jel no. c33,c52,i0,i12,i30,j0,j20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy...

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NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES "HEALTHY, WEALTHY AND WISE?" REVISITED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSAL PATHWAYS FROM SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS TO HEALTH Till Stowasser Florian Heiss Daniel McFadden Joachim Winter Working Paper 17273 http://www.nber.org/papers/w17273 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 August 2011 Financial support was provided by the National Institute on Aging (NIA) grant No. P01 AG005842. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2011 by Till Stowasser, Florian Heiss, Daniel McFadden, and Joachim Winter. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

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Page 1: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

"HEALTHY, WEALTHY AND WISE?" REVISITED:AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSAL PATHWAYS FROM SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS TO HEALTH

Till StowasserFlorian Heiss

Daniel McFaddenJoachim Winter

Working Paper 17273http://www.nber.org/papers/w17273

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02138August 2011

Financial support was provided by the National Institute on Aging (NIA) grant No. P01 AG005842.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of theNational Bureau of Economic Research.

NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies officialNBER publications.

© 2011 by Till Stowasser, Florian Heiss, Daniel McFadden, and Joachim Winter. All rights reserved.Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission providedthat full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

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"Healthy, Wealthy and Wise?" Revisited: An Analysis of the Causal Pathways from Socio-economicStatus to HealthTill Stowasser, Florian Heiss, Daniel McFadden, and Joachim WinterNBER Working Paper No. 17273August 2011JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20

ABSTRACT

Much has been said about the stylized fact that the economically successful are not only wealthierbut also healthier than the less affluent. There is little doubt about the existence of this socio-economicgradient in health, but there remains a vivid debate about its source. In this paper, we review the methodologicalchallenges involved in testing the causal relationships between socio-economic status and health. Wedescribe the approach of testing for the absence of causal channels developed by Adams et al. (2003)that seeks identification without the need to isolate exogenous variation in economic variables, andwe repeat their analysis using the full range of data that have become available in the Health and RetirementStudy since, both in terms of observations years and age ranges covered. This analysis shows thatcausal inference critically depends on which time periods are used for estimation. Using the informationof longer panels has the greatest effect on results. We find that SES causality cannot be ruled out fora larger number of health conditions than in the original study. An approach based on a reduced-forminterpretation of causality thus is not very informative, at least as long as the confounding influenceof hidden common factors is not fully controlled.

Till StowasserUniversity of MunichDepartment of EconomicsLudwigstr. 28D-80539 [email protected]

Florian HeissDepartment of Statistics and EconometricsJohannes Gutenberg-Universität MainzHaus Recht und Wirtschaft IID-55099 [email protected]

Daniel McFaddenUniversity of California, BerkeleyDepartment of Economics549 Evans Hall #3880Berkeley, CA 94720-3880and [email protected]

Joachim WinterDepartment of EconomicsUniversity of MunichLudwigstr. 28 (RG)D-80539 [email protected]

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1 Introduction

In health economics, there is little dispute that the socio-economic status (SES)of individuals is positively correlated with their health status. The size of thebody of literature documenting that wealthy and well-educated people gener-ally enjoy better health and longer life is impressive.1 The robustness of thisassociation is underscored by the fact that the so-called health-wealth gradienthas been detected in different times, countries, populations, age-structures, andfor both men and women. Moreover, the results are largely insensitive to thechoice of SES measures (such as wealth, income, education, occupation, or so-cial class) and health outcomes.

While the existence of the gradient may be uncontroversial, the same cannotbe said about its explanation. Medical researchers, economists and other socialscientists have developed a large number of competing theories that can broadlybe categorized as follows: there may be causal effects from SES to health, causaleffects that work in the opposite direction, and unobserved common factors thatinfluence both variables in the same direction without a causal link betweenthe two. Distinguishing among these explanations is important since they havedifferent implications for public policy aimed at improving overall well-being.For instance, if causal links between wealth and health were confirmed, societywould likely benefit from more universal access to health care and redistributiveeconomic policy. Yet, if such causal links were rebutted, resources would bebetter spent on influencing health knowledge, preferences, and ultimately thebehavior of individuals.

Besides its importance, the discrimination between these alternative hypothe-ses also poses a great methodological challenge since the variation found inobservational data is typically endogenous. This is especially true for cross-sectional data, which only offers a snapshot of the association between healthand wealth. Without further information on the history of both variables, theresearcher faces a fundamental simultaneity problem, which makes the identifi-cation of causal paths a hopeless venture. A possible remedy consists of findingsome sort of exogenous variation in SES or health to infer causality and thedirection of its flow. This search, however, is typically quite difficult becauseconvincing instrumental variables are very hard to come by. As a consequence,researchers often face the unattractive choice between the easy path of ignoringthe endogeneity problem, which casts serious doubts on any drawn conclusions,and the more involved use of IV strategies that critically rely on the untestablequality of the instruments.

1Smith (1999) and Goldsmith (2001) provide extensive surveys of the earlier literature. A briefsummary of more recent contributions to this field can be found in Michaud and van Soest (2008).

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The nexus of health, wealth, and wisdom is also the subject of the study byAdams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill, and Ribeiro (2003) (HWW henceforth). Theauthors propose an innovative approach that attempts to solve the above trade-off, on the premise that causal inference may be possible without having toisolate exogenous variation in SES. Their identification strategy consists of twomain ingredients: First, they exploit the dynamic nature of panel data, focusingon health innovations rather than the prevalence of medical conditions. Second,they make use of the so-called Granger causality framework, which representsa purely statistical approach to the theory of causation. The great advantage ofworking with this alternative concept is that the detection of potential Grangercausality is a rather easy task. While knowledge on the existence of Grangercausality may not be useful in its own right, it allows for tests on the absence of“true” causality in a structural sense.

Applying this framework to the first three waves of the Asset and Health Dy-namics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey study, HWW find that in an elderlyUS population, causal channels that operate from wealth to health are an excep-tion rather than the rule: while causality cannot be ruled out for some chronicand mental conditions for which health insurance coverage is not universal, SESis unlikely to be causal for mortality and most other illnesses. Considering thesestrong results, as well as the methodological novelty of HWW’s approach, it isnot surprising that their work has subsequently been the subject of vivid de-bate within the literature.2 So far, the focus has clearly been on the validity ofHWW’s identification strategy in general, with some calling into question theability to truly infer causality with a concept that arguably is a rather sparsecharacterization of causal properties.

We certainly agree that HWW’s model would benefit from certain method-ological refinements and plan to implement these in future research. For thepresent project, however, we deliberately leave the econometrics unchanged, tostudy a different aspect that also merits attention: the stability of HWW’s resultswhen confronted with new data that allows for hypothesis tests of greater statis-tical power. Special interest lies in assessing whether the somewhat surprisingabsence of direct causal links from SES to most medical conditions is a robustfinding or perhaps the artifact of a particular data sample. Since the publica-tion of HWW’s original article, the AHEAD survey has been incorporated intothe more-encompassing Health and Retirement Study (HRS). This permits devi-ations from HWW’s data benchmark along the following dimensions: the sameindividuals can be tracked for a longer period of time, the analysis can be ex-tended to new cohorts of respondents, and the working sample can be widened

2As an example, consider the comments to HWW by Adda, Chandola, and Marmot (2003), Flo-rens (2003), Geweke (2003), Granger (2003), Hausman (2003), Heckman (2003), Hoover (2003),Poterba (2003), Robins (2003), and Rubin and Mealli (2003) published in the same issue as theoriginal article.

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by including younger individuals aged 50 and older. The last point is of spe-cial interest as it offers variation in health insurance status that is not availablein a Medicare-eligible population. To understand which of these data changescontribute to any deviating conclusions, we do not apply the whole bundle ofmodifications at once. Instead, we estimate the model multiple times, by apply-ing it to several different data samples, which are gradually augmented alongthe dimensions just outlined.

We lay out the theoretical background of our analysis in section 2, where wereview the potential explanations for the association between SES and healthand specify the econometric challenges that arise when trying to discriminateamong them. This is followed by a discussion of how to address these challenges.Section 3 describes the approach proposed by HWW. A reanalysis of HWW withnew data is presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes and outlines topics forfuture research.

2 The difficulty of causal inference

2.1 The issue: Potential channels between SES and health

Correlation does not necessarily imply causation. This insight is one of the mainlessons every empiricist needs to internalize. At times, however, it can be tempt-ing to neglect this admonition, especially when a causal interpretation of a jointmotion of two variables is very intuitive. The relationship between SES andhealth is a prime example for such a situation. As an illustration, consider ta-ble 1, which lists household median wealth of HRS respondents arrayed againstself-reported health status. Here, the wealth-health gradient is prominently ondisplay as median wealth monotonically decreases with impairing health self-reports – an observation that is remarkably stable over time.

What could be more natural than to interpret this strong correlation as acausal influence of wealth on health? After all, it is the explanation best inline with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even betterhealth. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may not necessarily be the only valid

Table 1. Median wealth by self-rated health status

Self-rated health 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008

Excellent 155.6 192.0 256.0 331.4 363.0Very good 122.1 159.0 202.6 240.0 304.0Good 82.5 106.2 130.6 160.0 194.0Poor 46.7 62.2 69.0 75.1 86.1Fair 19.5 35.0 36.5 39.7 48.1

Notes: Calculations by authors based on HRS data. Numbers reported in thousands of USD.

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one. In fact, there are two additional hypotheses for the association of SES andmedical conditions: the causation could flow from the latter to the former, andthe correlation may actually be spurious, with third factors affecting health andwealth in a similar way. This section describes these rivalling theories and givesan overview of the most commonly-cited potential pathways between SES andhealth (see Adler and Ostrove (1999), Smith (1999), Goldsmith (2001), andCutler, Lleras-Muney, and Vogl (2011) for more extensive reviews).

Hypothesis A: SES has a causal influence on health ouctomes

This is the hypothesis most energetically advocated within the epidemiologicalliterature. While it is true that the main contribution from economists consistsof formulating alternative interpretations of the socio-economic health gradient(see hypothesis B, below), it should be emphasized that they are not on record ofcategorically challenging hypothesis A, either. Below, we list the most prominenttheories of channels through which SES may have a causal effect on health.

Channel A1: Affordability of health care. This potential channel is arguably oneof the most intuitive explanations and may be active both before and afteran individual is diagnosed with an illness. For one, varying SES may be re-sponsible for differentials in the onset of health conditions as poorer peoplemay be overly sensitive to the costs of preventive health care. In addition,wealth could play a crucial role in determining the quality or even the plainaffordability of medical treatments, once they become necessary.

Channel A2: The psychological burden of being poor. Medical scientists increas-ingly emphasize the importance of psychological consequences of low SES.They argue that low-wage employment is typically associated with a highdegree of work monotonicity and low job control, leading to psychosocialstress. Similarly, economically disadvantaged individuals are believed to berepeatedly exposed to episodes of high emotional discomfort, either due tolong phases of unemployment or a general feeling of social injustice. Whenaccumulated, these stressful experiences may well have strong adverse ef-fects on physical health as well. Furthermore, adverse wealth shocks – suchas the loss of life savings in a stock market crash – are likely to cause anxi-ety and depression, representing a more immediate avenue through whichSES may impact health.

Channel A3: Environmental hazards. Another line of argument is that the ex-posure to perilous environments is considerably higher for the poor. Thismay concern job-related risks since it can be argued that workplace safetyis lower and physical strain higher for poorly-paid occupations. The reason-ing also extends to people’s living environments as neighborhood safety,dwelling condition, air and water quality, etc. are usually much better inexclusive residential areas.

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Channel A4: Health knowledge. Considering that education is an integral com-ponent of SES, it is conceivable that part of the correlation between SESand health is attributable to differences in health knowledge. Accordingto this argument, information on medical risk factors or the importance ofpreventative care may be more widespread among the highly educated andwealthy, leading to healthier lifestyles and lower morbidity rates amongthis group.

Channel A5: Risk behaviors. An often-cited pathway through which SES mayinfluence health is the asymmetric distribution of unhealthy lifestyles suchas smoking, drinking and poor diet. To the extent that all of these vicesare less common among the rich, health differentials may in fact be drivenby SES variables. Note that the question of why smoking, excess alcoholconsumption, and obesity are especially prevalent in lower social classes,is interesting in its own right, with channels A2 and A4 potentially account-ing for part of this relationship.

Hypothesis B: Health has a causal influence on SES outcomes

Economists and other social scientists were among the first to challenge the con-ception that causal mechanisms would work their way exclusively from SES tohealth. Much of this research is inspired by Grossman’s (1972) health produc-tion framework, which models the impact of health capital on savings, labormarket participation, and retirement decisions. We believe the following threechannels to be the most important in describing causal effects from health toSES outcomes.

Channel B1: Productivity and labor supply. Arguably, the most relevant reasonwhy health may be causal for SES outcomes can be found on the labormarket. The productivity of an individual in poor health is generally lowerthan that of someone whose physical robustness allows for longer workinghours, less absenteeism, and better career options. As a consequence, frailpeople will tend to earn lower wages and accumulate less assets through-out their life course. Adverse health shocks may even be so severe that peo-ple are forced to leave the labor market altogether, depriving them fromany realistic chance to improve their SES.

Channel B2: Life expectancy and time preferences. To the extent that severe ill-nesses increase mortality risks, there may be an impact of poor health ontime preferences. Life-cycle models predict that the optimal response to aperceived reduction in life expectancy is to move consumption from an un-certain future towards the presence. Thus, a history of dire medical eventsmay induce individuals to dissave faster, establishing a causal link fromhealth to SES.

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Channel B3: Medical care expenditures. The most immediate form of impacthealth events can have on financial endowments are out-of-pocket costsof medical care. While it can be argued that the influence of this path-way should only be modest in size, this is certainly untrue for people with-out health insurance. In many cases, not even the insured are completelyshielded from medical bills: the existence of deductibles and lifetime cov-erage limits poses great financial threats especially for the chronically ill.

Hypothesis C: SES and health are jointly caused by an unobserved third factor

This hypothesis makes the case that the association between health and wealthcould have other reasons than causal mechanisms between the two: There maybe hidden third factors with a common influence on both SES and health, ren-dering the correlation among the latter spurious. This distinction is vital sincepolicies that aim at improving health outcomes by, say, redistributing wealth arebound to be ineffective, as long as the true common cause remains unaffected.

Channel C1: Unobserved genetic heterogeneity. A good candidate for an unob-served common cause is genetic disposition. For instance, genetic frailtymay reduce the physical resistance as well as the intellectual and profes-sional skills of an individual. In such cases, health will be poorer and SESwill be lower despite the absence of causal links among the two.

Channel C2: Unobserved family background. Genetic endowment is not the onlydeterminant of people’s physical and personal traits. Similarly influentialare matters of parentage and upbringing. Especially pre-natal and early-childhood nutrition as well as stress are believed to have lasting negativeeffects on well-being and functional abilities, establishing an associationbetween health and SES that is similar to that of Channel C1.

Channel C3: Unobserved preferences. Irrespective of whether they are inher-ited or learned, preferences that influence certain behavior and lifestylesare another often-cited source of common effects. The prime example aredescendants of dysfunctional families, who adopt both the unhealthy lifestyles(such as poor diet or smoking) and the unambitious attitudes towards edu-cation and work by which they are surrounded. Another example are timepreferences: overly myopic people will underinvest in preventative medi-cal care and in education since in both cases pay-offs will materialize in adistant future, to which only little importance is attached.

2.2 The challenges: Simultaneity and omitted variables

The fact that all of the aforementioned hypotheses are generally plausible, makesthe inference on causation a methodologically challenging task. Suppose – as isthe case for the remainder of this paper – we were interested in testing the

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validity of hypothesis A, that is whether SES has a causal effect on health out-comes. Ideally, we would want our analysis to rely on truly exogenous variationin SES variables, similar to that attained in controlled experiments. The realityfor economists, however, is far from being ideal since the sources of variation wefind in observational data is unknown to us. As a consequence, causal variablesare potentially endogenous themselves.

The possible sources of endogeneity in the wealth-health case have been de-scribed in section 2.1. Ultimately, they generate two fundamental econometricchallenges: we have to distinguish hypothesis A from hypothesis B, and hypoth-esis A from hypothesis C. As we discuss below, the first consists of dealing witha simultaneity problem, and the second of finding a solution to the problem ofomitted variables.

Challenge 1: The simultaneity problem (hypothesis A vs. hypothesis B)

Imagine for a moment that hypothesis C could be dismissed, so that any associ-ation between SES and health had to be due to either hypothesis A or B. Evenwith this kind of simplification in place, the identification of SES causality forhealth is still difficult. Of course, we could regress our health variable of interest(Hi) on SES (Si) and a vector of exogenous control variables (Xi), estimating thefollowing equation with OLS:

Hi = θ0 + θsSi +X′iθx +ηi , (1)

where i denotes the unit of observation and ηi is the residual. Yet, the crucialquestion is if we could interpret the parameter estimate bθs as the causal effectof SES on health. The answer would be affirmative if the structural model wereto look like

E(Hi |Si ,Xi) = α+ βSi +X′iγ,

E(Si |Hi ,Xi) = E(Si |Xi).

This model describes a world in which causality only flows from SES to health,with β capturing the true causal effect. In this world, bθs would indeed have acausal interpretation, with plim bθs = β . However, the existence of hypothesis Bindicates that the above model may not be a realistic description of reality. Infact, the true structural model is likelier to look like

E(Hi |Si ,Xi) = α+ βSi +X′iγ, (2)

E(Si |Hi ,Xi) = a+ bHi +X′ic, (3)

with β again measuring the true causal effect of SES on health, and b capturingany causation working its way in the opposite direction. Equations 2 and 3 de-scribe a standard simultaneous-equation model (SEM) as both dependent vari-

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ables are jointly determined with each being a function of the other. When try-ing to estimate this SEM by simply running regression equation 1, bθs will besubject to simultaneous-equation bias, picking up the information conveyed inb as well. As a result, the parameter of interest, β , is not identified, making atest for causation of SES to health all but impossible.

Challenge 2: The omitted-variable problem (hypothesis A vs. hypothesis C)

Even in the absence of challenge 1, we would still face the problem of havingto discriminate between hypotheses A and C. Presume we were able to plau-sibly exclude causal paths from health to SES. In this case, the identificationproblem no longer consists of confounding the causal effect of wealth on healthwith reverse causality. Instead, the question arises if an association betweenboth variables is attributable to causality at all since it could also stem from ajoint reaction to a third factor. As the review of hypothesis C has shown, all ofthese potential common causes (such as genetics or preferences) are inherentlyunobservable, rendering challenge 2 an omitted-variable problem.

Suppose the true structural model is best described by

E(Hi |Si ,Xi, Ci)= α+ βSi +X′iγ +δCi , (4)

with Ci standing for an individual-specific variable that influences both SES andhealth. If this common cause were observable, we could simply include it inour regression function and the causal effect, β , would be readily identified.However, given its omitted-variable nature, Ci will be swamped into the errorterm, as the comparison of the structural model in error form (equation 5) withthe estimable model (equation 6) demonstrates:

Hi = α+ βSi +X′iγ +δCi + εi , (5)

Hi = α+ βSi +X′iγ + ui . (6)

Here, the well-behaved structural error is denoted by εi, whereas the compos-ite residual is ui = δCi + εi. Given that Ci has an impact on our explanatoryvariable of interest, Si, the latter will be endogenous since cov(Si , ui) 6= 0. As aconsequence, the estimation of this model by means of regression equation 1will yield a parameter estimate bθs that suffers from omitted-variable bias, withplim bθs 6= β . Importantly, bθs will absorb any causal impact that Ci may have onHi. As a result, the presence of common effects could easily lead to erroneousconclusions of active causal links between wealth and health in cases where βactually equals zero.

Causal inference in the face of both challenges

Naturally, there is no reason to believe that both econometric problems are mu-tually exclusive. As a rule, they will be present at the same time, aggravating

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causal inference even more. Ultimately, we have to estimate a structural modelthat takes the following form:

Hi = α+ βSi +X′iγ +δCi + εi︸ ︷︷ ︸

=ui

, (7)

Si = a+ bHi +X′ic+ dCi + ei︸ ︷︷ ︸

=vi

, (8)

with ei denoting a structural error and vi representing the composite unobserv-able. Given this multitude of potential confounders, we truly cannot expect thesimple regression function 1 to uncover β , the structural parameter of interest.While this assessment is certainly sobering, it also sets a clearly defined bar forany alternative identification strategy: in order to be convincing, it has to liveup to the challenges of simultaneity and omitted variables.

A common way of dealing with the potential endogeneity of SES is the useof instrumental variable (IV) estimators. The virtue of this approach is that – atleast in theory – it solves both of these challenges at once. A good instrumentis, however, hard to find in practice. In the context of the SES-health causality,exogenous wealth shocks have been used as instrumental variables. For instance,Meer, Miller, and Rosen (2003) as well as Michaud and van Soest (2008) useinheritances. In a similar vein, Smith (2005) interprets the strong stock-marketsurge in the 1990s as a positive wealth shock, and it is probably just a matter oftime until we will see the first papers that make use of the exogenous variationin wealth caused by the recent global financial crisis.

We do not discuss IV approaches in detail, but we would like to point out oneproblem that arises in the analysis of the SES-health gradient. While the aboveinstruments may well be exogenous and certainly have an impact on wealth, itis not entirely clear if the SES variation they induce is really that relevant forhealth. According to Grossman’s (1972) standard economic model of health, anindividual’s general health status can be viewed as a latent capital stock that re-flects the entire history of medically relevant events and behaviors. As a result,the human body will certainly react to current influences but it will not forgethow it was treated in the past either. This “memory effect” likely extends to anyinfluence SES may have had during one’s lifetime. In light of this, it is question-able whether sudden changes in wealth are really that informative when testingfor causal links between SES and health. In fact, since an IV estimator makesuse of exogenous variation in wealth at one point in time to identify β , there is agreat chance that causal links from SES to health are statistically rejected eventhough they have been operating in the past.3 Admittedly, an IV estimator willstill capture any instantaneous impact a wealth shock would have on health out-

3In this light, it is not too surprising that none of the aforementioned studies using wealth shocksas an instrument for SES was able to find evidence supportive of hypothesis A.

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comes. As a renewed look at the potential causal pathways for hypothesis A sug-gests, immediate effects are most likely to arise through channel A.2 if wealthshocks are severe enough to have direct psychological consequences.

3 The approach of the HWW study

The previous section demonstrates that the identification of causal paths be-tween health and wealth with IV approaches is not always feasible. Especiallythe isolation of truly exogenous and yet meaningful variation in SES poses con-siderable problems. On this account, HWW propose an alternative identificationstrategy that avoids this critical step altogether. In fact, they make use of the en-tire observed variation in SES variables, tacitly accepting that some of it maywell be of endogenous nature. The authors argue that, in spite of this method-ological simplification, their approach still allows for at least indirect inferenceof causal links from SES to health.4

Naturally, HWW need to find convincing answers to the two econometricchallenges described in section 2.2. When testing hypothesis A, they face chal-lenge 1 of excluding the possibility that any observed co-movement of wealthand health is in reality due to reverse causality. In addition, they have to tacklechallenge 2 of ruling out that the association is driven by unobserved commoneffects.

Challenge 1: Ruling out hypothesis B

Distinguishing hypotheses A and B without the aid of instrumental variables isa difficult task. We may observe that the poor are less healthy but we have noinformation on which happened first: were people already poor before they gotsick, or were they already sick before they became poor? With cross-sectionaldata that only offers a snapshot of this association, there is no way of findingout. Panel data, on the other hand, provides valuable information on transitionsin health and wealth, making it possible to analyze the dynamics of their rela-tionship and to identify the direction of the causality flow. Imagine we were toanalyze the dependence of health innovations on past levels of SES. As long asone agrees that a cause must precede its effect, we can be sure that the (unantic-ipated) onset of an illness at time t cannot have caused the amount of wealth oreducation at time t − 1. Given there is any causation at work, it must flow fromthe past to the present, or – as in this case – from SES to health innovations.

4In their article, HWW also formulate tests on causality working in the opposite direction. How-ever, the authors themselves are quite skeptical about this part of their analysis, admitting that it islikely subject to model misspecification. As they stop short of endorsing their own results, we followtheir lead and concentrate on the more promising test of hypothesis A.

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HWW take this insight to heart by applying their framework to the first threepanel waves of the aforementioned AHEAD survey study, which spans the yearsbetween 1993 and 1998 and is representative of the US population aged 70and older. They propose a dynamic model of health incidence that takes thefollowing form:

f (HI ji t |HIk< j

i t ,Hi t−1,Si t−1,Xi t−1), (9)

where i once again stands for the unit of observation (in this case: household)and the newly introduced t denotes time. The index j stands for the respec-tive health condition as the authors apply their model to 20 different medicaloutcomes.5 The dependent variable, HI j

i t measures a new incidence of a givenhealth condition.6 According to this model, a health innovation is potentiallyinfluenced by the following explanatory variables:

Past level of SES: The vector Si t−1 includes five SES variables, namely wealth,income, years of education, dwelling condition, and neighborhood safety.These are the variables of main interest. Conceptually, if SES had any directcausal impact on health, we would expect to observe that rich individualsare less likely to develop a new medical condition compared with poorindividuals. While this finding alone would not yet prove the existence ofa causal link from SES to health, confounding with reverse causality couldbe ruled out since Si t−1 precedes HI j

i t .

Past health status. New medical events are likely influenced by a respondent’shealth history as well. This may take the form of state dependence (e.g.,past cancer influences the onset of new cancer) and co-morbidities (e.g.,past cancer influences the onset of depression). For this reason, HWW con-trol for vector Hi t−1, containing the past levels of all 20 health conditions.

Current health incidences with immediate impact. In theory, health innovationscould also be influenced by contemporaneous shocks in SES or other healthconditions. This constitutes a problem for HWW’s concept of dealing withsimultaneity as it critically relies on the ability to observe the timing of in-novations in both variables. HWW solve this problem by imposing furtherstructure: On the one hand they make the assumption of no instantaneouscausation of SES to health shocks, arguing that any causal action as de-

5These include acute illnesses (cancer, heart disease, stroke), mortality, chronic conditions (lungdisease, diabetes, high blood pressure, arthritis), accident-related events (incontinence, severe fall,hip fracture), mental problems (cognitive impairment, psychiatric disease, depression), as well asinformation on interview status (self vs. by proxy), BMI, smoking behavior, ADL/IADL impairments,and self-rated health.

6Note that this measure of health innovation cannot be interpreted as a simple change in healthstatus (∆H j

i t = H ji t −H j

i t−1) since HI ji t generally captures deteriorations in health only. For chronic

illnesses, such as diabetes, it measures when the condition was first diagnosed. For acute healthevents, such as stroke, HI j

i t indicates every new occurrence.

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scribed by channels A.1 to A.5 takes time.7 On the other hand, they im-pose a chain structure on contemporaneous health innovations, groupingthem in the order in which instantaneous causality is most likely to flow.8

Thus, they include the vector HIk< ji t containing the incidence variables for

all health conditions (1, ..., k) that are causally arranged upstream of con-dition j.

Demographic control variables. Finally, the authors control for a number ofdemographic factors that could have an impact on health events, too. Thecorresponding vector, Xi t−1, includes the respondent’s age, marital status,as well as information on the parent’s mortality and age at death.

Building on model 9, HWW design a test for non-causality of SES in thespirit of Granger (1969) and Sims (1972). This so-called Granger causality (orG-causality) approach is a purely statistical take on the concept of causation,having its origin in the time-series literature. Formally, SES is not Granger causalfor health condition j if

f (HI ji t |HIk< j

i t ,Hi t−1,Si t−1,Xi t−1)= f (HI ji t |HIk< j

i t ,Hi t−1,Xi t−1), (10)

i.e., HI ji t is conditionally independent of Si t−1, given HIk< j

i t ,Hi t−1, and Xi t−1. In-tuitively, given health history, knowledge of SES history must not contribute tothe predictability of health innovations. The test is implemented by estimatingthe model by maximum likelihood (ML) both unconstrained (with Si t−1 as re-gressors) and constrained (without Si t−1) and by subsequently comparing thelog likelihoods of both versions. The motivation for this likelihood ratio test isthat the two values should be the same if the null hypothesis of non-causality istrue.

The detection of Granger causality, however, does not guarantee the pres-ence of “true” causality in a structural sense, which is the concept we are ulti-mately interested in.9 Admittedly, information on the presence of G-causality ishelpful when predicting health innovations for an individual with given health

7The authors themselves make the point that this assumption loses its innocuousness if thetime intervals between panel waves become too large since even the more inertial causal linkswill then have enough time to unfold. Given that the AHEAD study is conducted biennially, the timeaggregation to observation intervals may indeed reintroduce some degree of simultaneity.

8HWW list cancer, heart disease, and stroke first because they can have an immediate impacton mortality. The other medical conditions are grouped such that degenerative illnesses can causechronic diseases, which in turn may influence accidents and finally mental health. Importantly, in-stantaneous causality is not designed to flow in the opposite direction.

9There are three major “schools” of causal analysis: The structural approach (S-causality) de-scribed by Hoover (2001) and Hausman (2003) that is grounded in econometric simultaneousequations models, the potential-outcomes approach (P-causality) characterized by Rubin (1974)and Heckman (2000) that is based on the analysis of experimental treatments and the time-seriesprediction approach (G-causality) employed here. The conventional interpretation of “true” causal-ity is arguably best described by S- and P-causality treatments. In fact, Pearl (2000) demonstratesa formal equivalence between the two concepts. Both of these schools are critical of G-causality,arguing that its purely positivistic approach does not realistically characterize causal properties.

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and SES history. However, the reduced-form nature of G-causality renders itunsuitable to predict the effects of (economic) policy interventions. If SES isGranger causal for health innovations, we only know that, for instance, the on-set of an illness is likelier for a person with low SES. Yet, we do not know ifthis statistical dependence is due to a real causal link from wealth to health(hypothesis A) or due to unobserved common effects (hypothesis C). Given thediverging policy conclusions both interpretations would trigger, HWW also needto address the second methodological challenge of dealing with the omitted-variable problem.

Challenge 2: Ruling out hypothesis C

Most of the omitted variables identified in section 2.1 to potentially have a com-mon influence on health and SES are unobservable by definition. As a result,challenge 2 cannot simply be resolved by improvements in data quality and theaddition of missing variables to the vector of covariates. HWW also refrain frommaking use of fixed-effects estimation, which represents another common strat-egy to heal omitted-variable bias in cases where panel data is available. In fact,the efforts made by the authors to distinguish between structural causality andcommon effects are limited to using a rich set of covariates in the hope that thiswill mitigate the importance of unobservables. They argue that,

[f]or example, genetic frailty that is causal to both health problems and lowwages, leading to low wealth, may be expressed through a health condition suchas diabetes. Then, onset of new health conditions that are also linked to geneticfrailty may be only weakly associated with low wealth, once diabetic conditionhas been entered as a covariate.

Despite this conciliating argument, HWW acknowledge that the failure to cleanlyidentify causal structures questions their approach’s ability to gauge the effectsof “out-of-sample” policy changes. To address this issue, they scrutinize the gen-erality of their results by adding invariance tests to the analysis. Intuitively, amodel is only suitable for the sort of predictions HWW have in mind if it re-mains valid under different scenarios than those covered by the data, or – asthe authors put it – if it has the invariance property of being valid for eachpossible history. For instance, if the application of the model to different popu-lations, time periods, and policy regimes had a negligible impact on estimationresults, there would be reasonable hope that the Granger non-causality testsare indeed informative. The invariance tests as implemented by HWW mainlyinspect the stability of findings across time. Model 9 is estimated by stacking thedata for the two available panel wave transitions (i.e., W1→W2 and W2→W3)above another. The same model is also estimated for both wave transitions indi-vidually, and a test statistic is constructed that compares the log-likelihoods ofthese three estimations. The motivation for this likelihood ratio test is similar

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to that of a Chow test. If the null hypothesis of model invariance is true, esti-mated parameters of the stacked model should not differ from those of the twosingle-transition models.

All told, HWW apply the following system of non-causality and invariancetests to the estimations of all 20 health conditions: First, they test for Grangernon-causality of SES for health innovations in the stacked version of the modelunder the maintained assumption of invariance (S|I). Then, they employ anunconditional invariance test, as described above (I), followed by an invariancetest with non-causality imposed (I|noS). Finally they implement a joint test ofinvariance and non-causality (S&I). Conceptually, HWW condition the validityof their non-causality tests on the outcome of the corresponding invariance test:only if invariance is confirmed, they will put faith in the model’s results. Theauthors are optimistic that with these refinements in place, their model is well-placed to make meaningful predictions even if it fails to identify true causallinks, stating that

[i]t is unnecessary for this policy purpose to answer the question of whether theanalysis has uncovered a causal structure in any deeper sense. Econometric anal-ysis is better matched to the modest task of testing invariance and non-causalityin limited domains than to the grander enterprise of discovering universal causallaws. However, our emphasis on invariance properties of the model, and on testsfor Granger causality within invariant families, is consistent with the view ofphilosophers of science that causality is embedded in “laws” whose validity as adescription of the true data generation process is characterized by their invari-ance properties.

They even go a step further and suggest that their approach – while not pow-erful enough to distinguish between causation and common effects – permitsat least the one-sided test for the absence of true causal links. Essentially, theyview Granger causality as a necessary but insufficient condition for a structuralcausal pathway from SES to health. Their decision criteria when interpreting re-sults are as follows: If the invariance test fails, one should question the validityof the model for this particular health variable and refrain from drawing anyconclusions. If invariance holds and Granger causality is present, one cannotdistinguish between a direct causal link and a common factor. Yet, if invarianceholds and Granger causality is ruled out, it should be safe to deduce that SESdoes not have a causal impact on the health condition under consideration.

Summary of HWW’s findings

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the evidence from applying HWW’s approachto the elderly US population is not universally supportive of hypothesis A. Infact, they find that SES is unlikely to be causal for mortality, most acute healthconditions, accidents, and a large number of degenerative diseases. Medical

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conditions, for which direct causal links cannot be ruled out, include self-ratedhealth status, most mental illnesses and some chronic conditions such as dia-betes, lung disease and arthritis. This pattern loses some of its mysteriousnesswhen viewed in the context of US health-policy characteristics. The populationunder examination is of advanced age and eligible for Medicare, which willlikely weaken any causal impact wealth could have on well-being via the afford-ability of health care. Yet, even Medicare coverage is not fully comprehensiveand tends to focus on acute care procedures, while generally failing to limitout-of-pocket costs for treatments of chronic and psychological conditions.10

This lends indirect evidence for the importance of channel A.1 since the socio-economic gradient emerges exactly for those health conditions, for which theability to pay is most likely to be an issue.

Reflecting the substantial degree of ambiguity in these results, the policyconclusions formulated by HWW are rather contained in both phrasing andsubstance. On the one hand, they cannot overcome the methodological chal-lenge of inferring true causality when G-causality is detected. This leaves openwhether SES-linked preventive care induces onset of chronic and mental ill-nesses or whether persistent unobserved factors are to blame for the observedhealth-wealth association. On the other hand, even convincing evidence for theabsence of direct causal links might not necessarily warrant the bluntest form ofpolicy recommendation. Sure enough, SES-linked therapies for acute diseasesdo not appear to induce health and mortality differentials, which – to quoteHWW – should theoretically permit the strong conclusion that

policy interventions in the Medicare system to increase access or reduce out-of-pocket medical expenses will not alter the conditional probabilities of new healthevents[.]

However, the authors stop short of actually drawing this conclusion, which re-flects their reluctance to base overly aggressive policy proposals on a conceptwhose ability to simulate the effect of system shocks is not indisputible.

Discussion of HWW’s approach

All things considered, what should we make of HWW’s approach of inferringcausality and yet avoiding the cumbersome search for exogenous variation inSES? Does their reliance on Granger causality and their decision to focus onhealth innovations really do the trick of solving the endogeneity problem, orhave they entered a methodological dead-end street? Overall, the responsewithin the literature has been fairly critical, albeit not excoriating, pointing outa number of issues briefly discussed below.

10Note that the study was conducted well before the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006 thatespecially benefited the chronically ill by improving the coverage of prescription drugs.

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Existence vs. activation of channels It is important to understand the limita-tions of an approach that focusses on innovations in health, rather thanhealth status itself. HWW detect a strong and ubiquitous association ofSES and prevalence of health conditions in the initial wave of their sample.This suggests that the elderly population under consideration has poten-tially been affected by some of the causal channels between health andwealth in the past. This history, however, remains a blind spot for HWW’smodel: by concentrating on future health events, they are unable to explainwhat factors lead to the pre-existing SES gradient. By contrast, they studythe question whether SES has an impact on the onset of additional medi-cal conditions, given an individual is already old, still alive, and has gonethrough a long and unexplained health-wealth history. While the analysisof an elderly population is not illegitimate and certainly interesting in itsown right, one should entertain some doubts about its external validity. Intheory, HWW’s findings could – if extrapolated backwards – also providea retrospective explanation for the early relation between SES and health.However, as pointed out by Adda et al. (2003), Heckman (2003), Poterba(2003), and HWW themselves, this extreme form of time invariance overthe entire life cycle is unlikely to hold as certain causal channels are prob-ably relevant at different stages in one’s life.11 In light of this, an acceptednon-causality test should perhaps not be taken as evidence against theplain existence of a causal link but rather against its activation within theclass of invariances under consideration.

Unobserved common effects. As argued above, the major weakness of HWW’sapproach is that it cannot separate true causality from hidden common ef-fects. Yet, according to the authors, this will only constitute a problem ifGranger causality is detected. In the absence of G-causality, causation ina structural sense should be ruled out as well. This interpretation impliesthat the detection of conditional dependence is a prerequisite for an activecausal link – an assumption that is questioned by Heckman (2003), whoargues that persistent hidden factors may also work in the opposite direc-tion of causal pathways and offset them. If this were the case, informationon G-causality might actually not tell us anything about true causal mech-anisms, rendering HWW’s strategy ineffective. However, the likelihood ofdirect causal effects being exactly offset by unobserved common factorsshould be practically zero, making this argument irrelevant for identifica-tion. Then again, there are obvious limits to this defence in finite samples,

11For retirees, pension income is not affected by (contemporary) ability to work, occupationalhazards vanished on the day of retirement, and Medicare provides basic health insurance, renderingchannels B.1, A.3, and A.1, respectively, of little importance when late in the life cycle. At youngerages, however, all of these pathways may well have played an important role.

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so that statistical inference of causation could indeed be seriously jeopar-dized by the failure to account for hidden common causes.

Invariance tests. Anticipating that their framework might fall short of infer-ring deep causal structures, HWW subject their model to the aforemen-tioned invariance tests. On a conceptual level, model invariance would ar-guably justify predictions of policy effects but there are legitimate concernswhether the actual tests implemented in their paper are statistically power-ful enough. Granger (2003), Hausman (2003), Heckman (2003) and, oncemore, HWW themselves point out that invariance under historical interven-tions is of little use when the panel is as short as AHEAD, offering hardlyany in-sample variation in populations, age structures, and – most impor-tantly – policy regimes. As a consequence, an accepted invariance test asimplemented by HWW is unlikely to be a sufficient condition for the sort ofmodel validity necessary to make out-of-sample predictions. On top of that,Poterba (2003) even questions whether one should view the acceptance ofHWW’s invariance tests as a necessary condition for meaningful analysis.Instead of discarding results when invariance tests are rejected, one couldfollow up on the reasons for time invariance failures as they may be in-formative of structural breaks in causal relationships. For instance, certaincausal pathways may switch on or off in the course of policy changes oras the observed cohort grows older. In such cases, failed invariance testswould actually shed light on the circumstances under which causal linkswill be active or unexpressed, allowing for sharper, channel-specific causal-ity tests.

Health dynamics. Another reason for concern is the fact that HWW modelhealth dynamics as a first-order Markov process, which cannot be expectedto properly capture the medium and long-run evolution of health. Intu-itively, this is because the Markov model assumes that all relevant informa-tion about the whole past is captured in the observed variables one periodago. This is unrealistic since knowledge of longer histories would bettercapture the stock characteristics of health capital as envisioned by Gross-man (1972). Taking functional limitations as an example, a respondentwho reported difficulties with walking one year ago and no limitationspreviously has a different outlook than a respondent who consistently re-ported difficulties with walking for the last ten years.

Instantaneous causality. Finally, Florens (2003), Geweke (2003), and Heck-man (2003) express their skepticism about HWW’s handling of instanta-neous causality. The hierarchy imposed on health conditions (with theassumption that incidence of each condition is conditioned on upstreamincidences but not on downstream ones) may be acceptable as a reduced-form assumption and is etiologically fairly reasonable. Yet, it likely falls

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short of the structural stability explored by invariance tests and is a poten-tial source of serious model misspecification, making it a prime target formethodological improvements in the course of future research.

4 Reanalysis of HWW with new data

The preceding discussion indicates that HWW’s approach of disentangling theassociation between health and wealth while avoiding the often futile struggleof finding exogenous variation in SES comes at the price of limited methodolog-ical persuasiveness. However, since the generic alternative – instrumental vari-ables – is not exempt from substantial criticism either, we certainly feel that thisidentification concept merits methodological refinement rather than being dis-missed altogether. Some weaknesses, such as the treatment of common effects,health dynamics, or instantaneous causality, require significant modifications tothe original model and we plan to implement these in future research.

Yet, one of the major downsides of HWW’s study – the lack of invariance testpower – can be addressed without the need for complex changes but instead byapplying the largely unaltered model to a more apposite set of data. Recall thatthe root of this problem is that the invariance tests are based on rather limitedvariation in “histories” of states relative to the universe of potential histories.Increasing the N as well as the T dimension of the panel data will arguably raisethe number of histories and enhance the power of these tests. Of course, we canalso expect larger sample sizes to boost the statistical power of non-causalitytests, effectively reducing the risk of committing type-II errors. But sample sizeis not everything. We believe that the analysis will also greatly benefit fromlarger sample “diversity”, with data covering different kinds of populations thatare subject to varying institutional setups. For instance, the inclusion of youngerrespondents could shed light on the question if the activation of causal links isstable throughout the life cycle or if reaching the retirement age induces somesort of structural break.

Given that the HRS survey study provides panel data that meets all of theabove requirements, the present analysis keeps methodological changes to anabsolute minimum and assesses the stability of HWW’s results when applyingtheir model to new and more encompassing data.12 Of particular interest isthe question whether HWW’s somewhat surprising result of SES not havingany direct causal impact on most health conditions is confirmed as test powerincreases.

12In fact, this study exactly replicates HWW’s model of health incidence with one notable ex-ception. For simplicity, we skip their treatment of interview delay, which accounts for the fact thatinterview timing appears to depend on health status. While this potentially calls into question thecomparability of responses from healthy and severely ill individuals, we find that results are virtuallyunaffected by this non-random distribution of time at risk.

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Figure 1. Sample sizes, decomposed by entry cohorts

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 Wave 9

Nu

mbe

r of

Res

pon

den

ts

Waves

HRS

AHEAD

CODA

EBB WB

Total

4.1 The HRS panel data

Sample characteristics

Our data – which is representative of the non-institutionalized US populationover the age of 50 – comes from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), alarge-scale longitudinal survey project that studies the labor force participationand health transitions of individuals toward the end of their work lives and inthe years that follow. While the data is collected by the University of MichiganSurvey Research Center for the National Institute of Aging, we use the public-release file from the RAND Corporation that merged records from the nine panelwaves available to date. The wave 1 interviews were conducted in 1992 andthen repeated every two years, so that HRS incorporates data from 1992–2008.Due to significant changes to the survey design between waves 1 and 2, thefirst cross-section cannot be directly compared to subsequent observations andis therefore not used in our analysis. To ensure that HRS stays representativeof the population as time goes by, the panel is periodically refreshed with newcohorts of respondents. Up to now, the sample consists of five different entrycohorts: the original 1992 “HRS” cohort (born 1931–1941), the 1993 “AHEAD”cohort (born 1923 or earlier), the “CODA” (born 1924–1930) and “WB” (born1942–1947) cohorts entering in 1998, and the EBB cohort (born 1948-1953)added in 2004.

At baseline in wave 2 (covering interviews conducted between 1993 to 1994),the data set contains 18,694 individuals with usable records. The panel is sub-

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ject to considerable attrition, which reduces sample sizes from wave to wave – atrend that is only temporarily disrupted when a refreshment cohort is added tothe sample (see figure 1). The two sources for attrition are mortality (especiallyfor the elderly AHEAD cohort) and “sample fatigue”. Death-related attritors arekept in the working sample since mortality is one of the key outcomes of interest.With respect to all others attritors, we apply two alternative sampling schemes.The first exactly mirrors HWW’s benchmark in that it categorically excludesnon-respondents from the working sample, irrespective of when their drop-offoccurs or whether they rejoin the survey in later waves. As detailed below, thesecond sampling procedure assures that the information of these households isused for as long as they are part of the sample.

Much like in HWW’s original study, we exclude all individuals with missinginformation on critical variables. This includes item nonresponse for key de-mographic variables as well as cases where information on health conditionsis generally unavailable. If respondents merely fail to answer isolated healthqueries, these gaps are filled by means of simulation-based imputation. Certainhealth questions on cognitive ability, severe falls, and hip fractures are not askedto participants below the age of 65, which is why these variables are excludedfrom all estimations that include younger sub-populations. While HWW went togreat lengths to impute a large number of wealth and income observations withfirst-order Markov cross-wave hot deck imputation methods, we are in the moreconvenient position to rely on the imputations that are now readily availablewithin the RAND/HRS data. We should note that, in spite of this data cleaning,the self-reported wealth and income measures are still suspect of considerablemeasurement error. The summary statistics for all variables used in our analysisis given in table A-1.

Comparison with HWW’s data benchmark

HWW’s original data sample consists of the AHEAD cohort of US Americans aged70 and older who are tracked through panel waves 2 to 4. Using the HRS datathat is available to date, allows for deviations from this benchmark along severaldimensions. Naturally, we can follow the same individuals for more time periodssince the AHEAD cohort is now biennially observed between 1993/94 and 2008.Given the introduction of the four additional entry cohorts, the analysis canalso be extended to different individuals with potentially diverging histories com-pared to those in the original study. In addition, it is now possible and certainlyinteresting to also widen the working sample by incorporating younger individ-uals, aged 50 and older. Finally, it should be noted that there is an additional,albeit minor, deviation from HWW’s data benchmark even for the same obser-vations as in the original study. One reason for this is that the early AHEADdata has subsequently been subject to data updates and revisions within the

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HRS project. Similarly, there may be differences between the SES imputationscarried out by HWW and those conducted by RAND/HRS.

4.2 Results

Following the strategy described in section 3, we fit model 9 as binomial pro-bits except for BMI and ADL/IADL impairments, which are estimated with OLSand ordered probit, respectively. Appendix tables A-2 and A-3 contain the em-pirical significance values for the system of non-causality and invariance testsspecified above. For a more concise overview of results, refer to tables 2 and3. In a nutshell, the reanalysis with fresher and more encompassing data sug-gests that direct causal links from SES to health can be ruled out for muchfewer health conditions than in the original study. This casts some doubt on thestability of HWW’s findings. In order to understand which of the data changescontribute to these deviating conclusions, we estimate the model multiple times,using several different data sets by augmenting them stepwise along the dimen-sions outlined above. In the first step, we rerun HWW’s benchmark study forthe same cohort and time periods, yet reverting to the current version of HRSdata instead.13 This will detect any impact arising from data revisions and differ-ences in imputations. The second step consists of extending the analysis to theother three cohorts in the sample, hence testing whether HWW’s conclusionsare also valid for different individuals. The third step addresses the question ofhow results are affected by increasing the number of time periods under con-sideration. Since in HWW’s model there is no self-evident way to aggregate theinformation from multiple time intervals, we compare two different samplingapproaches: one that refills the sample after each wave with applicable observa-tions and one that does not. In the fourth and final step, we evaluate the impacton estimation results when younger individuals are included in the analysis aswell. This stepwise decomposition of all data and sampling changes appears tobe more informative than applying the whole bundle of modifications at once.

Step one: Re-estimating HWW with revised data

In order to gauge the result’s sensitivity to data revisions and imputations, themodel is re-estimated with fresh HRS data for the exact same cohort (AHEAD)

13To ensure that none of the observed changes is confoundedly rooted in the way certain variablesare constructed and program codes are implemented, we also reran HWW’s study verbatim usingtheir original data. While the goal to exactly reproduce HWW was ultimately achieved, it should benoted that results are identical to those published as log files within the appendix of the original2003 paper, but not to those in the article itself. This difference is attributable to data revisions thatHWW accounted for shortly after the paper was published, which means that the outcome from theappendix should be preferred as the ultimate benchmark. As is evident from comparing columns(1) and (2) of table A-2, said differences are not always trivial in size. Most strikingly, invariancetests tend to fail less frequently when applied to HWW’s post-publication data set. Yet, the impacton causality tests is negligible, thus not challenging the author’s main conclusions from the article.

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Table 2. Tests for non-causality (Steps 2 to 4)

Health Test results for Granger non-causalitycondition HWW (70+) Step 2 (70+) Step 3 (70+) Step 4 (50+)

W234 W234 W456 W789 W2-9 W2-9F M F M F M F M F M F M

Cancer • •Heart • • •• ••Stroke • ••

Mortality • •• ••• •••

Lung • • ••Diabetes • •••High bp. • •Arthritis •• ••• •• •

Incontinence • • • ••• •• ••• •••Fall • • n.a. n.a.Hip fract. •• n.a. n.a.

Proxy • ••• •• •• ••• ••• •••Cognition •• • •• • • •• • ••• ••• n.a. n.a.Psychiatric •• • ••• • ••• •Depression • •• •• •• ••• • ••• ••• ••• •••

BMI • •• ••Smoke now • ••• •••ADL • • ••• ••• •••IADL ••• •• ••• ••• ••• •••S.-r. health •• • ••• • •• •• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••

Notes: Results are for white females (F) and males (M). Abbreviations are as follows: Granger non-causalityrejected at 5% level (•), rejected at 1% level (••), or rejected at 0.1% level (•••). Gray symbols indicate thatthe corresponding invariance test is rejected at the 5% level.

and time periods (waves 2 to 4) as in the original study. The differences be-tween the new results and HWW’s benchmark are quite modest, and outcomesof causality test are mostly unchanged. The most notable exception is diabetesfor which the non-causality test had to be previously rejected among male re-spondents. With revised data, however, a direct causal link from SES to diabetesseems unlikely to exist. For further details, compare columns (2) and (3) of ta-ble A-2.

Step two: Adding new cohorts

While the relative stability of results in face of data revisions is certainly encour-aging, a much stricter test is posed by extending the analysis to all availablecohorts. To achieve this, we run three separate estimations on the followingsamples: First, we revisit waves 2 to 4 but allow members of cohorts other thanAHEAD to be part of the working sample. This barely changes the sample com-position because the only other cohort that is part of the survey in this earlystage is HRS, which hardly contains any individuals aged 70+. For the othertwo estimations, HWW’s data benchmark is additionally changed inasmuch aslater waves are used. The second estimation starts at wave 4, when the newcohorts CODA and EB are interviewed for the first time. Note that we do not

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restrict analysis to these two cohorts. Rather, all respondents who are at least70 years old at wave 4 and who are not subject to subsequent sample attritionare followed until wave 7. This closely mirrors HWW’s approach of analyzing athree-period panel, hence still keeping the deviations from the benchmark to aminimum. The third estimation repeats the second for waves 7 to 9, coincidingwith the entry of the most recent cohort, namely WB.

Not surprisingly, the first estimation (table A-2, column (4)) yields resultsthat are almost identical to those of HWW’s benchmark with revised data (ta-ble A-2, column (3)). The hypothesis tests associated with the other two esti-mations, however, prove to be rather different. As far as non-causality tests areconcerned, the differences seem to be unsystematic. For some medical condi-tions, such as depression and ADL impairments for females and incontinencefor males, causality from SES can no longer be ruled out as non-causality testsare now consistently rejected. For other health conditions, namely diabetes andlung disease for males as well as psychiatric disease for females, the oppositeholds true, as non-causality tests can no longer be rejected. In addition, thereare a number of diseases for which the benchmark causality test results are notconfirmed for only one of the sub-samples. For further details compare columns(4), (5), and (6), respectively with column (3) of table A-2. Invariance tests, onthe other hand, tend to be accepted more often than those under the bench-mark scenario. At first glance, this may seem contradictory since causality testshave yielded fairly different results depending on which panel waves are underconsideration. One should, however, not forget that the invariance tests merelycheck whether the model is time invariant within each of the three estimationsbut not among them. This is changed in the third step when the informationfrom more than just three waves is incorporated.

Step three: Increasing the number of time periods

Step two has indicated that results depend on which panel waves are chosen toform the working sample. In order to reduce this arbitrary element and to maxi-mize the use of available information in the data, it makes sense to increase thenumber of panel waves. Since there is no unequivocal way to implement thisin practice, we propose two different sampling approaches. The first approachis a simple extrapolation of HWW’s sampling method. The working sample con-sists of all individuals who participated in the survey in wave 2 and who werenot subject to sample-fatigue-related attrition in later waves. This cohort is thenfollowed for as many waves as possible. This sampling scheme has two majordisadvantages. First, by restricting the sample to individuals who were part ofthe survey from the very start, we exclude refreshment cohorts CODA, EB, andWB, basically discarding useful information. The second drawback is of a morepractical nature: death-related attritors cause the sample to dramatically thin

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out over time, so that sample sizes eventually become too small to conductany meaningful analysis. Moreover, as time moves on, the sample arguably be-comes less representative of the true population because the ongoing attritionwill select against the most frail. Nevertheless, and for the sake of maximumcomparability with HWW, we estimate two versions of this first approach. Onethat follows individuals from wave 2 until wave 6 (covering cohorts HRS andAHEAD) and another that follows individuals from wave 4 until wave 9 (cov-ering HRS, AHEAD, CODA, and EB). The number of waves is chosen so thatsample sizes in the last respective wave are still reasonably large.

The alternative sampling scheme directly addresses the downsides of the ap-proach above. Instead of limiting the sample to respondents who are part of thesurvey from the beginning, it is now refilled in each wave with all available re-spondents who meet the respective age criterion (i.e. 70+) and who answer allrelevant questions for two consecutive waves. That way, all cohorts are used foranalysis, sample sizes never diminish to levels too low for efficient estimation,and, consequently, all 8 waves can be used simultaneously. As a positive sideeffect, attrition bias is reduced as well, as the mortality-induced loss of observa-tions is offset by filling up the sample with new respondents, once they becomeage-eligible. One might object that this approach reduces the power of panelanalysis as it does not make much use of its potential time-series length. For thepurpose of reproducing HWW, however, we deem it suitable since the originalmodel does not use the theoretical length of the panel either, assuming thathealth and wealth trajectories are sufficiently described by single lags. Giventhat the models are estimated by simply stacking the data of all two-waves tran-sitions above another, it is irrelevant how long an individual is part of the survey.The information conveyed in the responses of a person who only participates in,say, waves 4 and 5 is no less valuable than that of a respondent who participatesfrom the very beginning to the end, and should therefore not be excluded.14

It is noteworthy that the invariance tests of both sampling schemes haveslightly different interpretations. In both cases, they test whether parameter es-timates stay constant over time, by comparing the log likelihood when all singlewave transitions are pooled together with those when estimated separately. Fora sample with refilling, an accepted invariance test indicates that the uncovered(non-)causal relationships hold for different populations at different times, un-derlining the generality of results. Invariance tests for samples without refilling,however, cannot answer the question whether causal links hold for differentpopulations since only one cohort is being followed. They rather check whetherthese links remain constant as a steadily diminishing cohort becomes older over

14Of course, the validity of this argument relies on HWW’s conceptualization of health trajectoriesas a first-order Markov process. The future development of more realistic models of health dynamicswill require a more sophisticated sampling procedure as well.

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time, ultimately comparing the frail (who exit the sample early) with the medi-cally more robust.

The main change in results from using a larger number of sample waves isthat causality from SES to health can no longer be ruled out for a large array ofconditions, even for an elderly population, aged 70 and older. This observationholds, no matter which of the two above approaches is used, even though thereare some differences. As columns (7), (8), and (9) of table A-2 reveal, there areseven health conditions for which the samples without refilling yield a rejectionof non-causality tests, even though this was not the case for shorter samples.This number even increases to ten conditions, if the sample with refilling isused instead. The most unambiguous evidence exists for six conditions (mortal-ity and falls for males, proxy and BMI for females, and cancer irrespective ofgender) for which both approaches suggest that, contrary to earlier evidence,causality may well play a role. The reversed case of causality becoming lesslikely to exist as panel length grows, is as good as non-existent. The influenceof analyzing more time periods at once on invariance tests is about the same forboth approaches and not very strong. If anything, invariance failures tend to besomewhat likelier – a result that makes sense because it is more demanding fora model to be valid for eight waves than a mere three.

Step four: Adding younger individuals

So far, the consequence of applying HWW’s model to data that includes moreindividuals and time periods, is that the number of medical conditions for whichSES causality may play a role has considerably increased. However, for a pop-ulation aged 70 and older there remains a large number of diseases for whichcausal links are not detected, despite the fact that high SES is associated with alower prevalence of these conditions. While this cross-sectional correlation can-not be interpreted causally, it indicates that causal channels may have been atwork earlier in life, before the individual even entered the sample. In light ofthat, it is interesting to also include younger individuals, to test if the data willpick up additional causal links that are already mute in an elderly population.

First, the sample is opened up to people who are at least 65 years old, so thatit represents (with some exceptions) the whole Medicare-eligible subpopulation.This yields a net-increase of 3 to 6 health conditions (depending on whethersamples with or without refilling are used) for which causality can no longerbe rejected, affirming the speculation above. See columns (2), (6) and (10)of table A-3 for details. A similar effect can be observed when the sample isopened up even further to include individuals aged 50+, exploiting the entireage range available within HRS. This time, the net-increase amounts to another3 to 9 conditions, rendering cases for which causal links can be ruled out theexception rather than the rule. Among the latter are illnesses such as strokes

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Table 3. Tests for non-causality (Pre- vs. post-retirement population)

Health Test results for Granger non-causalitycondition Step 4 (0-64) Step 4 (65+)

W2-9 W2-9F M F M

CancerHeart •Stroke •

Mortality •• • ••

Lung •Diabetes ••• •• •High bp. •Arthritis ••• •••

Incontinence ••• ••• •••Fall n.a. n.a. • •Hip fract. n.a. n.a.

Proxy ••• ••• •••Cognition n.a. n.a. ••• •••Psychiatric ••• •Depression ••• ••• ••• •••

BMI • ••Smoke now ••• •••ADL ••• ••• ••• •••IADL ••• ••• • •••S.-r. health ••• ••• ••• •••

Notes: The same abbreviations as in table 2 apply.

and high blood pressure for males, lung disease for females, and cancer forboth men and women. For all other health conditions the existence of causallinks cannot be refuted. For further details, consider columns (3), (7) and (11)of table A-3.

It is also worthwhile to split up the sample into older (65+) and younger(50–64) individuals to study how the activation of causal channels differs be-tween a mostly retired, Medicare-eligible population and people who are typ-ically still on the labor market and not quasi-universally health insured. Astable 3 shows, there is quite a number of medical conditions for which SESmay be a causal driving force irrespective of age. These include depression fprboth genders, IADL impairments, incontinence, and diabetes for women as wellas ADL impairments for men. For other conditions like arthritis, heart disease,strokes for females, or incontinence for males, SES is only a good predictor ofnew medical incidences at a higher age. On the other hand, smoking behavioras well as psychiatric problems for women are among the conditions for whicha causal link may only be active at a pre-retirement age. Intriguingly, whenyoung and old people are studied separately, results appear to be sensitive towhether samples with or without refilling are chosen (see table A-3). For olderindividuals, the sample with refilling suggests more cases of Granger causality

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than its counterparts without refreshment do. The exact opposite, however, istrue for younger individuals as for these, rejected causality is a less frequentoutcome in samples without refilling. The latter observation is likely an artifac-tual side effect of the way the sampling methods are defined: Sampling withrefilling effectively excludes people from the 50–64 sample once they becomeolder than 65, whereas sampling without refilling follows all individuals untilthey die, even if they grow much older. As a consequence, unrefilled “young”samples may arguably pick up some of the causal effects that are exclusivelyactive for the older subjects of the cohort.

Model invariance is not systematically influenced by adding younger individ-uals to the data set. The fact that the seeming structural breaks in the relationof SES and health as people grow older are not detected by HWW’s invariancetests, should, however, not be surprising. Recall that the test design does notpit the young against the old but the past against the future. The idea is tocheck parameter invariance as time progresses. Since the age structure withinthe sample varies only little from wave to wave (especially when it is regularlyrefreshed), the invariance test will not permit a direct comparison of, say, pre-and post-retirement populations. In light of this, the results in table A-3 merelysuggest that the time stability of the model is rather insensitive to changes inthe age composition of the sample.

Changes in results of the underlying prediction models

Given the strong dependence of non-causality test results on both the size andage coverage of the estimation sample, it seems natural to investigate how thesechanges are related to the size and the precision of coefficients of the under-lying prediction models.15 As table 4 exemplifies, precision of SES coefficientestimates does generally increase with the size of the respective sample, eventhough this relation is not perfect. While standard errors remain fairly constantacross estimations based on similarly sized 3-waves samples (step 2), they sur-prisingly spike upwards once all waves are pooled together in step 3. This obser-

Table 4. Prediction model: Average standard errors of SES coefficients

Sex Standard errors of SES coefficients (average of all health cond. and SES regressors)HWW Step 2 (70+) Step 3 (70+) Step 4 (W2-9)W234 W234 W456 W789 W2-9 65+ 50+ 0-64

Female 0.081 0.083 0.087 0.091 0.126 0.107 0.085 0.172Male 0.108 0.105 0.111 0.110 0.167 0.135 0.098 0.185

Notes: Reported are average standard errors of SES coefficients obtained from estimating model 9. Eachentry is an average of 160 single standard errors (20 health variables and 8 SES regressors). Individualstandard errors follow the depicted pattern quite uniformly.

15HWW did not report the coefficients of the prediction models, but these estimates are alsoavailable in their online appendix.

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Table 5. Prediction model: Significant SES coefficients

Health SES regression coefficients that are significant at 5% levelcondition HWW (70+) Step 2 (70+) Step 3 (70+) Step 4 (50+)

W234 W234 W456 W789 W2-9 W2-9F M F M F M F M F M F M

Cancer E E H WHeart I I I E NH NStroke I E E W H I W

Mortality E E W W

Lung W W W W H E WH WDiabetes E E W W E WEHigh bp. E E W EArthritis E E I W E

Incontinence N E N I E I W HFall E E n.a. n.a.Hip fract. W I W I W n.a. n.a.

Proxy I E I E E W I ECognition WIN I WIN I E E E n.a. n.a.Psychiatric I W I WDepression N N E IH EH E E WE

BMI H IH E E HSmoke now W W W N W W E W IADL E E IE WI WIADL WI WIH IE N E H W N WS.-r. health EH WE EH WE N EH INH IEH IEH NH WIENH IEH

Notes: Results are for white females (F) and males (M). Abbreviations are as follows: Significant coefficientsat 5% level for wealth (W), income (I), education (E), neighborhood (N), or housing quality (H). Bold(e.g. W) symbols indicate that signs are in line with theory. Italic (e.g. W) symbols denote the opposite case.

vation may well be rooted in the aforementioned switch from a sampling proce-dure without (steps 1 and 2) to one with refilling (steps 3 and 4). Precision fol-lows a more predictable pattern within step 4, as standard errors are invariablysmaller, the larger the respective sample (note that N50+ > N65+ > N70+ > N0−64).The same pattern emerges when comparing results by gender, as the number ofwomen exceeds that of men in each of the subsamples.

Despite increased precision, table 5 suggests that the number of statisticallysignificant SES coefficients does not seem to be systematically affected as sam-ples become more encompassing. In HWW’s benchmark sample, there is a totalof 29 SES regression coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. This num-ber stays rather constant across the performed steps. Yet, note that in the bench-mark case there is a fair amount of cases for which coefficients have an unintu-itive sign, suggesting that respondents with high SES are likelier to develop anew health condition. The share of these cases stays rather high for all 3-wavessamples and drops significantly once all waves are used at once. This meansthat, while the overall number of significant SES coefficients does not increase,the direction of effects is now more in line with theory. This is an additionalinsight since non-causality tests as implemented here do merely check whether

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health innovations are conditionally independent of SES variables, whereas thequality of this dependence is not under consideration.

5 Conclusion and future research

All in all, re-estimating HWW’s model of health incidence with new HRS data,alters conclusions about SES causation quite significantly. While the impact ofdata revisions within HRS is encouragingly small, the addition of new cohortsshows that causal inference critically depends on which time periods are usedfor estimation. Using the information of many – ideally all – waves at once hasthe greatest effect on results, with many health conditions moving to the col-umn of illnesses for which SES causality may well play a role. Adding youngerindividuals to the sample has a very similar effect, reducing the number of medi-cal conditions for which the existence of causal links can be statistically rejectedeven further. As a consequence, the only health conditions for which SES cau-sation can be ruled out when estimation is based on the most encompassingdataset with refilling, are cancer (irrespective of gender), lung disease for fe-males and high blood pressure for males. For all other health incidences, SESis either G-causal or the failure of invariance tests does not permit reliable con-clusions. This represents a stark contrast to HWW’s original findings, where therejection of structural causality was the most frequent outcome.

Given that the greatest changes are triggered by the addition of panel waves(step 3), the main driving force behind this reversal in results is most likelyan increase in test power as sample sizes soar. After all, in HWW’s stackingmodel, a longer panel is equivalent to a larger sample (with respect to N) sinceall waves are pooled together and treated as if they formed one cross section.This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that test results from long panelsdo not always reflect the average outcome of the respective three-wave panelsthey consist of. As the example of cancer in table A-2 illustrates, non-causalitytests are often rejected in the long samples, even though they are consistentlyaccepted in each of the short panels. Similar observations can be made whencomparing test results by age group. In some cases, a non-causality test is onlyrejected for the largest, most-encompassing sample of all individuals aged 50and older. However, in all smaller sub-samples (50–64, 65+, and 70+) the samenull hypothesis cannot be rejected. As an example for the latter case, see heartdisease for females in table A-3. All of this evidence permits the emergenceof a clear picture: the larger the sample under consideration, the likelier therejection of non-causality.

We also find that causal inference depends on the age structure of the un-derlying population, with certain conditions being Granger caused by SES atyounger or older ages only. This yields at least indirect evidence that the activa-

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tion of causal links may indeed change over the life cycle. However, we recom-mend to take these results with a grain of salt since their lack of robustness isfar from comforting, as evidenced by the sensitivity to the choice of samplingschemes. In addition, we should note that the data set for the 65+ population isabout three times as large as that of the pre-retirement group. As a consequence,we face the risk of confounding the true effect of age structures with the impactof varying sample sizes identified above. This may well provide an alternativeexplanation for the failure to detect many cases of G-causality among the 50to 64 year olds if estimation is based on a refilling sample – a result that is notconfirmed if samples without refilling are used instead.

From a methodological point of view, the results of this study pose bad newsfor a model whose identification strategy relies on Granger causality. Recall thatthe reduced-form nature of G-causality cannot discriminate between structuralcausation and ecological association due to common unobserved effects if G-causality is detected. Ultimately, HWW’s framework allows only the one-sidedtest for the absence of direct causal links, which is confirmed if G-causality isrejected as well. While HWW’s original dataset provided us with a large numberof such cases, the more-encompassing data samples analyzed here, do not dous this favor. As a result, we find ourselves in the unfortunate situation thatlittle can be learned about the true links between SES and health, making itimpossible to draw meaningful policy conclusions.16

In light of this, the need to improve the empirical model within future re-search so as to account for the confounding influence of hidden common fac-tors, becomes even more pressing. In our view, there are two alternative waysto achieve this. The first mirrors the identification strategy of IV approaches:instead of using endogeneity-stricken SES histories as regressors, one could con-centrate on the impact of clearly exogenous changes in these variables. If theseSES innovations meet the standard IV assumptions, we would be able to formu-late two-sided tests that permit the clean identification of causality in a struc-tural sense. Among the natural experiments one could exploit, are the majornegative shock to housing and financial wealth that many people experiencedduring the ongoing financial market crisis of 2008/09, the positive shock Medi-care households received as a result of the introduction of the heavily subsidizedMedicare Part D program in 2006, and the shocks some employed individuals re-ceived from changes in employer-provided health insurance.17 Particular atten-

16While invariance tests have arguably gained power by the inclusion of different time spans,cohorts, and age structures, we are still doubtful that their acceptance would attest the model thekind of stability necessary to make out-of-sample predictions of policy effects. The reason for thisis that – with the notable exception of the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006 – the observedvariation in relevant policies remains rather low.

17When it comes to the recent financial crisis, we acknowledge that the equity shock mightnot be large enough to provide strong identification. Using HRS data, Gustman, Steinmeier, andTabatabai (2010) report that equity accounted only for about 15% of assets prior to the 2008/09

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tion could be given to the differential exposure to wealth shocks in the presenceof health care delivery systems that vary in the financial impact of copayments,premiums, and coverage, particularly for chronic conditions and preventativeand palliative therapies. Provided that the causal link in questions even exists,wealth shocks will take some time to affect health outcomes. Therefore, we ex-pect any effects of the 2008/2009 financial crisis or Medicare Part D to leavetheir marks only in future waves of the HRS dataset.

However, the use of such natural experiments is not immune to objection,which leads to a fundamental trade-off. On the one hand, we can try to infercausality by relying on wealth shocks like the ones just described, which hasthe advantage of not having to worry about endogeneity issues. Yet, as arguedin section 3, there is a risk that these shocks may not be all that relevant forhealth, especially when occurring late in life. On the other hand, the informa-tion contained in past levels of SES – the regressor used in HWW’s G-causalityframework – is certainly of great relevance, as it reflects the entire history be-tween SES and health status. The disadvantage is that this pool of informationmay also include confounding elements, such as the impact of hidden commoncauses, calling into question the exogeneity of such explanatory variables.

The other alternative we deem feasible of discriminating among hypothe-ses A and C, seeks to solve this trade-off by exploiting the relevant informationcontained in SES histories, while eliminating the misleading influence of com-mon effects. As extensively argued in the fixed- and random-effects literature,this may be achieved by interpreting the problem of common effects as an is-sue of unobserved individual heterogeneity, whose effect is controlled by fullyexploiting the panel structure of HRS. This being said, the choice of a suitableestimator is not trivial because it needs to combine three important featuresthat often tend to be mutually exclusive. First and foremost, the estimationstrategy must allow heterogeneity to be correlated with SES, which makes FEestimators a logical candidate. However, FE estimation is generally ridden bymatters of inconsistency, once confronted with the other two features, namelya dependent variable that is both binary (requiring a non-linear specification)and state-dependent (reflecting the dynamic nature of the model). A feasibleway of tackling these three issues at once, promises to be a dynamic correlatedRE Probit approach as implemented by Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004).It solves the usual trade-offs between FE and RE setups, by allowing for corre-lated heterogeneity and the estimation of time-invariant regressors even whenconfronted with non-linear data structures and lagged dependent variables.18

crisis. Whether this is sufficient exogenous variation would have to be scrutinized as part of fu-ture research. Alternatively, one could explore negative shocks to housing wealth which representanother aspect of the financial market crunch. Exogenous variation in these shocks is provided byregional differences in house prices and the severity of declines in real estate value during the crisis.

18Michaud and van Soest (2008) adopt a similar strategy, by eliminating the effect of individualheterogeneity with GMM estimators in the spirit of Arellano and Bond (1991). In analyzing the

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We acknowledge that this alternative strategy of coping with common effects isnot devoid of criticism either, which is why we consider it reasonable to indepen-dently explore both routes in what lies ahead. This is especially true inasmuchas both approaches are expected to uncover different causal channels: while thelatter strategy of modelling individual heterogeneity may allow the detection ofaverage causal effects as manifest in SES histories, the exploitation of natural ex-periments will predominantly shed light on the most immediate (mental) healthconsequences of wealth shocks.

A second opportunity for future research lies in improving the limited micro-foundation of causal pathways, which is inherent in the reduced-form natureof Granger causality. Even if we were able to univocally confirm the presenceof causal effects from wealth to health, we still would not know the channelsthrough which they operate. Yet, the latter information is absolutely criticalfrom a policy perspective: interventions to increase the affordability of healthinsurance would be warranted if channel A1 were to be active, but would proveineffective if the causal link were to work through, say, channel A3 instead. Toaddress this issue, we intend to specify and test more differentiated hypothe-ses that may facilitate the discrimination among these channels. For instance, ifchannel A1 is truly relevant, we should observe a certain sensitivity of resultsto the availability and generosity of health care systems. Possible comparisonsinclude the time before and after Medicare Part D, individuals with and withouthealth insurance, or cross-country differences in health care regimes.19 Anotherway of gauging the importance of health care affordability is to compare in-dividuals with and without health insurance. Of particular interest will be thepre-retirement population not yet eligible for Medicare, as their insurance sta-tus will be endogenous unless they are covered by employer-provided healthcare. Even if health insurance proves to be of little importance for the onset ofa health condition, it may well be decisive in determining whether and how itis treated, given that the individual has already gotten sick. On this account weintend to follow the health trajectories as well medical care use of respondentsthat share the characteristic of having developed a certain medical condition.

Finally, the model would certainly benefit from addressing another of themethodological shortcomings identified in section 3: the treatment of health dy-namics. In our view, there are several ways to accommodate the long memory

HRS population aged 51–61, they find that causal effects of wealth on health can be ruled out ifunobserved heterogeneity and a more realistic lag structure are accounted for. However, given thattheir approach is incompatible with non-linear models, it is not directly applicable to our researchquestion.

19In fact, Hurd and Kapteyn (2003) find that causal effects from SES to health status are less pro-nounced in the Netherlands than in the USA. Given that the Dutch health care system is basicallyuniversal, they see this result as an indication of the general importance of differential access tohealth care: SES gradients in health are strongest in institutional environments in which affordabil-ity should a priori matter most.

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effects that prove to be so critical for a realistic description of health trajec-tories. The simplest fix consists of adding higher-order lags of health conditionprevalences to the list of explanatory variables. A better, albeit more demanding,alternative is a hidden Markov structure in which health is controlled by a la-tent random process that drives the onset of health conditions, self-rated healthand mortality. According to Heiss (2010), such models are parsimonious andcapture the observed dynamics better than commonly applied random-effectsor conditional Markov chain models.

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Page 38: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

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A-1

Page 39: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

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A-3

Page 41: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

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A-4

Page 42: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

Inco

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A-5

Page 43: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

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A-6

Page 44: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

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A-7

Page 45: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

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A-8

Page 46: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

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A-9

Page 47: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

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A-10

Page 48: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

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A-11

Page 49: JEL No. C33,C52,I0,I12,I30,J0,J20 · 2011. 12. 5. · line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may

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A-12