jorn rusen's theory of historiography between modernism and rhetoric of inquiry - allan megill

8/2/2019 Jorn Rusen's Theory of Historiography Between Modernism and Rhetoric of Inquiry - Allan Megill

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Wesleyan University

Jorn Rusen's Theory of Historiography between Modernism and Rhetoric of InquiryAuthor(s): Allan MegillReviewed work(s):Source: History and Theory, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 39-60Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505651 .

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JORN RUSEN'S THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHYBETWEEN MODERNISM AND RHETORIC OF INQUIRY

ALLAN MEGILLABSTRACT

JornRusen s the preeminentGermanpractitioner f "historics," r theoryof historiog-raphy.Unlikehis closestAmerican ounterpart,HaydenWhite,Rilsenplacesparticularemphasison the historicaldiscipline.The emphasis s embodied n Rilsen'snotion ofthe"disciplinary atrix" f historiography, hichembraces ive"factors":hecognitiveinterestof humanbeings n havingan orientationn time; theoriesor "leadingviews"concerning he experiences f the past;empirical esearchmethods; ormsof representa-tion; and the functionof offeringorientation o society.Rilsen'saccountof the disci-plinarymatrixwill remindsome readersof the "hermeneuticircle."But Rilsen s farcloser to Jirgen Habermas han to MartinHeideggeror Hans-GeorgGadamer, or,like Habermas,he emphasizes he authoritative ole of universal ationalscience.Theessayargues hat Rilsen'snotion of the disciplinarymatrix s an important ontri-butionto the understanding f historiography.Combinedwith his parallelconceptionof differing"paradigms"f historiography,t helpsus to make sense of the historyof(German)historiography, nd is useful for analyzingand commenting n present-dayhistoriography.The essay also argues for a greaterdegree of pluralism han seemsassumednRiisen's iew.It suggests hatinanageof diversityhe rhetorical onceptionof "topic" whichprovidesquestionsto be asked ratherthan answers is of specialuse, and it reinterpretsRiisen'sdisciplinarymatrix n a topicaldirection.Rilsenrightlysuggests hat historieshas a unifying function.The essay suggeststhat, given socialdiversity,onlysuch reflectiveheorycanunite thevariedbodyof historiography. hisis one of the reasonswhy historiographicalheory s importantnow.

In a series of books, beginning with Fur eine erneuerte Historik (For a RenewedHistorics) and followed by the three-volume Grundzugeeiner Historik (Funda-mentals of a Historics), Jorn Rusen, Professor of General History at the Univer-sity of Bielefeld, has sought to articulate a historiess," or theory of historiog-raphy.1Although a number of Riisen'sessays have appearedin English, because

1. Jorn Rusen, Fu'r eine erneuerte Historik: Studien zur Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft(Stuttgart, 1976) (reviewed by J. L. Herkless, History and Theory 17 [1978], 241-245); HistorischeVernunft: Grundzu'geeiner Historik I, Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft (Gottingen,1983) (reviewed by Peter Munz, History and Theory 24 [1985], 92-100); Rekonstruktion der Ver-gangenheit: Grundzuigeeiner Historik II, Die Prinzipien der historischen Forschung (Gottingen,1986) (reviewed by F. R. Ankersmit, History and Theory 27 [1988], 81-94); Lebendige Geschichte:Grundzuge einer Historik SII, Formen und Funktionen des historischen Wissens(Gottingen, 1989)(reviewed by Robert Anchor, History and Theory 30 [1991], 347-356). See also Zeit und Sinn:Strategien historischen Denkens (Frankfurt am Main, 1990), a collection of occasional essays ofthe years 1979-1988 in which Riusen'stheoretical concerns are manifest.


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40 ALLAN MEGILLof their diverse foci and often specialized character they do not afford muchsense of his theoretical project generally.2One suspects that even among Germanhistorians the general shape tends to disappear, in part because Rfisen is such aprolific writer and editor, but more importantly because the historical professiontends to be quite sharply antitheoretical, or at least untheoretical. And yettheory, in the deep sense of a reflection on basic presuppositions (as aGrundlagenrefiexion, in Riisen's terminology), is important for the discipline,especially in its current, fragmented state.

My main aim here is to give an account of Riisen's histories. I shall suggestsomething of the theory's background and rationale, situating it within thecontext of German historiography. At the core of Riisen's theory is his notionof historiography's "disciplinarymatrix" (disziplinare Matrix), a term that heof course borrows from Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolu-tions.3 (Riisen's disciplinary matrix differs markedly from Kuhn's, however,for, as we shall see below, he uses the term to designate not only the authorizedorientations and procedures of the discipline but also its external relations -its relations, that is, to the social community in general.) My secondary aimis to suggest a revision of Riisen's theory through greater emphasis on thenotion, adapted from classical rhetoric, of the inventional role of topoi, ortopics. The revision is intended to detach Riisen's histories from the contextwithin which it was originally articulated, that of social democratic intellectualpolitics in the Federal Republic of Germany from the late 1960s until the recentpast. My purpose is not to reject the theory's implicit politics, but rather toadapt the theory to a situation where a greater diversity of ends and identitiesis to be expected than was the case within the German historical profession inthe 1970s and 1980s.

The notion of a histories (we could equally well call it a "historiology") is evenmore foreign to the historical profession in the English-speaking world thanit is to the German branch of the profession. Yet, at least in the United States,one historian has come to be especially well known for his theoretical work,namely, Hayden White. In an essay concerned with conveying a sense of what

2. Four of the essays appeared in History and Theory: Jorn Riisen, "Jacob Burckhardt: PoliticalStandpoint and Historical Insight on the Border of Post-Modernism," History and Theory 24(1985), 235-246; "The Didactics of History in West Germany: Towards a New Self-Awareness ofHistorical Studies," History and Theory 26 (1987), 275-286; "Historical Narration: Foundation,Types, Reason," History and Theory, Beiheft 26 (1987), 87-97; and "Rhetoric and Aesthetics ofHistory: Leopold von Ranke," History and Theory 29 (1990), 190-204. l am aware of three otheressays in English: Jdrn RUsen, "Theory of History in the Development of West German HistoricalStudies: A Reconstruction and Outlook," GermanStudies Review 7 (1984), 11-25; "NewDirectionsinHistoricalStudies,"n MiedzyHistoriaa Theoria.Refleksje ad Problematykaziejow wiedzyhistorycznej, ed. Marian Drozdowski (Warsaw, 1988), 340-355; and "The Development of Narra-tive Competence in Historical Learning: An Ontogenetic Hypothesis Concerning Moral Conscious-ness," History and Memory 1 (Winter/Fall 1989), 35-59. Most of these essays, and a number ofothers, appear in JmrnRiisen, Studies in Metahistory, ed. Pieter Duvenage (Pretoria, 1993).

3. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, [1962], 2nd rev. enl. ed.(Chicago, 1970), "Postscript- 1969," 182-187.


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JORN RUJSEN'STHEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 41Risen's theory s in the firstplace, it wouldbe inappropriateo offera thoroughcomparisonwiththe workof another heorist;but a cursorycomparisonwilloffer us a quick way of situatingRiisen, throughcontrastwithWhite.

Born n 1938,Riisen s ten yearsyounger han White. But as theorists he twoare more nearlycontemporary.AlthoughWhite publishedseveral heoreticalessays earlier,the first of his theoreticalpieces to acquiresome notice was apugnaciousessay, "TheBurdenof History,"published n 1966.4 n the sameyear, at the Universityof Cologne, Riisen defended his dissertation,on thenineteenth-century istorian and theorist of historiographyJohann GustavDroysen.Whiteand Riisenhave continued o contribute o theoryof historiog-raphyeversince.In 1969Riisenpublisheda revisedversionof his dissertation,BegriJfeneGeschichte:Genesisund Begrundungder Geschichtstheorie . G.Droysens (HistoryGrasped:The Genesisand Foundationof J. G. Droysen'sTheory of History).5His programmatic ur eine erneuerteHistorik appearedin 1976.Thereare also variouseditedor coeditedcollections,Grundzuge inerHistorik(1983, 1986, 1989),Zeit und Sinn (1990),and many essays. White'swork is of course much better knownin America, both inside the professionand outsideit: most importantly,his influentialMetahistory:The HistoricalImagination n Nineteenth-Century urope appeared n 1973,and two essaycollections, Tropicsof Discourseand The Contentof theForm, appeared n1978and 1987respectively.6But whileRilsenand Whitebothseereflective heoryasimportant orhistori-ography,andhave addressedn theirtheorizingcertaincommon issues(mostnotably, the forms of historicalwriting), their basic concerns are sharplydifferent.An economicalwayof situating he two theorists s via theirdifferentintellectualprovenances.In brief, Rusenfinds his intellectual nspiration nDroysen. White,on the otherhand, has found substantial nspiration or hishistoriographicalhinkingnFriedrichNietzsche. Tobesure,the latterconnec-tionneeds o benuanced, or, unlikeNietzsche,White s an Americandemocratanda moralist.Still, by highlightinghe pointsof contrastbetweenWhiteandRiisen,the connectionwill helpus to see better where Riisenstands.)Withoutdiscussing n detail Nietzsche'sreflectionson historiography, heimportant hingto know is that in the sectionon myth and history n TheBirthof Tragedy 1872),andin theessay"On he UsesandDisadvantages f Historyfor Life" (1874) that expandson that section, Nietzsche offered as harsh acriticismof the ethos of professionalhistoricalscholarshipas has ever beenmade.He claimed hatprofessionalhistorians ndphilologistswereunimagina-tive myth-destroyers,whose own lackof nobilitymadethemincapableof dis-

4. HaydenWhite,"TheBurdenof History,"Historyand Theory5 (1966), 111-134,reprintedin White, Tropicsof Discourse:Essays n CulturalCriticismBaltimore,1978),27-50.5. Jorn Rfisen,BegriJfeneGeschichte:Genesisund Begrundung er Geschichtstheorie. G.Droysens Paderborn,1969).6. HaydenWhite,Metahistory:TheHistorical maginationnNineteenth-CenturyEuropeBal-timore, 1973);White, Tropics f Discourse:Essays n CulturalCriticismBaltimore, 978);White,The Contentof the Form:NarrativeDiscourseand HistoricalRepresentationBaltimore,1987).


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42 ALLAN MEGILLcerning nobility in the past.7 In "The Burden of History," White is entirelyexplicit about his acceptance of the Nietzschean diagnosis of professional histo-riography.8White's conception of historiography is resolutely nonprofessional.He strongly resists the professional historian's claim to offer, through the auton-omous practice of history, an authoritative picture of the past. Little wonderthat guild historians reacted with hostility to White's initial foray into the theoryof historiography and to the later, more extensive writings that followed from it.

Rtsen, for his part, is unequivocal about the Droysenian provenance of hishistories.9As Professor of History at Jena and then at Berlin, Droysen (1808-1884) offered a lecture course on histories a full seventeen times, the first timein 1857, the last in 1883.10Thus, while Nietzsche was castigating the professionalpractice of historiography Droysen was delivering his theoretical lectures justi-fying that very practice. Droysen aimed at providing an account of the "encyclo-pedia and methodology" of history viewed as a unified and autonomous aca-demic discipline. Riisen's aim is in many ways similar: he conceives of hishistories as offering a "Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft," to cite the subtitleof Fur eine erneuerte Historik. When Rusen quotes Droysen's assertion thathis aim is to offer "a systematic representation of the field and method of ourscience," he well conveys not only Droysen's aim but a large part of his ownaim as well.11In short, whereas White often seems to theorize in anarchic hostility to thediscipline, to its compromises and its consensus, Rusen sees himself as theorizingon and for the discipline. In part (although not entirely), the difference seemssituationally induced, for in the American context there has been little spacewithin the discipline for reflective theorizing about it. Insofar as such theoryhas arisen, it has done so almost entirely outside the discipline -in philosophyand (more recently) in literary studies, as well as in the hybrid region betweenhistory, philosophy, and literary theory that History and Theory sometimes

7. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, sect. 23, in Nietzsche, "The Birth of Tragedy"and "The Case of Wagner," transl. W. Kaufman (New York, 1967), 135-139, and FriedrichNietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," especially sects. 5-7, in Nietzsche,Untimely Meditations, transl. R. J. Hollingdale, with an Introduction by J. P. Stern (Cambridge,Eng., 1983), 83-100.

8. White, "The Burden of History," 125, 134.9. Rusen repeatedly notes the connection between his notion of a histories and Droysen's. See,

for example, Fur eine erneuerte Historik 11 and 18, and Historische Vernunft (Grundzuge I), 22.10. See Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik: Rekonstruktion der ersten vollstandigen Fassung

der Vorlesungen (1858); Grundrifi der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857/1858) undin der letzten gedruckten Fassung (1882), ed. P. Leyh, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1977). (The promisedvols. 2 and 3, which would contain textual apparatus, have not been published.) A translation byElisha Benjamin Andrews of the final, 1882 edition of the published summary of the course,Grundrifider Historik, appeared in English as Outline of the Principles of History (Boston, 1893);it is currently out of print. A version of the lectures themselves was first published only in 1937:Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik: Vorlesungenuber Enzyklopddie und Methodologie der Gesch-ichte, ed. R. Hubner (Munich, 1937).

11. Historische Vernunft, 22, quoting Droysen, Historik, 3. Rusen emphasizes that historics,in his conception of it, "stands ... in an inner relation to the practice of the historian" (HistorischeVernunft, 11), not in opposition to it.


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JORN RUSEN'S THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 43occupies. In Germany, on the other hand, reflective theory of historiographyhas had a long presence within the German discipline, in part because of thediscipline's close proximity to philosophy. Thus Rtisen is able to see himselfas continuing, and renewing, Droysen's histories. Droysen, in turn, was ableto attach himself to a tradition of reflection on historiography going back tothe eighteenth century.12Pointing to the existence in many German universitiesof courses devoted to historics, Riisen and his colleagues are able to arguethat by the second half of the nineteenth century "theory was part of 'normal'scholarly practice"in the discipline."3 t is generally not so today even in Ger-many, as Rusen has noted; indeed, his major academic concern has been therevival of histories in a discipline now largely indifferent or even hostile to it. 14Still, it does have a position within the German discipline rather than outsideit in philosophy, literary studies, or "cultural criticism." Risen's position influ-ences the character of his theorizing.But what is involved in Risen's professionally-oriented theory of historiog-raphy? How does it connect with the context of German historiography andpolitics from the late 1960s onward, within which it was articulated? Mostimportantly, what tools and insights might we derive from it in the changedcontext of the 1990s, given the concerns that now arise out of American society(and not only American society) as compared to West German society beforethe collapse of the German Democratic Republic?

Risen's work, articulated over the last quarter century, involves four distin-guishable yet connected projects. First, some of his work can be identified aswhat in the American context is known as intellectual history: his book onDroysen most clearly fits this mold. Second, and closely overlapping with thefirstcategory, in the Droysen book and in many essays Rusen contributes to thehistory of (German)historiography.15Third, some of Risen's work is concernedprimarily with commenting on the present situation and problems of (German)historiography: one notable concentration is in Zeit und Sinn. Finally, Rusen

12. On the long-standing tradition of histories in German universities, see Horst Walter Blanke,Dirk Fleischer, and Jorn Rtisen, "Theory of History in Historical Lectures: The German Traditionof Historik, 1750-1900," History and Theory 23 (1984), 331-356 (also, in more detail, Blanke,Fleischer, and Rtisen, "Historik als akademische Praxis: Eine Dokumentation der geschichtstheore-tischen Vorlesungen an deutschsprachigen Universitaten von 1750 bis 1900," Dilthey-Jah'rbuch urPhilosophie und Geschichte 1 [1983], 182-255). Georg Iggers emphasizes the relation of historyto German idealist philosophy in Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National Tradi-tion of Historical Thoughtfrom Herder to the Present, [1968] rev. ed. (Middletown, Conn., 1983),3-4 and passim.

13. Blanke, Fleischer, and Rtisen, "Theory of History in Historical Lectures," 350.14. Ruisen,Fur eine erneuerte Historik, 17; see also Blanke, Fleischer, and Rtisen, "Theory of

History," 332.15. See especially Jorn Rtisen, Konfigurationen des Historismus: Studien zur deutschen Wis-

senschaftskultur (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), which brings together and revises much previouslypublished work. Note also the massive study by a Rusen student and collaborator, Horst WalterBlanke, Historiographiegeschichte als Historik [History of Historical Studies as Historics] (Stutt-gart, 1991), which fits clearly into the Rusenian history of historiography program.


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44 ALLAN MEGILLoffers a general theory of historiography-that is, a histories. This project, too,is articulated in many of his writings, but its most important concentration isin Grundziige iner Historik.

Rilsen'shistories comes out of a particular conjuncture in Germanhistoriog-raphy. As Georg Iggers has shown, in the nineteenth century there emerged aspecifically German conception of history, closely connected to the Germanstate system. This tradition presupposed the existence and validity of a semi-autocratic society guided by a small political elite. Although the social andpolitical basis for this form of historiography largely collapsed in 1945, in WestGermany historians continued for another fifteen years to write the same sortof history and to deny that the enormity of the Third Reich was anything otherthan an unfortunate aberration from the mainstream of German historical de-velopment. 16

Only in the early 1960s did the situation begin to change. The initial episodein the struggle against the older historiography was the "Fischer controversy"of 1961 and after. Fritz Fischer's revisionist account of the origins of WorldWar I, Der Griffnach der Weltmacht(1961), did not diverge methodologicallyfrom traditional "historicist"historiography: it remained a work of narrativehistory focused on political events, with no appeals to explicit theory. But itchallenged the nationalist political commitments of that historiography andbreached, at least to some degree, its unquestioned dominance.'7 In conse-quence, the Fischer controversy made it easier for younger Germans to thinkthat a historiography of sharply different cast from traditional political narrativecould and should be introduced into the German profession. When, in the late1960s and early 1970s, the German university system considerably expanded,some of these scholars were able to obtain secure academic positions.

There thus emerged a new trend in German historiography. Such historiansas Hans-Ulrich Wehler (b. 1931)and Jirgen Kocka (b. 1941) began to advocateand writea history that self-consciously diverged from the method of historicisthistory. Their ideal was a "historical social science"that would apply to historytheories articulated by social scientists.'8 In addition to its methodological di-mension historical social science had a political dimension, as did historicisthistoriography. But whereas, after the founding of the German Empirein 1871,historicist historiography served to justify the existing order, historical socialscience was explicitly critical of that order and was concerned to show, amongother things, where, how, and why German history had gone wrong.'9 Critical

16. Iggers, The German Conception of History, 252-262, 269-270.17. An abridged version of Fischer's book appears in English as Germany'sAims in the FirstWorld War (New York, 1967). On the Fischer controversy and its sequelae, see Georg Iggers, NewDirections in European Historiography, 90-95. For a collection in English that focuses, however,on substantive rather than on methodological matters, see The Origins of the First World War:

Great Power Rivalry and German WarAims, ed. H. W. Koch (New York, 1972).18. For an important manifesto in this direction, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, GeschichtealsHistor-ische Sozialwissenschaft (Frankfurt am Main, 1973).

19. The classic work along this line is Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918,transl. Kim Traynor (Leamington Spa, Eng., 1985).


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JORN RUSEN'S THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 45historical social science was able to obtain a significant foothold in the Germanhistorical establishment in part because of the improved fortunes of the SocialDemocratic Party, which in 1969 formed the federal government. By the 1970sthe University of Bielefeld held a concentration of these critically-orientedhisto-rians, and the new orientation in German historiography has sometimes beenreferred to as the "Bielefeld school."20Risen's project of a histories emerges out of the reorientation in Germanhistori-ography of the late 1960s and 1970s (accordingly, it is significant that Rusenholds a chairat Bielefeld; previously, from 1974to 1989, he was professor at thenearby Ruhr University of Bochum). The reorientation provides the commonground on which come together his history of historiography, his commentaryon contemporary historiography, and his reflective theory historiess properlyso called). Indeed, even his decision as far back as the middle 1960s to writean intellectual historical study of Droysen makes sense in the light of the emer-gence of historical social science, although it is hard to believe that Rusen knewthis when he first embarked on the study. For by choosing to write on theforemost theorist of "the German conception of history," he was able to dotwo things. First, by situating Droysen within the political context out of whichhe came, he was able to show that, far from being only an apologist of theexisting order, Droysen was deeply concerned with the progressive, emancipa-tory political movements of his own time, thus suggesting the legitimacy of acritical and emancipatory historiography for our time. Second, he was ableto find in Droysen a model of self-reflection in historiography that, mutatismutandis, is applicable to historiography's future; in short, he was able to findin Droysen'shistories the exemplar for his own project of historiographical self-reflection.21

As I noted at the beginning, Rusen borrows from Kuhn the terminology ofthe "disciplinary matrix," which is central to his histories. He also borrows

20. Useful accounts of the transformation in German historiography in the 1960s and 1970sare offered by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Historiography in Germany Today," in Observations on "TheSpiritual Situation of the Age": Contemporary German Perspectives, ed. J. Habermas, transl.with an Introduction by Andrew Buchwalter [1979] (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 221-259, at 232ff.;Georg Iggers, New Directions in European Historiography, [1975], rev. ed. (Middletown, Conn.,1984), chapter III, "Beyond 'Historicism'- Some Developments in West German Historiographysince the Fischer Controversy," 80-122; Georg Iggers, "Introduction," in The Social History ofPolitics: Critical Perspectives in West German Historical Writingsince 1945, ed. G. Iggers (Leamin-gton Spa, Eng., 1985), 1-48; and Roger Fletcher, "Introduction" to Fritz Fischer, From Kaiserreichto Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History (London, 1986), 1-32. Geoff Eleysituates the story within the wider context provided by the development in the late 1970s and 1980sof "historyof everyday life" in his "Labor History, Social History, Alltagsgeschichte: Experience,Culture, and the Politics of the Everyday-A New Direction for German Social History?" Journalof Modern History 61 (1989), 297-343. Rusen discusses the evolution of German historiographyfrom 1945 through to the early 1980s in "Theory of History in the Development of West GermanHistorical Studies" (note 2, above), 14-25.

21. See Jorn Rusen, "Johann Gustav Droysen," in Deutsche Historiker, ed. H.-U. Wehler(Gottingen, 1971), II, 7-23, especially 11, 22.


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46 ALLAN MEGILLfrom Kuhn the terminology of the "paradigm,"which is central to his conceptionboth of the history of German historiography and of its situation in the 1960sand 1970s. There is a close connection between Riisen's history of historiog-raphy, his commentary on current historiography, and his theory of historiog-raphy. The three projects are tied together at the theoretical level by a juxtaposi-tion of "paradigm"and "disciplinarymatrix." They aretied together empiricallyby the particular interpretation of the past and present of German historiog-raphy and its contexts that Rusen offers.

Ironies abound in the articulation and reception of Kuhn's brilliant and con-tradictory book.22The irony most relevant in the present context is that Kuhnutterly denied that the account of science offered in The Structure of ScientificRevolutions had any applicability to social science, holding instead that itsapplicability was to natural science alone.23 Yet The Structure of ScientificRevolutions was quickly taken up by social scientists, who adapted the workto their own purposes. Our concern here is with its use by Rusen and by otherproponents and practitioners of historical social science in Germany. SinceRiisen's use of Kuhn is somewhat different from the roughly contemporaneoususe of Kuhn in American social science, it seems important at least to pointout the difference. In brief, American social scientists focused on the "structure"in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: they saw the paradigm notion asunderwritingthe authority of disciplinarycommunities.24Risen and other Ger-mans associated with the new historiography focused on the "revolution" inKuhn's book: their emphasis was more on paradigm change, and they usedKuhn as support for the legitimacy of moving from an old paradigm to anew one.25

The emphasis on paradigm change is manifested at many points in Rusen'swork. In his commentary on currenthistoriography, a crucially important con-cern is to highlight the need for and possibility of transformation. Thus in theinitial "programmatic" essay in Fur eine erneuerte Historik he highlights a"fourfold problematizing of the traditional discipline of history," occasioned

22. For one discussion, see Steve Fuller, "Being There with Thomas Kuhn: A Parable forPostmodern Times," History and Theory 31 (1992), 241-275.

23. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 164-165.24. For an important statement of this view, see David Hollinger, "T. S. Kuhn's Theory of

Science and Its Implications for History," in Hollinger, In the American Province: Studies inthe History and Historiography of Ideas (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), 105-129, especially 116-119(originally published in American Historical Review 78 [1973], 370-393). As Johannes Fabiannoted, from a hostile viewpoint, the use of Kuhn in [Anglo-American] social science "anoints thefetish of professionalism" (Johannes Fabian, "Language, History and Anthropology," Philosophyof the Social Sciences 1 [1971], 19-47, at 19). For a general discussion, see Allan Megill, "FourSenses of Objectivity," in "Rethinking Objectivity I," ed. A. Megill, Annals of Scholarship 8 (1991),nos. 3-4, 301-320, at 305-307.

25. See, for example, the brief discussion of Kuhn in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Krisenherde desKaiserreichs, 1871-1918: Studien zur deutschen Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Gottingen,1970), 163. The language of "paradigm"also appears in Iggers's 1975discussion of recent historiog-raphy, no doubt picked up in part from discussion with German colleagues: see Iggers, NewDirections, 6-8, 25-26, 31.


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JORN RUSEN'S THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 47by changes n the pre- and extra-scientificonditionsof the discipline,by thegrowing laimsof socialscience,by recent heoryof science,andby theexistenceof theMarxistradition.26 erefers n thesubsequent ssayof FureineerneuerteHistorik to a "Strukturwandel"structural ransformation)n the historicaldiscipline: he Wandel s, in essence, the hoped-forchangefrom traditional,"historicist" istoriographyo "historical ocial science."27The sameemphasison transformations to be found in Ruisen'sonceptionof the historyof Germanhistoriography ince the Enlightenment.Thus his1984essay,"VonderAufklarung umHistorismus:dealtypische erspektiveneinesStrukturwandels"FromEnlightenmento Historicism:deal-Typical er-spectiveson a StructuralTransformation], losely parallels hose otheressaysin whichhe discusses"paradigm hange"n the present.28WhileRusenhimselfhas not cultivatedat lengththe historyof historiography,H. W. Blankehas.Blanke's 809-page Historiographiegeschichte als Historik is essentially an at-tempt o define hecharacter ndboundaries f thehistoricistmodeof historiog-raphy.Here he notionof historiographicalaradigmsinds ts detailedapplica-tion. In the Riisenianperspective,the paradigmnotion is deployed in adiachronicway.Theparadigms f Enlightenment istoriography, istoricism,andhistorical ocialscienceare"ideal ypes"designatinghreesuccessivemodesof historiography.Myconcernhere s withRuisen'sontributiono theoryof historiography, otwith hiscontribution o the historyof Germanhistoriography r hiscommen-taryon present-dayGermanhistoriography.Butthedifferent reasof concernarenonetheless onnected n waysthathelpus to understandhe shapeof thetheory.I assertedat thebeginning hatRusen's entral heoretical ontributionis his notion of the "disciplinarymatrix"of historiography.Yet, as we havejust seen,Riisenalso usestheterminology f "paradigm." hepresence f both"paradigm"nd"disciplinarymatrix"n Rusenraisesa puzzle, since,as is wellknown, Kuhn introduced he notion of the disciplinarymatrix n the secondedition of The Structureof ScientificRevolutions as a replacement for the muchdisputednotion of paradigm n the first edition.29

26. Rfisen, "Fur eine erneuerte Historik: Voruberlegungen zur Theorie der Geschichtswis-senschaft," in Fur eine erneuerteHistorik, 20-30. See also the earlierversion of this essay in DenkenuberGeschichte, ed. F. Engel-Janosi, G. Klingenstein, and H. Lutz, WienerBeitrdgezur Geschichteder Neuzeit (Munich, 1974), I, 227-252, where Rfisen likewise discusses the current"problematiza-tion" of the discipline (239) and introduces for the first time the paradigm notion (252).

27. Rfisen, "Der Strukturwandel der Geschichtswissenschaft und die Aufgabe der Historik"[The Structural Transformation of Historical Science and the Task of Historics], in Fur eineerneuerte Historik, 45-54. See also the 1986 essay "Grundlagenreflexionund Paradigmenwechselin der westdeutschen Geschichtswissenschaft" [Reflection on Foundations and Paradigm Changein West German Historiography], in Zeit und Sinn, 50-76.

28. Rfisen, "Von der Aufklarung zum Historismus: Idealtypische Perspektiven eines Struktur-wandels,"in VonderAufkldrung zum Historismus: Zum Strukturwandel des historischenDenkens,ed. H. W. Blanke and J. Rfisen (Paderborn, 1984), 15-57.

29. More precisely, Kuhn embraced within one aspect of his notion of the disciplinary matrixone aspect of what he earlier designated by the term "paradigm." A Kuhnian natural scientificdisciplinary matrix has four components: symbolic generalizations (such as f = ma), models and


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48 ALLAN MEGILLWe must of course rememberhat Rusen borrows erminology rom Kuhnmuch more than he does definitions still, his appeal to Kuhn s appropriate,

since,likeKuhn,he is at a deeplevel concernedwith the questionof the ratio-nality of [social] science).Conceptually, he interesting hing about Rilsen'snotion of the disciplinarymatrix s that it providesa way of responding o anumberof questionsbrought o mindby his "paradigmatically"onceivedhis-toryof historiography ndby the commentary n presenthistoriographyon-nectedwith that history.First, in responseto the descriptionof the past intermsof a smallnumberof paradigms, here arises he questionof whetherneach case differencesare beingobscured n the attemptto fit phenomena oparadigms.Second,wheneverone attempts o conceptualizehe past in termsof a successionof paradigms, herearisesthe explanation-seeking uestion,namely, why did one paradigmgive way to another?Third,when one turnsto the presenta normativequestionarises, namely, whyshould one paradigmgiveway o another inthiscase, whyshould"historicism"ivewayto"historicalsocial science"?).Finally,the questionariseswhy, if there is a successionofparadigms achgiving wayto the next, any of them at all should be taken se-riously.30Riisen'snotionof thedisciplinarymatrixof historiographyffersa conceptualbasis for responding o the four questions.But before we can see how thisis so, we need to see what contentRusen attributes o "disciplinarymatrix."According o Rusen,the"disciplinarymatrixof the scienceof history" onsistsof a "dynamic onnection"amongfive"factors" r "principles"f historicalthinking.3'Theyare:(1) the actor of "cognitiventerest":Because heintentionsof humanbeingsalways go beyondtheirpresentsituations,and because results often divergefrom intentions,humanbeingshavea needfortemporalorientation.Historicalconsciousnessemergesout of this need; so, too, does historicalscience.(2) the "theory"actor, or "leading iews" leitendeHinsichtenJ oncerningtheexperiences f thepast:"Theory"s a looseterm nGermanhistoriographicaldiscussiongenerallyandin Rusen n particular.32n his broadestdefinitionofmetaphors, values, and exemplars of scientific practice. The term "paradigm,"Kuhn states, "wouldbe entirely appropriate"' or the fourth element (Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,186-187).

30. I generate the questions out of a reflection on the descriptive, explanatory, and justificatoryaspects of historiography. Iggers raises the first, description-oriented question in a review essayon Von derAufklarung zum Historismus, ed. Blanke and Riisen, in History and Theory 26 (1987),114-121, at 121.

31. Rusen describes the disciplinary matrix at various places in his corpus. See especially Zeitund Sinn, 51-55 and Historische Vernunft (Grundzuge 1), 24-32. For an account in English, seeRfsen, "Theoryof History in the Development of West German Historical Studies," 12-13. Rusen'sfirst discussion of the disciplinary matrix of the science of history appears in "Der Strukturwandelder Geschichtswissenschaft und die Aufgabe der Historik," in Fur eine erneuerteHistorik, 46-48;his account there is somewhat different from his later accounts, for he omits forms of historicalrepresentation and does not distinguish between "interests" and "functions."

32. As Ankersmit points out in his review essay on Rekonstruktion der Vergangenheit (Grund-zuge II) (note 1, above), 88-89.


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JORN RUSEN'STHEORYOF HISTORIOGRAPHY 49Methods(rules ofempirical research)

Theories(leading views concerning Foresthe experiences of the past) (of representation)[Historical Discipline]-- -- -- -- --------- - - - - - - ----------------__ ____[Life-pratic]

Interests(interpreted needs for Functionsorientation in time) (of existential orientation)

FIGURERusen's Disciplinary Matrix

the "theory" factor, Rusen has in mind the conceptions that historians haveconcerning the historical character of human action generally. But he recognizesthat theory enters into historiography at other levels as well - for example,through the application to history of explanatory theories articulated by so-cial scientists.33(3) methods of empirical research

(4) forms of historical representation(5) the functions of orienting existence: Having arisen from a human existen-

tial need, historiography then contributes back to life-practice, constitutingidentities and offering guidance. Ideally, it should serve to facilitate humaninteraction generally.

The intellectual utility of such matrices resides, as I shall argue below, muchmore in their application than in their schematic presentation. Since my mainaim hereis to explicate Rusen'stheory in general, the disciplinarymatrix cannotbe applied to specific cases here. Still, we can gain some sense of how it allowsone to resolve the problems noted above.

33. In an essay originally published in 1979, "Wie kann man Geschichte vernunftig schreiben?Ober das Verhaltnis von Narrativitaitund Theoriegebrauch in der Geschichtswissenschaft," Rusenidentifies six types of historical theory; see Rusen, Zeit und Sinn, 106-134, at 125-129. Theory isalso addressed in Rekonstruktion der Vergangenheit, chapter 1, "Systematik-Strukturen undFunktionen historischer Theorien" [Systematics Structures and Functions of Historical Theories],19-86.


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50 ALLAN MEGILLFirst, on the level of description, the disciplinary matrix allows the historian

of historiography to respond to the objection that the paradigmnotion, becauseit does not take account of differences within a given historiographical para-digm, is descriptivelycrude. For the matrix allows one to conceptualize histori-ography within the same paradigm as varying considerably with respect tointerests, theories, methods, forms of representation, and functions, withoutsuch variations necessarilyresultingin a paradigmshift. Of course, the questionof whether in a particular case one is justified in speaking of a paradigm shiftcan only be answered by study of the details of that case.

Second, on the level of explanation, the matrix offers an answer to the ques-tion, why does one paradigm give way to another? The matrix implies that ashift from one paradigm to another is primarily the result of a change in theworld of Lebenspraxis that generates new cognitive interests and offers newpossibilities of orientation. A change in the world of Lebenspraxis is a necessary,although not a sufficient, condition of paradigm shift.

Third, the notion of the disciplinary matrix offers an answer to the normativequestion, why should one historiographicalparadigmgive way to another? Theanswer, clearly, is because the social order has changed. Thus a historicismthat was (perhaps) adequate to German social and political life in 1850, andserved emancipatory interests at that time, was not adequate to the Germanyof 1960. In Fur eine erneuerte Historik Rusen makes the point that historiesis concerned, finally, with the present situation.34Riisen's renewed histories isclearly inspired by the model of Droysenian histories. Its "renewed"characterhas to do with the claimed impossibility, in the face of the economic, social,and political realities of present-daylife, of relying any more on the "commonlyheld ethical principles" (sittliche Gemeinsamkeiten) to which Droysen, deeplyinfluenced by the German idealist tradition, appealed.35Given a society thathas undergone a modernization process, involving an economic dynamic ofincreased productivity, a political dynamic of democratization, and a socialdynamic of increasingequality,36one needs, the argumentgoes, a historiograph-ical paradigm adequate to that reality.

Finally, the notion of the disciplinary matrix offers an answer to the broadestand most difficult question of historics, namely, why should historiography betaken seriously at all? After all, the succession of historiographical paradigmsand interpretations could be taken as arbitrary, as mere emanations of theLebenswelt: "And we are hereas on a darklingplain ... Where ignorant armiesclash by night." But Rusen recoils from such an answer. Time and again, inone form or another, he asks the question, "How can one write history ratio-nally?" His basic answer is that one can write history rationally by pursuingit as a universalizing, theory-oriented enterprise.The argument is not that histo-riography ought to articulate its results in the form of universal theories, but

34. Riisen, Fur eine erneuerte Historik, 44, 183-184, and passim.35. Droysen, Historik, 212, 288, 437; Droysen, Outline, 37.36. Rusen, Zeit und Sinn, 69.


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JORN RUSEN'S THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 51rather that in various ways history depends on and connects with universals.Historiography has a set of more or less clearly identifiable methodologicalrules and practices. When properly done, it seeks to articulate a knowledgethat is theoretically guided. It seeks consensus among its practitioners. Throughthe articulation of its research in appropriate forms of representation, it seeksto serve a general function of existential orientation, responding to the cognitiveinterests of human beings in their social lives. And, because it is theoreticallyguided, it is able to stand apart from, and adopt a critical stance toward, thevague and ideologically-tinted knowledge that circulates in the Lebenswelt.Indeed, because it is guided by theory, historical narrative is not just mimeticbut also constructive, taking as its object not just what is given but what isintelligible.37The question here is not whether Rtisen's vision of historiography as a scienceultimately stands up, but rather what its significance is -both for Rtisen andfor us herenow, whoeverthis "us"may be. Particularlyin its graphic representa-tion, the disciplinary matrix will remind some readers of the notion of thehermeneutic circle, articulated by William Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and other writers in the hermeneutic tradition.38But as aprogressive German writing in the wake of the Holocaust, Riisen cannot acceptthe hermeneutic circle unmodified, at least not as an account of scientific andscholarly investigation. Thus, contraryto the hermeneuticists, he draws a sharpboundary between discipline and "life-world." In his view, research-orientedhistoriography does arise from the life-world's orientational needs and fromexpectations in the life-world that identity (national and otherwise) will besupported. But he also holds that research-oriented historiography is not justa response to such needs and expectations; rather, as he writes in Zeit undSinn, it "produces a theoretical surplus beyond the need for identity of actingsubjects." As he emphatically puts it: "My thesis is that this theoretical surplusmust be seen as the distinctive rational achievement of research-orientedhistor-ical narrative." With its theoretical (universal) aspect, historiography "tran-scends the particularity of the 'commonsensical' orientation of action withinthe life-world."'39

Whether the sharp line between Fachwissenschaft and Lebenspraxis is justi-fied or not, one can see why it is there: for it is clearly a response to the realitiesof the Third Reich, to a historiography that did not adequately confront thoserealities, and to political tendencies in the present that have tried to minimizethe enormities of modernGerman history. The impact of that history on Rtisen's

37. Risen, "Wie kann man Geschichte vernunftig schreiben?" in Zeit und Sinn, especially 114-124 and 130-134.

38. For a brief and helpful account, see Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Rela-tivism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia, 1983), 131-139.

39. Rusen, Zeit und Sinn, 119-120.


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52 ALLAN MEGILLthinking s clear.40ndeed,returningo hisconceptionof the pastand presentof Germanhistoriography,we can see him as trying,in his advocacyof theparadigm f historical ocialscience, o restorehespecificallyriticaldimensionthat was important n the Enlightenment aradigm,but that was mutedandthensilenced n the historicistparadigm. n linewith thiscriticalspirit,Rusenhasdevotedagreatdealof attention o theprojectof historicaldidactics,aimedat improving itizens'historicalconsciousness.41Rfisen'scriticalposition may well remind some readersof the work of amuchbetterknownGermanntellectual,hesociologistandphilosopher urgenHabermas b. 1929).The parallelsbetweenRiisen'spositionand that of Ha-bermasare often striking.For example,whenRiisendrawshis line betweenFachwissenschaftndLebenspraxis, e followsa thematization ffered n Ha-bermas'sclassic study Knowledgeand Human Interests,wherethe centralproblemshow rationalknowledge etsconstituted ut of the worldof praxis.42Similarly,Rilsen's1988essay,"HistorischeAufklarungmAngesichtderPost-Moderne:Geschichtem Zeitalterder'neuenUntibersichtlichkeit"'HistoricalEnlightenmentn the Faceof the Postmodern:History n theAge of the 'NewObscurity"'],lludes o, withouteverciting,Habermas's 985Streitschrift,Dieneue Untibersichtlichkeit,hichargued n favorof the projectof "modernity"or "Enlightenment"ndagainst"postmodernism."43imilarly,na 1989article,"TheDevelopment f NarrativeCompetence,"Rusen dentifies"fouressentialforms of historicalconsciousness,reflecting our stages of developmentbylearning," ollowing,in this progressivist tory, Habermas'suse of LawrenceKohlberg'sheory of moraldevelopment."My claim, let it be noted, is not that Rtisenwas deeplyinfluencedby Ha-bermas.Theclaim srather hatRusen,alongwithsuchotherGermanhistoriansas WehlerandKocka,occupieda politicalposition(socialdemocratic,deeplymarkedby "theGerman atastrophe")hatledthemto respond n similarwaysto the problemof the intellectual'sand academic'srole in the social order.Habermasarticulatedon a philosophicalplanearguments hat the historiansalsoarticulated, r at leastpresupposed.Thus,in spiteof disciplinary ivisions

40. See, for example,his reservationswith regard o JacobBurckhardt'spost-modernism,"whichhe views n the lightof "thehistorical xperiencewhichEuropeand especiallyGermany ashad withthe politicalconsequences f anti-modernorms of thought,"n Rusen,"JacobBurck-hardt" note2, above),246.41. For a summarydiscussion, ee LebendigeGeschichte GrundzdgeII), 77-135.42. Jirgen Habermas,Knowledgeand Human Interests, transl. J. J. Shapiro [1968](Boston, 1971).43. Riisen,"Historische ufklarung...," in ZeitundSinn, 231-251;JurgenHabermas,DieneueUntibersichtlichkeitKleine olitischeSchriftenV)(Frankfurt m Main, 1985).Partsof DieneueUnubersichtlichkeitaveappearedn English n TheNew Conservatism: ulturalCriticismand theHistorians'Debate,d. andtransl.S. W. Nicholsen,ntroduction yR. Wolin Cambridge,Mass., 1989).44. Rusen,"TheDevelopmentf NarrativeCompetencen HistoricalLearning"note2, above),37. See Jirgen Habermas,Communicationnd the Evolutionof Society,transl.T. McCarthy(Boston,1979),chapter2, "MoralDevelopment ndEgo Identity," 9-94. For Kohlberg imself,thebestpointof entry s LawrenceKohlberg,EssaysonMoralDevelopmentSanFrancisco,1981).


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JORN RUSEN'S THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 53(for historiography is not philosophy), there has long been an affinity betweenHabermas and the progressive historians. From the late 1970s onward, in theface of the so-called Tendenzwende (turn to the right) in German political life,the affinity became quite explicit. Wehler and other historians contributed toHabermas's 1979 collection seeking to evaluate the present situation and tocounter the rise of the right, Stichworte zur "Geistigen Situation der Zeit"[Observationson "The Spiritual Situation of the Age"] 45 Significantly, althoughnot a historian, Habermas was the catalyzing figure in the "Historians'Debate"of 1986-1987 concerning the place of the Holocaust in German history.46

As part of his similar commitment to an "Enlightenment"position, Rusenarticulates a version of the idea that there ultimately exists a single history.The idea of a single history-the idea of a "grand narrative," to appropriateJean-Francois Lyotard's now famous term - is deeply imbedded in the Westernhistoriographical tradition, in the shape of a preccupation with "universal his-tory" that goes back to the sixteenth century and beyond. The concern hasappeared in a number of different forms in the tradition of modern Westernhistoriography. It is present in Droysen's Historik, manifested in Droysen'sconcern with the problem of converting "histories" nto "History";one also findsit in Leopold von Ranke and in other participants in the historicist tradition.47In Rilsen, it appears in the guise of his concern with discovering "historicaluniversals" n termsof which the life of humanbeings in time is to be understood.These universals (concepts like progress, decline, individuality, process, andstructure) enter into what Rusen, in Rekonstruktion der Vergangenheit, calls"historical anthropology." Rtisen's historical anthropology is focused on theconcept of humanity, which is the historical universal that embraces all theothers.48As F. R. Ankersmit has pointed out, the term "transhistorical anthro-pology" might have been more appropriate, since Rusen stresses that thesehistorical concepts are to be applicable to every conceivable historical period.49In an essay published in 1990, "Der Teil des Ganzen: Uber historischen Kateg-

45. Note 20, above.46. For an account of the Historikerstreit and Habermas's important role in it, see Charles S.

Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge,Mass., 1988), especially chapter 2, "Habermas among the Historians," 34-65. Note also Die Zukunftder Aufklarung, ed. J. Risen, E. Lammert, and P. Glotz (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), where anumber of authors write explicitly in the wake of Habermas's Die neue Unubersichtlichkeit, andJiirgen Kocka, "Geschichte und Aufklarung," in Kocka, Geschichte und Aufklarung: Aufsdtze(Frankfurt am Main, 1989), 140-159.47. Droysen, Historik, 441 (see also 253-254); Outline, 44: "Eventhe narrow, the verynarrowestof human relations, strivings, activities, etc., have a process, a history, and are for the personsinvolved, historical. So family histories, local histories, special histories. But over all these andsuch histories is History." For Ranke's concern with universal history (which occupies a somewhatdifferent register than Droysen's), see, among many possible references, Leopold von Ranke, "TheRole of the Particular and the General in the Study of Universal History (A Manuscript of the1860s)," in Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History, ed. Georg G. Iggers and Konrad vonMoltke, with new translations by Wilma A. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke (New York, 1983),57-59.

48. Rdsen, Rekonstruktion der Vergangenheit, 56-65.49. Ankersmit, Review of Rekonstruktion der Vergangenheit (note 1, above), 91.


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54 ALLAN MEGILLorien" [The Part of the Whole: Concerning Historical Categories], Rusen re-flects on the matter again, contending that "one of the tasks of historical science[is] to thematize the whole of history."50

In a certain sense such a thematization seems indispensable to history con-ceived of as a scientific enterprise, since science as we understand it claimsuniversal validity. And yet with regard to the notion of a historical whole, oneis caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one side, unless one assumes somebasic identity at the level of historical agents and sufferers, the historical wholecan never actually be told (except at the end of time), since there is always thepossibility of divergence from what we understand as human nature. On theother side, if we posit a human nature whose fundamental modifications areknown now, we will have then articulated a substratum protected from thevicissitudes of historical time, and we will at the same time have deprivedhistoriography of the possibility of generating knowledge that is simultaneouslynew, true, and important. Pragmatically, what is told will always be someversion of an assumed historical whole. Rusen himself points out that the pro-posed anthropology is a regulative Idea in the Kantian sense; and so, obviously,is the historical whole.5"One is thus left with a paradox, namely, that oneattaches oneself to the Idea of a single history, but that the single history isnever actually articulated as history; instead, it remains behind the history, asa justifying theory. In Rusen, the assumed "grand narrative" is essentially aWeberian story of modernization and secularization, a movement toward whatErnst Troeltsch once referred to as the "kirchenfreiemoderneWelt."52Building on Rusen, I propose to suggest here a way of thinking about historiog-raphy that avoids the opposition between, on the one hand, a "modernist"or"Enlightenment" version of grand narrative that looks to (in Jurgen Kocka'swords) a single "historischeZusammenhangserkenntis"(knowledge of historicalinterrelation), and, on the other hand, a "postmodern"view that would dissolvehistory into "miniatures and insular modes of representation."53 t seems clearthat no conception of science can abandon a "methodical strivingtoward inter-subjectively valid knowledge (truth)," to quote Kocka again.54The question is,to what extent does this also require a striving toward a single history?

My point of entry to the revision of Ruisen'sdisciplinary matrix is the notionof topic, whichRusen, and Droysen before him, both evoke.55Topic is a classicalnotion, part of ancient dialectic and rhetoric. Obviously, my aim here is not

50. See Jorn Rusen, "Der Teil des Ganzen: uber historische Kategorien," in Teil und Ganzes,ed. K. Acham and W. Schulze, [Theorie der Geschichte, Beitrage zur Historik, vol. 6] (Munich,1990), 299-322, at 299.

51. Ruisen, Rekonstruktion der Vergangenheit, 59; see also the entire section, entitled "DerZugriff aufs Ganze: zur Theorie 'der' Geschichte" [Access to the Whole: Toward Theory 'of' His-tory], 47-64.

52. Ernst Troeltsch, quoted by Rusen, BegriJfeneGeschichte, 144 n. 24.53. Kocka, "Geschichte und Aufklarung," 156.54. Ibid., 157.55. See Droysen, Historik, 425, 445ff.; Rusen, Lebendige Geschichte (Grundzuge III), 57.


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JORN RUSEN'S THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 55to offer a reconstruction f classicalnotions of topic, for that task is properlythe concern of historiansof rhetoric and dialectics, and its details are notespecially elevant o the theoretical oncernhere."6 or ourpurposes, opicisbest understoodas offeringcollectionsof subjectheadings hat we can hold inour mindsand activate n particular hetorical ituationswhenwe find themsuited. Topic in the classicalsense involves the listing of considerations hatmightpossibly arise n discussionof any particularmatter.Further, he Greektermtopos andits Latineqivalent, ocus, are often translated nto Englishas"lineof argument."The translationunderlines he fact that, most notably intheadversarial ituationscommon nthe judicialuse of rhetoric, opic suggestsarguments hat the advocatemight find advantageouso employ.

There are, of course, differentclassical presentationsof topic. Aristotle'saccounts, n his Rhetoricandespecially n Topics,areof fundamentalmpor-tance.57 ut whileAristotle'sdialecticalopicsdo havea continuingntellectualrelevance, opicas described y CiceroandQuintiliann theirrhetorical reatisesis more immediately pplicable o the work of historians.An importantpointis that Ciceroand Quintilianboth emphasize he interrogativeharacter f thetopics. For example,Cicero n hisDe Inventione, n the contextof a consider-ation of judicialrhetoric,proposes hat whentheadvocateexamines wo com-petingnarratives that s, his own narrativenarratio) ndthatof hisopponent,he will be better able to invent argumentsabout themif he has stored in hismind topics with which to address he material.The topics come out as ques-tions-such as "why,with whatintention,andwith whathopeof successeachthingwas done; why it was done in this way rather hanin that;why by thisman rather than by that; why with no helper or why with this one . . . ," andso on. Nothingis determinedn advance; f a question fits, it can be workedwith;if not, not.58

56. The best entry to the history of topics is perhaps via the writings and translations of EleonoreStump. See Boethius, De Topicis Differenthis, transl., with notes and essays on the text, byE. Stump (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978), especially "Introduction," 16-26, and the essays that Stump appendsto her translation, 159ff. See also Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica, transl., with notes and an introduc-tion, by E. Stump (Ithaca, N.Y. 1988). A good general history of rhetoric, within which topic findsa considerable place, is Thomas M. Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition (New York, 1990).

57. Aristotle, Rhetoric, in Aristotle, "Rhetoric" and "Poetics," transl. W. R. Roberts and I.Bywater, respectively, with an introduction by E. P. J. Corbett (New York, 1954), 1395b 20-1400b 35; Aristotle, Topics, in Aristotle, A New Aristotle Reader, ed. J. L. Ackrill (Oxford, 1987),60-77.

58. Cicero, Delnventione, in "Delnventione, ""De Optimo Genereoratorum, ""Topica, "transl.H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), II. xiv. 45. The best introduction to topic is Quintilian'schapter on argument: Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, transl. H. E. Butler (Cambridge, Mass.,1920-1922), V. x. 20-125 (vol. 2, 213-271 of this edition). A word to rhetorical cognoscenti: Iintentionally absorb into my discussion of topic the ancient conception of "status" or "basis" aswell. "Status" questions (often taken to be "An sit? Quid sit? Quale sit?" [Is it? Whatis it? Whatcharacter does it have?]) seem to be of similar character but of more general formulation than"topic" questions. On status theory, Lucia Caboli Montefusco's La dottrina degli 'status' nellaretorica greca e romana (Hildesheim, 1986) is the best survey. For a parallel in historiography tothe status questions, see the discussion of "What was the case? Why was it the case? What groundsdo we have for believing so?" in Allan Megill, "Recounting the Past: 'Description,' Explanation,and Narrative in Historiography," American Historical Review 94 (1989), 627-653.


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56 ALLAN MEGILLThe payoff for the rhetorically trainedspeaker is clear. By holding in mind sets

of questions that can be posed whenparticular cases come up, the rhetorician hasa device for quickly inventing arguments for and against. But topic need notbe limited to the world of the advocate. For topics -understood, here, as setsof questions ready to be activated where it seems appropriate to do so - arean enrichment of the understanding. They enable us to see the world morefully, and to impart some sense of order - indeed, various senses of orderto what would otherwise remain buzzing confusion. They are the elements ofa mind that is well-stocked, in an active sense of "stocked." They stand between,on the one hand, a consciousness that seeks to understand the world in termsof universal laws, abstracting from particular cases, and, on the other, a con-sciousness so caught up in the charm of particulars as to be unable to gain anyintellectual, let alone critical, purchase on them.

I wish to suggest here a conjunction between historiography and topic in itsjudicial or (more generally) adversarial use. In classical antiquity the conjunc-tion occurred only in a highly limited way, for classical historians and rhetori-cians saw historiography as epistemologically unproblematic -as lux veritatis,in Cicero's well-known phrase.59While Roman historians did employ topics,the topics in question (for example, lists of virtues) came from the demonstrativegenre of rhetoric, which was concerned with praising or blaming, rather thanfrom the judicial genre; they were thus not contributions to an argument againstan adversary. Admittedly, as Jacqueline de Romilly has pointed out, thespeeches that Thucydides included in his History have a rhetorical argumenta-tive structure.60 But classical rhetoricians did not see historiography itself asan argumentative project (as was, for example, a speech in a law court, orthe political speeches summarized or reconstructed in Thucydides' History),because historiography had not yet developed into an enterprise involving thesystematic confrontation of competing narratives-which it became, with evergreater insistence, in the modern period.6'

Since the classical rhetoricians saw history as embodying the light of truth(any work that did not was in their view simply not history), they could hardlysee it as standing in need of rhetorical argument, for in their view rhetoricalargument was required only in instances where one possessed, not the light oftruth, but only plausibilities. Accordingly, when the classical rhetoricians turnedto historiography they focused on historians' literary styles, not on argumenta-tive strategies.62Nor, despite Droysen's use of the term "topic," did a conjunc-

59. Cicero, De Oratore, transl. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.,1942), II. ix. 36.

60. Jacqueline de Romilly, Histoire et raison chez Thucydides (Paris, 1956), "Les Discoursantithetiques," 180-239.

61. In John Tinkler's words, among"modern 'accurate'historians ... historiography has tendedto shift from the demonstrative genre to the judicial" (Tinkler, "Bacon and History," CambridgeCompanion to Francis Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

62. See, for example, Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX. iv. 16-18 (Vol. 3, 514-517), X. i. 33,73-75, and 101 (Vol. 4, 20-21, 42-43, 58-59), and X. ii. 17 (Vol. 4, 82-85). For a useful surveyof classical rhetoricians' views on historiography, see Eckhard Kessler, "Das rhetorische Modell


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JORN RUSEN'S THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 57tion of historyand topicin its adversarial se occur n Droysen'sHistorik, for,far from seeingtopicas a devicefor the inventionof arguments,Droysenusedsheterm o designate"apodeixis"rrepresentationDarstellung,Darlegung).i3In short, he assumed hat topic is a stylisticconception,aligninghimself withthe general endency,going backto the second half of the sixteenthcentury,to reduce rhetoric o elocutio.6Mnly in the last generation, n Paul Veyne'sComment on ecrit ('histoireand in a paper by Nancy Struever,"Topics inHistory,"havehistoriography ndtopic nanargumentativelynventional ensebeen brought together.65 ut Veyne'sand Struever's uggestions or relatingtopic and historiography ave for the most partnot yet been takenup.In an age of diversity,a unificationof historiography n a substantive evelcannotbeattained, ordifferentdentitieswillfinddifferent istoriesmportant.Nor can one find unificationon the more abstract evel of method, for thepursuitof different istories, ome of whichwillinvolvehybrid nteractionwithother fields and concerns, may well requiredeploymentof different,and tosome extentcontradictory,methods.66 ather,assuming ocialdiversitywithinthe practiceof social science (which, as Kuhnrightly points out, has directconnections o larger ocialpraxis),disciplinary onsensuswould seemto havesome chanceof existing only on the level of a reflective heoryof historiog-raphy-on the level, thatis, of "histories"n Riisen's ense.Riisenhimselfseeshistoriesas havinga unifying function,helping us to see the "forest"as wellas the"trees."67his is a necessary unction, especiallyat thepresentmoment.Thehistoricaldisciplines widely andI thinkrightly heldto be in a state offragmentation.68ragmentationssuch s not theproblem, orfragmentationder Historiographie," in Formen der Geschichtsschreibung, ed. R. Koselleck, H. Lutz, and J.Riisen(Theorieder Geschichte,Beitrage urHistorik,vol. 4) (Munich,1982), 37-85.63. See Droysen, Historik, 217, 405, 425, 445. This edition contains three distinct versions ofthe Historik, dating from 1857, 1857 or 1858, and 1882. Droysen uses the term "topic" only inthe 1882 version among the three printed here. (The presence of "topic" in the 1882 Grundri])derHistorik is obscured in Elisha Benjamin Andrews's English translation, where the unfamiliar term"Topik" is rendered as "The Doctrine of Systematic Presentation" [Droysen, Outline, 49]).

64. On this reduction, see G. Mazzacurati, La Crisi delta Retorica Umanistica nel Cinquecento(Naples, 1961).

65. Paul Veyne, WritingHistory: Essay on Epistemology, transl. Mina Moore-Rinvolucri [1971](Middletown, Conn., 1984), chapter X, "Lengtheningthe Questionnaire," 213-235, especially 218-224; Nancy S. Struever, "Topics in History," History and Theory, Beiheft 19 (Metahistory: SixCritiques) (1980), 66-79. Since the fact will be at least vaguely familiar to some readers, I shouldnote that in ancient tradition topic also served as a device of memory; this is the form of topichighlighted in Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (London, 1966) and Jonathan Spence, TheMemoryPalace of MatteoRicci(New York, 1984).

66. On hybridization, see Mattei Dogan and Robert Pahre, Creative Marginality: Innovationat the Intersections of Social Sciences (Boulder, Colo., 1990)- although the notion could be carriedmuch further than Dogan and Pahre do.

67. Risen, Historische Vernunft, 21, 32, 36; "Theory of History in the Development of WestGerman Historical Studies," 13.68. SeePeterNovick,ThatNobleDream:The"Objectivity uestion"andheAmericanHistor-ical Profession (New York, 1988), especially 415-629; Allan Megill, "Fragmentationand the Futureof Historiography," American Historical Review 96 (1991), 693-698.


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58 ALLAN MEGILLalso known as "specialization" is essential to the advance of research, andthe fragments produced by that researchmay well enter into productive, hybridinteractions with other fields and with practical concerns. The problem, rather,is narrowness, andtheory of historiography - especially if practiced asa rhetoricof inquiry carried out in ways both interrogative and analytical - can help prac-titioners to see beyond their specialties, opening their minds to broader issuesand improving their work in the process.

As Struever has pointed out, the rhetorical discipline of topic is rooted in acivil discourse, beginning as it does in "reputable opinion."69 Since topic isrooted in opinion, not in claimed certainty, and since its medium is the giveand take of argument, it is peculiarly open to pluralism.70Part of its pluralismis its propensity for the interrogative mode.7' On the level of theory, Rfisen'smost important contribution is the notion of the disciplinary matrix: thus Ihave emphasized it, and have put less emphasis on other aspects of his work.Shifting the disciplinarymatrix to the interrogativemode yields not "principles"or "factors" but rather a typology of good questions to ask when one is at-tempting to come to grips with the multifarious projects of historiography.(Note that Rusen is in principle open to such a pluralism: he always speaks ofa historics, thus suggesting that more than one histories is possible.)

One might also wish to make the matrix easier to keep in mind by simplifyingit, perhaps in the following way:

History(conceptionof, in general) Empirical esearchmethods

Life-world connection o) Presentation forms of)

FIGURE 2The Disciplinary Matrix of Historiography (Revised)72

69. Struever, "Topics in History," 70-71, 72-73, and passim. The reference is to the beginningof Aristotle's Topics, where Aristotle states that "our treatise proposes to find a line of inquirywhereby we shall be able to reason from reputable opinion about any subject presented to us"(Topics, 100a, in The New Aristotle Reader, 60).

70. Conversely, one might suggest, anti-pluralism is peculiarly resistant to topic. Referring toAristotle's Topics, G. W. F. Hegel saw "topic" as being concerned with enumerating "the differentpoints of view from which a thing may be considered" (G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Historyof Philosophy, transl. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, 3 vols. [New York, 1974], II, 217-218). Hegel's overall objection to the philosophy of Aristotle was that it was not sufficiently system-atic: instead of being "developed in its parts from the Notion," the parts "are merely ranged sideby side" (II, 118). Hegel'sobjection is of a piece with his conviction that there is a single, authoritativeworldview. From such a perspective, topic might well be seen as nonessential -a matter of (inade-quate) modes of representation.

71. Cf. Michel Meyer, From Logic to Rhetoric (Amsterdam, 1986), especially chapter 6, "Dia-lectic and Questioning," 99-114.72. By integrating Rfisen's categories of "interests"and "functions" into the single heading of"life-world" (since "interests"arise from the life-world and "functions" represent a contributionback to it), the revision perhaps underplays Rfisen's immense concern with historical didactics


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JORN RUSEN'S THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 59My schema does not embody a substantive theory of historiography. It is

only a reminder of what sorts of metahistorical questions we can and oughtto ask when we confront works of history and the institutions that producesuch works. The schema offers, in short, the basis for a topic of historiography,with such questions as the following: How is this historian, in writing this work,influenced by his or her own society and by his or her place within that society?What social agenda does the work implicitly or explicitly attach itself to? Whatoverall vision of history informs the work? What type or types of methoddoes the historian deploy? What forms of representation? One could also askquestions about the relations among the four categories -for example, howdoes a work's conception of History connect the historian's life-world with themethods deployed in the work, and with its forms of presentation?The questions are calculated to help us discover arguments about historiog-raphy-showing us (as Quintilian says that topic does) "the secret places wherearguments reside."73 n the language of rhetoric, the matrix offers a strategyfor the "invention"of arguments, which can then be methodically tested. Outof the four slots an infinite number of questions can be developed by divisionand subdivision. In considering forms of presentation, for example, one couldwell be prompted by a knowledge of the major branches of poetics to ask suchquestions as the following: How is the text arranged (a question deriving fromnarrative theory)? How is the author manifested in the text (theory of enuncia-tion)? How are the text's assertions rendered persuasive (rhetoric narrowlyconstrued)? Finally, how is the text made readable (stylistics)?74

A topical list can be extended or retracted as the specific case demands. It canalso be simply set aside when it does not prove illuminating. Strictly speaking, atopic should not be seen as either true or false, for, qua list, it makes neithertheoretical nor empirical claims. Rather, it is "abductive," in Charles Peirce'ssense, articulating things that may possibly be true.75Thus the question "Isthis(discussed most sustainedly in Lebendige Geschichte, 76-120). Without denying the importanceof historical didactics, one might say that this aspect of Riisen's theoretical project is far moretied to particular national contexts than are "leading views," "methods,""forms of representation,"and even "interests." Consequently, didactics seems harder to grasp at the broad theoretical levelthat is in play here, and more appropriately grasped in connection with specific institutions (forexample, schools), media (for example, television), communities, and events.

73. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, V. x. 20 (II, 213).74. The four branches of poetics are suggested (and their application to historiography exempli-

fied) in Philippe Carrard, Poetics of the New History: French Historical Discourse from Braudelto Chartier (Baltimore, 1992).75. On the Peircean sense of "abduction," see Charles Peirce, Collected Papers, ed. ArthurW. Burks (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), VII, chapter 3, "The Logic of Drawing History from AncientDocuments," especially "Abduction, Induction, and Deduction," 121-125, and "Abduction," 136-144. For a discussion by a historian, see Edward Muir, "Introduction: Observing Trifles,"in Micro-history and the Lost Peoples of Europe, ed. Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero, transl. Eren Branch(Baltimore, 1991), xviii-xix. Abduction is to be distinguished from deduction, that form of argumentin which, if the premises are true, the conclusion is necessarily true, and from induction, that formof argument in which, if the premises are true, the conclusion isprobably true. Historians generallybelieve, as an article of faith, that theirs is an inductive science. I would suggest, however, thatmany important historical arguments are better seen as abductive than as inductive, for nontrivialhistorical arguments will hinge in part on our own conception of ourselves and of our projects


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60 ALLAN MEGILLtopic true?" makes no sense at all. The only reasonable question is "Does thistopic offer illumination, in the range of cases with which we are currentlycon-cerned?"

Riisen's project of a histories, which he and others have begun to apply ina variety of ways to the past and present of historiography, is rich in illuminatingtopics. In focusing on his notion of the disciplinary matrix of historiography,I have presented only one aspect of his historics, albeit an important aspect.His theoretical project is best approached not as an attempt to offer a definitiveview of historiography but ratheras a tool-box, containing questions that can beasked with illuminating effect of the immense and varied body of historiographythat, after a century and three-quartersof "professional"historical production,now confronts us.University of Virginia