joint publication 1 - bits00).pdfpreface i 1. scope joint publication 1 is the capstone joint...

14 November 2000

Joint Warfareof the Armed Forcesof the United States

Joint Publication 1

Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates, serves as the capstone publication for all US joint doctrine. Thisrevision represents the evolution in our warfighting guidance since the lastedition — including sections on consideration for the use of force, interagencyoperations, and multinational operations. This publication also includes anexpanded scope that bridges the gap among the national, strategic, andoperational levels.

JP 1 now ties joint doctrine to the national security strategy and nationalmilitary strategy and describes the military’s role in the development of nationalpolicy and strategy. It provides the linkage between joint doctrine and thecontribution of other government agencies and multinational endeavors. JP 1sets forth the concepts, relationships, and processes necessary for unifiedaction of joint, interagency, and multinational operations. This publicationalso addresses the importance of doctrine in the development of futureconcepts and capabilities, since joint doctrine provides the foundation foraddressing the future.

Most of all, JP 1 is about the employment of the Armed Forces as an instrumentof national power, with the enduring theme — joint warfare is team warfare.The philosophy is reflected throughout this publication, from the mindsetand attitudes described in joint values through the guidance on fundamentalsof joint operations. It is the attitude of the team approach, established on thefoundation of joint doctrine that is universally understood and practiced, thatensures the most effective employment of our Armed Forces.

The knowledge and use of joint doctrine positions us for success in fightingthe Nation’s wars — where winning is the only choice. To that end,commanders must understand, teach, and apply joint doctrine as they prepareand train the Nation’s Service men and women for joint force employment.

Please ensure the widest distribution of this and the other supporting jointpublications, promoting their use at every opportunity.

HENRY H. SHELTONChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

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1. Scope

Joint Publication 1 is the capstone jointdoctrine publication. It guides the ArmedForces of the United States in joint,multinational, and interagency activities at alllevels across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

The Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucialroles, defending the United States against alladversaries and serving the Republic as abulwark and the guarantors of itsindependence. When called to action, theysupport and defend national interestsworldwide. The Armed Forces embody thehighest values and standards of Americansociety and the profession of arms. They fulfilltheir roles, missions, and functions within theAmerican system of civil-military relations.They serve under the civilian control of thePresident who is the Commander in Chief.

The nature of the challenges to the UnitedStates and its interests in the contemporarysecurity environment demand that the ArmedForces operate as a fully integrated joint teamin combat and noncombat operations. Theseoperations often take place with forces of alliesand coalition partners, and with US andforeign governmental and nongovernmentalnonmilitary agencies. The challenges are bestmet when the unified action of the ArmedForces elicits the maximum effect from theunique but complementary capabilities of eachService and command, and from the synergythat results from their synchronized andintegrated action.

Joint warfare is team warfare.Effectively integrated joint forces expose noweak points or seams to an adversary, whilethey rapidly and efficiently find and engagethose adversary weak points and

vulnerabilities that assure missionaccomplishment. This does not mean that allforces will be equally represented in eachoperation. Joint force commanders maychoose the capabilities they need from the air,land, sea, space, and special operations forcesat their disposal.

3. Application

This publication is written to assistmembers of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates to operate successfully together. Thejoint team is comprised of the members ofeach Service, active and reserve, as well asassociated civilians in the supportinggovernmental and private sector workforces.The guidance in this publication is broad andauthoritative. It requires a leader’s judgmentin application. This doctrine will be followedexcept when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise.

The Services have the principalresponsibility to organize, train, equip, andsustain forces. These forces are employedunder joint force commanders. Therefore, toassure that the Armed Forces achieve theirfullest potential, all American military leadersmust integrate the content of this publicationinto their efforts to develop leaders and trainforces for joint, multinational, and interagencyoperations.

Service skills form the very core of USmilitary capability. Joint warfare relies uponService traditions, cohesion, and expertise.Successful joint operations are made possibleby the capabilities developed and embodiedin each Service, including Service “cultures,”heroes, and professional standards. TheArmed Forces of the United States continueto build on the tradition of joint victory in warthat began with the Revolutionary War.

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Preface

JP 1

The Armed Forces of the United States faceunparalleled challenges to US interests aroundthe world, unlike nations whose militaryforces can concentrate on a more limited rangeof operational environments. This means thatjoint forces must master multifacetedconditions in conducting successful unifiedaction. The chapters that follow describe theprinciples for forming, training, andemploying joint teams in unified action at alllevels across the range of military operations.These broad principles that guide operationsare neither policy nor strategy — they are

doctrine. The principles apply to actionundertaken by the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates to execute applicable national policies,as well as the contemporary national securityand military strategies.

Today, joint action is practiced and routine.The key to maintaining and enhancing jointforce effectiveness is the military leader’sdiligence in studying, applying, teaching, andultimately improving joint doctrine, whichprovides the foundation for joint warfare.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER IFUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

• National Security — Developing Strategy and Policy ............................................... I-1• The Political Context ................................................................................................ I-4• Instruments of National Power .................................................................................. I-5• The Role of Doctrine — “An Engine of Change” ...................................................... I-8

CHAPTER IITHE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

• Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1• Threats to US Interests ............................................................................................. II-1• Assessing the National Strategic Situation ................................................................ II-3• Operations and Conflict Termination ........................................................................ II-5

CHAPTER IIIUNITED STATES MILITARY POWER

• The Purpose of the Military .................................................................................... III-1• National Military Objectives .................................................................................. III-1• Core Military Competencies ................................................................................... III-2• Joint Warfighting ................................................................................................... III-3• Conclusion ............................................................................................................ III-17

CHAPTER IVTHE APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER

• Considerations for the Use of Military Force .......................................................... IV-1• National Military Strategy ...................................................................................... IV-3• Enduring Concepts ................................................................................................. IV-6• Enduring Enablers .................................................................................................. IV-8

CHAPTER VFUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

• Elements of Joint Operational Art ........................................................................... V-1• The Campaign ......................................................................................................... V-4• Unified Command and Theater Strategies ............................................................... V-6• Unified Action ........................................................................................................ V-7• Command Relationships ......................................................................................... V-7

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Table of Contents

JP 1

CHAPTER VIFUNDAMENTALS OF INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

• The Interagency Process and Participants ............................................................... VI-1• Interagency Coordination ....................................................................................... VI-2• Command Relationships ........................................................................................ VI-4• Organizing for Interagency Operations ................................................................... VI-4• JTF Interagency Operations ................................................................................... VI-6

CHAPTER VIIFUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

• Overview .............................................................................................................. VII-1• Definition and Types of Multinational Operations ................................................. VII-1• Strategic Context ................................................................................................... VII-2• Considerations ...................................................................................................... VII-6

CHAPTER VIIIADDRESSING THE FUTURE

• Identifying Future Challenges .............................................................................. VIII-1• Preparing for Change and the Future .................................................................... VIII-3• Transforming the Force ........................................................................................ VIII-4

APPENDIX

A The Strategic Estimate ...................................................................................... A-1B Principles of War ............................................................................................... B-1C Principles of Military Operations Other Than War ............................................. C-1D Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... D-1

FIGURE

I-1 National Security Planning Processes ............................................................. I-3I-2 Instruments of National Power ....................................................................... I-6III-1 Joint Warfare Values .................................................................................... III-4III-2 Principles of War ......................................................................................... III-8III-3 Principles of MOOTW ................................................................................ III-8III-4 Joint Warfare Fundamentals ........................................................................ III-8III-5 Range of Military Operations ..................................................................... III-15IV-1 Considerations for Use of Military Force ..................................................... IV-2IV-2 Enduring Concepts and Enablers ................................................................. IV-9V-1 Elements of Operational Art ......................................................................... V-2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Fundamental Concepts

Guides the Joint Action of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates

Describes the Strategic Security Environment

Explores the Purpose of American Military Power and ItsCore Competencies

Provides Considerations for the Application of MilitaryForce Guided by National Military Strategy

Specifies Fundamentals for Joint, Interagency, andMultinational Operations

Addresses the Challenges of the Future

The Armed Forces of the United States hold in trust for theAmerican people the military power of the Nation and are theultimate guarantors of its territorial integrity and independence.Challenges and threats may arise from adversaries who areopposed to US values and interests. The fundamentalpurpose of the Armed Forces is to win the Nation’s wars.The employment of American military power adheres toconstitutional and other legal imperatives, the highest societalvalues, and the concepts of proportionality, decisiveness, andaccountability to the American people. Military commandersat all levels are responsible for infusing in the fighting forcesan attitude of willing joint integration of effort that recognizesthat all forms of combat power present advantages forexploitation.

The United States relies for its security on the complementaryapplication of the basic instruments of national power:diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. Guidedby national security policy and strategy, the Armed Forces ofthe United States shape and employ the military instrument toadvance and defend national security interests and objectives.

The fundamental purposeof the Armed Forces is towin the Nation’s wars.

National security dependson the complementaryapplication of theinstruments of nationalpower.

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Executive Summary

JP 1

Senior US military leaders are responsible for providing adviceand recommendations to the President and the Congress onmilitary aspects of national security including the developmentof forces, implications of the use of force, and integration ofmilitary planning and actions with the other instruments ofnational power. Combatant commanders also have the uniqueresponsibility for execution of military actions under theNational Command Authorities — the President and theSecretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates orsuccessors — in furtherance of national security policy andstrategy.

American military power has vital roles in peace, crisis, andconflict. In peace, the political imperative is to maintain visible,credible military capability and readiness for response acrossthe range of military operations. Demonstrated militarycapability is the cornerstone of deterrence, which remainsa principal means for dissuading would-be aggressors andadversaries from action harmful to the United States. Duringcrisis, US military authorities focus on activities that bolsterdeterrence in conjunction with the other instruments of nationalpower and prepare for rapid and effective transitions to conflictshould deterrence fail. During conflict, the principalresponsibility of the Armed Forces of the United States is toemploy rapid and decisive military power to achieve USobjectives, and do so in a manner that sustains the fruits ofsuccess in the postconflict environment. In unilateral ormultinational operations, the United States adheres to domesticand international law governing warfare. It also conforms todomestic and international legal conventions and prescriptionssupporting human rights.

Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guidethe employment of forces. Joint doctrine provides authoritativeguidance, based upon extant capabilities of the Armed Forcesof the United States. It incorporates time-tested principles forsuccessful military action as well as contemporary lessonswhich together guide aggressive exploitation of US advantagesagainst adversary vulnerabilities. Doctrine shapes the waythe Armed Forces think about the use of the military instrumentof national power.

Senior US military leadersprovide the advice andrecommendations on theapplication of the militaryinstrument and itsintegration with the otherinstruments.

Effective deterrencedepends on visible,credible, militarycapability that can bedemonstrated. Its use inconflict must be decisiveand overwhelming.

Military doctrine shapesthe way the Armed Forcesthink about the use of themilitary instrument ofnational power.

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Executive Summary

The international security environment is dynamic anduncertain, with recurring disputes, crises, and conflicts in manyregions, and endemic conflicts in regions of particularimportance to the security of the United States. Challengersand adversaries may be states or groups of states, as well asnonstate groups including terrorist, criminal, ethnic, religious,and special-interest organizations. Military assessments andestimates must include threats abroad as well as the projectionsof those threats to US territory. The United States itself is nota sanctuary from many of the forces threatening US security;it is not immune from attack.

Military leaders have fundamental responsibilities indeveloping national assessments of the strategic situation.Specifically, in the US system of civil-military relations, seniormilitary leaders provide recommendations on the feasiblemilitary options, resources required and anticipatedconsequences of military action, and the military requirementsfor conflict termination. They also are uniquely responsiblefor the military components of operation plans developed inresponse to decisions prompted by national assessments ofthe strategic situation.

Success in combat in defense of national sovereignty, territorialintegrity, societal values, and national interests is the essentialgoal and measure of the value of the profession of arms inAmerican society. The Armed Forces also have a long historyof unconditional service in military operations other than warthat support broad national objectives including such areas asparticipating in humanitarian relief efforts for victims of naturaldisasters in the United States and abroad.

The Armed Forces of the United States must have extantcapabilities and maintain core military competencies forsuccessful action across the range of potential militaryoperations, including the ability to deploy rapidly from theUnited States or other locations to the region of need. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commanders haveunique responsibilities for planning and directing theemployment of the Armed Forces of the United States. Thisis their core competency. The Military Services, the United

The Strategic Security Environment

American Military Power

The international securityenvironment is dynamicand uncertain. Militaryestimates must includethreats abroad and theirprojection to US territory.

Senior military leadersprovide recommendationson feasible militaryoptions, resourcesrequired, and anticipatedconsequences of militaryaction, as well as themilitary requirements forconflict termination.

The Armed Forces aremeasured by success incombat and unconditionalservice in militaryoperations other than war.

The Armed Forces of theUnited States must haveextant capabilities andmaintain core militarycompetencies forsuccessful action acrossthe range of militaryoperations.

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Executive Summary

JP 1

States Special Operations Command, and Defense agenciesthat develop and provide force elements to combatantcommands for employment have as primary responsibilitiesorganizing, training, and equipping forces for joint employmentby combatant commanders in accordance with joint doctrine.

War is a human undertaking that does not respond todeterministic rules. Of primary importance, therefore, arethe values that US military experience has proven to be thebedrock of combat success. The foremost value is integrity,the cornerstone for building trust. Military men and womenmust know that they can count on each other to say what theymean and do what they say, relying with confidence on othersto carry out assigned tasks. Competence is at the core of theprofession of arms and includes both the technical competenceto perform the relevant task to standard as well as the ability tointegrate that skill with others according to joint doctrine.Physical and moral courage have defined warriors throughouthistory. Even in warfare characterized by advanced technology,individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspirationfor teamwork. Moral courage involves competent risk takingand tenacity and includes the willingness to stand up for whatone believes to be right, accepting full responsibility for theoutcome. Finally, teamwork results from cooperative effortsbased on demonstrated competence and a willing attitude toachieve common goals.

Joint warfare is team warfare. This requires the integratedand synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities.The synergy that results maximizes combat capability in unifiedaction. Joint doctrine stipulates joint operations guided by theprinciples of war, the adaptation of these principles to militaryoperations other than war, and the fundamentals of joint warfarethat result from applying the basic principles to actualexperience of American arms in warfare.

The principles of war adopted by the Armed Forces of theUnited States are objective, offensive, mass, economy offorce, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise andsimplicity.

In the human undertakingof war, military valuesprovide the bedrock ofcombat success. They areIntegrity,

Competence,

Physical and moralcourage,

and Teamwork.

Joint warfare is teamwarfare, requiringintegration andsynchronization ofcapabilities.

The principles of war are:objective, offensive, mass,economy of force,maneuver, unity ofcommand, security,surprise, and simplicity.

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Executive Summary

Adapting these, the principles for military operations otherthan war are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint,perseverance, and legitimacy. The fundamentals that guidejoint operations are anchored on these principles. They do notsupercede the principles of war. They must be consideredtogether when conducting joint operations.

The fundamentals of joint warfare are unity of effort,concentration, initiative, agility, extension, freedom ofaction, sustainment, clarity, knowledge of self, andknowledge of the enemy. These principles and fundamentalsshould be applied broadly in peace, crisis, or conflict, avoidingliteral or dogmatic interpretations, across the range of militaryoperations (war and military operations other than war).Military operations typically represent only one dimension ofUS action and require integration with the other instrumentsof national power.

The Armed Forces of the United States must be prepared toconduct a complex set of military operations simultaneouslyacross and within theaters. A combat operation to contain amajor conflict in one part of the world may be taking placealongside a number of supporting and independent operationsto reinforce peace, provide foreign humanitarian assistance,and assist civil authorities. The military power of the UnitedStates must be prepared to fulfill both its fundamental purposeof winning the Nation’s wars and provide unconditional servicein support of other broad national objectives.

The use of military force is the most important military decisionthat the United States can make. It is a civilian decision, basedon sound military advice. There are no unbending rules tohandling the countless possible crises, but the followingimportant considerations inform the decision making process.When the use of military force is considered, that use shouldbe linked to discernible national interests; have a clearly definedand achievable mission, end state, termination conditions, andexit strategy; and include overwhelming and decisive forcefor combat. It should also have a campaign plan showing thepath to success with measurable milestones; provide for

Application of Military Force

The principles of militaryoperations other than warare: objective, unity ofeffort, security, restraint,perseverance, andlegitimacy.

Applying the principles ofwar to Americanexperience in joint warfarederives the fundamentalsof joint warfare: unity ofeffort, concentration,initiative, agility,extension, freedom ofaction, sustainment,clarity, knowledge of self,and knowledge of theenemy.

The Armed Forces must beprepared to conduct acomplex set of militaryoperations simultaneouslyacross and within theaters.

The use of military force isthe most importantmilitary decision that theUnited States can make. Itmust be based on soundmilitary advice, beoverwhelming and decisivewhen used for combat, andremain clear in purposeand resolute in action.

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Executive Summary

JP 1

alternative courses of action if the military action isunsuccessful; integrate national and international agencies andthe other instruments of national power; seek the support ofmultinational partners; and ensure the support of the Americanpeople. Once the President makes the decision, the use ofmilitary force must remain very clear in purpose and resolutein action.

The US national military strategy guides the Armed Forces inemploying their resources to achieve national security anddefense objectives in peace, crisis, and conflict. Theseobjectives traditionally include promoting a stable internationalorder that promotes democracy, economic well-being, andpeaceful change. Military forces can provide a degree ofsecurity to deter or contain violence in a region so thatdemocratic processes can address the root causes of societaldysfunctions and conflict. Military forces contributesignificantly to deterrence by presenting visible evidence oftheir ability to decisively defeat aggression. Defense of USinterests worldwide entails the unambiguous ability of theArmed Forces of the United States to fight and win in large-scale, sustained combat operations abroad. In addition,simultaneous occurrence of challenges and threats to USinterests worldwide often require concurrent commitment ofUS forces to a variety of relatively small-scale contingencyoperations.

The ability to commit US military power depends on theposture and readiness of the forces. A set of enduring conceptsassists the Armed Forces of the United States in this regard.Strategic agility addresses the ability to adapt, conceptuallyand physically, to changes in the international securityenvironment. Overseas presence, which includes permanentlystationed and rotationally or temporarily deployed forcesforward in important regions, helps shape the securityenvironment to directly advance and defend US interests.Force projection is the military dimension of national powerprojection. It is the ability to project the military instrumentof national power from the continental United States or anothertheater, in response to requirements for military operations.Decisive force entails forces powerful enough to unequivocallyand rapidly defeat an opponent. Campaigns use these conceptsin a timely manner, sequenced and integrated with the otherinstruments of national power, to achieve US strategic aims.Campaigns may include forcible entry to establish a militarylodgment in the face of armed opposition, and must provide

US national militarystrategy guides the ArmedForces to achieve nationalsecurity objectives. Todefend US interestsworldwide, the ArmedForces must have theunambiguous ability tofight and win in large-scale, sustained combatoperations abroad.

The ability to commit USmilitary power in defenseof national securitydepends on readiness andposture, guided byenduring concepts.

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Executive Summary

for timely application of military power in a manner thataccomplishes the mission while making every effort to ensurethe combat capability and survival of the men and women inuniform and supporting the force.

The campaign is the central organizing instrument for jointwarfare. Campaigns, by their nature, are joint undertakings.They are planned and executed by applying operational art.The joint operational art encompasses the translation of nationalsecurity and military strategies into operational design for thejoint employment of forces at all levels of war. Combatantcommands develop command and theater strategies to applythe joint operational art to their contemporary missions andsituations. The purpose of these command and theater strategiesis to assure unified action by all command components andsupporting commands. Unified action under the overalldirection of the combatant commander will then be able toencompass the actions of military, interagency, multinational,and nongovernmental organizations in execution of thecampaign plan.

The Armed Forces of the United States routinely participatewith other governmental entities in interagency operations, inthe United States and abroad. Early inclusion of interagencyconsiderations in military assessments, estimates, and planswill facilitate civil-military integration of effort. Theinteragency process in the United States, under the NationalSecurity Council, focuses on the appropriate functions formilitary and nonmilitary participants and facilitates unifiedaction in pursuit of national objectives. Overseas, ordinarilythe US ambassador and the country team take the lead forinteragency operations. For domestic interagency operationsthat may require that the Armed Forces support civil authorities,the Federal Emergency Management Agency has the lead forcrises precipitated by natural and man-made disasters and civildefense. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has the domesticlead for crises relating to terrorism. The United States JointForces Command is responsible for providing militaryassistance to the appropriate civil authorities within the UnitedStates for managing and mitigating the consequences ofterrorist employment of nuclear, biological, chemical, andradiological weapons and other high-yield explosive weapons.

Fundamentals of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations

Campaigns are joint. Theyare the central organizinginstrument for jointwarfare.

The Armed Forcesroutinely operate in theinteragency environment.Unified action in pursuitof national objectivesrequires early inclusion ofinteragencyconsiderations.

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Since the Revolutionary War, American military operationshave benefited from participation by other like-mindedcountries. The Armed Forces of the United States must beprepared to operate abroad within a multinational framework,and should be prepared to operate under other-than-USleadership. However, US forces must maintain the ability tooperate unilaterally across the range of military operations.US multinational operations adhere to four tenets. Respectconfirms the importance of genuine partnership and includesdue regard to each partner’s culture, religion, customs, history,and values. Rapport is a personal direct relationship thatfacilitates teamwork and unity of effort. Knowledge ofpartners is vital, and as important to success as knowledge ofthe enemy. Patience is needed because it takes time to establishrespect, rapport, knowledge of each other, and understandingand agreement on the best methods of accomplishing thecommon mission. Unity of effort, assuring unified action, formultinational operations requires clear and effective commandand control structures. Consensus and compromise are vitalin multinational military operations characterized by voluntaryparticipation by the partners who retain their sovereignty andnational interests.

The Armed Forces of the United States simultaneouslyparticipate in shaping the strategic environment to prevent war,respond when deterrence fails, and prepare for an uncertainfuture. Joint doctrine establishes the foundation for addressingthe future for the Armed Forces. Joint operational conceptsfocused on plausible future environments and militaryrequirements assist the Armed Forces in developing conceptsfor future joint operations and force development activitiesunder control of the responsible Services, commands, andagencies, and facilitating interagency and multinational effortsaimed at future operations.

Shaping the future in the present calls for a blend of continuityand audacious innovation. Analysis supported by modeling,simulation, and experimentation has a vital role in developingthe future Armed Forces of the United States. Jointexperimentation, a concepts-based process focused on thecapabilities required by future joint force commanders, is anessential component of addressing the future.

The Armed Forces of theUnited States must beprepared to operate abroadwithin a multinationalframework, and should beprepared to operate underother-than-US leadership.However, US forces mustmaintain the ability tooperate unilaterally acrossthe range of militaryoperations.

Joint doctrine establishesthe foundation foraddressing the future.

Shaping the future in thepresent calls for a blend ofcontinuity and audaciousinnovation.

Addressing the Future

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Executive Summary

CONCLUSION

Both the human and technological dimensions of warfare inthe future are vital. Academe has a significant role, since USeducational and research institutions play unique roles inestablishing and furthering societal values and, withcommercial and nonprofit laboratories, are the centers ofscientific and technological innovation. Shaping the futurecapabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States is acollaborative responsibility of five major groups ofinstitutions in contemporary society. These include: theMilitary Services and other organizations charged with futureforce development, combatant commands responsible forensuring interoperability and coherence of joint operations,multinational partners without whose assistance US interestsmay be irreparably compromised, nonmilitary agenciesincluding educational and research institutions that areresponsible for the majority of societal activities, and industrywith its unique roles in enhancing the general welfare andproviding the bulk of the capacity for realizing militaryinnovation.

The Armed Forces of the United States are the instruments ofthe people exercised through their constitutional duly-electedand appointed civilian leaders. They must be prepared to fightand win against any foe under any circumstances, and to assistcivil authorities in meeting challenges that cannot beadequately addressed by nonmilitary institutions. The ArmedForces must reflect and support the highest values of Americansociety.

Both the human andtechnological dimensionsof warfare in the futureare vital.

Five groups of institutionsassist the Armed Forces ofthe United States inshaping the future: USMilitary Services;combatant commands;multinational partners;educational and researchinstitutions and othernonmilitary agencies; andindustry.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IFUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

I-1

The Armed Forces of the United States holdin trust for the American people the militarypower of the Nation and are the ultimateguarantors of its territorial integrity andindependence against all adversaries.Fundamental concepts of national security andthe principles of the military profession indemocratic societies establish the generalcharacter of the Armed Forces. Contemporaryassessments of the international securityenvironment, the interests of the United States,and the will of the citizenry expressed throughUS constitutional institutions guide the ArmedForces in developing their capabilities.Military doctrine establishes principles thatprovide direction for the employment of thosecapabilities.

1. National Security —Developing Strategy andPolicy

National security is among the fundamentalnational purposes that the American peopleembedded in the Constitution. The UnitedStates relies on the complementary applicationof the basic instruments of national power(diplomatic, economic, informational, andmilitary) for its security. Under theframework of shared responsibilities set outby the Constitution, the United Statesestablishes specific policies and strategies inorder to preserve its values, to identify itsinterests, and to assure the best use of itsresources in advancing its interests anddefending the security of the Republic and itscitizens.

“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, acommon language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”

GEN George H. Decker, USA

In order to be relevant to the contemporaryinternational security environment, nationalsecurity policy and strategy must be guidedby a clear understanding of the capabilities,limitations, and consequences of militaryaction. US military leaders therefore haveconstitutional, legal, and professionalobligations to provide advice andrecommendations on the military aspects ofnational security to national leaders in theexecutive and legislative branches. Theseobligations include advice andrecommendations on the use of force, thedevelopment and employment of militaryforces, and the integration of military planningand actions with the other instruments ofnational power. Combatant commanders alsohave the unique responsibility for effectiveexecution of military actions under theNational Command Authorities (NCA) infurtherance of national security policy andstrategy.

a. Participants. Developing nationalsecurity policy and strategy involves theinteraction of the highest level US civilian andmilitary authorities, principally the Presidentand the members of the National SecurityCouncil (NSC). Supporting these primaryparticipants are the senior officials of theOffice of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) andthe individual Services, the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the othermembers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),the combatant commanders, and a number ofagencies with unique defense responsibilities.

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Chapter I

JP 1

“[My job is] to give the President andSecretary of Defense military advicebefore they know they need it.”

GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA,Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

• National Command Authorities. TheNCA, which consist of the President andthe Secretary of Defense or their dulydeputized alternates or successors, arethe highest levels in the military chainof command. The NCA exerciseauthority over the Armed Forces boththrough the combatant commanders forthose forces assigned to combatantcommands, through the Secretaries ofthe Military Departments for those forcesnot assigned to combatant commands,and through the Secretary ofTransportation for the US Coast Guard.

• National Security Council. ThePresident chairs the NSC. In addition tothe President and Vice President, theNSC’s statutory members are theSecretaries of State and Defense. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff isthe statutory military advisor to theCouncil and discharges the responsibilityfor professional military advice andrecommendations in this forum as wellas in other ways as stipulated by theNCA. The Director of CentralIntelligence is the NSC’s statutoryintelligence advisor.

• Department of Defense. The supportingparticipants in the Department of Defense(DOD) — the individual Services,combatant commands, and agencies —provide their advice andrecommendations through the Secretaryof Defense and the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. In the American systemof civil-military relations, civilian-electedofficials and their duly appointed

subordinates have primary responsibilityfor broad national policies andprocedures that reflect the will of thepeople. Military officials have primaryresponsibility for advice andrecommendations on professionalmilitary matters including capabilities,limitations, and implications of militaryaction, as well as for commanding themilitary forces in carrying out theirassigned missions.

b. Processes. Under the direction of theNCA, the Armed Forces of the United Statesparticipate in US national security activitiesguided by the following interrelated planningsystems and associated processes (Figure I-1).

• NSC System. The NSC is the President’sprincipal forum for considering nationalsecurity and foreign policy matters. TheNSC functions to advise and assist thePresident by presenting assessments andoptions for decision that reflect allrelevant government agencies andconsiderations. The NSC alsocoordinates the dissemination andmonitors the implementation ofPresidential and other high-level nationalsecurity decisions among the variousgovernment agencies. The NSCprepares, disseminates, and overseesexecution of Presidential nationalsecurity decisions and directives, the USNational Security Strategy (NSS), andother directives that provide the basis formilitary action.

• Planning, Programming, andBudgeting System (PPBS). The PPBS,presided over by the Secretary ofDefense, has as its primary objective theallocation of resources needed by theArmed Forces of the United States toexecute military aspects of the NSS andthe National Military Strategy (NMS).The PPBS enables the Services andselected commands and agencies to

I-3


develop and sustain necessary militarycapabilities. Under this system, theDepartment of Defense translatesrequirements for forces, personnel,materiel, and facilities into budgetaryrequirements to be presented to thePresident for approval and to theCongress for authorization andappropriation. The principal participantsin this system are civilian leaders in theOSD, and the individual Services and USSpecial Operations Command(USSOCOM). The PPBS system assuresprofessional military advice by theparticipation of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff and the other members ofthe JCS, the combatant commanders, andselected Defense agency officials.

• Joint Strategic Planning System(JSPS). The JSPS is the primary formalsystem by which the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination withthe other members of the JCS and thecombatant commanders, providesmilitary advice to the NCA and

recommendations to the PPBS. JSPSproducts — such as the NMS and theJoint Strategic Capabilities Plan —provide guidance and instructions onmilitary policy, strategy, plans, forces,and resource requirements andallocations essential to successfulexecution of the NSS and otherPresidential directives. They alsoprovide a means to evaluate extant USmilitary capabilities, to assess theadequacy and risk associated with currentprograms and budgets, and to proposechanges for NCA and Congressionalapproval.

• Joint Operation Planning andExecution System (JOPES). TheJOPES is the principal DOD system fortranslating policy decisions intooperation plans and orders in order tomake the most effective use of USmilitary capabilities and to meet USrequirements for the employment ofmilitary forces. The JOPES includesdeliberate and crisis action planning

Figure I-1. National Security Planning Processes

NATIONAL SECURITYPLANNING PROCESSES

NationalSecurityCouncilSystem

Planning,Programming,andBudgetingSystem

JointStrategicPlanning

System

JointOperationPlanning andExecutionSystem

Four Interrelated Planning SystemsSupport National Security:

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processes. It guides US military actionduring crises and transition to operationsthrough rapid, coordinated planning andimplementation of plans. Campaignplanning encompasses both the deliberateand crisis action planning processes. Ifthe scope of contemplated operationsrequires it, campaign planning beginswith or during deliberate planning. Itcontinues through crisis action planning,thus unifying both planning processes.

2. The Political Context

The Armed Forces of the United Statesoperate in a democratic political context thatenables the American people to express theirviews and preferences about the employmentof military forces. In due course, those viewsinfluence the use of the military instrument,including the scope and limitations of militaryaction. Under the Constitution’s framework,American military power operates for andunder the conditions determined by the peoplethrough their elected representatives. Thispolitical context establishes the objectives andthe limits of legitimate military action inpeace, crisis, and conflict in the United Statesand abroad.

“Our armies must be subject to ultimatecivilian control and command at alltimes, in war as well as peace. Thebasic decisions on our participation inany conflict and our response to anythreat — including all decisions relatingto the use of nuclear weapons, or theescalation of a small war into a largeone — will be made by the regularlyconstituted civilian authorities.”

President John F. Kennedy

a. Peace, Crisis, and Conflict

• In peace, the political imperative for theArmed Forces of the United States is tomaintain visible, credible militarycapability and readiness for employmentacross the range of military operations.

Demonstrated military capability is thecornerstone of deterrence, which remainsa principal means for dissuading would-be aggressors and adversaries from actionharmful to the United States. Within theUnited States, primacy for action restswith civil authority, with military powerplaying a supporting role. Interagencytask forces with civilian agency andmilitary participation, and with civilianofficials in charge, are the norm. Incountries abroad, US military activitiesundertaken outside the establishedprocedures of formal alliances andsimilar international arrangements fallunder the oversight of the US ambassadorand the country team, with commandauthority over US forces remaining undera US military commander.

• During crisis, US military authoritiesfocus on military activities that bolsterdeterrence in conjunction withcoordinated actions by civil authoritiesin charge of the other instruments ofnational power. The NSC has a lead rolein managing crises that may involvemilitary action. When military supportfor predominantly civilian noncombatactivities is envisioned, other USgovernmental agencies may assumethe lead role. Essential militaryconsiderations during crisis includepreplanned and specially tailored flexibleoptions to bolster deterrence and ensurerapid and effective transition to conflictincluding war.

• During conflict, the principalresponsibility of the Armed Forces of theUnited States is to employ rapid anddecisive military power to achieve USobjectives in a manner that sustains thefruits of success in the postconflictenvironment. Conflict encompassescombat (including formally declaredwar) or situations in which there is a riskof combat, such as those that result in

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multinational peace operations. Therapidity and visible capability of US forcedeployments alone may be sufficient todeter conflict expansion and achieve USobjectives. In conflict situations, USmilitary commanders adhere to US jointdoctrine and ratified multinationaldoctrine, and integrate their efforts withmultinational and interagency partners.They also integrate the actions of themilitary instrument with those of the civilauthorities responsible for the otherinstruments of national power. Joint USmilitary operations are normallyintegrated with US and foreign militaryand civil organizations in pursuit ofcommon or complementary objectives.

b. Public Opinion. The opinions of theAmerican citizenry, and of peoples elsewhere,concerning the legitimacy, appropriateness,and effectiveness of US military action havean important effect on the activities of theArmed Forces of the United States. Publicopinion influences the ability of the ArmedForces to accomplish their missions and toprepare for future uses of US military power.US military leaders are responsible forproviding timely and accurate information tothe citizenry concerning the activities of theArmed Forces of the United States. The

responsibility of US military leaders to thepublic is complementary to, not in conflictwith, their responsibility for providingconfidential professional military advice to theNCA in support of the Constitution. Similarly,US military leaders are responsible forproviding professional military advice andrecommendations as well as timely andcomplete information to the LegislativeBranch in order to enable it to fulfill itsconstitutional responsibilities for militaryaffairs.

c. Legal Considerations. The UnitedStates adheres to domestic and internationallaw governing warfare. The United States alsosupports human rights worldwide, andconforms to customary international law andthose international legal conventions andprescriptions supporting human rights towhich it is a party. These considerations applyto the Armed Forces of the United Statesacross the range of military operations.

3. Instruments of NationalPower

The ability of the United States to influenceevents to its advantage worldwide depends inlarge measure on the will of its citizenry, thevitality of its societal institutions, the strength

Demonstrated military capability is the cornerstone of deterrence.

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of its relations with like-minded multinationalpartners, and the effectiveness of theGovernment in employing the instruments ofnational power (Figure I-2). Theseinstruments are diplomatic, economic,informational, and military and are normallycoordinated by the appropriate ExecutiveBranch officials often with NSC assistance.They are the tools the United States uses toapply its sources of power; including itshuman potential, economy, industry, scienceand technology, academic institutions,geography, and national will.

The NCA establish the rules for andintegrate military power with the otherinstruments of national power to advance anddefend US values, interests, and objectives.To accomplish this integration, the ArmedForces interact with the other responsibleagencies to ensure mutual understanding ofthe capabilities, limitations, and consequencesof military and civilian actions, and to identifythe ways in which military and nonmilitary

capabilities best complement each other. TheNSC plays key roles in the integration of allthe instruments of national power, facilitatingmutual understanding, cooperation, andintegration of effort, as well as adherence toPresidential and other national-leveldirectives.

a. The Diplomatic Instrument. Thediplomatic instrument of national power is theprincipal instrument for accomplishingengagement with other states and foreigngroups in order to advance US values,interests, and objectives. However, withoutthe credible threat of force, diplomacyhistorically is inadequate against a determinedand powerful adversary. Leaders of theArmed Forces of the United States have aresponsibility to understand US foreign policyand to assure that those responsible for USdiplomacy have a clear understanding of thecapabilities, limitations, and consequences ofmilitary action. Combatant commanders areresponsible for integrating military activities

Figure I-2. Instruments of National Power

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

�

�

�

�

DIPLOMATIC

ECONOMIC

INFORMATIONAL

MILITARY

The four instruments of national powerare used to employ the many sources of

national power.

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with diplomatic activities in their geographicregions. The US ambassador and thecorresponding country team are normally incharge of diplomatic-military activities incountries abroad. When directed by the NCA,the combatant commander employs militaryforces in concert with the other instrumentsof national power. In these circumstances,the US ambassador and the country team mayhave complementary activities (employing thediplomatic instrument) that do not entailcontrol of military forces, which remain undercommand authority of the combatantcommander.

b. The Economic Instrument. Theeconomic instrument of national power is onlypartially controlled by governmental agencies.In keeping with US values and constitutionalimperatives, American individuals and entitieshave broad freedom of action abroad. Theresponsibility of the US Government (USG)lies with facilitating economic and traderelationships worldwide that promote USfundamental objectives, such as promotinggeneral welfare and supporting securityinterests and objectives. A strong domesticUS economy with free access to globalmarkets and resources is a fundamental engineof the general welfare, the guarantor of astrong national defense, and an influence foreconomic expansion by US trade partnersworldwide. The Armed Forces mustcoordinate with USG agencies responsible foremploying the economic instrument tofacilitate unity of action. The NSC hasprimary responsibility for the integration ofthe economic and military instruments ofpower abroad.

c. The Informational Instrument. Theinformational instrument of national powerhas a diffuse and complex set of componentswith no single center of control. In theAmerican culture, information is freelyexchanged with minimal governmentcontrols.

• Information itself is a strategic resourcevital to national security. This realityextends to the Armed Forces at all levels.Military operations in particular aredependent on many simultaneous andintegrated activities that, in turn, dependon information and information systems.Information and information-basedtechnologies are vital elements formodern war and military operations otherthan war (MOOTW).

• Constraints on public access to USGinformation normally may be imposedonly for national security and individualprivacy reasons. Information readilyavailable from multiple sourcesinfluences domestic and foreignaudiences including citizens, adversaries,and governments. It is important for theofficial agencies of government,including the Armed Forces, to recognizethe fundamental role of the media as aconduit of information. The ArmedForces must assure media accessconsistent with classificationrequirements, operations security, legalrestrictions, and individual privacy. TheArmed Forces must also provide timelyand accurate information to the public.

• Success in military operations dependson acquiring and integrating essentialinformation and denying it to theadversary. The Armed Forces areresponsible for conducting defensive andoffensive information operations,protecting what should not be disclosed,and aggressively attacking adversaryinformation systems. Informationoperations may involve complex legaland policy issues that require approval,review, and coordination at the nationallevel.

d. The Military Instrument. Thispublication focuses on the employment of theArmed Forces of the United States. In

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wielding the military instrument of nationalpower, the Armed Forces must ensure theiradherence to the values and constitutionalprinciples of American society. They mustalso meet the standards for the profession ofarms demanded by American society. Whileresponsibility for wielding the otherinstruments of power rests outside the militaryestablishment, US military leaders areresponsible for providing the advice andrecommendations necessary for the overall USeffort in order to properly incorporate themilitary instrument with the other instrumentsof national power.

4. The Role of Doctrine — “AnEngine of Change”

a. Joint Doctrine

• Military doctrine presents fundamentalprinciples that guide the employment offorces. It provides the distilled insightsand wisdom gained from experience inwarfare and other operations requiringthe use of the military instrument ofnational power. Nevertheless, doctrinedoes not replace or alter a commander’sauthority and obligation to determine theproper course of action (COA) under thecircumstances prevailing at the time ofdecision.

• Joint doctrine enables the Armed Forcesof the United States to conduct the mosteffective joint activities and unifiedaction. Joint doctrine is based on extantcapabilities and incorporates time-testedprinciples for successful military actionas well as contemporary lessons thattogether guide aggressive exploitation ofUS advantages against adversaryvulnerabilities. It does this by promotinga common perspective from which toplan, train, and conduct militaryoperations in combat and noncombatsituations. It also fundamentally shapesthe way the Armed Forces think about

the use of the military instrument ofnational power.

• Though neither policy nor strategy, jointdoctrine serves to make US policy andstrategy effective in the application ofUS military power. Joint doctrine andits supporting tactics, techniques, andprocedures focus on how best to employthe Armed Forces in order to achieve USobjectives at strategic, operational, andtactical levels. The Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff has the statutoryresponsibility to develop and disseminatejoint doctrine, and does so in coordinationwith the Services and combatantcommands. As such, joint doctrine isauthoritative guidance and will befollowed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptionalcircumstances dictate otherwise. Joint

Joint doctrine enables the most effective jointactivities and unified action.

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doctrine applies to the commanders ofcombatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, subordinatecomponents of these commands, combatsupport agencies, and other Defenseagencies. Joint doctrine takes precedenceover individual Service doctrines, whichmust be consistent with joint doctrine.When the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates participate in multinationaloperations, US commanders shouldfollow multinational doctrine andprocedures that have been ratified by theUnited States. For multinational doctrineand procedures not ratified by the UnitedStates, commanders should evaluate andfollow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures whereapplicable.

b. Evolution of Doctrine. Joint doctrine— an “engine of change” — serves as animportant method for implementing changeas forces train and build effective joint teams.It facilitates development of a common jointculture from which to integrate Servicecultures and doctrines. The joint doctrinedevelopment process provides the conceptualbasis by which Armed Forces assess, review,

and revise doctrine and concepts for thefuture. The continuous application of jointdoctrine in training and leader developmentalso encourages development of new andinnovative capabilities — including jointtactics, techniques, and procedures — thatimprove upon extant capabilities. Becausethe Armed Forces of the United States operateand fight jointly, all the men and women inits ranks must learn and practice joint doctrineand joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.Feedback to the doctrine process from jointexercises and operations is essential for thecontinuing vitality and improvement of jointdoctrine and the consistency of Servicedoctrine and procedures. This process ofdeliberate and experience-based doctrinalchange is crucial for the present and futureeffectiveness of the Armed Forces of theUnited States.

“Military doctrine cannot be allowed tostagnate, especially an adaptivedoctrine like maneuver warfare.Doctrine must continue to evolve basedon growing experience, advancementsin theory, and the changing face of waritself.”

Gen Charles C. Krulak, USMC

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IITHE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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1. Introduction

a. The international security environment isdynamic and uncertain, with recurring disputes,crises, and conflicts in many regions as well asendemic conflicts in regions of particularimportance to the security of the United States.Challenges and threats may arise fromadversaries who are inherently opposed to USvalues, power, and role in the internationalsystem, or from adversaries for whom the UnitedStates presents an obstacle to their specificobjectives. These adversaries may be states orgroups of states as well as nonstate groups,including terrorist, criminal, ethnic, religious,and special-interest organizations. While stateshave defined territorial and population bases ofpower, nonstate groups may rely on statesponsorship, have transnational bases of power,or rely on the support of adherents to their pointsof view regardless of citizenship or place ofresidence.

b. The United States and its key allies andlike-minded partners exercise significantinfluence on current events and have importantroles in determining the nature of the future.The Armed Forces of the United States havethe responsibility to shape and employ themilitary instrument of power to advance anddefend US interests in this turbulent internationalsecurity environment.

2. Threats to US Interests

a. The complex range of threats to USinterests arises from the perspectives and

“The superpower conflict is over, but many complex and dangerouschallenges remain. The enemy we face today is instability andunpredictability. It is a virulent drug trade, and the spread of the weapons ofmass destruction. And it is terrorism, the weapon of cowards andmalcontents.”

President George Bush

actions of a variety of potential adversaries.Some states aspire to global influence andact to achieve that influence in ways that areharmful to US interests. Other states may seekto enhance their power and influence byopposing US interests and objectives within theirregions. Territorial disputes and armed conflictsspurred by social, ethnic, and religiousdifferences, as well as civil wars, pose threats toregional and international peace. Man-madeor natural disasters may also threaten USinterests within the United States and abroad.While contemporary assessments of US interestsand threats to those interests evolve over time toconform to reality, joint doctrine provides broadguidelines that are not limited solely to a single,unique assessment or period of time. When theenvironment, interests, and threats changesignificantly — as occurred following the endof the Cold War — joint doctrine also evolvesto conform to the new reality. The ArmedForces of the United States must take intoaccount the entire range of challenges andthreats to the United States. Militaryassessments and estimates must includethreats abroad as well as the projections ofthose threats to US territory.

b. In assessing threats, it is essential tounderstand clearly what is being threatened.The United States holds as most dangerousthe threats to its fundamental well-being,territory, and safety; these vital interestsinclude US social and economicinfrastructures. Threats to the vital interestsof US allies may also threaten the UnitedStates.

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c. The United States exists in a communityof interdependent states. Threats to theinternational norms of state behavior, to globaldemocratic and economic progress, and to theglobal environment also threaten importantUS interests. The United States also has aninterest in promoting the values of individualworth, human rights, and democratic self-determination that are at the core of theAmerican social contract. Threats to thosevalues abroad compromise US efforts to createa hospitable international environment.

• Regional and Space Threats. A numberof states have the capability to threatenUS vital interests in overseas regionsthrough aggression and coercion. Ifunchecked, these threats may constrainor interrupt the flows of resources andcommerce that are vital to the economicwell-being of the United States, its allies,and other states. Some regional powersalso have long-range delivery systems aswell as clandestine means to threaten theterritories of the United States and itsallies. Similarly, regional powers mayhave the capability to threaten the flowof vital information and communicationsthat rely on space-based systems.Unimpeded access and freedom tooperate in space are essential toprotecting US vital interests.

• Transnational Threats. A number ofnonstate groups pursue objectivesdirectly threatening to US vital and otherimportant interests. These includeorganizations that have the means andmotivation to employ terrorism, conductattacks on critical infrastructures, engagein international crime, and direct illicitdrug and arms traffic. Uncontrolledrefugee migrations resulting fromconflict or environmental causes threatento overwhelm the capabilities ofinternational organizations, the UnitedStates, and other countries, upsettingregional economic and political stability.

The global diffusion of sophisticatedtechnologies and means ofcommunication permit US adversaries toachieve transnational reach even into USterritory. Moreover, adversaries not partyto an ongoing conflict may seize thatopportunity for their own purposes andhold US interests at risk, perhaps atlocations beyond the region in which theconflict is taking place, including USterritory. Taken together, thesetransnational threats challenge the ArmedForces to assess likely threats beyond theimmediate regions of disputes, crises, andconflicts.

• Weapons of Mass Destruction.Weapons that are capable of a high orderof destruction pose a significant threat toUS interests worldwide. In the hands ofregional and nonstate groups, theseweapons may be used in a widespreadmanner or against specific point targetsof particularly high value to the UnitedStates. These weapons include nuclear,biological, chemical, and radiologicalweapons as well as other weaponscapable of a high order of destruction orof being used in such a manner as todestroy large numbers of people. Inaddition to their direct physical effects,the threat or use of these weapons willhave significant psychological effects inthe immediate target area and in othervulnerable areas that may be potentialtargets.

• Spread of Dangerous Technologies.The global diffusion of knowledge,improved communications capabilities,and sophisticated technologies empowersadversaries and facilitates theirdevelopment of capabilities that mayattempt to exploit vulnerabilities of theUnited States, its allies, and other friendlystates. The United States, withcooperation from like-minded states andnonstate groups, seeks to limit the

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dissemination of dangerous technologies(such as advanced weapon and missiletechnologies) in order to contain thisthreat.

• Failed States. Governments underpressure from internal and external forces— social, economic, or military — maylose their ability to meet even the minimalexpectations of their citizens. “Failed”states may become powerless to preventinternal conflict, massive killing, vastmigrations, environmental disasters, lossof control of their armed forces, andarmed conflict with neighboring states.The uncontrolled violence in failed states,therefore, can threaten neighboring statesand groups, US citizens and interests inthe region, and require US andinternational assistance.

• Foreign Intelligence Collection.Foreign threats may exploit the versatilityof human intelligence as well as theadvances in science and technology, thuspresenting a range of traditional and newchallenges to the instruments of nationalpower. Invasive intelligence operationsmay use common and specialized globalinformation networks to penetrate keyUS governmental and private

organizations as well as theirunclassified and classified data systemsand individual computers.

• Asymmetric Threats. Contemporarythreats share an important characteristicwith past threats. A timeless andfundamental principle of the professionof arms is to avoid the strengths and focuson the vulnerabilities that will mostrapidly and decisively cause theopponent’s defeat. The capabilities ofAmerican military power make it difficultfor any adversary to develop asymmetrical force that mirrors that of theUnited States. The Armed Forces of theUnited States must, therefore, expectadversaries — whether states or nonstategroups — to seek to exploit asymmetriesand focus on US vulnerabilities.Combatant commanders must anticipateasymmetric threats in preparing for andconducting joint, multinational, andinteragency operations.

3. Assessing the NationalStrategic Situation

a. US national security demands periodicassessments of the adequacy of strategies andresources available to achieve national

Weapons of mass destruction pose a significant threat to US interests.

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security objectives. Unity of effort is essentialfor timely and accurate assessments and foractions taken in light of the assessments.Ordinarily, the NSC is the lead agency for thiseffort. The Armed Forces routinely carry outassessments of the effectiveness of the militaryinstrument in accomplishing nationalobjectives, and contribute to the assessmentof the effectiveness of the other instruments(diplomatic, economic, and informational).These assessments inform US leaders in theexecutive and legislative branches, and whensecurity permits, the general public.

b. Developing assessments of nationalstrategic issues requires the coordinated andintegrated action of the USG agenciesresponsible for wielding the instruments ofnational power. When the military instrumentis employed in coordination with otherinstruments, the NSC normally coordinatesthe effort. In wielding the economic andinformational instruments, the United Statesmust be cognizant of the significant role of theprivate sector in these arenas. As a result, theArmed Forces and the other USG agencies thathave responsibilities and activities in these areasmust incorporate private sector perspectives intotheir assessments of strategic issues.

• Military Participation. Militaryleaders have fundamentalresponsibilities and roles in theassessment of national strategic issues.Specific tasks and methods ofparticipation will be stipulated in NCAdirectives and instructions from theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.In addition to the roles discharged bythe Chairman and the other members ofthe JCS, the combatant commandershave unique roles. In view of theirassigned missions and/or geographicresponsibilities, the combatantcommanders provide assessments ofthreats, strategies, and resources tosupport national assessments of strategicissues. The fundamental purpose ofprofessional military participation in thedevelopment of these assessments is tofulfill military responsibilities in the USsystem of civil-military relations.Specifically, senior military leadersprovide advice and recommendations onthe feasible military options, resourcesrequired, and anticipated consequencesof military action. They also areuniquely responsible for developing themilitary components of operation plans

Terrorist bombings such as the Khobar Towers attack are an example ofasymmetric attack that must be anticipated and for which military forces mustprepare.

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developed as a consequence of decisionsprompted by national strategicassessments.

• Interagency Participation. The NSCis responsible for guiding andcoordinating interagency participation instrategic assessments. The NSC is alsoresponsible for assisting the President inactions taken to execute plans andactivities that result from theseassessments. Contingency operations,particularly peace operations, require ahigh degree of integrated andsynchronized interagency participation.These operations call for assessments thatinvolve a wide range of nonmilitaryagencies.

• Executive Committee Participation.To assist in assessments of strategicsituations, development of policy andoptions, and planning and execution ofinteragency operations, the NSC mayorganize an executive committeeconsisting of high-level officials ofparticipating agencies, including thosenot normally part of the NSC structure.This committee, with appropriateprofessional military representation, maydevelop organizational arrangements tointegrate interagency efforts, monitortheir progress, and assess their operations.For example, the executive committeemay be tasked to manage day-to-dayinteragency planning and integration incomplex peace operations.

• Political-Military Plans andRehearsals. Due to their complexity,situations that call for significant militaryand nonmilitary participation will requirespecific political-military planscooperatively developed by theparticipants, under the coordination ofthe NSC and its executive committee (ifactivated for the situation at hand). To

the maximum extent feasible prior toexecution, all participants at theappropriate level will rehearse thesepolitical-military plans.

Appendix A, “The Strategic Estimate,”provides a guide for developingassessments of national strategic issues.

4. Operations and ConflictTermination

National political objectives guide militaryaction. This includes establishment ofsupporting military objectives, developmentof strategies and plans to achieve theobjectives, conduct of operations, anddefinition of criteria for cessation ofoperations. These national objectives alsoinfluence requirements for military operationsand support to achieve the desired end stateand maintain it in the theater followingcessation of operations.

a. Military plans and operations serve tosupport the attainment of the overarchingpolitical objectives that give rise to militaryinvolvement. Therefore, military plans andoperations must focus both on achieving thepolitical objectives and on establishing themilitary conditions necessary to sustain theobjectives following cessation of militaryoperations. This calls for planning based onthe desired end state, ensuring that the longer-term postconflict environment called for byUS political objectives is preserved followingconclusion of military involvement. Militaryplans at all levels should therefore includeconsideration of conditions under whichconflict termination and termination ofmilitary involvement can be executed.

“The formulation of a clear and precisemission statement which definesmeasurable and attainable objectivesis paramount.”

Gen Joseph P. Hoar, USMC

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b. Senior military leaders have aresponsibility to clarify to the NCA and othercivilian leaders the military aspects ofoperations. This includes the manner bywhich military force will achieve and sustainpolitical objectives, considerations for conflicttermination, and the potential need for follow-on operations. Military advice andrecommendations on conflict terminationhave political and military dimensions.

• Political. Control of Armed Forces ofthe United States participation in joint,multinational, and interagency operationsrests with the NCA, assisted by the NSCand any groups specifically empoweredby the NCA to accomplish this task.Participation of US forces with othercountries, international bodies, and otherdesignated groups must be authorized bythe NCA. Clear political objectivesestablished in advance of militaryplanning and operations facilitatedetermination of supporting militaryobjectives aimed at achieving the desired

The Medal of Honor is Awarded toSignalman First Class Douglas Albert Munro, United States Coast Guard

Signalman First Class Munro was Petty Officer in Charge of a group of 24Higgins boats, engaged in the evacuation of a battalion of marines trapped byenemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz Guadalcanal, on 27 September 1942.After making preliminary plans for the evacuation of nearly 500 beleagueredmarines, Munro, under constant strafing by enemy machineguns on the island,and at great risk of his life, daringly led 5 of his small craft toward the shore.As he closed the beach, he signaled the others to land, and then in order todraw the enemy’s fire and protect the heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placedhis craft with its 2 small guns as a shield between the beachhead and theJapanese. When the perilous task of evacuation was nearly completed, Munrowas instantly killed by enemy fire, but his crew, 2 of whom were wounded,carried on until the last boat had loaded and cleared the beach. By hisoutstanding leadership, expert planning, and dauntless devotion to duty, heand his courageous comrades undoubtedly saved the lives of many whootherwise would have perished. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

end state. Nevertheless, combatantcommanders must be prepared to adaptto unforeseen events and to the evolutionof political objectives as the situationdevelops.

• Military. The combatant commander isresponsible for executing the militarydimensions of conflict termination asdirected by the NCA. Militaryconsiderations for conflict terminationare an essential element in nationalstrategic assessments that guideoperations across the range of militaryoperations. Combatant commandersshould infuse in the fighting forces anattitude of willing joint integration ofeffort, based on joint doctrine, andrecognize that all forms of combat powerpresent advantages for exploitation. Theremainder of this publication providescontext and describes the principles thatguide military operations in combat andnoncombat situations, both abroad andin the United States.

CHAPTER IIIUNITED STATES MILITARY POWER

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1. The Purpose of the Military

a. The Armed Forces of the United Statesfulfill the constitutional imperative to providethe common defense. They are the soleinstrument that enforces national will by thethreat or employment of organized violence.The fundamental purpose of the ArmedForces is to win the Nation’s wars. Successin combat in defense of national sovereignty,territorial integrity, societal values, andnational interests is the essential goal andmeasure of value of the profession of arms inAmerican society.

b. The Armed Forces also serve to advanceand defend other important national interestsand objectives, including participation inoperations that do not envision combat, asdirected by the NCA. American militaryforces have a long history of unconditionalservice in operations that support broadnational purposes. From surveying railroadrights-of-way in the 19th century toparticipating in humanitarian relief efforts forvictims of natural disasters in the present, theArmed Forces maintain as their inherentsecondary purpose the advancement andprotection of national interests in MOOTW.

2. National Military Objectives

The operations of the Armed Forces focuson military objectives derived frompreeminent national political objectives. Therange of military action as well as thegeographical location of the United States

“No matter where we fight in the future, no matter what the circumstances,we will fight as a joint team. We will have fingers on the team that areindividual Services, but when it comes to the fight we want the closed,clenched fist of American military power. The days of single Service warfareare gone forever.”

ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN

define particular characteristics that USmilitary power must exhibit to achieve itsmilitary objectives. The Armed Forces of theUnited States must be able to successfullyaccomplish a wide variety of missions andtasks. They must possess capabilities acrossthe full range of potential military operations,including the ability to deploy rapidly fromthe United States or other locations to thetheater of focus.

a. Promote Peace and Stability. Inpursuit of its national interests, the UnitedStates seeks to influence the character of theinternational security environment. Aninternational order hospitable to US values,democratic principles, human rights, and therule of law facilitates both promotion of thegeneral welfare and the common defense.Peaceful progress and peaceful resolution ofdisputes are at the core of US interests abroad.

• Stability is not an end in itself. It is adesirable characteristic of a theaterstrategic environment that enables theUnited States to achieve its objectivesabroad, but may not be desirable inenvironments that threaten US interests.

• American military power has vital rolesin encouraging, promoting, andpreserving an environment favorable toUS interests abroad. Most important ismaintaining the visible ability to actrapidly and decisively in regions of USinterests, in combat or noncombatoperations. This central capability relies

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on the combination of several factors: thepresence of forces in a region; the abilityto tailor an appropriate package ofadditional forces that may be requiredfrom locations outside the region; andtheir rapid deployment (if required) andemployment to overcome challenges andpreserve US interests in the region.

• Deterrence is a central concept inshaping and employing the ArmedForces. The force development activitiesof the Services, the USSOCOM, andother agencies focus their efforts oneffective forces that can discouragepotential threats to US interests.Doctrine, employment concepts, andtraining reinforce these capabilities withvisible evidence to reduce the possibilityof miscalculation by a challenger orpotential adversary. Force readiness andmilitary professionalism lessen the riskof having to fight at all. If deterrencefails, then the preeminent militaryobjective is winning the war. WhenAmerican Service men and women fight,they fight to win.

“The ultimate promise of our doctrineis its potential to accomplish themission, achieve the warfighter ’sobjectives, and not insignificantly, tosave lives on the battlefield.”

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF

b. Defeat Adversaries. The Armed Forcesof the United States develop their capabilitiesfor prompt, sustained engagement anddecisive defeat of adversaries worldwide.Force development exploits fully thecapabilities of the individual and the bestavailable technology, guided by joint doctrinethat seeks to maximize the effects of Americancombat power.

• American arms seek rapid decision insimultaneous application of allappropriate dimensions of combat power

against adversary centers of gravity(COGs) and vulnerabilities. US forcesseek to destroy or neutralize theadversary’s capability for organizedresistance and to facilitate post-combattermination objectives. This central endorients the actions of Services and othersin force development, establishes thepurpose of joint doctrine, and guides theactions of combatant commanders inpreparing their assigned forces.

• The United States requires decisive,overwhelming military capabilities.This characteristic of American militarypower influences the application of thetime-tested principles of war and servesas the basis for deriving subordinatefundamentals of joint operations.

3. Core Military Competencies

In pursuit of its roles in peace and war, theArmed Forces of the United States developand maintain core military capabilities thatenable their success across the range ofmilitary operations. At the highestprofessional levels, senior leaders developjoint warfighting core competencies that arethe capstone to American military power. TheServices, USSOCOM, and other agenciesdevelop capabilities oriented on their corecompetencies embodied in tradition, law, andNCA directives.

a. Military Competencies at SeniorLevels. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, the other members of the JCS, and thecombatant commanders have uniqueresponsibilities for planning and directing theemployment of the Armed Forces of theUnited States. This is their core competency.The combination of joint professional militaryeducation, as well as progressive andsequential assignments toward higher levelsof joint operations, supports the developmentand continuous revitalization of this corecompetency. It is supported by the systems

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United States Military Power

that prepare and assign the most competentofficers to the staffs that support these seniormilitary leaders.

b. Military Competencies of the ArmedForces. The Services, USSOCOM, anddefense agencies (e.g., Defense IntelligenceAgency, Defense Logistics Agency) thatdevelop and provide force elements tocombatant commands have the primaryresponsibility for organizing, training, andequipping forces for joint employment inaccordance with joint doctrine. These forceelements enable the Services, USSOCOM,and agencies to carry out their respectiveresponsibilities. These force elementsundergo periodic review at the national levelto ensure that there are no capability gaps orunwanted overlaps, and that they areappropriately integrated for successfulmission accomplishment by combatantcommands. The combatant commanders areresponsible for the integration of military corecompetencies across all the forces at theirdisposal. This integration should be basedon joint doctrine and take account of all forcecharacteristics (including personnel andmateriel, training, and leader development)in order to facilitate coherent joint operations.

“With the draw-down of our forces overthe years, each of the Services hasbecome more and more dependent onthe other. In fact I can think of veryfew instances where any one Serviceis capable of doing the challenging jobsthat are presented to us in today’s worldby itself. Each of us brings a particularcore competency to the missions thatare presented to the joint forcecommander and presents that corecompetency to the joint forcecommander for him to be able to layer,overlap and use the force the way heneeds to be able to accomplish hismission. We will be forever dependenton each other for the missions thatchallenge the nation today.”

Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF

4. Joint Warfighting

a. Joint warfare is team warfare. Theengagement of forces is not a series ofindividual performances linked by a commontheme; rather, it is the integrated andsynchronized application of all appropriatecapabilities. The synergy that results fromthe operations of joint forces according to jointdoctrine maximizes combat capability in

Organizing, training, and equipping force elements are part of themilitary core competencies.

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unified action. Joint warfare does not requirethat all forces participate in a particularoperation merely because they are available.The joint force commander (JFC) has theauthority and responsibility to tailor forces forthe mission at hand, selecting those that mosteffectively and efficiently ensure success.

Joint Warfare is Team Warfare

“When a team takes to the field,individual specialists come together toachieve a team win. All players try todo their very best because every otherplayer, the team, and the home townare counting on them to win.

So it is when the Armed Forces of theUnited States go to war. We must winevery time.

Every soldier must take the battlefieldbelieving his or her unit is the best inthe world.

Every pilot must take off believing thereis no one better in the sky.

Every sailor standing watch mustbelieve there is no better ship at sea.

Every Marine must hit the beachbelieving that there are no betterinfantrymen in the world.

But they all must also believe that theyare part of a team, a joint team, thatfights together to win.

This is our history, this is our tradition,this is our future.”

GEN Colin L. Powell, USAChairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

b. War is a human undertaking thatdoes not respond to deterministic rules.Indeed, the rapid advance of technology andthe diversity of threats to national interestshave accelerated and amplified the effects ofthe traditional obstacles to military operationsof friction, chance, and uncertainty. Thecumulative effect of these obstacles is often

described as “the fog of war” and places aburden on the commander to remainresponsive, versatile, and able to adjust in realtime to seize opportunities and reducevulnerabilities. This is the art of war.

c. Values of Joint Warfare. Americanmilitary service is based on values that USmilitary experience has proven to be thebedrock of combat success (Figure III-1).These values adhere to the most idealisticsocietal norms, are common to all the Services,and represent the essence of American militaryprofessionalism. The discussion that followsfocuses on those values that have a specialimpact on joint matters.

• The foremost value is integrity. It is thecornerstone for building trust. AmericanService men and women must be able torely on each other, regardless of thechallenge at hand; they must individuallyand collectively say what they mean anddo what they say. Integrity inspiresconfidence in others to carry out assignedtasks and is a fundamental requirementfor building effective teams.

• Competence is at the core of theprofession of arms and of the relationship

Figure III-1. Joint Warfare Values

JOINT WARFAREVALUES

INTEGRITY

COMPETENCE

PHYSICAL COURAGE

MORAL COURAGE

TEAMWORK

INTEGRITY

COMPETENCE

PHYSICAL COURAGE

MORAL COURAGE

TEAMWORK

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of the profession with the Americanpeople. Competent performanceincludes both the technical competenceto perform the relevant task to standardas well as the ability to integrate that skillwith others according to joint doctrine.The American people and multinationalpartners expect US military competencein every aspect of warfare. Service menand women deserve no less from thosewho lead them into battle. Successfuljoint action relies on each of the Servicesto deliver trained and ready, competentand confident forces and leaders, able tofight decisively under joint forcecommanders. For the dedicatedprofessional, building Servicecompetence is an intense, lifelong affair.

Moreover, many serve in assignmentsrequiring additional competency in jointskills, and all members of the ArmedForces must understand their fellowServices to the extent required foreffective operations. Those who will leadjoint forces must develop skill inorchestrating air, land, sea, space, andspecial operations forces into smoothlyfunctioning joint teams.

• Throughout the history of mankind,physical courage has defined warriors.The United States of America is blessedwith its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, whosecourage knows no boundaries. Even inwarfare characterized by advanced

The Medal of Honor is Awarded toSecond Lieutenant Audie L. Murphy, United States Army

2d Lt Murphy commanded Company B, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, whichwas attacked by 6 tanks and waves of infantry near Holtzwihr France on 26January 1945. 2d Lt Murphy ordered his men to withdraw to prepared positionsin a woods, while he remained forward at his command post and continued togive fire directions to the artillery by telephone. Behind him, to his right, 1 ofour tank destroyers received a direct hit and began to burn. Its crew withdrewto the woods. 2d Lt Murphy continued to direct artillery fire which killed largenumbers of the advancing enemy infantry. With the enemy tanks abreast ofhis position, 2d Lt Murphy climbed on the burning tank destroyer, which wasin danger of blowing up at any moment, and employed its .50 calibermachinegun against the enemy. He was alone and exposed to German firefrom 3 sides, but his deadly fire killed dozens of Germans and caused theirinfantry attack to waver. The enemy tanks, losing infantry support, began tofall back. For an hour the Germans tried every available weapon to eliminate2d Lt Murphy, but he continued to hold his position and wiped out a squadwhich was trying to creep up unnoticed on his right flank. Germans reachedas close as 10 yards, only to be mowed down by his fire. He received a legwound, but ignored it and continued the single-handed fight until hisammunition was exhausted. He then made his way to his company, refusedmedical attention, and organized the company in a counterattack which forcedthe Germans to withdraw. His directing of artillery fire wiped out many of theenemy; he killed or wounded about 50. 2d Lt Murphy’s indomitable courageand his refusal to give an inch of ground saved his company from possibleencirclement and destruction, and enabled it to hold the woods which hadbeen the enemy’s objective.

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members having trust and confidence ineach other. This trust does not result fromgood feelings or devout wishes. Trust isbased on the mutual confidence resultingfrom honest efforts to learn about andunderstand the capabilities each memberbrings to the team. Trust and confidencewithin a joint force are built the same wayas within a Service tactical unit, by hardwork, demonstrated competence, andplanning and training together.

•• Successful teamwork requiresdelegation of authority commensuratewith responsibility. This is a necessarypart of building and maintaining the trustbased on competence that characterizesthe successful team. Oversupervisiondisrupts teamwork. Delegationunleashes the best efforts and greatestinitiative among all members of militaryteams. Delegation is especially importantin joint warfare where Service expertiseis an essential building block.

•• Successful teamwork also requirescooperation. While this aspect ofteamwork can be at tension withcompetition and both are central humancharacteristics, the nature of modernwarfare puts a premium on cooperationwithin the team in order to competesuccessfully with the adversary. Higherechelons should never have to mandatecooperation. Cooperation requires teamplayers and the willingness to share creditwith all team members.

“Our military forces are one team — inthe game to win regardless of whocarries the ball. This is no time for‘Fancy Dans’ who won’t hit the line withall they have on every play, unless theycan call the signals. Each player onthis team — whether he shines in thespotlight of the backfield or eats dirt onthe line — must be an all-American.”

GEN Omar N. Bradley, USA

technology, individual fighting spirit andcourage remain the inspiration forteamwork.

• Moral courage is also essential inmilitary operations. This includes thewillingness to stand up for what onebelieves to be right even if that stand isunpopular or contrary to conventionalwisdom. Other aspects of moral courageinvolve risk taking and tenacity:making bold decisions in the face ofuncertainty, accepting full responsibilityfor the outcome, and holding to thechosen course despite challenges ordifficulties. Competence is an essentialfoundation for moral courage.Competence separates the professionalfrom the foolhardy. Military power mustbe wielded in an unimpeachable moralfashion, with respect for human rightsand adherence to the GenevaConventions. This morality should notbe a matter of legality, but of conscience.Moral behavior is essential for gainingand maintaining the positive worldwidereputation of American fighting men andwomen as well as the confidence andsupport of the American people, a basicsource of American military strength.

• Teamwork is the cooperative effort bythe members of a group to achievecommon goals. The Armed Forces ofthe United States — every militaryorganization to the lowest level — are ateam. Deterring adversaries, and whennecessary, winning the Nation’s wars arethe team’s common goals. Americansrespond to and respect teamwork as animportant value. This societal approvalprovides to the Armed Forces of theUnited States a solid basis upon whichto build effective joint teams.

•• Trust and confidence are central tomilitary unity of effort. A highlyeffective team is based on the team

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When the members of the Armed Forcesof the United States internalize and embodythese values of joint warfare, their attitudeabout joint warfighting produces a synergythat multiplies the effects of their individualactions. A freely developed cooperativeattitude is the key to the most productiveintegration of all force competencies andcapabilities, and to the effective prosecutionof the campaign.

d. The Principles of War. The principlesof war provide the basis for the fundamentalsof joint warfare and for the Services to developtheir respective doctrine, tactics, techniques,

and procedures. The principles adopted bythe Armed Forces of the United States areobjective, offensive, mass, economy offorce, maneuver, unity of command,security, surprise, and simplicity (see FigureIII-2). They are the bedrock of US militarydoctrine. JFCs should exercise judgment inapplying these principles, recognizing thatthey are in some cases paired juxtapositionsthat address opposite aspects of warfare; massand economy of force and security andsurprise are examples. Appendix B,“Principles of War,” contains a description ofthe principles of war and their applications tojoint warfare.

CHAMBERLAIN HOLDS AT GETTYSBURGCOURAGE AND COMPETENCE IN ACTION

On the second day of the battle of Gettysburg, Brigadier General GouverneurK. Warren ordered Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain’s 20th Maine Regiment tohold Little Round Top, a critical hill on the left end of the Union line. IfConfederate forces took the hill, they could roll up the Union flank, precipitatinga general collapse. Then General Robert E. Lee could move toward Washingtonas he liked, and the war might be lost. Chamberlain was ordered to hold thatground at all costs. The fate of the Union depended on the tactical performanceof fewer than 400 men and officers.

Confederate forces attacked up the hill repeatedly. Chamberlain recognizedthat the more numerous Confederates were spreading to the unprotected leftof his force. Under fire, he thinned his ranks to extend his line and bent back(refused) his left flank to prevent being attacked from behind. With eachConfederate charge, his force shrank. As the day wore on, the Confederateswere near exhaustion, but the 20th Maine was down to 200 men, all short onammunition.

In a tactical inspiration, Colonel Chamberlain ordered bayonets to be fixed,and his entire regiment charged. The men on the refused flank spontaneouslyraced to straighten the line. Faced with what seemed like two regiments, theConfederates began a retreat, which soon turned into a rout. As the fightended, the 20th took 400 prisoners. More important, they took from theConfederates all chance of turning the Union’s flank.

Without Colonel Chamberlain’s physical and moral courage — his willingnessto make bold decisions in the face of uncertainty — backed by his tacticalcompetence and the brave performance of his troops, the Union cause mayhave been lost.

SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection15 July 1997

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e. The Principles of Military OperationsOther Than War. Joint doctrine adapted theclassic principles of war to situations short ofwar that require the use of US military forces.The resulting principles for MOOTW areobjective, unity of effort, security, restraint,perseverance, and legitimacy (see FigureIII-3). The definitions of these principles takeinto account the unique politicalconsiderations and nature of the operations,which differentiates the principles ofMOOTW from the principles of war. Thefirst three — objective, unity of effort, and

security — closely parallel their combatcounterparts. Restraint, perseverance, andlegitimacy address the uniqueness ofMOOTW and the political context in whichthey are conducted. Appendix C, “Principlesof Military Operations Other Than War,”contains a description of the principles ofMOOTW and their applications to jointoperations.

f. Fundamentals of Joint Warfare. Thefundamentals that guide joint operations ofthe Armed Forces of the United States (FigureIII-4) are anchored in the application of thetime-tested principles of war and the actualexperience of American arms in warfare.These fundamentals do not supercede theprinciples of war. Rather, both must beconsidered together when conducting jointoperations. As in all cultures, the applicationof general principles is best accomplished withdue regard to the uniqueness — includingcultural background — of the forces involvedand the contemporary challenges they face inthe envisioned battlespace. Therefore, thefundamentals of joint warfare that followshould be applied broadly, avoiding literal ordogmatic interpretations.

Figure III-2. Principles of War

PRINCIPLESOF WAR

OBJECTIVE

OFFENSIVE

MASS

ECONOMY OF FORCE

MANEUVER

UNITY OF COMMAND

SECURITY

SURPRISE

SIMPLICITY

OBJECTIVE

OFFENSIVE

MASS

ECONOMY OF FORCE

MANEUVER

UNITY OF COMMAND

SECURITY

SURPRISE

SIMPLICITY

Figure III-3. Principles of MOOTW

PRINCIPLESOF MOOTW

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

Figure III-4. Joint Warfare Fundamentals

JOINT WARFAREFUNDAMENTALS

UNITY OF EFFORT

CONCENTRATION

INITIATIVE

AGILITY

EXTENSION

FREEDOM OF ACTION

SUSTAINMENT

CLARITY

KNOWLEDGE

UNITY OF EFFORT

CONCENTRATION

INITIATIVE

AGILITY

EXTENSION

FREEDOM OF ACTION

SUSTAINMENT

CLARITY

KNOWLEDGE

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• The fundamental of unity of effortdemands that all undertakings be directedtoward achievement of common aims.Unity of effort is first achieved at thenational level when the Presidentdevelops national security strategy(otherwise known as “national” or “grandstrategy”). In support of this nationalsecurity strategy, the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation withthe other members of the JCS, advisesthe NCA concerning the application ofmilitary power. The resulting nationalmilitary strategy provides strategic focusfor US military activity. Strategyinvolves understanding the desired policygoals for a projected operation; that is,what should be the desired state of affairswhen the conflict is terminated. The cleararticulation of aims and objectives andthe resulting strategic focus arefundamental prerequisites for unity ofeffort. National military strategyprovides focus not only for war involvingsimultaneous major combat in multipletheaters (e.g., World War II), but also forregional crises, to which the ArmedForces respond rapidly, conductoperations, redeploy forces, and preparefor future operations. In such cases, asingle combatant command is normallysupported with the others in a supportingrole. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff assists the NCA as coordinatorof the whole effort. Even here, however,where only one combatant command issupported, use of American militarypower directly or indirectly affects theother combatant commands and Federalagencies. Of the ten combatantcommands of the Armed Forces of theUnited States in 1990, for instance, nineplayed major roles in the Gulf War, andthe tenth (US Southern Command(USSOUTHCOM)) was affected. Sixof these commands supportedUSSOUTHCOM in Operation JUSTCAUSE in Panama. Cooperation among

the combatant commanders and theirsupporting joint force and componentcommanders — within the framework ofunity of effort directed and arranged atthe national level — is crucial.

• Concentration of military power is afundamental consideration. The ArmedForces of the United States should striveto operate with overwhelming force,based not only on the quantity of forcesand materiel committed, but on thequality of their planning and skill of theiremployment. Properly trained andmotivated forces, armed with superiortechnology and executing innovative,flexible, and well-coordinated plans,provide a decisive qualitative edge.Careful establishment of priorities aidsconcentration at the decisive point andtime. Action to affect the enemy’sdispositions and readiness prior to battleand to prevent enemy reinforcement ofthe battle by land, sea, or air alsopromotes concentration. The purpose ofthese and related measures is to achievean advantage and exploit that advantagedecisively to win quickly, with as fewcasualties as possible.

• Seizing and maintaining the initiativeis an American military tradition.Because the United States of Americais not an aggressor nation, the ArmedForces may be initially forced to fightdefensively for a time. However, allactions should be offensive in spirit,exploiting the full leverage of allavailable forces to confuse, demoralize,and defeat the enemy. Taking calculatedrisks to throw an opponent off balanceor achieve major military advantagemay be required. In any case, retainingthe initiative relies on the ability ofmilitary people to think for themselvesand execute orders intelligently — theingenuity that has always been anAmerican trademark.

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• Agility, the ability to move quickly andeasily, should characterize US militaryoperations. Agility is relative; the aim isto be more agile than the foe. Agility isnot primarily concerned with speed itself,but about timeliness: thinking, planning,communicating, and acting faster than theenemy can effectively react. Operatingfaster than and within the opponent’sdecision cycle can expand options whiledenying options the opponent deemsimportant. Agility has differentperspectives based on the level of war(strategic, operational, or tactical). Ateach of these levels, operations on landand sea, undersea, and in the air andspace must achieve a synchronized

timing and rapid tempo that overwhelmthe opponent.

•• Strategic agility requires properlyfocused logistic support includingsmoothly functioning defensetransportation and global distributionsystems, and a robust joint deploymentsystem. Forward-deployed forces, pre-positioning, and the ability to deployforces rapidly from the United States andredeploy them as necessary within andbetween theaters, also enhance strategicagility.

•• The interaction of air, land, and seaforces contributes powerfully to

JOINT CAMPAIGNING IN THE SOLOMONS, 1942-1943

The struggle for control of the Solomon Islands was a critical turning point inthe war against Japan. These campaigns can best be appreciated as asequence of interacting naval, land, and air operations. Operations beganwith the August 1942 amphibious landings at Guadalcanal, an audaciousstroke to eliminate the threat to the Allied air and sea lines of communicationwith Australia posed by a potential Japanese air base on that island. Duringthe next several months, under the tenacious leadership of General AlexanderA. Vandegrift, USMC, Marine and later Army units fought a series of desperateland battles to defend Henderson Field, the captured airfield on Guadalcanal.During the same period US Navy and Allied naval forces fought six gruelingsurface actions, finally thwarting the Japanese naval bombardment that hadso punished the land and air forces ashore. From Henderson Field flew aunique air force: Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces planes under a single aircommand, the “Cactus Air Force.” (CACTUS was the codeword forGuadalcanal.) In the words of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, “If it hadwings it flew; if it flew it fought....”

In February 1943 the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal. The Allies undertooka sequence of actions to capture the remaining Solomons and isolate the hugeJapanese base at Rabaul. Local air superiority enabled naval surface forcesto shield amphibious landings from enemy surface ships and submarines;once ashore, land forces seized and built airfields; from these airfields airforces assisted in their defense and extended air cover to shield further navaladvance; and then the cycle repeated. The Cactus Air Force grew into AirSolomons Command, a remarkably effective joint and combined airorganization led in turn by Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces commanders.

SOURCE: JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,10 June 1995

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operational agility, as shown by theexample of the Solomon Islandscampaigns. The ability to integrate andexploit the various capabilities of a jointforce can disorient an enemy who is weakin one or more of the dimensions ofwarfare, helping to create a mismatchbetween what the foe anticipates andwhat actually occurs. This mismatch canlead to shock, panic, and demoralization,especially in the minds of the enemyleadership.

• When militarily advantageous,operations should be extended to thefullest breadth and depth feasible givenpolitical, force, and logistic constraints.Requiring the enemy to disperse forcesover a broad area can render those forcesineffective and complicate enemyplanning. At the operational level, jointair, land, sea, special operations, andspace forces can enable operations to beextended throughout a theater, denyingsanctuary to the enemy. At the strategiclevel, for a country like the United Stateswith global responsibilities andworldwide military capabilities, the useof armed force anywhere can haveimplications throughout the military

establishment. Commanders notimmediately affected may nonethelessplay critically important support roles,while preparing their forces for thepossibility of more direct involvementshould the scope or site of conflict changeor expand.

• Maintaining freedom of action is vital.There are many components to securingthe freedom to act. Effective diplomatic,economic, military, and informationalinstruments of power are needed toprovide the freedom to act at the nationallevel. Adequate robust logistic supportis essential, as is maintaining the securityof plans and gaining the fullest possiblesurprise. Having a force structure thatprovides insurance against unanticipateddevelopments or the underestimation ofenemy strengths is important as well.

•• Several aspects of modern warfaretend to restrict freedom of action.Sophisticated information technologyand the nature of modern news reporting,for instance, make the tasks of ensuringoperations security and surprise moredifficult. But as Operations JUSTCAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and

B-17 Flying Fortress making low-level attack on Japanese installations duringthe Solomons campaign, October 1942.

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equipment interoperability wherepractical) also enhances sustainment ofjoint force operations.

• Because modern warfare is inherentlycomplex, plans and operations should bekept as simple as possible. Clarity ofexpression should predominate, usingcommon terms and procedures. This isparticularly important when operatingwith allies or improvised coalitions.Making sure that all speak the samelanguage and keeping that language clearand concise are essential.

“Know the enemy and know yourself;in a hundred battles you will never bein peril.”

Sun Tzu

• Knowledge

•• Knowledge of self is required foreffective joint operations. The firstpriority is to have a full and frankappreciation for the capabilities andlimitations of all friendly forces. JFCsmust also have a clear appreciation offriendly centers of gravity which are theirkey sources of strength, so that operationsmay assure their protection fromadversary attack. In joint matters,reliance is first upon componentcommanders and staffs as the true expertson their forces. Service forces assignedto a joint force provide an array of combatpower from which the JFC chooses.Component commanders best know theunique capabilities that their forces bringto combat and how those capabilities canhelp attain the JFC’s objectives.Component commanders should alsoknow how these capabilities mesh withthe forces of the other components. Theycan then assist JFCs, other componentcommanders, and their staffs to integratethe whole.

DESERT STORM showed, tightoperations and information security —even at the expense of some staffefficiency — can work to achieveeffective surprise. Joint forces shouldunderstand that these sorts of verydemanding security precautions are alikely part of future operations and shouldaccommodate stringent operationssecurity in exercises and training in orderto practice staff efficiency and publicaffairs activities under realisticconditions.

•• The role of deception in securingfreedom of action should never beunderestimated. Indeed, military thinkerssince Sun Tzu have stressed the centralnature of deception in successful warfare.Deception can provide a highly leveragedmeans to confuse US enemies and causethem to miscalculate friendly intentions,deploy their forces poorly, andmistakenly estimate friendly strengthsand weaknesses, while helping topreserve friendly freedom of action.Deception at the joint force level requiresclear themes around which allcomponents can focus their efforts.

“The essence of flexibility is in the mindof the commander; the substance offlexibility is in logistics.”

RADM Henry Eccles, USN

• Sustaining operations at the strategic andoperational levels underwrites agility,extension of operations, and freedom ofaction. Strategic and theater logistics anddeployment concepts are integral tocombat success. These concepts aredriven by the plans and orders of JFCsand supported by the Services, by othersupporting commands, and often bysupport from allies and friends. Logisticstandardization (to include deploymentand redeployment procedures and

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•• The requirement to plan and conductjoint operations demands expandedintellectual horizons and broadenedprofessional knowledge. Leaders whoaspire to joint command must not onlyhave mastered the essentials of their ownService capabilities, but also mustunderstand the fundamentals of combatpower represented by the other Services.Beyond that, they must have a clear senseof how these capabilities are integratedfor the conduct of joint and multinationaloperations. This individual professionalgrowth, reinforced by military educationand varied Service and joint assignments,leads to a refined capability to commandjoint forces in peace and war.

•• Knowledge of the enemy is apreeminent but difficult responsibility.Traditionally, emphasis has been onunderstanding enemy capabilities; butknowledge of enemy intentions can beequally or even more important, to theextent that light may be shed on enemyplans, permitting timely and effectiveaction to blunt them. Joint intelligencepreparation of the battlespace is acontinuous process that enables thecommander to understand the total

battlespace environment. Key to thisprocess is understanding the adversary’scritical vulnerabilities, capabilities,limitations, COGs, and potential COAs.The Armed Forces of the United Statesand the national intelligence communityhave harnessed the capability of moderntechnology to provide intelligence to thefighting forces. The challenge for JFCsnormally is not to amass more data butto extract and organize the knowledgemost useful for overcoming the enemy.A key concept that integrates intelligenceand operations is COGs, a term firstapplied in the military context byClausewitz to describe “the hub of allpower and movement, on whicheverything depends.” Joint doctrinedefines centers of gravity as: “Thosecharacteristics, capabilities, or localitiesfrom which a military force derives itsfreedom of action, physical strength, orwill to fight.”

•• Finding and attacking enemy COGsis a singularly important concept. Ratherthan attack peripheral enemyvulnerabilities, attacking COGs meansconcentrating against capabilities whosedestruction or overthrow will yield

Finding and attacking enemy centers of gravity is a singularlyimportant concept.

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success. Though providing an essentialfocus for all efforts, attacking COGs isoften not easy because they are anadversary’s sources of strength.Progressively defeating enemy measuresundertaken to defend COGs may berequired to expose those centers to attack,both at the strategic and operationallevels. Actions to extend offensiveefforts throughout the theater, includingdeep penetrations of enemy territory, canincrease the vulnerability of enemyCOGs.

•• This concept of COGs helps JFCsfocus their intelligence requirements.Intelligence should anticipate the needsof the commander and be timely,objective, usable, complete, accurate,relevant, and available to all who needit. It should aid the identification ofCOGs and suggest how they might mosteffectively be dealt with. Beyond that,however, intelligence should provide thecapability to verify which desiredmilitary effects have or have not beenachieved and generally support thecommander’s situational awareness inwhat will often be a dynamic, fast-moving, and confusing (fog of war)situation.

•• Knowing oneself and the enemyallows employment of friendlystrength against the enemy’s keyvulnerabilities and avoids exposingfriendly vulnerabilities to the enemystrengths. This fundamental andfamiliar precept is designed to preservethe competitive advantage for one’s ownforces. It suggests an indirect approach— avoiding head-on attacks whenenveloping movements, for example, willbetter capitalize on one’s strengths andenemy vulnerabilities. The diversity andflexibility of joint forces are particularlywell suited to provide the commander

with an expanded range of operationalor tactical options. The side with the mosteffective integration of operations on landand sea, undersea, and in the air and spaceis best situated to exploit the diversity ofapproaches that a joint force provides.

g. Range of Military Operations. TheUnited States employs military forces in avariety of ways based on the characteristicsof the particular situation in the context of theoverall international security environment.The range of military operations encompasseswar and operations other than war (FigureIII-5). In many circumstances, a mix of thesetypes of operations may be underwayworldwide or even in a particular theater. Thedistinctions that follow assist commanders inunderstanding the characteristics of each andprovide guidance for associated militaryactions.

• War in this context refers to large-scale,sustained combat operations. Whennecessary to achieve national objectivesor protect national interests, the UnitedStates may decide to conduct large-scale,sustained combat operations inconjunction with other instruments ofnational power, placing the United Statesin a wartime state. When US militaryforces are committed to combat, theirpurpose is to fight and win, concludinghostilities on terms favorable to the UnitedStates and its multinational partners.

• Military operations other than warfocus on deterring war and promotingpeace. These operations include twogeneral types, one in which force is usedand one in which it is not used. Duringpeacetime, combatant commandersdevelop plans to focus their command’sefforts at engaging allies and otherfriendly countries in cooperative activityto promote peace, deter war, and promoteUS objectives. These plans must include

III-15


provisions for both types of operationsother than war.

•• In spite of US efforts to promotepeace, conditions within a country orregion may result in armed conflict.When other instruments of nationalpower are unable to influence adeteriorating or potentially hostilesituation and US interests are at risk,military force may be required. Such ause of force would serve to demonstrateUS resolve and capability, support theother instruments of national power, andterminate the situation on terms favorableto the United States. The general goalsof US military operations during suchperiods are to support US objectives,deter war, and return to a state of peace.These operations involve a greater riskthat US forces could become involvedin combat rather than operationsconducted to promote peace. Thesemilitary operations other than war

include but are not limited to peaceoperations, strikes, raids, shows of force,combatting terrorism, evacuation ofnoncombatants, and support to insurgency.

•• The second category of militaryoperations other than war does notinvolve use or threat of force, but ratheremploys military forces in peacetime tocontinue to promote peace and alleviatehuman suffering. This assists in keepingthe day-to-day tensions between nationsbelow the threshold of armed conflict andmaintains US influence in foreign lands.These operations include, but are notlimited to, disaster relief, nationassistance, foreign humanitarianassistance, support to counterdrugactivities, assistance to civil authorities,and support to diplomatic peaceactivities. These operations do notinvolve combat, but military forces mustalways be prepared to protect themselvesand to adapt to a changing situation.

Figure III-5. Range of Military Operations

Peace EnforcementCounterterrorism

Show of Force/Raid/StrikePeacekeeping/Noncombatant

Evacuation OperationsNation Assistance

Deter War&

Resolve Conflict

Promote Peace&

SupportUS Civil

Authorities

Freedom of NavigationCounterdrug

Humanitarian AssistanceProtection of Shipping

US Civil Support

MilitaryOperations

OtherThanWar

MILITARYOPERATIONS

GENERALUS GOALS

REPRESENTATIVEEXAMPLES

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

War Fight & WinLarge-scale Combat Operations:

Attack / Defend / BlockadeCOMBAT

NONCOMBAT

WarLarge-scale Combat Operations:

Attack / Defend / BlockadeFight & Win

MILITARYOPERATIONS

GENERALUS GOALS

REPRESENTATIVEEXAMPLES

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h. Integration with Other Instrumentsof National Power

• When the United States undertakesmilitary operations, the Armed Forces ofthe United States are only one componentof a national-level effort involving allinstruments of national power. Instillingunity of effort at the national level isnecessarily a cooperative endeavorinvolving a number of Federaldepartments and agencies. In certainoperations, agencies of states, localities,or foreign countries may also beinvolved. The President establishesguidelines for civil-military integrationand normally disseminates decisions andmonitors execution through the NSC.

• Complex operations, such as peaceoperations, may require a high order ofcivil-military integration. Presidentialdirectives (such as Presidential DecisionDirective 56, Managing ComplexContingency Operations) guideparticipation by all US civilian andmilitary agencies in such operations.Military leaders must work with the othermembers of the national security team inthe most skilled, tactful, and persistent

ways to promote unity of effort.Operations of agencies representing thediplomatic, economic, and informationalinstruments of power are not undercommand of the Armed Forces of theUnited States or of any specificcombatant commander. In domestic USsituations, a civil agency such as theFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) orthe Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA) assumes overall controlof interagency operations includingmilitary elements. Abroad, the USambassador and the country team maybe in control in operations other than warnot involving the use of force.

• Across the range of military operations,military leaders play key roles incooperation with civilian governmentaland private agencies. These includeagencies of US federal, state, and localgovernments; international organizationssuch as the United Nations;nongovernmental organizations (NGOs);private voluntary organizations (PVOs);and various governmental andnongovernmental agencies of hostnations and multinational partners.Military commanders have responsibility

A complex set of military operations may be underway at any one timeacross and within theaters.

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for the command and control of theirforces and are accountable for theiractions. They also are responsible fortimely and complete advice andrecommendations to the leaders ofnonmilitary organizations with whomthey are operating in order to ensure clearunderstanding of military capabilities,limitations, and consequences of militaryaction.

5. Conclusion

At any one time, joint forces may beinvolved in a complex set of militaryoperations across and within theaters to

accomplish missions. For example, a combatoperation to contain a major conflict in onepart of the world or one part of a theater maybe taking place simultaneously with a numberof supporting and independent operationsother than war to reinforce peace, provideforeign humanitarian assistance, and assistcivil authorities. The purpose of employingmilitary forces and military force — defendingand advancing US interests — may call forany number of combinations of types ofoperations. The Armed Forces of the UnitedStates must be prepared to fulfill both theirfundamental purpose of winning the Nation’swars as well as providing unconditionalservice in support of broad national objectives.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVTHE APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER

IV-1

This chapter completes the description ofthe relationship of fundamental nationalsecurity ends to military means. Chapter I,“Fundamental Concepts,” and Chapter II,“The Strategic Security Environment,”outlined the primacy of national securityinterests, the development of national securitypolicy and strategy to protect and advancethose interests, and the nature of the challengesto those interests in the international securityenvironment. Chapter III, “United StatesMilitary Power,” explained the purpose andnature of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates and their unique responsibilities inAmerican society, and fundamental principlesthat guide their employment. The paragraphsthat follow describe the use of force andemployment of forces as means to achieve USstrategic ends, with national military strategyproviding the link between the two.

1. Considerations for the Use ofMilitary Force

a. When the United States resorts to theuse of force, it adheres to its fundamentalsocietal values and moral precepts. The useof military force is the most important militarydecision that the United States can make. Itis a civilian decision, based on sound militaryadvice, ultimately made by the electedpolitical leaders on behalf of the Americanpeople. There are no unbending rules to

“Allied effectiveness in World War II established for all time the feasibility ofdeveloping and employing joint control machinery that can meet the sternesttests of war. The key to the matter is a readiness, on highest levels, toadjust all nationalistic differences that affect the strategic employment ofcombined resources, and, in the war theater, to designate a single commanderwho is supported to the limit. With these two things done, success rests inthe vision, the leadership, the skill, and the judgment of the professionalsmaking up command and staff groups; if these two things are not done, onlyfailure can result.”

GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA

handling the countless crises that confrontthe United States. Each must be weighedbased on its own merit and in its own context.However, there are clear parameters andconsiderations, based on law, values, andexperience, which inform decisions aboutmanaging crises and the use of force. Amongthese are the legality, propriety, and likelihoodof success of the use of force; the commitmentto decisive yet proportional action; theintegration of the other instruments of nationalpower; and accountability to the Americanpeople. In all cases, the use of force, unlesslinked to discernible vital, important, or othernational interests, is not sustainable.

• Vital interests are those that directlyimpact the survival and vitality of theRepublic and its way of life. Such issuesas the safety of American citizens at homeand abroad, the security of US territoryor that of US allies, and protection of USeconomic well-being are examples.When force is used in combat fordefending these interests, it must be bothoverwhelming and decisive.

• The category of important nationalinterests includes those short of nationalsurvival that affect national well-being andthe character of the world in whichAmericans live. In these situations wherethere is a threat to important interests, the

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use of military force is an option if thecosts and risks associated with their useare commensurate with the threatenedinterest. In these situations, use of forcemust be selective, depending on thecircumstances at hand. Nevertheless, theforces employed in pursuit of importantnational interests must be of the size,capabilities, training, and readiness toaccomplish the mission. When combatis possible, the force employed must beboth overwhelming and decisive.

• The cases involving other interests,including humanitarian concerns,frequently require the use of militaryorganizational capabilities and resourcesrather than their combat power and useof force. While military forces are notgenerally the best tools to solvehumanitarian crises, under certaincircumstances the appropriate use of theArmed Forces of the United States canbring about a solution to the problem athand. Such efforts should be limited induration. They should also have a clearlydefined end state, entail minimal risk to

the Armed Forces, and be designed togive the affected country or region theopportunity to restore its own basicservices. And, at the same time, theseefforts should not jeopardize the abilityof the Armed Forces to respond to directthreats to vital and important nationalsecurity interests in other regions of theworld.

b. When the NCA consider the use offorce, military advice on the employment ofthe Armed Forces of the United States seeksto clearly define the contemplated mission,and ensure understanding of the means neededto accomplish it and the campaign plan thatestablishes the path to success. The militaryadvice should address these and a number ofother important considerations summarized inFigure IV-1. Among them are missionmeasures of success and milestones,alternative COAs, and termination conditionsand exit strategy. These considerations guidecivil-military interactions and support theNCA’s decision making process. Forexample, in the case of a threat to vital nationalinterests, although the support of multinational

Figure IV-1. Considerations for Use of Military Force

CONSIDERATIONS FOR USE OFMILITARY FORCE

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Advances National Interests

Clearly Defined and Achievable Mission

End State, Termination Conditions, and Exit Strategy Clear

Decisive Means Available

Campaign Plan Showing Path to Success

Milestones to Measure Success

Alternate Courses of Action if Military Unsuccessful

National and International Agencies Ready for Their Roles

Support of Allies, Friends, International Institutions

Support of American People

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The Application of Military Power

partners is clearly desired, the United Statesis prepared to act alone. Sustaininginvolvement in military operations, regardlessof the level of national interest, ultimatelyrequires support of the American people. Toensure their support, military involvementmust clearly advance national interests. If itdoes, then the use of force and employmentof forces must remain very clear in purposeand very resolute in action.

2. National Military Strategy

The US NMS guides the Armed Forces inemploying their resources in the most effectivemanner to achieve national security anddefense objectives. The Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, in consultation with the othermembers of the JCS and the combatantcommanders, periodically publishes the NMSto implement the current US national securitystrategy. The NMS expresses the relationshipsbetween key US military objectivesworldwide and the capabilities available tothe Armed Forces of the United States in orderto achieve the objectives. The campaigns thatcombatant commanders develop to supportnational strategic objectives are heavilyinfluenced by the NMS.

Joint doctrine includes fundamentalprinciples concerning how best to employmilitary power to achieve strategic ends.Since joint doctrine provides insights andwisdom gained from the collective experiencewith warfare, it fundamentally shapes the waythe Armed Forces think about and train forwar. Joint doctrine, therefore, influencesprofessional military participation in thedevelopment of military strategy and providesauthoritative guidance for its implementation.

a. Influencing the International SecurityEnvironment. Throughout the history of theRepublic, the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates have developed capabilities, maintainedreadiness postures, and operated abroad as anarm of the Nation to influence international

events. Guided by inherently defensivenational policies, the Armed Forces of theUnited States have capabilities to influencethe international environment in ways thatadvance and defend US interests and supportkey US objectives abroad.

• Promoting Stability. The United Statesinternationally promotes democracy,economic well-being, and peacefulchange. Where these policies enjoysupport, the United States actively seeksto promote regional stability to deterpotential aggressors and to advance USinterests and objectives. The ArmedForces of the United States typicallyoperate in conjunction with allies andother friendly states to demonstrate themilitary capability to defeat aggressionand thereby support the processes ofpeaceful progress. Military activities thatpromote stability include presence in theregion, assistance in the improvement ofindigenous military capabilities, andpeacetime engagement activities.Peacetime engagement activities whichpromote stability include military-to-military contacts, multinational exerciseswhich improve readiness andinteroperability, education and trainingprograms, foreign humanitarianassistance, security assistance, and armscontrol initiatives.

• Preventing or Reducing Conflicts andThreats. Military forces can provide adegree of security and deter or containviolence in a region so that democraticprocesses can address the root causes ofsocietal dysfunctions and conflict. TheArmed Forces may be directed to supportindigenous forces and civil authorities,improve their capabilities, and provideessential assistance with unique USmilitary operational and logisticcapabilities. The United States may alsoparticipate in regional arms controlactivities (such as inspections and

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monitoring) that may call for US militaryexpertise.

• Peacetime Deterrence. Successfuldeterrence requires a conclusion by thepotential adversary that aggressive actionwill not succeed, and that the certainconsequences of aggression outweighany potential benefit. Military forcescontribute significantly to deterrence bypresenting visible evidence of theirability to defeat aggression, including theability to act globally, rapidly, anddecisively in conjunction withindigenous military forces. In regionsof particular concern to the United States,continuous US military engagement withregional forces, frequent exercises andexchanges, visible presence, and pre-positioned equipment and supplies aremeans that can significantly contributeto peacetime deterrence.

• Action Across the Range of MilitaryOperations. The tumultuousinternational security environment andglobal diffusion of vital and importantUS interests demand that the ArmedForces of the United States maintainready capabilities to act across the rangeof military operations. In those situationswhere efforts to promote stability andreduce conflict have been unsuccessful,or where efforts to deter aggression havefailed, US ability to respond with readyforces is critical. While the specificmanifestations of threats, crises, andconflicts may vary from time to time, themilitary capabilities upon which theUnited States must rely take years todevelop and to achieve operationalcapability. A credible US force-in-being— capable of action across the range ofmilitary operations — is the only reliableguarantor of US vital interests.Moreover, the simultaneous outbreak ofcrises and conflicts in regions of USinterest dictate that US military forces be

capable of simultaneous operations in anumber of different theaters. Thechallenge to senior military leaders inplanning for the application of militarypower is to assess the risks associatedwith simultaneous engagements andprovide relevant advice andrecommendations to the NCA. Inaddition, the combatant commandersshould train their forces and includeappropriate branches and sequels in theircampaign and other operation plans inorder to adapt to unanticipatedcircumstances as the threats to USinterests change.

• Deterring Aggression and Coercion inCrises. In crisis situations, potentialadversaries may miscalculate UScapabilities and resolve. Therefore, avital element in containing a crisis anddeterring aggression is to communicateclearly US commitment, resolve, andintentions. Military options to emphasizeresolve and bolster deterrence that maybe considered include reinforcement ofregional forces, demonstrations ofmilitary capabilities, rigorous and visibleenforcement of pre-existing sanctions,and conduct of limited strikes. Seniormilitary leaders, particularly theresponsible combatant commander,present their advice and recommendationsto the NCA for specific actions toreinforce deterrence during crises.

• Fighting and Winning Major Wars.Defense of US interests worldwideentails the unambiguous ability of theArmed Forces of the United States tofight and win in large-scale, sustainedcombat operations abroad. Theapplication of US military power in majorwars entails careful assessments of whatother military activities may be possiblewhile war is being prosecuted. TheUnited States may simultaneously faceaggression in multiple theaters. The

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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inconsultation with the other members ofthe JCS and the combatant commanders,has key responsibilities in this regard.The Chairman must provide to the NCAperiodic assessments of the US ability tosupport the national security and militarystrategies with the forces available.These assessments include thepossibility of simultaneous operations.The corresponding advice andrecommendations focus on the militaryoptions available to advance and defendUS interests.

• Conducting Multiple, ConcurrentSmall-Scale Contingency Operations.Simultaneous occurrence of challengesand threats to US interests worldwideoften requires concurrent commitment ofUS forces to a variety of relatively small-scale contingency operations. The keychallenge to US military capabilitiesunder these circumstances may be thelimitations on logistic support and limitednumbers of units with scarce or uniquecapabilities that are in high demand. TheArmed Forces of the United States mustmaintain the capability to support anumber of concurrent operations in the

United States and abroad. Senior militaryleaders are responsible for timely andcomplete advice and recommendationsto the NCA concerning the negativeimpact on readiness for major war thatmay result from commitment to multiple,concurrent small-scale contingencyoperations.

• Use of Flexible Deterrent Options. Todeter or defeat aggression and otherchallenges to its interests, the UnitedStates must be able to employ variablecombinations of the instruments ofnational power. Therefore, the UnitedStates maintains capabilities and plans toexercise tailored mixes of diplomatic,economic, informational, and militaryinstruments to reinforce deterrence andcope with the outbreak of conflict. Theseflexible deterrent options call for detailedpeacetime planning by the combatantcommand and supporting agenciesinvolved. Many of these options areunder control of nonmilitary agencies.Senior military leaders are responsible forproviding advice and recommendationson the military aspects of flexibledeterrent options to the NCA. Combatantcommanders are responsible for

IMPORTANCE OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

Nevertheless, Operation ALLIED FORCE could not have been conductedwithout the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance and withoutthe infrastructure, transit and basing access, host-nation force contributions,and most importantly, political and diplomatic support provided by the alliesand other members of the coalition. These immense contributions from ourallies and partners — particularly those nations near the theater of conflictsuch as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Bulgaria,Romania, Albania and others — were in large part a dividend of sustained USand NATO engagement with those nations over the last few years. Thisengagement — including vigorous participation in Partnership for Peaceactivities — helped to stabilize institutions in these nations so they were betterable to withstand the tremendous burden inflicted upon them by thehumanitarian crisis and the conduct of the operation itself.

SOURCE: “Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report,”DOD Report to Congress, 31 January 2000

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preparing and employing trained, ready,and exercised force elements when theoptions are put into action.

b. Preparing Now for an UncertainFuture. The Armed Forces of the UnitedStates are living, learning institutions. Whileresponsible for delivering US military powerin the present, they also are responsible forlearning from the past and preparing for thefuture. The role of senior military leaders inshaping the future is twofold. The first aspectis to provide advice and recommendations tothe NCA, the Congress, and other responsiblecivil authorities on projected requirements forfuture military capabilities. This will assistthe civilian leaders in providing needed policyand resource guidance and decisions. Thesecond aspect is to establish a framework fordeveloping future joint and Service doctrine,concepts, and assessments and from these todevelop future forces.

3. Enduring Concepts

The ability to commit US military powerdepends on the posture and readiness of theforces. The Armed Forces of the United Statesapply a set of enduring concepts for conductingkey types of military operations. These concepts

provide guidelines to define and establish theposture needed to accomplish contemporarymissions. In view of the current internationalsecurity environment, these concepts includestrategic agility, overseas presence, powerprojection, and decisive force.

a. Strategic Agility. Strategic agility is theability to adapt, conceptually and physically,to changes in the international securityenvironment in order to prevent an adversaryfrom successfully exploiting surprise and toensure the protection of US interests at risk.This requires that the Armed Forces be ableto act effectively more rapidly than theadversary, even in the absence of advancewarning. Military leaders and planners applythis concept to ensure the ability of joint forcesto plan and operate in unanticipatedcontingencies in accordance with theprinciples of war or operations other than waras well as the fundamentals of joint warfare.

b. Overseas Presence. Overseas presenceincludes permanently stationed androtationally or temporarily deployed forcesforward in regions of particular importancefor advancing and defending US interests.Overseas forces maintain visible capabilitiesthat support deterrence, are able to operate

Availability of low density, high demand units is a key challenge toconducting concurrent contingency operations.

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international security environment, US forcesmust be prepared for deployment, and in somecases employment, from the United States toany theater, as well as from one theater toanother. Similarly, forces able to project theireffects directly to the desired area ofengagement without deployment must beprepared for such contingencies as an inherentelement of US power projection. Thechallenge to senior military leaders is to assessand provide recommendations to the NCA onthe overseas presence and power projectioncapabilities to maintain worldwide.

d. Decisive Force. The Armed Forces ofthe United States employ decisive force —force powerful enough to unequivocally andrapidly defeat an opponent — to achieve themilitary objectives assigned. Senior militaryleaders must understand the likely demandsof an operation and provide advice andrecommendations to the NCA on the degreeof confidence and risk they associate with thecontemplated force.

“We use force as a last resort . . . whenthe decision is made to use force, thenwe need to go in with overwhelmingforce, quite frankly, extraordinaryviolence that the speed of it, thelethality of it . . . the weight of it has tomake an incredible impression on theadversary, to such a degree that he isstunned and shocked . . . you take thefight to the enemy. You go after thehead of the snake, put a dagger in theheart of the adversary, and you bringto bear all the force that you have atyour command.”

Lt Gen Mike Short, USAF

e. Other Concepts

• Forcible Entry. Adversary actions andcapabilities may require a forcible entry intothe theater of operations, with forcesprepared to fight immediately upon arrival.Forcible entry entails seizing and holdinga military lodgment in the face of armedopposition. While normally complex and

across the range of military operations shoulddeterrence fail in their regions of deployment,and are able to project power to other regionswhen necessary. The forward-positioning ofthese forces helps shape the securityenvironment by promoting regional stability,giving substance to US security commitments,helping to prevent power vacuums,contributing to deterrence, and ensuringcontinuing access to the regions where USnational interests are most concentrated.Forces deployed overseas should beconfigured to provide combatant commanderswith a flexible array of immediately availableoptions for prompt response to aggression andunanticipated military operations other thanwar. In considering overall US defenserequirements, senior military leaders andplanners develop options for the proportionof the force to commit to overseas presence,assessments of the risks associated with theoptions, and provide advice andrecommendations for decision to the NCA.

c. Power Projection. The Armed Forcesof the United States provide the militarydimension of US national power projectionand support, as appropriate, the projection ofthe other instruments of national power.Power projection is the ability of a nation toapply all or some of its instruments of nationalpower — diplomatic, economic,informational, or military — to rapidly andeffectively deploy and sustain forces in andfrom multiple dispersed locations to respondto crises, to contribute to deterrence, and toenhance regional stability. Force projectionis the ability to project the military instrumentof national power from the continental UnitedStates (CONUS) or another theater, inresponse to requirements for militaryoperations. Force projection operationsextend from mobilization and deployment offorces to redeployment to CONUS or hometheater. Given the absence of military threatson US borders, power projection is a conceptthat defines the utility of American militarypower. Due to the uncertainties in the

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risky, forcible entry is a required capabilityfor the Armed Forces of the United States.Joint training, doctrine, tactics, techniques,and procedures, assist combatantcommanders to prepare for and executeforcible entry operations while containingrisks and providing the foundation forsuccess.

• Timeliness is a key challenge to militaryleaders and planners. While UScapabilities permit rapid arrival of forcesin an objective area, it may take time toassemble and commit a force sufficientto achieve decisive results. Arriving firstwith the most capability clearly remainsthe objective. The art in planning militaryoperations is to sequence the concentrationin conjunction with application of otherinstruments of national power. US militarycampaigns should be designed to achievetheir objectives in the most rapid, effectivemanner possible and at the lowest costfeasible in terms of loss of life and unwanteddestruction.

“Time is the essence in war, and whilea defeat may be balanced by a battlewon, days and hours — even minutes— frittered away, can never beregained.”

BGen Samuel B. Griffith, II, USMC

• While not unique to American culture,preserving human life is among itshighest imperatives. However, casualtiesare inevitable in most violent applicationsof military power. The guiding principlefor US military operations is to assuremission accomplishment while makingevery effort to ensure the combatcapability and survival of the force.

4. Enduring Enablers

The following aspects of the United Statesand its military forces are of particular

importance in enabling the application of theenduring concepts (Figure IV-2).

a. People. People are the most importantenabler of US military forces and are the keyto their success in peace and war. Whiletechnology may assist Service men andwomen, it is their innate courage, intellect,motivation, skill, tenacity, and self-sacrificethat makes the difference and assures victory.In developing and fielding forces, the ArmedForces of the United States keep foremost theresponsibility to provide the best leadership,training, and equipment; to attend to thewelfare of Service members and families; andto treat all individuals with dignity and respect.

b. Technology. The US commitment toproviding the best advanced technology to theArmed Forces of the United States is animportant aspect of American military power.While technology alone cannot assure successin battle, when adapted to empower theindividual and integrated with doctrine,training, and leader development, the resultcan produce dominant capabilities against anadversary. A discussion of harnessingtechnology for the future is in Chapter VIII,“Addressing the Future.”

c. Information Superiority. The UnitedStates has the human and technologicalcapability to establish and maintaininformation superiority. This entails a varietyof measures to provide complete, timely andsecure information to friendly users whiledenying vital information to the adversary.The objective of information superiority is tomake the most effective use of friendly forcesby assuring a timely, reliable, and securecontinuous flow of accurate key informationabout the ongoing situation, and interferingwith the opponent’s information to the extentthat opposition becomes ineffective ornonexistent. Of particular importance isthe timely availability, integrity, andconfidentiality of intelligence, and the

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integration of intelligence functions with allother functions across the range of militaryoperations. Information superiority cannot beautomatically assumed. Military leaders andplanners must continuously plan, execute,assess, and adjust the means available toachieve and maintain information superiority.

d. Global Command and Control. TheUnited States maintains global command andcontrol systems and processes to support therange of military operations in peace, crisis,and conflict. These systems and processesenable the NCA and the Armed Forces toestablish and maintain unity of command andunity of effort. The military requirements forcommand and control in support of USinterests worldwide demand a robust globalsystem of communications and computers tofacilitate transmissions of data, decisions, andorders. Military planners and specialized unitsmust plan for security and redundancy in orderto ensure effective global command and control.

e. Air, Land, Sea, and Space Control.Maintaining US military freedom of actionand the ability to project power globallydemand assured access to air, land, sea, andspace lines of communications at a time andplace of US choice. Therefore, within thelimits allowed by law and national policy, theArmed Forces of the United States must beable to gain and maintain at minimumsuperiority and, if feasible, dominance in thesemediums to assure the effectiveness of USmilitary power.

f. Strategic Mobility. The ability todeploy, sustain, and redeploy US militaryforces with their associated equipmentworldwide is essential to the effectiveexecution of US national security and militarystrategies. The Armed Forces must maintainthe mix of military and immediately availablecivilian contract capabilities to meet the mostchallenging scenarios across the range ofmilitary operations.

Figure IV-2. Enduring Concepts and Enablers

ENDURING CONCEPTS AND ENABLERS

ENDURING CONCEPTS

ENDURING ENABLERS

Strategic AgilityOverseas PresencePower ProjectionDecisive Force

PeopleTechnology

Information SuperiorityGlobal Command and Control

Air, Land, Sea, and Space ControlStrategic Mobility

SustainmentIntelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Assured Access to the BattlespaceNational Will

Force Protection

Forcible EntryTimeliness

Survivability

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g. Sustainment. Logistic support ofmilitary forces in the international securityenvironment places a special burden on theArmed Forces of the United States. Theuncertainties and the likelihood of suddenunforeseen challenges to US vital andimportant interests demand that logisticsupport and the underlying civilian industrialbase be immediately available to initiate,prosecute, and terminate operations withouta prolonged period of mobilization and build-up. Logistic considerations are integralelements of military planning for all types ofoperations from the development ofrequirements, options, and concepts throughthe conclusion of operations.

h. Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance. A robust and secure systemof intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance that combines all sources —US military, nonmilitary intelligence agencies,commercial systems, and systems of allies andother friendly countries — is essential. Theentire system and supporting networks andprocesses should be integrated with globalcommand and control systems, synchronizedwith current and planned military operations,facilitate development and dissemination ofa common intelligence picture, and contributeto assuring US information superiority.

i. Assured Access to the Battlespace.Overseas presence and power projection arepossible only if US military forces haveassured access to the battlespace in which theyoperate and to the shore-based infrastructurefrom which they operate. Access may besecured by the capabilities of the land, air,maritime, special operation, and space forcesto be employed (including forcible entry) fromthe United States or other locations, or frominternational waters and airspace. Access mayalso be secured by agreements reached by theUnited States with other countries involved.This places a requirement on the civilian andmilitary agencies of the USG to have prudentpeacetime agreements with other states aroundthe world to facilitate US entry, prosecution,and conclusion of operations. In the absenceof permanently-stationed overseas forces,rotationally or temporarily deployed forceshelp maintain US access to regions of nationalinterest by deterring potential adversaries,reassuring friends and allies of continuing UScommitment to regional security and stability,and enabling the flow of follow-on forces inthe event of crisis. Their peacetimeengagement operations may be adapted tospearhead access for contingency operations.Their military-to-military contacts mayprovide essential host nation access. Oftenthe initiative rests with the diplomatic

The Medal of Honor is Awarded toLieutenant Commander James Jonas Madison, United States Navy

Lieutenant Commander Madison was commanding officer of the U.S.S.Ticonderoga, when, on 4 October 1918, that vessel was attacked by an enemysubmarine and was sunk after a prolonged and gallant resistance. Thesubmarine opened fire at a range of 500 yards, the first shots taking effect onthe bridge and forecastle, 1 of the 2 forward guns of the Ticonderoga beingdisabled by the second shot. The fire was returned and the fight continued fornearly 2 hours. Commander Madison was severely wounded early in the fight,but caused himself to be placed in a chair on the bridge and continued todirect the fire and to maneuver the ship. When the order was finally given toabandon the sinking ship, he became unconscious from loss of blood, butwas lowered into a lifeboat and was saved, with 31 others, out of a total numberof 236 on board.

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instrument, the Secretary of State, and USambassadors and their country teams abroad.Military leaders have the responsibility toclearly communicate their requirements foraccess and to identify alternatives when aparticular locale becomes unavailable.Despite all efforts, access may beproblematical, necessitating that the ArmedForces of the United States maintain a forcibleentry capability.

j. National Will. National will is anexpression of the support and determinationof the American people for a particularoutcome or policy. National public cohesionfor objectives in war and other militaryoperations are visible to friend and foe andcan influence the outcome of the enterprise.While in the US constitutional system thePresident, appointed leaders, andCongressional members bear theresponsibility for explaining the purpose andobtaining the support from the public for anyparticular COA including military action,senior military leaders have important andunique supporting responsibilities. Principalamong these responsibilities is maintaining atrained and ready force in whose competencethe American people can be confident.Supporting military responsibilities includetimely and accurate dissemination ofinformation to the public about ongoingoperations, and support of military men andwomen and their families during periods ofoperational stress.

k. Force Protection. It is essential for theArmed Forces to provide the best feasible

protection for US forces, people, families, andfacilities worldwide from a variety ofpredictable and inherently unforeseeablethreats. Protection should include militarycapabilities and functions such asinformation, intelligence, logistics and othersthat are essential for missionaccomplishment. These threats include theextension of a conflict beyond its originalregion to US citizens, bases, facilities, andinterests, even into US territory. Of particularconcern is the capability of clandestinemilitary operations and terroristorganizations to attack vulnerable, populatedareas and critical infrastructures with avariety of lethal means. The threat includesemployment of nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) and radiological weaponsand other highly destructive conventionalexplosives and highly toxic chemicals andmaterials against unprotected people andfacilities. Military considerations for forceprotection therefore include not only militaryelements in a region of conflict, but alsomilitary and civilian potential targets of highvalue to the United States wherever they maybe, including US territory. While not a stand-alone military mission, force protection is anessential consideration for peacetimereadiness and military activities across therange of military operations.

“Even in friendly territory a fortifiedcamp should be set up; a generalshould never have to say: ‘I did notexpect it.’”

Emperor MauriceThe Strategikon, 600 A.D.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VFUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

V-1

The campaign is the central organizinginstrument for joint warfare. The JFC uses itto arrange tactical, operational, and strategicactions into a series of related majoroperations, focused on accomplishingstrategic and operational objectives. Thecampaign is planned and executed by applyingoperational art. To establish the context forcampaign planning in combatant commands,unified command and theater strategiesestablish the relationships between nationalsecurity and military objectives and the forcesand other resources available to the command.The use of unified action and clear commandrelationships assist combatant and subordinatecommanders in employing forces across therange of military operations.

1. Elements of JointOperational Art

The joint operational art encompasses thetranslation of strategy into operational designfor the joint employment of forces at all levelsof war. It integrates all force capabilities intoa unified whole focused on the command’smajor objectives. It guides the development,organization, integration, and execution ofstrategies, campaigns, major operations, andbattles. The following discussion summarizesthe elements of joint operational art, whichare explained in more detail in JointPublication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for JointOperations (see Figure V-1).

a. An important challenge in applying theoperational art is to achieve the greatest effect

“There is still a tendency in each separate unit . . .to be a one-handed puncher.By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, theartilleryman to fire . . .To get harmony in battle, each weapon must supporteach other. Team play wins.”

GEN George S. Patton, Jr., USA

from the combination of all relevant andavailable force capabilities — synergy. Thesynergy that results from the integration andsynchronization of the actions of air, land, sea,space, and special operations forces over timeand space assists the JFC to assail importantadversary vulnerabilities while presenting nofriendly seams or vulnerabilities for theadversary to exploit. The degree of synergyachieved depends in large part on the friendlyforces’ shared understanding of friendly andadversary situations — including friendlycommander’s intent and adversary intentions— and on being able to exploit that situationalawareness to achieve leverage and advantageover the adversary.

“We plan because synergy does nothappen by itself. Synchronization doesnot happen by accident. Forsynchronization, coordination, [and]integration to take place, planning isrequired.”

VADM Vern Clark, USN

b. Another fundamental aim in applyingthe operational art is to bring the appropriateelements of the force to bear simultaneouslyagainst the opponent’s entire structure to thedepth of the theater in order to multiply thecombined effects and increase synergy. Whenthe friendly forces have an accurate and sharedawareness of the situation, understand theopponent, and operate more rapidly than theopponent can react, they can anticipateevents, achieve surprise, and seizeopportunities.

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c. To assure freedom of action andmaintain the initiative, the JFC should striveto maintain balance in the force’s posture(forces committed and in reserve, decisivelyengaged and able to accept changes inmission, in fixed positions and able to moveand maneuver at will, etc.). Balance willpermit rapidly adapting to a changingsituation. This will allow the JFC to tailorthe force mix and focus its capabilities,exploit adversary vulnerabilities, and adaptthe nature and timing of its operations to mosteffectively accomplish its mission. JFCsdesignate priority efforts and establishappropriate command relationships, and controlthe timing and tempo of operations to assist inmaintaining balance. These efforts seek topreserve the responsiveness of the total joint forceand its components’ capabilities, which is centralto operational art. The JFC seeks to maintainfriendly force balance while aggressively seekingto disrupt the adversary’s balance by strikingwith powerful blows from unexpected directionsor dimensions.

d. An appropriate mix of force capabilitiesalso contributes to achieving leverage againstthe opponent. Attaining this advantage isthe centerpiece of the operational art. JFCsachieve leverage by properly integrating andemploying their forces to gain, maintain, andexploit advantages in combat power acrossall its dimensions, employing to themaximum all other elements of theoperational art.

• The JFC obtains leverage byestablishing appropriate commandrelationships between components andestablishing a focus of effort, or maineffort, for each phase of an operation.This allows the JFC to maintain unityof effort and focus and integrate eachcomponent’s unique capabilities whilearranging symmetric and asymmetricactions to take advantage of friendlystrengths against important enemyvulnerabilities.

Figure V-1. Elements of Operational Art

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART

OPERATIONAL

ART

ANTICIPATION

BALANCE

LEVERAGE

TIMING AND

TEMPO

OPERATIONAL

REACH

AND APPROACH

FORCES AND

FUNCTIONS

ARRANGING

OPERATIONS

TERMINATION

CENTERS OF

GRAVITY

DIRECT VERSUS

INDIRECT

DECISIVE POINTS

CULMINATION

SYNERGYSIMULTANEITY AND

DEPTH

ANTICIPATION

BALANCE

LEVERAGE

TIMING AND

TEMPO

OPERATIONAL

REACH

AND APPROACH

FORCES AND

FUNCTIONS

ARRANGING

OPERATIONS

TERMINATION

CENTERS OF

GRAVITY

DIRECT VERSUS

INDIRECT

DECISIVE POINTS

CULMINATION

SYNERGYSIMULTANEITY AND

DEPTH

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Fundamentals of Joint Operations

“The Americans, with minimum losses,attacked and seized a relatively weakarea, constructed airfields, and thenproceeded to cut the supply lines totroops in that area. The Japanese armypreferred direct assault, after Germanfashion, but the Americans flowed intoour weaker points and submerged us,just as water seeks the weakest entryto sink a ship. We respected this typeof strategy for its brilliance because itgained the most while losing the least.”

Lieutenant Colonel Matsuichi Iino,Japanese Eighth Area Army, WW II

• The JFC also shapes the nature ofinteractions with the adversary to achieveleverage. Engagements with the enemymay be thought of as “symmetric” iffriendly and enemy forces have similartypes of forces and capabilities, or“asymmetric” if forces and/or capabilitiesare significantly dissimilar. Asymmetricengagements with the enemy can createdecisive advantages and be extremelylethal, especially if the force beingattacked is not prepared to defend itself.Similarly, the joint force must be shieldedagainst an enemy’s asymmetric attack.

e. The posture of the forces and theircommand relationships also facilitateestablishing the timing and tempo ofoperations that best exploits friendlycapabilities and inhibits the adversary.Control of timing and tempo allows the JFCto remain unpredictable, operate beyond theenemy’s ability to react, and achievedominance throughout the battlespace.

f. In applying the operational art, the JFCneeds a clear understanding of the operationalreach of friendly capabilities, including thosethat may be in support from locations outsidethe immediate theater of operations. Thisunderstanding will facilitate establishing the

operational approach, proper lines ofoperations, and sequencing operations.

g. An understanding of the types ofcapabilities and forces available to theopponent will assist the JFC to focuscampaign objectives, phasing, and timing.Opponents that do not have full forcecapabilities may have vulnerable keyfunctions that provide the most lucrativetargets for friendly attack. With an opponentwho has a full range of functions and typesof forces, friendly operations may be moreeffective by simultaneously engaging themall.

h. The JFC arranges elements of thecampaign in time and space to exploit keyfriendly strengths and adversaryvulnerabilities. This may be accomplishedby a combination of simultaneous andsequential actions to achieve campaignobjectives most effectively and rapidly. Thecampaign is typically organized by phases.Phasing assists commanders in thinkingthrough an entire campaign, definingrequirements in terms of forces, resources,time, space, and manageable subordinateobjectives. Phasing also leads to an orderlyprocess of developing branches and sequels(which are crucial for anticipation andflexibility) and to help dissipate the fog of war.Branches and sequels in campaigns facilitatephasing a campaign and enable the JFC tomaintain freedom of action in rapidlychanging situations.

i. A central consideration in applying theoperational art is the location and nature ofadversary centers of gravity — thosecharacteristics, capabilities, or localities fromwhich a military force derives its freedom ofaction, physical strength, or will to fight.

j. Accurate identification of these COGswill assist in overall campaign planning and

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in decisions by the JFC on the relative meritsof simultaneous or sequential operations anddirect or indirect attack. During executionof a campaign, COGs may change as theopponents act and react in relation to eachother and cause changes in their relativecapabilities.

k. Supporting the assessment of COGs isthe identification of decisive points. Thesepoints may be geographic in nature(constrained sea lanes, hills, towns, and airbases), key events (attainment of air and navalsuperiority), and systemic conditions(effective command and control systems,adequate refueling and ammunition storagecapacity). Control, destruction, orneutralization of decisive points by friendlyforces can yield a marked advantage over theenemy and therefore influence the outcomeof battles, operations, and campaigns.

l. At the outset of campaign design, theJFC and planners must consider culmination,the point at which a force no longer has thecapability to continue its form of operation,offense or defense. For the offense,culmination is the point at which continuingthe attack is no longer possible and the forcemust consider reverting to a defensive postureor attempting an operational pause. For the

defense, culmination is the point at whichcounteroffensive action is no longer possible.An objective in campaign design is to compelthe adversary into unanticipated culmination,avoid culmination for the friendly force, andachieve campaign objectives as quickly aspossible.

m. Finally, termination is a componentof strategy and the operational art. The endstate envisioned for a campaign or majoroperation defines termination, identifying thepoint at which military operations may bebrought to an end. For the Armed Forces ofthe United States, termination requiresconditions in place that will support thedesired US postconflict objectives andinterests.

2. The Campaign

The campaign is an inherently jointinstrument for planning the employment ofthe Armed Forces of the United States inmilitary operations of all types. The campaignis based on US national security and militarystrategies as well as the mission assigned tothe JFC. Campaign plans are normallycomprehensive for all operations in a theater.Subordinate campaign plans prepared by jointtask forces (JTFs) or subunified commands

Centers of gravity may be attacked directly or indirectly.

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may be appropriate in complex situations.Fundamental planning concepts underliecampaign planning. The campaign is orientedon a clear statement of the combatantcommander’s intent and the focus ofoperations, taking into account the objectivesto be secured at national, strategic, andoperational levels. To guide the conduct ofoperations, campaign planning identifies theopponent’s COGs and related key areas ofvulnerability. Planning also includesprotection of friendly COGs and key areas ofvulnerability, including considerations at thenational and theater levels for the United Statesand other participating countries in the case ofmultinational operations. In complex situationsand when forces needed for the operation mustbe deployed from other areas, joint planningincludes phasing with the commander’s intentfor each phase clearly defined.

The campaign is based on thecommander’s concept, a broad vision thatis the intellectual core of the campaign plan.The commander’s concept begins bypresenting the commander’s intent, whichdefines the desired end state, concisely

expresses the purpose of the operation, andprovides focus for subordinates. Thecommander’s concept then describes howoperations will be integrated, sequenced, andsynchronized to achieve conflict terminationobjectives (including postconflict measures).The commander’s concept normally includesfour elements:

• The operational concept itself based onthe unified command or theater strategy,which is the scheme for the entireoperation;

• The logistic concept, which provides anoverall description of how the joint forcewill be supported;

• The deployment concept, whichdescribes the sequencing of operationalcapabilities and logistic support into theobjective area; and

• The organizational concept, whichincludes external and internal commandrelationships and, when required,organization for deployment.

The Medal of Honor is Awarded toMajor Charles J. Loring Jr, United States Air Force

Maj Loring was the leader of a flight of 4 F-80 type aircraft on a close supportmission near Sniper Ridge, North Korea, on 22 November 1952. Maj Loringwas briefed by a controller to dive-bomb enemy gun positions which wereharassing friendly ground troops. After verifying the location of the target,Maj Loring rolled into his dive bomb run. Throughout the run, extremelyaccurate ground fire was directed on his aircraft. Disregarding the accuracyand intensity of the ground fire, Maj Loring aggressively continued to pressthe attack until his aircraft was hit. At approximately 4,000 feet, he deliberatelyaltered his course and aimed his diving aircraft at active gun emplacementsconcentrated on a ridge northwest of the briefed target, turned his aircraft 45degrees to the left, pulled up in a deliberate, controlled maneuver, and electedto sacrifice his life by diving his aircraft directly into the midst of the enemyemplacements. His selfless and heroic action completely destroyed the enemygun emplacement and eliminated a dangerous threat to United Nations groundforces.

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The campaign is explained in moredetail in JP 3-0, Doctrine for JointOperations, and JP 5-0, Doctrine forPlanning Joint Operations.

3. Unified Command andTheater Strategies

As a precursor to theater planning,combatant commands normally developstrategic estimates, command or theater

strategies, and supporting peacetime plansfor their assigned responsibilities in order toimplement US national security and militarystrategies. The connecting link betweencombatant command and national planningis the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Thisplan, developed under CJCS authority assignsplanning tasks, apportions major combatforces and resources, and issues planningguidance to the combatant commands. Theresulting unified command and theater

OPERATION OVERLORDA CLASSIC JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATION; KEYSTONE TO A

SUCCESSFUL COMBINED THEATER CAMPAIGN

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, Allied ExpeditionaryForce, used two years of preparation and team-building leadership to createunity of effort for OVERLORD and the subsequent campaign to free Europe.This effective joint and combined staff operation owed much to Alliedexperiences in North Africa and the Mediterranean, and included a deputy ofanother Service and nation and subordinate commands for air, land, and navalforces. Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff provided the necessary but very elasticstrategic guidance, directing him only to “Enter the continent of Europe, and... undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction ofher armed forces.”

With the Combined Chiefs’ directive as guidance, General Eisenhower plannedand directed a seven phase campaign to recapture Western Europe. The singleguiding principle of this campaign was the destruction of the enemy’s forces.

Combined military deception operations reinforced this principle by causingthe Germans to disperse significant forces outside the planned invasion area.Massive air bombardment interdicted railroads and bridges leading to theinvasion area. Other Allied forces screened the invasion flanks by neutralizingenemy air and naval threats. During the night of 5 June airborne landingsblocked key causeways, road junctions, and bridges leading to the amphibiousassault area. Underwater demolition cleared paths through the obstaclesblocking the seaward approaches. On 6 June 1944 naval gunfire and tacticalair support proved indispensable in destroying German fortifications, troopconcentrations, and minefields.

Although Allied invasion troops faced locally stout German resistance, oncethe bulk of the first wave was through the German beach defenses, theoperational issue was no longer in doubt. Logistic preparation to support theinvasion was so effective that by D+12, over 2,700 ships and 1,000 transportaircraft had landed 692,000 troops, 95,000 vehicles, and 228,000 tons ofsupplies. This build-up laid the foundations for the remaining phases of theoverall campaign that was to reach its successful conclusion in May 1945.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

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strategies assist the combatant command andits components in the pursuit of unity of effort.These command and theater strategies providethe basis for campaign and operation plans,and for determining requirements for forcesand resources to execute those plans. Thestrategies, plans, and resource requirementssupport a collaborative and iterative set ofprocesses for joint strategic planning as wellas for resource planning, programming, andresourcing.

4. Unified Action

Unified action describes the broad scopeof activities taking place within unifiedcommands, subordinate unified commands,or JTFs under the overall direction of thecommanders of those commands for thepurpose of achieving unity of effort in missionaccomplishment. Unified action requires theintegration of effort across the command. Thisincludes joint, single-Service, special, andsupporting operations; as well as interagency,NGOs, PVOs, and multinational participantsinto a unified effort in the theater or jointoperations area. Military support of unifiedaction is facilitated by operations under asingle commander, in execution of a singleplan, that encompass all assigned andsupporting military and nonmilitary elements.Unified action within the military instrumentof national power supports the nationalstrategic unity of effort through closecoordination with the other instruments ofnational power.

a. Unified action requires unified direction.The combatant command and theaterstrategies, including their derivative campaignand operation plans, provide that direction.The principles and considerations for unifiedaction apply to US participation inmultinational and interagency operations.Multinational operations may require uniquecommand relationships that maintain unity ofeffort while not establishing a singlemultinational force commander.

b. For interagency operations abroad,including participation by NGOs and PVOs,the combatant commander may designate aJTF to conduct the military portion ofinteragency operations. For example, incounterdrug operations, combatantcommanders may establish joint interagencytask forces in their areas of responsibility. Tofacilitate operations, the combatant or jointtask force commander may establish a civil-military operations center, other specializedfunctional coordination centers, and liaisonteams to ensure unity of effort in theinteragency actions.

c. A primary consideration for combatantcommand unified action is the primacy of thetheater military objectives that directly relateto national security and military strategies. AllArmed Forces of the United Statesparticipation in multinational and interagencyoperations abroad adhere to this principle.

d. In operations within US territory, themilitary instrument is normally subordinateto the national or other civil governmentalagency with primary jurisdiction for thefunction or area concerned. This may requirethe provision of support from a standing taskforce formed specifically for the purpose ofassisting civil authorities, or the formation ofa special task-oriented organization for uniquecircumstances. In the defense of US territory,the FBI has responsibility for counteringterrorism. For relief from natural andmanmade disasters, the responsible Federallead agency is the FEMA. To assure unity ofeffort, military activities under thesecircumstances should be conducted understanding or tailored JTFs that specificallysupport the lead Federal agency under termsstipulated by the President.

5. Command Relationships

Command is central to all military action,and unity of command (a principle of war)is central to unity of effort (a fundamental

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of joint warfare). US military power isemployed under JFCs. Unified action beginswith unified direction. This is normallyaccomplished by assigning a mission orobjective to a single commander, andproviding that commander sufficient forces,other resources, and authority to accomplishthe assigned mission or objective. Therelationships between and among forceelements follow a set of principles to establisha chain of command, facilitate the bestpossible utilization of all available capabilities,and ensure unified action in missionaccomplishment. Inherent in command is theauthority that a military commander lawfullyexercises over subordinates. Commandconfers the authority to assign missions andto demand accountability for their attainment.The four command relationships arecombatant command (command authority),that only combatant commanders canexercise; operational control; tactical control;and support. In addition, there are anotherthree authorities. They are administrativecontrol, which permits exercise of authorityover subordinate organizations foradministration and support; coordinatingauthority; and direct liaison authorized.Although commanders may delegate authorityto accomplish missions, they may not absolve

themselves of the responsibility for theattainment of those missions. Authority isnever absolute. The extent of authority islimited by the establishing instruction,directives, and law.

See JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF), for additional information.

a. Exercise of Command. The primaryemphasis in command relations should be tokeep the chain of command short and simpleso that it is clear who is in charge and of what.Unity of command is the guiding principle ofwar in the exercise of command. The systemsthat support the exercise of command aresimilarly guided by time-tested principles.These systems — including command,control, communications, computers, andinformation systems and networks — shouldbe reliable, survivable, flexible, interoperable,timely, and secure.

• In the exercise of command and thecontrol of operations, commandersshould adhere to two key tenets: clarityin the statement of the commander’sintent, so that all subordinates understandthe conditions to be established bysuccessful operations and, therefore,

Military assistance to civil authorities calls for unity of effort insupport of the lead Federal agency.

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define the military criteria fortermination; and simplicity of orders.JFCs should use their liaisons to assistin directing the actions of the force inanticipation of a developing situationand in assuring shared understanding ofmissions and situations.

• Continuity of command is essential forcontinuity of operations. Commandersare responsible for assuring continuity ofcommand in the event they or theirheadquarters become incapacitated orunavailable, therefore, JFCs must makeprovisions for continuity of command,control, and communications in aseverely degraded communicationsenvironment. Continuity is assured bydefining the succession of command,designating alternate headquarters, andstipulating those circumstances underwhich another will assume command andthe procedures for such assumption. Thecommand should strive for redundancyof means and the reduction or eliminationof unique nodes.

• The components of a joint force may becomprised of Service elements orfunctional elements such as specialoperations forces. JFCs may organizetheir forces as necessary to accomplishthe command’s mission. Nevertheless,subordinate units should be permitted tofunction within the parameters of theirdesign and capabilities, mission andcircumstances permitting.

• The role of component commanders in ajoint force merits special attention.Component commanders are firstexpected to orchestrate the activity oftheir own forces, branches, and warfarecommunities. In addition, they mustunderstand how their own capabilitiesbest integrate into the overall design tomost effectively satisfy the JFC’s intent.Component commanders are also the

primary sources of advice to the JFC andtheir fellow component commanders ontheir requirements for support from, andtheir capabilities for support to, othercomponent commanders.

• The contributions of training, leaderdevelopment, and education areindispensable to effective command.Leaders acquire their joint skills insequential and progressive systems ofeducation, training, self-development,and assignments of increasing Serviceand joint responsibility. Leaders in theArmed Forces of the United States shouldunderstand and make every effort to availthemselves of the opportunities for jointprofessional development, education,and training.

• The exercise of command takes placeagainst the backdrop of the adversary’scommand structure. The joint warfarefundamental of knowledge of the enemyis indispensable for effective command.The JFC, supported by the analysis ofthe command’s staff, must be able toidentify peculiarities and vulnerabilitiesthat will enable the joint force to destroythe adversary’s command capability earlyin the action. This will facilitate thedestruction, neutralization, ordegradation of the adversary force’scapabilities.

b. Supported and SupportingRelationships. Supported and supportingrelationships between commands facilitateunified action in planning and conductingoperations. Support is a command authorityestablished by a superior commander betweensubordinate commanders when anorganization should aid, protect, complement,or sustain another force. It may be exercisedby commanders at any echelon at or belowthe level of combatant command. Thisincludes the NCA designating a supportrelationship between combatant commanders

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The Medal of Honor is Awarded toLieutenant Harvey C. Barnum Jr, United States Marine Corps

On 18 December 1965, near Ky Phu in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam,1st Lt Barnum’s company was suddenly pinned down by a hail of extremelyaccurate enemy fire. The company was quickly separated from the remainderof the battalion by over 500 meters of open and fire-swept ground, andcasualties mounted rapidly. Lt Barnum quickly made a hazardousreconnaissance of the area, seeking targets for his artillery. Finding the riflecompany commander mortally wounded and the radio operator killed, he, withcomplete disregard for his safety, gave aid to the dying commander, thenremoved the radio from the dead operator and strapped it to himself. Heimmediately assumed command of the rifle company, and moving at once intothe midst of the heavy fire, rallying and giving encouragement to all units,reorganized them to replace the loss of key personnel and led their attack onenemy positions from which deadly fire continued to come. His sound andswift decisions and his obvious calm served to stabilize the badly decimatedunits and his gallant example as he stood exposed repeatedly to point outtargets served as an inspiration to all. Provided with 2 armed helicopters, hemoved fearlessly through enemy fire to control the air attack against the firmlyentrenched enemy while skillfully directing 1 platoon in a successfulcounterattack on the key enemy positions. Having thus cleared a small area,he requested and directed the landing of 2 transport helicopters for theevacuation of the dead and wounded. He then assisted in the mopping up andfinal seizure of the battalion’s objective.

as well as within a combatant command.Within a combatant command, JFCs maydesignate one of their components orsubordinate joint forces as a supported activityfor a certain purpose and time. In fulfillingthat responsibility, the supported commandersmust coordinate, synchronize, and integratethe activities of the supporting commands inconjunction with their own forces under theJFC’s overall supervision and authority. Morethan one supported command may bedesignated simultaneously and componentsmay simultaneously receive and providesupport in different mission areas, functions,or operations. (These relationships arefurther described in subordinate doctrine andjoint tactics, techniques, and procedures.)

• The supported commander has authorityto exercise general direction of thesupporting effort, unless limited by aspecific directive. This includes

designating and establishing prioritiesfor targets or objectives, timing andduration of the supporting action, effectsof the action, and other instructionsnecessary for coordination and efficiencyof the operation for which the support isprovided.

• The supporting commander isresponsible for determining the forces,tactics, methods, procedures, andcommunications to employ in providingsupport. The supporting commander isalso responsible for ascertaining theneeds of the supported force and takingaction to fulfill them within existingcapabilities, consistent with priorities andrequirements of other assigned tasks.

c. Integration of Service and FunctionalComponent Capabilities. Centralizedplanning and direction, and decentralized

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execution facilitate integration of all elementsof a joint force. That is, integration isaccomplished through the development ofcommand and theater strategies, campaign andoperation plans, operation orders and othermission directives as well as forms oforganization that achieve the greatest synergyand make the best use of the combined effectsof all available capabilities.

• The joint force’s organization for combatshould promote integration and mayinclude Service and functionalcomponent commands. The combatantcommander has Service componentcommands comprising the force elementsassigned from the particular Service.Combatant commanders and subordinatesubunified and joint task force

commanders have the authority tocentralize selected functions andestablish functional componentcommands to perform those functions.The functional component commanderis normally a Service componentcommander with the preponderance offorces and the capability for performingrequired command and controlfunctions.

• Regardless of the particular form oforganization, the principles of war andmilitary operations other than war, andthe fundamentals of joint warfare, applyto the operations of the joint force andits components, Service components, andfunctional components in order to assureunified action.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIFUNDAMENTALS OF INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

VI-1

The purposes of joint doctrine for militaryparticipation in interagency operations are toguide the proper employment of the militaryinstrument and to assure unity of effort withthe diplomatic, economic, and informationalinstruments of national power. Interagencyoperations may be conducted in the UnitedStates and abroad. Combatant commandersand other JFCs must consider the potentialrequirements for interagency operations as apart of their activities across the range ofmilitary operations. Early inclusion ofinteragency considerations in assessments,estimates, and plans will facilitate civil-military integration of effort, focus theappropriate military participation, and assistthe military effort to obtain the best availablesupport from other interagency participants.The guidance outlined in this chaptersupplements the authority of combatantcommanders to take immediate action inresponse to incidents on their installations,domestic and abroad, as well as in support ofa host country abroad.

1. The Interagency Process andParticipants

The interagency process facilitates unifiedaction by military and nonmilitary participantsconducting interagency operations in pursuitof national objectives.

a. At the highest level the NSC is the leadagency for national security civil-militaryintegration. Its responsibilities are focusedon integrating advice and recommendationsfor consideration and decision by the President

“A Task Force Commander who creates a close knit interagency workingrelationship can focus on getting the mission accomplished without thedistractions created by outside agencies or attempts to fulfill special agendasthat might be disruptive to the operation.”

RADM Michael D. Haskins, USN

as well as disseminating and monitoringimplementation of those decisions.Interagency groups within the NSC systempermit task-organized participation at theappropriate level by agencies (includingmilitary representation) involved in anyparticular interagency task. The Secretary ofDefense is a statutory member of the NSC,and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffis its statutory military advisor. Officials ofthe Office of the Secretary of Defenserepresent the Secretary in NSC interagencygroups. Similarly, the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, assisted by the Joint Staff,represents the combatant commanders forinteragency matters in the NSC system.

b. Interagency organization for matters thatare primarily nonmilitary but may requiremilitary participation are organized underappropriate lead agencies abroad and in theUnited States. Overseas, ordinarily the USambassador and the country team take thelead. At the national level, for support ofoverseas interagency operations, normally theDepartment of State leads the effort, formingtask-oriented groups or availing itself of theNSC system to organize the effort. Fordomestic interagency operations that mayrequire military participation, the FEMA hasthe lead for mitigating the consequences ofnatural and manmade disasters and civildefense, and the FBI for crises relating toterrorism. The Secretary of Defense retainsthe authority to approve use of combatantcommand resources for assistance to civilauthorities. For military support in responseto natural and manmade disasters, the Army’s

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Director for Military Support (DOMS) is thefocal point and has the capabilities needed toorganize, integrate, and provide militaryassistance for approved operations. TheUnited States Joint Forces Command(USJFCOM) is responsible for providingmilitary assistance within CONUS formanaging and mitigating the consequences of,the deliberate use of, or accidents involving,NBC, radiological, and other high-yieldexplosive weapons.

c. Operations abroad may involve a varietyof US Government agencies, internationalorganizations (such as the United Nations andits subordinate agencies), regionaltransnational organizations (such as the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization, theOrganization for African Unity, and theOrganization of American States), NGOs(such as Doctors Without Borders and Savethe Children Fund), and PVOs (such as theAmerican Red Cross and CARE (Cooperativefor Assistance and Relief Everywhere)). Inaddition to US Government agencies,domestic participants may include a numberof state and local government organizationsas well as the types of NGOs and PVOs thatoperate internationally.

2. Interagency Coordination

a. The guidelines for interagencycoordination assure that all participatingagencies, under appropriate authority, focustheir efforts for domestic or foreign operations.The Armed Forces of the United States haveunique capabilities to offer for interagencyoperations. These include influence throughestablished military-to-military domestic andinternational contacts; resources such aslogistics not available to nonmilitary agencies;and responsiveness based on military trainingand readiness. Additional unique militarycapabilities include command and controlresources supported by worldwidecommunications and intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissanceinfrastructures; robust organizational andplanning processes, training support for largenumbers of individuals on myriad skills, andair and sea mobility support for intertheateror intratheater requirements. Four generalconsiderations apply to civil-militarypreparations for interagency activities.

• The Department of Defense mustdevelop consensus on and approval ofthe desired scope, nature, and end stateof military participation.

Operations abroad may involve a variety of US and international agencies, suchas in this meeting of US Army, UN, Serb, and Croat officials on de-mining inBosnia-Herzegovina.

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Fundamentals of Interagency Operations

• Participating agencies must clearlyunderstand their respective missions,capabilities, and methods of operation.

• The agencies must develop a sharedappreciation of their individual andmutual needs, and develop thefundamental rules to conduct operationsand to promote confidence in theirinterdependence.

• Participating agencies should establishtheir short-term objectives, bothindividually and collectively, in the contextof the long term desired end state in orderto assure the value of the operation beyondits immediate conclusion.

“The necessary first step in shapingeffective interagency groups is makingknown what skills and resources onebrings to the table.”

ADM P. D. Miller, USN

b. Domestic Operations. Militaryparticipation in operations inside the UnitedStates and its territories may include assistancefor domestic emergencies that result fromnatural or manmade causes, or assistance tocivilian law enforcement agencies. Militaryassistance may be approved by the Presidentor the Secretary of Defense — depending onthe circumstances — for interagency actionsto cope with contingencies such as civildisturbances, counterdrug operations, supportfor combatting terrorism, and other events forwhich the Armed Forces of the United Statesmay have unique and essential capabilities.

• In domestic situations, the Constitution,law, and other governmental directiveslimit the scope and nature of militaryactions. The National Guard has uniqueroles in domestic operations. Undercontrol of the respective states, NationalGuard units provide a wide variety ofdirect support to civil authorities, whereas

military forces under Federal controlmust adhere to the provisions of thePosse Comitatus Act. This act, togetherwith related DOD regulations, prohibitsthe Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, andNavy from participating in civilian lawenforcement activities within the UnitedStates. In its maritime law enforcementrole, the US Coast Guard is a uniquebranch of the Armed Forces withjurisdiction in both US waters and on thehigh seas and the only military Servicenot constrained by the Posse ComitatusAct. Domestic interagency operations areconducted under the control of a leadFederal or state agency. Early in theplanning phase and following approvalby the Secretary of Defense of a requestfor assistance, the military andnonmilitary participants must define theappropriate scope of militaryparticipation, consistent with applicablelaw and policy.

• In the event of a domestic crisis or naturalor manmade disaster, the Armed Forcesof the United States may provideassistance as approved by the Secretaryof Defense to the responsiblegovernmental agencies, normally the FBIand FEMA. Military assistance mayinclude direct support for planning,organizing, and employing militarycapabilities under control of theUSJFCOM. USJFCOM is responsiblefor providing military assistance to civilauthorities for a range of domesticcontingencies, and has unique missionresponsibilities for managing andmitigating the consequences of deliberateuse of, or accidents involving, NBC,radiological, and other high-yieldexplosive weapons. USJFCOM mayprovide approved support in suchcircumstances, supplementing the effortsof Federal, state, or local elements firstresponding to the disaster.

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c. Foreign Operations

• Interagency operations in foreign areasmay arise as a result of risks to USinterests or those of US allies or otherfriendly countries. Such operations mayinvolve preexisting bilateral andmultilateral military relationships,treaties involving US defense interests,initiatives concerning technology transferor armaments cooperation and control,foreign humanitarian assistance, peaceoperations, or other contingencies.

• Within a theater, the geographiccombatant commander is responsible forplanning and implementing militarystrategies and operations that requireinteragency coordination. Coordinationrequired outside the geographic regionmay be supported by groups within theNSC system or individual Departments,with lead for such coordination fallingeither to the combatant command or theFederal agency depending on thecircumstances. In some operations, aSpecial Representative of the Presidentor Special Envoy of the United NationsSecretary-General may be involved.

• The formal US interagency structure inforeign countries operates under the leadof the US ambassador and the countryteam, and may include US InformationService and US embassy public affairsrepresentation. The US ambassador isordinarily the lead agent for interagencyoperations abroad that are essentiallynonmilitary in nature but require militaryparticipation, with representation andcontrol of the military operationsprovided by the JFC.

3. Command Relationships

a. Command relationships in interagencyoperations differ from joint and multinationaloperations. In interagency operations,

command relationships preserve the primacyof civil authorities in their spheres ofresponsibility while facilitating the fullutilization of military forces as permitted bythe Constitution, law, and directives of thePresident. Military commands normallyprovide assistance in consonance with thesedirectives for activities conducted under thecontrol of civil authorities.

b. The NCA ordinarily establish supportedand supporting command relationshipsbetween combatant commanders whenissuing the deployment and execution ordersfor the particular interagency operationrequiring military involvement. Thegeographic combatant commanders,supported by functional combatant or otherjoint force commands, provide the forces andresources to accomplish the mission.

c. The relationship between NGOs andPVOs and US military elements is an associateor partnership relationship. These civilianorganizations do not operate in military orgovernmental hierarchies and therefore cannothave formal supporting or supportedrelationships with US military forces.

4. Organizing for InteragencyOperations

a. The organizational guidelines for jointand multinational action apply to organizingfor interagency operations with deference todifferences in command relationships, legalstrictures, and national policy. In allinteragency operations, foreign and domestic,military commanders have inherentresponsibilities. These include therequirements to clarify the mission; determinethe controlling legal and policy authorities;task, organize, direct, sustain, and care for theorganizations and personnel provided for theinteragency effort; and assure seamlesstermination under conditions which assurethat identified national objectives are met andcan be sustained after the operation.

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Fundamentals of Interagency Operations

b. For interagency operations abroad,combatant commands establish a process forensuring effective organization for andconduct of the operation including a numberof specific tasks.

• Identification of all agencies andorganizations that are or should beinvolved in the operation.

• Establishment of an interagencyhierarchy and definition of the objectivesof the response effort pertinent to theoperation as a whole and to eachparticipating agency.

• Definition of COAs for both theatermilitary operations and agency activities.

• Solicitation from each agency,department, or organization of a clearunderstanding of the role that each plays.

• Identification of potential obstacles to thecollective effort arising from conflictingdepartmental or agency priorities.

• Identification of resources of eachparticipant in order to reduce duplicationand increase coherence in the collectiveeffort.

• Definition of the desired end state andexit criteria.

• Sharing of relevant intelligence to thosewith a need to know subject to US andcommand security standards.

• Focus of the mission’s assets to supportthe longer-term goals of the enterprise.

• Establishment of a liaison section,interagency assessment teams, civil-military operations centers, humanitarianassistance coordination centers, andlogistic operations centers as required.

c. For interagency operations (excludingterrorism and the management of theconsequences of an incident involvingweapons of mass destruction) within theUnited States and its territories, DOMS

INTEGRATING INTERAGENCY PLANNING

Our experiences in Kosovo and elsewhere have demonstrated the necessityto ensure that all concerned government agencies conduct comprehensiveplanning to encompass the full range of instruments available to decisionmakers. We all must move forward with our efforts to achieve increased levelsof integrated interagency planning now. To better support other agencies,DOD needs to give greater consideration to political, diplomatic, humanitarian,economic, information, and other nonmilitary activities in defense planning.In addition, the US Government must establish dedicated mechanisms andintegrated planning processes to ensure rapid, effective, well-structured, multi-agency efforts in response to crises. Finally, we must continue to emphasizethat our senior officials routinely participate in rehearsals, gaming, exercises,and simulations, as well as the CP IWG [Contingency Planning InteragencyWorking Group] - which has become a genuine leap forward in the effort toestablish a sound system to incorporate crisis and deliberate planning acrossthe interagency.

SOURCE: CJCS Posture Statement before the 106th Congress Committee,On Armed Services, United States Senate, 8 February 2000

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organizes the military effort followingauthorization by the Secretary of Defense andacts directly with the JFC. In circumstancesinvolving domestic terrorism, the NCA mustspecifically approve military assistance for theinteragency effort.

5. JTF Interagency Operations

a. There are specific policies and proceduresthat guide JTF interagency operations. The

US Marines provide security for UN investigationof war crimes. The JTF must remain aware of allagencies involved in operations.

unique aspects of the interagency process requirethe JTF headquarters to be especially flexible,responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities ofnot only the JTF’s components, but otheragencies as well. When designating a JTF, thecombatant commander will select the JTFcommander, assign a joint operations area,specify a mission, provide planning guidance,allocate forces from the assigned Service andfunctional component commands, ensure thatsupporting commands understand assistancerequired, and request forces as necessary fromthe NCA.

b. In contrast to the established commandstructure of a combatant command or JTF,NGOs and PVOs in the operational area maynot have a defined structure for controllingactivities. Upon identifying organizational oroperational mismatches betweenorganizations, the staff of the combatantcommand or JTF should designate points inthe NGOs and PVOs at which liaison andcoordinating mechanisms are appropriate.

c. In order to best coordinate military andcivilian operations, the JTF should establisha civil-military operations center (CMOC)near the JTF command center. The CMOC iscomposed of representatives from military,civilian, US, and multinational agenciesinvolved in the operation. An effectiveCMOC contributes to meeting the objectivesof all represented agencies in a cooperativeand efficient manner.

CHAPTER VIIFUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

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1. Overview

a. Since the Revolutionary War, Americanmilitary operations have benefited fromparticipation by other like-minded countries.The United States has habitually conductedmilitary operations abroad, typically inalliances and coalitions. The Armed Forcesof the United States must be prepared tooperate abroad within a multinationalframework, and should be prepared to operateunder other-than-US leadership.

b. All US force commanders participatingin multinational operations have key roles thatrequire acute political sensitivity in additionto military leadership skills. They must buildthe mutual confidence that is the basis foreffective multinational cooperative action.Four tenets guide the Armed Forces of theUnited States in multinational cooperativeactivities: respect, rapport, knowledge ofpartners, and patience.

• Respect. American military historyconfirms the importance of genuinepartnership based on mutual respectbetween the United States and its diverseforeign comrades in arms. This includesrespect for each partner’s culture,religion, customs, history, and values.Each participant has unique capabilitiesfrom which the entire multinationaloperation can obtain maximum benefitonly on the basis of mutual respect.

• Rapport. Harmonious relations amongparticipants in multinational operationsfacilitate teamwork and result in unity of

“In war it is not always possible to have everything go exactly as one likes.In working with allies it sometimes happens that they develop opinions oftheir own.”

Sir Winston Churchill

effort. Rapport is a personal directrelationship. Commanders mustestablish the environment and set theexample for developing rapport amongsubordinate commanders, staffs, andindividual members of US commands.

• Knowledge of Partners. The challengesof interoperability and unity of effortunderscore the importance of mutualknowledge of each other among themultinational participants. UScommanders in multinational operationsmust devote the time and resources toknow and understand their comrades inarms. This effort is as important tosuccess as the effort to understand theadversary.

• Patience. Developing mutual respect,rapport, and mutual knowledge amongmultinational partners takes time and theconcerted efforts of leaders. UScommanders at all levels must lead,setting the example of untiring and even-handed patience, focusing on eliciting thebest possible performance from theintegration of US and multinationalpartners’ forces.

2. Definition and Types ofMultinational Operations

a. Multinational operations is a collectiveterm used to describe military actionsconducted by forces of two or more nations,typically organized within the structure of analliance or coalition. An alliance is a result offormal agreements between two or more

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nations for broad, long-term objectives, suchas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Acoalition is an ad hoc arrangement betweentwo or more nations for common action;Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERTSTORM in 1990-1991 were coalitionoperations. Multinational operationsencompass activities across the range ofmilitary operations.

b. Planning for multinational operations isaccomplished in national and internationalchannels. Collective security goals, strategies,and plans are developed in accordance withalliance, individual treaty, or special coalitionarrangements. Whether under alliance orcoalition auspices, peacetime preparations arevital to ensure the most effective possibleperformance in war. Therefore, peacetimeactivities that stress the participation of allmultinational partners’ armed forces intraining, exercises, leader development,education, and liaison and expert personnelexchanges lay the groundwork for success incrisis and war.

3. Strategic Context

The strategic context for multinationaloperations includes a diversity of nationalobjectives and cultures, the challenges ofunified action with disparate force capabilitiesand resources, and the requirements of publicinformation. Partners in multinationaloperations will share areas in commonalongside unique areas for each partner. Aprincipal initial objective in multinationaloperations is for the prospective partners toensure that the areas held in common aresufficient to sustain the operation to acommonly-agreed end state, and that theunique areas are not sufficiently different tothreaten the common enterprise.

a. National objectives duringmultinational operations, particularly those inwhich the United States may be one of thefew participants from outside the theater of

operations, must be clarified and reconciled.Preferably, this consensus should be reachedbefore the initial phases, during whichdeclarations of intent and policy as well asbrandishing of deterrent options by themultinational partners take place for thepurpose of deterring the adversary. If thisagreement is delayed until after the first bulletis fired, proper preparation and consultationof publics and government agencies amongparticipants to assure support over the courseof the operation may not be possible.

b. Methods of operation and individualbehavior that respect the cultural andreligious differences among and betweenpartners are essential in multinationaloperations, particularly in developingteamwork based upon mutual trust andrespect. Similarly important is reaching earlyagreement on roles and missions for each

Respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, andpatience guide multinational cooperative activities.

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Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

partner that respects their equality whilefocusing on their best contributions to themultinational effort (e.g., intratheater groundtransportation, human intelligence, speciallytrained close combat units). Clear roles,missions, and rules of engagement (ROE) areessential for proper planning, training, andrehearsals, and therefore are a cornerstone ofeffective multinational unified action.

c. Military resource and capabilitydifferences, particularly between partners ofmodest means and the United States, presentserious challenges. Combatant commandersmust perform unbiased assessments of theresource and capability needs and disparitiesbetween US and other forces in order topresent unsatisfied requirements andlimitations to the NCA for consideration. Forinstance, if not covered by a more capablepartner, lack of missile defense, offensive airsupport, or individual NBC protectiveclothing and equipment may seriouslyconstrain participation of a country’s forcesand constitute fatal vulnerabilities in themultinational structure. Such deficiencieswould be significant enough to warrantconsideration of providing additional

resources from US sources or cross-levelingresources in the theater. In any case, importantdisparities should be resolved before plans arecompleted and operations undertaken.

d. The global visibility of operations inwhich the United States participates placesspecial responsibilities and burdens on UScommanders. This is all the more so inmultinational operations in which theapproach to information, media access, andthe role of the public may differ amongparticipating countries. While US forces mustrespect the differences among partners, theycannot fail to discharge their responsibilitiesfor timely and accurate information to thepublic and all branches of the USG.Therefore, it may be necessary for thecombatant commander to establish specialprocedures so that media access and publicinformation activities required by US policycan take place without directly conflictingwith the requirements of other partners in themultinational operation. Similarly, combatantcommanders must ensure that they enforce thestandards of operations security whileproviding needed information, intelligence,and other access to multinational partners.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE — CONSENSUS IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization proved to be flexible, effective, andultimately successful during a uniquely challenging time in its history. Despitedomestic pressures in many NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] nations,an enormous humanitarian crisis, and isolated instances of targetmisidentification with incidental injury or collateral damage, the nations of thealliance held firm and unified and saw the operation through to a successfulconclusion. . . . Admittedly, gaining consensus among 19 democratic nationsis not easy and can only be achieved through discussion and compromise.However, the NATO alliance is also our greatest strength. It is true that therewere differences of opinion within the alliance. This is to be expected in analliance of democracies, and building consensus generally leads to sounderdecisions.

SOURCE: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,DOD Report to Congress, 31 January 2000

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e. Command and Control of US Forcesin Multinational Operations

• Unity of effort assuring unified action formultinational operations requires clearand effective command and controlstructures for the entire endeavor focusedon common objectives, plans, desired endstates, and ROE. Multinational partnersmust provide the multinational forcecommander sufficient authority over theirnational forces to achieve this unity. Inturn, multinational force commandersand staffs exercise their authority to unifythe efforts of the multinational forcetoward common objectives. Consensusand compromise are vital in multinationalmilitary operations characterized byvoluntary participation by the partnerswho retain their sovereignty and nationalinterests.

• The President retains command authorityover US forces involved in multinationaloperations. When prudent oradvantageous (for reasons such asmaximizing military effectiveness andensuring unity of effort) the Presidentmay agree to place appropriate US forcesunder the control of a foreign commanderin order to achieve specified militaryobjectives. To support a Presidentialdecision on multinational commandrelationships, senior military leaders areresponsible for providing information onsuch factors as the mission, size of theproposed US force, risks involved,anticipated duration, and ROE. Instanding alliances such as the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization, commandarrangements are established byagreement of all members.

• In general, a foreign commander’sauthority over US forces will depend onthe nature and goals of the mission andmust be clearly defined for eachmultinational operation. Within the

limits of this authority, a foreigncommander cannot change the missionor deploy US forces outside theoperational area agreed to by thePresident. A foreign commander cannotseparate US units, redistribute USsupplies, administer discipline, promoteUS personnel, or change internal USforce organization unless agreed to by theNCA. US commanders always maintainthe right and authority to report separatelyand directly to higher US authorities,regardless of the agreed authority of theforeign commander over US forces. Formatters perceived as illegal under US orinternational law, or outside the mandateof the mission to which the United Stateshas agreed, US commanders will firstattempt resolution with the appropriateforeign commanders. If issues remainunresolved, the US commanders willrefer the matters to higher US authorities.The chain of command from thePresident to the lowest US commanderin the field remains inviolate. These sameconsiderations apply when foreign forcesare placed under the authority of a UScommander. Nations do not relinquishtheir national interests by participatingin multinational operations. UScommanders must be prepared to dealwith these issues as they arise during anoperation.

f. Multinational Force Commander. Thecommander of the multinational force maybe a serving commander of a military arm ofan alliance when the alliance conducts themultinational operation, or a commandernominated by the nation providing thepreponderance of forces and resources andapproved by the other partners. The extent ofthe multinational force commander’s authorityis determined by agreement of themultinational participants and is seldomabsolute. As in the case of a joint USheadquarters, a multinational forceheadquarters and staff should reflect the

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general composition of the force as a whole.This includes all the essential areas of jointand multinational operations competence, aswell as the unique partnership of individualexperts and representatives. The objective ofthe command team is to unify the variousparticipating force elements and assureharmonious operations and effective unifiedaction.

g. Multinational Command Structures.Formal alliances typically establish integratedcommand structures, with participationreflecting the composition of the alliance.Alliances may also place their forces underthe command of one participant; the leadnation with the preponderance of the force.Temporary coalitions formed to pursuespecific, limited multinational operationsgenerally rely on three types of commandstructures: parallel command, lead nationcommand, and a combination of the two. Interms of components, multinationalcommands may be composed of nationalcommands with subordinate Servicecomponents and functional components,multinational functional componentcommands with subordinate nationalfunctional commands, or other combinations

tailored to the situation and capabilities ofpartners.

• In a parallel command, participatingcountries retain command and control oftheir deployed forces. Unity of effort andunified action are effected throughmultinational coordinating councils at thelevel of the national commanders, withtactical control of individual nationalcomponents being assigned to othernational commanders under bilateralagreements.

• In a lead nation command, participantssubordinate their forces to thecommander of the partner providing thepreponderance of forces and resources.

• Parallel and lead nation commandstructures may exist simultaneously in amultinational operation. Thiscombination may occur when two ormore partners control a number ofparticipants.

Typically, a multinational authority withrepresentatives of heads of state orgovernment (the NCA in the case of the

Multinational partners must provide the multinational force commandersufficient authority to achieve unity of effort.

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operations is the effective integration andemployment of all assets provided towardthe achievement of common objectives.Early in multinational operationalplanning, efforts to achieve a level ofstandardization and interoperabilityshould be made through the provision oftraining assistance, liaison teams, sharingof resources, and providing entire unitsfor support in functional areas ofdeficiency (air defense, fire support, andarmor are examples). An importantconcern of the commander is obtainingthe maximum effectiveness from themultinational force in accomplishing themission. When forces have disparatecapabilities, mission assignments shouldoptimize force effectiveness. To theextent possible, forces with greatercapabilities should not be constrained byforces with lesser capabilities. To reducedisparities among participating forces,minimum capability standards should beestablished and a certification processdeveloped. Identified shortcomingsshould be satisfied by either bilateral ormultilateral support agreements.

• Multinational commanders must givehigh priority to planning and conductingtraining events and rehearsals for keyaspects of the planned operation in orderto assure requisite overall force readinessand interoperability.

“ . . .we need an agreed way for doctrineto capture how we deal withmultinational and interagencyoperations. The EUCOM experiences. . . have indicated that training andshared ideas (about such issues asoperations, organization, andcommitment to civilian control of themilitary) are paramount to multinationaland interagency operations. And thekey to the military aspects ofmultinational operations is doctrine.”

GEN George A. Joulwan, USA

United States) provides common strategicdirection to the multinational militarycommand. For the United States, the NCAretains its command relationship directly tothe combatant commander when acting as USforce commander.

4. Considerations

In addition to the strategic context, thereare considerations for multinational unity ofeffort that are based on political, military,legal, and civil-military aspects of theparticipating countries and civilianorganizations operating in the theater. It isimportant to take these considerations intoaccount in initial planning for the formationof the multinational endeavor when it is notconducted by an existing alliance that hasalready shaped its procedures.

a. Political and Military Considerations.International and domestic politicalimperatives influence the behavior of nationalpolitical and military leaders andorganizations in multinational operations. Itis unrealistic to expect that strongly heldnational perspectives and preferences wouldbe set aside entirely in favor of a commonmultinational formula. Therefore, the formsof participation, decision making, andassignment of military tasks may have to beadapted to accommodate important nationalneeds. Multinational force commanders mustbe aware of the differences in politicalconstraints and military capabilities of theforces under their direction and establishprocedures and assign tasks accordingly.Commanders will routinely work directly withpolitical authorities in the theater ofoperations. The commander’s role asdiplomat should not be underestimated.

• Among the most important militaryconsiderations are the doctrine, level oftraining, leadership style, and hardwaretypes and capabilities of the participants.A basic challenge in multinational

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support military forces in peace and war. Asin the case of US interagency operations,combatant commanders must be cognizant ofthese organizations and their actions. To theextent possible, commanders should assurethat these organizations’ efforts and themilitary efforts are integrated, complementary,or not in conflict; and establish coordinationand mutual support mechanisms as needed toeliminate or mitigate conflict and support USgoals in the region. Since the NGOs andPVOs in the operational area may not have adefined structure for controlling activities, themultinational command may establish liaisonsections, assessment teams, civil-militaryoperations centers, humanitarian assistancecoordination centers, and logistic operationscenters as required. Other civil affairs supportmay also be required and should be provided,as resources permit, by the United States andother participating countries.

“Instead of thinking about warfightingagencies like command and control,you create a political committee, a civil-military operations center (CMOC) tointerface with volunteer organizations.These become the heart of youroperations, as opposed to a combat orfire-support operations center.”

Gen A.C. Zinni, USMC

• Of prime importance in multinationaloperations is the integration of separatecommand, control, communications, andcomputer systems; intelligence; andlogistic systems. Normally, nationalforces maintain separate intelligence andlogistic structures. Unless alliancestructures already exist to integrate thesevital functional areas, multinationalcommanders must establish effectivecoordination mechanisms, realizing thatUS capabilities are likely to be morecapable and sophisticated than those ofmost other participating forces. The UScombatant commander must understandwhat US intelligence may be shared andensure that the process is in place toprovide that intelligence in a timelymanner to the level needed by otherparticipants. Similarly with logistics, theUS combatant commander must knowwhat US resources may be madeavailable, on routine or emergency basis,to other forces with vital needs.

b. Integration of InternationalOrganizations (IOs), NGOs, PVOs, andContractors. Many host countrygovernmental and civilian agencies, IOs,NGOs, PVOs, and civilian contractorsroutinely carry out activities to assist in nationdevelopment, ameliorate suffering, and

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIIIADDRESSING THE FUTURE

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The Armed Forces of the United Statessimultaneously participate in shaping thestrategic environment to prevent war, respondwhen deterrence fails, and prepare for anuncertain future. Mindful of the lessons ofthe past, the Armed Forces maintain requiredcore competencies, identify future challenges,and transform forces to meet those challenges.An essential element in addressing the futureis the development of operational conceptsthat focus on the challenges that joint forcesmay encounter. These concepts should seekto exploit US national advantages, enabledominance against any adversary andcircumstance across the range of militaryoperations, and reduce the likelihood ofsurprise. Concepts for the future should notbe constrained by current joint doctrine; rather,joint doctrine provides the foundation andpoint of departure for thinking about futureAmerican military power.

The Services and USSOCOM have theprimary responsibility for future forcedevelopment, and the functional defenseagencies have the responsibility of providingspecified combat support services towarfighting forces. The Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff — in consultation with theother members of the JCS and the combatantcommanders — has a special responsibilityfor identifying, providing assessments of, andproviding guidance for meeting the challengesthat may face joint forces in the future. Toguide joint initiatives focused on the future,the Chairman periodically disseminates a joint

“If successful war-making depended upon masses of men, this country wouldbe at least fourth down the list of world powers. If it depended on world-girdling colonies, possessions, and sea bases, we should definitely have totake secondary position. But when it depends upon technological progress,mass production and men capable of intelligent use of intricate machines,we are in a field where America can be second to none.”

Gen Jimmy Doolittle, USAF

vision document. This document is the basisfor studies and analyses, including jointconcept development and experimentationwhich identify plausible future operationalcapabilities and explore the challenges acrossthe range of military operations that mayconfront the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates.

1. Identifying FutureChallenges

a. The joint process in place to assist inshaping the future is focused on contemporaryprojections of future challenges. Thesechallenges address many areas essential fordeveloping and fielding military forces forjoint operations, including concepts anddoctrine, organizational design, education andtraining for individuals and units, leaderdevelopment, logistic support, personnel, andfacilities. The concepts for overcoming thechallenges should assume a range ofadversaries, from the most primitive to peercompetitors able to threaten US interests andengage US forces directly and indirectly insymmetrical and asymmetrical warfare.

b. Advanced technologies alone will notwin future wars. Properly led, trained, andequipped people from all the Services willremain the surest guarantor of success in war.Therefore, in developing joint concepts forthe future, it is important to maintain a mix ofthe scientific and technological, and thehuman dimension.

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• The American experience has producedglobal leadership in science andtechnology. Technological innovationhas been an important catalyst for changefor the United States and has been a majorcontributor to American military power.To shape and harness future technologyfor military use, joint and Serviceprograms should focus on threefundamental requisites.

•• First, the Armed Forces must remainabreast of the leading edge of Americanand foreign science and technology sothat new developments and their promisecan be professionally incorporated intomilitary statements of futurerequirements.

•• Second, identify those challenges thatmay not be overcome in the futurewithout technological breakthroughs.Since the civil sector will not necessarilypursue challenges that are unique tomilitary operations, government-sponsored research and developmentmust do so.

•• Third, the design of future capabilitiesmust avoid dependence on uniquesystems whose malfunction may resultin mission failure.

• Perennial challenges for joint,multinational, and interagency operationsare the interoperability of the elementsand the integration of their capabilities.Concepts designed for future operationsshould address these challenges alongtwo paths.

•• One would provide for commondevelopment of capabilities for militaryorganizations across Services, agencies,and commands so that their resultingcapabilities are inherently interoperable.

•• The second should allow for adaptingextant capabilities that were notdeveloped in common to assureinteroperability. Both approaches areessential and should not be viewed asbeing mutually exclusive. The UnitedStates does not know now with whom itmay want to engage in cooperativemilitary operations in the future. Whilethe logic of maximum commondevelopment clearly applies to the ArmedForces of the United States, it cannotapply to all potential interagency andmultinational partners with whomoperations may be necessary. As aconsequence, the Armed Forces of theUnited States must remain abreast ofdevelopments in the civilian sector so thatcivil-military integration may be readilyachieved in the future. Continuousliaison with civilian centers ofinnovation, including educational andresearch institutions, can take advantageof the pace and scope of Americantechnological progress and offer thepromise of synergy and reduced costs.Similarly, cooperation with foreignpacesetters in the fields of military art andcivilian science and technology offersimilar benefits for future multinationalinteroperability.

• In developing concepts and harnessingtechnology for the future, the ArmedForces of the United States must be awareof the progress of potential adversariesand multinational partners in order toavoid circumstances in which the leastcapable partner defines the combatpotential of the entire multinational force.The requirements of futureinteroperability may require the sharingof technology, education, and trainingprograms with potential partners. In allcases, the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates must maintain the ability to operate

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effectively unilaterally as well as withmultinational partners, regardless of theircapabilities.

• Interoperability cannot rely solely ontechnology. Joint concepts must take intoaccount modes of operations and thetraditions of all military forces as well asthe human factor that is a dominantcharacteristic of the culture. In futurejoint and multinational operations, as inthe present, the simple exchange ofliaison elements may be the mostimportant guarantee of interoperability.

• American military men and women ofthe future will reflect the characteristicsof the Nation’s citizenry: its values, ethnicand cultural diversity, intellect andinitiative, and thirst for advancementbased on equality and respect for humanrights. Worldwide trends andcharacteristics in civilian and militarydemography, values, and infrastructureswill shape the environment and themilitary organizations of potentialadversaries and partners. Joint conceptsfor future operations must incorporate theprojected human dimensions.

“Well, the main thing — that I haveremembered all my life — is thedefinition of esprit de corps. Now mydefinition — the definition I was taught,and I’ve always believed in — is thatesprit de corps means love for one’smilitary legion, in my case the UnitedStates Marine Corps. I also learnedthat this loyalty to one’s Corps travelsboth ways, up and down.”

LtGen Louis “Chesty” Puller,USMC

• It will be American military personnelwho employ new technologies and fillany gaps in interoperability. Futureconcepts must account for people as the

most important national resource andcontribute to an environment in whichthey can succeed and take pride in theirprofession. Retention of trainedindividuals will continue to be essentialto military effectiveness as technologyadvances.

2. Preparing for Change andthe Future

Shaping the future in the present calls for ablend of continuity and audacious innovation.

a. Analysis supported by modeling,simulation, and experimentation has a vitalrole in developing the future Armed Forcesof the United States. Modeling and simulationare useful in representing conceptual systemsthat do not yet exist and systems that cannotbe subjected to actual experimentationbecause of safety requirements and thelimitations of resources and facilities.Experimentation assists in illuminating areasthat theory alone cannot resolve. Someuncertainties cannot be removed withoutempirical evidence; experimentation coupledwith sound military judgment can helpprovide that evidence.

b. The Services have been, and willcontinue to be, actively involved inexperimentation to help define their futures.At the same time, a vigorous jointexperimentation program is necessary tosupport the requirements of joint,multinational, and interagency operations.The USJFCOM is the DOD executive agent,and is responsible to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff for joint warfightingexperimentation. Joint experimentation is aconcepts-based process focused on thecapabilities required by future JFCs. It shouldkeep in view developments in US and foreigncivilian and military centers of innovation.While joint experimentation with all US

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participants is clearly necessary, it should laythe groundwork for future multinationalinteroperability with potential partners.

c. Educational and research institutions,military and civilian, have a significant rolein the preparation of the Armed Forces of theUnited States for change and the future.Civilian universities and military educationinstitutions have unique capabilities,especially in concept development andexperimentation. With their resident expertisein wide areas of knowledge, educational andresearch institutions are sources of conceptualproposals for transforming the future force andmay serve well as a sounding board forproposed concepts and other initiativesdeveloped by the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates. These institutions have extensivecapabilities for simulations, wargames,seminars, symposia, experimentation, andother thoughtful civil-military collaborativeefforts for concept and force developments.

d. Military interaction with civilianinstitutions can also play an important role inpreparing the Armed Forces for the future bymaintaining links to the civilian sector, as wellas helping academicians better understand andappreciate the role of the military instrument

in modern society. American educationalinstitutions are primary sources of culturalassimilation, intellectual innovation, andsocietal progress. Schools and colleges arealso the instruments that shape many of theattitudes and much of the personal capabilityof the men and women who constitute theArmed Forces of the United States. Americaneducational and research institutions have avital and irreplaceable role in shaping thefuture military capability of the United States.

3. Transforming the Force

a. Transforming the Armed Forces of theUnited States for future action across the rangeof military operations has evolutionary andrevolutionary dimensions. Organizations thatmaintain readiness for current operations andcontingencies may be limited totransformation at an evolutionary rate ofchange. Organizations that can suspendcurrent activities may be able to sustain arevolutionary high rate of change. Anapproach that permits American militarypower to maintain a required readiness levelwhile accepting rapid change is one thatdifferentiates between the organizationscharged with responsibilities for the presentand those responsible for innovating for the

Joint experimentation is a concepts-based process focused on thecapabilities required by future JFCs.

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future. Transforming the Armed Forces ofthe United States, then, requires a carefullydesigned mix of current readiness andexperimentation for the future, of stability andinnovation. Organizations responsible forinstantaneous response to unforeseeablethreats cannot be experimental laboratories.Experimental laboratories cannot be expectedto support ongoing military requirements ofthe combatant commands or the Services.Plans and programs for transformationmust simultaneously enhance the currentforce, facilitate evolution of the projectednext force, and creatively invent the forceafter next.

b. The products of analysis, modeling,simulation, and joint experimentation supportthe development of recommendations forchange by the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates in the areas of concepts and doctrine,organizational design, education, and trainingfor individuals and units, leader development,materiel, personnel, and facilities. To harnesstechnology most effectively in thedevelopment of future materiel, co-evolutionis essential among all these areas. In otherwords, future force development calls for anintegrated system in which a change in anyarea is reconciled with the others. Theirinterrelationships must be addressedsimultaneously. Consequently, concepts forfuture joint operations must not focus on anyone area to the exclusion of the others. Eachof the areas contains the potential forsignificant enhancement of US militarycapabilities.

c. Shaping the future of joint Americanmilitary power calls for the integration ofefforts across five groups of institutions thatcan contribute to this outcome.

• The Services and USSOCOM that areprimarily responsible for future forcedevelopment, and the defense agenciesthat are tasked to provide combat supportcapabilities to US forces.

• The combatant commands and other jointorganizations whose responsibility it is toensure the interoperability and coherencyof the Armed Forces of the United Statesacross the range of military operations.

• Multinational partners.

• The nonmilitary agencies of governmentand the civilian community, each withunique roles in shaping andcomplementing military power.

• Industry.

In conjunction with the co-evolution of allforce development areas, the integration ofthese five groups is essential to a successfultransformation of the Armed Forces of theUnited States. Together, they provide sourcesof future concept and force development.

d. Addressing the future of Americanmilitary power, above all, calls for aggressivepursuit of new ideas. Those individuals andinstitutions charged with shaping the futuremust be able to think freely, to exploit successalong the way and to be free to fail as well.Joint concepts for future operations providea basis for the development of future jointforces, and assist the Services in developingtheir future forces for joint, multinational, andinteragency operations.

“We face challenges today not greatlydifferent from ancient warfighters, butwe have added some new wrinkles. Astechnology has improved, distancesand time have shrunk. The tempo ofwarfighting has increased over the lastseveral decades; and the range,accuracy, and kinds of weaponry havegreatly improved. But some challengeswill never change. Commanders at alllevels need to understand the enemy,to know their own forces, to establishwarfighting goals and objectives, andto lead men and manage battles whilesuffering the fog and friction of war.”

Gen Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., USAF

VIII-6

Chapter VIII

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX ATHE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

A-1

1. General

The estimate process is central toformulating and updating military options,plans, and actions to meet the requirementsof any situation. Commanders and staffs atall levels should use the estimate process.Though its central framework for organizinginquiry and decision is essentially the samefor any level of command, specific detailedquestions within each part of this frameworkwill vary depending on the level and type ofaction or operation contemplated. Thisframework is presented below. Specificmaterial appropriate to national-level strategicactivities has been added to flesh out the basicframework for readers of this publication.

2. Mission

a. Mission Analysis

• Determine the NCA’s intent for theArmed Forces of the United States.Analyze presidential and other relevantnational-level statements, guidance,policies, and strategies, including long-and short-term objectives.

• Determine the President’s intent formilitary and nonmilitary participants inthe contemplated action. Include otherinstruments of national power(diplomatic, economic, andinformational).

• Identify the requirements for supportbetween military and nonmilitaryparticipants in meeting the presidentialintent.

• Identify standing arrangements betweenmilitary and nonmilitary participants that

could facilitate accomplishing thepresidential intent.

• Determine specified and implied tasks,and the priority that should be assignedto the tasks.

b. Mission Statement

• Express in terms of who, what, when,where (task parameters), and why(purpose).

• Frame as a clear, concise statement of theessential tasks to be accomplished andthe purpose to be achieved.

3. Situation and Courses ofAction

a. Situation Analysis

• Strategic Context

•• Domestic and international context:political and diplomatic long-term andshort-term issues; international economicissues; international informational issues;international interests (reinforcing orconflicting with US interests, includingpositions of parties neutral to theconflict); international law, positions ofinternational organizations; domesticinfluences, including media access,public information, competing demandsfor resources, and national will; domesticand international political, economic,legal, and moral constraints; and othercompeting or distracting domestic andinternational situations.

•• Characteristics of the issue that affectthe battlespace, including: perspectives

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Appendix A

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and interests of other participants andopponents; unique militarycharacteristics; economics (organization,industrial base, and mobilizationcapacity); social conditions; and scienceand technology factors affecting theoperational area.

• Analysis of the Adversary. Adversarysituation, including capabilities andvulnerabilities (at the national level, theintelligence community may have, or beable to produce, a formal nationalintelligence estimate). Analysis shouldinclude the following:

•• Broad military COAs affecting theissue that are currently being taken orcould be available in the future.

•• Political and military intentions andobjectives (to extent known).

•• Military national, strategic, andoperational advantages and limitations.

•• Possible domestic and internationalmilitary and nonmilitary support.

•• COGs (national, strategic, andoperational).

• Friendly Situation. Should follow thesame pattern used for the analysis of theenemy. At the national level, this willnormally rely on supporting estimates(including other participants’ situations)and the relevant military personnel,logistics, and command, control,communications, and computerestimates. Multinational and interagencyoperations require specific analysis ofother partners’ objectives, capabilities,and vulnerabilities.

• Restrictions. Those limitations to theuse or threat of use of the militaryinstrument of national power that are

imposed or necessary to support otherparticipants and other military worldwidestrategic requirements and associateddiplomatic, economic, and informationalefforts.

• Assumptions. Intrinsically importantfactors on which the conduct of thecontemplated action is based. Theirarticulation will facilitate periodic review,validation, and modification, as lessonslearned from operations becomeavailable.

• Deductions. Deductions from aboveanalysis should yield estimates of therelative strength of the fourinstruments of national power withemphasis on the capabilities of themilitary instrument in concerted actionwith the other instruments, includingpotential adversarial or othercapabilities that can detract frommission accomplishment.

b. Courses of Action Analysis. COAdevelopment is based on the above analysisand a creative determination of how themission will be accomplished. Each COAmust be adequate, feasible, acceptable, andcontribute to the accomplishment of nationalobjectives. State all practical COAs open tothe Armed Forces of the United States that, ifsuccessful, will accomplish the mission.Generally, at the national level, each COA willconstitute a strategic concept and shouldoutline the following:

• Major national and strategic tasks to beaccomplished and the order in which theyare to be accomplished.

• Forces and other resources required.

• Support concept including militarylogistic considerations.

• Force deployment concept, if required.

A-3

The Strategic Estimate

• Estimate of time required to achievepresidential intent expressed as politicaland military objectives.

• Concept for maintaining reserves, ifapplicable.

• Consequences for other high priorityongoing military activities.

4. Analysis of OpposingCourses of Action

a. Determine the probable effect of possibleadversary COAs on the success of eachfriendly COA.

b. Conduct this analysis in an orderlymanner: by nonmilitary participant, timephasing, and functional event. Consider thepotential actions of subordinates two echelonsdown.

c. Consider end state desired andtermination issues; think through own action,adversary reaction, and friendly counteraction.

d. Conclude with revalidation of suitability,adequacy, and feasibility; determine additionalrequirements, if any; make requiredmodifications; list advantages anddisadvantages of each COA.

5. Comparison of Own Coursesof Action

a. Evaluate the advantages anddisadvantages of each COA.

b. Compare with respect to governingfactors.

• Fixed values for military activities(national policy and strategy, domesticand international law, the principles ofwar, and the fundamentals of jointwarfare).

• Other critical factors (for example, moraland practical constraints).

• Mission accomplishment.

c. If appropriate, merge elements ofdifferent COAs into one.

6. Decision

Translate the selected COA into a concisestatement of what the Armed Forces of theUnited States, as a whole, are to do andexplain, as may be appropriate, thefollowing elements: who, when, where,how, and why.

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Appendix A

JP 1

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BPRINCIPLES OF WAR

B-1

The principles of war guide warfighting atthe strategic, operational, and tactical levels.They are the enduring bedrock of US militarydoctrine.

1. Objective

a. The purpose of the objective is to directevery military operation toward a clearlydefined, decisive, and attainable objective.

b. The objective of combat operations isthe defeat of the enemy’s armed forces’capabilities or the enemy’s will to fight. Theobjective of an operation other than war mightbe more difficult to define; nonetheless, it toomust be clear from the beginning. Objectivesmust directly, quickly, and economicallycontribute to the purpose of the operation.Each operation must contribute to strategicobjectives. Avoid actions that do notcontribute directly to achieving the objective.

2. Offensive

a. The purpose of an offensive action is toseize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

b. Offensive action is the most effective anddecisive way to attain a clearly definedobjective. Offensive operations are the meansby which a military force seizes and holds theinitiative while maintaining freedom of actionand achieving decisive results. Theimportance of offensive action isfundamentally true across all levels of war.

c. Commanders adopt the defensive onlyas a temporary expedient and must seek everyopportunity to seize or regain the initiative.An offensive spirit must therefore be inherentin the conduct of all defensive operations.

3. Mass

a. The purpose of mass is to concentratethe effects of combat power at the place andtime to achieve decisive results.

b. To achieve mass is to synchronize andintegrate appropriate joint force capabilitieswhere they will have decisive effect in a shortperiod of time. Mass must often be sustainedto have the desired effect. Massing the effectsof combat power, rather than concentratingforces, can enable even numerically inferiorforces to achieve decisive results andminimize human losses and waste ofresources.

4. Economy of Force

a. The purpose of economy of force is toallocate minimum essential combat power tosecondary efforts.

b. Economy of force is the judiciousemployment and distribution of forces. It isthe measured allocation of available combatpower to such tasks as limited attacks, defense,delays, deception, or even retrogradeoperations in order to achieve mass elsewhereat the decisive point and time.

5. Maneuver

a. The purpose of maneuver is to place theenemy in a position of disadvantage throughthe flexible application of combat power.

b. Maneuver is the movement of forces inrelation to the enemy to secure or retainpositional advantage, usually in order todeliver — or threaten delivery of — the directand indirect fires of the maneuvering force.

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Appendix B

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Effective maneuver keeps the enemy offbalance and thus also protects the friendlyforce. It contributes materially in exploitingsuccesses, preserving freedom of action, andreducing vulnerability by continually posingnew problems for the enemy.

6. Unity of Command

a. The purpose of unity of command is toensure unity of effort under one responsiblecommander for every objective.

b. Unity of command means that all forcesoperate under a single commander with therequisite authority to direct all forcesemployed in pursuit of a common purpose.Unity of effort, however, requirescoordination and cooperation among all forcestoward a commonly recognized objective,although they are not necessarily part of thesame command structure. In multinationaland interagency operations, unity of commandmay not be possible, but the requirement forunity of effort becomes paramount. Unity ofeffort — coordination through cooperationand common interests — is an essentialcomplement to unity of command.

7. Security

a. The purpose of security is to neverpermit the enemy to acquire unexpectedadvantage.

b. Security enhances freedom of action byreducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts,influence, or surprise. Security results fromthe measures taken by commanders to protecttheir forces. Staff planning and anunderstanding of enemy strategy, tactics, anddoctrine will enhance security. Risk is

inherent in military operations. Applicationof this principle includes prudent riskmanagement, not undue caution. Protectingthe force increases friendly combat power andpreserves freedom of action.

8. Surprise

a. The purpose of surprise is to strike theenemy at a time or place or in a manner forwhich it is unprepared.

b. Surprise can help the commander shiftthe balance of combat power and thus achievesuccess well out of proportion to the effortexpended. Factors contributing to surpriseinclude speed in decision making, informationsharing, and force movement; effectiveintelligence; deception; application ofunexpected combat power; operationssecurity (OPSEC); and variations in tacticsand methods of operation.

9. Simplicity

a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepareclear, uncomplicated plans and concise ordersto ensure thorough understanding.

b. Simplicity contributes to successfuloperations. Simple plans and clear, conciseorders minimize misunderstanding andconfusion. When other factors are equal, thesimplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plansallows better understanding and executionplanning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarityof expression greatly facilitate missionexecution by reducing the stress, fatigue, andother complexities of modern combat and areespecially critical to success in combinedoperations.

APPENDIX CPRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

C-1

The principles of war, while principallyassociated with combat operations, apply aswell to MOOTW. Given the range ofsituations covered by MOOTW, the principlesof war require special interpretation. Whenapplied to MOOTW situations, the principlesof war and other relevant factors form the basisfor the principles of MOOTW. These are:objective, unity of effort, security, restraint,perseverance, and legitimacy.

1. Objective

a. Direct every military operation towarda clearly defined, decisive, and attainableobjective.

b. Understand the strategic aims, setappropriate objectives, and ensure that theseaims and objectives contribute to unity ofeffort.

c. Define specific measures of missionsuccess.

d. Translate political guidance intoappropriate military objectives.

e. Maintain flexibility to adapt to changesin political objectives.

2. Unity of Effort

a. Seek unity of effort in every operation.

b. Ensure that all means dedicated to theMOOTW are directed to a common purpose.

c. Define command arrangements formilitary and nonmilitary participants.

3. Security

a. Prevent hostile factions from acquiringa military, political, or informationaladvantage.

b. Focus on achieving and maintainingfreedom of action.

c. Maintain vigilance; all forces have aninherent right of self-defense.

d. Maintain OPSEC.

e. Make provision for protection ofcivilians and participating agencies andorganizations.

4. Restraint

a. Apply appropriate military capabilityprudently.

b. Make judicious use of force, applyingthe principle of proportionality.

c. Gain and maintain the initiative whileadhering to the ROE; ensure periodic reviewof the ROE and recommend changes whenappropriate.

5. Perseverance

a. Prepare for the measured, protractedapplication of military capability in supportof strategic aims.

b. Remain patient, resolute, and persistentin pursuit of US and multinational objectives.

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JP 1

c. Integrate military actions withdiplomatic, economic, and informationalefforts.

6. Legitimacy

a. Committed forces must sustain thelegitimacy of the operation and of the hostgovernment, where applicable.

b. Legitimacy is based on the legality,morality, and rightness of the actionsundertaken.

c. Adhere to objectives, ensuring actionsare appropriate to the situation, and exhibitfairness in dealing with competing factions.

d. Attend to the perspectives of thecitizenry in the area of operations, particularlytheir views of the legitimacy of theirgovernment and of the MOOTW.

APPENDIX DADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

D-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Directorate forOperational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 1, 10 January 1995, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forcesof the United States.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and JointForce Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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Appendix D

JP 1

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the jointpublication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outsidethe combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified jointpublication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through thelocal embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL,Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD), US Coast Guard2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

CommanderUSJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, InformationSecurity Program.

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director, J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is a joint doctrine capstone publication. The diagrambelow illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 1

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

� Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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