Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–98)From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Japanese invasions of Korea" redirects here. For the Japanese occupation of Korea during the 20th

century, see Korea under Japanese rule.

"Invasion of Korea" redirects here. For invasions of Korea during the Korean War, see Korean War.

Japanese invasions of Korea

The Japanese landing on Busan

Date 1592–1598Location Korean Peninsula

Result Korean-Chinese victory; Withdrawal of Japanese armies

Belligerents

Korea: Joseon Dynasty

China: Ming Dynasty

Japan: Azuchi-

Momoyama period

Commanders and leaders

Korea

Yi Sun-sin †

Japan

Toyotomi Hideyoshi

Ukita Hideie

Yi Eok-gi †

Won Gyun †

Sin Rip †

Kim Si-min †

Song Sang-hyeon †

Go Gyeong-myeong †

Kim Cheon-il †

Jo Heon †

Gwon Yul

Yu Seong-ryong

Kim Myeong-won

Yi Il

Gwak Jae-u

Jeong Ki-ryong

Kim Deok-nyeong

Yu Jeong

Hyujeong

Jeong Mun-bu

Kim Chung-seon.

China

Song Yingchang

Yang Hao

Li Rusong

Xing Jie

Listed above: Inspectors-

general/field commanders

Yang Shaoxun

Ma Gui (pr.)

Liu Ting

Deng Zilong†

Wu Weizhong

Chen Lin

Qian Shizheng et al.

Katō Kiyomasa

Fukushima Masanori

Konishi Yukinaga

Kuroda Nagamasa

Mōri Terumoto

Kobayakawa Takakage

Mōri Katsunobu

Toyotomi Hidekatsu

Listed above: Legion

chiefs

Chōsokabe Motochika

Shimazu Yoshihiro

Tachibana Muneshige

Kobayakawa Hidekane

Kuki Yoshitaka

Tōdō Takatora

So Yoshitoshi

Matsuura Shigenobu

Arima Harunobu

Ōmura Yoshiaki

Gotō Sumiharu

Nabeshima Naoshige

Sagara Yorifusa

Ōtomo Yoshimasa

Mōri Yoshimasa

Takahashi Mototane

Akizuki Tanenaga

Itō Suketaka

Shimazu Tadatoyo

Toda Katsutaka

Ikoma Chikamasa

Hachisuka Iemasa

Tachibana Naotsugu

Tsukushi Hirokado

Ankokuji Ekei

Hosokawa Tadaoki

Tokugawa Ieyasu

Uesugi Kagekatsu

Gamō Ujisato

Ōtani Yoshitsugu

Mori Hidemoto

Ikeda Hideuji

Nakagawa Hidenari

Mōri Yoshinari

Ikoma Kazumasa

Shimazu Tadatsune

Mitaira Saemon

Wakizaka Yasuharu

Katō Yoshiaki

Kurushima Michiyuki†

Kurushima Michifusa†

and others

Strength

Korea

172,000 Korean Army,[1]

(at the beginning)

at least 22,600 Korean

volunteers and insurgents

China

1st. (1592–1593)

43,000+[2]

2nd. (1597–1598)

~75,000[3]

Total:221,500[4]

Japan

1st. (1592–1593)

~ 158,000 [5]

2nd. (1597–1598)

~ 141,500[6]

Casualties and losses

Joseon: 260,000+ killed or

wounded

260,000-1,000,000 civilian

+ military

Ming: 30,000+ killed or

wounded

140,000+ killed or

wounded

[hide]

V

 

T

 

E

Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598)

1st Busan

 

Dadaejin

 

Dongnae

 

Sangju

Chungju

 

Okpo

 

1st Sacheon

 

Imjin River

Dangpo

 

Danghangpo

 

Hamgyong

 

Yongin

Hansan Island

 

Ichi

 

1st Pyongyang

2nd Busan

 

Bukgwan

 

1st Jinju

2nd Pyongyang

 

Byeokjegwan

 

Haengju

2nd Jinju

 

2nd Danghangpo

 

Chilcheollyang

Namwon

 

Myeongnyang

 

Jiksan

 

1st Ulsan

2nd Sacheon

 

2nd Ulsan

 

Suncheon

Noryang

Korean name

Hangul 임진왜란 / 정유재란

Hanja 壬辰倭亂 / 丁酉再亂

Revised Romanization Imjin waeran /

Jeong(-)yu jaeran

McCune–Reischauer Imjin waeran / Chŏng'yu

chaeran

Japanese name

Kanji 文禄の役 / 慶長の役

Kana ぶんろく・けいちょうのえ

き

Hepburn Bunroku no Eki / Keichō no Eki

Chinese name

Traditional Chinese 萬曆朝鮮戰爭

Simplified Chinese 万历朝鲜战争

Hanyu Pinyin Wànlì Cháoxiǎn

Zhànzhēng

The two Japanese invasions of Korea took place from 1592 to 1598. Toyotomi Hideyoshi led the

newly unified Japan into the first invasion (1592–1596) with the professed goal of conquering

the Joseon Dynastyin Korea, and subsequently the Ming Dynasty in China,[7] and the European

Merchants (Nanban, 南蛮[8][9]). The second invasion (1597–1598) was aimed as a retaliatory

offensive against Joseon Dynasty Korea and Ming Dynasty China as its ally.[7] The invasions are also

known as Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, theSeven Year War (in reference to its span), the Imjin

Waeran (Hangul: 임진왜란, Hanja: 壬辰倭亂 - lit. Japanese Invasion of the Imjin Year), in reference

to the "Imjin (壬辰)" year of the sexagenary cycle inKorean,[10] and Bunroku Keichō no

eki (Japanese: 文禄・慶長の役).

Contents

  [hide] 

1 Name

2 Overview

3 Effects

4 Background

o 4.1 Korea and China before the war

o 4.2 Hideyoshi and his preparations

4.2.1 Diplomatic dealings between Japan and Korea

o 4.3 Military capabilities

4.3.1 Problems with Joseon Defense Policies

4.3.2 Troop strength

4.3.3 Weapons

4.3.4 Naval power

5 First invasion (1592–1593)

o 5.1 Initial attacks

5.1.1 Busan and Dadaejin

5.1.2 Dongnae

5.1.3 Occupation of the Gyeongsang Province

o 5.2 Joseon response

5.2.1 Battle of Sangju

5.2.2 Battle of Chungju

o 5.3 Capture of Seoul

o 5.4 Japanese campaigns in the north

5.4.1 Crossing of the Imjin River

5.4.2 Distribution of Japanese forces in 1592

5.4.3 Capture of Pyongyang

5.4.4 Campaigns in the Gangwon Province

5.4.5 Campaigns in the Hamgyong Province and Manchuria

o 5.5 Naval battles of Admiral Yi

5.5.1 Battle of Okpo

5.5.2 Battle of Sacheon and the Turtle Ship

5.5.3 Battle of Dangpo

5.5.4 Battle of Danghangpo

5.5.5 Battle of Yulpo

5.5.6 Battle of Hansando

5.5.7 Battle of Angolpo

o 5.6 Korean Militias

5.6.1 Gwak Jae-u's Campaigns along the Nakdong River

5.6.2 Battle of Uiryong/Chongjin

5.6.3 Jeolla coalition and Battle of Yongin

5.6.4 First Geumsan Campaign

o 5.7 Siege of Jinju

o 5.8 Intervention of Ming China

o 5.9 Siege of Pyongyang

o 5.10 Battle of Byeokjegwan

o 5.11 Battle of Haengju

o 5.12 Stalemate

6 Negotiations and truce between China and Japan (1594–1596)

7 Korean military reorganization

o 7.1 Proposal for military reforms

o 7.2 Military Training Agency

8 Second invasion (1597–1598)

o 8.1 Initial offensive

8.1.1 Plot against Admiral Yi

8.1.2 Battle of Chilcheollyang

8.1.3 Siege of Namwon

8.1.4 Battle of Hwangseoksan

8.1.5 First Korean and Ming counter offensive

8.1.6 Battle of Jiksan

8.1.7 Battle of Myeongnyang

8.1.8 Siege of Ulsan

o 8.2 Final allied offensive of 1598

8.2.1 Battle of Sacheon

o 8.3 Death of Hideyoshi

o 8.4 Battle of Noryang Point

9 Postwar negotiations

10 Aftermath and conclusion

o 10.1 Losses and gains

o 10.2 War brutality

o 10.3 Legacy

10.3.1 International awareness

11 See also

12 References

13 Bibliography

14 External links

Name[edit]

The first invasion (1592–1596) is literally called the "Japanese (倭 |wae| ) Disturbance (亂 |ran| ) of

Imjin" (1592 being an imjin year in the sexagenary cycle) in Korean. In Chinese, the wars are

referred to as the "Wanli Korean Campaign", after then reigning Chinese emperor, or the "Renchen

War to Defend the Nation" (壬辰衛國戰爭), where renchen (壬辰) is the Chinese reading of imjin.

Meanwhile, the war is calledBunroku no eki in Japanese (Bunroku referring to the Japanese

era under the Emperor Go-Yōzei, spanning the period from 1592 to 1596). The second invasion

(1597–1598) is called the "Second War of Jeong-yu" and "Keichō no eki", respectively. In Japanese,

the war was also called "Kara iri" (唐入り, literally "entry to China") in Edo period (17–19C) because

Japan's ultimate purpose was the conquest of Ming China although the armies of Toyotomi

Hideyoshi were confined to the Korean Peninsula for the duration of the war.

Overview[edit]

In 1592 Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent 158,000 troops to the Joseon Dynasty Korea in order to conquer

Ming Dynasty China. As the Japanese army approached Seoul, Sonjo, King of Korea, transferred the

capital and fled to Pyongyang.[11] As the Japanese army marched close to Pyongyang, Sonjo fled

to Pyeongan Province located at the north end of Korea and on the border of China and asked the

Ming for help based on past homage to Chinese emperors.[12] The Japanese forces, well trained,

confident, and experienced after the numerous conflicts of the Sengoku Period, typically held the

field in most land engagements, but were eventually hampered in their advances as their

communication and supply lines were disrupted. Ming China quickly interpreted the Japanese

invasions as a challenge to its tributary system [13]  and their entry into the conflict under the Wanli

Emperor brought about an eventual military stalemate. China dispatched 200,000 soldiers, and

banished Japan from Pyongyang.[14] The war stalled for five years during which the three states

attempted to negotiate a peaceful compromise. The first phase of the invasion lasted from 1592 until

1596, with a brief interlude for what would be failed peace negotiations between 1596 and 1597. In

October 1596, Hideyoshi issued orders to invade Korea again. The pattern of the second invasion

largely mirrored the first. After limited progress on land and continued lack of security at sea,

Hideyoshi died in September 1598. The Council of Five Elders ordered the remaining Japanese

forces in Korea to withdraw back to Japan. Final peace negotiations between the parties followed

afterwards and continued for several years, ultimately resulting in the normalization of relations.

Effects[edit]

Korea suffered the loss of a large portion of its soldiers and faced enormous financial difficulties as a

result of the war taking place almost entirely on its soil and nowhere else.[15] Korea suffered the loss

of a large portion of its civilian population through both warfare and famine.[citation needed]

In addition to the human losses, Korea suffered tremendous cultural, economic, and infrastructural

damage, including a large reduction in the amount of arable land,[citation needed] the destruction and

confiscation of significant artworks, artifacts, and historical documents, and the loss of artisans and

technicians. During this time, the main Korean royal palaces Gyeongbokgung, Changdeokgung,

and Changgyeonggung were burned down, the palace Deoksugung was used as a temporary

palace.[citation needed] The heavy financial burden placed on China by this war, as well as two other wars

in the south, adversely affected its military capabilities and partly contributed to the fall of the Ming

Dynasty and the rise of the Qing Dynasty.[16] However, the sinocentric tributary system that Ming had

defended was maintained by the Qing, and ultimately, the war resulted in a maintenance of the

status quo - with the reestablishment of trade and the normalization of relations between all three

parties.[17]

Background[edit]

Main articles: Joseon Dynasty and History of Korea

Main articles: Azuchi-Momoyama period and History of Japan

Main articles: Ming Dynasty and History of China

Korea and China before the war[edit]

In 1392, the Korean General Yi Seong-gye led a successful coup to take political power from King

U of the Goryeo Dynasty by using military force. His followers forced Yi to take the crown, thus

founding the Joseon Dynasty.[18] In search of a justification for its rule given the lack of a royal

bloodline, the new regime received recognition from China and integration into its tributary

system [4]  within the context of the Mandate of Heaven.[19] Ashikaga Yoshimitsu was conferred the title

of 'King of Japan' by the Emperor of Ming in 1375, Japan briefly accepted a position in the tributary

system, but this it quickly renounced Ashikaga Yoshimochi in 1411 and chose to no longer be subject

to oversight and control from Ming.[20][21] Within this tributary system, China assumed the role of a "big

brother", with Korea maintaining a favored relationship among tributory states in return for accepting

the role of a "younger brother".[22]

Unlike the situation over one thousand years earlier when Tang Dynasty China had an antagonistic

relationship with Goguryeo , the one of the Three Kingdoms of Korea, Ming China had close trading

and diplomatic relations with the Korean Joseon Dynasty, which remained a tributary state, but also

enjoyed continuous trade relations with Japan.[23]

The two dynasties, Ming and Joseon (also called Choson), shared much in common: both emerged

during the fourteenth century at the fall of Mongolian rule, embraced Confucian ideals in society, and

faced similar external threats (the Jurchen raiders and the Wokou pirates).[24] Internally, both China

and Korea were troubled with fights among competing political factions, which would significantly

influence decisions made by the Koreans prior to the war, and those made during the war by the

Chinese.[25][26] Dependence on each other for trade and also having common enemies resulted in

Korea and Ming China having a friendly relationship.

The Wanli Emperor succeeded to the Ming dynasty in the year 1572 at the age of 9; for the first 10

years of his reign the Ming was largely run by his teacher and guardian, Zhang Juzheng; who pushed

through a series of reforms that revitalized the declining dynasty and made major breakthroughs in

several of the key areas that had plagued the Ming, especially its financial problems. Zhang also

made strong progress in defending against the Mongols of the north, and (as opposed to corrup

practices of the past) promoted military generals based on their merits, such as Li Chengliang and Qi

Jiguang.

Although after Zhang Juzheng's passing in 1582, the Ming court slowly began to reverse some of his

reforms and the Wanli Emperor himself increasingly became disillusioned and uninterested with daily

politics. The Ming was in effect still at a relatively revitalized stage during the 1590s.

The Ming saw a string of conflicts during this period. Aside from their endless struggle against

the Mongolians, they were also dealing with a military rebellion in Ningxia just before the war broke

out, along with a border war with the Burmese Taungoo dynasty that coincided with the Imjin war.

Their conflicts with the Wokou pirates a couple decades earlier also gave them significant experience

against the Japanese style of warfare. Japan was by this time ending a period of internal conflict and

the process of unification had been taken forward by Toyotomi. Japan launched the first attack to the

Korean Peninsula, with the pretext that Korea refused to let pass Japanese soldiers pass through

their land to get to China. This could have effectively been true since Japan was eager, for social and

economic reasons, to take land on the continent and expand.

Hideyoshi and his preparations[edit]

By the last decade of the 16th century, Hideyoshi as daimyō had unified all of Japan in a brief period

of peace. Since Hideyoshi came to hold power in the absence of a legitimate Minamoto

lineage necessary for the Imperial Shogun commission, he sought for military power to legitimize his

rule and to decrease his dependence on the Imperial family.[27] It is said that Hideyoshi planned an

invasion of China to fulfill the dreams of his late lord Oda Nobunaga,[28] and to mitigate the possible

threat of civil disorder or rebellion posed by the large number of samurai and soldiers in unified

Japan.[29] But it is quite possible that Hideyoshi might have set a more realistic goal of subjugating the

smaller neighbouring states (i.e. Ryukyus, Luzon, Taiwan, and Korea), and treating the larger or

more distant countries as trading partners, as [27] all throughout the invasion of Korea, Hideyoshi

sought for legal tally trade with China[27] Hideyoshi's need for military supremacy as a justification for

his rule which lacked Shogunal background could, on an international level, eventually translate into

an order with Japan's neighbouring countries below Japan.[27] Hideyoshi was also tempted by an

external conflict to prevent internal rebellion within Japan. This would keep his newly formed state

united against a common enemy, and prevent the Daimyo from acting on any ambitions against his

rule. Fighting a war away from Japanese territory would also prevent territorial destruction, and

maintain the infrastrcuture of the state.[5]. These considerations would be consistent with the fact

that Hideyoshi was not a Shogun nor had any bonds with the royal bloodline.

The defeat of the Odawara-based Hōjō clan in 1590[30] finally brought about the second unification of

Japan,[31] and Hideyoshi began preparing for the next war. Beginning in March 1591, the Kyūshū

daimyō and their labor forces constructed a castle at Nagoya (in modern-day Karatsu) as the center

for the mobilization of the invasion forces.[32]

Hideyoshi planned for a possible war with Korea long before completing the unification of Japan, and

made preparations on many fronts. As early 1578, Hideyoshi, then battling under Nobunaga

against Mōri Terumoto for control of the Chūgoku region of Japan, informed Terumoto of Nobunaga's

plan to conquer China.[33] In 1592 Hideyoshi sent a letter to the Philippines demanding tribute from

the governor general and stating that Japan had already received tribute from Korea (which was a

misunderstanding, as explained below) and the Ryukyus.[34]

As for the military preparations, the construction of as many as 2,000 ships may have begun as early

as 1586.[35] To estimate the strength of the Korean military, Hideyoshi sent an assault force of 26

ships to the southern coast of Korea in 1587.[36] On the diplomatic front, Hideyoshi began to establish

friendly relations with China long before completing the unification of Japan and helped to police the

trade routes against the wakō.[37]

Diplomatic dealings between Japan and Korea[edit]

In 1587, Hideyoshi sent his first envoy Yutani Yasuhiro,[38][39][40] to Korea, which was during the rule

of King Seonjo [41]  to re-establish diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan (broken since the

Japanese pirate raid in 1555),[42] which Hideyoshi hoped to use as a foundation to induce the Korean

court to join Japan in a war against China.[43] Yasuhiro, with his warrior background and an attitude

disdainful of the Korean officials and their customs, failed to receive the promise of future

ambassadorial missions from Korea.[44]

Around May 1589, Hideyoshi's second embassy, consisting of Sō Yoshitoshi (or Yoshitomo),[45]

[46] Yanagawa Shigenobu[47][48] and Buddhist monk Genso[49] reached Korea and secured the promise

of a Korean embassy to Japan in exchange for a group of Korean rebels which had taken refuge in

Japan.[44]

In 1587 Hideyoshi had ordered the adopted father of Yoshitoshi and the daimyō of Tsushima, Sō

Yoshishige,[39][50] to offer the Joseon Dynasty an ultimatum of submitting to Japan and participating in

the conquest of China, or facing the prospect of open war with Japan. However, as Tsushima

enjoyed a special trading position as the single checkpoint to Korea for all Japanese ships and had

permission from Korea to trade with as many as 50 of its own vessels,[51] the Sō family had a vested

interest in preventing conflict with Korea, and delayed the talks for nearly two years.[45] Even when

Hideyoshi renewed his order, Sō Yoshitoshi reduced the visit to the Korean court to a campaign to

better relations between the two countries. Near the end of the ambassadorial mission, Yoshitoshi

presented King Seonjo a brace of peafowl and matchlock guns - the first advanced fire-arms to come

to Korea.[52] Yu Seong-ryong, a high-ranking scholar official, suggested that the military put

the arquebus into production and use, but the Korean court failed to appreciate its merits.[53] This lack

of interest and underestimation of the power of the arquebus eventually led to the decimation of the

Korean army early in the war.

On April 1590, the Korean ambassadors including Hwang Yun-gil, Kim Saung-il and others[54] left

for Kyoto, where they waited for two months while Hideyoshi was finishing his campaign against the

Odawara and the Hōjō clans.[55] Upon his return, they exchanged ceremonial gifts and delivered King

Seonjo's letter to Hideyoshi.[55] Hideyoshi assumed that the Koreans had come to pay a tributary

homage to Japan, but the Koreans still refused. For this reason the ambassadors were not given the

formal treatment that was due to diplomatic representatives. In the end, the Korean ambassadors

asked for Hideyoshi to write a reply to the Korean king, for which they waited 20 days at the port of

Sakai.[56] The letter, redrafted as requested by the ambassadors on the ground that it was too

discourteous, invited Korea to submit to Japan and join in a war against China.[52] Upon the

ambassadors' return, the Korean court held serious discussions concerning Japan's invitation;

[57] while Hwang Yun-gil reported to the Korean court conflicting estimates of Japanese military

strength and intentions. They nonetheless pressed that a war was imminent. Kim Saung-il claimed

that Hideyoshi's letter was nothing but a bluff. Moreover, the Korean court, aware only that Japan

was in turmoil with various clan armies fighting each other, substantially underrated the combined

strength and abilities of many Japanese armies at the time. Some, including King Seonjo, argued

that Ming should be informed about the dealings with Japan, as failure to do so could make Ming

suspect Korea's allegiance, but the Korean court finally concluded to wait further until the appropriate

course of action became definite.[58]

In the end, Hideyoshi diplomatic negotiations did not produce the desired result with Korea. The

Joseon Court approached Japan as a country inferior to Korea, and saw itself as superior according

to its favored position within the Chinese tributary system. It mistakenly evaluated Hideyoshi's threats

of invasions to be no better than the common wakō Japanese pirate raids.[59] The Korean court

handed to Shigenobu[47] and Genso, Hideyoshi's third embassy, King Seonjo's letter rebuking

Hideyoshi for challenging the Chinese tributary system. Hideyoshi replied with another letter, but

since it was not presented by a diplomat in person as expected by custom, the Korean Court ignored

it.[60] After this denial of his second request, Hideyoshi proceeded to launch his armies against Korea

in 1592.

Military capabilities[edit]

Main articles: Military history of Korea, Military history of Japan, and Military history of China (pre-

1911)

Japanese infantry were used to fusillade using matchlock guns

The two major security threats to Korea and China at the time were the Jurchens, who raided along

the northern borders, and the wakō (Japanese pirates), who pillaged the coastal villages and trade

ships.[61][62]

This defensive stance within an environment of relative peace pushed the Koreans to depend on the

strength of their fortresses and warships. With the transmission

of gunpowder and firearms technology from Mongol Empire during theGoryeo Dynasty, Korea

improved upon the original Chinese designs of firearms(Zhen Tian Lei) and developed advanced

cannon which were used in the Mongol invasions of Japan. Even though China was the main source

of new military technologies in Asia, Korea was one of the manufacturing base of warship of the

Mongol Empire.[63][64]

Japan, on the other hand, had been in a state of civil war for over a century, which had the result of

turning Japan into a very proficient warlike society. When traders from Portugal arrived in Japan and

introduced arquebuses and muskets, the Japanese warlords were quick to adapt to this innovative

weapon, giving them a large advantage over the Korean armies. On land, however, the charging

Japanese infantry were very difficult targets for the Korean cannons, and the small arms carried by

Japanese soldiers had greater advantage. This strategic difference in weapons development and

implementation contributed to the in-war Japanese dominance on land, and The Allied Forces

dominance of the West Coast in the Korean Peninsula.

As Japan had been at war since the mid-15th century, Toyotomi Hideyoshi had half a million battle-

hardened soldiers at his disposal[65] to form a remarkable professional army in Asia for the invasion of

Korea.[66] While Japan's chaotic state had left the Koreans with a very low estimate of Japan as a

military threat,[66] a new sense of unity among the different political factions in Japan, the "Sword

hunt" in 1588, (the confiscation of all weapons from the peasants) indicated otherwise.[67] Along with

the hunt came "The Separation Edict" in 1591, which effectively put an end to all

Japanese wakō piracy by prohibiting the daimyōs to support the pirates within their fiefs.[67] Ironically

enough, the Koreans believed that Hideyoshi's invasion would be just an extension of the previous

pirate raids that had been repelled before.[68] As for the military situation in Joseon, the Korean

scholar official Yu Seong-ryongobserved, "not one in a hundred [Korean generals] knew the methods

of drilling soldiers":[69] rise in ranks depended far more on social connections than military knowledge.

[70] Korean soldiers were disorganized, ill-trained and ill-equipped,[70] and they were used mostly in

construction projects such as building castle walls.[71]

Problems with Joseon Defense Policies[edit]

Japanese arquebuses of the Edo era. These types offirearms were used by Japanese

soldiers during Hideyoshi's invasions.

There were several defects with the organization of the Joseon-era Korean military defence system.

[72] An example was a defence policy that stated local officers could not individually respond to a

foreign invasion outside of their jurisdiction until a higher ranking general, appointed by the king's

court, arrived with a newly mobilized army.[72] This arrangement was highly inefficient since the

nearby forces would remain stationary until the mobile border commander arrived on the scene and

took control.[72] Secondly, as the appointed general often came from an outside region, he was likely

to be unfamiliar with the natural environment, the available technology and manpower of the invaded

region.[72] Finally, as a main army was never maintained, new and ill-trained recruits conscripted

during war constituted a significant part of the army.[72] The Korean court managed to carry out some

reforms, but they remain problematic. For example, the military training center established in 1589 in

the Gyeongsang province recruited mostly either too young or too old soldiers (as able men targeted

by the policy had higher priorities such as farming and other economic activities), augmented by

some adventure-seeking aristocrats and slaves buying their freedom.[72]

The dominant form of the Korean fortresses was the "Sanseong", or the mountain fortress,[73] which

consisted of a stone wall that continued around a mountain in a serpentine fashion.[66] These walls

were poorly designed with little use of towers and cross-fire positions (usually seen in European

fortifications) and were mostly low in height.[66] It was a wartime policy for everyone to evacuate to

one of these nearby fortresses and for those who failed to do so to be assumed to be collaborators

with the enemy; however, the policy never held any great effect because the fortresses were out of

reach for most refugees.[66]

Troop strength[edit]

Hideyoshi mobilized his army at the Nagoya Castle on Kyūshū (present-day Karatsu), newly built for

the sole purpose of housing the invasion forces and the reserves.[74] The first invasion consisted of

nine divisions totaling 158,800 men, of which the last two of 21,500 were stationed as reserves

in Tsushima andIki respectively.[75] The Japanese used a total of 500,000 troops throughout the

entire war.[65]

On the other hand, Joseon maintained only a few military units with no field army, and its defense

depended heavily on the mobilization of the citizen soldiers in case of emergency.[71] During the first

invasion, Joseon deployed a total of 84,500 regular troops throughout, assisted by 22,000 non-

regular volunteers.[76] Ming troops never numbered more than 60,000 troops in Korea at any point of

the war.[77]

Weapons[edit]

Joseon cannons such as this one were extensively used in the Joseon navy.

Large iron-tipped wooden missile fired from Korean cannons.

Since its introduction by the Portuguese traders on the island of Tanegashima in 1543,

[78] the arquebus had become widely used in Japan.[79] While both Korea and China had also been

introduced to firearms similar to the Portuguesearquebus, most were older models. The Korean

soldiers' small firearms was a handgun with simple mechanism either with gunstock or wooden shaft

attached. When the Japanese diplomats presented the Korean court arquebuses as gifts, the Korean

scholar-official Yu Seong-ryong advocated the use of the new weapon but the Korean court failed to

realize its potency.[55] In contrast, the Japanese often deployed the arquebus in combination with

archery in war.[80]

The Chinese used a variety of weapons, including long bows,[81] swords,[82][83] firearms, early kind

of land mines and early hand grenades.[84]

An illustration of an ampulliform Chinese fire-lance with a gunpowder charge shooting a

blast of flame with lead pellets as coviative projectiles. The weapon was called the

'phalanx-charging fire-gourd'

Chinese also demonstrated massive use of rocket-propelled arrows, notably during the Siege of

Pyongyang in January 1593. During siege actions, Chinese deployed rattan shields and iron pavises

(large shields), reputed to be musket-proof.

The Japanese defeated successive Korean armies with a combination of muskets, spears and

swords. While muskets used by the Japanese were superior to Korean bows in terms of penetration,

the former lacked the range, accuracy, and fire rate of the latter.[citation needed] Numerous battle accounts

from the Annal of Joseon dynasty and various essays, diaries of Korean officials and commanders

show that musket alone could not ensure victory. By employing both musket and arme blanche ("cold

steel", swords, lances, spears, and the like), the Japanese were able to achieve success during the

early phase of war. Indeed, the ferocious charge of Japanese troops with spears and swords were

often more decisive than with muskets. This is because the Koreans, who fare fairly well in ranged

combat by employing small firearms and bows, were poorly trained in close combat, and lacked

battlefield experience and discipline. Thus Korean soldiers were unable to hold their line against

charging Japanese soldiers. The following words from a Korean military official named Shi-eon Lee

to the Korean king clearly shows such weakness:

The King asked him (Shi-eon Lee),

"You have already told me about the low accuracy of Japanese muskets. Why, then, are Korean

armies having great problem with defeating them?"

He then answered, "The Korean soldiers cower before the enemy and flee for their lives even

before they have engaged the enemy. As for the commanders, they seldom leave their positions

because they fear that they might be executed for deserting. However, there is a limit to

executing deserting soldiers since there are so many of them. Truly, the Japanese aren't good

musketeers, but they advance so rapidly that they appear right in front of the Koreans in the time

Koreans can shoot only two arrows. It is said that Koreans are good archers, but they seldom hit

the targets when the enemy is too far away, and are too scared to shoot when the enemy is near

because they fear Japanese swords[verification needed][page needed]. Archery often becomes useless

because Koreans, fearing the Japanese arme blanche, can barely shoot. The Japanese are

reputed to be good swordsmen, but it is possible for Koreans to draw swords and hold their

ground. However, the Koreans seldom do this and merely run for their lives[verification needed]

[page needed]."[85]

As for field artillery, it seems the Koreans seldom employed them, with cannons mainly used in

siege action and in defending castles. According to the "The Diary of a Militia" (향병일기;

Hyangbyeong-ilgi), which is stored in the database of National Institute of Korean History, there

are a few cases of Koreans employing artillery in the field. At the battle of Haengju, the Korean

army employed "Earth" class cannon (Jija-chongtong) behind field fortification. In addition,

irregular Korean units with government-supplied weapons used explosive shots fired from

mortars at the open terrain in Ban-am, Gyeongsang district. The Chinese seem to have been

more active in employing field artillery than the Koreans. One of the notable Chinese field gun

was "Great General Cannon". This was a large breech-loading cannon with two-wheeled cart,

shooting an iron ball weighing about 10 kilograms. The Japanese, on the other hand, employed

virtually no artillery neither in siege or field warfare.

The Koreans actively deployed their cavalry divisions in action, however they often suffered

significant disadvantages. Terrain was often mountainous, lacking both the flat plains suitable for

cavalry charges, the land was prone to ditches, and it lacked grass essential in feeding their

horses. In addition, Japanese use of the arquebus at long range and in concentrated volleys

negated effective cavalry tactics.[83] Korean cavalrymen's primary weapons were bows, with

swords and lances holding only subsidiary positions. Most of cavalry action for the Koreans took

place in the Battle of Chungju at the beginning of the war where they were outnumbered and

wiped out by Japanese infantry.[86] Although the Japanese divisions also fielded cavalry (they,

however, dismounted when engaged in action, acting more like mounted infantry) and

occasionally specialized firearms were used on horseback, though most cavalrymen preferred

the conventional yari (spear),[87] their use was reduced by increasing logistical difficulties and the

increasing use of firearms by the Koreans and Chinese.[88]

Naval power[edit]

An old painting of a panokseon.

In contrast to the Japanese advantages on land, Korea possessed a large advantage at sea.

Advanced artillery and shipbuilding technology, along with an experienced naval history against

Japanese pirates, allowed the Korean navy to field highly advanced and formidable watercraft.

By the time of the Japanese invasion, Korea employed thepanokseon, a powerful galley-type

ship armed with cannon that outranged most Japanese vessels.

As virtually all Japanese ships in the first phase of the war lacked cannon artillery,[63] Korean

ships outranged and bombarded Japanese ships with impunity outside the range of the

Japanese muskets, arrows, and catapults.[63]When the Japanese attempted to outfit cannon to

their ships,[89] their lightweight ship design prohibited using more than a few per vessel and

usually lacked the firepower or range of their Korean counterparts[90]

In addition to a lack of effective naval armament, most Japanese ships were modified merchant

vessels more suited for transportation of troops and equipment than fielding artillery weapons.[63]

[91] Most Japanese ships were also constructed with a deep keel and a single sail, that while

provided speed limited movement to favourable winds and manouevrability was considerably

disadvantaged by Korea's narrow coastal waters. Korean ships in contrast fielded multiple sails

and crews providing oar power, and were constructed with a flat keel that enabled sharp

turns[citation needed]. Additionally Japanese ships were constructed with iron nails while the Korean

panokseons used wooden pegs. In water, nails corroded and loosened while wooden pegs

expand and strengthened the joints[citation needed].

Admiral Yi's leadership and strategic thinking was also a large factor in Korea's naval

dominance, using a superior naval force to disrupt the Japanese logistical network of the Korean

Peninsula coast, This dominance, however, had limited effect on Japan's ability to continuously

reinforce on the Korean peninsula in the area of Pusan, once Korean naval bases in the

immediate area were neutralized.

In order to bolster his fleet, Hideyoshi attempted unsuccessfully to hire two Portuguese galleons

to join the invasion.[92]

First invasion (1592–1593)[edit]

First wave of the Japanese invasion[93]

1st div. Konishi Yukinaga 7,000

Sō Yoshitoshi 5,000

Matsuura Shigenobu (ja) 3,000

Arima Harunobu 2,000

Ōmura Yoshiaki (ja) 1,000

Gotō Sumiharu (ja) 700 18,700

2nd div. Katō Kiyomasa10,000

Nabeshima Naoshige12,000

Sagara Yorifusa (ja) 800 22,800

3rd div. Kuroda Nagamasa 5,000

Ōtomo Yoshimasa 6,000 11,000

4th div. Shimazu Yoshihiro10,000

Mōri Yoshimasa (ja) 2,000

Takahashi Mototane (ja), Akizuki Tanenaga, Itō Suketaka (ja), Shimazu Tadatoyo [94]

2,000 14,000

5th div. Fukushima Masanori 4,800

Toda Katsutaka 3,900

Chōsokabe Motochika 3,000

Ikoma Chikamasa 5,500

Ikushima (Kurushima Michifusa)? 700

Hachisuka Iemasa (ja) 7,20025,000 (sic)

6th div. Kobayakawa Takakage10,000

Kobayakawa Hidekane, Tachibana Muneshige, Tachibana Naotsugu (ja),Tsukushi Hirokado, Ankokuji Ekei

5,700 15,700

7th div. Mōri Terumoto30,000

30,000

Subtotal 137,200

Reservers Ukita Hideie (Tsushima Island) 10,00

(8th div.) 0

(9th div.)Toyotomi Hidekatsu (ja) and Hosokawa Tadaoki (ja) (Iki Island)

11,500

21,500

Subtotal 158,700

Stationed force at Nagoya

Tokugawa Ieyasu, Uesugi Kagekatsu,Gamō Ujisato, and others

75,000

Subtotal 233,700

Naval force exclusion

Kuki Yoshitaka, Wakizaka Yasuharu,Katō Yoshiaki, Ōtani Yoshitsugu

-9,000

Total (rounded)

225,000

Initial attacks[edit]

Busan and Dadaejin[edit]

Main articles: Siege of Busan and Battle of Dadaejin

On May 23, 1592, the First Division of the Japanese invasion army consisting of 7,000 men led

by Konishi Yukinaga [95]  left Tsushima in the morning, and arrived at the port city of Busan in the

evening.[96] Korean naval intelligence had detected the Japanese fleet, but Won Gyun, the Right

Naval Commander of Gyeongsang, misidentified the fleet as trading vessels on a mission.[97] A

later report of the arrival of an additional 100 Japanese vessels raised his suspicions, but the

general did nothing about it.[97]Sō Yoshitoshi landed alone on the Busan shore to ask the

Koreans for a safe passage to China for the last time; the Koreans refused, and Sō

Yoshitoshi laid siege to the citywhile Konishi Yukinaga attacked the nearby fort of Dadaejin the

next morning.[96]Japanese accounts claim that the battles dealt the Koreans complete

annihilation (one claims 8,500 deaths, and another, 30,000 heads), while a Korean account

claims that the Japanese themselves took significant losses before sacking the city.[98]

Dongnae[edit]

"Dongnaebu Sunjeoldo", a Korean painting from 1760 depicting the Battle of Dongnae.

Main article: Siege of Dongnae

On the morning of May 25, 1592, the First Division arrived at Dongnae eupseong.[98] The

resulting fight lasted twelve hours, killed 3,000, and resulted in Japanese victory.[99] A popular

legend describes the governor in charge of the fortress, Song Sang-hyeon. When Konishi

Yukinaga again demanded before the battle that the Koreans allow the Japanese to travel

through the peninsula, the governor was said to have replied, "It is easy for me to die, but

difficult to let you pass."[99] Even when the Japanese troops neared his commanding post during

the battle, Song remained seated with cool dignity.[99]Finally, when a Japanese soldier cut off

Song's right arm holding his staff of command, Song picked up the staff with his left arm, which

was then cut off; again Song picked it up, this time with his mouth, but was killed by a third blow.

[99] The Japanese, impressed by Song's defiance, treated his body with proper burial ceremony.

[99]

Occupation of the Gyeongsang Province[edit]

Katō Kiyomasa's Second Division landed in Busan on May 27, and Kuroda Nagamasa's Third

Division, west of Nakdong, on May 28.[100] The Second Division took the abandoned city

of Tongdo on May 28, and captured Kyongju on May 30.[100]The Third Division, upon landing,

captured the nearby Kimhae castle by keeping the defenders under pressure with gunfire while

building ramps up to the walls with bundles of crops.[101] By June 3, the Third Division captured

Unsan, Changnyong, Hyonpung, and Songju.[101] Meanwhile, Konishi Yukinaga's First Division

passed the Yangsan mountain fortress (captured on the night of the Battle of Dongnae, when its

defenders fled after the Japanese scouting parties fired their arquebuses), and captured the

Miryang castle on the afternoon of May 26.[102] The First Division secured the Cheongdo fortress

in the next few days, and destroyed the city of Daegu.[102] By June 3, the First Division crossed

the Nakdong River, and stopped at the Sonsan mountain.[102]

Joseon response[edit]

Upon receiving the news of the Japanese attacks, the Joseon government appointed General Yi

Il as the mobile border commander, as was the established policy.[103] General Yi headed to

Myongyong near the beginning of the strategically important Choryong pass to gather troops,

but he had to travel further south to meet the troops assembled at the city of Daegu.[102] There,

General Yi moved all troops back to Sangju, except for the survivors of the Battle of Dongnae

who were to be stationed as a rearguard at the Choryong pass.[102]

Battle of Sangju[edit]

Main article: Battle of Sangju (1592)

On April 25,[104] General Yi deployed a force of less than 1,000 men on two small hills to face the

approaching First Division.[105] Assuming that a rising smoke was from the burning of buildings by

a nearby Japanese force, General Yi sent an officer to scout on horseback; however, as he

neared a bridge, the officer was ambushed by Japanese musket fire from below the bridge, and

was beheaded.[105] The Korean troops, watching him fall, were greatly demoralized.[105] Soon the

Japanese began the battle with their arquebuses; the Koreans replied with their arrows, which

fell short of their targets.[105] The Japanese forces, having been divided into three, attacked the

Korean lines from both the front and the two flanks; the battle ended with General Yi Il's retreat

and 700 Korean casualties.[105]

Battle of Chungju[edit]

Main article: Battle of Chungju

General Yi Il then planned to use the Choryong pass, the only path through the western end of

the Sobaek mountain range, to check the Japanese advance.[105] However, another

commander, Sin Rip, appointed by the Joseon government had arrived in the area with a cavalry

division, and moved 8,000 combined troops to the Chungju fortress, located above the

Choryong pass.[106] General Sin Rip then wanted to fight a battle on an open field, which he felt

ideal for the deployment of his cavalry unit, and placed his units on the open fields

of Tangeumdae.[106] As the general feared that, since the cavalry consisted mostly of new

recruits, his troops would flee in battle easily,[107] he felt the need to trap his forces in the

triangular area formed by the convergence of the Talcheon and Han rivers in the shape of a "Y".

[106] However, the field was dotted with flooded rice paddies, and was not suitable for cavalry

action.[106]

On June 5, 1592 the First Division of 18,000 men[107] led by Konishi Yukinaga left Sangju, and

reached an abandoned fortress at Mungyong by night.[108]The next day, the First Division arrived

at Tangumdae in the early afternoon, where they faced the Korean cavalry unit at the Battle of

Chungju. Konishi divided his forces into three, and attacked with arquebuses from both flanks

and the front.[108] The Korean arrows fell short of the Japanese troops, which were outside their

range, and General Sin led two charges that failed against the Japanese lines. General Sin then

killed himself in the river, and the Koreans that tried to escape by the river either drowned, or

were decapitated by the pursuing Japanese.[108]

Capture of Seoul[edit]

The Second Division led by Katō Kiyomasa arrived at Chungju, with the Third Division not far

behind.[109] There, Katō expressed his anger against Konishi for not waiting at Busan as planned,

and attempting to take all of the glory for himself; then Nabeshima Naoshige proposed a

compromise of dividing the Japanese troops into two separate groups to follow two different

routes to Hanseong (the capital and present-day Seoul), and allowing Katō Kiyomasa to choose

the route that the Second Division would take to reach Seoul.[109] The two divisions began the

race to capture Hanseong on June 8, and Katō took the shorter route across the Han River while

Konishi went further upstream where smaller waters posed a lesser barrier.[109] Konishi arrived at

Hanseong first on June 10 while the Second Division was halted at the river with no boats with

which to cross.[109] The First Division found the castle undefended with its gates tightly locked, as

King Seonjo had fled the day before.[110] The Japanese broke into a small floodgate, located in

the castle wall, and opened the capital city's gate from within.[110] Katō's Second Division arrived

at the capital the next day (having taken the same route as the First Division), and the Third and

Fourth Divisions the day after.[110] Meanwhile, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions had

landed on Busan, with the Ninth Division kept in reserve on the island of Iki.[110]

Parts of Hanseong had already been looted and torched, including bureaus holding the slave

records and the weapons, and they were already abandoned by its inhabitants.[110] General Kim

Myong-won, in charge of the defenses along the Han River, had retreated.[111] The King's

subjects stole the animals in the royal stables and fled before him, leaving the King to rely on

farm animals.[111] In every village, the King's party was met by inhabitants, lined up by the road,

grieving that their King was abandoning them, and neglecting their duty of paying homage.

[111] Parts of the southern shore of the Imjin River was burnt to deprive the Japanese troops of

materials with which to make their crossing, and General Kim Myong-won deployed 12,000

troops at five points along the river.[111]

Japanese campaigns in the north[edit]

Crossing of the Imjin River[edit]

Main article: Battle of Imjin River (1592)

While the First Division rested in Hanseong, the Second Division began heading north, only to

be delayed by the Imjin River for two weeks.[111] The Japanese sent a familiar message to the

Koreans on the other shore requesting them to open way to China, but the Koreans rejected

this.[111] Afterwards, the Japanese commanders withdrew their main forces to the safety of the

Paju fortress; the Koreans saw this as a retreat, and launched an attack at dawn against the

remaining Japanese troops on the southern shore of the Imjin River.[111] The main Japanese

body retaliated against the isolated Korean troops, and acquired their boats; in response the

Korean General Kim Myong-won retreated with his forces to theKaesong fortress.[112]

Distribution of Japanese forces in 1592[edit]

With the Kaesong castle having been sacked shortly after General Kim Myong-won retreated to

Pyeongyang,[112] the Japanese troops divided their objectives thus: the First Division would

pursue the Korean king in Pyongan Province in the north (where Pyongyang is located); the

Second Division would attack Hamgyong Province in the northeastern part of Korea; the Sixth

Division would attack Jeolla Province at the southwestern tip of the peninsula; the Fourth

Division would secure Gangwon Province in the mid-eastern part of the peninsula; and the

Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions would stabilize the following provinces

respectively: Hwanghae Province (below Pyongan Province), Chungcheong Province (below

Gyeonggi Province); Gyeongsang Province (in the southeast where the Japanese first had

landed); and Gyeonggi Province (where the capital city is located).[113]

Capture of Pyongyang[edit]

The First Division under Konishi Yukinaga proceeded northward, and sacked Pyongsan,

Sohung, Pungsan, Hwangju, and Chunghwa on the way.[114] At Chunghwa, the Third Division

under Kuroda Nagamasa joined the First, and continued to the city of Pyongyang located behind

the Taedong River.[114] 10,000 Korean troops guarded the city against 30,000

Japanese [115] under various commanders including the Generals Yi Il and Kim Myong-won, and

their defense preparations had assured that no boats were available for Japanese use.[114]

At night, the Koreans silently crossed the river and launched a successful surprise attack against

the Japanese encampment.[114] However, this stirred up the rest of the Japanese army, which

attacked the rear of the Korean positions and destroyed the reinforcements crossing the river.

[116] Then the rest of the Korean troops retreated back to Pyongyang, and the Japanese troops

gave up their pursuit of the Koreans to observe the way the Koreans crossed the river.[116]

The next day, using what they had learned from observing the retreating Korean troops, the

Japanese began sending troops to the other shore over the shallow points in the river, in a

systematic manner, and at this the Koreans abandoned the city overnight.[117] On 20 July 1592,

the First and Third Divisions entered the deserted city of Pyongyang.[118][117] In the city, they

managed to gather 100,000 tons of military supplies and grain.[118] Following the fall of

Pyongyang, King Seonjo requests the assistance of the Ming Dynasty, who send 5,000 soldiers

led by Zhu Chengxun.[119]

Campaigns in the Gangwon Province[edit]

Main article: Gangwon campaign

The Fourth Division under the command of Mōri Yoshinari set out eastward from the capital city

of Hanseong in July, and captured the fortresses down the eastern coast

from Anbyon to Samcheok.[117] The division then turned inward to capture Jeongseon, Yeongwol,

and Pyeongchang, and settled down at the provincial capital of Wonju.[117] There Mōri Yoshinari

established a civil administration, systematized social ranks according to the Japanese model,

and conducted land surveys.[117] Shimazu Yoshihiro, one of the generals in the Fourth Division,

arrived at Gangwon late, due to the Umekita Rebellion, and finished the campaign by

securing Chunchon.[120]

Campaigns in the Hamgyong Province and Manchuria[edit]

Main article: Hamgyong campaign

Katō Kiyomasa leading the Second Division of more than 20,000 men, crossed the peninsula

to Anbyon with a ten-day march, and swept north along the eastern coast.[120] Among the castles

captured was Hamhung, the provincial capital of the Hamgyong Province, and here a part of the

Second Division was allocated for defense and civil administration.[121]

The rest of the division of 10,000 men[115] continued north, and fought a battle on August 23

against the southern and northern Hamgyong armies under the commands of Yi Yong at Songjin

(present-day Kimchaek).[121] A Korean cavalry division took advantage of the open field at

Songjin, and pushed the Japanese forces into a grain storehouse.[121] There the Japanese

barricaded themselves with bales of rice, and successfully repelled a formation charge from the

Korean forces with their arquebuses.[121] While the Koreans planned to renew the battle in the

morning, Katō Kiyomasa ambushed them at night; the Second Division completely surrounded

the Korean forces with the exception of an opening leading to a swamp.[121] Here, those that fled

were trapped and slaughtered.[121]

Koreans who fled gave alarms to the other garrisons, allowing the Japanese troops easily to

capture Kilchu, Myongchon, and Kyongsong.[121] The Second Division then turned inland

through Puryong toward Hoeryong where two Korean princes had taken refuge.[121] On August

30, 1592, the Second Division entered into Hoeryong where Katō Kiyomasa received the Korean

princess and the provincial governor Yu Yong-rip, these having already been captured by the

local inhabitants.[121] Shortly afterward, a Korean Warrior band handed over the head of an

anonymous Korean general, and the General Han Kuk-ham tied up in ropes.[121]

Katō Kiyomasa then decided to attack a nearby Jurchen castle across the Tumen

River in Manchuria to test his troops against the "barbarians", as the Koreans called the

Jurchens ("Orangkae" in Korean and "Orangai" in Japanese – the Japanese derived both the

word and the concept of the Jurchens as barbarians from the Koreans).[122] The Koreans with

3,000 men at Hamgyong joined in (with Kato's army of 8,000), as the Jurchens periodically

raided them across the border.[122] Soon the combined force sacked the castle, and camped near

the border; after the Koreans left for home, the Japanese troops suffered a retaliatory assault

from the Jurchens.[122] Despite having the advantage, Katō Kiyomasa retreated with his forces to

avoid heavy losses.[122]Because of this invasion, rising Jurchen leader Nurhachi offered military

assistance to Joseon and Ming in the war. However, the offer was refused by both countries,

particularly Joseon, citing that it would be disgraceful to accept assistance from the "Barbarians"

to the north.

The Second Division continued east, capturing the fortresses

of Jongseong, Onsong, Kyongwon, and Kyonghung, and finally arrived at Sosupo on the estuary

of the Tumen River.[122] There the Japanese rested on the beach, and watched a nearby volcanic

island rising on the horizon that they mistook asMount Fuji.[122] After the tour, the Japanese

continued their previous efforts to bureaucratize and administrate the province, and allowed

several garrisons to be handled by the Koreans themselves.[123]

Naval battles of Admiral Yi[edit]

Main article: Joseon naval campaigns of 1592

Having secured Pyeongyang, the Japanese planned to cross the Yalu River into Jurchen

territory, and use the waters west of the Korean peninsula to supply the invasion.[124] However, Yi

Sun-sin, who held the post of the Left Naval Commander (equivalent of "Admiral" in English) of

the Jeolla Province (which covers the western waters of Korea), successfully destroyed the

Japanese ships transporting troops and supplies.[124] Japan lacking enough arms and troops to

carry on the invasion of the China, changed the objective of the war to the occupation of Korea.

[124]

When the Japanese troops landed at the port of Busan, Bak (also spelled Park) Hong, the Left

Naval Commander of the Gyeongsang Province, destroyed his entire fleet, his base, and all

armaments and provisions, and fled.[97] Won Gyun, the Right Naval Commander, also destroyed

and abandoned his own base, and fled to Konyang with only four ships.[97] Therefore, there was

no Korean naval activity around the Gyeongsang Province, and the surviving two, out of the four

total navies, were active only on the other (west) side of the peninsula.[97] Admiral Won later sent

a message to Admiral Yi that he had fled to Konyang after being overwhelmed by the Japanese

in a fight.[125] A messenger was sent by Admiral Yi to the nearby island of Namhae to give Yi's

order for war preparations, only to find it pillaged and abandoned by its own inhabitants.[125] As

soldiers began to flee secretly, Admiral Yi ordered "to arrest the escapees" and had two of the

fugitives brought back, beheaded them and had their heads exposed.[125]

Admiral Yi's battles steadily affected the war and put significant strain on Japanese supply

routes.[126]

Battle of Okpo