental Union while connected we may

hope for the trade of the Miss., but if separate we need not expect it, as all the States will then be

against it, or careless about it . ... you will easily see the tone of that arguments," (27).

In other words, Monroe's argument was that, with the separation of Kentucky, first, Virginia's power

would be diminished, and, second, the claim of the free navigation of the Mississippi would be

abandoned by the Atlantic states. Monroe was an oddity among the Virginia leaders on the question of

the Kentucky separation. Jefferson, R.H.Lee, Madison, and Washington approved, in general, theindependence of the western counties, but Monroe had a different view. He opposed the separation of

Kentucky believing that Virginia could model its regulations as to accommodate the government to the

convenience of Kentucky, and in that way avoid diminishing its power within the Union (28).


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At first glance, Monroe's arguments seem to be grounded in high policy like his "reduction" proposal.

But on a harder look, it appears that more personal reasons may have influenced his position. In effect,

Monroe's landholdings in Kentucky were extensive. Besides, his military warrant for 5,333,33 acres that

he received in February 1784. The same year, he registered another 20,000 acres in Lincoln County. In

addition, during 1783 he had filed entries for 49,867 acres in Fayette County. Finally, on Octuber 23,

1785, during his tour, Monroe made an additional single entry in Fayette County for 42,656 acres (29).

Thus, by the fall of 1785, Monroe had already obtained title to extensive land holdings in Kentucky

which allowed him three years later, as Ammon says, to realize "his long-cherished dream: the purchase

of an estate in Albermarle. He had acquired 800 acres of land (the present site of the University of

Virginia) and a house in Charlottesville from George Nicholas, a purchase made possible by the

willingness of Nicholas, who was moving west, to accept Kentucky land in lieu of 2,500 [pounds

sterling]" (30). As it looks, Monroe had very powerful reasons to protect his bounty lands in Kentucky

from the vagaries of new western states' politics (31). Moreover, the division of the western country in

states following the guidelines of the ordinance of 1784 would have meant the partition of the Kentucky

district, and, probably, uncertainty to Monroe's land title.

While Monroe's self-interest cannot be considered as an exclusive factor motivating his conduct, it

cannot be ignored either. Undoubtly, it had to influence his view of the future of the western states.

Some confirmation may be found in contemporaneous opinions. In effect, in 1786, Monroe's political

adversary, Rufus King, wondered in private correspondence "how will this article [treaty with Spain to

shut up the Mississippi for 25 years to American navigation] affect the Sale of the Western Territory?

The answer which the delegates of Virginia would give (all of whom are probably deeply interested inthe Ohio Country West of the Allegheny Mountains) depends in a high degree upon the opening of the

Mississippi" (32).

On the other hand, Monroe himself, on May 31, 1786, in a letter to Madison said that King had married

a woman of fortune in New York so that if he secures a market for fish and turns the commerce of the

Western country down this river [Hudson] he obtains his object." And, in the same letter Monroe also

said that "Pettit who is always here and the influential man from Pennsylvania is a speculator in

certificates. He came forward under the patronage of Reid with impressions entirely eastern and the

opposition given the requisition last year by the delegation of Virginia has given him an opinion that she

[Virginia] wishes to defraud the publick creditors" (33). So, it may be seen that the self-interest

argument was used at that time by both sides, at least, in private correspondence.


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It seems also significant that, on January 6, 1786, the assembly of Virginia passed a separation law which

guaranteed broadly the Virginia's landowners' interests. All private rights and interests in lands derived

from the laws of Virginia would "remain valid and secure" and determined by Virginia laws. The lands of

non-resident proprietors would not be taxed higher than the lands of residents, nor would a neglect of

cultivation or improvement of Kentucky land belonging to nonresidents subject those persons to

forfeiture or other penalty for six years after admission. It also guaranteed to Virginia the free navigation

of the Ohio (34). At the beginning of 1786, then, Virginia let Kentucky go to become a separate state

with the boundaries of the district. This evidenced the inadequacy of the plan of 1784 which had split

Kentucky land between two new states.

II. Monroe's Legislative Actions

The traditional account of Monroe's legislative initiatives to amend the 1784 ordinance indicates that,about three months after he returned from his 1785 trip to the West, he motioned in March 24, 1786 to

amend the ordinance as to the size and number of the future northwestern states (35).

Barrett said that "after sounding members of Congress on the subject and finding them favorable, he

moved to refer the matter to a grand committee," citing an excerpt from a letter to Madison of 1212-85

-the day after his return from the western tour-, which in its entirety says: I find the most enlightened

members here fully impress'd with the expediency of putting an end to the dismemberment of the old

States doubtful of the propriety of admitting a single new one into the Confederacy & well inclin'd to a

revision of the compact between the U.S. & Virga. respecting the division of the country beyond the

Ohio.(36)

Monroe arrived in New York back from his trip to the West on December 12 1785, and the next day he

wrote this letter saying that he found some of the members of Congress in the mood described. By his

own account, he did not bring the idea to his colleagues, on the contrary, he found them already

propounding those ideas. In brief, the mood of some of the delegates was, first, to stop the

dismemberment of the old states, second, to disfavor the admission of new states, and, third, to revise

the proposed division of the NWT. Again, as to the last point he did not bring the idea of fewer andlarger states to Congress, on the contrary, Congress was already elaborating on it along with the other

two issues -dismemberment and admission-. Monroe and his trip brought if anything only one more

advocate "violently" opposed to the "dismemberment" of Virginia (McDowell's observation).


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In fact, Monroe said that it was convenient to confine the number of the western states as much as

possible, but this thinking preceded his trip and was based on a different motivation. In effect, in August

25, 1785, two hours before his departure "for the Indian treaty on the Ohio," he wrote to Jefferson that

he disliked the idea of Kentucky separating from Virginia because, if that happened, Virginia would have

"less consequence ... in the Union." He also said that the Atlantic states should keep a prevailing

influence on the new states, because when the Mississippi river be opened to their commerce they

would have but little interest in whatever occurred to the Atlantic states.

At this time, he was seeing the closure of the Mississippi with some sort of implied approval, as a factor

aiding in keeping the western territory within the Union. He also said that unless the Atlantic states

confine their numbers as much as possible, the new states would outnumber the original states in

Congress. Monroe finally stated that the matter should be well investigated before any measure was

hastily adopted (37).

These letters reveal that, before the 1785 tour, Monroe was inclined to believe that the number of

western states should be reduced for political reasons not geographical ones (38). They also show that,

after the trip, he found in Congress a movement which among other things proposed to reduce the

number of new states to be created in the NWT, based also on political reasons.

"Dismemberment Agitation" in Congress

While Monroe was touring the Ohio, initiatives concerning the admission of new states issue were being

discussed in Congress.

It is necessary to go back to October 1785 to understand the reports of March 1786. In the fall of 1785,

the landed states reacted to the attempts of several movements tending to form new states out of old

ones. First, there was the new state of Franklin comprising the settlements on the Watauga and Holston

rivers which at one time included a portion of southwestern Virginia (Washington county). This

separation movement began in 1784 as a result of the North Carolina cession, and later, after the repealof the cession, it remained autonomous in defiance of state authority. The selfgovernment provisions of

the 1784 ordinance legitimized the political aspirations of these settlers (39).

Secondly, the Kentucky settlements had been "agitating" since the first conventions began discussing

separation from Virginia in 1784. The Danville convention of August 8, 1785 requested from Virginia the


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separation of the district by sending Muter and Innes to lobby for its acceptance (40). Thirdly, the

Massachusetts' district of Maine began its own quest for statehood in 1785 (41). Finally, last but not

least, the "state of Vermont" was at this time still pressing its case against New York (42).

The most urgent claims were those of Kentucky and Franklin, because Vermont's case had a protracted

history, and the Maine movement was just in its beginnings. This "agitation" culminated in the fall of

1785 with a reaction by two the affected states, Virginia and Massachusetts.

In Virginia, the assembly declared "treason" any attempt to separate its western districts (43). In

October 7 1785, Massachusetts made a motion seconded by Virginia to appoint a committee to prepare

a report for expressing the highest disapprobation of Congress toward the separatists movements (44).

Rhode Island, represented by Howell and Ellery, made a motion to postpone the consideration of the

Massachusetts-Virginia motion and to amend the Articles of Confederation adding an article toempower nine states or two thirds of the states to erect into a new state and admit into the Union on

the terms to be specified any part or district of any of the United States by a joint application of the

legislature of the state to which the district belongs and the people of such district. Three states voted

for the consideration of this report: Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Georgia. Five states were opposed:

Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. South Carolina was divided, and New

Hampshire and North Carolina were represented by just one delegate each (45).

A new motion by Howell-Ellery proposed to postpone the consideration of the Massachusetts-Virginia

motion until 11-585, but it was lost by the same margin. Five days later, on 12-85, the delegates from

Massachusetts (Gerry-Holten-Icing) and Virginia (Lee-Grayson [Monroe was still on his tour]) withdrew

their 10-7-85 motion and proposed instead that a grand committee be appointed to report what

measures were proper to prevent the ill consequences of a particular district in any State acting up and

claiming the right of independent government without the consent of the said state and of the United

States. It was ordered that a grand committee meet the following Friday.

The committee book reveals that on 10-13-85 a grand committee (Massachusetts represented by Gerry,

and Virginia by Grayson) was appointed to consider the motion proposed on 10-12-85 and also theHowellEllery motion to amend the Articles. Later, the large states in agreement with the small states left

the motions "in suspence" until anyone of the large ones would bring it forward for approval. The small

states were going to lay the matter before their respective constituents, so that instructions might be

sent for that purpose (46).


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Once the October 1785 "agitation" in Congress opened the discussion on dismemberment of old states

and creation of new ones, it became apparent that the ordinance of 1784 which had encouraged

"dismemberment" in the SWT -Kentucky and Franklin-, could have the same effect in the NWT with the

dissemination of small states (54). The issue evolved from controlling the formation of new states on thebacklands of some states to con trolling their formation on the public domain. Thus, the potential

"dismemberment of the public domain" opened the discussion on the politically sound bases for

expansion of the Union and avoidance of the formation of new states outside the control of Congress.

Monroe and the Reports of March 24, 1785

The July 7 resolution provided for a reduction in the number of future states to be created in the NWT,

from 8 provided in the Ordinance of 1784 to the 3-5 formula, so, it meant fewer and larger states to be

set up in the NWT. What was Monroe's contribution to this reduction? He was a member of the grand

committee which produced two reports rendered on, among other things, a Monroe's motion. The

"other things" were the 10-12-85 motion by Massachusetts and Virginia, and the Howell's motion on the

amendment to the Articles of Confederation (55).

Monroe's motion to the 3-24-86 reports cannot be found either on the journal or among the papers of

the Continental Congress. In his 5-11-86 letter to Jefferson, Monroe said that the 100-150 condition of

the Virginia cession had been questioned and that a report was before Congress. He did not assume theauthorship of the proposal, he just said that "it [the condition] 3was question'd" without saying by

whom (56). No reference can be found to support the assertion that Monroe was the chairman of the

grand committee. It seems that he was just the member representing Virginia. Finally, neither one of the

reports was in his writing (57).

In sum, Monroe was not the chairman of a committee but just a member of the grand committee. His

motion to the report cannot be found among the Papers of the Continental Congress. The reports are

not in his handwriting, and, when he mentions the subject to Jefferson, he does not assume the

authorship of the proposal. However, it is true that the original reports in the PCC No. 30, folios 75 and

79 indicate that both were given on his motion.

The two reports of 3-24-86 were different, but complementary. The first recommended to Virginia and

Massachusetts to revise their cessions of western territory to allow the Congress to modify the


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The second report of March 24 was written assuming that the recommendation had been approved and

the condition modified, and for the purpose of modifying the ordinance of 1784 to reflect those

changes. It provided for the repeal of the boundaries and the compact clause.

The Population Threshold Requirement and the Admission to the Confederacy

What was the real issue under debate on 7-7-86? It turned from being one that confronted the small

states against the large ones in October 1785, to a sectional confrontation between the eastern and

middle states against the southern ones in July 1786. This is in part explained by the crisis on the Spanish

treaty negotiations, but, mainly, by the growing realization that the balance of power of the

Confederation itself was at stake in the development of the West (62).

In October 1785, Virginia and Massachusetts were together in claiming their right not to be

dismembered, and they remained so in the 3-24-86 report. But, in the 7-7-86 debate, Massachusetts is

dropped from the resolution even though its cession had been made agreeable to the 10-10-80

resolution which established the 100-150 condition in the first place. As Monroe said, the 7-7-86 debate

"opened the eyes" of the Eastern delegates and it made them increased the number of inhabitants of

the new states required for admission.

The population requirement in the Ordinance of 1784 was the population of the state with the least

numerous inhabitants. The 1786 proposal meant to make larger states with more chances to include the

threshold number of inhabitants required for admission. This idea, however, requires some elaboration

because without talking about density of population, the preceding statement seems to be incomplete.

In effect, the assumption was that the density was going to be more or less stable and uniform over the

NWT based on the fact that an 3agricultural society without great concentrations of population was

prevalent at that time. And also, on the assumption that with more territory the population could grow

larger and vice versa (64).

Thus, the South was proposing an amendment to the ordinance to facil itate the eventual admission ofnew states which supposedly were going to follow southern politics (65). It helped not so much to the

admission of more states because actually it reduced the total number to be admitted, but it helped

southern politics in the sense of allowing the effective admission of new states because they would

reach the threshold faster.


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It seems then that the direction of policy after the confrontation of October 1785 was, first, to separate

the SWT leaving the new states movements subject to negotiation with their parent states. The

dismemberment movements in Kentucky and Franklin highlighted the need to distinguished between

the ceded and the unceded areas. Secondly, it made the ordinance of 1784 more realistic in favor of

admission by reducing the number of states.

The vote of October 1785 was a large-small states vote because the "dismemberment" affected the

large and landed states, but the vote of July 1786 was a sectional vote because it affected only the

public domain which belonged also to the small states. Finally, a compromise was reached on the 3-5

limit. In addition, as Monroe said, it "open'd the eyes of a part of the Union ... to view the subject in a

different light." The "subject" was the political control of the admission process and, eventually, of the

Union itself (66).

The 7-7-86 vote may also be seem as a compromise with the northern states which were not

enthusiastic about the expansion to the West even though some elements were pushing in that

direction (67). It should also be remembered that the holders of securities who were to be paid with the

proceeds of the sale of western lands were concentrated in the eastern states. This worked as an

incentive to an orderly and controlled disposition of the public lands in the NWT even with large states

(68).

The South did favor admissions. If it could not be eight states, three states was not bad and five would

be better (Grayson tried unsuccessfully to fix the boundaries for five states). But the compromise was

only partial because the population quantity was still open. When the eastern states added the so called

1/13th requirement, Monroe became upset and told Jefferson that their purpose was to keep the new

northwestern states out of the confederacy defeating the condition of the Virginia cession. Monroe's

implied reasoning was that the 1/13th requirement meant the postponement of admissions sine die.

Jefferson, in his 7-9-86 letter answering Monroe's of 5-11-86, compared states of 30,000 sq.ml. to states

of 160,000 sq.ml. Jefferson called the former "happier states of a moderate size," and the latter too

large for a regular society to exist. It should however be kept in mind that when Jefferson talked of

states of 160,000 sq.ml., he was thinking in the entire western country divided in three states, not just in

the NWT (69).

The 1/13th requirement which was introduced in the 9-19-86 report on territorial government must

have been put forward earlier in July when the original 5-10-86 report was modified, because Monroe

mentioned the requirement in his 7-16-86 letter to Jefferson. This new threshold meant a minimum of

about 200,000 inhabitants required for admission (70).


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The eastern states were opposed to the proliferation of new states for a number of reasons: western

states supposedly would favored the south and would probable follow southern politics; the Atlantic

states should control the western states and not the other way around; the population was moving

toward the Southwest and the eastern states were losing population; the new western states mightthrow their political weight to remove the seat of government to Georgetown; and vacant land in New

York and Massachusetts was depreciating in value due to availability of federal lands (71).

So, the answer of the eastern states to the southern proposal of forming eventually five states in the

NWT was to increase the population requirement to slow down the reaching of the threshold. Nathan

Dane revealed this connection in his motion of October 4, 1786 defeated on a clear sectional vote (72).

Finally, let's take a comparative look at the different proposals on size and number. It was known at that

time that the areas of the NWT was approximately a quarter of a million square miles (73). The area ofeach state proposed in 1784 was going to be about 29,000 sq.ml. on average (74). The resolution of July

7 provided for states of a maximum size of 83,000 sq.ml. and a minimum of 50,000 sq.ml. on average.

The conditions of the Virginia cession (resolution of 10-10-80)would have produced states of a minimum

of 10,000 sq.ml. and a maximum of 22,500 sq.ml. (75). Thus, under the Virginia cession there was to be

a maximum of 25 states and a minimum of 11. The number of states projected for the NWT decreased

then from 25 11, to 8, to 3-5. The respective areas increased from 10,000 22,500, to 29,000, to 50,000-

83,000 (76).

III. New Scheme for the "Territory Northwest of the River Ohio"

To understand the complexity of forces shaping the new policy of fewer and larger states for the NWT,

consideration should also be given to some additional factors which evolved in between 1784 and 1786.

They were the land ordinance of 1785; the 1786 ,reports of a plan of temporary government to replace

the ordinance of 1784; and, the Washington's and Eastern Nationalists' influence in favor of progressive

seating and compact settlements (77).

Land Ordinance of 1785

This ordinance changed the conception on which the report of 1784 was based. On April 30, 1784,

Jefferson reported a land ordinance which was to be the companion of the ordinance for the

government of the western territory passed on April 23, 1784. This plan was amended and eventually


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became the land ordinance of 1785 (78). A comparison between the two plans reveals that they were

based on different assumptions. The 1784 land disposal report was consistent with the division of the

NWT under the 1784 territorial ordinance, but the changes introduced in 1785 were based on a

different conception which conditioned the design of new states introduced by the ordinance of 1784

(79).

In effect, the 1784 project of land ordinance provided that it was applicable to the western territory

once it was ceded by the states, purchased from the Indians, and laid off in states. The "laying off in

states" provided in this report was going to precede the survey and disposal of land. This idea is

developed in the report by making the surveying to take place within the borders of each one of the

states projected by Jefferson. Pattison put it technically in this way" "Jefferson's state boundaries ...

were in effect an interlocking series of principal meridians and base lines ... These boundaries, under the

law, were to be laid out prior to the initiation of land subdivision, and the lines defining hundreds were

to be spaced out from the corners of the states, just as township lines would later be spaced out from

the intersections of principal meridians and base lines." (80).

The land ordinance of 1785 eliminated all this. "The term prior survey may suggest to the reader the

policy of surveying state boundaries before proceeding with subdivision and settlement. This policy, laid

down in the ordinance of 1784, and further developed in the land ordinance intended to accompany it,

was ignored in the Land Ordinance of 1785," which "was directed toward the survey and disposal of

lands in one specific area, extending from the Ohio River to Lake Erie, immediately west of

Pennsylvania." (81). This altered the picture in the NWT and relegated Jefferson's boundaries to a future

determination. Besides, the land ordinance of 1785 was to apply only in the NWT. Thus, when the landreport of 1784 was substantially amended in 1785, the Jefferson's ordinance and with it its boundaries

was left without its original land disposal support.

1786 Reports of a Plan of Temporary Government

These reports designed a system of government preliminary tc the formation of states which was absent

in the ordinance of 1784. At the same time that a revision of the number and size of the futurenorthwestern states was under discussion, a committee was appointed on March 27, 1786 to report on

forms of temporary government for the Western territory. Its members were Monroe, Johnson, King,

Kean, and Pinckney. Many historians affirm or at least imply that this was the committee which reported

on the number and size of the states in July 1786, but that is not the case. To be sure, the ordinance of

1784 contained a provision on the location and boundaries of the future states, but left opened the

organization of preliminary governments. Then, during 1784 and 1785, it became clear the need to


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include a plan for temporary government. At the same time, the dismemberment "agitation" led

eventually to the revision of the number and size of the states. This, as we have already seen, found

congressional expression in the 7-7-86 resolution. The elaboration of these two issues, temporary

government and "number and size", followed different courses of action. Thus, the two 1786 reports on

temporary government included no regulation on the "number and size" issue. Finally, in 1787, the

NWO consolidated all the issues in one ordinance.

The two reports of 1786 were the one issued on May 10 and amended on July 13 by the socalled

Monroe committee, and the one issued on September 19 by a committee consisting of Johnson,

Pinckney, Smith, Dane, and Henry. The May 10 report was significant in relation to the "number and

size" issue not only because in its preamble announced the need to reduce the number of prospective

states but also because it provided for a type of government adequate for areas not yet populated. In

effect, the NWT at that time was inhabited by the Indians, the French settlers of Illinois, and the

inhabitants of Detroit. These were small groups scattered over the vast NWT. Thus, it made no sense to

appoint authorities for several empty districts. Moreover, as Eblen pointed out, the Congress's financial

resources could not have provided for authorities for more than one district (82).

On May 10, 1786, the Monroe committee presented a report prompted by a motion by Nathan Dane. It

was said to be in the writing of Remsen with a preamble and resolve in the writing of Monroe (83). The

preamble indicated that Congress had to take measures to comply with two objectives: first, promote

settlement, and, second, secure to the settlers and absentee purchasers the rights of property and

personal safety. As to settlement, the plan was addressed to future residents and absentee landowners

(future population). As to property, it would be more secure in districts under congressional control.

The preamble said that, it was the duty of Congress, previous to sell the territory, to adopt and publish a

plan of temporary government for the state or states to be created thereon and to establish a period at

which such government shall expire and admission on an equal footing may take place. These goals

meant an ordered and supervised process of settlement to fill the void left in the 1784 ordinance. In

addition, it said that was proper to define first the bounds of the states within which the temporary


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government would apply. But, it was improper to make divisions until the condition from the Virginia

cession (100-150 clause) were modified.

The temporary government of the 5-10-86 report was designed under the assumption that there was

going to be fewer and larger states as revealed by the preamble, and also that the "number and size"

issue had not been yet settled. The July 13 report is an slightly modified vesion of the 5-10 plan and the

main novelty of the September 19 new version was the 1/13th requirement advanced by the Eastern

states as a counterpoise to the new "number and size" arrangement of July 7 (84).

Washington's and Eastern Nationalists' Influence

An additional factor was Washington's opinion in support of progressive seating and compact

settlement. To consider his influence may seem to resurrect the great-man approach which this essay

disregards when applied to Monroe. However, to do so seems justified, because, first, his own

contemporaries recognized the considerable weight of his influence (85), secondly, he actually had an

effective and extensive experience in western matters (86), and, finally, he had been proposing these

measures for some time starting with his September 7, 1783 letter to Duane. Most of Washington

recommendations were included in the congressional report of October 15, 1783.

Washington's ideas about the NWT in this regard were progressive seating, and compact settlement.

The former meant the gradual settlement of the NWT beginning from the area bounded by lake Erie, the

western boundary of Pennsylvania and the Ohio river, and from there advancing Westward avoiding in

that way that a more remote state be admitted before a closer one. Compact settlement meant the

initial creation of just one state with more or less the borders of Ohio. This was opposed to "the decies,"

as the proliferation of states in the ordinance of 1784 was called by Washington (87).

The practice of creating a large district at the beginning and, then, as the population increase to

subdivide the district in smaller jurisdictions was typical of Virginia's experience (88). Propounding this

idea of leaving the territory opened to future demarcation, Madison in The Federalist No. 14 said that"the arrangements that may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our

northwestern frontier must be left to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more

equal to the task.


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As to the eastern nationalists' influence, some New Englanders were trying to settle the Ohio country

since the end of the war. The officers ' petition of 1783, issued with Washington's support, proposed an

state equivalent to Ohio which did not match the boundaries of the 1784 ordinance. These officers were

mainly from New England. Samuel J. Parsons accompanied the commissioners to Fort Finney in 1785,

and Benjamin Tupper, surveyor of the seven ranges, reported to. Rufus Putnam in January 1786 on the

quality of the Ohio lands. From there, they went in March 1786 to found the Ohio Co. in Boston. The

influence of this group on the elaboration of the new policy was carried out not only by Washington

himself, but also by Manasseh Cutler and his contacts with the Massachussetts' congressional

delegation (89).

Conclusion

State-making in the NWT received during 1784-1786 its preliminary definitions. The size and boundariesof the new states to be carved out of the NWT was pretty much set in the summer of 1786, establishing

a precedent for the future institutional expansion of the Confederation.

The traditional view of Monroe's influence in shaping statemaking policy for the NWT seems the result

of a simplistic adherence to the great-man approach. Barrett's selected facts fitted well the image of a

responsible statesman who being concerned with high policy visited the region to make sure that the

legislation to be promulgated would be successful and compatible with the needs of its future

inhabitants. This was an inspiring image of the future president's statesmanship, but it does not muster

the reality test. It was based on unwarranted assumptions, half truths, and a desire to introduce order

and rationality in a very complex and often confused political reality.

It seems appropriate to conclude this essay pointing out to further developments of two aspects of the

story: Monroe's western tours, and the Black swamp. The first is that Monroe, as president, thirty one

years later, had the chance to "complete" his 1780's tours. In effect, in 1817, he finally and effectively

saw the country lying between Lake Erie and the Ohio. The tour was a sort of political good-will

campaign that took him through the original states and Vermont. From there he sailed lake Erie to visit

Detroit, and, on his way back to Washington he crossed the new state of Ohio passing throughDelaware, Columbus, Worthington, Circleville, Chillicothe, and Zanesville. At Worthington, Monroe

addressed the citizens stating that "he had a strong desire to ascertain and know by actual view, the

situation of the northern border of Ohio". This belated remark which ironically seems to confirm some

of the observations made in this essay, was however made in the context of Ohio's aspirations

concerning its northern boundary (90).


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The second event concerns Monroe's comments on the region "near lakes Michigan & Erie." A new

slander of that area took place in 1815. Monroe, as Madison's Secretary of State, requested from

Edward Tiffin, surveyor general of the U.S., the survey of 2,000,000 acres in the territory of Michigan to

satisfy bounties promised by Congress to the officers and soldiers who fought in the War of 1812. The

Tiffin's report was as bad as Monroe's 1-19-86 opinion in his letter to Jefferson, and it briefly slowed

down the settlement of the region, but, eventually, it proved to be no major obstacle to Michigan's

statehood (91).

End Notes

(1) Bernard Bailyn. Voyagers to the West. N.Y.: Knopf, 1986. Drew R. McCoy. The Elusive Republic.

Chapel Hill: Univ.N.C.Pr., 1980. David H. Fischer. Albion's Seed. N.Y.: Oxford, 1989. Daniel J. Boorstin. The

Americans: The National Experience. N.Y.: Random, 1965. Patricia N. Limerick. The Legacy of Conquest.

N.Y.: Norton, 1987. Michael Lienesch. New Order of the Ages. Princeton Univ.P., 1988. Donald K.

Pickens. "The Turner Theses and Republicanism" PHR(1992): 319. Andrew Cayton & Peter S. Onuf. The

Midwest and the Nation. Bloomington: Ind.Univ.P., 1990. William Cronon. "Revisiting the Vanishing

Frontier." WHQ (Ap. 87):157. Richard Jensen. "On Modernizing F.J.Turner." 11 WHQ (1980): 307-22.

(2) Rush Welter. "The Frontier West as Image of American Society." 46 MVHR (1960): 593-614. Paul W.

Conner. Poor Richard's Politicks. N.Y.: Oxford, 1965. Henry N. Smith. Virgin Land. Cambridge: HarvardUniv.P., 1950. A.L.Rowse. "Tudor Expansion." 14 WMQ (1965): 309-316. For Turner's central theme I

follow Bestor for whom, the theme was not really the frontier, but something larger: the westward

movement, the West which it created, and the influence of both on American life. See, Arthur E. Bestor,

Jr., "PatentOffice Models of the Good Society." 58 AHR (AP. 1953): 505-526. William Cronon. "BecominC

West," in Under the Open Sky. N.Y.: Norton, 1992.

(3) Jay Amos Barrett. Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787 with an Account of the Earlier Plans for the

Government of the Northwest Territory. N.Y.: Putnam, 1891.

(4) Barrett, ibidem, 34. For the text of the Ordinance of 1784, see, Julian P. Boyd, ed. Papers of Thomas

Jefferson, Princeton Univ.P., 613-615 (hereafter "Papers"). For the resolution of 7-786, see Journal of

the Continental Congress, L.C. ed. (Ju1.1786), 390-394 (hereafter "JCC").


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(5) George H. Alden. "The Evolution of the American System of Forming and Admitting New States into

the Union," 18 Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Sciences (1901): 469-479, 477;

Alpheus H. Snow. The Administration of Dependencies. N.Y.: Putnam, 1902, 430; Edmund C. Burnett,

Letters of Members of the Continental Congress. Wash.D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1921, vol. 8, xxv,

Preface; Clarence Carter ed., Territorial Papers of the United States, NWT, 48 n. 29. Francis S. Philbrick.

The Rise of the West, 1754-1830. N.Y.: Harper, 1965, 128; Daniel J. Boorstin. The Americans: The

National Experience. N.Y.: Random, 1965, 244; Jack E. Eblen. The First and Second United States

Empires. Univ.Pittsburgh P., 1968, 28; Merril D. Peterson. Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation. N.Y.:

Oxford, 1970, 283; Harry Ammon. James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity. N.Y.: McGraw, 1971,

53; Robert F. Berkhofer Jr., "Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American Territorial

System," 29 WMQ (1972): 231262; H.James Henderson. Party Politics in the Continental Congress. N.Y.:

McGraw, 1974, 409; Joseph L. Davis. Sectionalism in American Politics, 1774-1787. Madison: Univ.Wis.P.,

1977, 120. Peter S. Onuf. The Origins of the Federal Republic. Philadelphia: Univ.Penn.P., 1983, 154;

Onuf, Statehood and Union. Bloomington: Ind.Univ.P., 1987, 52. William A. Williams. The Contours of

American History. N.Y.: Norton, 1988, 132. Reginald Horsman, The Northwest Ordinance and the

Shaping of an Expanding Republic, Wisconsin Magazine of History (Autumn, 1989): 21-32. Dexter

Perkins, in his contribution of Monroe's biography to the Dictionary of American Biography, N.Y.:

Scribner's, says that the "youthful delegate [Monroe] was not a dominating influence, ..., in the great

legislation of 1784 and 1785 for the organization of the West." For a work preceding Barrett's Evolution,

see, John M. Merriam, "The Legislative History of the Ordinance of 1787,. American Antiquarian Soc.

(Ap. 1888): 303-342.

(6) Monroe to Jefferson, 8-9-84, in The Writings of James Monroe, ed. by Stanislaus Murray Hamilton,

N.Y

.: AMS P., 1969 (1989), I, 38 (hereafter "Writings").

(7) Harry Ammon, James Monroe. N.Y.: McGraw, 1971, 45.

(8) Monroe to Jefferson, 7-20-84 and 11-1-84, Writings, I, 3538 and 40-46.

(9) To avoid confusions on the NWT concept, see, Hildegard B. Johnson, Order Upon the Land, N.Y

.:Oxford, 1976, 7-8. For the location of Ft. Niagara and Ft. Erie, see, Scribner's Atla of American History, 2d

ed., N.Y., 1984, maps Nos. 25 & 73.

(10) Writings, 113, n. 1. Justin Winsor. The Westward Movement, N.Y.: Franklin, 1968 (1897), 272.

Ammon, ibidem, 53. Gerry to Jefferson, 9-12-85, LMCC # 227 at 216.


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(11) 7 Statutes at Large 26. Long to Langdon, 3-29-86, LMC # 361 at 335. Monroe to Jefferson, 8-25-85,

Writings, 107/8.

(12) To understand the geography of this trip, see, Scribner's Atlas, maps Nos. 55 & 103.

(13) Monroe to Jefferson, 1-19-86, Writings, 112-120, 113.

(14) Ibidem, 117.

(15) Ibidem, 112-120, 118. This rationale will be referred to hereafter as the "unfertile lands" argument.

(16) William D. Pattison, Beginnings of the American Rectangular Land Survey System, 1784-1800,

Columbus: Ohio Hist.Soc., 1957, 1970, 32.

(17) Ray A. Billington, Westward Expansion, Macmillan, 1967, 277, 280-81, 305. Harlan Hatcher, Lake

Erie, N.Y.: Bobbs Merrill, 1945, 190. Frank Angelo. Yesterday's Detroit, Miami: Seemann, 1974. BruceCatton, A Bicentennial History, N.Y.: Norton, 1976, 72.

(18) Ralph H. Brown, Historical Geography of the U.S., N.Y.: Harcourt Brace, 1948, 204, 209, 284.

Billington, Expansion, 305. Philbrick, Rise, 128.

(19) Papers, 591, 593. Pattison, Beginnings, 18, 27, 34.

(20) JCC, 7-7-86, 390-91. There was to be much cohtroversy between Ohio and Michigan concerning this

boundary.

(21) See supra note 19. Brown, Historical Geography, 206211. Johnson, Order, 16.


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(22) See supra note 12. Winsor, Westward, 262.

(23) Hutchins to the President of Congress, 11-24-85, in Papers of the Continental Congress (microfilm

edition) M247, r. 74, i. 60, pg. 193-197 (herein after PCC).

(24) Pattison, Beginnings, 17, n. 3.

(25) Ammon, Monroe, 39. Monroe to Clark, 10-19-83, in Draper Coll. microfilm ed., Serv. J, r. 13, # 85-

91.

(26) Manasseh Cutler. An Explanation of the Map of Federal Lands. Ann Arbor: Univ. Microfilms, 1966,

12, 15 [It is true that this is a promotional pamphlet which would try to avoid any unfavorable feature];

N.H. delegates, 5-29-85, in E.C.Burnett ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, 8-130/131

(hereinafter LMCC); William Thomas Hutchinson, The Bounty Lands of the American Revolution in Ohio.

New York: Arno, 1979 (1927), 76 (on Tupper's and Putnam's opinions); Louis Guillaume Otto, Question

of the Mississippi (1786), in Albert Bushnell Hart ed. American History told by Contemporaries,

N.Y.:Macmillan, 1900, III150/154.

(27) Draper Coll. MS 2U-139. See also, Monroe's own 1783 contrary opinion in a letter to Clark, 10-19-

83, Draper Mss. 52 J 85 [...you may rest assured that the objects of this part of the state, an object which

will govern in all our councils, will be to effect a separation an erect an independent state westward, as

it will enable us to economize our efforts here & give us greater strength in the federal councils].

(28) Monroe to Jefferson, 8-25-85, Writings, 107; Lowell H. Harrison, Kentucky's Road to Statehood,

Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky, 1992, 41. Jefferson believed that, by letting Kentucky go, Virginia would be

able to keep Southwest Virginia. Jefferson to Madison, 2-20-84, Robert A. Rutland ed. The Papers ofMadison, Charlottesville: Univ. Pr. of Va., VII-425 (herein after Papers of Madison). Thomas P.

Abernethy. Western Lands and the American Revolution. N.Y.: Russell, 1964 (1937), 308.

(29) Ammon, supra, 38, and n. 26. Willard R. Jillson, Old Kentucky Entries and Deeds, Louisville:

Standard, 1926, 51, 130, 350, 434, 515. Samuel M. Wilson, Revolutionary Soldiers and Sailors,


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Greenville: Southern Historical Pr., 1994 (1913), 52. Daniel M. Friedenberg. Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit

of Land. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1992, 220; Monroe to Clark, 10-1983, Draper Mss. 52 J 85 [sale of land

from Major Crittenden to Monroe].

(30) Ammon, Monroe, 74. Monroe to Madison, 10-26-88, Writings, 194-95 [In this letter Monroe said

that he acquired 300 acres not 800 as indicated by Ammon]. Treasury warrants were purchased at 40

pounds sterling per hundred acres. Harrison, Statehood, 11. Edgar Woods, Albemarle County in Virginia,

Bridgewater, Va.: Carrier, 1964, 279-80, 289-90.

(31) Merrill Jensen, The New Nation, N.Y.: Random House, 1950, 354.

(32) LMCC: 8-381/382, # 413. Henderson, Party Politics, 393.

(33) LMCC: 8-375/377, # 408. Monroe to Henry, 8-12-86, Writings, 150. Davis, Sectionalism, 122.

(34) Papers of Madison, 12-22-85, 450-453. Some of the terms of the act had been anticipated by

Madison who was being consulted by Caleb Wallace. See, Madison to RHLee, 7-7-85, Papers of Madison,

314.

(35) JCC, 28132/135.

(36) Monroe to Madison, 12-19-85, Writings, 108.

(37) Monroe to Jefferson, 8-25-85. Samuel Cole Williams, History of the Lost State of Franklin, 1974

(1924), 86, n. 8. See also, supra, footnote 27.

(38) Philbrick, Rise, 128. The boundaries of the Ordinance of 1784 should not be taken too seriously

anyhow. See, Jefferson's thinking in September 1785 as revealed in his letters to RH Lee (712-85) and

Hartley (9-5-85), Papers, 287, 483.


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(39) Williams, Franklin, 86-87. Campbell to Madison, 10-2885, Papers of Madison, 381-385. Johnson to

Sherman, 4-20-85, LMCC # 110 at 100, 102. LMCC 5-16-85, 120, n.2. RHLee to Madison, 5-30-85, LMCC #

142 at 131. Spaight to Caswell, 6-585, LMCC # 146 at 134.

(40) Harrison, Statehood, 35. John A. Caruso, The Appalachian Frontier, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,

1959, 316317.

(41) Ronald F. Banks. Maine Becomes a State, Portland: N.Y. Publis.Co1, 1973, 3-25. Grayson to Short, 6-

15-85, I14CC # 153 at 141. Dane to Phillips, 1-20-86, LMCC # 317 at 289, n. 8. Van Beck Hall. Politics

Without Parties. Massachusetts, 1780-1791. U.Pitts.Pr., 1972, 40-42, 173-175.

(42) RHLee to Jefferson, 10-29-85, LMCC 8-242; Virginia delegates to Patrick Henry, 11-7-85, LMCC 8-

249; Grayson to Madison, 11-8-85, LMCC 8-251; Luther Martin, Genuine Information, Farrand, Records,

App. A, CLVIII, 223.

(43) The Virginia act is explained by Williams as a reaction to the threatened separation of Washington

county (S.W. Va.), which aspired to join the new state of Franklin, more than to the separation of

Kentucky. Williams, Franklin, 54. See, Papers, 1-2286, Madison to Jefferson, at 201. George H. Alden.

The State of Franklin, 8 AHR (1903): 282. Norman K. Risjord. Chesapeake Politics 1781-1800. N.Y.:

COl.U.Pr., 1978, 237, n. 26 (616). James William Hagy. Arthur Campbell and the Origins of Kentucky: A

Reassessment. 55 The Filson Club History Quarterly (1981): 373. Jay said in a letter to Adams (10-14-85)

that "the rage for separation and new states is mischievous, it will, unless checked, scatter our resources

and in every view enfeeble the Union." Cited in Winsor, Westward, 262.

(44) The motion disapproved the disposition which appears in several districts of the U.S., to be

separated from the states which have exercised constitutional jurisdiction over them, and be erected

into independent governments without the consent of the said states and of the U.S.- It also stressedthe intention of Congress to support any state when opposing such unconstitutional attempts to destroy

the fundamental principles of the Union. JCC, 29:810. Grayson to Madison, 8-2185, LMCC #203 at 193,

195.


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(45) The rationale for the Massachusetts vote was given by Dane in a letter to Samuel Phillips saying that

with the exception of Canada or any other British colony, no other states could be admitted, because it

would be in the power of nine states to balance the Union at pleasure by dividing old states and making

new ones. January 20, 1786, Dane Manuscripts, cited in Onuf, Origins, 165, n. 78. Dane to Choate, 1-31-

86, LMCC # 320 at 293. This motion was a forerunner of Art. 4, clause 3, Sec. 1 of the Fed. Const. See

also Williamson's motion of 6-19-83, Papers of Madison, 7, 164. To appreciate the significance of these

issues, see, debates in the Federal Convention on August 29 and 30, 1787.

(46) Virginia delegates to the Governor [P.Henry], LMCC 8:249; RHLee to Jefferson, 10-29-85, LMCC #

264 at 243. See also, Onuf, Origins, 163.

(47) See, supra, footnote # 15. On the "diversity of interest" as an obstacle to republican government,

see, Cathy D. Matson and Peter S. Onuf, A Union of Interest, Lawrence U.Pr. of Kansas, 1990, 82, andalso Madison to Jefferson, 3-1886, The Writings of Madison, 230. Jefferson himself, the great champion

of western rights preferred to have the commercial reform passed before the admission of the western

states; in Jefferson to Monroe, 6-17-85, Writings, IV, 49.

(48) JCC (July 86): 390-94.

(49) The Virginia motion on boundaries should be understood as a proposal to secure the maximum of

five states. This vote reveals that the Southern states supported the creation of more states in the NWT

than the Eastern states which at this point were increasing the minimum population required for

admission.

(50) The elimination of Massachusetts from the language of the resolution has been attributed to the

fact that her 4-19-8G cession did not specifically referred to the 100-150 clause, however, her cession

was made under the provisions of the 1010-80 resolution which brought that condition in the first place.

It seems that the elimination of Massachusetts may have been prompted by the Eastern states'

realization that the size of the future northwestern states was intrinsically related to the populationthreshold requirement (See infra footnote # 71). The issue since October 85 had changed from affecting

the unceded lands (SWT plus Maine and Vermont) to regarding only the ceded lands (NWT). The

southern states seem to have dropped the boundaries which secured five states for an increase in the

minimum from two to three states. In 1787, the NWO would include both, the boundaries and the 3-5

clause.


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(51) Madison, in The Federalist # 14, in discussing what to do with "angles and fractions" laying in the

"northwestern frontier" of the Union, proposed to leave the issue "to those whom further discoveries

and experience will render more equal to the task." Onuf, origins, 162 [He clearly develops the

distinction between the institutional treatment of ceded and unceded lands].

(52) Madison in 1783 said that "from several circumstances there was reason to believe that Rhode

Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, if not Maryland also, retained latent views of confining

Virginia to the Allegheny mountains." JCC 25:973 and Madison's notes. On Rhode Island's policy, see

Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, 457-459. Ellery and Howell to Governor Greene, 10-9-

83, "It has been earnestly contended that they [Virginia] should relinquish all their claims over the

Allegheny mountains. In alleviation of the public disappointment by failing in this point, it may be

observed that the lands appropriated by Virginia to her line, at all events, must have been taken out of

these western claims. The lands already ceded to the United States are estimated to amount to upwards

of 500,000 square miles. Allowing the state of Rhode Island to strike one-fiftieth, our share would

amount to ten thousand square miles, a territory of ten times the extent of the whole state."(Emphasis

added); and 517. Howell to Deputy Governor Bowen, 5-31-84. Howell was optimistic that "Congress will

be able to open a land office for the sale of one or two states by next Christmas." Ibid., 524, Howell to

Governor Greene, 2-9-85. Congress waits impatiently for the outcome of the Indian negotiations, since

there is a great demand for land. Spaight to Blount, 3-27-85, LMCC #85 at 75. Madison's observations, 5-

1-82, LMCC 6-340, 341. Howell to Greene, 7-30-82, LMCC 6-399, 402.

(53) Debates in the Convention for 6-28-87 (Madison), and 69-87 (Brearly). Rosemarie Zagarri, The

Politics of Size, Ithaca: Cornell U.Pr., 1987, 68. A.C. McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution,

1905, 216. Jefferson to Madison, 2-20-84, Papers of Madison, 7-424 (RHLee was talking of separating

the Northern Neck from Virginia and make it part of Maryland to interest the small states int he Union).

Williamson to Martin, 11-18-82, LMCC 6-544, No. 689.

(54) See, supra, footnote # 41. Campbell to Madison, 10-2885, Papers, 8:383. Onuf, Origins, 156, 161.

(55) JCC 28132.

(56) Monroe to Jefferson, 5-11-86, Writings, 126. A Monroe scholar, in a comparable situation, believes

that the absence of an allusion in a letter sent to Jefferson a week after the submission of a report,


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provides no evidence of the report's authorship. Charles E. Dickson, James Monroe's Defense of

Kentucky's Interests in the Confederation Congress: An Example of Early North/South Party Alignment,

Register of the Kentucky Historical Society (1976): 261,280, 264. As to the absence of Monroe's motion

from the JCC and the PCC, it is interesting to observe that motion was already missing from the previous

edition of the Journals. See, Snow, Dependencies, 430 [The LC edition of the JCC by John C. Fitzpatrick

was published in 1933/34, and Snow's Dependencies in 1902].

(57) JCC, 3-24-86, 133, n. 1, and 135, n. 1.

(58) The ordinance of 1784 was to apply to lands ceded by the states, purchased from the Indians, and

offered for sale by the Congress. This guarantee given to the future property owners referred to the

population threshold requirement set at the population of the least numerous of the thirteen states as

well as to governmental provisions securing orderly settlements.

(59) JCC, 5-3-86: 230. With respect to this motion by Dane, it is intriguing that the document shows

below the indorsement an sketch which resembles part of the 1784 boundaries of the ordinance

intersected by a river. See, PCC, No. 30, folio 83. The unfertile lands argument cannot be said to be

"apparent" as the term is used int he Secretary of Congress' letter to the Governor of Virginia, 711-86,

Territorial Papers (NWT), 19. For a discussion of "natural boundaries," see, Campbell to Madison, 10-28-

85, Papers of Madison, 382. JCC (3-24-1786), 394.

(60) It was eventually incorporated in art. IV of the NWO. See also, Madison to Jefferson, 1-9-85, Papers,

232 [opening the rivers as an answer to separatism].

(61) Grayson to Madison, 5-5-86, LMCC: 8-372/374, # 407.

(62) Peter Onuf, Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the Western Lands, 34 WMQ (1977): 372;

Grayson in Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788, Elliot, Debates, 340/343; Arthur P. Whitaker, The

Spanish-American Frontier. 1783-1795. Gloucester: P.Smith, 1962, 75. For the transition among the

following groupings: landed-landless states, the small-large states, and the eastern-southern states, see,

Madison to Pendleton, 4-23-82, in Hutchinson, Bounty Lands, 39 n.l.

(63) See, Monroe to Jefferson, 7-16-85, LMCC 8:403, No. 443.


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(64) See, comparison between agriculture and manufacturing related to density in C.E. Carter ed.

Documents Relating to the Mississippi Land Co., 1763-1769, 16 AHR(1911): 311-319, 316. McCoy, Elusive

Republic, 83-85. For maps depicting densities in 1790, 1800, and 1810, and for early Americans'

assumptions about the relationship between state size and population, see, Zagarri, Politics of Size, 6-7.

(65) Otto to Vergennes, 9-10-86, in Albert B. Hart ed., American History told by Contemporaries,

Macmillan, 1900, 111150. See also, Joseph L. Davis, Political Change in Revolutionary America: A

Sectional Interpretation," in James K. Martin, The Human Dimension of Nation Making, Madison: State

Historical Soc. of Wis., 1976, passim. Onuf, Origins, 154, 169. Dave to King, 7-16-87, LMCC: 8-621/22.

(66) Monroe to Jefferson, 7-16-86, LMCC: 8-403, # 443. See also, Williamson-Bland motion of 6-19-83,

Papers of Madison, 7164. Whitaker, Frontier, 76. See, Davis, interpretation of the "opened the eyes"

phrase, in Davis, Sectionalism, 117. Grayson to Washington, 5-8-85, LMCC: 118. Snow, Dependencies,

427 ["As the power to admit new "States" was based on Article XI of the Articles of Confederation, a

new "State" could be admitted by vote of any nine States of the Confederation. As soon as more than

three new States were added, the original States would have been at the mercy of any coalition

between these three and a minority of themselves, and as soon as more than five new States were

admitted, even nine of the old States voting together could not have prevented the admission of as

many new States as the remainder might have seen fit. The original states were slow to adopt a plan

which seemed certain to throw the power into the hands of the Western states."

(67) Tupper and Parsons toured some areas of the NWT as surveyors and Indian commissioners and

went to form the Ohio Co., see, Dumas Malone ed., Dictionary of American Biography, and Winsor,

Westward Movement, 280. Michael Allen, The Federalists and the West, 61 Western Pa.H.Mg. (1978):

315-332 [Allen develops the distinction among Federalists between the hard line constrictionists and the

"reluctant expansionists A good illustration of Allen's distinction is Putnam to Ames, Jan. 1790, in

Bushnell Hart ed., American History, III-106. It seems that a rejection of western expansionism had more

ideological than sectional background. The main example is Washington who presided over the federal

period. See also, Grayson to Washington, 4-15-85, LMCC: 8:95/97.

(68) Monroe to Madison, 5-8-85, Writings, I-78. JCC, 25-915 (226-83). LMCC: 8-130 ["(N.H. delegates)

think it beyond a doubt that many of the creditors of the U.S. in the middle and southern parts of the

Union have fixed their attention to this as a fund from which they shall soon be able to pay

themselves"]. An additional incentive was the revenue resulting from the sale of western lands which


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might be used to pay the federal debt without resorting to commercial taxes. Davis, Sectionalism, 116.

Dane to Wales, 1-31-86, LMCC # 321 at 296. Hall, Politics, 40-42.

(69) Jefferson to Monroe, 7-9-86, Papers, 111-115. This letter has been used and abused to prove

Jefferson's "democratic" views. For the political and institutional context of state size, see generally,

Zagarri, Politics of Size, supra.

(70) Monroe to Jefferson, 7-16-86, Writings, 140.

(71) Jefferson, LMCC: 8-91, n. 12. Monroe to Madison, 9-386, Writings, 162-163, and Monroe to Henry,

8-12-86, Writings, 150. For the federalist ideology in general, see, Linda K. Kerber, Federalists in Dissent,

Ithaca: Cornell U.Pr., 1983 (1970). Allen, Federalists, 315-332.

(72) JCC, 10-4-86 at 738. It is interesting that Dane's motion talked about the number of "free

inhabitants" necessary for admission raising thus implicitly the slavery issue to the fore. He later on

attached the slavery clause to the NWO.

(73) See, Jefferson's comments to Hogendorf on the western territory, 4-11-84, Papers, 220, n. 2.

Washington computed 500,000 sq.ml. for the entire western territory. As to Jefferson's geography, see,John K. Wright, Human Nature in Geography, Cambridge: Harvard U.Pr., 1966, 219.

(74) It is true that not all the states were planned to have the same extension. Berkhofer, Origins, 245.

See also, Arthur Bestor, Jr., Constitutionalism and the Settlement of the West: The Attainment of

Consensus, 1754-1784, in John Porter Bloom, ed. The American Territorial System, Athens, 1973, 29.

(75) See, Bestor, ibidem. The 3-24-86 report in its preamble assumes that the 1784 districts were drawn

in compliance with the 100-150 clause.

(76) For a New Hampshire delegate, the area of an state should be about 20 millon acres = 31,250 sq.ml.

See LMCC 2-2785, 8-46, # 52. This was the minimum size established by the financing committee report

of 1778, LMCC (Spt. 1778): 931 [20 to 40 million acres = 31,250/62,500 sq.mils.]


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(77) This enumeration is not exhaustive. In utilizing the word "factor" I have in mind the elemental idea

of connection which I take from Monroe himself. He said in his letter to Henry, 8-12-86, Writings, 149,

that "clearly I am of opinion it [the Mississippi question] will be held connected with other objects -&

perhaps with that upon which the convention will sit at Annapolis."

(78) See, text of the report of 1784 in Papers, 140-148; and the land ordinance of 1785 in C. Carter ed.,

Territorial Papers, 1218. Philbrick, Rise, 127.

(79) Onuf, Origins, 166. Monroe to Jefferson, 4-12-85, Writings, 71. Grayson to Washington, 5-8-85,

LMCC: 8-118.

(80) Pattison, Beginnings, 53.

(81) Pattison, ibidem, 88, 104; JCC: 18-915/16. Winsor, Westward, 261, 271.

(82) Eblen, Empires, 27. Richard P. McCormick, "The 'Ordinance' of 1784?" 50 WMQ(1993): 112, 119.

Onuf, Origins, 166. The distinction between settled and unsettled areas was crucial to an effective

expansion of the Confederation.

(83) JCC: 5-10-86, 255, n. 1. PCC No. 30, folio 85. A review of the original report in the PCC indicates that

the only portion in the writing of Monroe is just the "introduction" which says that "the committee to

whom a motion of Mr. Dane was referred for considering & reporting the form of a temporary

government for the western territory beg leave to report."

(84) Monroe to Jefferson, 7-16-86, LMCC 8:403, 404.

(85) Washington to James Duane, 9-7-83, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington, 27-133/140;

and Congress report of 11-15-83. Pattison, Beginnings, 29. William T. Hutchinson, The Bounty Lands of

the American Revolution in Ohio, N.Y.: Arno, 1979, 67. Also, in November 1785, Hamilton petitioned

Washington to use his influence with Congress in favor of Baron Steuben, LMCC: 8-260, n. 2 (261). On


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Washington's influence in passing the land ordinance of 1785, see, LMCC: 8-vii, introduction by Burnett.

On Washington's influence in acceptance of the Constitution see John C. Ranney, The Bases of American

Federalism, 3 WMQ(1946): 1-35, 28. Henry Lee to Washington, 10-17-86, LMCC: 8-486, # 523

["Unbounded influence" to conciliate the Shay's rebellion], and 8:343 # 374 (4-21-86).

Philbrick, Rise, 121, n. 66.

(86) As to Washington first hand knowledge of the West, see, Charles H. Ambler, George Washington

and the West, N.Y.: Russell, 1936, passim.

(87) For Washington ideas of progressive seating and compact settlement, see his letters to Arthur Lee,

3-15-85, in Writings of Washington, 106; Jacob Read, 11-3-84, 485-490, 487; Hugh Williamson, 3-15-85,

ibidem, 107-108; RHLee, 3-15-85, ibidem, 108109 [Lee showed this letter to Grayson, Payson Jackson

Treat, The National Land System, 1910, 29, n. 30], 6-22-85, and 8-22-85, ibidem, 173-175, 230-232;

William Grayson, 4-25-85 and 8-22-85, ibidem, 136-138, 232-234. See also, RHLee to Washington, 4-18-

85, LMCC: # 107 at 97/98. Winsor, Westward Movement, 261. Washington used the expression "the

decies" in his letter to RHLee, 3-15-85, Writings, 108-109. The partitions of Kentucky and Tennessee in

eastern and western portions was seen with suspicion and disapproval.

(88) Carl Evans Boyd, "The County of Illinois" 4 AHR (1899): 623-35. Abernethy, Western Lands, 309.

John Jay to John Lowell, 510-85, cited in Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union 17811789, N.Y.:

Harper, 1987, 21. As to the comparison of states to counties, see, Williamson at the Federal Convention

on 6-9-87, Governour Morris on 7-7-87, and Madison on 6-28-87.

(89) Hutchinson, Bounty Lands, 77. Onuf, Origins, 169. Jensen, New Nation, 355.

(90) Hatchet, Lake Erie, 177. R. Carlyle Buley, The Old Northwest Pioneer Period 1815-1840,

Bloomington: Ind.U.Pr., 1951, 51. Samuel Putnam Waldo. A Narrative of a Tour of Observation made

during the Summer of 1817, Hartford, Conn., 1817, 205-206. Cass to Secr. of War, 11-27-17,

Territ.Papers of U.S. (hereafter TPUS), X-711, 712. On the Northern border of Ohio, see, Spafford to

Meigs, 6-9-16, TPUS, X-650; Meigs to the President, 8-16-16, ibidem, X-663; Meigs to Tiffin, 8-22-16,

ibidem, X-664; Cass to Tiffin, 11-1-17, ibidem, X-709.


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(91) Buley, ibidem, 52. F. Clever Bald, Michigan in Four Centuries, N.Y.: Harper, 1954, 145146. Willis F.

Dunbar, Michigan: A History of the Wolverine State, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965, 241-242. John A.

Caruso, The Great Lakes Frontier, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961, 352 [Caruso seems to incurred in

the same fallacy criticized in this essay when he says that the surveyors of 1815 may have been

influenced by Monroe's comment in his 1-19-86 letter to Jefferson].