fcfcaWMFi* -jjk 1 * ^

RESEARCH PROPOSAL

So cia l Id entity , So cia l C ategorization and So cia l Comparison

in Intergroup Behaviour.

Henri T a jfe l

U niversity of BristolUo

A/

VdI The th eo retica l and research background p. l

II Intergroup hypotheses in social contexts p. 15

III Research plans and methods p . 29

(a) O b jective con flict of in te re s t, group identityand intergroup behaviour. p . 3 2

(b) R elative deprivation, absolu te deprivation andintergroup behaviour. p . 34

(c) Intergroup sim ilarity and p sych ologicald is tin c tiv e n ess . p . 39

(d) Superordinate goals and group identity. p .40(e) The ingroup and intergroup e ffe c ts of marginal

group id entity . p . 42

( f ) Group in ferio rity , group creativ ity and intergroupbehaviour. p . 44

(g) L inguistic correlates of intergroup discrim ination . p . 47

IV Conclusion

R eferences

$t\j

p . 53

p . 55

Henri T a jfe l

THE EXIT OF SOCIAL MOBILITY AND THE VOICE OF SOCIAL CHANGE:

NOTES ON THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS

As I shared until recently the puzzlement of M . Jourdain in not knowing

(at le a s t for some time) that I was writing p ro se , it would perhaps be appropriate

to introduce th ese notes with an explanatory account of a b rief encounter.

Towards the end of March 1974 I was spending a few days in Cam bridge, M a ss . ,

on my way to deliver some lectu res a t the University of M ichigan. When v isiting

some frien d s, I met for the first time Albert Hirschman who a lit t le la ter in the

evening asked me the kind of question that no w ell drilled academ ic ever should

in such circum stances take seriously or, even l e s s , answ er seriously : what was

I going to ta lk about a t Ann Arbor? But the question was asked with great courtesy

and apparent in terest; therefore I briefly answered in (I hope) no more than five

m inutes. Next morning, Hirschman appeared bearing a "slim volum e". On its

first page I la ter found an inscription: "Pour Henri T a jfe l , a v e c le pressentim ent

d'un d ia lo g u e". The book was his E x it , vo ice and loyalty (1970)*. The present

notes are a firs t step towards validating the se lf-fu lfillin g prophecy of H irschm an's

inscrip tion .2

Amongst the major them es of the Ann Arbor lectu res (T a jfe l, 1974a) was a

d iscu ssio n of certain th eo retica l in su ffic ien cie s in the so c ia l psych ological

theories of intergroup behaviour, of some p o ssib le reason s for th ese shortcom ings,

of proposals for a new theory , of preliminary studies relating to th is theory , and

of d irections for further resea rch . Some of th is d iscu ssio n converges c lo s e ly , a s

I hope to show ,,w ith H irschm an's an a ly sis of the role of ex it and vo ice (and their

various combinations) in the functioning of "firm s, organizations and s ta te s " .

But a fter th is common b a s is for a n a ly s is has been taken for granted , my purpose

* All quotations from E x it , v o ice and loyalty used in the present te x t are taken from the second printing (1972); so are the page numbers of the quotations.

These lectu res w ill be published in a modified form; cop ies of the present tex t are av ailab le on req u est. A preliminary version of one part of the lectu res appeared in So cia l Sc ien ce Information (T a jfe l, 1974b)l

2

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in the present paper w ill become twofold: (i) to suggest certain ex ten sion s of

the "e x it-v o ic e " a n a ly s is to a more exp licitly Intergroup context; and (ii) to show

th a t, within th is co n tex t, some forms of "v o ice" can ea s ily become a powerful

mechanism for the m aintenance of status quo rather than for the stim ulation of

e ffectiv e change. The d iscu ssio n w ill remain anchored to certain concepts and

problems in so c ia l psychology which constitu te its point of departure.

1. Exit and vo ice in the so c ia l psychology of intergroup behaviour.

It is p o ssib le to conceive the development of so c ia l psychology in the la s t

two generations or so a s reflectin g the preoccupation of its practitioners with four

large c la s s e s of problem s. The first of th ese concerns the modes of functioning

of "b a s ic " or "gen eral" p sych ological p ro cesses in the so c ia l behaviour of an

individual. For exam ple, the law s and findings relating individual frustration to

individual aggression find their counterpart in the studies of g en eralization ,

inhibition or displacem ent of aggression in a large variety of so c ia l interaction

settin gs (e .g . Berkow itz, 1962, 1969). Or, the general tendency to seek cognitive

co n sisten cy (or reduce inconsistency) finds its widespread application in a

m ultiplicity of theories of attitude change (e .g . Abelson et a l . , 1968 - the largest

compendium to d a te ). Or, attem pts are made to provide th eo retica l continuity

between the general cognitive p ro cesses of human judgement and categorization

and their reflectio n in so c ia l settin g s (e .g . Appley, 1971; Eiser and Stroebe, 1972;

Sherif and Hovland, 1961).

The second c la s s of problems i s , in a w ay, a mirror-image of the f ir s t . The

long tradition of theory and research on so cia liza tio n and personality development

has largely been devoted to an a n a ly sis of the em otional, m otivational and

cognitive functioning of an individual a s th is is moulded or a ffected by his so c ia l

environment. The literature here is so varied and immense that exam ples need

hardly be g iven .

The point of departure for the study of the third c la s s of problems was an

in terest in the functioning of interindividual human relationsh ip s w hich, in the

present c la s s if ic a tio n , include behaviour in sm all so c ia l groups a s w ell a s

interaction betw een individuals. This has probably been until very recen tly the

dominant trend. For exam ple, in one of the in fluential textbooks published in the

la te 's ix tie s (Jones and G erard, 1967), two chapters are introductory and five are

concerned with our previous two categ o ries; the remaining ten chapters would

fit without much strain into the "interindividual" c la s s of problem s.

F in a lly , and largely in response to a variety of external p re ssu res , there

has been in recen t years a rapid in crease of in terest (which is a ls o a return to an

older tradition) in what might be called the "so c ia l psychology of so c ia l problem s".

The vigorous ex is te n ce led sin ce many years b y , for exam ple, the Journal of

So cia l Issu e s w itn esses to the fact that th ese issu e s were never fully forgotten

by so c ia l p sy ch o lo g ists . But if we are to b e lie v e , with the benefit of hindsight

ju s t given us by reaching the m id-decade, a prophecy im plicit in the contents of

a book on So cia l psychology in the sev en ties (W rightsman, 1972) written a t the

very beginning of th ese turbulent y e a rs , then w ar, rac ism , so c ia l c la s s and

ethnic d iffe re n ce s , the "nature of so c ia l ch an g e", p o litica l rep ression and

"community ap p lications of so c ia l psychology" are edging their way towards the

centre of the s ta g e .

All th is is no more, of co u rse , than a rough and ready c la ss ific a tio n in

which overlaps are so numerous and om issions so glaring that it could not hope to

withstand a serious scrutiny of its con fu sion s. It d o e s , how ever, have its

short-lived u sefu ln ess b ecau se of one d istinction that it helps to make. Of the

four c la s s e s of problems m entioned, the la s t one has alw ays tended to benefit or

suffer (depending upon o n e 's point of view) from a large measure of th eoretica l

ex tra -territo ria lity . The so c ia l psychology of so c ia l problems was ( is ? ) considered

to be mainly "ap p lied "; and th is means that th eoretica l approaches to It drew

much of their inspiration from one or more of the other three ca te g o rie s . The micro

tended to guide the macro in so c ia l psychology.

And so we come to the so c ia l psychology of intergroup rela tion s - to a large

extent a set of "applied" problem s. N ational, ra c ia l , ethnic or so c ia l c la s s

re lation s may be considered a s amounting together to what is the su bstance of

so c ia l c o n flic t , s in ce co n flict becom es " s o c ia l" when it involves relation s

between la rg e -s c a le so c ia l groups or "ca teg o ries" rather than between sm all

groups or between individuals. In so c ia l psychology, much of the work relevant

to various a sp e c ts of so c ia l con flict proceeded to extend to it the im plications of

the theory and research from the first three c la s s e s of problems previously mentioned.

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T h u s, we have been much concerned with the development of prejudiced attitudes

and discrim inatory behaviour in individuals - and we drew upon general theories

of individual motivation and cogn ition , or upon the etiology and the symptom­

atology of personality development in order to account for various forms of h ostility

again st outgroups. The study of interindividual behaviour provided us with theories

of competition and cooperation, and more g en era lly , of the interindividual ad ju st­

ment of goals and stra teg ies w hich, a s it was hoped im plicitly or sometimes stated

ex p lic itly , could contribute to our understanding of the psychology of the wider

forms of co n flic t. No doubt, a great deal has been achieved and s t ill more can

probably be done. There is a lso no doubt that an understanding of th ese individual

and inter individual p ro cesses may be n ecessary for the a n a ly sis of some a sp e cts

of the psychology of so c ia l co n flic t. The d ifficu lties a r ise with regard to the

question whether it is a lso su ffic ie n t.

The answ er to th is question depends, a s u su al, upon the emergence (or

absence) of new structural variab les in the "wider" situations to which extrapol­

ations are being made. H irschm an's d iscu ssio n of the role of ex it and v o ice in

the functioning of "firm s, organizationsnnd s ta te s " provides some pertinent

propositions and a language in which to d escribe a t le a s t one such set of emergent

variab les relevant to the psych ological a sp e cts of so c ia l co n flic t. This was by

no means h is principal aim; if he had any wish to arrange a m arriage, it was to

be between prospective partners from p o litica l sc ien ce and from econ om ics. My

hope is that the suggestions made in the present paper may lead to a reasonably

happy manage £ t r o ls .

The language of ex it and voice is the prose which led me to assum e earlier

in th is tex t the stan ce of M . Jourdain. It converges c lo se ly with the language of

" s o c ia l m obility" and "s o c ia l change" adopted in a previous paper (T a jfe l, 1974a).

In the first description in his book of the "e x it and vo ice options" Hirschman

( o p .c i t .) wrote: "Some custom ers stop buying the firm 's products or some members

leav e the organization: th is is the ex it option " (p .4 ) . And: "The firm 's

custom ers or the organization 's members express their d issa tis fa c tio n directly to

management or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or

through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to lis ten : th is is the

vo ice option " (p. 4 ). Very soon we learn that "v o ice is p o litica l actio n by

e x c e lle n c e " (p. 16). Much of the book Is devoted to an a n a ly s is of the functioning

of voice when ex it from buying a product, or from an organization or a sta te is or is

not p o ssib le ; and to the d ifficu lt problems of the "e lu siv e optimal mix of ex it

and v o ice" in maintaining or obtaining an e ffic ien t lev el of functioning in a variety

of so c ia l organizations.

The two equivalent descriptions (T a jfe l, o p .c i t . ) of so c ia l mobility and

so c ia l change are a s follow s:

"What I mean by so c ia l mobility is an individual's perception that he can improve his position in a so c ia l situ atio n , or more g en erally , move from one position to another, a s an Individual. The first direct im plication of th is definition is that the individual's system of b e lie fs about the society in which he liv es contains the expectation th a t, in p rin cip le , he is ab le to leav e his present so c ia l group or groups and move to other groups which suit him b etter. So cia l mobility in th is sen se co n sists therefore of a su b jectiv e structuring of a so c ia l system (however small or large the system may be) in which the b a s ic assum ption is that the system is flex ib le and perm eable, that it permits a fairly free movement of the individual p artic les of which it c o n s is ts . At th is point of the argument, it does not matter very much whether the causation of free individual movement is perceived a s being due to lu ck , m erit, hard work, ta len t or other attributes of individuals.

The concept of so c ia l change, a s I would lik e to use it in a so cia l psych ological s e n s e , is at the other extreme of the su b jectiv e modes of structuring the so c ia l system in which an individual l iv e s . It refers b a s ica lly to h is b e lie f that he is enclosed within the w alls of the so c ia l group of which he is a member; that he cannot move out on his own into another group in order to improve or change his position or his conditions of life ; and that therefore the only way for him to change th ese conditions (or for that m atter, to re s is t the change of th ese con d ition s, i f he happens to be sa tisfied with them) is together with h is group a s a w hole, a s a member of it rather than a s someone who leav es i t . In other words, in the old American usage of "p assin g " and "not p assin g " th is is in some ways sim ilar to the "not p assin g " extrem e" (p p 5-6).

H ere, how ever, the aim s of the two d iscu ssio n s d iverge. As ju st sta ted ,

H irschm an's a n a ly s is of the "resp on ses to d e clin e" is largely concerned with the

re la tiv e e ffic ien cy of the ex e rc ise of the two op tion s, or their various com binations,

in preventing the d eclin e in the functioning of various kinds of so c ia l in stitu tio n s ,

public or p rivate. The d istinction between "so c ia l m obility" and "so c ia l change"

attem pts to define two (theoretical) extrem es in a continuum of individuals' b e lie fs

about the relationship between the so c ia l group or groups to which they belong

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and other groups. The "behavioural" translation of th is continuum of b e lie fs

re la tes it to three other pairs of extrem es which are asso cia ted with it:

"The relationship I outlined earlier between intergroup behaviour and so c ia l change must be supplemented by another th eoretica l continuum in addition to the one moving from the b e lie f structure of so c ia l mobility to the b e lie f structure of so c ia l change. This is a continuum w hich, when it is related to the previous one, provides a bridge between a system of so c ia l b e lie fs and a system of so c ia l behaviour. This second continuum can be applied to many interactions between two or more p eop le. One extreme of it would be represented by an individual interacting with others in terms of se lf; the other extreme - by an individual interacting with others entirely in terms of h is and their group membership. Neither of th ese extrem es can probably be found in "real l i f e " ; but there is no doubt that approaching the one or the other is crucial to the form that o n e 's so c ia l behaviour will ta k e .

There are three important points concerning th is behavioural progression .The firs t concerns the relationship between the so c ia l ch an g e-so cia l mobility continuum of structure of b e lie fs and the self-group continuum of the structure of so c ia l in teraction . On the b a s is of my argument so fa r , a prediction can be made th a t, in any situation perceived a s relevant to rela tion s with another group, the nearer an individual Is to the so c ia l change extreme on the b e lie f continuum, the nearer he w ill be to the group extreme of the behavioural one. The second point concerns a prediction about individual d ifferen ces: the nearer a co llectio n of individuals is to the so c ia l change end of the b e lie f continuum, the more uniformity they w ill display in their behaviour towards the relevant outgroup. This prediction must be backed up by considerations about the nature of certain so c ia l communication p ro cesses to which I shall return la te r . The third prediction is c lo se ly related to the secon d , a s it follow s lo g ica lly from it: the nearer a co llectio n of individuals is to the so c ia l change extreme of the b e lie f continuum, the le s s they w ill take into account in their intergroup behaviour the individual d ifferences between members of the outgroup, and the more they will react to them en m a ss e , treating them a s undifferentiated item s in a unified so c ia l ca te g o ry ." (o p .c it . p p .8 -9 ) .

The main purpose of th is continuum -splitting ex erc ise was to contribute to

a so c ia l psych ological theory of intergroup rela tion s from which predictions could

be made about certain uniform ities in the behaviour and attitu d es of members of

soqjQ so c ia l groups (or categories) towards members of other so c ia l groups (or

ca te g o ries). (D escriptions of other th eoretica l assum ptions and of various pre­

d ictions from them can be found in T a jfe l 1974a and b ) . The convergences with

H irschm an's ex it-v o ice pair (I shall d iscu ss loyalty later) are of two kinds: (i) the

nature of the concepts used and of some consequences following from them; and

(ii) the relationship of the general approach to certain strands of an in te llectu a l

tradition.

One of the p h ases Of H irschm an's d iscu ssio n a ls o u ses a continuum in

which the transition from a fully free (or co stless) ex it to its virtual im possibility

in teracts with the appearance of voice and with conditions for its e ffe c tiv e n e ss .

We move here from the free and easy change of a brand of toothpaste (If , for

exam ple, its co st in crea se s or its quality deteriorates) to an enormous variety of

so c ia l situations in which the co st of ex it i s , su b jectively or o b je c tiv e ly , so high

a s to make it im possible or unbearable - such a s may be the ca se with fam ily ,

national or p o litica l a ff ilia tio n s . In betw een th ese extrem es, the various degrees

of a c c e s s to ex it may determine the strength of v o ic e , or of attem pts to change

from within a deteriorating situ atio n . This is w ell summed up in the quotation by

Hirschman of Erikson 's (1964) dictum: "You can activ ely f le e , th en , and you can

a ctiv e ly stay p u t".

Som etim es, of co u rse , you cannot activ ely flee and you must stay put,

activ e ly or not; or, having u nsu ccessfu lly tried to f le e , or seen other people try ,

you may come to b eliev e that escap e is im possible and that you must take the

consequences of staying put. These consequences include those to which

Hirschman referred in describing vo ice a s "p o litica l action by e x c e lle n c e " . For

a so c ia l p sy ch o lo g ist, they would imply the numerous behavioural and attitudinal

e ffe c ts on intergroup relation s of the b e lie f system previously described a s "so c ia l

change"; particularly so when the effectiv e diffusion of the idea that "p assin g "

individually from o n e 's own group to another is im possible or extrem ely d ifficu lt

cau ses more and more people from that group to fee l and act in unison.

This form of v o ice in intergroup attitudes and behaviour need not only apply

to th ose groups who wish (or need) to modify the nature of their relationsh ips to

other groups. It may a lso appear in groups who aim at preserving or strengthening

the status quo. I sh all return to th is issu e la te r .

The second point of convergence re la tes more directly to ex it and "so c ia l

m obility". In h is d iscu ssio n of the cultural and h isto rica l background of ex it and

vo ice in the United S ta te s , Hirschman (o p .c it . , chapter 8) refers to the "ex tra -

ordinarily privileged p osition " which has been accorded to ex it in the American

tradition:

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"The traditional American idea of su cce ss confirms the hold which ex it has had on the national im agination. S u ccess - or, what amounts to the same th in g , upward so c ia l mobility - has long been conceived in terms of evolutionary individualism . The su ccessfu l individual who starts out a t a low rung of the so c ia l ladder, n ecessa rily leav es his own group a s he r is e s ; he "p a sse s" in to , or is "accep ted " b y , the next higher group. He tak es his immediate family a lon g , but hardly anyone e l s e . " (pp. 108-109).

In co n trast, "the b lack power doctrine represents a to ta lly new approach to

upward mobility b ecau se of its open advocacy of the group p ro ce ss . It had

immense shock value b ecau se it spurned and castigated a supreme value of the

American society - su cce ss via ex it from o n e 's group" ( ib id ., p .112). This

"supreme valu e" seem s to have been reflected in some of the in tellectu a l

traditions of so c ia l psychology. A d istinction can be made "betw een two p o ssib le

kinds of theories of intergroup behaviour . . . (those) concerned with the inter­

individual psychology of intergroup behaviour and those concerned with the so c ia l

psychology of intergroup behaviour. It is theories of the first kind, the in ter­

individual o n e s , which have been predominant. Their general im plication is that

the study of p ro cesses resp on sib le for various forms of in teraction between

individuals a s individuals w ill te ll us a ll - or most - that we need to know about

forms of in teraction betw eeen individuals a s members of separate groups which

stand in various kinds of so c ia l re la tion s to one another (T a jfe l, op. c i t , , pp. 3 -4 ) .

Consequently "most of our so c ia l psychology of intergroup behaviour derives

from the b e lie f structure of so c ia l m obility , and very lit t le of it from the b e lie f

structure of so c ia l change. In p a ra lle l, and a s might be exp ected , most of our

so c ia l psychology of Intergroup behaviour applies to the behaviour of individuals

who are assum ed to have the b e lie f structure of so c ia l mobility and very lit t le of

it to the behaviour of individuals who are assumed to have the b e lie f structure of

so c ia l change" (pp. 6 -7 ) .

Two additional comments need to be made to conclude th is general d iscu ssio n

of con verg en ces. The first re la tes to the rough d istin ctio n , made earlier in th is

paper, between the four wide categories of problems in so c ia l psychology. It

would be grossly sim p listic to attribute the interindividual tradition of "so c ia l

m obility" in the so c ia l psychology of intergroup relations to nothing but the over­

whelming predominance of the "ex it option" in American so c ia l h istory . Much of

it goes back to the background of the so c ia l p sy ch o lo g ists ' th eo retica l concern

with the first three categories of problems enumerated above - which are mainly

individual or interindividual. The second point is that if Hirschm an, Hofstadter

(1945) and others are correct about "the hold which ex it has had on the national

im agination" and about su cce ss having "long been conceived in terms of

evolutionary individualism " , then it follow s that "most of our so c ia l psychology

of intergroup behaviour" should apply "to the behaviour of individuals who are

assum ed to have the b e lie f structure of so c ia l m obility". Undoubtedly, th is is

why good progress has been made in our understanding of the individual patterns

of p re ju d ice , discrim ination and h o stility . But the intention of the present

argument is not to question the validity of much of th is work; the concern is not

with its achievem ents but with its lim itation s.

The American tradition of ex it developed again st a background of b e lie f in

individual mobility w hich, although it is by no means exclu siv ely Am erican, has

probably been more sa lien t in the so c ia l history of the United S tates than alm ost

anywhere e ls e . This tradition has been weaker e lsew h ere, and alm ost non­

ex isten t in some cultures (including many ex -"p rim itiv e" o n e s). This being the

c a s e , the question a r ise s whether findings derived from a so c ia l context over­

whelmingly dominated by the ex it (or so c ia l mobility) option can be said to have

a wider general va lid ity . M oreover, an ex p lic it so c ia l psychology of v o ice or

"s o c ia l change" in intergroup relations is a s n ecessary in the United S ta tes a s it

is anywhere e ls e . The example of b lack power is one ca se in p oint, and many

other sim ilar so c ia l and national movements are not far behind - in America and

elsew here.There i s , how ever, one further point which is equally important. It is banal

to say that in the so c ia l p ast (or present) of the United S ta te s , a s in so many other

cou n tries, the b e lie f in , or the myth o f, individual mobility was conceived by many

not to apply with indiscrim inately equal gen erosity , liberality and force to every­

body. This denial of equal opportunity (or sometimes "ab ility ") to scram ble up the

so c ia l ladder to members of some so c ia l groups is one of the psych ological

e ffec ts of the "o b je c tiv e " intergroup con flicts of in terest; but it a ls o finds its

roots in some fundamental a sp e c ts of the so cia l comparison p ro c e s se s . To put it

crudely, very often we are what we are b ecau se "they" are not what we a re . The

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psych ological and "superior" d istin ctiv en ess of a so c ia l group, sometimes

achieved at the co st of strenuous e ffo rts , must be maintained and preserved if the

group is to conserve some kind of a common and valued identity . It is a t th is

point that v o ice w ill be u sed , sometimes in rem arkable unison, by members of the

"superior" groups, particulariy sin ce ex it is very often unthinkable for them . At

th is point of the argument, th is function of vo ice is stressed b ecau se it points to

an additional and important lim itation of the "so c ia l m obility" approach to the

psychology of intergroup re la tio n s , even again st the background of the American

tradition of e x it . I shall return to it in more detail la ter in the d iscu ssio n of the

contribution of v o ice to the preservation of status quo in intergroup rela tion s and

behaviour.

2 . Group ex it and group chorus

In a previous contribution to th is jo u rn al's series of papers on the ex it and

voice them e, Coleman (1974) wrote:

" In trin sic to the paradigm of ex it and vo ice which Hirschman (1970) has se t forth is the recognition that so c ia l structure is composed of two kinds of acto rs : persons and corporate a c to rs . For it is th ese persons (my ita lics ) for whom the problem of implementing their w ill reduces to the dilemma of e x it , that i s , withdrawal of resources from the corporate a c to r , or v o ic e , which attem pts to control the direction of actio n of the corporate a c to r. " (p .7 ).

A lit t le further in the same paper, Coleman adds: "Hirschman was largely

concerned with the m aintenance of the e ffic ien cy of corporate acto rs and with the

p ro cesses through which persons (my ita lics ) contribute to that m aintenance"

( ib id .) .In pursuing the im plications of the paradigm of ex it and voice for the so c ia l

mobility - so c ia l change continuum one must take note of a certain assynxetry in

the two resp ectiv e points of departure. So cia l mobility is ex it of an individual

from his group. So cia l change is the situation in which the extreme difficulty or

im possibility of individual ex it leads a t le a s t some of the people concerned to

develop , or try to develop , an effectiv e common voice for their group. The

various modes of th is v o ic e , or the conditions under which th ese modes may

develop are not of d irect concern at th is point of the argument (c f . T a jfe l , 1974a

-11 -

and b ) . The assym etry betw een vo ice and "so c ia l change" res id es in the

comparison of the re la tio n , described by Colem an, of persons to corporate acto rs

with the relation s of members of one group to other groups. In both c a s e s voice

w ill be used in its various form s. But in the ca se of a group, the persons

composing it may be concerned with the prevention of d eclin e in the "e ffic ie n cy "

( i . e . conditions of l i f e , s ta tu s , opportunities, e tc .) of the corporate actor w hich,

in th is in s ta n ce , is their own group. Therefore, in an organization consisting of

many groups, their vo ice may have to be directed towards a change in the nature

of the relations between their own and other groups, i . e . other corporate a c to rs .

In th is p rocess voice may becom e a chorus.

An example of sim ilar assym etry is provided by the notion of re la tiv e

deprivation, a s it has som etimes been used (exp licitly or im plicitly) by so cia l

p sy ch o lo g ists . The focus of the theories has been on individuals comparing

them selves with other individuals ( e .g . Festin g er, 1954, on so c ia l com parison).

This is entirely adequate a s long a s conclusions are drawn about the e ffe c ts of

th ese comparisons on interindividual attitudes and behaviour - which is what

Festinger has been aiming to do. As a matter of fa c t , he exp lic itly denied the

p o ssib ility of operation of so c ia l comparison so understood in the context of

intergroup rela tio n s: "Com parisons with members of a different status group,

either higher or low er, may sometimes be made on a phantasy le v e l , but very rarely

in re a lity " (o p .c lt . p .135). Festin g er's interindividual em phasis is c lo sely

related to the econom ic version of re la tiv e deprivation, the "rela tiv e income

h y p o th esis", which Hirschman (1973) - after Duesenberry - described a s follow s:

"the w elfare of an individual varies inversely with the income or the consumption

of those persons with whom he a s s o c ia te s " (p .546).

D ifficu lties begin when th ese interindividual com parisons are transposed to

intergroup situ a tio n s. One of them concerns a b a s ic canon of the so c ia l comparison

theory in so cia l psychology and of the rela tiv e income hypothesis in econom ics:

people who provide the b a s is for comparisons must not be too different from those

who are doing the comparing. I have argued elsew here (T a jfe l, 1974a) that th is

lim itation does not hold in the ca se of intergroup comparisons in which the

requirement of a certain degree of sim ilarity between the comparer and the

compared is rep laced by the perceived legitim acy of the perceived relationship

- 12 -

between the groups. If perception of illeg itim acy entBrs the com parison, then we

are soon very far indeed from F estin g er's assertio n that comparisons with members

of groups of different status happen "very rarely in re a lity " and perhaps even

further from his "phantasy le v e ls " . The difference between the two kinds of

comparisons is simply described :in the ca se of interindividual com parisons, a

person re la te s h is position to that of other persons; in the ca se of intergroup

com parisons, an individual compares him self a s a member of his own group with

other individuals a s members of their groups, or with outgroups conceptualized a s

an en tity . The questions are: under what conditions do th ese intergroup compar­

ison s become widely diffused within a group, and what then a r e their so c ia l

p o litica l and p sych ological con seq u en ces. But th ese are large is s u e s outside the

scope of th is paper.

Let us return to the assym etry of voice and chorus. In the ca se of the so c ia l

comparison theory a co llectio n of interindividual comparisons is sometimes endowed

with the capacity to contribute to long-term uniform ities of behaviour in large

m asses of people (e .g . Berkow itz, 1972), although how th is is supposed to happen

rem ains a lit t le obscure. In H irschm an's e x it-v o ice a n a ly s is , transpositions of

th is kind are not made. Also in his d iscu ssio n of "changing to leran ce for income

inequality in the course of econom ic development" (Hirschm an, 1973), there is a

c lear aw areness of the psych ological d ifferences between groups which can afford

to wait for a time to catch up with others and those which fee l they cannot:

" . . . the group that does not advance must be ab le to em pathise, at le a s t for a tim e, with the group that d o es. In other w ords, the two groups must not be divided by barriers that are or are fe lt a s im p assable. " (p .5 5 3 ).

He returns to the theme in suggesting that the temporary patient waiting by some

while others advance "need not happen if each c la s s is composed of ethn ic or

relig ious groups that are d ifferentially involved in the growth p ro ce ss . H ence, the

contrast between fairly unitary and highly segmented society is particularly relevant

for our to p ic" (o p .c it . , p p .5 5 3 -4 ) .

In H irschm an's a n a ly s is vo ice comes from a co llectio n of individuals

(sometimes organized into a group) who wish to change the institu tion or the

organization of which they feel them selves to be a n inherent part. In one funda­

mental s e n s e , th is may a lso be true of a so cia l group which attem pts to change its

- 13 -

relationship to other groups within a largEr so c ia l structure which is common to a ll

of them . But if the e x it-v o ic e an a ly sis is to be ap p lied , the question a r ise s of

how, if a t a l l , is th is chorus form of vo ice related to the potentiality or the

actu ality of group e x it .

There are two kinds of group e x it , d iscu ssed by Hirschman from his per­

sp e c tiv e , which are of in terest here . The first of th ese is opting out, or the "

""co p -o u t" movement of groups like the hippies" which is "flight rather than fight"

(o p .c it . , p . 108), i . e . ex it without v o ic e . This ex it is no more than temporary for

some of the people involved; but their choice to come back (or not to come b a ck ,

in the ca se of the permanent or long-term opters-out) is not dependent upon the

past instrum entalities of their use of v o ic e . If they come b a ck , it is b ecau se

they have changed, or society has changed or they think society has changed. In

add ition, they often become a group with w ell-defined common in terests and a

common identity only a fter they have opted out (e .g . in communes) rather than

before; so th a t, ju st a s in the ca se of vo ice we are d ealin g , in C olem an's (op.

c i t . ) w ords, with "the p ro cesses through which persons contribute to (the)

m aintenance" of a corporate a c to r , here we are dealing with persons who wish to

get a s far away a s they can from a vast co llectio n of corporate a c to rs . In th is

s e n s e , th erefore , their ex it cannot be considered a s relevant in the context of

the group exit-group vo ice re lation sh ip .

The other kind of group ex it is boycott (Hirschman, o p .c it . , p . 8 6 ). It is a

"phenomenon on the borderline between voice and ex it" , s in ce th is actio n " is

undertaken for the sp e c ific and ex p lic it purpose of achieving a change of policy

on the part of the boycotted organization" (ib id .) and is accom panied by "a

promise of re -en try " should the desired changes take p la c e . To be e ffe c tiv e ,

boycott (like a strike) cannot, of co u rse , be an action by iso lated individuals.

This "true hybrid of the two m echanism s" (ib id .) ra ise s a number of interesting

psych ological questions about the relationship between a d issa tis fie d group and

the organizational or institu tional structure defining the position of that group

v is -a -v is other groups which are within the same structure. For exam ple, an

underprivileged group in a strongly stratified so cia l system ( i . e . a system

preventing so c ia l mobility and/or a b e lie f in th is option) cannot rea lly ex it; there

is nowhere to g o , u n less a ll of its members chose to em igrate, or - a s in the ca se

- 14 -

of ethnic or national groups - the ex it option is fought for in the form of a

sep aratist movement. The p o ssib ility of an exit which is neither emigration nor

separation must be sought e lsew h ere, and lik e H irschm an's b oycott, it is bound

to be a "hybrid of the two m echanism s" of ex it and v o ic e . But in the ca se of

so c ia l groups which are strongly d isaffected and see their only hope in a funda­

mental change of the sy stem , it is a ls o a hybrid from another point of view .

The individuals involved are strongly identified with one of the corporate acto rs

(their own group); but the effic ien cy of functioning of that corporate actor is part

and p arcel of the functioning of a wider system consisting of their own and other

groups. Therefore, the prevention of a continuing decline in the functioning of

the corporate acto r (the ingroup) may be perceived a s p o ssib le only through a

change (more or le s s fundamental) in the functioning of the wider multi-group

system .

In such c a s e s , one of the solutions which may be adopted is a s much of a

hybrid of ex it and vo ice a s is b oy cott. It is obviously vo ice s in ce it is a form of

p o litica l or so c ia l actio n from within; it is a ls o ex it or threatened ex it to the

extent that itinpLies a refusal to a ccep t the ru les by which the present relationsh ips

between the groups are regulated , and containsa "promise of re-en try " when th ese

ru les are changed. Once again we have a continuum here which moves from total

accep tan ce of the ru les to partial accep tan ce to to ta l re jec tio n .

This continuum c lo se ly re fle c ts a progressive transition from group vo ice

to group e x it . The relationship in th is transition between the psych ological and

the "o b jec tiv e " determinants of group ex it can be considered , once a g a in , in

terms of leg itim acy . But here an in teraction between three forms of it would have

to be taken into account: the legitim acy of the intergroup relationship a s it is

perceived by the d isaffected group; the legitim acy of th is relationship a s it is

perceived by the other groups involved; and an "ob jectiv e" definition ( i . e . a

se t of rules and regulations) of leg itim acy , whenever such a thing is p o ss ib le .

In considering th ese three kinds of leg itim acy , it can be assum ed that group

ex it (or the threat of it) w ill b e , on many o c ca s io n s , the more lik ely the greater is

the discrepancy between the first two kinds of leg itim acy , and the narrower are the

confines of actio n from within (voice) encom passed by the third . On the fa ce of i t ,

the second part of th is statem ent seem s to contradict H irschm an's view that " if

- 15 -

ex it is followed by severe sanctions the very idea of ex it is going to be rep ressed

and the threat (of it) w ill not be uttered for fear that the sanctions w ill apply to the

threat a s w ell a s to the a c t i ts e lf " (op. c i t . , p p .9 6 -9 7 ) . There is no doubt that

th is proposition holds in a v ast number of c a se s for individual ex it or a co llectio n

of individual e x its . But it would be useful to consider the many important

exceptions to it which may occur in the relation s between separate groups within

a system rather than in the relation s between persons and corporate a c to rs . Although

a s a so c ia l p sych ologist I should tread most gingerly in domains which are far

removed from my own, it seem s not unreasonable to assum e that in many multi­

group system s th ese important exceptions are likely to occur when the contribution

from the d isaffected group is e sse n tia l to the continuing e ffic ien t functioning of the

system a s a w hole.

The so c ia l psych ological consequences of th is kind of actu al or threatened

group ex it can be d iscu ssed in terms of its relationship to the im possibility or

d ifficulty of individual ex it from the ingroup. Some of them are clearly im plicit in

H irschm an's d iscu ssio n of loyalty w hich, a s he w rites , w ill be needed more

(together with a coh esiv e ideology) a t the "densely occupied lower end of the

s c a le " consisting of a ranking of "organizations . . . in order of q u ality , p re stig e ,

or some other d esirab le ch a ra cteris tic " ( o p . c i t . , p . 8 2 ). The tendency to try for

th is kind of individual e x it , or even to conceive it a s a p o s s ib ility , may be in th is

c a se inversely related to the perceived rea lity or potentiality of group e x it . This

relationship can become a powerful ingredient of ingroup loy alty . The second so c ia l

p sych ological consequence (related to H irschm an's cohesive ideology) is the

increasing uniformity within the group of the relevant ingroup and outgroup attitudes

and behaviour - a phenomenon which was mentioned earlier in th is paper. In th is

c a s e , a so c ia l psych ological an a ly sis of the situation must take exp lic itly into

account the increased sharing by many individuals of their "exp ectation s about,

and evaluations o f, other p eop le 's behaviour" (T a jfe l, 1972, p.111).

In turn, the p ositiv e feedback triggered into actio n by th is sharing of

expectations and evaluations provides a p aralle l to the jo y s of participation which

find their p lace amongst H irschm an's (1974) "new econom ic arguments in favour of

v o ice " (p .7 ) . ’’The a c tiv itie s connected with v o ice can on o ccasio n become a

highly desired <*nd in i t s e l f ” (o p .c it . , p .8) and thus they d ecrease the co st of

_ 16 -

vo ice and may even turn it into a b en efit. But in the ca se of group ex it it is the

co st of th is ex it rather than of v o ice which is psychologically decreased in th is

way. This co st can som etimes be enormous for the individuals concerned. Its

accep tan ce by many would be incom prehensible without the e x isten ce of a com­

pensating mechanism of increasing loyalty to the ingroup a s the dangers of group

ex it loom larger and the deviant status of its members in the outside world becom es

sharper and c learer.

3 . V oice , status quo and so c ia l comparison in interqroup relations

The major theme of H irschm an's book was the sp ecifica tio n of conditions in

which vo ice can help in counteracting a declin e in the e ffic ien cy of functioning of

an organization. There is no doubt that voice w ill som etimes a ls o be heard a s a

rationalization for keeping things a s they are in the in terest of some p eo p le , even

when general effic ien cy leav es much to be desired . But a d iscu ssio n of th is banality

was not the purpose of H irschm an's e x e rc is e , and the value of his a n a ly s is lie s

p recise ly in its focus on the p oten tia lities of voice a s a recuperation m echanism .

In the previous section of th is paper group ex it and some forms of its in ter­

action with group vo ice were d iscu ssed a s a recuperation mechanism for groups

which p erceive their position in a multi-group system a s being le s s than s a t is ­

factory . One of the conditions in w hich, a s Hirschman w rote, 'fei n o -e x it situation

w ill be superior to a situation with some lim ited ex it (is) i f ex it is in effectiv e a s a

recuperation m echanism , but does succeed in draining from the firm or organization

its more quality co n sc io u s , a le r t , and potentially a c tiv is t custom ers or members"

(o p .c it . , p . 5 5 ). It is l ik e ly , of co u rse , that custom ers or members who display

the q u alities ju s t mentioned are often nearer to the top of the so c ia l heap than are

the more p assiv e o n es.

In the ca se of individual members of an organization the greater involvement

in it of those who are nearer to the top makes ex it for them more costly or d ifficu lt

than for o th ers , and a t the same time their vo ice is likely to be louder, more

en th u siastic and more e ffe c tiv e . As indiv iduals, they may be sim ultaneously

concerned with preventing the declin e of the organization and preventing the d eclin e

of their re la tiv e position in i t . The same w ill be true of the higher status groups

when the organization co n s is t* of groups which are clearly separate from one another.

- 17 -

W e have here a situation which is parallel to th a t d iscu ssed in relation to

the exit of d isaffected groups in the previous section of th is paper. The position

of an individual belonging to a higher status group needs to be considered in

relation to his group at the same time a s the position of h is group in relation to

other groups in the organization. This can be done with regard to the p o ss ib ilitie s

of an individual's ex it from his group, his group's ex it from the organization,

and the corresponding functions and directions of v o ice .

The membership of a high status group is often satisfying in a variety of

w ays. Exit from it is th erefore, on the w hole, unlikely. But the point is that

whether some individuals do or do not leav e the group (and they may leav e for a

number of re a so n s , including a con flict of values that the "superior” position of

their group som etimes entails) the intergroup situation within the organization

remains the sam e. The high status group a s a whole cannot e x it , u n less it is

intent upon co llec tiv e se lf-d estru ctio n , actu al or sym bolic. As d istin ct from the

d isaffected group, its members have a great deal to lo se and very often nothing

to gain from any form of ex it - be it em igration, separation or refusal to play by

the ru les . From their point of v iew , the declin e in the e ffic ien cy of the organization

can take one of two forms: a decline in the overall functioning of the system , or

a declin e in the re la tiv e position of their group within the system . The former

without the la tter would lead to the use of v o ic e , individually or co lle c tiv e ly , in

the ways described by Hirschman. The d eclin e in the relativ e position of the

group, or the threat of such a d e clin e , has certain p sych ological consequences

relevant to th e use of group voice which may be considered by returning briefly

to some a sp e c ts of the psychology of so c ia l com parison.

In a recent letter to The Times (29 O ct. 1974) concerned with the present

econom ic plight of Britain Elliott Jaques exclaim ed in desperation: "Is it not

apparent to a ll that the present wave of disputes has to do with r e la t iv it ie s ,

re la tiv itie s and nothing but r e la t iv it ie s ? " The "re la tiv itie s" of the lower status

groups were d iscu ssed from a certain point of view earlier in th is paper. Those

of the higher status groups a re , of co u rse , concerned with the preservation of

d ifferen tia ls . As I wrote ab o v e, we are what we are because "they" are not what

we a re . But th is item of folk wisdom needs to be inserted in a wider context

which is that of the preservation of an individual's sa tisfactory so c ia l identity in

a network of so c ia l com parisons.

- 18 -

Social identity can be defined a s "that part of an individual's se lf-co n cep t

which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a so c ia l group (or groups)

together with the emotional sig n ifican ce attached to that membership "(T a jf e l , 0£ ^

c it . , p .15). O r, a s Berger (1966) wrote: " Society not only defines but creates

p sych ological re a lity . The individual rea liz e s him self in society - that i s , he

reco g n ises h is identity in so cia lly defined terms and th ese definitions become

reality a s he liv es in so c ie ty " (p. 107).

"Several consequences regarding group membership follow upon this "recognition of identity in so cia lly defined term s". They can be described a s follow s:

(a) It can be assumed that an individual will tend to remain a member of a group and seek membership of new groups if th ese groups have some contribution to make to the positive a sp e c ts of his so c ia l id en tity ; i . e . to those a sp e c ts of it from which he derives some sa tis fa c tio n .

(b) If a group does not sa tisfy th is requirem ent, the individual will tend to leav e it u n less

(i) leaving the group is im possible for some "o b jec tiv e " re a s o n s , or,

(ii) it co n flic ts with important values which are them selves a part of his accep tab le so cia l identity .

(c) If leaving the group presents the d ifficu lties ju st mentioned, then at le a s t two solutions are p ossib le :

(i) to change on e 's interpretation of the attributes of the group so that its unwelcome features (e .g . low status) are either ju stified or made accep tab le through a reinterpretation;

(ii) to accep t the situation for what it is and engage in so cia l actio n which would lead to desirable changes in the situ ation .(Of co u rse , there may be various combinations of (i) and (ii) such a s , for exam ple, when the negative attributes are ju stified and so c ia l actio n to remove them is undertaken at the same tim e.)

(d) No group liv es alone - a ll groups in society live in the midst of other groups. In other words, the "positive a sp e cts of so cia l identity" and the reinterpretation of attributes and engagement in so cia l action only acquire meaning in relation to , or in comparisons w ith, other groups. " (T a jfe l, op. c i t . , p p .15-16).

The in escap able nature of th ese comparisons Is due to the fact that:

"The ch a ra cteris tics of o n e 's group a s a whole (such a s its s ta tu s , its rich n ess or poverty, its skin colour or its ab ility to reach its aims) ach iev e most of their sig n ifican ce in relation to perceived d ifferences from other groups and the value connotation of th ese d ifferen ces. For

- 19 -

exam ple, econom ic deprivation acquires its importance in so cia l a ttitu d e s , intentions and actio n s mainly when it becom es relative deprivation; easy or d ifficu lt a c c e s s to means of production and consumption of goo d s, to benefits and opportunities becom e psychologically salien t mainly in relation to com parisons with other groups; the definition of a group (national, ra c ia l or any other) makes no sen se unless there are other groups around. A group becom es a group in the sen se of being perceived a s having common ch a ra cteris tics or a common fate only b ecau se other groups are present in the environment.

Thus the p sych ological a sp ects and consequences of the membership of a group are capable of any kind of a definition only b ecau se of their insertion into a multi-group structure. C onsequently, the so c ia l identity of an individual conceived a s his "knowledge that he belongs to certain so c ia l groups together with some emotional and value sig n ifican ce to him of h is membership" can only be defined through the e ffe c ts of so c ia l categorizations segmenting an individual's so c ia l environment into his own group and o th ers. " (o p .c lt . , pp. 17-18).

In situations which are characterised by the structure of b e lie f in so c ia l

change (as the term was defined in th is paper) "a so c ia l group can fu lfil its

function of protecting the so c ia l identity of its members only if it manages to keep

its positiv ely valued d istin ctiv en ess from other groups" (o p .c lt . , p .18). The

em ergence of th is structure of b e lie f must be understood, in the ca se of high

status groups, a s being dependent upon the two conditions ju st d iscu ssed : the

high co st of an individual's ex it from his group; and the very high cost (or

im possibility) of the group's exit from the organization. These are a lso the

conditions determining an in tense use of the group's voice in the attem pts to

prevent its comparative d eclin e .

We must now return to the use of vo ice not a s a response to the comparative

d eclin e of the ingroup but a s a response to the decline in the effic ien cy of

functioning of the to ta l organization. Assuming that d ifferentia ls are perceived by

members of a high status group a s being eroded, three p o ss ib ilitie s need to be

considered:

(1) The comparative d eclin e of the group is not perceived by its members a s

being a sso cia ted in one way or another with the decline or the prevention of decline

in the functioning of the organization a s a whole.

(2) This comparative decline is perceived a s being a sso cia ted with the

d eclin e in the functioning of the to tal organization.

- 20 -

(3) This comparative d eclin e is perceived a s being a sso cia ted with the

prevention of declin e in the iunctioning of the to tal organization.

These are the p sych ological a ltern a tiv e s. The actu al changes in the

functioning of the organization may or may not correspond to the group's perception

of what happens. The point i s , however, that it is th ese shared p ercep tion s,

tending to become more common and widespread a s the group se es i t s e lf increasingly

beleagu ered , which will determine the intensity and the direction of the use of

v o ice . In the first two of the three c a s e s , there is no perceived co n flict between

responding to the threat of comparative decline and the wider in terests at stak e .

It can therefore be assum ed that the group's "ethnocentric" (or more g en erally ,

sociocentric) vo ice w ill be given free re in . Human nature being what it is (an odd

expression to come from a psychologist) , it can be assum ed that there w ill be a

solid wall of ration alization s (or defensive ideologies) to ward off the uncomfortable

thoughts inseparable from the third c a s e .

The em ergence and diffusion of th ese defensive ideologies may at tim es

determ ine, and at tim es may be determined b y , the use of vo ice (c f . Festin ger,

1957 , for th eoretical statem ents concerning the second a ltern ativ e , followed by an

exten siv e literature of experim ental studies on cognitive d isso n an ce). Independ­

e n tly , how ever, of the nature of the p sych ological p ro cesses generating th ese

id eo lo g ies , we must consider the following relationsh ips between the use of voice

by the threatened group and the re a litie s of the decline of the to tal organization;

(1) As determined by some external criteria (e .g . measures of econom ic

performance) the group is wrong in assuming that its comparative d eclin e is not

a sso c ia ted either with a decline or with a prevention of declin e in the functioning

of the to tal organization.

(2) As determined in the same manner, the group is wrong in assum ing that

its comparative d eclin e is a sso cia ted with a decline in the to ta l functioning.

(3) The group is right in assuming that its comparative d eclin e is asso cia ted

with a prevention of d eclin e in the to ta l organization. But in the ensuing co n flict

of perceived in te re s ts , the former d eclin e turns out to be more important than the

la tter .

W henever any of th ese three relationships comes to m ateria lize , the use of

vo ice by the threatened group may prove catastrop hic for the organization a s a whole;

- 21 -

and the higher is the status of the group threatened by the lo ss of its superior

d is tin c tiv e n ess , the more catastrop hic is its use of vo ice likely to becom e.

Two notes need to be appended to conclude and clarify th is d iscu ssio n of

group v o ice . The first concerns its alm ost exclu siv e preoccupation with the

"su b jec tiv e " a sp e c ts of the relationsh ips between groups, with the p sych ological

p ro cesses of so c ia l comparison rather than with the "o b je c tiv e" co n flic ts of

in te re s t. This em phasis was not chosen b ecau se of a b e lie f on my part that th ese

so c ia l p sych ological p ro cesses are"m ore important" th an , or primary to , the s o c ia l ,

econom ic and political intergroup p ro cesses which form their con text. These

psych ological correlates of the other relationsh ips d o, however, e x is t ; and, a s I

wrote elsew here (T a jfe l, 1974b) the concern is "with certain points of insertion of

so c ia l psych ological variab les into the causal sp iral; and (the) argument is th a t,

ju st a s the e ffe c ts of th ese variab les are determined by the previous s o c ia l ,

econom ic and p o litica l p ro cesses , so they a lso acquire in their turn an autonomous

function which en ab les them to d eflect in one direction or another the subsequent

functioning of th ese p ro ce sse s" (p. 65).

F in a lly , I wish to return to the "individual" v s . "group" dichotomy d iscu ssed

earlier in th is paper. There is litt le doubt that many of the points d iscu ssed and

conclusions presented here apply to interindividual behaviour and attitudes a s well

a s to the intergroup scen ario . The point of departure (and of arrival) w as, however,

firmly kept in the area of intergroup relation s becauee of my conviction that it is

only when th is is exp lic itly done (at some risk of neg lect of other issu es) that we

h av e, a s so c ia l p sy ch o lo g ists , a good change of making a contribution to the

understanding of so c ia l p ro cesses at large.

/

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econom ic developm ent.11 Quarterly journal of econom ics 87:

5 4 4 -5 6 6 .

1974 ""E x it, v o ice and lo y alty ": Further reflectio n s and a survey of

recen t co n trib u tion s." So cia l sc ien ce information 13 (1): 7 -2 6 .

H ofstadter, R.1945 So cia l Darwinism in American thought. Philadelphia , University

of Pennsylvania P ress .

Jo n e s , E . J . ; G erard, H .B .

1967 Foundations of so c ia l psychology. New York, W iley .

Sh erif, M .; Hovland, C . I .1961 So cia l judgment: A ssim ilation and contrast e ffe c ts in communication

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1972 "Experiments in a vacuum ", in: J . Isra e l; H. T a jfe l (ed s.) , The

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Academic P ress .

1974a "Intergroup behaviour, so c ia l comparison and so c ia l ch a n g e ,"

U niversity of M ichigan , Katz-Newcomb L ectu res. (M im eo).

1974b "S o cia l identity and intergroup behaviour." So cia l sc ien ce

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W rightsm an, L .S . (ed.)

1972 So cia l psychology In the se v e n tie s . Belm ont, C a lif . , Wadsworth.

- 22 -

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