j.j. thomson, "the trolley problem" (1985)
TRANSCRIPT
J.J. Thomson, “The Trolley Problem” (1985)
PHIL 102, UBCChristina Hendricks
Summer 2015
Except images licensed otherwise, this presentation is licensed CC BY 4.0
Review a little from the videos
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=99wc1C_yDIM&list=PLaSGognTdxBBGIET_i-vJ39HmiWG6OqnV
Trolley driver & transplant
• Discussed in part I of Thomson’s article
• How does Philippa Foot (1967) explain the difference between these cases?
• What do you think?
Thomson’s response to Foot
• Discussed in part II of Thomson’s article
• Foot’s solution won’t work for a slightly different case from “trolley driver”: “bystander at the switch”
oWhy not?
Bystander at the Switch
Basic Trolley Scenario, Flickr photo shared by John Holbo, licensed CC BY-NC 2.0
Foot’s Driver vs Transplant
I. “Killing one is worse than letting five die” (Thomson 1396)
II. “Killing five is worse than killing one” (Thomson 1397) Trolley, Flickr photo shared by
John Holbo, licensed CC BY-NC 2.0
Bystander at the switch is in this situation too
Thomson’s main question
“Why is it that the bystander may turn his trolley, though the surgeon may not remove the young man’s lungs, kidneys and heart?” (1401)
Basic Trolley Scenario, Flickr photo shared by John Holbo, licensed CC BY-NC 2.0
Can we appeal to rights?• We often think that “rights trump
utilities” (1404)• Can we say, then, that (1404):
i. Surgeon cannot transplant b/c violates rights of patient, but
ii. Bystander can flip switch b/c doing so doesn’t violate rights of the one who is killed?
This may not be true (1405)May still flip switch even if violate rights (1405-1406)
Then why can’t surgeon transplant?
Another way to solve the problem
• Bystander: saves five by making something that threatens them, threaten one instead (1407)
• Not true of transplant
o But we could imagine a case where it is true: deflecting lethal gas in hospital from five to one (1407-1408)
“Distributive Exemption”
• “permits arranging that something that will do harm anyway shall be better distributed than it otherwise will be—shall…do harm to fewer rather than more” (1408).
• Could use this to say:o Bystander may turn the trolleyo We may deflect gas fumes in the hospitalo The surgeon must not transplant
“Distributive Exemption”• Somewhat similar to Foot’s trolley driver, who
chooses between violating two negative duties; can choose least harm, but not exactly the same
• The bystander o isn’t choosing between killing one vs killing five (two
neg duties) like the drivero Chooses between killing one (neg duty) to save five
(positive duty) vs. letting five die
• “Distributive exemption” shows why bystander can still flip switch
But…
• Distributive exemption is only morally permissible if we can deflect a harm from many onto fewer “by means which do not themselves constitute infringements on the rights of the one” (1409)
• This is where she brings in the “fat man” example
“Fat Man”
Bridge Situation, Flickr photo shared by John Holbo, licensed CC BY-NC 2.0
Basic Trolley Scenario, Flickr photo shared by John Holbo, licensed CC BY-NC 2.0
Summary
• Bystander may flip the switch but surgeon may not transplanto b/c the distributive exemption applies to the
bystander but not the surgeono Bystander “makes be a threat to fewer what is
already a threat to more” (1408)
• Bystander may flip the switch but may not push the “fat man”o b/c distributive exemption only works if you can
deflect harm from more to fewer by an action that does not itself violate rights
Your views
• What do you think about Thomson’s argument for why we can say that the bystanderomay flip the switch and turn the trolley
to kill one to save fiveo may not push the “fat man” to kill one
to save five
Groups
• Can you think of any real-world scenarios the trolley problem might be applicable to?
• Can you make up any other versions of the trolley problem? If so, what can they get us to think about that the earlier versions don’t?
http://is.gd/PHIL102Trolley