july 1996 alerts - federal aviation administration...cessna golden eagle cessna rudder structural...

General AviationAirworthinessAlerts

AC No. 43-16

ALERT NO. 216JULY 1996

Improve Reliability-Interchange ServiceExperience

ALERTS

Contents of this publication are informational only. Due to the need for extensive distribution of the GeneralAviation Airworthiness Alerts, only one copy will be provided to an addressee. This publication may beduplicated as required.

CONTENTS

AIRCRAFTAMERICAN CHAMPION ..................................................................................................... 1BEECH................................................................................................................................... 1CESSNA ................................................................................................................................. 4FOUGA ................................................................................................................................... 7HELIO .................................................................................................................................... 8LEAR ...................................................................................................................................... 8MOONEY................................................................................................................................ 9PIPER .................................................................................................................................... 9SIAI-MARCHETTI .............................................................................................................. 11SUKHOI ............................................................................................................................... 12

HELICOPTERSBELL .................................................................................................................................... 12AMERICAN EUROCOPTER .............................................................................................. 13ENSTROM ........................................................................................................................... 13McDONNELL DOUGLAS ................................................................................................... 13

AMATEUR, EXPERIMENTAL, AND SPORT AIRCRAFTAVIAT .................................................................................................................................. 14KIT FOX ............................................................................................................................... 14CHRISTEN .......................................................................................................................... 14

HOT AIR BALLOONSHEAD ................................................................................................................................... 15

POWERPLANTS AND PROPELLERSHARTZELL .......................................................................................................................... 15PRATT AND WHITNEY ..................................................................................................... 15TEXTRON LYCOMING ...................................................................................................... 16

ACCESSORIESSLICK MAGNETOS ............................................................................................................ 16

AIR NOTESA & P EXPERIENCE VERIFICATION ............................................................................. 16OSHKOSH ’96 ...................................................................................................................... 17ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43.13 UPDATE ........................................................................... 17FAA FORM 337 INFORMATION ....................................................................................... 18GOOD NEWS FROM THE FCC.......................................................................................... 18SUBSCRIPTION REQUEST FORM ................................................................. LAST PAGE

July 1996 FAA AC 43-16

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FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICEMike Monroney Aeronautical Center

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONFEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20590

GENERAL AVIATION AIRWORTHINESS ALERTS

AMERICAN CHAMPION

American Champion Fuel Quantity ErrorModel 8KCAB 2842Super Decathlon

The pilot reported the left fuel quantityindicator read “zero” with the left fuel tankfull.

After removal, the sending unit was checked,and the operational test was normal. Furtherinvestigation revealed the fuel tank baffle wasbroken off and lying on the bottom of the tank.It was determined that the sending unit’s floatoperation had been obstructed by the brokenbaffle. The submitter did not offer a cause forthe failure of the baffle. If this condition is

found, a thorough investigation of the bafflefailure should be completed.

Part total time-1,728 hours.

BEECH

STARSHIP

Beech Throttle CableModel C23 FailureSundowner 7603

The pilot reported that during flight thethrottle authority became intermittent,jammed, and then was unresponsive. Theuncontrollable engine was stuck at 1,600 RPM.The condition necessitated an off-airportlanding.

The General Aviation Airworthiness Alerts provide acommon communication channel through which the aviationcommunity can economically interchange service experienceand thereby cooperate in the improvement of aeronauticalproduct durability, reliability, and safety. This publication isprepared from information submitted by those of you whooperate and maintain civil aeronautical products. Thecontents include items that have been reported as significant,but which have not been evaluated fully by the time thematerial went to press. As additional facts such as cause andcorrective action are identified, the data will be published insubsequent issues of the Alerts. This procedure gives Alerts’readers prompt notice of conditions reported via Malfunctionor Defect Reports. Your comments and suggestions forimprovement are always welcome. Send to: FAA, Attn:Safety Data Analysis Section, AFS-643, P.O. Box 25082,Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029.

FAA AC 43-16 July 1996

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An investigation found the throttle was stilljammed. The throttle was thawed, and somemovement was obtained; however, the cablewas still binding. The cable was removed andreplaced. Disassembly of the cable revealedthe inner cable was bent, stretched, and dirty.The submitter speculated the most likelycause for this defect was dirt and moisturebuildup and the low operating temperature.It was stated the replacement cable(P/N 169-380084-13) appeared to be “superiorin design.”

Beech Landing GearModel B24R FailureSierra 3230

The pilot reported that when the landing gearwas retracted after takeoff, the red indicatorlight remained illuminated. All normalprocedures failed to extend the landing gear,and an emergency extension was necessary.After an uneventful landing, the aircraft wasturned over to maintenance.

During the investigation, the landing gear’spump motor (P/N 105932B) was removed anddisassembled. Both of the motor brushes werefound worn to the point of being nonfunctional.After replacing the brushes and reassembly,the motor functioned properly. The submitterstated the manufacturer’s service manual doesnot list brush wear or inspection/overhaultimes for the landing gear pump assembly. Itwould be wise to inspect this assembly atregular intervals, especially on high timecomponents.


Beech Landing GearModel A-36 DamageBonanza 3230

During an annual inspection, the left mainlanding gear uplock cable (P/N 35-815109) wasfound to have low tension.

Further examination revealed three brokencable strands, and the terminal fitting

(P/N MS20667-2) was bent in the threadedarea. The bend distortion was approximately20 degrees. This finding prompted aninspection of the right uplock cable, and thesame results were found. The submitterspeculated this damage was caused byscrewing the cable terminal too far into theclevis end fitting, which left the other endwith an excessive amount of exposed threads.(Refer to the following illustration.)


Beech Engine ExhaustModel A-36 System FailureBonanza 7810

During a scheduled engine oil change, thetechnician discovered exhaust stains in thearea of the vacuum pump.

A closer inspection revealed the right exhauststack (P/N 35-950005-39) was cracked andsplit. (Refer to the following illustration.) It


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appeared the crack originated adjacent to awelded seam and progressed to a split whichwas approximately 4 inches long and .5 inchwide. The defect was located directly belowthe area where three cylinders dump into theexhaust stack. The submitter cautioned thatunrelated defects may be discovered by payingclose attention to the area surrounding thesubject of your work.

Part total time not reported.

Beech Wing Flap StructuralModel 55 DamageBaron 5753

During an annual inspection, the right wingflap leading edge skin was found cracked.

The cracks were located in the area where theflap actuator attaches to the flap. Furtherinvestigation revealed the adjacent rib(P/N 35-16505-84) and actuator attachmentbracket were also broken. The submitterstated the location of the rib is not visible forinspection, and damage is usually not detecteduntil the outer skin cracks. Also, rib repairand replacement is difficult since there is noaccess provided. It was stated this defect is

caused by people stepping on the flap whileentering or exiting the aircraft. The submittersuggested the manufacturer issue a servicebulletin on this subject and design areinforcement for this area. This report hasbeen sent to the responsible FAA aircraftcertification office for action.


Beech Nose SteeringModel C55 FailureBaron 3250

The pilot reported that during taxi prior toflight, directional control was difficult tomaintain. The planned flight was continued,and during landing, the nose landing gearscissor broke. Steering control wasmaintained with differential braking, and nofurther damage was done.

An investigation revealed two bolts(P/N AN4H4A/M) were broken, which causedthe original steering problem. It appeared thescissor (P/N 96-820020-1) broke duringlanding. The submitter speculated the causeof the bolts breaking was exceeding the turnlimits while towing the aircraft.


Beech Engine Oil FilterModel 58 SeizedBaron 8550

During the first engine oil change, afterengine installation, the oil filter wasextremely difficult to remove.

Two technicians were required to physically“untorque” the filter. The submitterspeculated this was caused by not lubricatingthe filter seal during the initial filterinstallation. It was suggested themanufacturer’s recommended procedures befollowed when installing oil filters. Althoughless severe, the right engine oil filter was alsodifficult to remove.

Part total time-22 hours.


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Beech Landing GearModel 95B55 FailureBaron 3210

The pilot reported the left main landing gearcollapsed during landing.

An investigation disclosed the left main geartire had failed, as evidenced by a severe flatspot in the tread area. The landing geardownlock tension was found set atapproximately 18 pounds. The manufacturer’sservice manual requires the tension to be setbetween 45 and 65 pounds. The submitterspeculated the gear failure was caused by acombination of low downlock tension andexcessive loads applied to the downlockmechanism caused by “skidding” the tire onthe runway.


Beech Oxygen SystemModel F90 FailureKing Air 3520

During routine maintenance, the oxygen masksystem’s “autodeploy system” was activated.

All of the oxygen masks failed to deploy. Aninvestigation disclosed the “new” headlinermaterial installed in the cabin was thickerthan the original headliner. The additionalthickness prevented the oxygen system maskactuator plunger from contacting the strikerplate on the mask container cover.Considerable force was required to free eachof the oxygen mask container covers. The newinterior had been installed 28 months prior tothis test, and this was the first time thesystem had been actuated since the newinterior was installed. The submitterrecommended the oxygen system’s“autodeploy” function be tested for properoperation after completion of interiorrefurbishment.


Beech Landing Gear DoorModel 400 Hinge CracksBeechjet 5280

During a scheduled inspection, hairline crackswere detected on both left and right mainlanding gear door end cap beams.

The cracks were in the area of the forwarddoor hinges. Further examination disclosedthe forward hinges (P/N’s 45A30380-9 and -10)were also cracked. The submitter did not offera cause or cure for this defect; however, itwould be an excellent idea to closely scrutinizethese hinges and the surrounding area duringmaintenance and inspections. Failure of alanding gear door hinge, especially in theforward position, could cause serious damageto the aircraft and possibly endanger safety offlight.


CESSNA

GOLDEN EAGLE

Cessna Rudder StructuralModel 152 CracksAerobat 5540

During an annual inspection, the rudder’sforward skin was found cracked.

The cracks were located adjacent to thelightening hole at the upper hinge point.(Refer to the following illustration.) This skin(P/N 0433010-6) acts as the forward rudderspar, and this defect seriously compromisedthe structural integrity of the rudder. Thecracks traveled horizontally from both sides ofthe lightening hole and extended to the bendradius. A review of the service difficulty database revealed, since March 1991, there havebeen 15 similar failures reported. The


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manufacturer has issued Service Bulletin (SB)SEB 94-3 which deals with this issue. It isrecommended that operators of these aircraftreview the contents of the SB.


Cessna Elevator BellcrankModel 172F FailureSkyhawk 2730

After being tied down, during a strong wind,the elevator was found to be unresponsive.

An inspection revealed the elevator bellcrank(P/N 0513063-3), located under the cockpitfloor, was broken. The strong tailwindevidently caused excessive force on theelevator, and that energy was transmitted tothe bellcrank. A thorough operationalinspection of the flight control system shouldbe accomplished any time the aircraft isexposed to these conditions.


Cessna Defective AileronModel 172M CableSkyhawk 2710

During an annual inspection, the left aileroncable (P/N 0510105-13) was found severelyfrayed.

Approximately 50 percent of the cable strandswere broken. This damage was located in thecabin above the headliner, where the cablepasses over three pulleys. There was noevidence of the cable chafing on othercomponents, and all three pulleys rotatedfreely. The cause of this defect could not bedetermined.


Cessna Defective FuelModel 172P Quantity TransmitterSkyhawk Float

2842

During a 100-hour inspection, the left fuelquantity transmitter float was found defective.

The fuel quantity transmitter(P/N C668050-0802) had been removed toaccommodate replacement of a gasket andscrew seals. The composite transmitter floatwas found to contact the top and bottom of thefuel tank. A large amount of black residue,from the float, was found floating in theresidual fuel. The submitter stated thisproblem would present a potentiallydangerous situation, not only from possibleblockage of the fuel supply to the engine, butalso, the possibility of inaccurate fuel quantityindications. An examination of the fueltransmitter floats during scheduled inspectionwould be prudent.


Cessna Brake FailureModel 182Q 3242Skylane

The pilot reported there was no braking actionwhile taxiing the aircraft.


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Since the aircraft was being operated inwinter environments, it was suspected that iceand snow may have caused the problem. Themaster cylinder was checked, and nocontamination was found. The aircraft wasthen moved into a heated hangar, and all thebrake fluid was drained. This revealed therewas more water in the system than brakefluid. Considering the amount of waterpresent in the system, the submitter suspectedthe cause of this contamination was not fromcondensation. It was speculated the watercame from contaminated service equipment.We take great effort to eliminatecontamination from all of the aircraft systems,and the same care should be given to theequipment used to service the aircraft.


Cessna Propeller SpinnerModel 207A FailureStationair 6113

The pilot reported the propeller spinnerseparated from the aircraft during flight.

An inspection disclosed the propellerspinner’s dome stabilizer (P/N 0550340-1) hadworn through the spinner. This causedweakening of the structure and led to thefailure. The submitter suggested the causemay have been improper shimming of thestabilizer. It was suggested the manufacturer’smaintenance manual be followed whenever thespinner is removed and reinstalled.


Cessna Loose Main LandingModel 310R Gear Attachment

3221

During unrelated maintenance, the left mainlanding gear attachment was found loose and“working.”

The four mounting screws, used to attach thelanding gear trunnion support to the wing,displayed evidence of “working” over asubstantial period of time. Further inspectionrevealed 7 of approximately 50 screws had the

nut “bottomed out” on the threads. It would bewise to give this area special attention duringscheduled inspections and maintenance.


Cessna Landing Gear CrackModel 340A 3211

During an annual inspection, the left mainlanding gear torque tube (P/N 5045010-19) wasfound cracked.

The crack was approximately 2 inches longand was located around the circumference ofthe weld at the clevis boss for the overcenterlink. This was the fifth such finding by thesubmitter on like aircraft. No cause or curewas offered by the submitter. This would be agood area to give special attention duringscheduled inspections and maintenance.


Cessna Passenger SeatModel 402C FailureBusinessliner 2520

While loading for the first flight of the day, apassenger leaned against the Number 4 seatback, and the seat bucket separated from thepedestal.

This seat (P/N 5219125-14) had been installed,in accordance with Supplemental TypeCertificate (STC) SA2715CE, approximately3 months prior to this occurrence. Thesubmitter recommended that operators usingthese seats should inspect them on a dailybasis. Special attention should be given to thearea around the “hourglass” seat pedestal.This was the second occurrence of this typeexperienced by this operator.


Cessna Wheel Half Tie BoltModel 560 3246Citation

During a preflight inspection, the pilot foundtwo adjacent wheel half tie bolts broken.


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The wheel was disassembled, and the boltswere found broken approximately four threadsfrom the shank. Prior to failure, these boltswere checked (by magnetic particle inspection)at 43.5 hours of operating time and 42 cycles.The bolts had been through seven new tiresand had a total of 1,463 operating hours sincethey were new. Proper lubrication had alwaysbeen used during installation and torquing,and there was no evidence of overtorquing.This operator has initiated a policy ofinstalling new bolts after five tire changes andchecking by magnetic particle inspection afterthe third tire change.

Part total time as previously stated.

FOUGA

Fouga Fuel ContaminationModel CM 170 2810

Information for the following article wasfurnished by the FAA’s Flight StandardsDistrict Office (FSDO) located in Riverside,California.

This aircraft was a former French Air Forcetwin-engine jet trainer which had beenimported into the U.S. The aircraft lost poweron both engines during takeoff and collidedwith the terrain approximately 2,000 feet fromthe departure end of the runway.

An investigation of the wreckage revealedsmall particles and water in a fuel sample. Thedesign of the aircraft fuel system does notaccommodate preflight fuel sampling from thebladder fuel cells located in the fuselage. Thefollowing is a suggested and acceptable meansby which an operator can minimize thepossibility of fuel contamination and perform afuel sampling.

1. The addition of a fuel additive, inaccordance with the manufacturer’sinstructions, which will hold water in solution

on a regular basis or at the time of everyfueling, based on operating environment andutilization schedule.

2. Keep fuel tanks full to help excludecondensation.

3. Take a fuel sample prior to flight if theaircraft has not been operated for 30 days orlonger, or at a minimum monthly if the aircraftis operated frequently.

4. A maintenance record entry should bemade each time a fuel additive is used andwhen fuel samples are taken.

A fuel sample may be taken by thefollowing procedure:

1. Remove inspection cover “39F,” locatedin the bottom center of the fuselage just aft ofthe rear cockpit and nacelle intakes.

2. Remove the fuel drain cap by rotatingthe attached arm 90 degrees.

3. Place a clear container under the drainhole located on the belly skin directly belowthe fuel drain.

4. Press the fuel drain upward whileavoiding interference with the downwardstream of fuel.

5. Examine the fuel sample forcontamination, and if none is found, replacethe fuel drain cover cap.

CAUTION: Do not use excessive force whilereinstalling the cap, as damage to the seal mayoccur.

NOTE: Tools are not required for removal orreplacement of the fuel cap. The rubber capseal should be checked for condition while thecap is removed.


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HELIO

Helio AccidentModel H-295 InvestigationSuper Courier Results

2700

Information for this article was furnished byMr. David Sexton, an Aviation SafetyInspector with the FAA Flight StandardsDistrict Office located in Columbia,South Carolina and Mr. Jeff Kennedy from theNational Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).The following information resulted frominvestigation of an aircraft accident.

The aircraft struck the terrain approximately300 feet from the departure end of the grassrunway. It appeared the aircraft was in anosedown attitude, and the engine wasproducing power when the impact occurred.A preliminary investigation of the wreckagedid not reveal a possible cause for theaccident.

A technician, who worked on the aircraft,disclosed the pilot typically used a “dry wallscrew” as a device to lock the flight controlswhen the aircraft was parked. During anotherexamination of the wreckage, the remnants ofthe “dry wall screw” were found still installedin the pilot’s control column. With the controlcolumn locked, it was held in almost the fullforward or “nosedown” position. This wasidentified by the NTSB as the cause of theaccident.

There were at least two mistakes, which led tothis accident. First, the proper control lockshould have been used, with a streamer orplacard stating: “REMOVE BEFOREFLIGHT.” Second, a preflight inspection of theflight controls should have been made, tocheck for freedom of movement, which wouldhave disclosed the presence of a control lock.

Aircraft accidents involve fatalities, injuries,and/or damage to a valuable piece ofequipment. For these reasons, we should allkeep operational safety at the top of our

priority list. The lessons of this type ofaccident should be taken to heart andreverently observed. Aircraft accidents are theleast favorite job of the FAA inspectors andNTSB investigators.

LEAR

Lear AccidentModel 35A InvestigationCentry III Results

2400

An article was printed in the July 1995 editionof this publication concerning the use of thisaircraft as an “electronic target plane” insupport of military operations. At the time ofthe previous writing, an accident investigationwas in progress, and the cause of the accidenthad not been determined by the NationalTransportation Safety Board (NTSB). Thisarticle will provide an update to the previousinformation.

The aircraft was operating as “Public Use” andhad been modified by installing electronicequipment (required by the mission). TheNTSB stated the “probable causes” of theaccident were:

1. “Improperly installed electrical wiringfor special mission operations that led to anin-flight fire that caused airplane systems andstructural damage and subsequent airplanecontrol difficulties.”

2. “Improper maintenance and inspectionprocedures followed by the operator.”

3. “Inadequate oversight and approval ofthe maintenance and inspection practices bythe operator in the installation of the specialmission systems.”

The following statement was taken from theNTSB report. “The Safety Board believes thata qualified mechanic should not have


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overlooked basic electrical power wireinstallation practices, such as ensuring propercurrent overload protection for the entiresystem. Similarly, the failure of the avionicsinspector to compare the actual installationwith the specified installation instructions isinexcusable. The instructions for the workspecified the proper installation; however, itwas not followed by the mechanic, and the IAdid not meet his inspection responsibilities.These failures, coupled with the fact that 14additional airplanes had been modifiedincorrectly, reflects on the competence of theindividuals involved and a lack of adequateoversight by the operator’s maintenancemanagement personnel.”

MOONEY

Mooney Elevator ControlModel M-20E System FailureChaparral 2730

During an annual inspection, an operationaltest of the flight control system disclosedrestricted movement of the elevator.

After moving the elevator through five cyclesof its full travel, movement becameunrestricted. Further investigation revealedthe threaded end of a rod-end bearing(P/N M34-14) had broken at the elevatorcontrol tube located aft of the adjustable tailsection joint. The fracture occurred in thethreaded section of the rod-end approximatelysix threads from the jamnut end. The bearingin the rod-end was “frozen,” and exhibitedevidence of corrosion and lack of lubrication.To prevent recurrence of this defect, it wasrecommended that all rod-end bearings beproperly lubricated in accordance with themanufacturer’s technical data.


PIPER

SARATOGA

Piper Cockpit Fuel FumesModel PA 23 2140

The pilot reported strong fuel fumes in thecockpit when the heater was turned on afterstarting the engines. The heater wasimmediately shut off, and the engines weresecured.

An investigation revealed fuel was leakingfrom the heater’s fuel strainer assembly(P/N 460-755) which was located in the nosecompartment. The sediment bowl was foundcracked and severely corroded. The corrosionand crack were located in the bottom of thebowl, and the crack traveled“circumferentially” around the bowl.According to the maintenance records, the fuelscreen was cleaned during the last annualinspection. It appeared the corrosion hadweakened the metal bowl, which was“crushed” when the nut was tightened.

The fuel strainer assembly is mounted abovethe heater in the nose of the aircraft. Fuelleaking onto the heater, as in this case,created a very hazardous condition whichcould have caused fire, serious injuries, anddestruction of the aircraft. It wasrecommended that the condition of the fuelstrainer bowl be checked when the fuel screenis cleaned during annual inspections.Everyone should be alert for the possibility offuel leaks in this area.


Piper UncontrollableModel PA 24-250 Propeller In FlightComanche 6120

The pilot reported the propeller RPM wentfrom 2,350 to 2,700 without command, and


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could not be decreased with the propellercontrol. A safe landing was made, and theaircraft was delivered to maintenance.

An inspection disclosed the propeller controlball joint (P/N 19987-00) had separated fromthe propeller governor. A review of themaintenance records revealed the joint wasreplaced during the last annual inspection,which was approximately 5 months prior tothis occurrence. The ball joint was severelycorroded, and there was no evidence that ithad ever been lubricated. The manufacturer’smaintenance manual requires lubrication ofthis ball joint at 100-hour intervals. To avertrecurrence of this defect, the submittersuggested following the manufacturer’srequirements.


Piper Fuel LineModel PA 28-150 DeteriorationCherokee 2820

During an annual inspection, the fuel linesconnecting the tank to the fuselage brokewhile the fuel tank was being removed.

The submitter stated there was no corrosionon the spar or tanks. It was speculated thelines became brittle due to their age (as wellas corrosion) and broke when a small amountof pressure was applied. It is necessary toinspect these fuel lines with a flashlight andmirror, and the submitter suggested they beinspected as soon as possible. It was stated:“If the lines haven’t been replaced since theaircraft was built, they should be.”


Piper Engine FailureModel PA 30 7160Twin Comanche

The pilot reported the right engine lost powerduring takeoff. After a safe landing, theaircraft was sent to maintenance.

An investigation revealed the engine inductionsystem’s alternate air door had separated fromthe hinges and had been “sucked” into theinduction duct. This severely restrictedairflow to the engine. It is suggested thecondition of the alternate air door hinge bechecked at every opportunity.


Piper Nose Landing GearModel PA 31T3 Malfunction

3230

The pilot reported the nose landing gearwould not remain up and locked when the gearselector was returned to the “neutral” positionafter retraction. All other landing gearfunctions were normal, and the aircraft wassafely landed.

During an investigation, excessive moisturewas found under the “dust boots” on thenormal and emergency uplock hook retractionrods (P/N’s 41949-00 and 81947-02). It seemsapparent that the moisture froze andprevented the uplock mechanism fromfunctioning properly. After the rod assemblyboots were dried and lubricated, the systemfunctioned normally. During cold weatheroperations, it would be wise to check formoisture accumulation in these areas.


Piper Oxygen BottleModel PA 32R-301T Bracket FailureTurbo Saratoga 5345

During a scheduled inspection, all fourbrackets, used to attach the oxygen bottle rackto the side of the rear fuselage, were foundcracked.

The submitter speculated the brackets are notstrong enough to support the oxygen bottle’sweight. This may be especially true when the“G loads” imposed during flight areconsidered. It was recommended these


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brackets be made of a thicker material. Thiswould be a good area to check duringscheduled inspections and maintenance. Thisreport and the recommendations have beensent to the responsible FAA aircraftcertification office for action.


Piper Vacuum SystemModel PA 32RT-300T Filter ContaminationTurbo Lance 3710

During an annual inspection, the vacuumsystem’s regulator filter was found discolored.

While removing the filter element, itdisintegrated. The maintenance records gaveno indication of the filter ever being changed.The location of this filter makes it difficult toaccess, which could have been the reason itwas never changed. A little extra effort tocheck, and if necessary, change this filter mayprevent a later instrument malfunction.


Piper Cracked Wing FlapModel PA 34-200T Actuation LeverSeneca II

During a scheduled inspection, the wing flapactuation lever was found cracked.

The crack was located at the forward lowerbend radius, adjacent to the attachment pointon the floor. The submitter did not offer acause or cure for this defect; however,considering the number of operating hours onthe aircraft, it seems likely that metal fatiguewas a factor. It would be wise to closelyscrutinize this area during maintenance andinspections.


Piper Main Landing GearModel PA 38-112 AttachmentTomahawk 3211

During an annual inspection, the left and rightmain landing gear attachment bolts

(P/N AN7-17A) and one saddle bolt(P/N AN6H-14A) on each side were found bent.

The submitter stated the only logical cause forthis type of damage was a hard landing. Thisdefect had been discovered by the submitteron several other occasions. From thisexperience, the operator has initiated a policyof removing these bolts each 100 hours ofoperating time for a damage inspection. Thesubmitter recommended pilots be moreforthright in reporting and documenting hardlandings.


Piper Oil Drain PlugModel PA 44-180 MissingSeminole 8550

The pilot reported the right engine lost oilpressure during flight. The engine wassecured, and a safe landing was made.

An investigation by maintenance techniciansrevealed the oil sump drain plug was missing.This was a new aircraft, and the submitterspeculated the plug was not “safety wired” atthe factory. The left engine was inspected andalso found with no safety wire on the oil sumpplug. Although this was apparently anomission by the factory when the aircraft wasdelivered, it lends credence to accomplishing athorough acceptance inspection whenpurchasing an aircraft.


SIAI-MARCHETTI

SIAI-Marchetti Exhaust SystemModel S205/22R Failure

7820

During an accident investigation, the left sideengine exhaust system’s muffler was found tohave an internal baffle (end plug) broken.

This allowed exhaust gases to be venteddirectly into the exhaust pipe. It was believedthis condition caused back pressure on the


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engine and degraded performance. Duringinspections, it is recommended that a carefulcheck of the baffle and diffusers be made toassure their security.


SUKHOI

Sukhoi Aircraft Accident,Model SU-29 Possible Elevator

Failure2730

The National Transportation Safety Board(NTSB) recently investigated a fatal aircraftaccident. This aircraft was built in Russia andimported into the U.S. Approximately 5 weeksprior to this accident, a Sukhoi Model SU-31suffered an in-flight breakup. The SU-31 andthe SU-29 were both engaged in aerobaticmaneuvers prior to their respective accidents.

Although the composite wing spar wasfractured and separated into numerous pieces,the SU-29 had no evidence of an in-flightbreakup. During examination of the remnantsof the elevator control system, a bellcrank wasfound with the upper attaching holes showingno visible deformation and no visible bendingof the ears; however, the upper control tubeattachment bolt and rod-end were missing.(Refer to the following illustrations.) Thisbellcrank was the only component of theelevator and aileron control systems that didnot display some impact damage. A laboratoryexamination revealed that, at one time, a bolthad been installed; however, there was noindication a bolt was installed at the time ofthe accident. The bolt, intended for use in thebellcrank, requires a castellated nut and acotter key.

There is concern over the issuance ofairworthiness certificates forforeign-manufactured aircraft, which the FAAhas no surveillance of during themanufacturing process and no agreement withthe CAA of the country of manufacture.

JET RANGER

BELL

Bell Main Rotor Hub GripModel 222, 222B, Retaining Bolt222U, And 230 Torque

6114


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The following article was submitted by theFAA’s Rotorcraft Certification Office(ASW-170) located in Fort Worth, Texas.

A Bell Model 230 operator reported a crack inthe tang of the main rotor grip(P/N 222-012-104-101) at the junction with thepitch horn. Subsequent investigation revealedthe fatigue crack was caused by heavy frettingdue to loss of torque of the attachinghardware. The main rotor part numbers(P/N’s 222-012-101-103 and -107) are similar tothe hub assembly used on Bell Model 230aircraft and spare replacements for BellModels 222, 222B, and 222U.

On December 4, 1995, Bell Helicopter releasedAlert Service Bulletin (ASB) 222-95-78 forModels 222 and 222B; ASB 222U-95-49 forModel 222U; and ASB 230-95-10 for Model 230aircraft. These ASB’s advised customers toperform an initial bolt torque inspection andadditional bolt torque inspections of the mainrotor grip retaining bolts(P/N 222-310-127-101) after 5 to 10 hours ofoperation following each installation, andevery 150 hours thereafter. If any fretting isevident, consult the Bell BHT-222-CR&O-2Manual for instructions on further inspections,replacement, or repair.

Copies of this bulletin may be obtained, uponrequest, from Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.;P.O. Box 482; Fort Worth, TX 76101.

AMERICAN EUROCOPTER

American Eurocopter Aft HorizontalModel AS350B Stabilizer SkinEcureuil Cracked

5510

While replacing the aft horizontal stabilizerskins (P/N’s 350A13-0020-61 and -62) for otherdefects, it was discovered that the skins werecracked at the upper inboard attachment area.The submitter recommended closer attentionto the adjacent stabilizer attachment upperand lower surfaces during routine inspections.


American Eurocopter Fuel Pump BearingModel BK117A3 FailureSpace Ship 7314

Internal leakage of the fuel pump washedgrease from the fuel pump bearing into thefuel control unit, which caused it to fail. This,in turn, caused the engine go into anoverspeed condition and fail. The submitterstated, this is the second incident, of this type,within a 6 day period.


ENSTROM

Enstrom Tail Rotor CableModel 28-F FrayedFalcon 6720

While performing a visual inspection, it wasdiscovered that the tail rotor cables werefrayed where they pass over the aft alignmentpulleys in the tail cone. The submitter statedthe pulleys were lubricated, free, and turningwhen the discrepancy was noted. It wassuspected that vibration caused the cables to“rattle” in the pulley guides and eventuallycaused these cables to fray. The submittersuggested that cables in this area be inspectedat 100-hour inspections or annual inspections.

This Malfunction or Defect Report applies toModels F28C, F28C-2, F28-F, F280F,and 280FX.


McDONNELL DOUGLAS

McDonnell Douglas Skid Adapter SleeveModel 369E Corroded500E 3211

While performing an inspection, the left-handskid sleeve was noted to be loose. Afterremoval of the sleeve, a closer inspectionrevealed it was severely corroded to the point


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of penetration and complete failure. Thesubmitter stated this is the second problem, ofthis type, found on two separate aircraft.


AVIAT

Aviat Longerons Aft RearModels S-2A, S-2A, Cabane For CracksAnd S-2S 5713Pitts

Excerpts of the following article were takenfrom a recent Airworthiness Directive (AD)AD 96-09-08.

SUMMARY: Date Effective: May 20, 1996. ThisAD is applicable to Aviat Aircraft, Inc.,airplanes, formerly Pitts Aircraft. This actionrequires an inspection of the longerons aft ofthe rear cabane struts for cracks. If theselongerons are discovered to be cracked, theymust be repaired prior to further flight.Reports of longeron failure, caused by fatigueaft of the rear cabane struts, promptedthis AD. The actions specified by this AD areintended to prevent cracking and subsequentfailure of the longerons, resulting in possibleloss of control of the airplane. (Aviat ServiceBulletin No. 24, dated February 8, 1996, is partof this AD.)

KIT FOX

Kit Fox Metal Filings AroundModel IV Trigger PointsSpeedster 7414

The following article was submitted by theFAA’s Flight Standards District Office locatedin Sacramento, California.

An experimental Kit Fox IV crashed afterexperiencing a loss of engine power, shortlyafter departing the runway. There wassubstantial damage to the airplane. The pilotstated the engine began to “run rough” shortlyafter reaching a 300 foot altitude. The pilotapplied fuel boost, to alleviate the roughness,but to no avail. The pilot executed a forcedlanding.

After the accident, an investigation of theengine (Rotax 912UL) revealed the following:

1. Metal filings around the trigger points,which grounded out the ignition system.

2. The left carburetor slide valve wasfound installed 90 degrees off its properposition. (The right throttle slide valve wasinstalled according to the manufacturer’smaintenance manual.)

3. The right carburetor choke arm nut wasmissing and the choke was partially open.

4. The carburetor vent lines wereextended, and did not comply with themanufacturer’s installation recommendations.

A Rotax manufacturing representative statedthe left-hand carburetor slide valve and rightcarburetor activated choke would result inexcessive vibration, engine stumbling, andpossible stoppage. It was also stated, theincorrectly routed fuel vent lines would createa differential pressure between the carburetorintakes and float bowl chambers, which wouldalso create unstable fuel delivery, roughrunning, excessive vibration, and possiblestoppage of engine functions.


CHRISTEN

Christen Induction Air FilterModel A-1 Assembly Crack

7160

The following article was submitted by HighPlains Aero Service of Amarillo, Texas.


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While performing an annual inspection, afterremoval of the induction air filter element(P/N BA-4111), a vertical 3.5-inch crack wasdiscovered in the element retaining screen.The submitter stated that if pieces of theelement had broken loose, they could havebeen ingested into the carburetor. This was asteel mesh screen which was not covered byAirworthiness Directive 81-15-03.

This filter element is compatible to severalother types of aircraft such as Aeronca,Cessna, Christian Husky, Luscombe, Mooney,Morrisey, Piper, Shinn, Taylorcraft, UnivarUniversal and Varga.


HEAD

Head Faulty BasketModel AX8-88 Suspension Cables

5102

During an annual inspection, the basketsuspension cable eyes were found elongated.

This condition clearly falls outside themanufacturer’s criteria for airworthiness.

When replacement cables were received fromthe manufacturer, it was evident thatincorrect cables were originally installed. Noother information was given concerning theusage of the incorrect cables.

Use of the wrong parts could endanger thecrew, passengers, and people on the ground.


HARTZELL

Hartzell Abnormal PropellerModel PHC-C3YF-1RF Wear And Damage

6114

While disassembling the propeller for its firstoverhaul, the cotter pin used to lock the pistonretention nut was found in several pieces.

The piston nut was loose, and the piston rodbore of the hub was abnormally worn. Thesubmitter stated this was the third propellerfound with this type damage and wear. Theother two occurrences were first-timeoverhauls and all three propellers wereinstalled (by STC) on Continental IO-520engines in Beech Bonanza model aircraft.It was stated, that installation of a stainlesssteel cotter pin may prevent this defect fromreoccurring; however, it would be moreappropriate to contact the STC holder or FAAengineer for a suitable fix for the problem.


PRATT AND WHITNEY

Pratt and Whitney Engine FailureModel PT6A-42 7261

This engine was installed in the left positionon a Beech Model B200 aircraft.

The pilot reported the low fuel pressure lightilluminated, followed by an “autofeather” ofthe left engine. The engine was shut down, andan uneventful single-engine landing was made.


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Investigation revealed the oil quantity waslow, there was oil in the exhaust case, andmetal particles were found in the oil filter.Further inspection revealed the engine oilscavenge pump shaft (P/N 3008127) wassheared. The engine was removed from servicefor an overhaul. No cause for this failure wasgiven by the submitter.

Part time since overhaul-2,730 hours.

TEXTRON LYCOMING

Textron Lycoming Exhaust ValveModel TIO-541-E1C4 Failure

8530

This engine was installed on the left side of aBeech Model B-60 aircraft.

When the pilot advanced power for takeoff,the left engine died. A boroscope inspectiondisclosed the exhaust valve in the Number 4cylinder was not opening. When the rocker boxcover was removed, several broken parts werefound. The following broken parts were foundin the bottom of the rocker box; exhaust valverocker shaft, rocker shaft boss casting, and therocker tang (which holds the rocker shaft inplace). The submitter speculated the rockershaft’s retaining clip broke, allowing therocker shaft to migrate out of the outboardcasting boss.


SLICK MAGNETOS

These magnetos were installed on TCMModel TSIO-520 engines used on a CessnaModel 414A aircraft.

The aircraft owner presented the aircraft fora 100-hour inspection and stated the rightmagneto on the right engine was “rough.”

An investigation revealed severe corrosion onthe points, gears, capacitor, and bearings. Thisled to disassembly and inspection of theremaining three magnetos. All were found inthe same condition. The submitter speculatedthis defect was caused by the use of air fromthe turbochargers for pressurization.


A & P EXPERIENCE VERIFICATION

Have you ever been asked to verifymaintenance experience for someone? If so,you should be well aware of yourresponsibilities to document only the actualexperience required by Title 14 of the Code ofFederal Regulations (14 CFR) section 65.77.This regulation states, in part, that anapplicant for a mechanic certificate mustpresent documentary evidence (satisfactory tothe Administrator) of at least 18 months ofpractical experience in airframe orpowerplant, appropriate to the rating sought.Also allowed, is 30 months of practicalexperience concurrently performing the dutiesappropriate to both the airframe andpowerplant ratings. You should reviewsection 65.77, and all other applicableregulations, before your name is signed to anapplicant’s experience verification statement.Your responsibilities for this verificationshould not be taken lightly. However, if youfeel an applicant has met the experiencerequirements, and you have verifieddocumentation, you may give yourendorsement, support, and encouragement.


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At times, you may be pressured to sign anendorsement that cannot be verified. This maycome from coworkers, superiors, pilots, orsomeone “requesting a favor.” These are thetimes when your integrity is on the line, andyou must deal with your conscience and thelegality of your action. Just ask yourself thefollowing question. How hard did I have towork to earn my ticket?

An excellent article, entitled “Squeezed,”appeared in the January/February 1996edition of Aircraft Maintenance Technologymagazine. This article was written byMr. Bill O’Brien of the FAA AircraftMaintenance Division, AFS-300, located inWashington, DC. You are encouraged to readthis article, and other reference material,before signing your name. Your experienceverification, for an A & P applicant, will beclosely scrutinized by the FAA AirworthinessInspector, and if the facts do not “add up,” youmay be asked some embarrassing questions.

OSHKOSH ’96

Once again, it is time for the annualcelebration of aviation, affectionately knownthroughout the aviation world as OSHKOSH!About this time each year, for the past43 years, this Wisconsin community istransformed into the aviation Mecca of theworld.

This year’s event will, as always, be held atWittman Regional Airport inOshkosh, Wisconsin, and is scheduled to beginAugust 1, 1996 and conclude August 7, 1996.

The Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA)sponsors this annual event. Officials fromtheir organization, the FAA, and many othergroups, organizations, and manufacturers willbe available to offer information, educationalprograms, and material. The staff of thispublication will be present to distributeinformation and accept your questions andcomments. Seminars, workshops, and forums

will be presented continually each day. Manyevening events will be held at the “Theater inthe Woods.”

This year, there will be a salute to the Koreanand Vietnam veterans which will include bothaerial and static displays of aircraft fromeach era. Also, there will be a salute to testpilots. Many well-known pilots will be on handto present forums and relate some of theirexperiences.

In 1995, more than 830,000 people and 12,000aircraft, including 2,719 showplanes, attendedthis event. This year, expectations are veryhigh for a record setting attendance andsuccessful show. No matter what your aviationinterest may be, there will be many itemswhich will grab your attention and possiblyspark a new idea.

We look forward to seeing you at Oshkosh ’96.

ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43.13 UPDATE

The process of revising AC 43.13-1, AcceptableMethods, Techniques, And Practices--AircraftInspection and Repair, has been a long andarduous task involving many hours of researchand the efforts and expertise of many people.The importance of this publication to aircraftmaintenance requires that it provide accurateand current information which is acceptablefor aircraft inspection, repair, and alteration.

At the time of this writing, the third draft wasready for “Public Comment.” A noticeappeared in the Federal Register in May 1996,with a notice as to the due date for comments.To request a draft copy of the document forreview, you may contact Mr. George Torres bywriting to:

FAA, Regulatory Support DivisionATTN: GEORGE TORRES, AFS-610P.O. Box 25082Oklahoma City, OK 73125


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You may also contact Mr. Torres by telephoneor FAX.

The numbers are:

(405) 954-6923 (voice line)(405) 954-4104 (FAX line)

Your comments and questions will beappreciated.

FAA FORM 337 INFORMATION

After reviewing numerous submissions ofFAA Form 337, Major Repair and Alteration(Airframe, Powerplant, Propeller, orAppliance), it was obvious that a clarificationof the proper use of FAA Form 337 wasnecessary. The information was furnished bythe FAA Aircraft Maintenance Division,AFS-300, located in Washington, DC.

It seems there may be some confusionconcerning the necessary data and signatureblocks 6 and 7. In the case of a SupplementalType Certificate (STC) installation, thetechnician should verify that the data andparts supplied are complete. If there is anydoubt, a call to the STC holder should providethe answer. When the installation is complete,the technician certifies the installationconforms to the STC data by signing block 6 ofFAA Form 337.

A technician with Inspection Authorization(IA), or other authorized personnel, returnsthe aircraft (or product) to service by signingblock 7 of FAA Form 337. By this action, theperson certifies the aircraft is in a conditionfor safe operation and meets its properlyaltered type design.

Although an FAA Airworthiness Inspectormay sign block 7 of FAA Form 337, this rarelyhappens. However, in many cases, the FAAInspector will review the FAA Form 337, thetechnical data used for installation of the STC,and inspect the installation. Without the STCholder’s complete technical data for STC

installation, a technician should not engage inthe performance of the STC.

Additional guidance material regardingFAA Form 337 can be found in AC 43.9-1E,Instructions For Completion Of FAA Form 337(OMB NO. 2120-0020), Major Repair andAlteration (Airframe, Powerplant, Propeller, orAppliance).

GOOD NEWS FROM THE FCC

On February 8, 1996, the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996 was signed into law. This Act givesthe Federal Communications Commission(FCC) discretion to eliminate the individualradio station licensing requirement for shipsand aircraft operating domestically which arenot required by law to carry a radio. OnApril 12, 1996, the FCC released a Notice ofProposed Rule Making (NPRM) in WT Docketnumber 96-82, FCC 96-145, asking for publiccomment concerning the elimination of theradio station licensing requirement. Thecomment period for this NPRM closedMay 20, 1996. At the time of this writing, theoutcome had not been determined by the FCC.

Pending a final decision in this matter, theFCC has issued an interim rule temporarilyeliminating the individual licensingrequirement for recreational ships and privateaircraft operating domestically which are notrequired by law to carry a radio.

The term “private aircraft” was defined toinclude aircraft that are not required by law tocarry a radio. Also included, are aircraftweighing less than 12,500 pounds maximumcertified takeoff gross weight which are notoperated as air carriers.

What does all this mean? There is no need tocancel your present radio station license,return it to the FCC, or request a refund atthis time. If you operate a private aircraftdomestically, you are not required to apply fora new license or renew your current license atthis time.


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If the individual licensing requirement is noteliminated by the NPRM, the FCC will allowsufficient time to obtain a license. It seemshard to imagine that any negative commentswould be received on this subject. The FCChas set up a toll-free Customer AssistanceHotline with a recorded message explaining

the latest information on this subject. Simplydial (800) 322-1117, press the number “2,” thenpress the number “1.” Update information isalso available via the internet on the FCC’sWorld Wide Web homepage at:http://www.fee.gov/wtb/avmarsrv.html.


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SUBSCRIPTION REQUEST FORMADVISORY CIRCULAR (AC) 43-16, GENERAL AVIATION AIRWORTHINESS ALERTS

Please use this request to subscribe to AC 43-16 or to change your address if you are presently on the mailinglist. Once your name has been entered, you will continue to receive this publication until you request your namebe removed or a copy is returned because of a bad address.

Because this mailing list is independent of other FAA mailing lists, it is necessary that you notify us when youraddress changes. (Our address is on the following subscription request.) If you are presently receiving thispublication it is NOT necessary to send another subscription request. The following subscription request may beduplicated, as necessary. TELEPHONE REQUESTS WILL ALSO BE ACCEPTED, OUR TELEPHONENUMBER IS (405) 954-6487.

AC 43-16 SUBSCRIPTION REQUEST

If you would like to BEGIN receiving AC 43-16, orCHANGE your address, please complete the following:

PLEASE PRINT INFORMATION LEGIBLY,INCLUDE YOUR ZIP CODE, AND THE DATEOF YOUR REQUEST.

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FAA, Regulatory Support DivisionATTN: AFS-640 (Phil Lomax)P.O. Box 25082Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029

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