john kwoka's mergers, merger control, and …...callison, tim deyak, nathan wilson, dave...

JOHN KWOKArsquoS MERGERS MERGER CONTROL AND REMEDIES A CRITICAL REVIEW

MICHAEL VITA

F DAVID OSINSKI

John Kwokarsquos 2015 Mergers Merger Control and Remedies1 has received considerable attention from both antitrust practitioners and academics2 The bookrsquos centerpiece is a meta-analysis of retrospective studies of consummated mergers joint ventures and other horizontal arrangements3 Professor Kwoka creates a database of the estimated price effects reported in these academic studies and uses it to address important questions about federal antitrust en-forcement such as Do the agencies successfully identify anticompetitive mergers Do merger remedies effectively prevent the creation and exercise of market power Have the agencies applied consistent standards over time for identifying and challenging anticompetitive mergers

Based on summary statistics generated from his database Kwoka concludes that domestic antitrust agencies are excessively tolerant in their merger en-forcement that merger remedies are ineffective at mitigating market power and that merger enforcement has become increasingly lax over time

As Federal Trade Commission economists we appreciate Kwokarsquos effort to distill for a broader audience the wide range of published analyses of antitrust

Deputy Director for Research amp Management and staff economist respectively Bureau of Economics US Federal Trade Commission The views expressed herein are the authorsrsquo not those of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner We thank Ginger Jin Debbie Feinstein Dan Hosken Chris Taylor Lou Silvia Alison Oldale Andrew Stivers Liz Callison Tim Deyak Nathan Wilson Dave Schmidt Jon Nathan Katie MacAdam and Paul Pautler for helpful comments Remaining errors are ours

1 See JOHN KWOKA MERGERS MERGER CONTROL AND REMEDIES A RETROSPECTIVE ANAL-

YSIS OF US POLICY (2015) 2 See eg Robert A Skitol A Harsh Report Card on the Merger Enforcement Process

ANTITRUST SOURCE (Feb 2015) wwwamericanbarorgcontentdamabapublishingantitrust_ sourcefeb15_skitol_review_2_11fpdf

3 Meta-analysis is a method for systematically combining quantitative findings from multiple studies to develop a finding that has greater statistical power than any of the individual studies alone

361

82 Antitrust Law Journal No 1 (2018) Copyright 2018 American Bar Association Reproduced by permission All rights reserved This information or any portion thereof may not be copiedor disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronicdatabase or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association

362 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol 82

enforcement actions The FTC has a longstanding culture of reflection and self-assessment indeed current or former FTC Bureau of Economics (BE) staff authored many of the studies in Kwokarsquos survey4 The FTC recently released its second major assessment of its merger remedies5 the first was released in 19996 Retrospective studies of consummated mergers have in-creased the FTCrsquos antitrust knowledge base and have helped it improve en-forcement accuracy by providing valuable insights into when merger policy has worked and when it has not

For example after a series of unsuccessful hospital merger challenges FTC Chairman Timothy Muris launched the Hospital Merger Retrospective Project in 2002 which contributed to the FTCrsquos recent successes in challenging harm-ful hospital mergers7 More generally as Orley Ashenfelter et al have noted prior to the publication of merger retrospectives in the academic literature there was virtually no empirical evidence on the actual competitive effects of horizontal mergers8 Retrospective analyses also help the agencies assess and improve the empirical tools used for prospective merger enforcement9 We

4 In addition to studying mergers retrospectively FTC staff also have studied the effects of nonmerger activity retrospectively See BUREAU OF COMPETITION amp BUREAU OF ECON FED TRADE COMMrsquoN IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

CASES (Ronald N Lafferty et al eds 1984) 5 BUREAU OF COMPETITION amp BUREAU OF ECON FED TRADE COMMrsquoN THE FTCrsquoS MERGER

REMEDIES 2006ndash2012 (2017) [hereinafter FTCrsquoS MERGER REMEDIES 2006ndash2012] 6 BUREAU OF COMPETITION FED TRADE COMMrsquoN A STUDY OF THE COMMISSIONrsquoS DIVESTI-

TURE PROCESS (1999) 7 See Deborah Haas-Wilson amp Michael Vita Mergers Between Competing Hospitals Les-

sons from Retrospective Analyses 18 INTrsquoL J ECON BUS 1 (2011) see also Orley Ashenfelter et al Retrospective Analysis of Hospital Mergers 18 INTrsquoL J ECON BUS 5 (2011) Since the completion of this project the FTC has enjoyed a string of successes either successful litigation or transactions abandoned after the issuance of an FTC complaint See eg FTC v Penn St Med Ctr 838 F3d 327 (3d Cir 2016) FTC v Advocate Health Care Network 841 F3d 460 (7th Cir 2016) Promedica Health Sys Inc v FTC 749 F3d 559 (6th Cir 2014) FTC v OSF Healthcare Sys 852 F Supp 2d 1069 (ND Ill 2012) Order Dismissing Complaint Reading Health Sys FTC Docket No 9353 (Dec 7 2012) Decision and Order Carilion Clinic FTC Docket No 9338 (Nov 23 2009) Order Dismissing Complaint Inova Health Sys Found FTC Docket No 9326 (June 17 2008) In Advocate the appellate court cited published FTC hospital merger retrospectives Advocate 841 F3d at 470 472 (citing Steven Tenn The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction 18 INTrsquoL J ECON BUS 65 (2011) Aileen Thompson The Effect of Hospital Mergers on Inpatient Prices A Case Study of the New Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction 18 INTrsquoL J ECON BUS 91 (2011) Michael G Vita amp Seth Sacher The Competitive Effects of Not-for-Profit Hospital Mergers A Case Study 49 J INDUS ECON 63 (2001))

8 Orley Ashenfelter et al Generating Evidence to Guide Merger Enforcement 5 COMPETI-

TION POLrsquoY INTrsquoL 57 58 (2009) 9 See Craig Peters Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation Evidence from the

US Airline Industry 49 JL amp ECON 627 (2006) Matthew C Weinberg amp Daniel Hosken Evidence on the Accuracy of Merger Simulations 95 REV ECON amp STAT 1584 (2013) Christo-pher Garmon The Accuracy of Hospital Merger Screening Methods (Fed Trade Commrsquon Working Paper No 326 2016)

2018] JOHN KWOKArsquoS MERGERS MERGER CONTROL amp REMEDIES 363

therefore regard retrospective analyses of policy decisions as a vital input into the refinement and improvement of antitrust merger policy

While acknowledging many of these valuable contributions of retrospective analysis to merger policy Kwokarsquos principal focus is to use this literature to draw conclusions about contemporary federal merger policy These include

ldquo[W]e can conclude that recent merger control has not been sufficiently aggressive in challenging mergersrdquo10

ldquo[T]he evidence also indicates that many challenged mergers are subject to remedies that fail to prevent post-merger price increases Neither con-duct nor structural remedies on average succeed in that objective but of the two types of remedies the conduct approach has shown itself to be particularly ineffectiverdquo11

ldquoIt can therefore reasonably be concluded that the numerical shift toward more accommodating policy across these decades reflects a bona fide policy changerdquo12

Are these conclusions justified In what follows we provide a detailed ex-amination of Kwokarsquos conclusions and the studies and methods on which they rely For a variety of reasons we find that his evidence cannot support such broad conclusions For example as we will show several of the studies that form the basis for his criticisms of negotiated remedies actually provide no information about the effectiveness of those remedies When those studies are removed from his analysis the remaining evidence is weak and equivocal

In addition there are substantial methodological issues with his analysis Kwoka does not employ well established meta-analytic techniques for com-puting average price effects and their associated standard errors For example he does not weight his observations by their estimated variances The absence of weighting means that imprecise estimates of price effects receive the same weight as precisely estimated effects in the computation of his averages which is a substantial departure from standard meta-analytic methodology More importantly he reports no standard errors for his estimated average price effects which means that neither he nor his readers can conduct the hypothesis tests (eg is the average merger price effect statistically different from zero) that normally are the focus of this type of inquiry The absence of standard errors not only is a substantial departure from basic meta-analytic methods but also is a substantial departure from normal econometric practice

10 KWOKA supra note 1 at 158 11 Id at 159ndash60 12 Id at 117


Last we show that Kwokarsquos analysis provides little support for the conclusion that enforcement standards have become weaker over time

In what follows we explore and discuss these issues in greater detail

I KWOKArsquoS ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL MERGER POLICY AND MERGER REMEDIES

The core of the Kwoka study at least as it concerns FTC and DOJ enforce-ment policy is contained in chapter 7 of Merger Policy and Remedies Kwoka canvases the economic literature for relevant research identifying 49 transac-tions for which a retrospective study exists Of these 49 transactions 42 are mergers the others are either joint ventures or airline ldquocode sharesrdquo Kwoka provides a brief synopsis of each transaction and the relevant study (or stud-ies) in Appendix I of his book The Appendix to this article reproduces Kwokarsquos Table 6213 which lists all 49 transactions in his database

After compiling a database of these estimated price effects from the studies in his sample Kwoka computes average price changes based on various mutu-ally exclusive categories of agency actions Table 1 lists Kwokarsquos results where the first column contains average price effects reported in Kwokarsquos Table 7914 while the second column reports the number of mergers in each category from Kwokarsquos Table 7415 Kwoka interprets these average price ef-fects as follows

Kwoka interprets the 186 percent increase for ldquoopposed mergersrdquomdashthat is mergers where either the FTC or DOJ recommended blocking the transaction in its entiretymdashas evidence that the ldquoagenciesrsquo actions were effectiverdquo16

He interprets the 705 percent and 1603 percent increases for mergers with divestiture and conduct remedies respectively as follows ldquoThus while neither type of remedy for competitively problematic transactions seems to have been especially effective in restraining postmerger price increases conduct remedies were by far the weaker of the twordquo17 He also states that ldquoit is clear that agency actions did not preserve or restore the price competition otherwise lost as a result of these mergersrdquo18

Regarding the 608 percent and 715 percent price increases for cleared mergers Kwoka states ldquoThese studied mergers appear to be cleared too

13 Id at 90ndash91 14 Id at 120 15 Id at 115 16 Id at 120 17 Id 18 Id at 119


oftenrdquo19 Elsewhere he states that the agencies ldquofail to challenge a con-siderable fraction of [mergers] that result in price increasesrdquo20

TABLE 1 KWOKA AVERAGE PRICE EFFECTS BY AGENCY

ENFORCEMENT ACTION21

Agency Action

Average Price Effect

(Kwoka Table 79)

Number of Mergers

(Kwoka Table 74)

All mergers in the sample 722 42

All mergers opposed by agencies 186 5

Mergers when a divestiture remedy was obtained 705 6

Mergers when a conduct remedy or conditions imposed 1603 4

Mergers explicitly cleared by agencies 608 5

Mergers presumably cleared due to lack of explicit information agency the an

715 22

Kwoka finds that FTCDOJ merger policy has failed systematically to achieve its stated objective of preserving competition

The mean price change for all the mergers where the antitrust agency took any enforcement actionmdashthat is opposition or any challenge and remedymdash was an increase of 771 percent22 This result is inconsistent with the pro-position that agency actions served to restore or preserve competition Rather it implies that policy decisions and actions have been too accommo-dating failing in their mission of preventing postmerger price increases23

19 Id at 120 20 Id at 126 21 There is a slight discrepancy between the count of mergers with divestitures listed in

Kwokarsquos Table 74 (ie 6) and the count that one obtains from Appendix I (ie 7) Apparently Kwoka assigned a ldquohalf-frequencyrdquo score to the KalvarXidex and ThomsonWest mergers because the remedies in those cases involved both divestitures and licensing See KWOKA supra note 1 at 162 183 245 n6

22 The average price change is 771 for the 15 transactions listed in rows 2 through 4 of Table 1 (ie those underlying the 186 705 and 1603) taking account of the different number of transactions in each row Id at 119

23 See id (emphasis added)


Kwoka concludes [T]hese results suggest that merger policy at the margin has been exces-sively permissive remedies do not appear adequate to the task of preventing postmerger price increases All in all both investigations and policy actions appear to err on the side of permissiveness with the result that too few mergers are challenged and too few of those that are challenged are subject to either adequate remedies or opposition by the antitrust agencies24

He also finds [T]here is strong evidence that these mergers on average have resulted in higher prices and strikingly that is the case regardless of whether the agen-cies acted or not and if they did what type of action they took This perva-sive anticompetitive outcome from these well-studied mergers is indicative of the need for closer policy scrutiny of mergers at the enforcement margin and for stronger actions and remedies in the case of challenged mergers25

II EVALUATION OF KWOKArsquoS EVIDENCE

Kwokarsquos central finding is that federalmdashthat is FTC and DOJmdashmerger enforcement is excessively lenient and ineffective He also concludes that too many anticompetitive transactions proceed unchallenged And when mergers are challenged and addressed via remedies negotiated with the merging par-ties these remediesmdasheither divestiture or conduct remediesmdashare inadequate to prevent the creation and exercise of market power Finally he concludes that federal merger enforcement has grown increasingly lenient over time

Do the underlying publications support these conclusions In what follows we examine more closely the relevant merger studies from his data sample

A COMPOSITION OF KWOKArsquoS SAMPLE INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

Given that a principal objective of Kwokarsquos analysis is to assess the effec-tiveness of recent antitrust enforcement policies one is struck by the age of some transactions in his sample Three mergers (Scott GraphicsXidex Kal-varXidex and WeyerhaeuserMenasha) pre-date the issuance of the modern 1982 Merger Guidelines One of them (KalvarXidex) pre-dates enactment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act in 1976 Transactions of this vintage do not inform the evaluation of contemporary federal enforcement policy In fact only seven of the mergers in his sample occurred in 2000 or later with the most recent in 2006 While the set of transactions available for inclusion in his meta-analysis is beyond Kwokarsquos control the paucity of recent transactions nevertheless constrains inference about current FTC and DOJ policy26

24 Id at 120ndash21 25 Id at 126 26 In contrast in comments to the FTC about its current merger remedies study Kwoka ex-

pressed concern that the findings of the previous (1999) FTC Remedies Study had grown stale


The data sample also is unrepresentative of the population of industries where mergers now occur The studies in Kwokarsquos sample are concentrated in a handful of industries Thirty of the 49 transactions (and 23 of the 42 merg-ers) occur in three industries petroleum (11) airlines (9)27 and academic professional journal publications (10)28 Also because some of the studies in-cluded in Kwokarsquos sample examine numerous transactions there is a lack of diversification in primary research sources One publication analyzes eight petroleum mergers29 and one author (in two publications) addresses ten merg-ers involving journal publications30 More than 40 percent of the mergers in Kwokarsquos data sample come from these two sources

This lack of diversification in sources and industries increases the likeli-hood that idiosyncratic issues will affect the results of his meta-analysis For example consider the transportation sector In the early stages of airline der-egulation prior to 1989 the Department of Transportation retained authority over airline mergers31 The DOJrsquos role was merely advisory All five of the airline mergers in Kwokarsquos sample occurred prior to this transfer of jurisdic-tion to the DOJ In addition Kwokarsquos analysis includes two railroad mergers which to this day fall under the Surface Transportation Boardrsquos jurisdiction

notwithstanding that the transactions in that study were more recent than many of those in his data sample Specifically Kwoka wrote ldquo[T]he nature of mergers has arguably changed in re-cent years so that a study reliant on twenty-year-old experiences may not capture the policy choices that are most relevant in the matters before the FTC todayrdquo and that ldquoover the past decade remedies themselves have shifted in their emphasisrdquo See John Kwoka Comment on the Merger Remedies Study Proposed by the Federal Trade Commission (Mar 2015)

27 Kwokarsquos count of cases by industry in his Table 63 is incorrect there are 11 petroleum transactions 9 (not 10) airline transactions and 5 (not 4) hospital mergers

28 Orley Ashenfelter et al make this same observation in their survey of the retrospective literature ldquoUnfortunately the mergers studied do not constitute a representative sample of all potentially anticompetitive mergers Most merger studies examine mergers in one of four industries that have experienced a large number of mergers and where data are available airlines banking hospitals and petroleumrdquo See Orley Ashenfelter et al Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers Evidence from Consummated Mergers 57 JL amp ECON S67 S77 (2014)

29 See John A Karikari et al The Impact of Mergers in US Petroleum Industry on Wholesale Gasoline Prices 25 CONTEMP ECON POLrsquoY 46 (2007) (analyzing BPAmoco ExxonMobil MAPUDS MarathonAshland ShellTexaco ShellStar ToscoUnocal and UDSTotal) We will have more to say about the Karikari et al study below

30 Mark J McCabe analyzes Wolters KluwerLippincott Reed ElsevierPergamon Wolters KluwerThomson HarcourtChurchill ThomsonShepards Wolters KluwerCCH Reed Elsevier West ThomsonWest Wolters KluwerLittle Brown and Reed ElsevierMatthew Bender See Mark J McCabe Journal Pricing and Mergers A Portfolio Approach 92 AM ECON REV 259 (2002) Mark J McCabe Law Serials Pricing and Mergers A Portfolio Approach 3 CONTRIBU-

TIONS TO ECON ANALYSIS amp POLrsquoY 1 (2004) [hereinafter McCabe Law Serials Pricing and Mergers]

31 When Congress eliminated the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1985 it temporarily transferred merger review authority to the Department of Transportation The DOTrsquos jurisdiction over merg-ers terminated effective December 31 1988 after which time the DOJ assumed sole responsibil-ity for airline merger review


These seven transactions representing 14 percent of Kwokarsquos sample cannot inform an analysis of the effectiveness of current FTC and DOJ merger policy

The concentration of Kwokarsquos sample in a small number of industries ren-ders it remarkably unrepresentative of recent merger activity The three indus-try groups discussed above (transportation energy and journal publishing) represent 32 of his 49 transactions ie two-thirds of his sample In contrast transportation and energy represent only 84 percent of FY2015 HSR filings with journals not even listed separately (presumably they are contained within the ldquootherrdquo category)32 Similarly consumer goods and manufacturing re-present 43 percent of FY2015 HSR filings versus 16 percent in the Kwoka sample

Kwokarsquos sample includes six mergers that were not reviewed by the agen-cies until after they had been consummated33 Under the 1976 HSR Act only mergers exceeding certain size thresholds require pre-merger filing with the antitrust agencies One merger in Kwokarsquos sample pre-dated HSR while the remainder fell below the HSR filing threshold and thus were consummated prior to agency review

Whether a merger was HSR-reportable is a vitally important factor to take into account in any assessment of enforcement effectiveness The remedies available to the agencies once a transaction has been consummated are very different from those available pre-consummation Indeed the HSR Act was enacted precisely because of the extreme difficulty in obtaining effective re-lief once a transaction has been consummated and the ldquoeggs scrambledrdquo34 As we discuss in detail below it is misleading to compare the effects of remedies obtained for HSR-reportable transactions to the effects of those remedies ob-tained for transactions that were not reported under HSR

As the discussion above highlights Kwokarsquos data sample does not re-present the population of agency-reviewed mergers This limits onersquos ability to draw general conclusions about the effectiveness of overall merger policy The remainder of Part II examines more closely the particular elements of the data sample used to support some of Kwokarsquos most targeted conclusions fo-cusing on his conclusions about the effectiveness of structural and conduct merger remedies

32 See FED TRADE COMMrsquoN amp DEPrsquoT OF JUSTICE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FIS-

CAL YEAR 2015 (2016) 33 These are Scott GraphicsXidex KalvarXidex DominicanAMI New HanoverCape Fear

EvanstonHighland Park Provena St ThereseVictory 34 See Kenneth G Elzinga The Antimerger Law Pyrrhic Victories 12 JL amp ECON 43 54

(1969)


B STRUCTURAL DIVESTITURE REMEDIES IN MERGER CASES

Kwoka concludes that even when the agencies obtained asset divestitures prices on average nonetheless increased by 705 percent From this he infers that asset divestitures in general were inadequate to constrain the exercise of market power35

As Kwoka reports in his Table 74 (reproduced in Table 1 above) this aver-age price effect is derived from seven transactions These are

Kalvar Xidex (1979) This consummated merger was challenged by the FTC in 1981 The FTC order requiring the licensing of technology36

and the divestiture of productive assets became final in July 1983 However the David Barton and Roger Sherman article on which Kwoka relies analyzes the effects of two Xidex mergers using data spanning the period 1973ndash1982mdasha sample period that ends one year before the rem-edy was imposed37 Barton and Sherman had no data from the post-remedy period

Accordingly this study cannotmdashand does notmdashsay anything about the effectiveness of the FTCrsquos relief in those two cases because its analysis is post-merger but pre-remedy Accordingly we conclude that this study provides no evidence on the effectiveness of FTC divestiture rem-edies and therefore cannot support Kwokarsquos conclusion that merger remedies have been ineffective Note that omitting the Barton and Sher-man study substantially reduces Kwokarsquos estimated average price effect in mergers with divestituresmdashreducing it from 705 percent to 443 per-centmdashbecause the estimated price increase for the XidexKalvar merger was large (228 percent)38

ThomsonWest (1995) Mark McCabe analyzes the price effects of sev-eral journal publishing mergers within a single framework39 The DOJ required divestiture of Thompsonrsquos legal publication unit to Reed El-sevier in January 1997 The author finds that prices rose significantly ranging from 11 percent to 40 percent following the divestiture40 We agree this study raises questions about whether this particular remedy was effective

35 Kwokarsquos Table 79 data are reproduced in Table 1 supra See KWOKA supra note 1 at 120 36 The non-divestiture portion of this remedy will be discussed further in Part IIC of this

article 37 See David M Barton amp Roger Sherman The Price and Profit Effects of Horizontal Merger

A Case Study 33 J INDUS ECON 165 (1984) 38 Id at 170 39 McCabe Law Serials Pricing and Mergers supra note 30 40 Id at 16


GuinnessGrand Met (1997) This merger combined two producers of distilled spirits The FTC required the divestiture of Bombay and Bom-bay Sapphire gin and Dewarrsquos scotch to Bacardi Orley Ashenfelter and Daniel Hosken estimate the price effects of the transaction for scotch gin and vodka finding positive price effects in scotch but am-biguous results for gin and vodkamdashsome empirical specifications yield a positive merger price effect others a negative effect41 In the case of gin and vodka this ambiguity arises from the choice of a control group positive price effects are obtained when a control group of private label producers is used while negative price effects are obtained with a branded producer control group42 For the merger viewed in its entirety Ashenfelter and Hosken find a net positive price effect of 27 percent when private label control groups are used but a negative 1 percent price effect when branded control groups are used43 In short Ashenfelter and Hoskenrsquos study provides mixed evidence on the effec-tiveness of the FTCrsquos remedy in contrast to Kwokarsquos definitive conclu-sions Depending upon how one averages together the numerous heterogeneous price effects reported in this studymdasha topic we shall fur-ther address belowmdashthe degree to which it supports Kwokarsquos conclu-sion about the ineffectiveness of divestiture relief is unknown

BPAmoco (1998) and ExxonMobil (2000) Kwoka relies on John Karikari et al44 for the price effects of these two mergers both of which required divestitures of various petroleum assets Karikari et al present the exact coefficient estimates that first were published in the 2004 GAO report Tables 21ndash23 Given the importance of petroleum market merger enforcement to the FTC BE staff expended considerable effort examining this study45 ultimately expressing substantial concerns about

41 Orley Ashenfelter amp Daniel Hosken The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin 53 JL amp ECON 417 (2010)

42 If the control group consisted of private label producers the estimated price effect tended to be positive With branded control groups the estimated effect tended to be negative See id at 451 In their Table 3 Ashenfelter and Hosken report overall price effects for this merger by computing revenue-weighted averages of the individual price effects See id at 441 They report estimated price effects for 28 individual products (a product is a brandsize combination eg Johnny Walker Black 750 ml) using both types of control groups Of these 56 reported price changes 25 were negative

43 Only the analysis of price effects for scotch and gin would be relevant to assessing the effectiveness of the FTC divestiture remedy (because the FTC did not require a divestiture for vodka) It remains unclear how Kwoka combined gin and scotch into an average post-remedy price effect for the purposes of assessing the FTCrsquos remedy

44 Karikari et al supra note 29 45 Prior to the studyrsquos public release the FTC provided the GAO with a detailed critique of its

methods and conclusions See Letter from Timothy J Muris Chairman Fed Trade Commrsquon to James E Wells Dir Nat Res amp Envrsquot US Gen Accounting Office (Aug 25 2003) wwwftcgovsitesdefaultfilesattachmentspress-releasesstatement-federal-trade-commission-


its empirical methods and the robustness of its results46 BE staff re-estimated the mergersrsquo price effects using a ldquodifference-in-differencesrdquo specification obtaining results inconsistent with GAOrsquos original find-ings47 For example the FTC estimated the price effect of the Exxon Mobil transaction to be about 011centgallon for branded gasoline (about one-tenth of GAOrsquos estimate of 134centgallon) and between -034cent and -026centgallon for unbranded gasoline (compared to GAOrsquos estimate of 077centgallon)48 For BPAmoco the FTCrsquos estimates also were smaller

chairman-timothy-jmuris-gao-study-1990s-oil-mergers-concentration-released-today040527pe-trolactionsftcresponsepdf (discussing shortcomings of the 2003 draft of the GAO analysis) US GEN ACCOUNTING OFFICE ENERGY MARKETS EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND MARKET CONCEN-

TRATION IN THE US PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (2004) Post-release in 2005 the FTC held a public conference on Oil Industry Merger Effects in which independent experts (Dennis Carlton Jerry Hausman Hal White Ken Hendricks and Scott Thompson) were invited to discuss the merits of the GAO study and an FTC study See Fed Trade Commrsquon Preliminary Conference Agenda Estimating the Price Effects of Mergers and Concentration in the Petroleum Industry An Evalua-tion of Recent Learning (Jan 14 2005) see also Press Release Fed Trade Commrsquon FTC to Host Conference on Oil Industry Merger Effects (Jan 12 2005) Additionally the FTCrsquos BE staff prepared a detailed technical report on the GAO study FED TRADE COMMrsquoN ROBUSTNESS

OF THE RESULTS IN GAOrsquoS 2004 REPORT CONCERNING PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND CON-

CENTRATION CHANGES IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (2004) [hereinafter FTC ROBUSTNESS OF

GAOrsquoS 2004 REPORT] 46 Among a number of statisticalmethodological problems the initial GAO study (GAO I

ultimately published as Karikari et al) did not estimate the mergersrsquo price effects using the ldquodifference-in-differencesrdquo empirical method See Karikari et al supra note 29 As Kwoka em-phasizes use of this method is essential if one is to measure correctly the competitive effect of a merger because it allows one to compare price changes in the market affected by the merger to a suitable ldquocontrolrdquo group See KWOKA supra note 1 at 84 see also id at 59 (describing this method) This methodological deficiency notwithstanding Kwoka included this study in his database

47 When the FTC staff re-estimated the GAO equation using a difference-in-difference specifi-cation GAOrsquos findings of positive merger price effects were substantially attenuated and in some cases reversed (ie negative price effects were found) The BE Staff Technical Report found that the GAO I results were not robust to a number of perturbations to GAOrsquos specifica-tion In response to another Congressional request (and after receiving the FTC staffrsquos critique of their first study) the GAO conducted a second set of merger studies in 2009 (GAO II) which was published as Michael Kendix amp WD Walls Oil Industry Consolidation and Refined Product Prices Evidence from US Wholesale Gasoline Terminals 38 ENERGY POLrsquoY 3498 (2010) In contrast to GAO I GAO II used a correct difference-in-difference specification (ie it addressed the concerns articulated by the FTC about the methodology of GAO I) GAO II studied 7 oil mergers and found 4 instances where there were not significant price effects mixed results in the other 3 (eg price increases in some specifications but not in others) and some significant price decreases Overall GAO II found far fewer adverse competitive outcomes than did GAO I GAO II was carried out as part of a formal audit of the FTCrsquos antitrust enforcement in oil markets The audit concluded that the FTC should continue to conduct oil merger retrospective analyses to help guide its enforcement actions Since then BE has conducted several additional oil merger retrospectives and has found little evidence of anticompetitive effects See Daniel Hosken et al Does Concentration Matter Measurement of Petroleum Merger Price Effects 101 AM ECON REV (PAPERS amp PROC) 45 (2011) Louis Silvia amp Christopher T Taylor Petroleum Mergers and Competition in the Northeast United States 20 INTrsquoL J ECON BUS 97 (2013) Nicholas Kreisle Merger Policy at the Margin Western Refiningrsquos Acquisition of Giant Industries 47 REV INDUS ORG 71 (2015)

48 See ROBUSTNESS OF GAOrsquoS 2004 REPORT supra note 45 at 38


than GAOrsquos by approximately 15ndash40 percent Kwoka did not include these very different findings in his meta-analysis49 Had they been in-cluded the average price increases reported in his Table 79 (Table 1 above) would have been reduced weakening the basis for his critique of federal merger enforcement policies

FleetBankBoston (1999) Charles Calomiris amp Thanavut Por-nrojnangkool50 analyze this merger in a working paper one of two un-published studies in Kwokarsquos sample51 In September 1999 the DOJ and the Federal Reserve cleared the merger subject to divestiture of 306 branches The authors estimate the effects of this merger on the cost of loans to borrowers of different sizes both inside and outside of New England For large and small borrowers they find negative price effects from the merger for medium-sized borrowers they find that the merger increased the price of loans As with Ashenfelter and Hosken52 these mixed results do not support a clear conclusion that this was an ineffec-tive remedy

Johnson amp JohnsonPfizer (2006) Steven Tenn and John Yun53 analyze the divestiture remedy used to resolve the FTCrsquos competitive concerns from this merger Kwoka acknowledges that the JampJPfizer remedy was effective ldquo[Tenn amp Yun] conclude that the postdivestiture performance of the divested brands was similar to their predivestiture performance and the divestitures served to maintain the pretransaction level of competitionrdquo54

In summary of the seven studied transactions underlying Kwokarsquos conclu-sion that FTCDOJ divestiture remedies have been ineffective one study (XidexKalvar) does not measure the effect of the remedy four studies (Ex-xonMobil BPAmoco GuinnessGrand Met and FleetBankBoston) obtained mixed results one study determined the remedy (JampJPfizer) to be an une-

49 TD STANLEY amp HRISTOS DOUCOULIAGOS META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS IN ECONOMICS

AND BUSINESS 17ndash19 (2012) discuss at length whether meta-analyses should include only pub-lished articles or instead should include all relevant research Their conclusion is unequivocal ldquoOur advice in all cases is to err on the side of inclusionrdquo Id at 19

50 See Charles W Calomiris amp Thanavut Pornrojnangkool Monopoly-Creating Bank Consoli-dation The Merger of Fleet and BankBoston (Natrsquol Bureau of Econ Research Working Paper No 11351 May 2005)

51 The other study is by Laurence Schumann et al LAURENCE SCHUMANN ROBERT P ROGERS

amp JAMES D REITZES FED TRADE COMMrsquoN CASE STUDIES OF THE PRICE EFFECTS OF HORIZON-

TAL MERGERS (1992) 52 Ashenfelter amp Hosken supra note 41 53 Steven Tenn amp John M Yun The Success of Divestitures in Merger Enforcement Evidence

from the JampJ-Pfizer Transaction 29 INTrsquoL J INDUS ORG 273 (2011) 54 KWOKA supra note 1 at 216


quivocal success and only one study (ThomsonWest) appears to present clear evidence of a failure to constrain market power

We are unpersuaded that these academic studies adequately support Kwokarsquos conclusion that the US antitrust agenciesrsquo merger remedies have been inadequate in preventing the advancement of market power or ldquothat many challenged mergers are subject to remedies that fail to prevent post-merger price increasesrdquo55

C NON-DIVESTITURE REMEDIES IN MERGER CASES

Kwoka also criticizes the use of conduct remedies by the federal antitrust agencies in merger investigations56 The term ldquoconduct remedyrdquo refers to a transaction that the agencies allow to proceed subject to restrictions on the merged entityrsquos post-merger conduct In contrast to a structural remedy a pure conduct remedy does not require physical separation or divestiture of assets

As reported above in Table 1 Kwoka in Table 74 lists four mergers in his sample cleared with a conduct remedy or other conditions and according to Kwokarsquos Table 79 these transactions exhibit an average price increase of 1603 percent Kwoka concludes that ldquowhile [neither divestitures nor conduct remedies] seems to have been especially effective in restraining postmerger price increases conduct remedies were by far the weaker of the twordquo57

Before proceeding with an analysis of the cases that underlie this conclu-sion (pausing to note that four is a small sample size on which to base Kwokarsquos broad policy conclusions) it is important to clarify the role conduct remedies play in federal merger enforcement Readers unfamiliar with federal antitrust policy as normally practiced by the DOJ and the FTC might infer from Kwokarsquos discussion that the agencies frequently attempt to remedy hori-zontal mergers with conduct remedies and that the frequency of such reme-dies may have increased over time

Such an inference would be mistaken As both the DOJ and the FTC em-phasize structural (ie divestiture) remedies are strongly preferred in hori-zontal merger enforcement The FTC makes this clear in its 2012 formal statement of advice to merging entities

Most merger cases involve horizontal mergers and the Commission prefers structural relief in the form of a divestiture to remedy the anticompetitive

55 Id at 159 56 ldquoConduct remedies are more difficult to design and implement than divestitures thus lead-

ing to their demonstrated ineffectiveness They have nonetheless become more frequently used by the US antitrust agenciesrdquo Id at 156

57 Id at 120


effects of an unlawful horizontal merger Non-structural or conduct relief may also be required in aid of a required divestiture to remedy those effects58

Conduct remedies are not a standard remedy for ordinary horizontal merger cases As the recently released FTC Merger Remedy Study shows during the period 2006ndash2012 89 percent (76 of 85) of the horizontal mergers studied were remedied with structural relief59 Rather as noted above conduct reme-dies serve as a complement to divestiture remedies to ensure the success of the latter60 Occasionally conduct remedies are employed in vertical merger cases61 which are not part of Kwokarsquos study Conduct remedies also are used in other exceptional cases such as consummated mergers But they rarely are employed as the principal remedy in traditional horizontal merger investiga-tions especially HSR-reportable transactions where the FTC and the DOJ can initiate enforcement actions prior to consummation Kwokarsquos discussion sug-gests erroneously that the agencies routinely (and increasingly) employ con-duct remedies as a principal mechanism to mitigate market power in horizontal merger enforcement62

With this perspective let us review the four transactions Kwoka identifies as conduct remedies underlying his reported average price increase of 1603 percent

58 See BUREAU OF COMPETITION FED TRADE COMMrsquoN NEGOTIATING MERGER REMEDIES

(2012) Similarly the DOJ has stated ldquoIn the case of horizontal mergers enhanced market power is the result of combining similar sets of assets that otherwise would be used to compete Consequently if a competitive problem exists with a horizontal merger the typical remedy is to prevent common control over some or all of the assets thereby effectively preserving competi-tion Thus the Division will pursue a divestiture remedy in the vast majority of cases involving horizontal mergersrdquo See ANTITRUST DIV US DEPrsquoT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY

GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 5 (2011) This policy position has been recently reaffirmed Makan Delrahim Assistant Attrsquoy Gen US Deprsquot of Justice Remarks at the Antitrust Divisionrsquos Sec-ond Roundtable on Competition and Deregulation (Apr 26 2018) wwwjusticegovopaspeech assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-antitrust-divisions-second

59 See FTCrsquoS MERGER REMEDIES 2006ndash2012 supra note 5 at 7 60 See Deborah L Feinstein Director Bureau of Competition Fed Trade Commrsquon Address

at GCR Live The Significance of Consent Orders in the Federal Trade Commissionrsquos Competi-tion Enforcement Efforts (Sept 17 2013)

61 See eg Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment In the Matter of The Coca-Cola Company 75 Fed Reg 61141 (Oct 4 2010)

62 Kwoka states that the agencies have increasingly employed conduct remedies See KWOKA supra note 1 at 134 The three cases he cites in supportmdashTicketmasterLiveNation Comcast NBCU and GoogleITAmdashinvolved the creation of market power primarily from vertical rather than horizontal consolidation See Competitive Impact Statement United States v Ticketmaster Entmrsquot Inc No 110-cv-00139 2010 WL 5699134 (DDC Jan 25 2010) wwwjusticegov atrcase-documentcompetitive-impact-statement-209 Competitive Impact Statement United States v Comcast Corp 808 F Supp 2d 145 (DDC Jan 18 2011) wwwjusticegovatrcase-documentcompetitive-impact-statement-72 Competitive Impact Statement United States v Google Inc No 111-cv-00688 (DDC Apr 18 2011) wwwjusticegovatrcase-document competitive-impact-statement-115


Scott GraphicsXidex (1976) This was one of the two consummated mergers studied by Barton and Sherman63 Earlier we discussed the Kal-varXidex case noting that Barton and Sherman studied pricing behav-ior post-merger but pre-remedy The identical observation applies for Scott GraphicsXidex as Barton and Shermanrsquos data spans 1973 to 1982 However the order requiring licensing of Scott Graphicsrsquo tech-nology did not become final and effective until 198364 This study pro-vides no information regarding the effectiveness of the FTCrsquos remedy because the remedy was outside the data window This remedy may well have been highly effective completely ineffective or something in between

DominicanAMI (1990) Kwoka also includes the DominicanAMI hos-pital merger in his sample studied by Michael Vita and Seth Sacher65

This also was a non-HSR reportable transaction consummated in 1990 prior to the FTCrsquos investigation After consummation the acquired hos-pital had been converted to a skilled nursing facility Accordingly re-storing the pre-merger state of competition was never an option as the FTC explained at the time66 For this reason the DominicanAMI merger provides an invalid basis for assessing agency policy for HSR-reviewable transactions

General MillsRalcorp (1997) In this HSR transaction Ralcorp sold its branded Chex cereals to General Mills The FTCrsquos remedy permitted Ralcorp to produce private label versions of these cereals We agree that this transaction constitutes a valid test of the effectiveness of a straight-forward conduct remedy in an HSR merger case and it is clear from the results in Ashenfelter and Hosken67 that this remedy was not effective

EvanstonHighland Park (2000) This merger was not reported under HSR and was consummated in 2000 without agency review The FTC

63 Barton amp Sherman supra note 37 64 The FTC required the royalty-free licensing of Scott Graphicsrsquo diazo microfilm technology

See id at 176 65 Vita amp Sacher supra note 7 66 See Dominican Santa Cruz Hosp 118 FTC 382 390ndash92 (1994) (statement of Chairman

Steiger) ldquo[T]he acquisition was not reportable under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and was con-summated before Commission staff was able to open an investigation to explore the competitive effects of the acquisition[] [C]onsequently the Commission never had the opportunity to con-sider seeking a preliminary injunction under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to prevent the acquisi-tion from being consummated Under these circumstances the Commission is left with less effective or more costly remedial optionsrdquo Id at 390ndash91 Because a possibility existed that timely competitive entry into the relevant market might occur and because forcing a divestiture faced a high risk of asset failure the FTC chose to impose a ldquoprior approvalrdquo remedy on Domini-canmdashthat is Dominican was barred (for 10 years) from acquiring any other hospitals in Santa Cruz County without first obtaining the approval of the FTC

67 Ashenfelter amp Hosken supra note 41


challenged the transaction in 2004 ultimately prevailing at trial in 2007 Because the integration of the two facilities occurred many years earlier the FTC concluded that divesting the acquired hospital would be too costly and risky and instead opted for a conduct remedy Kwoka relies on Deborah Haas-Wilson and Christopher Garmonrsquos analysis of the Ev-anstonHighland Park transaction68 The data period for this study was 1998 to 2002 As with the two Xidex mergers discussed previously the empirical analysis was post-merger but pre-remedy Thus Haas-Wilson and Garmon provide no evidence on the effectiveness of the FTCrsquos rem-edy and thus provides no support for Kwokarsquos conclusion that conduct remedies have been ineffective

With only four conduct remedy transactions in his sub-sample eliminating EvanstonHighland Park from Kwokarsquos sample would reduce substantially the overall average price increase (1603 percent) reported in Table 79 Haas-Wilson and Garmon reported large estimated average price effects from this transaction (20ndash35 percent depending on the choice of regression specifica-tion and control group)69

In conclusion of the four conduct remedies studied only one (General MillsRalcorp) provides any information about the effectiveness of the rem-edy in restoring the pre-merger state of competition in an HSR setting The other three studies involved consummated mergers and in two of those cases the studies provided no information about post-remedy competition and thus cannot support Kwokarsquos conclusion that conduct remedies are ineffective In the one study that did examine post-remedy competition (DominicanAMI) the FTC did not expect and did not claim that the remedy would restore the pre-merger level of competition We conclude that Kwoka provides virtually no support for his conclusion about the ineffectiveness of conduct remedies

It is unsurprising that Kwokarsquos sample contains only one transaction where either the FTC or DOJ attempted to remedy an HSR-reportable purely hori-zontal transaction with a conduct remedy As noted above the federal agen-cies prefer structural relief in horizontal mergers Conduct remedies normally supplement structural remedies resolve vertical competitive concerns and ad-dress other special circumstances The fact that the only relevant transaction in Kwokarsquos sample occurred in 1997 nearly 20 years ago reinforces that conduct relief is the exception rather than the norm in US merger policy

68 Deborah Haas-Wilson amp Christopher Garmon Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects Two Retrospective Analyses 18 INTrsquoL J ECON BUS 17 (2011)

69 See id at 27 tbl2


III KWOKArsquoS ESTIMATED PRICE EFFECTS METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The empirical core of Kwokarsquos book is a meta-analysis of the estimated merger-induced price effects presented in the studies that he surveys How-ever his analysis does not employ standard empirical methods because (a) he computes simple rather than weighted averages and (b) he does not use the standard methods of statistical inference

The goal of meta-analysis is to synthesize optimally and rigorously the findings of a series of empirical studies A standard text on the use of meta-analysis in economic research describes the basic approach

A simple (unweighted) average is often reported to summarize the findings from a literature However the weighted average effect size say an elastic-ity (hw)

hw = S(wihi)Swi

is statistically the preferred choice where the wi are the weights used and hi

is the measure of the estimated elasticity The optimal weights have been shown to be inverse of the estimatesrsquo variances70

To see how standard meta-analytic methods might have been applied to a set of retrospective merger analyses consider first a single retrospective study of a single merger in which competition in only one antitrust market might have been affected As explained by Kwoka in a ldquodifference-in-differencesrdquo analysis the researcher would estimate the following equation using pre- and post-merger price data on both the merged firms and ldquocontrolrdquo firms71

P = a + bMERGE + gPOST+ δMERGEPOST + e

where P is the firmrsquos price MERGE = 1 if the observation is for the merged entity 0 if it is for a control firm POST = 1 if the observation is from the post-merger period 0 otherwise and e is a random error term

In this analysis the parameter ldquoδrdquo is the estimated price effect of the merger Because this parameter is estimated from a sample of data there will be an associated estimated standard error that reflects the precision of the estimate If for example the price data exhibit substantial variation unrelated to the timing of the merger then this standard error will tend to be large making it difficult for the analyst to be confident that the estimated value of δ is capturing systematic differences in pre- and post-merger pricing behavior Using the estimated value of δ and its standard error the researcher normally

70 STANLEY amp DOUCOULIAGOS supra note 49 at 46 See also MARK W LIPSEY amp DAVID B WILSON PRACTICAL META-ANALYSIS 113 (2001) (ldquoThe mean effect size is computed by weight-ing each effect size by the inverse of its variancerdquo)

71 See KWOKA supra note 1 at 59


will test the hypothesis that prices remained the same after the merger versus the hypothesis that prices changed72

Now consider a set of merger retrospective studies Each study will produce its own estimated δ the estimated price effect of the merger that is the subject of the analysis Each study also will produce an estimate of the standard error of δ which is a measure of the precision of the estimate

A very basic meta-analysis of these studies would compute an average of these estimated δrsquos (call this average ldquoDrdquo since it is the average of the indi-vidual δrsquos) yielding an overall estimated average price effect The starting point in a basic meta-analysis would compute a weighted average of these δrsquos where each estimated δ would receive a weight reflecting its corresponding variance (equal to the square of the standard error)73 The logic for this weighting procedure is straightforward (and reflects standard econometric practice) estimates of δ that are imprecisely estimated (ie that have large standard errors and large variances) receive low weights while estimates of δ that are precisely estimated (ie small standard errors and small variances) receive larger weights74 As Stanley and Doucouliagos note this weighted av-erage is the preferred estimate of the overall effect ldquoA simple unweighted average will in most cases give a misleading measure of the effect sizerdquo75

The meta-analysis also would calculate a standard error for D which would be a function of the estimated standard errors of the δrsquos

Once these computations have been completed the analyst usually would then conduct formal hypothesis tests Here one would test the null hypothesis that D = 0 This is analogous to the test that is performed in each of the individual underlying studies where the chief objective of each study is to test the null hypothesis that δ = 0 that is the null hypothesis is that the merger did not cause a change in post-merger pricing A large positive or negative value for δ would count as evidence against this null hypothesis

Kwoka does not use any of these standard meta-analytic techniques He does not weight his observations by their estimated standard errors when he computes the price effects reported earlier in Table 176 The absence of

72 That is the researcher will test the hypothesis that δ = 0 against the alternative that δ ne 0 using a t-test where the test statistic equals δ(standard error of δ)

73 See STANLEY amp DOUCOUGLIAGOS supra note 49 at 46 74 This is the same estimation criterion employed by generalized least squares in the case of

pure heteroscedasticity See eg ARTHUR S GOLDBERGER A COURSE IN ECONOMETRICS

300ndash01 (1991) 75 See STANLEY amp DOUCOUGLIAGOS supra note 49 at 47 76 Kwoka does not appear to discuss explicitly how he weights his observations when comput-

ing these mean price effects See KWOKA supra note 1 However in his earlier meta-analysis of merger effects Kwoka states that the method used in that article ldquogives each study of a particular transaction equal weightrdquo See John E Kwoka Jr Does Merger Control Work A Retrospective


weighting by standard error means that imprecise estimates of price effects receive the same weight as sharply estimated effects which is a substantial departure from standard meta-analytic (and econometric) methodology

More importantly Kwoka does not provide any estimated standard errors for his estimated average price effects This makes hypothesis testingmdashthe primary objective of all the underlying empirical studies in his samplemdashim-possible One would like to see tests of the null hypothesis that the price effects reported above in Table 1 are equal to zero or that they are equal to one another The absence of standard errors makes this impossible

To illustrate the potential importance of computing a weighted versus an unweighted average consider the following example Suppose one wished to conduct a meta-analysis of three merger retrospectives with the following esti-mated price changes (the δrsquos from the equation above) and corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) minus5 (25) 10 (55) and 20 (16) A simple unweighted average of the three studies would yield an overall average price effect of 83 percent By contrast an ldquoinverse variancerdquo weighted aver-agemdashwhereby parameter estimates with small variances (ie greater preci-sion) receive greater weightmdashis negative 199 percent rather than positive 83 percent77 The standard error of this overall average can then be easily calcu-lated allowing the researcher to conduct hypothesis tests and to construct con-fidence intervals78 In this example the standard error of the unweighted mean in 569 while the standard error of the weighted mean is considerably smaller (232) reflecting the fact that the latter has made efficient use of the informa-tion in the sample to estimate more precisely the mean effect79

The procedure described in this example assumes implicitly that the only relevant variance is the ldquowithin-studyrdquo variance as measured by the standard error on each δ That is the procedure assumes that the true value of δ in each study is the same with the estimated values differing only because of sam-

on US Enforcement Actions and Merger Outcomes 78 ANTITRUST LJ 619 630 (2013) We assume that the same method was used in the book See KWOKA supra note 1

77 The formula for the simple ldquoinverse variancerdquo average estimate is S (w(i)b(i)Sw(i) where the weights (w(i)) are the estimated variances of the estimated price changes (b(i)) from the individual studies [= 1[SE(b(i)]2] In this example this average is computed as (125)2 -5)] + [(155)2 10)] + [(116)2 20)] [(125)2 + [(155)2 + (116)2] See LIPSEY amp WILSON supra note 70 at 114 STANLEY amp DOUCOUGLIAGOS supra note 49 at 46

78 The variance of this mean equals 1[(125)2 + [(155)2 + (116)2] = 538 The standard error is the square root of this variance and equals 232

79 Many standard software packages (eg Stata) include commands specifically for this pur-pose See eg Ross J Harris et al Metan Fixed- and Random-Effects Meta-Analysis 8 STATA

J 3 (2008)


pling error80 Typically however there also will be variance in the true val-ues of δ across the studies in the meta-analysis That is surely true here given that the studies reviewed by Kwoka cover many different industries in many different time periods There is no expectation that all would experience simi-lar merger-induced price changes

It is straightforward to incorporate this additional source of variance into the meta-analysis81 Essentially the weight assigned to each study is adjusted to take account of not just the within-sample variation (as reflected in the reported standard errors for the δrsquos) but also the between-study variation in the δrsquos Compared to the example given above where the weight applied to each study was 1variance(δ) the new weight would equal 1[variance(δ) + T2] where T2 is a measure of the across-study variance in the δrsquos82 The esti-mated variance of the overall mean effect (ie D) also will be adjusted to take account of this additional source of variance

As noted Kwoka does not report any standard errors for his estimated price effects which makes it impossible to test hypotheses about these effects83

However he does provide evidence that there is substantial variation both across different studies as well as within individual studies Had this variation been taken properly into account it is plausible (if not likely) that the result-ing average price effects would differ from those reported in Table 1 It also is plausible if not likely that the estimated standard errors for these averages would be substantial with obvious implications for hypothesis tests about the value of D

For price effects estimated at the transaction level Kwoka reports price changes ranging from -163 percent to 294 percent84 For price effects esti-mated at the product level the estimates range from -163 percent to 524 percent85 Thirteen of the 49 transactions (more than one quarter of his data sample) exhibit a price decrease86

At the product level 46 of the 119 products (about 387 percent) in his database exhibit post-merger price decreases87 The mean product-level price

80 In the terminology of meta-analysis this assumption is known as the ldquofixed effectsrdquo model See LIPSEY amp WILSON supra note 70 at 116 STANLEY amp DOUCOUGLIAGOS supra note 49 at 46

81 In the terminology of meta-analysis this assumption is known as the ldquorandom effectsrdquo model See STANLEY amp DOUCOUGLIAGOS supra note 49 at 46

82 See id 83 KWOKA supra note 1 84 Id at 110 tbl71 85 Id at 94 tbl64 86 Id at 110 tbl71 87 Id at 94 tbl64


effect is 431 percent compared to a median of only 08 percent88 suggesting a distribution with a small number of large price increases89 Indeed Kwoka states that 31 percent of the product-level price changes are clustered in the +- 1 percent range90

In other words Kwokarsquos sample of 49 transactions exhibits a considerable range of positive and negative price effects with many near zero Nonethe-less Table 1 above shows that Kwoka calculates substantial average (un-weighted) price increases for all six categories of agency actions91 This invites the conjecture that his unweighted averages depend critically on a small number of studies reporting substantial price increases and that the cal-culated values of these averages would not be robust to the application of alternative (but standard) weighting choices One also questions whether one would reject the null hypothesis that D = 0 had D and its standard error been estimated using standard meta-analytic procedures

IV HAVE THE FEDERAL AGENCIES BECOME ldquoMORE LENIENTrdquo OVER TIME

Kwoka criticizes the antitrust agencies not only because of (in his view) ineffective merger enforcement but also because he believes the agencies have become increasingly lenient over time Does his evidence support his conclusion

Kwokalsquos characterization of increased enforcement leniency relies princi-pally on a tabulation of enforcement actions by decade for all transactions and for mergers separately Using only the data for ldquoall transactionsrdquo he then calculates the proportion of actions cleared performing a large sample ldquoequal-ity of proportionsrdquo test to assess whether the 1980s and 2000s percentages differ Table 2 presents the results of his tabulations for both a ldquonarrowrdquo defi-nition of ldquoclearedrdquo (only when the agencies explicitly clear a transaction) ver-sus an ldquoexpandedrdquo definition (which includes cases with no explicit approval statement from the agencies)92 Using the first column of Table 2 Kwoka compares the proportion of cases cleared in the 1980s (0 of 5 = zero) to the

88 Id at 95 89 Lipsey and Wilson warn of the risk that outliers could distort the outcome of a meta-analy-

sis ldquoThe purpose of a meta-analysis is to arrive a reasonable summary of the quantitative find-ings of a body of research studies This purpose is not usually served well by the inclusion of extreme effect size values that are notably discrepant from the preponderance of those found in the research of interest and hence unrepresentative of the results of that research and possibly even spurious In addition extreme effect size values have disproportionate influence on the values of means variances and other statistics used in meta-analysis and may distort them in misleading waysrdquo LIPSEY amp WILSON supra note 70 at 107

90 See KWOKA supra note 1 at 95 91 Id at 120 tbl79 92 These data are taken from Kwokarsquos Tables 75 and 76 See id at 116ndash17


proportion cleared in the 2000s (3 of 7 = 043) A large sample test of the hypothesis that the two proportions are equal yields a p-value of 00993 Based on this Kwoka concludes the data show a ldquomore accommodating policy that reflects a bona fide policy changerdquo94

TABLE 2 KWOKA SUMMARY OF AGENCY DECISIONS TO

ldquoCLEARrdquo TRANSACTIONS BY DECADE95

Narrow definition of ldquoclearedrdquo

Expanded definition of ldquoclearedrdquo

All Transactions

Mergers only

All Transactions

Mergers only

1980s 05 05 510 510

2000s 37 36 48 47

Asymptotic test of equal proportions p-values

p = 009 p = 06 p = 10 p = 078

Fisherrsquos Exact Test of equal proportions p-values

p = 021 p = 018 p = 100 p = 100

Table cell entries in rows 1 and 2 are the number of cases ldquoclearedrdquo divided by the total number of cases Under the narrow definition of ldquoclearedrdquo cases are included only if the agency publicly announced that it was closing the investigation of the transaction without an enforcement action For the ex-panded definition any case lacking an enforcement action is considered cleared even if there was no public announcement from the agency

We note first that the ldquoequality of proportionsrdquo statistical test used by Kwoka assumes an (asymptotically) normal distribution While asymptotic as-sumptions of normality are valid in large samples this assumption is likely invalid for small samples (such as the sample we have here) A superior alter-native for small samples is ldquoFisherrsquos Exact Testrdquo which does not rely on asymptotic approximations to the normal distribution96 As shown in the bot-

93 Kwoka reports a significance level of 0055 See id at 117 However he appears to have made an error in his calculation the actual p-value is approximately 009

94 Id 95 These figures are from Kwokarsquos Tables 75 and 76 See id at 116ndash17 96 In large samples (eg where the number of observations is at least 30) one can use the

normal probability distribution to test hypotheses about the equality of proportions in different populations But when sample sizes are small as they are here the preferred statistical test of the null hypothesis of equal proportions would use Fisherrsquos Exact Test which does not rely on asymptotic approximations to the normal distribution See JOHN H MCDONALD HANDBOOK OF

BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS 77 (3d ed 2014)


tom row of Table 2 Fisherrsquos Exact Test yields a p-value of 021 using Kwokarsquos ldquonarrowrdquo sample which fails to reject (at conventional levels of significance) the null hypothesis of no differences between the 1980s and 2000s One reaches the same conclusion when one conducts a test of this null hypothesis using the data in column 2 of Table 2 which computes these pro-portions using data for mergers only the relevant p-value is 018 which leads to acceptance of the null hypothesis at conventional levels of significance

This technical point about large sample versus small sample tests aside a more important criticism is that Kwoka only performed his test on the data from the first column of Table 2 ie all transactions using a narrow defini-tion of cleared However Kwoka presents an additional set of figures using a more broad (and we would argue more appropriate) definition of cleared97

reported in the last two columns of Table 2 When one compares the propor-tion of cleared cases in the 1980s to the proportion for the 2000s (using Fisherrsquos Exact Test) one accepts the null hypothesis that the proportions were equal in the two decades Using Kwokarsquos alternate definition of cleared his conclusion that the two decades differ lacks statistical support

Other sections of Kwokarsquos book also undermine his conclusion that en-forcement has become more lenient Specifically Kwoka Table 21098 sum-marizes FTC data from Coate99 reporting the percentage of FTC HSR merger investigations resulting in enforcement actions100 Figure 1 graphs these data showing the percentage of merger investigations resulting in enforcement ac-tions is higher in every year during the 2000s relative to 1989 the only year from the 1980s for which Coate provides data More importantly the percent-age of cases with enforcement actions has increased every year since 2004 This does not support the proposition that federal agency policy has become more lenient over time

97 There is no meaningful difference between those cleared transactions that were accompa-nied by a public statement from the agencies and those that were not

98 See KWOKA supra note 1 at 34 99 Malcolm B Coate Merger Policy at the Federal Trade Commission What Changes What

Stays the Same (Sept 30 2013) (unpublished manuscript) papersssrncomsol3paperscfm abstract_id=2262933

100 The numerator consists of mergers that either were (1) challenged in court (2) approved conditional on a negotiated settlement or (3) abandoned after the FTC announced its intention to challenge in court The denominator is all merger cases where the FTC issued a ldquosecond re-questrdquo This does not include matters remedied through consent without issuance of a second request

1989

-90

1991

-92

1993

-94

1995

-96

1997

-98

1999

-200

0

2001

-02

2003

-04

2000

5-06

2007

-08

2009

-10

2011

-12


90

Percent of horizontal mergers enforced

Number of second requests

100

80 90

80 70

70

Per

cent

mer

gers

enf

orce

d 60

60

50

50

40

40

Num

ber

of s

econ

d re

ques

ts

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0

Fiscal Year

FIGURE 1 PERCENT OF MERGERS INVESTIGATIONS WITH ENFORCEMENT

ACTIONS 1989ndash2012101

One can also assess whether ldquorecent merger control has not been suffi-ciently aggressiverdquo102 by examining the recent cases contained in Kwokarsquos sample which consists of the following seven mergers during the 2000s

ExxonMobil (2000) This merger was approved subject to asset divesti-tures As described earlier GAO found a post-merger post-remedy price increase using a disputed methodology Applying a more accepted methodology the FTC found very different results

EvanstonHighland Park (2000) As described earlier the underlying ac-ademic study does not analyze the impact of the remedy in this non-HSR reportable transaction but rather examines the effect of the merger in the period immediately following the merger but before the remedy The FTC challenged this consummated merger in court ultimately suc-ceeding in 2007

VictoryProvena St Therese (2000) This hospital merger also fell be-low HSR thresholds and thus was investigated by the FTC post-con-

101 Coate supra note 99 at 37 Note that in 2001 the Hart-Scott-Rodino thresholds were re-vised upwards (the $150 million filing threshold increased to $500 million inflation adjusted) which accounts for the subsequent decline in second requests



summation Ultimately the FTC did not find sufficient evidence to challenge it As Kwoka notes the underlying academic study by Haas-Wilson and Garmon103 finds that this merger resulted in lower prices

SunocoEl Paso (2004) Sunoco purchased a New Jersey petroleum re-finery from El Paso The FTC concluded that the merger would not create market power because sufficient alternative sources of reformu-lated gasoline were available Silvia and Taylor104 found that this acqui-sition did not increase prices

ValeroPremcor (2004) Valero acquired petroleum refiner Premcor making Valero the largest refiner of crude oil in the United States with a 13 percent share Silvia and Taylor105 found that this merger did not increase prices

JampJPfizer (2006) As described earlier this merger was cleared subject to a remedy that Tenn amp Yun106 found to be effective

WhirlpoolMaytag (2006) Whirlpool and Maytag were two of the four largest domestic appliance manufacturers The DOJ approved the merger in 2006 Ashenfelter Hosken and Weinberg107 find differing levels of price effects across types of appliances with the largest in-creases in dishwashers and clothes dryers

In summary of the seven mergers in the 2000s that Kwoka analyzes four exhibited no increase in post-merger (or post-remedy) prices (Victory Provena SunocoEl Paso ValeroPremcor JampJPfizer) one had disputed re-sults (ExxonMobil) one represented a successful challenge to a consum-mated merger (EvanstonHighland Park) leaving only one (Whirlpool Maytag) indicative of potentially lax enforcement

This evidence does not support a conclusion that recent merger enforce-ment policy has been insufficiently aggressive If anything it highlights a flaw in Kwokarsquos analysis he examines only the number of agency actions by decade without consideration of the mergersrsquo effects As shown above all but one cleared merger in the 2000s exhibited neutral or ambiguous price effects Simply comparing the prevalence of enforcement actions by decade implicitly assumes a comparable risk of potential competitive harm over time As noted

103 Haas-Wilson amp Garmon supra note 68 104 Silvia amp Taylor supra note 47 105 Id 106 Tenn amp Yun supra note 53 107 Orley C Ashenfelter Daniel Hosken amp Matthew C Weinberg The Price Effects of a Large

Merger of Manufacturers A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool AM ECON J ECON POLrsquoY Feb 2013 at 239


earlier108 Kwoka has stated elsewhere that the nature of mergers has changed rendering transactions as recent as the 1990s a poor basis for assessing current policy It remains unclear why he deems appropriate a comparison of 1980s and 2000s

V CONCLUSION

Kwokarsquos 2015 book provides a useful overview of merger policy as well as a valuable review of the academic literature on merger retrospectives One should not underestimate the effort required to canvas 30 years of academic publications

We support the goal of using retrospective analyses to assess the perform-ance of the antitrust agencies and to identify possible improvements Unfortu-nately Kwoka has drawn inferences and reached conclusions about contemporary federal merger enforcement policy that are unjustified by his data and his methods His critique of negotiated remedies in merger cases relies on a small number of transactions a close reading reveals that a number of them are silent on the effectiveness of the associated remedies His data sample lacks diversity relying heavily on a small number of studies con-ducted on a small and unrepresentative set of industries His statistical meth-odology departs from well-established techniques for conducting meta-analyses making it impossible for readers to assess the strength of his evi-dence using standard statistical tools His conclusions about the growing per-missiveness of enforcement policies lack substantiation Overall we are unpersuaded that his evidence can support such broad and general policy conclusions

None of this is to claim that contemporary antitrust enforcement is in any sense perfect Antitrust enforcers invariably will make mistakes and agencies like the FTC engage in a continuous process of self-assessment and self-im-provement Indeed many of the studies in Kwokarsquos sample were conducted by FTC economists and the FTC recently released its second large-scale as-sessment of its merger remedies109

We agree with Kwoka that the benefits of additional merger retrospectives would outweigh the costs His book ldquoprovides a compelling argument for the value of merger retrospectives and certainly for doing more of themrdquo110 Look-ing ahead we anticipate that the retrospective merger analysis will continue to figure prominently in the FTCrsquos research agenda and we hope the same is true of the academic community

108 Kwoka Comment on Merger Remedies supra note 26 109 See FTCrsquoS MERGER REMEDIES 2006ndash2012 supra note 5 110 See KWOKA supra note 1 at 160


APPENDIX

KWOKA TABLE 62 LIST OF SINGLE MERGERS IN PRICE DATABASE

Transaction Transaction Firm 1 Firm 2 (3) type year

Scott Graphics Xidex Merger 1976 Kalvar Xidex Merger 1979 Weyerhaeuser Menasha Merger 1980 SCM Gulf amp Western Merger 1983 Lone Star Industries Kaiser Cement Merger 1985 Northwest Airlines Republic Airlines Merger 1986 Ozark Airlines Trans World Airlines Merger 1986 Texas Air People Express Merger 1987 Delta Airlines Western Airlines Merger 1987 USAir Piedmont Aviation Merger 1987 Dominican Santa Cruz AMI-Community Hospital Merger 1990

Hospital Wolters Kluwer Lippincott Merger 1990 Reed Elsevier Pergamom Merger 1991 Continental Airlines America West Airlines Code share 1994 Northwest Airlines Alaska Airlines Code share 1994 Burlington Northern Santa Fe Pacific Merger 1995 Thomson Shepardrsquos Merger 1995 Wolters Kluwer CCH Merger 1995 Reed Elsevier West Publishing (divested) Merger 1996 Thomson West Publishing Merger 1995 Union Pacific Southern Pacific Merger 1995 Wolters Kluwer Little Brown Merger 1996 Aurora Foods Kraftrsquos Breakfast Syrup Merger 1997 General Mills Ralcorp Merger 1997 Guinness Grand Metropolitan Merger 1997 Proctor and Gamble Tambrands Merger 1997 Tosco Unocal Merger 1997 UDS Total Merger 1997 Wolters Kluwer Thomson Waverly Plenum Merger 1997 BP Amoco Merger 1998 Harcourt Churchill Livingstone Mosby Merger 1998 Marathon Oil Ashland Joint Venture 1998 New Hanover Regional Columbia Cape Fear Merger 1998

Medical Center Memorial Hospital Pennzoil Quaker State Merger 1998 Reed Elsevier Matthew Bender Merger 1998 Shell Oil Texaco Joint Venture 1998 Shell Oil Star Enterprises Joint Venture 1998 Continental Airlines Northwest Airlines Code share 1999 Fleet Financial BankBoston Merger 1999 MAP UDS Merger 1999 Sutter Summit Medical Center Merger 1999



Exxon Mobil Merger 2000 Evanston Northwestern Highland Park Merger 2000

Healthcare Provena St Therese Victory Memorial Hospital Merger 2000

Medical Center Delta Northwest Continental Code share 2003 Sunoco El Paso Eagle Point Merger 2004 Valero Energy Premcor Merger 2004 Johnson amp Johnson Pfizer Merger 2006 Maytag Whirlpool Merger 2006

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enforcement actions The FTC has a longstanding culture of reflection and self-assessment indeed current or former FTC Bureau of Economics (BE) staff authored many of the studies in Kwokarsquos survey4 The FTC recently released its second major assessment of its merger remedies5 the first was released in 19996 Retrospective studies of consummated mergers have in-creased the FTCrsquos antitrust knowledge base and have helped it improve en-forcement accuracy by providing valuable insights into when merger policy has worked and when it has not

For example after a series of unsuccessful hospital merger challenges FTC Chairman Timothy Muris launched the Hospital Merger Retrospective Project in 2002 which contributed to the FTCrsquos recent successes in challenging harm-ful hospital mergers7 More generally as Orley Ashenfelter et al have noted prior to the publication of merger retrospectives in the academic literature there was virtually no empirical evidence on the actual competitive effects of horizontal mergers8 Retrospective analyses also help the agencies assess and improve the empirical tools used for prospective merger enforcement9 We

4 In addition to studying mergers retrospectively FTC staff also have studied the effects of nonmerger activity retrospectively See BUREAU OF COMPETITION amp BUREAU OF ECON FED TRADE COMMrsquoN IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

CASES (Ronald N Lafferty et al eds 1984) 5 BUREAU OF COMPETITION amp BUREAU OF ECON FED TRADE COMMrsquoN THE FTCrsquoS MERGER

REMEDIES 2006ndash2012 (2017) [hereinafter FTCrsquoS MERGER REMEDIES 2006ndash2012] 6 BUREAU OF COMPETITION FED TRADE COMMrsquoN A STUDY OF THE COMMISSIONrsquoS DIVESTI-

TURE PROCESS (1999) 7 See Deborah Haas-Wilson amp Michael Vita Mergers Between Competing Hospitals Les-

sons from Retrospective Analyses 18 INTrsquoL J ECON BUS 1 (2011) see also Orley Ashenfelter et al Retrospective Analysis of Hospital Mergers 18 INTrsquoL J ECON BUS 5 (2011) Since the completion of this project the FTC has enjoyed a string of successes either successful litigation or transactions abandoned after the issuance of an FTC complaint See eg FTC v Penn St Med Ctr 838 F3d 327 (3d Cir 2016) FTC v Advocate Health Care Network 841 F3d 460 (7th Cir 2016) Promedica Health Sys Inc v FTC 749 F3d 559 (6th Cir 2014) FTC v OSF Healthcare Sys 852 F Supp 2d 1069 (ND Ill 2012) Order Dismissing Complaint Reading Health Sys FTC Docket No 9353 (Dec 7 2012) Decision and Order Carilion Clinic FTC Docket No 9338 (Nov 23 2009) Order Dismissing Complaint Inova Health Sys Found FTC Docket No 9326 (June 17 2008) In Advocate the appellate court cited published FTC hospital merger retrospectives Advocate 841 F3d at 470 472 (citing Steven Tenn The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction 18 INTrsquoL J ECON BUS 65 (2011) Aileen Thompson The Effect of Hospital Mergers on Inpatient Prices A Case Study of the New Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction 18 INTrsquoL J ECON BUS 91 (2011) Michael G Vita amp Seth Sacher The Competitive Effects of Not-for-Profit Hospital Mergers A Case Study 49 J INDUS ECON 63 (2001))

8 Orley Ashenfelter et al Generating Evidence to Guide Merger Enforcement 5 COMPETI-

TION POLrsquoY INTrsquoL 57 58 (2009) 9 See Craig Peters Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation Evidence from the

US Airline Industry 49 JL amp ECON 627 (2006) Matthew C Weinberg amp Daniel Hosken Evidence on the Accuracy of Merger Simulations 95 REV ECON amp STAT 1584 (2013) Christo-pher Garmon The Accuracy of Hospital Merger Screening Methods (Fed Trade Commrsquon Working Paper No 326 2016)
























Agency Action


(Kwoka Table 79)

Number of Mergers

(Kwoka Table 74)







715 22




































(1969)





















































57 Id at 120


































hw = S(wihi)Swi






























J 3 (2008)


























All Transactions

Mergers only

All Transactions

Mergers only

1980s 05 05 510 510

2000s 37 36 48 47


p = 009 p = 06 p = 10 p = 078


p = 021 p = 018 p = 100 p = 100
















1989

-90

1991

-92

1993

-94

1995

-96

1997

-98

1999

-200

0

2001

-02

2003

-04

2000

5-06

2007

-08

2009

-10

2011

-12


90



100

80 90

80 70

70

Per

cent

mer

gers

enf

orce

d 60

60

50

50

40

40

Num

ber

of s

econ

d re

ques

ts

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0

Fiscal Year





















V CONCLUSION







APPENDIX











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[1200 1200] PageSize [612000 792000]gtgt setpagedevice
























Agency Action


(Kwoka Table 79)

Number of Mergers

(Kwoka Table 74)







715 22




































(1969)





















































57 Id at 120


































hw = S(wihi)Swi






























J 3 (2008)


























All Transactions

Mergers only

All Transactions

Mergers only

1980s 05 05 510 510

2000s 37 36 48 47


p = 009 p = 06 p = 10 p = 078


p = 021 p = 018 p = 100 p = 100
















1989

-90

1991

-92

1993

-94

1995

-96

1997

-98

1999

-200

0

2001

-02

2003

-04

2000

5-06

2007

-08

2009

-10

2011

-12


90



100

80 90

80 70

70

Per

cent

mer

gers

enf

orce

d 60

60

50

50

40

40

Num

ber

of s

econ

d re

ques

ts

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0

Fiscal Year





















V CONCLUSION







APPENDIX









































(1969)





















































57 Id at 120


































hw = S(wihi)Swi






























J 3 (2008)


























All Transactions

Mergers only

All Transactions

Mergers only

1980s 05 05 510 510

2000s 37 36 48 47


p = 009 p = 06 p = 10 p = 078


p = 021 p = 018 p = 100 p = 100
















1989

-90

1991

-92

1993

-94

1995

-96

1997

-98

1999

-200

0

2001

-02

2003

-04

2000

5-06

2007

-08

2009

-10

2011

-12


90



100

80 90

80 70

70

Per

cent

mer

gers

enf

orce

d 60

60

50

50

40

40

Num

ber

of s

econ

d re

ques

ts

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0

Fiscal Year





















V CONCLUSION







APPENDIX
































































57 Id at 120


































hw = S(wihi)Swi






























J 3 (2008)


























All Transactions

Mergers only

All Transactions

Mergers only

1980s 05 05 510 510

2000s 37 36 48 47


p = 009 p = 06 p = 10 p = 078


p = 021 p = 018 p = 100 p = 100
















1989

-90

1991

-92

1993

-94

1995

-96

1997

-98

1999

-200

0

2001

-02

2003

-04

2000

5-06

2007

-08

2009

-10

2011

-12


90



100

80 90

80 70

70

Per

cent

mer

gers

enf

orce

d 60

60

50

50

40

40

Num

ber

of s

econ

d re

ques

ts

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0

Fiscal Year





















V CONCLUSION







APPENDIX













































hw = S(wihi)Swi






























J 3 (2008)


























All Transactions

Mergers only

All Transactions

Mergers only

1980s 05 05 510 510

2000s 37 36 48 47


p = 009 p = 06 p = 10 p = 078


p = 021 p = 018 p = 100 p = 100
















1989

-90

1991

-92

1993

-94

1995

-96

1997

-98

1999

-200

0

2001

-02

2003

-04

2000

5-06

2007

-08

2009

-10

2011

-12


90



100

80 90

80 70

70

Per

cent

mer

gers

enf

orce

d 60

60

50

50

40

40

Num

ber

of s

econ

d re

ques

ts

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0

Fiscal Year





















V CONCLUSION







APPENDIX

































J 3 (2008)


























All Transactions

Mergers only

All Transactions

Mergers only

1980s 05 05 510 510

2000s 37 36 48 47


p = 009 p = 06 p = 10 p = 078


p = 021 p = 018 p = 100 p = 100
















1989

-90

1991

-92

1993

-94

1995

-96

1997

-98

1999

-200

0

2001

-02

2003

-04

2000

5-06

2007

-08

2009

-10

2011

-12


90



100

80 90

80 70

70

Per

cent

mer

gers

enf

orce

d 60

60

50

50

40

40

Num

ber

of s

econ

d re

ques

ts

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0

Fiscal Year





















V CONCLUSION







APPENDIX





































All Transactions

Mergers only

All Transactions

Mergers only

1980s 05 05 510 510

2000s 37 36 48 47


p = 009 p = 06 p = 10 p = 078


p = 021 p = 018 p = 100 p = 100
















1989

-90

1991

-92

1993

-94

1995

-96

1997

-98

1999

-200

0

2001

-02

2003

-04

2000

5-06

2007

-08

2009

-10

2011

-12


90



100

80 90

80 70

70

Per

cent

mer

gers

enf

orce

d 60

60

50

50

40

40

Num

ber

of s

econ

d re

ques

ts

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0

Fiscal Year





















V CONCLUSION







APPENDIX





















1989

-90

1991

-92

1993

-94

1995

-96

1997

-98

1999

-200

0

2001

-02

2003

-04

2000

5-06

2007

-08

2009

-10

2011

-12


90



100

80 90

80 70

70

Per

cent

mer

gers

enf

orce

d 60

60

50

50

40

40

Num

ber

of s

econ

d re

ques

ts

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0

Fiscal Year





















V CONCLUSION







APPENDIX
























V CONCLUSION







APPENDIX













APPENDIX












john kwoka's mergers, merger control, and …...callison, tim deyak, nathan wilson, dave...

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