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Many information security professionals know what to

look for when auditing a Windows machine, as they

are quite practiced at it and there are a lot of

resources that help them stay current. Although IBM System i

(the IBM midrange platform formerly known as the AS/400

and the iSeries) architecture has been around for more than 25

years, the amount of information available about how to audit

the system is scarceand not because the system is

unimportant. System i is found in just about every industry

vertical and contains some of the most critical data an

organization must protect. Credit card numbers, bank

accounts, healthcare histories, customer lists and payroll

records are all processed and stored on System i. More than

400,000 systems are estimated in production use in the loyal

install base throughout the world, and 16,000 banks run core

banking and financial applications on System i. Some of the

better-known software vendors that provide applications are

Oracle (JD Edwards ERP), Lawson/Intentia (Financials), Jack

Henry and FiServ (Core Banking), SSA (BPICS, MAPICS,

Infinium and Infor ERP applications), and Manhattan

Associates (Supply Chain).

Given the mission-critical data that are kept on the system,

maintaining a secure configuration should be a top priority.

However, many of these systems are poorly configured and

poorly managed, but are given a clean bill of health by IT

auditors. In working with companies that run System i, someerrors/problems this author has found include:

IT auditors working from old and outdated checklists, and

seeming to be unaware that a full Transmission Control

Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) networking capability

was introduced to the system back in 1993

IT auditors unaware of new capabilities (and risks) that have

been introduced in recent versions of the operating system

IT auditors not looking for issues that are specific to System i

IT auditors mistakenly assuming that limiting command-line

access (using the limit capabilities [LMTCPB] option on

user profiles) is adequate to control access to sensitive data

(It is not.)

This article outlines the key set of controls andconfiguration settings that need to be checked in any basic

review of System i and its i5/OS operating system. In many

places, a reference is provided to the relevant i5/OS command

required to retrieve the data, or alternatively the Compliance

Assessment1 tool, which gathers all of the relevant data into

one convenient report.

A Unique Operating SystemFirst, the basic principles of the operating system should be

reviewed. i5/OS (FKA OS/400) includes an integrated

enterprise-class relational database, DB2/400. Thus, auditing the

System i environment is similar to auditing the combination of

Microsoft SQL Server running on Windows Server, or Oracle

running on a UNIX system. It is not possible to have a System i

that does not have DB2/400 running.

One of the strengths of i5/OS is that it is an object-based

(not object-oriented) architecture, which makes it extremely

resistant to viruses. In fact, viruses that can plague Windows

or UNIX operating environments have no affect on a System i

because (among other reasons) the object-based architecture

can distinguish between files and programs and refuses to

execute files.

The most common control deficiencies on the System i

occur because of the incredibly loose authority structure under

which most shops run. On the typical System i, applications

have been configured such that every user has complete

access to every object on the system (equivalent to

read/write/execute). For example, in many of the banks that

run on System i, every teller can read and modify every

account. At thousands of retail giants, every one of the users

on System i can read and use credit card numbers stored in

database tables. In healthcare environments, no one can

definitively say who has looked at or changed various pieces

of data. And, in all of these environments, although the

operating system provides basic tools to do so, no one can

produce logs that describe what has happened on the machine.

Six Keys to SecurityThis article outlines six key areas that need to be checked

in an i5/OS environment. It explains how to spot the common

exposures, why they pose a threat and how best to remediate

those problems.2

The areas that need to be investigated are:

Network access

Program, file and library security

User security

Powerful administrator (root level) privileges

System values

Logging and auditing

Network AccessPerhaps the greatest area of risk on OS/400 systems is the

unprotected access that most end users have to the system

from their desktops, laptops and mobile devices.

The Big Risk: User Access Through the Network

When version 3.1 of OS/400 was released in 1994, IBM

not only introduced a robust TCP/IP stack to the AS/400, but

also enhanced its host servers capability to allow the system

Auditing IBM AS/400 and System iBy John Earl

Copyright 2008 ISACA. All rights reserved. www.isaca.org.

JO U R N A L ON L I N E 1


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to more easily exchange data with connected personal

computers (many auditors are working off checklists that have

not been updated since this time). This was widely received as

a great leap forward by all users of the machine because it

simplified the task of transferring data to and from personal

computers. However, a huge exposure was unleashed at the

same time because of the shoddy way that OS/400 objects

were secured up to that point. Prior to OS/400 release 3.1,

users were typically connected to AS/400s through fixed

function, nonprogrammable (dumb) terminals. During these

times, the favored way of protecting data from end users was

to limit their application access to a green screen menu

system. This control was coupled with the limited capability

parameter on the user ID, which prevented users from

entering commands at a standard OS/400 menu. In this way

users were easily prevented from wandering about the system

and peering into places they should not.

OS/400 Meets TCP/IP

The introduction of the TCP/IP stack changed all of this

dramatically. Users now have complete access to all of the data

because they continue to carry *CHANGE authority(equivalent to rwx) to the data and because they can use simple

tools such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or Microsoft Excel

(using Open Database Connectivity [ODBC] connections) to

download or upload data between their personal computing

devices and System i. Since the 1990s, IBM has shipped

System i from the factory with all TCP/IP services enabled and

ready to talk to the outside world. Few system administrators

take the time to investigate what services are open and

conversational, and even fewer understand networking well

enough to understand which services should be turned off. The

result is that nearly every i5/OS-based machine that sits on a

network is at risk of having every piece of confidential data on

that system disclosed or corrupted by any user with a valid userID and password.

Direct access to System i (iSeries) data is possible through a

Microsoft Excel Plug-in, for example, which is installed with

every copy of IBM Client Access, the most widely distributed

PC to the System i connectivity tool.

At the time that IBM enabled the TCP/IP stack on OS/400,

it also introduced exit points for various TCP/IP servers.

These exit point application programming interfaces (APIs)

allow a system administrator to attach a program to the

TCP/IP servers that will see inbound and outbound data

requests and have the ability to record, alter or even block

these transaction requests. IBM did not provide the exit

programs, but rather left it to its customers or third-partyproviders to provide these essential security services. With an

exit program attached to, for example, the FTP servers exit

point, the system administrator can now see information such

as User JOHN connected to system XYZ from remote IP

address 196.6.3.104 at 10:22 a.m. At 10:24 a.m., he sent a

request to download the Payroll file, and at 10:31 a.m., he ran

a remote command that attempted to delete his joblog.

Armed with this level of information, the system

administrator can create access rules (much like f irewall

rules) that will control which users can use which services,

what files may be accessed, and what level of logging and

alerting is desired for these transactions.

To determine if the system has exit programs attached, the

WRKREGINF and the DSPNETA commands should be used

and the servers listed in figure 2 examined. Services such as

FTP, remote command and remote SQL should be monitored

and controlled. The system administrator should be asked to

produce logs of exit point traffic, and review the access rules

that control the exit programs. Without exit programs in place,

there are no logs or alerts of any data transfer activity or

requests over FTP, remote command or ODBC.

Figure 1 lists the most important remote access servers

that can be protected by exit programs, along with a brief

description of the function provided.

To inspect whether exit programs are deployed on a

system, the WRKREGINF command is used and the list is

scanned to find the exit point servers named in figure 1. If

the Compliance Assessment tool can be used, then the display

shown in figure 2 will provide the results.

Program, File and Library SecurityNext the object-level security assigned to programs, data

files and libraries (database collections) should be reviewed.

Public Authority to Objects

One of the benefits of i5/OS is that it has an integrated

database (DB2/400) contained within the operating system.

This is one of the reasons the system earns the suffix i for

integrated.

On the downside, an integrated database also means that

every user who has a valid user ID and password to the

operating system can access the database system. If the

individual objects in the database are well secured, this is not

a problem. Unfortunately, the usual authority settings for

Figure 1Remote Access Servers That Can Be

Protected by Exit Programs

Exit Point Server Description

*DDM Alternate ODBC server

*DQSRV Client data queue server

*FILESRV Remote file serverused when drives are mappedto integrated file system

*FTPCLIENT FTP client on the iSeriesused for requestsoriginating from the System i server

*FTPSERVER FTP server on the iSeries

*NDB ODBC and JDBC native database

*RMTSRV Remote command server

*RTVOBJINF ODBC and JDBC retrieve object info

*SQL ODBC and JDBC sign-on (logon)

*SQLSRV 1 ODBC and JDBC server

*SQLSRV 2 ODBC and JDBC server

*TELNET TCP/IP terminal emulation

*DATAQSRV Remote data queue server

*FTPREXEC Remote command through FTP

*REXEC_SO Remote command sign-on (logon)

*TFRFCL Client file transfer server

JO U R N A L ON L I N E2


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OS/400 objects (files, programs, etc.) are for everyone

(*PUBLIC) to have at least change (*CHANGE) rights to allparts of an application. *CHANGE access not only allows a

user to read and change the contents of a file, but also to add

or delete entries in the file and to change some of the external

properties of a file (*CHANGE is roughly equivalent to rwx

on a UNIX system). To see whether a particular system allows

too much authority to important application objects, the object

authority must be displayed. To do this, the OS/400

DSPOBJAUT command must be used. Typical syntax for this

command is:

DSPOBJAUT OBJ(Library_Name /File_Name)

OBJTYPE(*FILE)

DSPOBJAUT OBJ(Library_Name) OBJTYPE(*LIB)

The Compliance Assessment display is shown in figure 3.

Who Is *PUBLIC?It is important at this time to understand the concept of

*PUBLIC. For every object on a system, there is an explicit

authority assigned to *PUBLIC. Typical assignments are *ALL

(complete rights to the object, including object deletion rights),

*CHANGE (the rights to change the contents and outer shell of

an object), *USE (the rights to use or read the object) and

*EXCLUDE (no rights to the object). Assuming one has a

system with 800 users and there is a f ile on that system called

PAYROLL, when the DSPOBJAUT command is issued on the

PAYROLL file, the following list of users appears: JOHN: *ALL

DAN: *USE

SCOTT: *EXCLUDE

*PUBLIC: *CHANGE

In this case, John, Dan and Scott have explicit authority to

the PAYROLL file, and the other 797 users on the system are

members of the group *PUBLIC.

On most OS/400-based systems, *PUBLIC has *CHANGE

access to virtually every object on the system, and

individually specified authorities are rare. This is for two

reasons. First, the default setting (as shipped from the factory)

for newly created objects is that *PUBLIC receives

*CHANGE access. Although this authority is almost alwaystoo permissive, history and inertia have conspired to leave this

setting in place. Additionally, there are few objects that detail

individual access because setting individual object authorities

is a far too cumbersome task for most system administrators.

Studies have found that the average number of users on a

system is approximately 800. Multiply that by an estimated

20,000 to 50,000 objects on the system, and it is quickly

evident why system administrators do not typically secure

individual objects to individual users.

A well-secured System i either has all application objects

and libraries secured against public access (*PUBLIC =

Figure 2Exit Program Display



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Figure 3Compliance Assessment Display

*EXCLUDE) or provides some mitigating control that

prevents users from directly accessing those objects. It is

recommended that IT auditors first check *PUBLICs access to

production libraries. Access to libraries should be restricted to

only users who have a demonstrated need. The IT auditorshould check the object authorities of some items in the library

and some of the critical applications on the system. Public

access should be set to *EXCLUDE, and individual access

should be granted where there is an appropriate business need.

Group profiles that have broad access rights to database

objects should be identifiedthis is a common back door.

This is where the previous two items come together with

potentially disastrous results. If the auditor finds that there are

no exit programs protecting network access points from client

tools such as FTP and ODBC and *PUBLIC has broad access

(*CHANGE, or worse), then the system is at critical risk of

having lost, damaged or stolen data. An exit program

remediation would be essential to quickly safeguard the data.

User SecurityAs with other platforms, organizations should maintain

adequate control over the creation and modification of user

accounts or logon identities, which are called user profiles on

i5/OS. As part of a comprehensive information systems review,the process for the creation of new user profiles on the system

should be audited. There should be adequate controls in place to

ensure that the level of privilege assigned to the new profile is

consistent with the employees job responsibility.

By default, System i assigns to new user profiles a default

password that is the same as the username. Controls should bein place to ensure that profiles are not created with default

passwords. The audit should also review the procedures for

when an employee is terminated or changes jobs.An enabled profile is an active profile that can be used to

log on to the system. A disabled profile is essentially in a

suspended state since it cannot be used to log on to the system

even if the password is known.

On Microsoft systems, security policy often enforces strongpasswords that require the use of at least one uppercase and

one lowercase letter, a number, and a special character.

Passwords are required to be changed on a regular basis.On OS/400, there is no way to force a special character

without writing custom code in a password validation exit

program. Most organizations run at password level 0 or 2,

which restricts passwords to a maximum of 10 characters in

length and uppercase letters only. Password level 3 isrecommended and requires longer, mixed-case passwords.

The full set of password-related settings (called system values

on i5/OS) that need to be checked is outlined in figure 4, alongwith recommended values. The security system values can be

viewed by typing DSPSYSVAL SYSVAL(QPWD*).



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Administrative Rights (Powerful Profiles)The most striking finding from the State of System i

Security Study 20073 is the large number of users that wield

special authority on the typical OS/400 system. Specialauthorities grant user prof iles system administrator, or even

root-level, privilege and essentially provide a free pass aroundthe usual authority restrictions. There are eight special

authorities on i5/OS (see figure 5), allowing for separation ofduties and a f ine level of granularity when it comes to

assigning powerful authorities.

However, as the study data show, too many users are granted

these powerful authorities, and too few managers and auditors

can see and understand how this power is used. The 2007 studyfound that the average number of users on a machine was 825,

and the average number of users wielding *ALLOBJ (the most

powerful of special authorities) was

8210 percent of the user profiles on a typical system(see figure 6). Fully 20 percent of users had *SPLCTL

special authority, and nearly 20 percent had *JOBCTL

special authority. Of the eight special authorities available to

end users, only *AUDIT was kept in any sort of check.One has to wonder if this is why all of the other settings are so

out of control.

Often programmers try to justify their need for a powerful

profile on a production system because of occasional

emergencies. Contrary to popular complaints, no one needs

these special authorities to run day-to-day business

applications. To ensure appropriate segregation of duties,

Figure 5Special Authorities on i5/OS

SpecialAuthority Name Special Authority Description

*ALLOBJ Root- or administrator-level access (very powerful)

*SECADM Security administrator (can create new user profiles)

*IOSYSCFG Network services conf iguration

*AUDIT Configuration of audit and logging settings

*SPLCTL Full access to reports and printer spool files

*SERVICE Hardware administration

*JOBCTL System operator controls

*SAVSYS Backup and restore operations

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

NumberofUserProfiles

Special Authorities

RootAccess(*Allobj)

SecurityAdmin.

(*Secadm)

NetworkServices

(*losyscfg)

AuditRights(*audit)

Full ReportAccess(*splctl)

HardwareAdmin.

(*services)

SystemOperator(*Jobctl)

BackupOperator(*Savsys)

Copyright 2007 The Power Tech Group, Inc.

Figure 6Special Authorities Observations

From State of System i Security Study

Figure 4Compliance Assessment User Security Tab

System Value Recommended Setting Explanation

QPWDEXPITV 90 Number of days before a password expires

QPWDLMTAJC 1 Limits adjacent digits in password. Level 1 limits to a single digit.

QPWDLMTCHR *NONE Prevents the listed characters in a password. Characters listed here would not be valid foruse in a password.

QPWDLMTREP 2 Limits repeating characters in a password. Level 2 allows repeated characters, but theycannot be consecutive.

QPWDLVL 3 Supports the more complex 128-byte upper-/lowercase pass phrases rather than the shorter,10-character, uppercase passwords

QPWDMAXLEN 128 Maximum length of password

QPWDMINLEN 6 Minimum length of password

QPWDPOSDIF 0 Limits password character positions. If 1, the same character cannot be in the relativeposition in a new password.

QPWDRQDDGT 1 Requires a digit in the password

QPWDRQDDIF A number less than or equal to 5 Number of new passwords that must be used before a previous password can be recycled.The nonintuitive values are:0=Any password can be used1=Cannot be the same as last 322=Cannot be the same as last 243=Cannot be the same as last 184=Cannot be the same as last 12

5=Cannot be the same as last 106=Cannot be the same as last 87=Cannot be the same as last 68=Cannot be the same as last 4

QPWDVLDPGM *NONE, *REGFAC or a A system exit program that sees and controls password changes. A program mayprogram name be registered that prevents the creation of weak passwords or dictionary words. Any

program registered here should be treated as very sensitive due to its ability to see anddisclose passwords.



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programmers and development staff members should not have

special authorities in their profiles. These authorities are

important for system management, but one of the notable

value propositions of System i is that it can typically be

managed by fewer than a handful of administrators.

Organizations can place far more restrictions on the use of

special privileges by granting the power only on an as-needed

basis. While the user has assumed privilege, all activity

should be audited and reported on a regular basis.

System SecuritySecurity on OS/400 begins with system values. These are

the base configuration settings that are used to harden the

system and prevent security breaches.

The most important of the system values is QSECURITY,

which defines the overall security level of the operating

system itself. Although it is still a quite common setting, a

QSECURITY value of 30 indicates an unprotected operating

system with suspect integrity. There are many well-known

exposures at this QSECURITY level. IBM recommends that

all systems should be set to security level 40 or higher, and all

new systems ship with a default value of 40.

To view the security-related system values, type in the

i5/OS command: DSPSYSVAL *SEC.The checklist of OS/400 system values and their

recommended settings is provided in figure 7.

Figure 7OS/400 System Values and Their Recommended Settings

System Value Recommended Value Explanation

QSECURITY 40 or 50 Controls the level of operating system integrity. Forty is the absolute minimum acceptable level.Thirty has numerous well-known exploits. Twenty and 10 indicate that every user has root-levelprivileges.

QALWOBJRST *NONE Controls the kinds of programs that can be restored to the system. W hile the *ALWPGMADP and

ALWPTF values may be acceptable from time to time, depending on specific circumstances, thedefault value should be the more stringent *NONE.

QALWUSRDMN Shall not contain the Certain sensitive objects can facilitate breaches if they are allowed in all libraries on a system. Ifvalues *ALL or *DIR these objects are required on a system, the applications and libraries that require these objects

should be known and documented here.

QAUTOCFG 0 Controls the automatic configuration of new physical devices as soon as they are connected to thesystem. This value should be turned off (0) until there is a specific need to use it, and turnedoff after use.

QAUTORMT 0 Controls the automatic configuration of remote device controllers as soon as they are connected tothe system. This value should be turned off (0) until there is a specific need to use it, and turnedoff after use.

QAUTOVRT 0 Controls the automatic configuration of new virtual devices as soon as they are connected to thesystem. This value should be turned off (0) until there is a specific need to use it, and turned offafter use.

QCRTAUT *EXCLUDE Controls what access the general public (*PUBLIC) should automatically receive to newly createdobjects (files and programs); ships as *CHANGE

QCRTOBJAUD *ALL Controls default auditing levels for all users and objects; should be set to the widest setting possible

QDSCJOBITV No more than 240 After an inactive Telnet session times out, determines how long (in minutes) to wait before the job isended. A longer time frame is tolerable if the QINACTITV and QINACTIVMSGQ values are set properly.

QDSPSGNINF 1 Requests that information about the last successful and unsuccessful sign-on attempts be displayedto the user as he/she signs on

QFRCCVNRST Set to 3-7 Forces program conversion on restore. Set to at least three.

QINACTITV No more than 30 The number of minutes before an inactive Telnet session times out

QINACTMSGQ *DSCJOB After a Telnet session has timed out, identifies what action should be taken.This setting instructsthe system to disconnect the job but leave it active in suspended animation for the amount of timedescribed in system value QDSCJOBITV. If the same user signs onto the same device within theQDSCJOBITV value, the job resumes where it left off.

QMAXSGNACN 2 After (QMAXSIGN) number of invalid sign-on attempts, identifies what action should be taken. Two

indicates that the user ID should be disabled. A setting of three (disable user and device) is bothcounterproductive and ineffective in a TCP/IP environment.

QMAXSIGN No more than 5 Maximum number of invalid sign-on attempts before a user is subjected to the action described insystem value QMAXSGNACN

QRMTIPL 0 Level one allows the system to be IPLd (booted) remotely via a modem. Should be set to zero unlessa specific contrary reason exists.

QRMTSIGN *VERIFY When a known user attempts to log in from a remote computer, allows login after verification hasoccurred

QUSEADPAUT A named authority list Names an authority list that names the system users who are allowed to create a program thatadopts another users authority. This list of users should be small and well managed.

QVFYOBJRST 3 or 5 Verifies object signatures when objects are restored to the system

Note: Specific system values related to auditing of the system and password control settings are covered elsewhere in this article.



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AuditingThe security audit journal QAUDJRN is a tamperproof log

that cannot be altered or changed once an event has been written

to the journal. The journal is a free feature of i5/OS, but it must

be turned on and properly configured in order to do its job.

Configuring the Audit Journal

The following is a checklist for the audit journal:

Verify that the security audit journal exists on the system

and that the auditing is active. Simply stated, the QAUDCTL

system value defines whether auditing is active on the

system (see figure 8).

Verify the type of activity that is configured to be logged to

the system (QAUDLVL below). QAUDLVL defines what

type of events to write to the audit log once the auditing has

been turned on by specifying *AUDLVL in the QAUDCTL

setting (figure 8).

Verify that a procedure exists to report against the audit logs

on a regular basis.

Determine how long the audit data are kept on the system.

QAUDJRN data should be kept live on the system for a

minimum of one month. Save the data to tape and store them for at least a year.

A complete table of the audit-related system values is

outlined in figure 8, along with recommended settings. The

audit-related system values can be viewed using the command

DSPSYSVAL SYSVAL(QAUD*).

i5/OS also has a history log (QHST), but it is less

reliable than the QAUDJRN because it is susceptible to

tampering. Beginning with V2R3 of the operating system,

all security-related events are written to the security audit

journal, making it unnecessary to review the history log for

these events.

Log File ReportingThe IT auditor should ensure that the organization reviews

the log file report output on a regular basis. Some of the most

important reports to review are:

Changes to user profiles

Changes to system values

Invalid sign-on attempts

Authority failures

Command usage by privileged users

Auditing changes

Attempts to violate OS integrity

It is most practical to conduct regular reviews using a

commercial reporting product since the format of the audit

journal makes it difficult to read.

ConclusionIBM System i is a powerful business platform, but data are

secure only if the IT department configures the system

correctly and maintains adequate controls over the

management of the system and its applications. Information

security professionals are now becoming more aware of some

of the more important security exposures on the system, such

as the open doors through FTP and ODBC. The checklists

outlined here form a basic IS audit program for AS/400.

Endnotes1 PowerTech Compliance Assessment is a tool that information

security professionals can download at no charge from

www.powertech.com. It simplifies the task of gathering audit

data from System i. The interactive graphical report includes

references to Control Objectives for Information and relatedTechnology (COBIT) objectives, along with hyperlinks to

detailed explanations of OS/400 concepts.2 IT professionals who are looking for a more advanced and/or

automated audit program for i5/OS and System i can f ind

more detailed information at www.powertech.com.3 The State of System i Security is an annual study that

reviews aggregate audit f indings from approximately 200

systems each year. Copies are available at

www.powertech.com.

John Earl

is a an expert on OS/400 security. He has presented several

hundred security sessions at System i and securityconferences worldwide. In addition, he has educated

thousands of IT auditors on methodologies to secure and audit

the platform. Earl has more than 25 years of experience with

IBM midrange systems and security. He has published

numerous articles and columns for industry magazines, and

served as a security subject matter expert for COMMON, the

worlds largest community of IBM midrange users. He is a

three-time winner of COMMONs Speaker Excellence Award.

Figure 8Audit-related System Values and Recommended Settings

System Value Recommended Value Explanation

QAUDCTL *AUDLVL, *OBJAUD, Specifies what type of audit ing is allowed on the system. Value *NOQTEMP is permitted but not*NOQTEMP required.

QAUDENDACN *NOTIFY Specifies the action to take if journal entries cannot be recorded.A llowable values are Notify andPower Down System Immediately, which may be too harsh for most environments.

QAUDFRCLVL *SYS Controls the buffering ration of records written to the security auditing journal. *SYS (systemregulated buffering) is sufficient.

QAUDLVL *AUTFAIL, *DELETE, Specifies what types of security events should be audited. This recommended group represents a*OBJMGT, *SYSMGT, minimum standard for best practices. More settings will require more data storage, but will also*SAVRST, *SECURITY, provide a fuller picture of system activity.*SERVICE, *PGMFAIL

QAUDLVL2 Use QAUDLVL system An extension of the QAUDLVL system value; could contain some additional valuesvalue to set auditing



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Authors NoteSome of the more advanced topics that were not covered in

this article because of space limitations are:

Adopted authority

Sign-on screen messages

Dedicated service tools (DST) profiles and passwords

Network attribute settings

Library lists

Printer output queues

More detailed information, beyond the scope of this

introductory article, is available in an Open Source i5/OS

Security Policy available at www.powertech.com. A free copy of

the OS/400 Compliance Assessment tool may be downloaded

from www.powertech.com.


Information Systems Control Journal is published by ISACA. Membership in the association, a voluntary organization serving IT governance professionals, entitles one to receive an annual subscription tothe Information Systems Control Journal.

Opinions expressed in the Information Systems Control Journal represent the views of the authors and advertisers. They may differ from policies and official statements of ISACA and/or the ITGovernance Institute and their committees, and from opinions endorsed by authors employers, or the editors of thisJournal. Information Systems Control Journal does not attest to the originality ofauthors' content.

2008 ISACA.All rights reserved.

Instructors are permitted to photocopy isolated articles for noncommercial classroom use without fee. For other copying, reprint or republication, permission must be obtained in writing from theassociation. Where necessary, permission is granted by the copyright owners for those registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), 27 Congress St., Salem, Mass. 01970, to photocopy articlesowned by ISACA, for a flat fee of US $2.50 per article plus 25 per page. Send payment to the CCC stating the ISSN (1526-7407), date, volume, and first and last page number of each article.Copying for other than personal use or internal reference, or of articles or columns not owned by the association without express permission of the association or the copyright owner is expresslyprohibited.

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