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«MEMORIAL» HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER

Moscow 1994

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1. INTRODUCTION

This Report deals with questions, concerning the problem of people returning , who have been displaced from their permanent residence as a result of Ingush-Osetian conflict in Autumn 1992. The report describes the course of events of autumn 1992. It does not aim at naming those who are guilty of instigating this conflict, or those who committed mass crimes against people of this region. The events of autumn 1992 are described only to such an extent, that is necessary for discussing the main questions of this report.

The report does not deal with questions concerning migration of the Russian population from or into Ingushetia and North Ossetia, which is not directly connected with the events of 1992. The Human Rights Centre (HRC) «Memorial» intends to prepare a separate report, which will deal with this question.

This Report is based upon material collected by the «Memorial» Human Rights Centre representatives during trips to North Ossetia and Ingushetia in 1993, February 21-24, 1994, July 3-31, 1994, and in September 1994. The documents referred to in the Report were also collected by the HRC «Memorial» from the beginning of the conflict through to the present time.

During their trips the representatives of the HRC «Memorial» talked to the President and Vice-President of Ingushetia Republic, North Ossetia Republic (NOR) and Ingushetia Republic (IR) parliament heads, the Chairman of Ingushetia Republic Government , government members, deputies, Ministries of the Interior officials of both republics, officials of the Provisional Administration on the part of North Ossetia and Ingushetia Republic territories, public organizations’ members, local administration representatives and persons, who became victims during the Ingush-Ossetian conflict and their relatives. The HRC «Memorial» has visited a number of populated areas within the Prigorodny Zone territory in North Ossetia, which suffered during the Autumn 1992 conflict and has talked to citizens both of the Ossetian and the Ingush nationality. The HRC «Memorial» members have visited a number of camps for displaced persons, as well as other places of their temporary residence.

The HRC «Memorial» would like to express its gratitude to the officials and public organization members from Ingushetia Republic and Ossetia Republic and the Provisional Administration officers on the part of North Ossetia Republic and Ingushetia Republic for their cooperation and help to our representatives.

The following people took part in the expedition of the HRC «Memorial» into the zone of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict: T.Kasatkina, D.Lozovan, S.Markelov, Y.Rachinsky, A.Tavrizov,D.Shkapov, M.Yakovlev. O.Orlov is the author of this report.

The HRC «Memorial» thanks A.B.Roginsky for taking part in the discussion of the report.

2. REPORT SUMMARY

As a result of the Autumn 1992 events the civilian population was forced to leave their permanent places of residence, which were mainly located in Prigorodny Region and in the town of Vladikavkaz. The displaced included Ingush, Ossetians, Russians and other minorities.

At that time 9,045 Ossetians fled from their homes in Prigorodny Region; 6,463 later returned to their places of residence by the end of July 1994. The question of return the other 2,582persons became difficult because their houses had been destroyed and the means for their reconstruction

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was not available.There were just several dozens of displaced persons of Ossetian nationality from Ingushetia that have been registered (just a few Ossetian families lived there).

Almost all the Ingush population from Vladikavkaz and Prigorodny Region fled to Ingushetia (the only exception being the population of three villages, which are Kartsa, Mayskoye and Yezmi). Following the flight of these people, their houses were purposely destroyed. At present, according to different estimations, from 46 to 64 thousand people, are registered as displaced persons from North Ossetia (see Chapter 5).

On the whole, as a result of the autumn 1992 conflict, 2728 Ingush and 848 Ossetian houses and a large number of communal services have been destroyed in North Ossetia.

According to figures of the HRC «Memorial» of 31.03.94, a number of destroyed Ossetian houses were rebuilt, but there were still 243 destroyed and 138 half-destroyed Ossetian houses (see table at p.15).

It should be pointed out that it is the Russian leadership and officials, who introduced the emergency status and who were supposed to protect the peaceful population from violence are guilty for these destructions to a considerable degree.

Only mass intentional activity with the purpose to destroy the housing of the Ingush population can explain the evident selectivity in this destruction. This conclusion can be illustrated by the example of Tarskoye village, where no military conflicts have taken place, but nevertheless the Ingush part of the village is completely destroyed, while the houses in the Ossetian part are intact. Even the houses which were ruined are being continuously pulled down. The HRC «Memorial» has witnessed how bricks and other construction materials were taken away by private persons from the ruins of Ingush houses in the villages of Tarskoye and Dachnoye (see Chapter 5).

Displaced persons,who have fled from their permanent places of residence, live under difficult conditions. Living conditions for some displaced persons in the Ingushetia Republic territory, which are accomodations unfit for habitation, especially concern the HRC «Memorial» (see Chapter 6).

At present, the Ingush generally live in four villages at Prigorodny Region and in the precincts of Vladikavkaz: Kartsa, Chermen and Yezmi. In some of these villages violations of human rights are constantly taking place.

The fate of each of these villages during the events of 1992 and its aftermath are individually unique.The mere fact that the Ingush population was living in these places is explained in each case by different reasons. Furthermore, various other problems for the Russian authorities exist in these populated areas. The problems which have already arisen in those three populated areas, may turn up sooner or later in all the places where displaced persons will return, if, of course, a large-scale process of return, which has been promised by the state, will start. The solution to these problems here today would allow avoiding complications in the future (see Chapter 8).

Terrorist acts and subversive activities continue in the region of the conflict. As a result people get killed and are being unjured, the state and private property is being damaged. The barbaric practice of holding hostages is still continued. These crimes are committed both on North Ossetia territory, and on Ingushetia territory. Among those who suffered are civilians of the Ossetian, Ingush, Russian, Georgian and other nationalities, officers from the RNO and IR Ministry of the Interior, internal troops servicemen from the Russian Federation Ministry of the Interior, Russian

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Army servicemen and Russian Ministry of the Interior servicemen, who were sent to the region on a mission. The authorities of both republics do not deny there are bandit units on the territories of their republics, but they insist, that these units are not controlled by the authorities, moreover, that the authorities fight them.

Large military units have been legalized in North Ossetia by the decision of the authorities, which is a direct violation of the Russian Federation legislation. The military units officially existed right up to May 1994 and they have received a large amount of arms from the federal bodies. The bulk of members in these units is formed by former criminals. According to the information, received by the HRC «Memorial» from competent sources, the decree on disbandment of these units and disarmament of its members is fulfilled in a bad way and the disarmament is moving very slowly (see Chapter 9).

One should note, that in the first half of 1994, the generally unfavourable criminal background in the region, the number of killed and wounded as a result of Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Emergency Zone has considerably decreased, which can be merited to the Provisional Administration (see Chapter 10).

Along with that, mass acts (blockade of roads, attacks of auto columns), directed against the peaceful Ingush population, living on the NOR territory, are being relocated to the territory of North Ossetia, while the authorities of this republic shut their eyes to these facts. Such acts critically destabilize the situation in the region and gravely violate the emergency status. Being faced with such crimes, the Provisional Administration has repeatedly demonstrated its complete helplessness (see Chapters 10 and 11).

The federal bodies of power could not and did not wish to display the necessary firmness in their relations with republican authorities and has not conferred sufficient powers upon the Provisional Administration for protection of their citizens’ rights. It was only gradually during 1993-94, that the powers of the Provisional Administration have been getting somewhat wider. But the Provisional Administration does not even use the available rights. It is possible, that its unwillingness in a number of cases to act decisively and try to stop violations of the Russian law in the Emergency Zone, is caused by the fear to complicate the situation and make the relations with the local authorities worse, but sometimes it looks like connivance.

Cases of lack of discipline and drunkenness among servicemen have been reported, which sometimes leads to grave consequences.

At the same time, it should be stressed that in general, in 1994 the number of registered and precisely known cases of violations of the law by servicemen from the units attached to the Provisional Administration in the Emergency Zone, is not large (see Chapter 11).

Investigation of crimes, committed on the ground of inter-ethnic animosity, both during period of the armed conflict in the autumn of 1992 and after it, meets serious opposition of the authorities in both republics and local population and is practically paralysed (see Chapter 10.2)

Unfortunately the national intelligentsia often plays the role of instigator in inter-ethnic tensions (see Chapter 14).

On the whole, the civilian population in Ingushetia and North Ossetia has accumulated an enormous amount of firearms, grenades, mines etc. This is recognized by the authorities of both republics, law enforcement bodies, officers and by practically all those who were interviewed in the region by the HRC «Memorial» . The arms come practically without any obstacle into

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Ingushetia through the unguarded and «transparent» border with Chechnya, where they are openly sold. The measures, which are being conducted by the Provisional Administration and the Ministry of the Interior of both republics are insufficient for serious disarmement in the area (see Chapters 9 and 11).

On June 26, 1994, in Beslan, Presidents of Ingushetia Republic, North Ossetia Republic and the Head of the Provisional Administration have signed the coordinated «Procedure for Returning and Resettlement of Refugees and Displaced Persons into Places of their Former Close »Compact" Living in the Villages of Chermen, Dongaron, Dachnoye, Kurtat in Prigorodny Region, North Ossetia Republic". It had been forseen by this document, that by July, 5 the concrete measures and the schedule for returning and resettlement of displaced persons should have been approven by the authorities of NOR and IR together with the Provisional Administration. Although neither by July 5, nor even later according to the agreed schedule did the mutual work to fulfil the Beslan Agreement begin (see Chapter 7).

What is the matter?

Both sides to the conflict started, to revise the agreement, which they have previously signed, it goes without saying to different degrees.

Deviating from the agreed «Procedure for Returning...», which suggested restoration of communications etc, at the first stage, and returning the people at the second, the representatives of Ingush authorities started insisting on immediate return of the citizens to all the four villages, irrespective of how reconstruction work went on and whether the accomodations were ready.

In the opinion of North Ossetia authorities, people can not be put among ruins without light, water, gas etc. It is necessary to do the reconstruction work first. Although the reconstruction work have been impeded by the Ossetian side.

As for the immediate return of the Ingush displaced persons into the houses, which are still intact, the reresentatives of the NOR authorities have chosen not to say anything concrete. They limit themselves to generic words about the necessity of reconciliation process and preliminary decisions on the question on each individual family by reconciliation commissions (see Chapter 7).

The way, those «reconciliation» commissions work, quickly become one-way «screening» commissions of one nationality only having the right to review the other nationality. This is evident from the example of Chermen village (see Chapter 8.2).

The Provisional Administration has worked out a plan of its own how to return people into places of their permanent residence. This plan has actually been the exact fulfilment of the «Procedure for Returning...», signed in Beslan. Nevertheless, it started being critisized both on the part of the authorities of Ingushetia, and North Ossetia.

In the opinion of the HRC «Memorial» it is the plan, which has been suggested by the Provisional Administration, which could have become the optimum way out of the grave situation. Provided that the authorities of North Ossetia have an honest attitude towards the fulfillment of commitments undertaken by them in June 1994 and the Provisional Administration is capable to function, this plan could have been put into life (see Chapter 7.3).

At the same time a number of public organizations in North Ossetia, «Styr Nyhas»1 first of all, which claims to be the mouthpiece of all Ossetian people, started again to demand that

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resettlement of displaced persons should take place only in the region of Mayskoye village, but even this step, in the opinion of these organizations’ leaderships, should serve as a condition for fulfilment of a number of demands for Ingushetia Republic and federal auhorities.Acts of protest in Prigorodny Region have been initiated by these organizations’ activists, while the local powers are closing their eyes to grave violations of the State of Emergency (see Chapters 7.3 and 10).

It was only on August 8, 1994 at Naltchik that the Russian Minister on Nationalities N.Yegorov, Vice-Premier of the Russian Government S.Shakhrai and Provisional Administration Chief V.Lozovoy, took the aforementioned as a basis and finally signed the schedule for returning displaced persons.According to this schedule, it was already by September,15, that 938 Ingush families were supposed to return into 4 villages at Prigorodny Region. North Ossetia and Ingushetia Presidents were supposed to sign those schedules. However, RNO President A.Galazov has firmly refused to sign this document.

The Provisional Administration still used this schedule and tried to implement the plan for the return of displaced persons into 4 villages at Prigorodny Region. It has partially succeeded in the village of Chermen. Besides that, the process of returning displaced persons, which has finally started, was constantly opposed by force.

The reason, why the plan for returning people to their places of residence failed, was the unwillingness of North Ossetia authorities at all levels to fulfil it, the non-disarmament of military units and indecisiveness on the part of the Provisional Administration. All of this was possible due to the weakness of the federal authoroties to control the region and unwillingness of the Russian leadership to observe human rights across Russia (see Chapter 12).

Both Russian leadership and Russian Federation Federal ministries do not abide by their own decisions, which influence not only the fates of thousands people, but practically peace in the North Caucasus (see Chapter 7).

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1.From the moment when the large-scale military conflict in the autumn of 1992 has been stopped, the problem of returning displaced people1 into their permanent residential areas remains the main and the most burning issue in the emergency zone. It is over two years, that tens of thousands of Russian citizens have been living in extremely hard conditions and their inalienable rights have been gravely infringed upon.

The majority of displaced persons are not guilty of committing crimes during the conflict, just the contrary — these people themselves have become victims of crimes.

By creating obstacles for the Ingush population to return to their permanent places of residence, the administration is violating these people’s rights to be free from discrimination based on nationality. This is directly prohibited by article 19 of the Russian Federation Constitution and article 26 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the USSR on September 18, 1973, which came into force for the USSR in 1976 (as Russia, by declaring herself the successor of the USSR, is bound by the international agreements, which have been concluded by the USSR).

Moreover, grave violations of article 12 of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights and article 27 of the Russian Federation Constitution, which allows all the people, staying legally

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on the territory of the state, the right to free movement and choice of living-place, are taking place.

A violation of article 40 of the Russian Federation Constitution, which proclaims that «no one can be arbitrarily deprived of their home», is also evident.

The attempts to put collective resposibility for the committed crimes upon the groups of people according to the nationality, place of residence, etc are clearly violations of international law and national legislation. The state, claiming itself to be called a legal one, should provide its citizens, who aredisplaced persons, with a possibility to return freely to places of their permanent residence and any necessary support, needed at least for the reconstruction of their houses.

2. Along with that, any attempts at territorial redivision and changing of boundaries without mutual consent of the sides, as it has been proven by the experience of a number of the former USSR countries, inevitably leads to escalation of the conflict and turning it into a prolonged blood-shedding war.

Articles 3 and 6 of the Law «On Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples», in its present-day form proclaim the right to territorial rehabilitation, i.e. for restoration of national and state formations or boundaries, which have been existing before their anti-constitutional forced abolition or change. Meanwhile, the law does not suggest any concrete mechanizm for realization of this right.

According to article 6 of this Law, territorial rehabilitation is exercised on the basis of the will of the people under repression. This approach to the territorial redivision and changing of the borders is a direct infringement upon the rights and interests of at least part of the population, living at present time on the territories under dispute and bearing no responsibility for infringement of the laws, which took place half of the century ago. This actually forsees new mass violations of the rights of Russian citizens for the rehabilitation of the rights and justice, which have been infringed upon in the past. The procedure for expression of the will has not been determined yet.

The present-day edition of article 6 of the Law «On Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples» directly contradicts article 67 of the Russian Federation Constitution. The third part of this article of the Constitution runs that «borders between the subjects of the Russian Federation can be changed on their mutual agreement».

The dispute about Prigorodny Region serves as the source of tension in the area, grounds for further continuation of the conflict, and also as the main argument for those, who set the Ossetian population in this region against returning of Ingush displaced persons.

That is why there is a pressing need for the quickest consideration of the Law «On Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples» in the Constitutional Court of Russia and introduction of corresponding changes into the wording of these articles by the Russian Federal Council. Approval of a moratorium for the re-establishment of boundaries between the Russian Federation subjects for a longer time (not less than twenty years) can be suggested as an alternative, but a much worse measure.

It is worth while reminding , that art.13 of the Law «On Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions» reads: «Recognition of the right of rehabilitated persons, who lost their houses due to repressions, to come back to live into the districts and populated areas where they lived before they got suffered repressions. In cases of returning to the former place of residence, the

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rehabilitated persons and members of their families have a right for immediate provision with housing, and those living in the country-side have the right for provision of interest-free loan and immediate provision with construction materials for construction of a house.»

3. The President of Russia B.N.Yeltsin has issued a Decree — «On the Procedure of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons into their Permanent Residential Places on the Territories of North Ossetia Republic and Ingushetia Republic».

In the light of the aforementioned, the Human Rights Centre «Memorial» considers that the complex approach, stated in this Decree means an undoubted return of displaced persons with confirmation of the status of Prigorodny Region as the territory, which is a part of North Ossetia Republic and it is aimed at observation of human rights and decreasing the possibility that a large-scale conflict in the region can be repeated.

4. Although practical actions of Russian central authorities in the region, represented by the Provisional Administration, pretend more than they actually provide for the fulfilment of the Decree on returning displaced persons.

5. Any obstacles and unjustified delays in returning displaced persons not only infringe upon the lawful rights of the citizens of Russia, but also provoke tension in the Republic of Ingushetia. They do this because this plays into the hands of those who are ready to struggle arms in hand for what they consider a fair and just solution to the question. In this case the authorities of Ingushetia Republic can lose control over a part of the population, which, taking into consideration a big amount of arms in the region, is fraught with grave consequences.

6. Along with that, the point of view, which is wide spread in North Ossetia, is that the joint living and returning of the Ingush population into Prigorodny Region is not wanted. The authorities of NOR, who in words refused to support this point of view, but in fact undermine the process of returning displaced persons.

The so-called reconciliation commissions, invented as a means of achieving reconciliation between Russian citizens of different nationalities, have in fact turned into an instrument for confrontation and became one-way screening commissions.

It is necessary to take into consideration, that the process of returning displaced people may be used by extremist elements in North Ossetia to escalate tension. They already try to provoke mass acts of protest. Meanwhile the republican authorities on different levels do not even try to stop such actions, but on the contary, in a number of cases they have directly encouraged them.

7. That is why, there is a high level of possibility that a question of necessity to use force can arise.

In the opinion of the HRC «Memorial», the Russian federal authorities should be consistent in standing up for the priority of human rights and for that end make use of all the means forseen by the law. Abandonment of the use of force in relation to the extremist elements, which are present on both sides, will only lead to the necessity to use force in relation to the extremist elements on a much bigger scale in future.

The state should use all the legal measures (force included) in stopping attempts to impede return of displaced people, for large-scale disarmament in the region (including the territories both of Ingushetia, and North Ossetia) and stopping terrorist activities in the region.

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It is only natural, that one should try that the use of force methods is limited to a minimum. It goes without saying, that the use of force should be exercised by specially trained units strictly in the frameworks of the law, and it should be selective and adequate to the threat.

8. All the necessary powers should be conferred upon the Provisional Administration to safeguard order in the zone of the SE (on the part of territories of North Ossetia Republic and Ingushetia Republic), which is in the framework of the Law «On the State of Emergency». The law empowers full possibilities for its use.

In case of opposition from the local authorities to the return of displaced persons it is necessary to temporarily stop the activity of the local bodies of power in those villages, where returning of displaced persons has been planned.

The way the question about the possible necessity to introduce some kind of «federal government» in Progorodny Region is formulated by high officials makes no sense and it only testifies to the fact that these people are not familiar with the Law.

At the same time, the Provisional Administration is reluctant to use even their existing rights, and the Russian authorities and RF federal departments do not take any serious steps in order that their own decisions on returning displaced persons are implemented.

The lack of consistency and decisiveness on the part of the Provisional Administration and federal authorities is one of the reasons why the problem has not been solved yet.

9. In the opinion of the HRC «Memorial», investigation of numerous grave crimes, committed on the basis of inter-ethnic animosity, and organization of trials against people who can be accused on the grounds of committing such crimes, is an indispensable condition for normalizing the situation in the region. At the same time, it is necessary that the influence of the political factors upon the conclusions of the investigation and the trial be reduced to a minimum.

Only in this way, in our opinion, a «legal evaluation» of the Autumn 1992 events, can and should be provided. This is demanded by both sides to the conflict.

Along with that, the proposal of the RF Procurator’s office to declare partial amnesty of the persons, who have committed separate non-grave crimes within the period of 31.10 — 06.11.1992 is justified by the fact that within this period of time an extremely large amount of NOR and IR citizens have committed acts, classified by the CC of Russia as crimes: storage and carrying of arms, theft of other people’s property etc. Announcement of such an amnesty could have contributed to the investigation about the persons, who have committed grave crimes.

The investigation of the crimes committed on inter-ethnic grounds, both during the armed conflict in autumn of 1992, and later on, meets serious opposition on the part of the authorities of both republics and the local population. Therefore the investigation is practically paralysed.

In the opinion of the HRC «Memorial», in order to correct this situation, the federal authorities should exercise effective influence upon the leadership of both republics, using to the full degree the possibilities provided by the RF Law «On the State of Emergency».

10. Extension of the State of Emergency (SE) regime in the region is still inevitable for a prolonged time. Termination of the state of emergency regime will inevitably lead to a new surge of a large-scale conflict. Limitation of the zone of the SE will have a negative impact

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upon the situation in the region, as it will make the struggle with spreading of arms and activity of terrorist groups even more difficult.

The implementation of the state of emergency in the region should be done under the close monitoring of the press and the public. The introduction of censorship on information from the zone of the conflict will create more negative consequences, than positive ones. Accurate information is needed to fight unbased rumours, which are wide spread in the conflict zone. Censorship should not be used to reporting of actual events. To stop the publications and information in the mass media, which maliciously distort facts and lead to escalation of the conflict, the Provisional Administration and federal bodies should use court prosecution possibilities in relation to authors and publications.

4. SHORT ESSAY ON THE POPULATION AND TERRITORY OF THE CONFLICT AND ITS HISTORY

4.1. NORTH OSSETIA REPUBLIC AND INGUSHETIA REPUBLIC

Both republics are within the Russian Federation. They are located in the Northern Caucasus and occupy both Alpine regions in the Caucasus, and valleys at the foothills.

The area of North Ossetia Republic (NOR) is 8000 sq.km. The arable land is around 2000 sq.km. The population is 632428 people (according to the 1989 census), among them 334876 are of Ossetian nationality.Vladikavkaz is the capital. 71% of the whole population live in the cities (according to the statitics from 1985).

The republic has a considerable industrial potential. In the south North Ossetia Republic borders on the Republic of Georgia. The territory of South Ossetia, where starting from 1989 a civil war took place, is on the Georgian side of the border.

The territory of Ingushetia Republic (IR) is not clearly identified. After the Chechno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic broke up in 1991 and Ingushetia Republic was founded in 1992, its borders have not been clearly identififed. According to the statistics, provided by the Representation of the Russian President in Ingushetia Republic, altogether within Ingushetia Republic there were 2,682 sq.km., among it 550 sq.km. arable land including.

The population of Ingushetia Republic is 180-190 thousand people (there is no accurate data; in 1979 there were 134.7 thousand Ingush, who lived in the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic). The majority of the population are Ingush.

Nazran is the capital.

There are just a few industrial enterprises on the territory of the republic, the infrastructure is not developed.

4.2. TERRITORY OF THE CONFLICT

The conflict involves part of the valley and foothills within North Ossetia Republic (NOR) and Ingushetia Republic (IR).The mountainous part of these republics is involved in the conflict to a lesser degree.

The main part of the territory under conflict partially involves present-day Prigirodny Region within NOR and a number of villages, which administratively are in the precincts of

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Vladikavkaz. In 1992 when an armed conflict took place here, tens of thousands people were forced to flee, and at present time acts of sabotage and terrorism continue in this area.

The territory covers an area of 742 sq.km., this includes 569 sq.km. arable land.

The biggest number of displaced persons’ camps are located on the Ingushetia Republic territory, acts of sabotage and terrorism also take place on the NOR territory.

4.3. SHORT HISTORY, FEATURING THE TERRITORY OF THE CONFLICT

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During the period after the Mongol invasion the valley and foothills of the present-day North Ossetia and Ingushetia were occupied by the Nogaits and Kabardinians. The Ingush and Ossetian settlements on this territory have been known already from the end of the XYIIc, but it was only after Ossetia (1774) and Ingushetia (1810) were joined to Russia that mountain people could freely move from the mountains down the valley. It was both just the Ingush and the Ossetians, as well as mixed settlements that existed on the territory adjacent to Vladikavkaz (the present-day NOR Prigorodny Region including). The Russian fortress of Vladikavkaz was founded in 1784 as a mixed settlements area. From 1860, Vladikavkaz got the status of city (the administrative centre of Tersk province). By the end of XIXc, Ossetians (about 3 thousand people) and Ingush (about 400 people) and others, who lived in the city besides Russians.

As a result of the Russian Empire governmental policy in the Northern Caucasus, which was aimed at deportation of mountain people from the valley and foothill settlements and foundation of large Cossack villages — stanitsas in their place, by the middle of XIXc Ingush were moved out of a number of villages, which were located in place of the present-day Prigorodny Region, and after that in place of the village Angusht a Cossack stanitsa Tarskaya was built, in place of Akhi-Yourt village Sunzhenskaya stanitsa, in place Tauzen-Yourt Moslem village — aul — Vorontsovsko-Dashkovskaya stanitsa and in place of Sholkhi aul a separate farmstead Tarsky khutor were built.

After the Russian Civil war, when the majority of Ingush supported the Bosheviks, the Cossack population was deported from the aforementioned villages, and Ingush settled there.

In 1921 the Autonomous Gorskaya Socialist Republic with its capital in Vladikavkaz, which has been divided into six administrative areas, Ingush and Ossetian including, was been founded by a decree of the RSFSR All-Union Central Executive Committee. The right-bank Terek-river territory, which at present forms the main part of the RNO Prigorodny Region, was assigned to the Ingush area.

In 1924, the Ingush and the North-Ossetian Autonomous regions were formed, both of these regions having their administrative centres at Vladikavkaz.

In 1933, by the decree of the RSFSR AUCEC Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz) was attached to North Ossetia, and in 1934 an amalgamated Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Region (later on Checheno-Ingush ASSR) with capital in Grozny was founded.

In February 1944, all Chechen and Ingush, living in CIASSR and adjacent territories, were forced to move down to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Accusation against these peoples in the struggle against Soviet power and cooperation with German nazi aggressors has been used as a pretext for it. Consequences of this criminal action of forced relocation of the Stalinist regime are among the main sources to the present-day conflict. The CISSR was liquidated by the USSR SS Presidium Decree and Groznenskaya Region was founded in its territory, some regions were attached to Dagestan, Georgia and North Ossetia. Displaced persons from neighbouring districts were brought into the territory depopulated in this way, which often happened against their will.

In 1957, CISSR was restored by the decrees of the USSR SS Presidium and the RSFSR SS Presidium, although Prigorodny Region and part of Malgobek Region remained within North Ossetia. The 3 new regions, which used to be within Stavropol Area, were included into the CISSR. Deported citizens returned to their former residential places. In Prigorodny Region their houses and property were not given back to them and secret regulations, prohibiting to sell houses and rent living space to Ingush, still remained in force.

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Inter-ethnic conflicts, the most acute of which were the events of 1981 in Vladikavkaz, took place in Vladikavkaz and Prigorodny Region in 70-80ies. After this event in 1982 the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree on limitation of propiska, residence registration, just as well as selling and buying houses in Prigorodny Region. A similar decree was adopted by North Ossetia SS in 1990. Although these decrees did not speak directly about Ingush population limitation on ethnic basis, they were in fact directed at decreasing the number of Ingush inflow. In spite of that, return of the Ingush population to North Ossetia Prigorodny Region continued right up to autumn 1992. Many Ingush settled and bought houses without getting propiska registration.

Up to 1944, the population of Prigorodny Region came to over 34 thousand people, out of them 31 thousand were Ingush; in 1990, 40 thousand people had been registered by propiska on this territory, 17.5 thousand of them were Ingush.1

In 1963, North Ossetian leadership had partially changed the Prigorodny Region borders by excluding some villages with Ingush population from it, and joining left bank Terek-river territories to it.

Some among the Ingush population have raised a critical question on returning Prigorodny Region within its former borders back to Checheno-Ingushetia. This slogan has been widely spread in the second half of 80-ies with a surge of condemnation of the totalitarian regime crimes, it has been used by politicians, public organizations have been founded under this slogan (for example, Ingush peoples’ union «Nijsho»), which further escalated tension in Ossetian-Ingush relations.

On April 20, 1991, the North Ossetian ASSR SS introduced a status of emergency in Prigorodny Region and Vladikavkaz, which has been regularly extended by the Russian Supreme Soviet right up to autumn 1992.

On April 26,1991, the RSFSR SS adopted the Law «On Rehabilitation of Repressed People», where articles 3 and 6 speak about territorial rehabilitation. At the same time no concrete machanisms of putting into life the process of change in present-day borders between the subjects of the Federation has been suggested. During the discussions of this draft law, voices were heard (not only from North Ossetia deputies) that adoption of this law in this form would inevitably lead to territorial dusputes, and this means bloodshed. Adoption of this law gave a new impetus to escalation of tension in the area.

The autumn events in Checheno-Ingushetia in the same year led to self— proclamation of independant Chechen state. As for the territory of Ingushetia, uniform state power practically did not exist there right up to December 1992.

In November 1991 illegal military units, the republican guard and people’s voluntary corps, were formed by the North Ossetia Supreme Soviet decision.

During 1991, and right up to end of October 1992, numerous acts of violence, evidently provocative, have been committed: murders of Ingush and Ossetians, explosions of Ingush houses. Both sides in the region were accumulating arms.

On June, 4, 1992 the Supreme Soviet of Russia adopted the Law on formation of Ingush Republic without determination of the borders of this Republic, which led to sharpening of territorial disputes in the area: between Chechnya and Ingushetia about Sunzhensky Region and between Ingushetia and North Ossetia about Prigorodny Region.

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On October 24, 1992 in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia, the united session of three Ingushetia regional councils and North Ossetia Prigorodny Region deputies group, «expressing the will of Ingush people and with purpose of protection of our relatives, who live in North Ossetia», has adopted a decision, contradictory to the Russian legislation, «to unite the units of volunteers into self-defense detachments and organize patrolling of all North Ossetia Prigorodny Region villages, where Ingush live. Patrolling by detachments of all the lands, detached by the Stalinist regime will be continued up to the moment, when they are returned under the jurisdiction of Ingushetia Republic».This decree put the control over the detachments upon the Departments of the Interior of three Ingushetia regions; in order to provide safety to volunteers and Ingush, living in Prigorodny Region, it allowed «use of personal firearms and other arms...»

In response to that the North Ossetia Supreme Soviet put forward a demand of disarmament of Ingush detachments and stopping the blockade of all villages, otherwise it threatened to start a military operation and use the republican guard and voluntary people’s corps. For all that the leadership of Russian internal troops avoided active moves in the area of emergency, as it considered that the mode of actions, suggested by North Ossetian leadership, leads to great bloodshed.

On October 26 after a number of discussions, the Russian SS Presidium suggested that the mixed commission, with participation of Ossetian and Ingush representatives, should prepare a draft decision of disputable Ingush-Ossetian questions.

On the night from October 30 to 31 an armed conflict between Ossetian and Ingush military units took place in the villages of Dachnoye, Octyabrskoye, Kambileevskoye and Kurtat. At 6 hours and 30 minuts on October, 31 military detachments, which entered the Prigorodny Region territory from Ingushetia, disarmed the internal troops post of the Russian Ministry of the Interior, attacked the State Auto Inspection post and the village militia office.

Several days after that, a military conflict, in which Ossetian and Ingush military units participated (including the ones that arrived here from Ingushetia), and then the units from the Russian Army and internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior, took place in RNO Prigorodny Region, the town of Vladikavkaz and adjacent villages. As a result of military actions there were a lot of killed and wounded (including the ones among the peaceful population) on both sides, there were enormous destructions to houses, tens of thousands displaced persons.

According to the information of the RF Procurator’s office, during the armed conflict from October 31 up to November 5, 1992, the number of killed reached 583, among them 350 Ingush and 192 Ossetians, the number of wounded was 939 people, among them 457 Ingush and 379 Ossetians, the number of people who were missing was 261, among them 208 Ingush and 37 Ossetians, the number of people, subjected to illegal imprisonment as hostages was 1093, among them 708 Ingush and 289 Ossetians.

Local population describe these tragic events as war.

On November 2, 1992, a State of Emergency (SE) was declared by a Presidential Decree in a number of NOR and IR regions. Since that time it has been periodically extended. The Provisional Administration, the head of which is appointed from Moscow (see about the Provisional Administration in the corresponding chapter) has been empowered to exercise the SE regime.

5. DISPLACED PERSONS VILLAGES, ABANDONED BY DISPLACED PERSONS

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As a result of autumn 1992 events the civilian population, which are Ingush, Ossetians, Russians and others have been forced to abandon their places of residence, mainly in Prigorodny Region and the town of Vladikavkaz.

At that time 9045 Ossetians fled away from their homes in Prigorodny Region, by the end of July, 6463 out of them returned to their places of residence.1 The obstacle to solving the question of returning the others (2582 people) is the absence of means for reconstruction of ruined houses.

As we have been informed by the NOR official, it is only several dozens Ossetians, who are displaced persons from Ingushetia (just a few Ossetian families lived there).2

Almost all Ingush population of Vladikavkaz and Prigorodny Region (with an exception of a part of citizens from three villages, which are Kartsa, Mayskoye and Yezmi) fled away from North Ossetia into Ingushetia. Only after those people fled, their houses were purposedly destroyed. At present, according to different estimations from 463 up to 64 thousand4 people have been registered as displaced persons from North Ossetia. Besides, the territorial Migration Service quotes different figures (from 3 up to 5 thousand people), who stay with their relatives in Grozny (Chechnya), which are not registered by the Federal service as displaced persons.

Political leaders of Ingushetia sometimes speak about 71 thousand displaced persons from North Ossetia. Taking into consideration the data on the number of houseownerships in the zone of the conflict (see table), the number of displaced persons should be recognized as overestimated.

According to the ASSR NOR CC Statistical Board as of 01.01.89, 32783 people of Ingush nationality, including 16529 people in Prigorodny Region, lived in North Ossetia. According to the ASSR NO passport service data, as to the status of 31.10.92, 34500 persons of Ingush nationality lived in the Republic.

A considerable discrepancy between the number of people, registered by propiska before the conflict and the number of displaced persons is explained by the Ingush side in such a way that, starting from 1957 a big number of Ingush permanently lived in Prigorodny Region without propiska registration due to the existing limitations (see Chapter 4.3).

Before the 1992 conflict the Ingush population lived in 17 villages of Prigorodny Region and settlements, which administratively are in the precincts of Vladikavkaz, just as well as in Vladikavkaz itself (see Table). Besides that 1 to 5 Ingush families lived in a number of other villages in this territory.

In some villages (Tarskoye, Chermen) Ingush and Ossetian communities lived mainly in a close «compact» way in different parts of the village; there were some villages with absolute quantitative predominance of Ingush over the citizens of other nationalities (Dachnoye, Chernorechenskoye); in some cases they lived in a mixed way, moreover, it was either Ossetians (Kambileevskoye), or Ingush (Terk), or people of other nationalities (Balta), who had a quantitative predominance over the others.

At present Ingush population still lives in Mozdok Region of North Ossetia (settlements Khurikau and Kusovo), in spite of the fact, that 249 Ingush have moved from Mozdok itself into Ingushetia.

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As a result of the conflict the total number of 2,728 Ingush and 848 Ossetian houses5 were destroyed, as well as a great number of social and cultural services units (schools, shops, polyclinics). As to the status of 31.03.94, destroyed Ossetian houses were partially reconstructed and 243 destroyed and 138 half-destroyed Ossetian houses remained by that time6.

7 8

Village name Total Ingush Ossetian Russian Othernation

Prigorodny Region

1. Chermen

Citizens on 01.01.893 4272 2899 305 66

Houses before conflict 1412 783 609 18 2

Intact 762 338 407 15 2

Destroyed 506 380 125 1

Half-destroyed 144 65 77 2

2. Dachnoye Citizens on 01.01.893

2390 359 234 66

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Intact 2 2

Destroyed 416 390 11 10 5

Half-destroyed

Besides, at present 3 multi-apartment houses (122 apartments) are occupied mainly by Ossetian refugees from Georgia4

3. Kurtat

Citizens on 01.01.893 2073 507 7 5

Houses before conflict 405 302 102 1

Intact 95 4 90 1

Destroyed 300 290 10

Half-destroyed 2

4. Dongaron

Citizens on 01.01.893 337 432 28 21


Intact 98 2 86 5 5

Destroyed 56 53 3

Half-destroyed

5. Tarskoye


Intact 569 33 529 3 4

Destroyed 190 190

Half-destroyed 61 61

6. Oktyabrskoye Houses before 1510 171 939 312 88

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conflict

Intact 1336 26 933 293 84

Destroyed 111 101 1 5 4


Besides that 80 apartments are occupied1

7. Kambileevskoye


Intact 1376 4 1240 126 6

Destroyed 238 192 37 3 6

Half-destroyed 47 1 46

Vladikavkaz and its precincts

8. Vladikavkaz

Destroyed 171 166 5


Besides that 800 apartments, where Ingush families lived, are now occupied1

9. Chernorechenskoye


Intact 18 5 12 1

Destroyed 232 212 18 1 1


10. Kartsa Houses before conflict 931 757 27 117 30

Intact 677 510 24 115 28

Destroyed 218 213 3 1 1

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11. Terk


Intact 27 5 19 1 2

Destroyed 145 118 26 1


12. Redant


Intact 56 32 17 7

Destroyed 123 114 2 7

Half-destroyed

13. Youzhny


Intact 107 11 64 27 5

Destroyed 46 44 1 1


14. Balta


Intact 241 4 96 3 138

Destroyed 42 41 1

Half-destroyed

Village Chmi (15 Ingush houses were destroyed), Popov Khutor (10 Ingush houses were destroyed) and settlement Sputnik (in 40 apartments of department-controlled multi-storied houses Ingush lived mostly without propiska registration), as well as at the Alpine village of Yezmi, where 300 Ingush are still living.

In Prigorodny Region there is the village of Majskoye, which has not been involved in the military conflict of Autumn 1992. The Ingush population never left it. 18 Ossetian families,

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which lived there, were forced to flee the village. Their houses were not destroyed and were illegally occupied by Ingush, displaced from villages in Prigorodny Region. North Ossetia officials did not provide us with any information about the number of houseownerships, about destructions, about the number of people registered by propiska in these villages, referring to the fact, that these figures continue to be checked (with an exception of administration in Chermen village, which provided us with the data on the village).

Some residential houses have been destroyed as a result of the armed conflict at the end October-beginning November 1992 (it mostly concerns the villages of Kartsa and Dachnoye). Although the majority of houses were destroyed after armed units established control of the given territory.

Citizens of the Ossetian part of Chermen village told us, that during the period October 31-November 4, 1992, when the village has been controlled by Ingush military units, numerous cases of setting houses on fire and destructions of Ossetian houses by fighting units took place.

On the other hand, it was only the mass purposeful activity on anihilation of Ingush population homes that can explain evident selectivity in destruction of Ingush houses. This conclusion can ve vividly illustrated by the example of Tarskoye village,where no military conflicts have taken place, but nevertheless one part of the village (Ingush) is completely destroyed, while all houses in the Ossetian part are intact.

Most of destructions have been done in the days of November immediately after the establishment of control by Ossetian military units over the territory. According to the information of eye-witnesses, it has been common practice to shoot tracer bullets at the houses, where gas stove or gas cylinder valves have been preliminarily open, after which the houses exploded.

The HRC «Memorial» has at its disposal a videotape of a Russian citizen from Dachnoye village, telling the story, which testifies to the fact, that it had been members of detachments, which arrived from South Ossetia, who destroyed houses in the village.

Although long after the large-scale military conflict stopped, terrorists on both sides continued to destroy and set the intact empty houses on fire. 88 Ossetian houses were ruined (10.4% from total destructions) and 143 Ingush houses (5.3% from total destructions) in such a way in the first half of 19929. Such destructions continued further on, but on a smaller scale.

It should be noted that the Russian leadership and officials, who exercised the emergency status regime in autumn 1992, who were obliged to protect the peaceful population from violence and necessity to flee to save their lives.

In responce to the Russian Presidential Decree on returning refugeees and displaced people in December 1993 — beginning 1994, the number of destroyed Ingush houses has increased. In spring and summer 1994 such acts of sabotage continued. For example, in January, February and March, 1994, abandoned houses10 in Kartsa settlement have been destroyed, in May this year the community club was destroyed and there was an attempt to set fire to the house, where an Ingush family lives; in July a half-destroyed house was exploded11.

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Even the destroyed houses are continuously pulled down. The HRC «Memorial» representatives witnessed, how bricks and other construction materials were taken away from the ruins of Ingush houses in the villages of Tarskoye and Dachnoye by private persons.

While most of the individual houses were ruined, the apartments in multi-apartment buildings, abandoned by Ingush, are occupied. For example, 3 multi-apartment buildings in Dachnoye are occupied by refugee Ossetians from Georgia.In relation to these buildings, the Chairman of the RNO Council of Ministers Nationalities Committee T.E.Kusov told HRC «Memorial» observers the following: departmental buildings, which belong to the poultry farm, were damaged during 1992 events, but they have been repaired at the expense of the state and handed over to the new farm workers. Although this explanation does not correspond to reality, as during the conversations with present-day inhabitants of these buildings the HRC «Memorial» found out that the absolute majority among them are unemployed.

In Vladikavkaz, about 800 apartments, abandoned by Ingush owners, are occupied by the Ministry of Foregn Affairs workers. Naturally, the RNO authorities can not provide any reasonable explanation to this fact.

The houses, which have been abandoned by Ossetian displaced persons from Ingushetia, are also illegally occupied, mainly by displaced persons from North Ossetia.

6. CONDITIONS OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE PLACES OF THEIR TEMPORARY RELOCATION

According to different estimations there are from 46 up to 64 thousand displaced persons (see Chapter 5) in Ingush Republic.

The majority of them (according to the migration service estimation it is about 70%) stay with their relatives. It should be pointed out, that only strong family and tribal connections, traditions of coming to the rescue in families have prevented the catastrophy, which could have broken out

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here in the conditions of a mass stream of people, who fled to Ingushetia in autumn of 1992 (displaced persons make up from 1/4 to 1/3 from the Ingush Republic permanent population). Unfortunately, the state structures don’t cope with the task of providing for the displaced persons’ elementary needs.

At the same time, the desire of many people, staying with their relatives, to move to mobile prefabricated «vagonchiki» caravans, is quite natural. Although such «vagonchiki» are at real shortage.

The «vagonchik» caravan is a house, consisting of two sections (a kitchen and a room) and is 3 by 6m in outside perimeter. Such houses are occupied by families, which sometimes have more than 10 children.

By Autumn 1992 Ingush Rebublic has received 1200 such «vagonchiki», as well as 200 pressed cardboard prefabricated houses. The first «vagonchiki» started to arrive already in November 1992. The last supply arrived in February 1994. Although in the beginning people refused to settle there. At that time even the displaced persons, which had no possibility to stay with their relatives, went on living in community clubs buildings, schools, kindergartens etc. That was the result of people’s convictions, that their agreement to put their everyday life in order here, in exile, will be interpreted as their reluctance to return to their permanent residential places. And it was only despair that drove people to occupy «vagonchiki» and prefabricated houses, which now are already in terribly shot supply.

There are 10 temporary residence centres (small towns), where «vagonchiki» and houses are concentrated. In some centres displaced persons also live in a compact way in the technical school hostel and former TB hospital department buildings (small town of «Molodezhny»), in the buildings of schools, kindergartens, children’s art centres, young technicians’ stations (small town of «Kometa») etc.

Life conditions in such buldings are often even worse than in vagonchiki. For example, technical school hostel bulding at Gomurzievo village, where 250 displaced persons live, is in the state of decrepancy and may collapse, its walls are already crisscrossed by large cracks. Initially it was planned that 120 people will stay in this building.

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However, families, which, due to room shortage, have been put by the IR migration service by themselves into the buildings of state offices and enterprises (machinery and tractor workshops, farms, electric station buildings etc) by themselves, are even in a more difficult situation. These rooms are often absolutely not adapted for a prolonged stay of people.

In this way, for example, 6 families (35 people) have been staying from December 1992 in the machinery and tractor workshops, which have been visited by a HRC «Memorial» representative in February 1994. Drinking water is not available here, so people have to walk 3 km away to get it and they melt snow in winter time. The rooms, which are damp, badly ventillated and have no heating, are warmed in wintertime by electric heaters. Beds have been brought here only in at the end of 1993, and before that people had to sleep on the floor.

From 1992 it was 6 families, which lived in the electric station building near the village of Plievo, which has been visited by the HRC «Memorial» representatives in July 1994. Each of three families (9, 7 and 6 people) had a separate room for each family, 3 other families (15, 5 and 4 people) lived all together in one big room (20 by 5m), separated by sheets into 3 sections.

There are a lot of similar examples, describing hard life conditions of displaced persons.

The disabled displaced persons, who stay in the temporary residence centres and buildings of state offices and enterprises, are provided with free meals from the Russian Federation budget, at a rate of 1000 rbl per day. In one of the small towns, which have been visited by the HRC «Memorial» members, meals have been provided on a centralized basis twice a day, although as a rule, foodstaffs are handed out to families, so that they can cook their own food.

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In the small temporary town of «Sputnik» for displaced persons, located in Nazran, we were given real rations per one person of some free foodstaffs: sugar — 30g/day; butter — 25 g/day; bread — 400 g/day; macaroni — 750g/15 days; tea — 1 g/day; chicken was handed out 1 kg once in 2 months; 1 egg in 2 days; potato — 1 kg in 2 months. Citizens of this small town complained about the bad quality of received foddstaffs.

By 1994 in all of these small towns water, electricity and gas have been installed. However, electric heaters have been first brought in to displaced persons only in December 19931, and even now they are missing in some «vagonchiki». In some small towns it was only in 1994 that gas has been installed.

The majority of displaced persons, whic have been visited in the towns by the HRC «Memorial», did not have a sufficient amount of vital things, which are tableware, clothing, footwear etc. In some families children have only one pair of warm boots for several people, which keeps them away from going to school in wintertime. Many displaced persons miss some of their documents, as they failed to bring them during the flight. In our opinion, these observations of the HRC «Memorial» completely oppose the propaganda cliche, which is unfortunately widely spread in North Ossetia, that all the Prigorodny Region and Vladikavkaz population, having known that the military actions were to start soon, have secretly fled from this territory before that.

Clothing and footwear is brought to displaced persons only from their relatives and through humanitarian aid.

In the small towns, visited by the HRC «Memorial» representatives, there are medical stations, where doctor’s assistants work. However, the situation with getting qualified medical assistance is bad. The little towns are periodically visited by teams of doctors (while the state enterprises’ buildings, where displaced persons stay, are deprived of this medical service). Displaced persons are attached to local polyclinics, which have special days for visits of displaced persons. However, due to the fact, that medical infrastructure in Ingushetia is underdeveloped and due to

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the big amount of displaced people, this is not sufficient. The necessary preventive medical check-up has not been made among the displaced persons.

Displaced persons’ children study at local schools, although due to the fact that schools and teachers are terribly overloaded, the level of teaching has considerably gone down.

Displaced persons, who are able to work, staying at the temporary residence centres and buildings of state offices and enterprises, as well as displaced persons, staying with their relatives, are not provided with free meals.

According to the data, which has been provided to us by the IR territorial migration service, extraordinary allowances are not provided to displaced people on a regular basis, but even after the inflation index is applied, these allowances are still extremely small.

For example, all displaced persons received from the Provisional Administration an allowance of 1800 rbl. in autumn 1992, and 13 thous.rbl in 1994 from the migration service; in autumn 1993 and winter 1994 they receved: in autumn 20 thous.rbl for each schoolchild, 13 thous.rbl for apartment rent allowance (for those, who live outside displaced persons towns and not in the buildings of state enterprises) and 10 thous.rbl per each head of the family. Allocations from the local budget came to: twice 500 rbl during the first year and 5 thous.rbl for each person in August 1993.

Children’s allowance is paid out regularly. Pensioners are provided with pensions. Starting from autumn 1993 those displaced persons, who are able to work and have no jobs, get unemployment benefit.

There is a high level of unemployment among Ingushetia permanent population, so it goes without saying that the absolute majority of displaced persons have no jobs.

Thus, according to the Provisional Administration data, out of 46 thous. displaced persons, registered by the Federal migration service, 23 thousand are able to work. Out of this number: 17,714 people are registered as unemployed, 380 people are provided with jobs (most of them got different jobs with temporary allocation centres).

According to what the HRC «Memorial» representatives have been told by the inhabitants of temporary allocation centres, it is the humanitarian aid, that helps people to survive. Such help is provided regularly by local business people, and in the beginning help was provided by the International Red Cross (blankets, pillows). People remember with gratitude big supplies of humanitarian aid from Kazakhstan (from Ingush diaspora) and from governments of Tatarstan and Bashkortastan Republics.

On the whole, within the period 1993 — May 1994, 3062.7 mln rbl has been allocated for Ingushetia Republic Federal migration service from the Russian budget for realization of aid programmes.

To our surprise, the IR migration service could not provide us with an accurate figure of the number of people, staying at the temporary residential centres. They could only give us the information on the number of displaced persons, which were provided with free meals in such centres, i.e. disabled people. 5200 people get free meals in the temporary allocation centres, besides free food provisions are received by 1.5 thous. people from those families, which are allocated in separate state institutional buildings.

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It should be pointed out that accurate figures on the number of displaced persons from North Ossetia are not available — different sources use different figures, there is disagreement on this question even among different units and structures within the Russian federal migration service. Absence of accurate figures on the number of displaced persons in the towns reveals the attitude of the Ingushetia territorial migration service to the question of accurate quantitative evaluation.

Practically all displaced persons express, sometimes very emphatically, a demand that their return to permanent residential places should be started immediately. Those, which houses have been destroyed, demand that they should be put next to the ruins «in vagonchiki-caravans or dug-outs», in order that they could start reconstruction of their houses themselves. Any talks about delays in connection with the necessity to reconstruct communications, schols, medical institutions etc first, are perceived by them in an extremely negative.way. According to what they say, they are deprived of good medical service here, and their children can not get proper education. At the same time, some displaced persons insisit, that they can reconstruct their houses themselves with the help of their relatives.

In all temporary allocation centres, which we have contacted, displaced persons claimed that Provisional Administaration head V.D.Lozovoy has never visited them.

An obligatory demand, put forward by displaced persons to the state, is that their safety in case of their return should be provided. In their opinion, it is necessary to station Russian Army or Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs posts and make the regime of the state of emergency more strict.At the same time the majority of them think, that real safety can be provided only on condition that «federal government» is introduced both in Prigorodny Region and in a number of villages, which are administratively subordinated to Vladikavkaz. Displaced persons express fear, that if this is not provided, they will be helpless in front of North Ossetia local powers, which will start discriminating them by their nationality.

Disbelief of the ability of the state to return them into their permanent residential places is spreading more and more widely among displaced persons. We have often heard the following point of view: «If Russia can not return us, then let them take away Russian troops from here, and we together with Ossetians shall decide by ourselves, where each of us is going to live.»

The large number of displaced persons, present on the territory of Ingushetia, is a powerful destabilizing factor for the whole area.

As a result of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict in autumn of 1992 displaced persons are also found on the territory of North Ossetia. At that time 9045 Ossetians fled from their homes in Prigorodny Region, by the end of July 1994 it was 6463 out of this number, that returned to their residential places2. The obstacle for returning the others (2582) was the absence of means for recostruction of ruined houses. About a hundred displaced Ossetians from Inguushetia (just a few Ossetian families lived there) have been registered.3 Besides, according to what the RNO officials are saying, there are about 500 Russian displaced persons from Ingushetia on the territory of North Ossetia.4

Displaced persons from Prigorodnu Region villages have been accomodated in the buildings of state institutions (tourist bases, rest-home buildings etc), and with their relatives. Some people were accomodated in the buildings of state institutions in the villages, where their homes used to be. For example, 19 families, whose houses have been ruined, stayed in Chermen village school #1 in summer of 1994.

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As the state means are not sufficient for provision of displaced persons elementary needs, collections of donations from private persons and enterprises have been made in North Ossetia to help these people.

Starting from December 1992 North Ossetian project organizations began compiling documentation for reconstruction of destroyed buldings — living apartments (irrespective of their owner’s nationality), schools, shops etc. In 1993-94 North Ossetia construction organizations began reconstruction of apartment buildings, which mainly belong to Ossetians and Russians. Cottages for Russian migrants from Chechnya and Ingushetia were being built in the vicinity of Popov Khutor village.5 8 billion rbl have been allocated from the Russian Federation budget for reconstruction of houses in North Ossetia. By summer 1994 all these means have been spent and besides, construction organizations were due 5.5 bln rbl for the amount of work done. That was the reason why housing reconstruction works have been stopped by state organizations. In summer of 1994 reconstruction of houses went on at the expense of victims and donations.

The situation concerning the status and conditions of displaced persons on North Ossetia territory is aggravated by the fact that there are 43168 Ossetian refugees from other countries on the territory of this Republic — most of them are from Georgia.6 7 thous. out of them are from South Ossetia (Georgia), i.e. at present time due to establishment of peace in this area only these 7 thous. people will hopefully return.

Moreover, Ossetian displaced persons (1100 people) from Chechnya have arrived in North Ossetia territory, and migrants from Kazakhstan and Central Asia regions are constantly arriving there (and in Ingushetia).

Both refugees and displaced persons are mainly staying in state institutions (tourist bases, rest home buildings, former sanatoria etc). However, after the autumn 1992 events, some refugees occupied non-ruined houses, abandoned by Ingush displaced persons.

16 thous. Ossetian refugees from Georgia live in Prigorodny Region.7 By settling refugees in this area, in the houses, which have been formerly occupied by Ingush, North Ossetia authorities subject themselves to new threats and creat new problems . Thus the situation of Ossetian refugees, who have been put into multi-apartment houses in the village of Dachnoye, is going to be complicated, if NOR authorities fulfil the Decree of the Russian President and Ingush migrants will be returned there.

According to the Provisional administration data, 23554 people capable of working have been registered among refugees and displaced persons in North Ossetia Republic. Out of this number: 290 people are registered as unemployed, 6420 are provided with jobs, 1531 people study during the day.

On the whole, during the period of 1993 — May 1994, the sum of 3967.8 mln rbl has been allocated from the budget of Russia for North Ossetia Republic for realization of the Federal migration service programs of aid to refugees and displaced persons.

The presence of a large number of refugees from Georgia on North Ossetia territory does not only make the situation with social and life conditions of Ossetian displaced persons worse, but also sharply aggravates social and housing, criminal and other problems in the area. Without any doubt one can state the presence of a certain tension in North Ossetia community, which is partially expressed in mass media publications. Reproach can be heard, addressed to some refugees, which blame them for their unwillingness to return to South Ossetia, where the war is

27




practically over8, that «criminal elements are operating on the territory of our republic under cover of refugees from South Ossetia and Georgia»9.

The presence of Ossetian refugees from Georgia, especially in Prigorodny Region and Vladikavkaz, creates additional difficulties for returning there displaced persons of Ingush nationality. However, in the opinion of the HRC «Memorial», it should not be regarded by some North Ossetia politicians as an insuperable obstacle.

The NOR authorities and public organizations put forward a demand that «all refugee problems are to be approached as a complex». One can agree to that, if by «complex approach» we understand that the Russian government should try in the shortest possible time together with the government of Georgia to solve the question of creating conditions for free return of refugees into their permanent residential places in Georgia, and for that end refugees should be provided with acceptable living conditions, which correspond to the international norms. However, returning refugees to Georgia should not be considered as an obligatory condition for returning Russian citizens to places of their residence on North Ossetia territory. Taking into consideration the responsibility of Russia for its citizens, who became victims of the conflict on the territory of Russia, the Russian federal powers have the right to consider the question of returning displaced persons to places of their permanent residence.

7. MAIN ACTIONS, UNDERTAKEN BY THE ADMINISTRATION UP TO AUGUST 1994, FOR RETURNING OF DISPLACED PERSONS INTO PLACES OF THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE

7.1. BEFORE BESLAN AGREEMENT

March, 20, 1993, the Agreement has been signed at Kislovodsk between the presidents of NOR ans IR, where both parties have announced for the first time about their readiness to jointly solve at the first stage the problem of returning refugees and displaced persons from both republics1 on the basis of voluntary return of the citizens, disposing of documentally confirmed propiska registration, into places of their compact residence. However, it did not result in any practical steps.

December 7, 1993, the Conference, chaired by B.N.Yeltsin, of the North Cuacasus republican, regional and district leaders have taken place. Having discussed the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, the conference suggested some measures for getting out of crisis, among this including:

— abandonment by the Ingush side of territorial claims for the part of the NOR Prigorodny Region;

— abandonment of changes of the present-day borders between the subjects of the Russian Federation without the subjects’ consent for it. It has been recommended to include propositions about changes in articles 3 and 6 of the RF Law «On Rehabilitation of Repressed Persons» in the established order;

— cancellation by the Ossetian side of the decision on non-possibility of joint residence between the NOR Ingush and Ossetian nationality citizens;

— returning the refugees into places of their former compact residence in correspondence with the Kislovodsk Agreement. The conference recommended to provide at the first stage, starting from December 1993 up to spring 1994, for returning of displaced persons into places of their

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former residence, which are villages of Chermen, Kurtat, Dongaron and Dachnoye in NOR Prigorodny Region;

— confiscation of the military equipment and disarmament of all the military units in North Ossetia and Ingushetia and in North Caucasus as a whole.

Unfortunately, it did not result in any practical steps then as well.

December, 13, 1993, the RF President has signed the Ukaz «On the Procedure of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons into Places of their Permanent Residence on the Territories of North Ossetia Republic and Ingushetia Republic». It confirms the status of the Prigorodny Region as a territory within North Ossetia Republic and the 4 aforementioned Prigorodny Region villages have been identified for returning displaced persons at the first stage. December 1993 is the date, when this process begins, although the date of completion of this process has not been identified.

December, 30, the RF President approves the working plan with concrete assignments to the ministries, which are almost word for word repetition of the December, 7 Conference recommendations. Refugees were supposed to return to the 4 villages before spring 1994.

However, it was only on March, 9, 1994, that the government has finally approven the list of measures for fulfilment of the presidential Ukaz and the Ministry of Nationalities is entrusted with its control. For all that, there was no money allocated to put the plan for return of people into practice.

On May 30, the RF President published the next Ukaz, extending the ES regime in the zone under conflict. However, besides that there are several paragraphs, present in the Ukaz, which testify to the fact, that the previous decisions have not been fulfilled. It means, that the RF Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence and General Procurator’s Office are repeatedly ordered to control the fulfilment of the militerized units’ disarmament and the RF government is ordered to finance «timely and in fully» measures on returning displaced persons. Now the Ukaz orderes to complete the return of people into 4 villages by July, 31, this year, and to create conditions for returning all refugees by December, 1.

However, the Government allocates the needed 60 bln.roubles only 22 days later, and the first 22 bln.rbl have actually been placed to the Provisional Administration’s account only on July, 23 (!), i.e. one week before the expiration of the new deadline, determined by the President for returning citizens into 4 villages.

The process of returning Refugees has been blocked not only by means of non-fulfilment by the Russian federal powers of their own decisions, but to a considerable degree, by the fact, that the talks, going on at present between the authorities of Ossetia and Ingushetia with participation of the Provisional Administration, did not yield any practical results. The sides proceeded from different stands, when they agreed to take part in the talks.

If earlier the North Ossetia officials have proceeded from the thesis of «non-possibility of joint residence» between the Ossetians and the Ingush and have suggested to settle the returning Ingush in new villages, located in the region of Mayskoye village, near the border with Ingushetia, then after the publication by the Russian President of the corresponding Ukazes, the official stand of the NOR leadership started gradually to change. Among the main conditions for returning the Ingush, the NOR leadership started to put forward the following demands: official abandonment of any territorial claims whatsoever by Ingushetia Republic, preliminary

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reconciliation process by means of agreement commissions and legal evaluation of 1992 events and punishment of the guilty.2

While the Ingush leadership has insisted upon immediate return of refugees, regarding restoration of the violated rights of the Ingush citizens in North Ossetia as being of paramount importance and refusing categorically to study the «territorial» question as a preliminary condition for returning people. It has been suggested to start the reconciliation process after citizens return to their permanent residential places.3 (Moreover, one should take into consideration, that article 11 of the Ingushetia Republic Constitution proclaims, that «Returning by political means of the Ingushetia territory, which has been illegally torn away... — is the main task of the state».)

7.2. «PROCEDURE FOR RETURNING AND RESETTLING OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS...» — BESLAN, 26.06.94

Finally, on June, 26, in the town of Beslan, the Presidents of both republics and the head of the Provisional Administration have signed the agreed «Procedure for Returning and Resettling of Refugees and Displaced Persons into Places of their Former Compact Residence in the Villages of Chermen, Dongaron, Dachnoye, Kurtat in Prigorodny Region, Republic Northern Ossetia». This document suggested, that at the preliminary stage, starting from July, 1, the lists of people, registered by propiska in these four villages, should be specified and engineering communications, pre-school and school establishments e.t.c. should be reconstructed. Groups of people, returning into residential places should be formed «with consideration to recommendations, worked out by agreement commissions on the basis of reconciliation procedure». Persons, accused of committing crimes, could be returned only on the decision of law enforcement bodies. The next stage forsees that returning of displaced persons into intact houses and installation of provisional housing for those, who will return and find their houses ruined and half-ruined. The restoration of the necessary infrastructure should be also done at the second stage.

The «territorial question» has been silenced in this document — the concluding clauses of the «Procedure...» identify, that both NOR, and IR proceed from the fact, that those returning «are obliged... to recognize territorial integrity of NOR within the existing administrative-territorial borders...» (nothing has been said about Ingushetia), and that the present «Procedure...» realizes the RF presidential Ukaz, which confirms the status of Prigorodny Region as a composite part of NOR.

The given «Procedure...» established, that the NOR and IR governmental commissions together with the Provisional Administration should approve concrete measures and a schedule for returning and settlement of displaced persons within a period of time up to July, 5.

And again — how many times — it has not been followed by any practical steps. Neither on July, 5, nor later on, the agreed list of measures and a schedule for returning people has turned up.

7.3. STANDS AND ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES AFTER SIGHNING JOINT DOCUMENTS ON THE PROCEDURE OF RETURNING DISPLACED PERSONS INTO PLACES OF THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Joint work for fulfilment of the Beslan Agreement has not started. Both parties to the conflict started revising, it goes without saying, to a different degree, the agreement, which has been already signed by them.

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It was already on June, 29, that the Ingushetia authorities have submitted their draft list of necessary measures and a schedule for returning people. In correspondence with this, all the Ingush, registered in those four villages, should be taken out and settled on the territory of these four villages up to July, 31. At first, people will be settled in the intact houses, then the people, whose houses were ruined, will settle near them in vagonchiki-caravans, tents and temporary houses. Along with that, reconstruction of engineering communications, pre-school and school establishments, social, cultural and everyday services is planned. In difference to the agreed «Procedure for Returning...», which suggested reconstruction of communications e.t.c. at the first stage, and returnnig people at the second, the Ingushetia authorities’ reperesentatives started to defend the standpoint that provision of any reconstruction works in the beginning is only a way to delay the solution of the main question.

This standpoint has been supported by the majority of displaced persons, who insisted they can quickly perform all this work, while staying in tents, vagonchiki-caravans e.t.c.

In the opinion of the North Ossetia authorities, with whom one can fully agree, it is not alloweed to put people among ruins without light, water, gas e.t.c. Reconstruction works should be done first. However, on the basis of this rather fair statement, the representatives of the NOR authorities insisted both in public speeches and in conversations with «Memorial» Human Rights Centre4, contrary to Beslan Agreement, signed by them, that any schedule for returning displaced persons is out of the question, and one should only talk about the schedule for reconstruction and restoration works. Moreover, as soon as no real money has been allocated (and money has been placed to the Provisional Administartion’s account only on July, 23), they refused to submit this schedule either.

An inambiguous statement could be heard in the speech of the NOR Military Council Chairman J.G.Biragov at the session of the Republican Parliament on 14.07.94, that returning is possible only into the houses, when their reconstruction is completely finished. This was the reason why the deadline for returning was delayed by undetermined time. In their conversations the NOR5 officials have been more liberal in these questions and they did not exclude the possibility of Ingush construction brigades, composed of male displaced persons, staying in vagonchiki-caravans and provisional houses, and then placing several returning Ingush families into one house, while other houses are being reconstructed. But all this can be done only after communications are reconstructed e.t.c. Although representatives of NOR authorities preferred not to say anything concrete about the immediate return of Ingush displaced persons into intact houses, limiting themselves to generic words about the necessity of reconciliation process and preliminary decision of the question on each family by agreement commissions.

The HRC «Memorial» representatives got acquainted with the work of these «agreement» commissions in Chermen village, which have sooner turned into one-way «screening» commissions (see p.41). Our interlocutors in North Ossetia gave as a positive example for solution of the question of returning the Ingush to their houses by means of «people’s diplomacy» the proposition of a gathering for the Ossetian nationality citizens in the villages of Kurtat and Dachnoye, which has already taken place in April 1994. In the opinion of the HRC «Memorial», this is more of a negative example, as at that time the gathering suggested that returning into these villages is possible only for six families «not guilty before the Ossetian people and other nationalities», i.e. 27 people (19 women out of them) out of over four thousand Ingush citizens from this village.6

At the same time a number of public organizations, «Styr Nyhas» 7 first of all, which claims to be the mouthpiece of the whole Ossetian nation, started repeatedly to demand settlement of displaced persons only in the vicinity of Mayskoye village, and even this step, in the opinion of

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these organizations’ leadership puts a condition to Ingushetia Republic and federal powers to fulfil a number of demands.8 The local powers are shutting their eyes to acts of protest, organized by activists of these organizations in Prigorodny Region, which is a grave violation of the ES regime.

The Provisional Administration has worked out a plan of its own how to return people into places of their permanent residence. It was general-major N.A.Gaiduk, the head of the Provisional Administartion department on returning refugees, who made the HRC «Memorial» acquainted with this plan on July, 23. According to this plan, upon completion of the first stage of reconstruction works (carried out mostly by Ingush brigades), when water pipeline and gas communications, electric lines, buildings of medical points and schools are ready, families of Ingush refugees will be returned into villages without waiting for completion of living apartments’ restoration. They could live in vagonchiki and tents, taking part in reconstruction of their homes by themselves. Construction and project organizations have been taking part in feasibility of volumes and deadlines of works. If the money, which has been allocated by the government, came on time, then, in the opinion of general-major N.A.Gaiduk, the majority of the citizens from the first four villages could have returned there by the end of September. The plan forsaw reconstruction of both Ingush and Ossetian ruined houses. Altogether, according to the data as of March, 31, 1994, these four villages had 1186 ruined and half-ruined Ingush houses, the number of such Ossetian houses has been 228. As the money has been placed into Provisional Administration’s account with delay, the deadline for completion of the first reconstruction stage was some what delayed, but, according to what general-major N.A.Gaiduk said, Ingush families could have been brought into villages by mid autumn.

This plan was, in fact, an exact fulfilment of the «Procedure for Returning...», signed in Beslan. But at the same time, it started being criticized both on the part of Ingushetia, and North Ossetia authorities. Some people did not like that returning of Ingush families has been delayed, practically they professed the principle «all or nothing». The others did not agree to settlement of Ingush displaced persons on the NOR territory in vagonchiki-caravans or tents.

In the opinion of the HRC «Memorial», it is just the plan, suggested by the Provisional Administration, which could become the optimum way out of the existing grave situation. Provided the relation of the North Ossetia authorities towards fulfilment of obligations, undertaken in June 1994, is conscientious and Provisional Administration is capable to act, the given plan could have been fulfilled.

It was only on August 8, 1994, that in Nalchik, that the Russian Minister of Nationalities N.Yegorov, Vice-Premier of the Russian government S.Shakhray and the Provisional Administration head V.Lozovoy have signed the schedule for returning refugees on the basis of the aforementioned plan. According to this schedule, it was already by September 15, that 938 Ingush families were supposed to return into 4 villages in Prigorodny Region. It was expected, that presidents of North Ossetia and Ingushetia will put their signatures under this schedule. Athough NOR President A.Galazov has categorically refused to put his signature on this document.

However, using this schedule as a basis, the Provisional Administration has tried to provide for returning of refugees into 4 NOR Prigorodny Region villages in August-September. It has only partially succeeded to do it in relation to Chermen village (see chapter 12).

The failure of the plan for returning people into places of their residence was explained by the unwillingness of North Osssetia authorities on all levels to fulfil it, non-disarmamant of militarized units and undecisiveness of the Provisional Administration. All that became possible

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due to weakness of federal power positions in the area and unwillingness of the Russian government to provide for observation of human rights on the whole territory of Russia.

8. VILLAGES IN PRIGORODNY REGION AND WITHIN THE PRECINCTS OF VLADIKAVKAZ, WHERE INGUSH POPULATION STAYS AT

PRESENT

These four villages are: Kartsa, Chermen, Mayskoye and Yezmi.

Each of these villages has experienced a special fate of its own during the 1992 events and after them. The fact of staying of theIngush population in each of them is explained in every case by different reasons. Just the same as each of the villages puts different problems in front of the Russian authorities.

The problems, which have already arisen in these three villages, may sooner or later arise in all other places, where displaced persons will return, if, of course, the large-scale process of returning them, promised by the state, will start. The solution of these problems here today can prevent complications in future.

8.1. KARTSA

This is a village in the precincts of Vladikavkaz, which is administartively a part of urban Industrial Region. Before the events of 1992 about 12 thous. people lived there, they were mostly Ingush. It was also Russians, Ossetians, Armenians, Georgians and others , who lived there. The majority of the people have been employed at Vladikavkaz enterprizes.1

From October 24, 1992, in correspondence with the decision of the «joint session of 3 regional councils of Ingushetia and deputies’ group of North Ossetia Prigorodny Region» (see chapter 4.3), Ingush armed posts have been put along the village perimeter.

From October 31, 1992 the village with armed Ingush fighting units has been subjected to continuous shooting from small arms and grenade discharger cups. There were killed and wounded among the peaceful population. Kartsa citizens have been forced to flee under the protection of the Russian army military unit, stationed nearby, where they stayed in old barracks. While the population was fleeing away, the Ingush military units shot 7 Ossetian hostages, kept in the building of the community club.

10-15 days later some Kartsa citizens came back to the village, refusing to get into the buses, brought to the military unit to take the hiding Ingush beyond the North Ossetia territory.

During the period, when citizens were absent, many houses have been exploded and burned. However, the majority of the houses were left intact. It can be explained by the fact, that rather many Russians lived in this village, and posts of Russian troops were put there. Ossetian formations have been driven out of the village.

Since that time some Ingush population of Kartsa (about nine hundred people) are permanently staying in the village; besides, several hundred people of other nationalities are staying there, and among them, according to different estimations, there are from 23 up to 100 Ossetians.2

The local power in the village is represented by the administration head Ruslan Basiev, appointed from Vladikavkaz, and the Provisional Administration is represented by village commandants, which are replaced almost every month. Besides that there is the head of the

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village Public Council Zakre Musiev, elected by the Ingush part of the population — while having no official power, he plays an important role of a mediator and represents Ingush interests. In the opinion of the HRC «Memorial» representatives, the stand of the Provisional Administration in relation to such non-formal Ingush community representatives here, as well as at Chermen (see below), is rather wise — they are given a legal status and are employed by the Provisional Administration.

The proposal of the village administration head to put several Ingush on the staff has been actually answered in a negative way by Zakre Musiev and other Ingush community village authorities and they lost the chance to make a step forward towards the normalization of the situation. As a result, there is only one Ingush woman among the village administration staff, which is performing some technical functions.

In Kartsa people live in their own homes — this is, what thousands of displaced persons can only dream about. However, the life of these people is hard and unsafe.

Practically, the Ingush in Kartsa turned out to be in isolation from the surrounding world: walking beyond the village boundary means subjecting your life to danger. It goes without saying, that all these people, in difference to non-Ingush population of the village, turned out to be unemployed. In 1993 at the request of J.Schatalin, who was then the Provisional Administration head , the decision was adopted, that «work record books of the Ingush, employed in Vladikavkaz, will remain at their work places without salaries paid out to them». It is interesting, that when citizens of Kartsa, who left for Nazran, request that their work books are sent to them from their former work places in Vladikavkaz, they arrive there with a record «discharged on agreement with local administration» or «discharged on agreement of the parties»3.

None of the village citizens has received or is receiving an unemployment benefit.

Twice a week they bring in free bread to the village from Ingushetia, 1 or 2 times a month it is flour and butter. Besides that, the citizens are periodically provided with humanitarian aid. Nnorth Ossetian powers say that they are ready to bring food-staffs to Kartsa, and in fact, they did bring bread from Vladikavkaz once, but nobody from the village could make use of it, as this was the bread for pay, and the Ingush are not working, and consequently, they do not get any salary. According to what the NOR officials are saying, Ossetia has no money to bring free food-staffs to Kartsa.

Pensions are paid out to the citizens through North Ossetia structures, although about 15% pensioners (mainly those, who became pensioners already after the conflict, or those, who received their pension before the conflict from other places than their places of living) do not receive money.

The village is provided with gas, electricity and water without pay. Once the corresponding ministries threatened to stop supplies, as they are not paid for, but it has not been followed by any real actions.

A secondary school and an out-patient clinic is functioning at the expense of North Ossetia budget. It is important to note, that the school employs both Ossetians and Russians. The school is being guarded round the clock by a Russian army post.

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The out-patient clinic employs two doctors — a general therapist and a pediatrician (there are 477 children up to 15 years in Kartsa, out of them 86 are under one year old), the doctors work part-time (in the morning up to 12 a.m.).

There is neither a dentist, nor an obstetrician-gynaecologist. Taking into consideration a special status of Kartsa, this is evidently not sufficient. Although ambulance cars come on calls into the village from Vladikavkaz, the doctors openly say, that they can not guarantee safety for their Ingush patients beyond Kartsa. Patients have to be transported to Nazran, but medical cars from Ingushetia are not let down Ossetian roads . The results of such a blockade are sad — for example, because the sick girl could not be delivered for several days to Nazran, a common appendicitis developed into acute peritonitis.

There are qualified medical workers in the village — they are former workers of the NOR Ministry of Health (these women are Ingush by nationality), who contacted the authorities with an initiative to organize round-the-clock medical service for the population, but they have been denied permission. As a result all of them — the general therapist, the pediatrician and 2 medical sisters — service all the population of Kartsa at their homes at the expense of Ingushetia Ministry of Health.

As we have been told by the Ingush citizens of Kartsa, in November 1992 — soon after the citizens came back to their village, doctors from Moscow brought here medications, dressing material, instruments and equipment. But soon after that all this has been taken away to Vladikavkaz polyclinics.

For communication of the Ingush part of the population with outside world twice a «column is convoyed» twice a week— these are people in cars under the guard of Russian soldiers or militiamen, who are brought from Ingushetia to Kartsa or back. Members of families travel to visit each other (many families are divided now), they travel to get treatments, for shopping e.t.c. But it is not more than 30 people, who can travel at a time, and besides these are only the people, who have been registered in Kartsa before the events of 1992. The fact of registration is being checked by the Ossetian regional department of the Interior — it is necessary to submit an application to the Provisional Administration authorities 3 days prior to travel . It is worth while reminding here, that many Ingush have been living in Prigorodny Region without propiska registration — and as a result, it happens so, that members of the same family, which have been living for a long time in the village, can not stay together in their home. Although it should be mentioned, that representatives of NOR authorities make exceptions in some cases.

Up to April this year the columns have been convoyed 4 times a week, but on April, 12 the column, which was travelling to Kartsa, with an ambulance car in it has been blocked by the crowd, while entering Vladikavkaz, with connivance of the NOR local authorities. There were attempts of holding hostages. The Provisional Administartion displayed complete unwillingness and inability to act in a decisive manner. As a result, up to May, 30 this year, the people could neither travel into, or leave Kartsa.

This situation led to the event, that on May, 19, 1994 the department head of the Provisional Administration, lieutenant-colonel J.P.Gorin has violated the established order and put into his service car 6 citizens of Kartsa, which had a pressing necessity to travel to Ingushetia. On the way to Nazran the car was blocked by four automobiles with sub-machine gunners and then brought into the headquarters of illegal Osssetian military formation — Management of Defence for the National Economy Objects (see below) in Vladikavkaz, Leninsky Region. While the lieutenant-colonel was finding out the reason for detention with headquarters head, the car together with its passengers has disappeared. Since that time the only thing, known about the fate

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of the kidnapped people (17-year old girl, a woman and a 72-year old man) is that the kidnappers are ready to exchange them for three Ossetians, captured before, probably by an Ingush bandit formation. Up to the present time workers of the NOR Procurator’s office and militia could neither arrest the suspects, nor free the hostages.4

Soon after that, on May, 22, still another Kartsa citizen has been kidnapped — 33-year old Magomed Khamathanov — during his visit of his parents’ grave at the cemetery, located outside the village. His corpse has been found three days after.5

One month before that at the cemetery the crowd has been interfering with the funeral of the old Ingush woman, who has been living in Kartsa for many years and died there. For two days the crowd has been blocking the road to the cemetery, has been throwing stones at the deceased woman’s relatives and the Provisional Administration staff, which has been accompanying them. As usual, the local militia took the stand of an indifferent observer. Finally, only on the third day, the woman was buried secretly, early in the morning, when the crowd did not gather yet.6

And in general, provision of safety is the main concern and theme of appeals of Kartsa citizens to the Provisional Administration. In spite of the fact that the village is guarded round-the clock by two permanent and two mobile Russian army posts (with 2 armoured carriers attached to them), arsons and demolitions of houses, as well as theft and plunder are still being continued, althoug on a considerably less scale now, than before (see chapters 5 and 10). For example, on May, 17 armed people have taken away the cow at the outskirts of the village in front of its woman-owner’s eyes. The woman begged on her knees not to leave her children without nourishment, but in responce to that the robbers advised that all the Ingush should leave Kartsa7.

According to what the citizens of Kartsa are saying, the empty houses, located at the outskirts of the village, have been subjected to plundering almost in the open. For example, on July 20, 1994, people, which came to the village, dismantled roofing slate from one of the Ingush houses, dismantled and took away floor boards inside the house. Meanwhile Russian soldiers did not choose to stop this plundering.

As Zakre Musiev says, 310 houses are occupied now, and about 350 intact houses are empty. It can be explained by the fact, that some owners have not been registered by propiska registration, as well as by the fact, that under the conditions of actual blockade of the village many citizens are afraid to come back.

The Ingush citizens of Kartsa complain that the commandant’s office is placed to a disadvantage — away from the main area of settled Ingush houses and ask for it to be transferred into the empty school building in the centre of the village.

One can not say, that NOR authorities do nothing for Kartsa, but the situation, in which the Russian citizens have found themselves can be hardly called an acceptable one for a civilized state. The leaders of the village community sometimes take a non-constructive stand. Although the main responsibility for reconstruction of normal life for all the people, who have suffered from the war, rests with North Ossetia authorities, because all these people are citizens of Ossetia, and they are equal in rights Russian sitizens. It is very important, that the relation to all victums was equal irrespective of their nationality.

Some requests of Kartsa8 village citizens should be immediately satisfied by the NOR authorities and the Provisional Administration (one does not need great means for it) — and these are to provide for normal medical service, including organization of stomatological service, safe and unhindered transportation of the Ingush, which need stationary treatment in Nazran, the work of

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the kindergarten should be started again (the building is intact), the place of commandant’s office location should be changed.

It requires serious work to satisfy other needs. Reliable safety is possible only within the context of general solution of the problem — actual complete disarmament of illegal formations, operating on the NOR territory, is required (see corresponding chapters), decisive struggle with terrorism, real change of the working style of the Russian law enforcement bodies in the region (see chapter 10.2), stopping by means of the Provisional Administration forces of any attempts to block the roads in the Emergency Status zone.

Providing Kartsa village citizens with work — is an utterly complicated question, which can be solved only in the context of solution of many Ingush-Ossetian conflict problems. Organization of home-work9 demands extra means first of all.

The limitation of the number of people, brought into the village, by checking their propiska registration in Kartsa, is the measure, motivated by the present-day situation. But at the same time one has to take into consideration, that propiska registartion in Prigorodny Region has been limited for a long time, and many of those, who actually lived in the village, did not have it at all. The question about their return needs to be solved .

At the example of Kartsa one can see, that the process of returning displaced persons can not be settled just by the mere act of transportation of people into places of their permanent residence.The actual return of people will demand a prolonged strain of forces on all levels of authorities.

The example of Kartsa demonstrates, that it has been possible to preserve the houses and return citizens there in autumn of 1992, on condition that Russian troops had fulfilled their duties. If this chance have not been missed at that time, then Russia would not face the problem of returning tens of thousands displaced persons into places of their permanent residence and reconstruction of thousands of ruined houses.

8.2. CHERMEN10

This is a village in the NOR Prigorodny Region. Before the events of autumn 1992 it was 3500 Ossetians, who lived here, 4300 Ingush and the number of Russians and other nationalities is considerably smaller.11 (According to other data it was 3061 Ossetians, 4114 Ingush, 284 Russians and 84 people of other nationalities.12)

Most of the people were employed by a collective farm. The Ingush and the Ossetian population lived in a close «compact» manner at different parts of the village (the Ingush were in the northern and southern and the Ossetians in the central part), although there were places, where Ossetian and Ingush houses were mixed.

Out of all villages involved in the 1992 events, Chermen has the closest location to the Ingushetian border.

By August 1994, 1,600 Ossetians and 2,260 Ingush lived in Chermen.13

Early in the morning, on October 31, 1992, armed formations from Ingushetia entered the village, after capturing State Auto Inspection post. Having crushed the resistence of the militsia, who were in the department building (meanwhile the militiamen were killed), they gained

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control of the village till the morning of November 4, when after artillery fire Russian troops and Ossetian military formations entered the village.

According to what civilians from the Ossetian part of Chermen told us, the period of time, when the village has been controlled by the Ingush military formations, several village civilians were killed by hands of these formations, hostages were held (Russians including), 4 of which were missing, cattle and cars were driven away, arsons and demolitions of Ossetian houses were organized by fighting units. Many civilians had to flee the village then.

Along with that, the majority of destroyed houses are still Ingush, which were destroyed, in its turn, by members of Ossetian military formations. Obviously, in the beginning, the presence of Russian troops prevented Ingush houses from destruction (although there are witnesses, who insist, that Russian soldiers took part in destruction of houses), and later on permanent posts of the Provisional Administartion powers were established. The fact, that the Ingush started returning already about a month and a half later, also contributed to saving houses from destruction.

It is worth while mentioning that, according to what Chermen civilians of Ossetian and Ingush nationality say, during the armed conflict in the village there were numerous cases of Ingush saving and helping Ossetians and vice versa.

Ingush population fled Chermen in the beginning of November 1992, but already from the end of December, same year, people started returning to intact houses. Since then and up to the present, slow unwarranted resettling to intact houses in the Ingush part of the village continues.

The Ossetian population, that fled, returned to intact houses in 1992. Although even by summer 1994 there were still 1,900 people, whose houses were destroyed. These people stay with their relatives, in the buildings of rest-homes, some live in Chermen school building, a number of families have been provided with flats at Vladikavkaz. In 1993 construction organizations from North Ossetia maintained and reconstructed destroyed houses (these were not Ingush houses). Although in 1994 the work was stopped due to absence of budget means. In summer 1994, in Chermen, it were owners by themselves who reconstructed their houses.

The village administration, the NOR Department of the Interior and commmandant’s office are located in the Ossetian part of Chermen. Several Russian army and militsia posts are located at the outskirts of the village and in the centre.

After the 1992 events, new village administration was appointed (before that, an Ingush was the administration head).14 The Provisional Administration Chief V.D.Lozovoy has reported the following about the new administration head: «May 10, 1994, in the NOR Prigorodny Region a group of Management of republican economy units ander the leadership of Chermen village administration head, committed outrages and attempted to block and disarm a Russian Ministry of the Interior patrol detail, threatening to shoot them right on the place». 15 Until the present-day Chermen administration head was appointed to this post, he was at the head of a local people’s voluntary corps detachment (see chapter 9).

During the conversation, which took place on July 4, 1994, in Vladikavkaz, the Chairman of the Nationalities Comittee under the NOR Council of Ministers T.Y.Kusov told the HRC «Memorial» representatives, that Ingush authorities decided to appoint their own administration head for the Ingush part of the village. Moreover, 3 weeks ago this person did not allow the administartion Chief of the NOR Prigorodny Region to his territory.

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When we tried to find out the real situation in Chermen from the Provisional Administration representative, we found out that these statements do not correspond to reality. There is one official administration in Chermen located in the Ossetian part of the village. The power in the Ingush part of the village is exercised by the commandant’s office, but there is a community representative, elected by the Ingush population, who does not dispose of real administrative authorities — this is Ajub Matsiev. He was employed by the Provisional Administration. There is no real possibility to prevent Prigorodny Region Chief from going to the Ingush part of the village. Matsiev has a regular communication with Prigorodny Region Chief, but he is sorry, that this communication has not become regular.

During the conversation with Chermen militsia department head16 we found out, that the whole village is actually controlled by the Ossetian militsiamen. Although the Ingush side does not have posts of its own, round the clock patrolling together with Russian troops is organized. Militsiamen visit Ingush houses and check who, where and on what reasons lives there.

The main problem in the village is the complete isolation of two communities from one another. Many times we heard determined and even agressive objections from Ossetian civilians against any attempts to settle Ingush and Ossetians next to each other. A number of Ossetian civilians from Chermen told us concrete names of Ingush nationality village civilians, who are involved in violence and plunder against peaceful population. Others inform, that Ingush from Chermen did not commit any acts of violence in their village, but took part in armed conflicts in other places. However, on the whole, the Ossetian civilians of Chermen have put up with the idea, that Ingush already live in a close «compact» way in their parts of the village.They are categorically against living next to them.

At the same time, leaflets calling to prevent Ingush from returning to Ossetia, to establish the border between the republics, which would be impossible to cross, etc, are periodically spread in the village. Some leaflets use this motto and call to get ready for elections. Purposeful work is organized in the village against any attempts to bring down the level of inter-ethnic animosity.

Meanwhile the authorities both of Prigorodny region and Chermen do not make any necessary steps for regulation of inter —communal relations, thus playing into the hands of an aggressive part of the population.

A number of problems here are similar to those in Kartsa.

In such a way, there are 2 outpatient clinics functioning in Chermen — one is in the Ossetian part, and the other — in the Ingush. The village administaration explained to us, that the outpatient clinic, located in the Ossetian part does not service Ingush, as they have their own clinic. The woman in charge of the outpatient clinic resolutely expressed her unwillingness to service Ingush or cooperate with them.16 As a result, the Ingush civilians of the village, located in North Ossetia, are serviced by medical workers, paid from Ingushetia. They complain of insufficient provision with medications (nothing is supplied from the North Ossetia Ministry of Health), they also complain of the room, which is not suitable for medical purposes and at the absence of necessary equipment.

There is general unemployment among the Ingush. They are not accepted into the collective farm, which is recovering with great difficulty from the 1992 pogrom. They are accused, that the herd and equipment were driven by fighting units away from the collective farm to Ingushetia.

Half of the collective farm land, located near Ingushetian border and adjoining the Ingush part of the village, is not cultivated. But if the republican and local NOR authorities really want, as they

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claim, that Ingush civilians from Prigorodny Region considered themselves civilians of North Ossetia, then they should organize a separate Ingush team at Chermen farm.

By the end of July, the Ingush in Chermen got an unemployment benefit for three months (over 14 thous. roubles).

Ossetian children study in Chermen secondary school #2, Ingush children studied in the school of the neighbouring Mayskoye village up to autumn 1994. In August, this year, the means paid from the Provisional Administration account, were used for repairs in Chermen school. So lessons finally started there.

The Ingush living in Chermen do not get children benefit from the local budget, while civilians of other nationalities do. Meanwhile the village administration insists, that this benefit is received by everybody.

Water pipeline is out of order in the Ingush part of the village and water has to be brought from the river, which is far away. It is possible, that there is a problem with pipelines and some Ossetian families suffer from that, too, but it is impossible to pursuade the Ingush in it, as they already experienced discrimination.

A big positive difference from for the Ingush in comparison with Kartsa is the absence of blockade. It is easy to travel to Nazran in your own car, a passing car, or by a regular bus.

Actions of bandits, scaring people and committing terrorist acts, are a serious problem. At the same time, the violence level here, just like in Kartsa, is much lower in 1994, than before.

Regularly at night time, the village (its Ingush part, first of all) is subjected to fire from small arms, less often — from grenade dischargers. The fire is usually not aimed, it is rather used for scaring people. While we were staying in the region, on July 16, at 23.00 hours, an extension to the living house of an Ingush, M.Kharsiev, was subjected to fire from a grenade discharger and as a result, two of his daughters were shell-shocked. Village civilians complain, that the village commandant’s office shows a very passive reaction to fire: they fire very seldom in responce and do not take any attempts to capture terrorists. Only a small number of case of opening fire were reported to the Ministry of the Interior.

A.Matsiev says, that in 1994 no Ingush were killed in Chermen,17 while last year 12 people were killed (usually civilians were taken away by armed people, and then their corpses were found at the outskirts of the village). The Chermen militsia chief denies outright the fact, that Ingush village citizens perished last year (although the facts of kidnapping of at least three people and murdering of four were confirmed by the Procurator’s office and the IR Ministry of the Interior). In its turn, the Chermen militsia chief reported, that there are victums and killed among civilians of the Ossetian part of the village. In 1993, 3 people were killed and 1 was missing. In spring 1994, while working at the collective farm field, a tractor driver blasted on a mine, he survived, but he can not walk now. Also in spring, the militsia chief himself was subjected to shooting in the street and in winter 1994, the militsia department building was subjected to shooting from small arms and grenade dischargers.

In the village itself, according to what militsia department chief told us, in 1992 through the beginning 1993, operations on disarmament were carried out. After that no arms were found with civilians.

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The Ingush population of Chermen does not trust North Ossetia militsia. We were told about provocative behaviour of some militsiamen, even about unprovoked pistol-shooting at people on July 4 or 5, this year, from a passing militsia car. We wrote down the story of a Chermen civilian Ruslan Nalgiev, how on 07.02.93, he together with his cousin Magomed Nalgiev and his neighbour Magomed Nakosthoyev were captured as hostages in the villige by two militsiamen from the NOT Ministry of the Interior on point-duty, taken down to Beslan and given over to the North Ossetia Republican Guard Headquarters, where they were kept for seven days, subjected to humiliation and beating. In winter 1993, R.Nalgiev gave evidence of this facts to the investigation group from Moscow, which worked in Nazran. But still, according to his words, the militiamen, who kidnapped him, are still standing on duty in Chermen.

The reason for many problems, which displaced persons from Ingushetia returning to Chermen are faced with, is that up to August 1994, this returnung went on «by itself», and not within the frameworks of a state program. «The Procedure for Returning and Resettling of Refugees and Displaced Persons ...» (see chapter 7.2), according to which Chermen civilians were supposed to return to intact houses exists, but a coordinated schedule for returning is not there it looked like people were returning home illegally — North Ossetia authorities didnot interfere and the Provisional Administration was in favour. The resulting situation was a real paradox — over 2 thousand Ingush returned to their homes, but Ingushetia authorities justly insisted, that the process of returning displaced persons had not really started yet.

Thus, by the end of July 1994, the majority of Chermen houses were resettled. With an exception of the houses, located in the periphery and along the border of two parts of the village — where the possibility of shooting and attacks was higher. The Ingushetia Republic State Committee on refugees reported, that 134 hoses in Chermen were not settled, but in fact 53 empty houses remained by this time. According to the data of theProvisional Administration, there was about the same number of empty Ossetian houses, located in the Ingush parts of the village. The Provisional Administration needed to strengthen the protection of the village, and the Ossetian side had to agree to returning of people from Ingushetia.

A list of 53 families had been submitted by the Ingush side to the Chermen reconciliation commission. The reconciliation commissions are the structures, created in correspondence with «Procedure for Returning...» from Ingush and Ossetian nationality civilians, living in a concrete populated area. The first practical move by this commission took place on July 21: at the meeting of the Ossetian part of the commission, in the absence of their Ingush colleagues a verdict was passed: 8 out of 53 families can return. Members of other families «were suspected by village civilians of committing crimes». The Russian TV news program «Viesty» reported about it with triumph.

However, the HRC «Memorial» members got some doubts regarding the work style of this commission.

Firstly, we talked with one of those, who adopted this decision, and he could not properly remember, how and on what basis it was adopted. While talking to other reconciliation commission members, we understood, that they collected evidence of illegal actions, committed by members of those families, which were due to return. There was no serious check-up of collected evidence. The decision on possibility or non-possibility of returning a family was made on the basis of this evidence.

Secondly — why set up commissions on parity basis, if the decision is taken by just one half of it without participation of the other? Possibly, it could make sence to discuss the arising objections on returning some or other families with another half of the commission. Besides, no one finds

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out the opinion of the Ingush side of the reconciliation commission about returning of Ossetian families to the village.

It should be mentioned, that according to our observation, the majority among the Ossetian members of the reconciliation commissions are the people, whose families suffered seriously during the 1992 autumn events. It is natural, that these people are not inclined to reconcile with the Ingush side. Such a composition of these commissions is predetermined by the very principle of their formation — and these are open-vote elections during the general meeting. Inevitably, under such conditions, these are either the people, who can make the most convincing speech, or those, who suffered most. A hope, that the gathering will elect wise elders, ready for compromise, is a share «manilovshina» unbased illusion.

If these commissions stick to this working style, then they should be rather called «confrontation» commissions.

Finally, in the beginning of August, the official return of Ingush displaced persons to Chermen started. The cars, bringing the people, were accompanied by servicemen, attached to the Provisional Administration. Up to September 2, the Provisional Administration brought in 35 families, other 43 came by themselves. Reconstruction of houses, installation of new water and gas pipelines started in the village. However, after several incidents, involving violence, took place, the Provisional Administration again had to stop the process of returning people (see chapter 12 on August-October period).

Chermen works, in a way, as litmus paper, which is used for checking the readiness of the authorities at all levels for displaced persons’ real returning.

8.3. MAYSKOYE

This is a village in Prigorodny Region located near the border with Ingushetia near Chermen. Before the autumn 1992 events, 2,899 people lived there, mainly Ingush and Russians. The people worked in a collective farm, a cannery and a packing production facility. During the last 2 years about 400 people, mostly Russians, sold their houses to Ingush and left the village. These were the people, whose work places and living places were planned in advance. Thus, the general number of citizens remained the same; there are 70% Ingush and 20% Russians.18

The village of Mayskoye is the only populated area in Prigorodny Region with Ingush population, which was not directly involved in autumn 1992 events. After occupying Chermen, Russian troops stopped military action in this area. The advance of Ossetian armed formations was stopped correspondingly.

18 Ossetian families (217 people), who lived in the village, fled Mayskoye. Their houses were not destroyed and were illegally occupied by Ingush displaced persons from Prigorodny Region villages. When civilians from Mayskoye talked to us, they did not mind Ossetians returning to their homes in the village, but they connected their return to returning Ingush displaced persons to places of their permanent residence. Twelve Ossetians live in the village (these are mixed marriages).

In summer of 1994 Mayskoye numbered one and a half thousand displaced persons from other Prigorodny Region populated areas, besides its permanent citizens. They stayed with their relatives, in non-working factory workshops and in other buildings of state offices, and also in 6 vagonchiki-caravans.

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What problems does this village have and what problems are connected with it?

When the NOR authorities talk about Mayskoye, they accentuate their attention on the fact, that this populated area is in fact not under the jurisdiction of North Ossetia any more and it is subordinated to the Ingushetia Republic authorities. In conversation with the HRC «Memorial » representatives, which took place on July 4, 1994, the Chairman of the Nationalities Committee under the NOR Council of Ministers T.Y.Kusov and the Chief of the Prigorodny Region Administration G.A.Dzagoyev reported, that Mayskoye village does not transfer any taxes to the NOR budget. They say, that the factory is working, but nobody knows, where the production goes. The taxes from the village enterprises are collected by Ingushetia Republic tax inspection. Meanwhile factory and collective farm leadership demand, that credits should be allocated to them, but the NOR budget has no means for it. During the last year and a half the Pension Fund is due 1,5 bln.roubles. The corresponding NOR structures pay pensions to Mayskoye civilians, although due to non-payment of means to the Pension Fund account, new pensions are not registered.

The question about the administrative subordination of Mayskoye village is not in the Provisional Administration’s competence — considers Ministry of the Interior general-major N.P.Votko — «this is a problem of North Ossetia authorities, they should work in this respect».19

The way they see the main problem in Mayskoye itself, is that the village enterprizes actually stopped working due to shortage of means, the question of second importance is the administrative subordination of the village (according to the opinion of many people, that we talked with, the village turned out to be as if outside of any administrative subordination).

The cannery (the largest one in Ossetia), does not have any means for buying glassware, covers, spicies etc. Its accounts are blocked. As a result of that, many workshops are at a standstill, the workers are not paid any salaries. The small (in comparison with previuos years) amount of production, which is at present produced by the cannery, is sold through the trading net of Ingushetia, as there are no other possibilities. According to the opinion of the factory leadership, the factory needs a credit of 1 bln.rbl., which was denied it by North Ossetia. Later the credit was promised by the Russian Minister of Agriculture.20

The situation with the state farm «Russia» is quite similar, with an exception, that they received credits from sponsors in Ingushetia. There are 200 people working now at the state farm, but 600-700 people worked there before. There were contacts with North Ossetia leadership — in such a way, even in the beginning of 1993 there was a meeting at the farm management office with the NOR Minister of Agriculture and two of his deputies in the presence of the Provisional Administration representatives. The leaders of the agricultural department promised to help the state farm with money, seeds, and also with exchange of part of the lands with Chermen collective farm for eliminate open-field system. The exchange of lands took place, but the state farm did not get the rest, that has been promised.21

Under the present-day situation, the enterprises of Mayskoye are not capable to pay taxes to NOR budget.

We were told in the Ingushetia Republic tax service, that Mayskoye village enterprizes did not pay and are not paying taxes to the budget of Ingushetia.

It is natural, that the unemployed and those village citizens, who do not receive any salary, do not pay taxes as well.

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In Mayskoye, as well as in Kartsa, a secondary school and an out-patient clinic function at the expense of North Ossetia budget. However, payment of salaries to teachers and medical people is always connected with troubles, insults and threats, according to what they say.One has to travel to regional managers to get money, and besides it should be people of other nationalities, but the Ingush. In August 1994, salaries were not paid out to the teachers even for April.

The school accomodates 480 pupils, but in 1993-94, 1,200 children studied there. It was overloaded due to refugees and pupils from Chermen (from September 1994 a part of pupils from Chermen, 127 children, started to go to school, that was repaired in their village. The building is in an extremely poor condition, the HRC «Memorial representatives could make sure of that. The school building had no capital repairs for 12 years, besides in 1992, a sub-unit of Russian troops aws located in school for a while, and they left a terrible destruction after themselves. However, the NOR Ministry of Education refuses to provide means for repairs. The same about the Ingush authorities, as Mayskoye is on the territory of North Ossetia. The cosmetic repairs are done by teachers at their own expense. The school will not work in winter of 1994, because the heating system is beyond repair. The »participation" of Ingushetia in the affairs of local education took the form of allocation of text-books for junior grades. The regional department of education allocated one third of text-books, requested by the school ( the mere fact of allocation of text-books under present conditions is a positive move, of course).

The citizens of Mayskoye, as well as Ingush part of Chermen, do not get children allowance.

The doctors in the out-patient clinic complain that medications and instruments are at shortage, that the ambulance car, allocated to them by the Provisional Administration, «has been lost» somewhere in North Ossetia on the way to the village.

The questions of safety concern Mayskoye civilians in a lesser degree — luckily, there are rare cases of fire here, although it takes place sometimes. In such a way, for example, in December 1993, an «Alazan» type rocket was shot at Mayskoye from the side of Ossetian village Olginskoye, which damaged a living house, without inflicting wounds to civilians. March 9, 1994, an unidentified armoured car shot at Mayskoye from a machine-gun from the side of Olginskoye; there were no victums. At night from March 28 to the 29, fire was open from large-caliber machine guns and sub-machine guns.22

The power at Mayskoye is represented by village administration, which was headed by Michail Temurziev from 1988. When the HRC «Memorial» representatives23 talked to him, he recognized his administrative subordination to the Administration Chief of NOR Prigorodny Region. Moreover, both he and the village administration apparatus get paid from the regional budget. He said, however, that contacts with the regional leadership are extremely rare and incidental. The connction is maintained through the secretary of Mayskoye village administration, which has a chance to go down to the area, as she is half Ossetian. Neither telephone, nor telegraph work in the village. The meetings with the regional leadership take place on the road connecting Mayskoye with Chermen. In spite of his promises, the Administration Chief of the Prigorodny Region has never been at this village.24 M.Temursiev asserts: «We guarantee safety. It is necessary to meet and decide upon economy and social and everyday life questions. We should not touch upon political ones. This is like pouring oil in the flame.»

According to HRC «Memorial», at the moment it is impossible to insist, that this village is not under North Ossetia jurisdiction, but there is a tendency of isolation, which under further development can lead to the result, that this territory will not be under the NOR subordination

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any more. The unwillingness of the regional and republican authorities to meet the needs of the village civilians half-way will make this tendency stronger.

In this respect one should note the fact, that the staff of law enforcement bodies does not turn up in the village and the adjoining territory, but the militsia from Nazran operates there (probably, episodically). In such a way, for example, when in December 1993, a rocket hit a living house (see above), then a senior investigator from Nazran regional Department of the Interior went to the place of accident.25 When at the end of July, a Vladikavkaz newspaper journalist, notorious for his anti-Ingush publications, unexpectedly turned up in Mayskoye, he was detained by a militsia patrol, which had specially arrived from Nazran under the pretext of providing his safety. An alternative to this practice can be only the formation of its own militsia from village citizens in Mayskoye, which will be a part of the North Ossetia Ministry of the Interior. It would naturally demand a serious and interested joint work on the part of the Prigorodny Region, NOR Ministry of the Interior and the local administration. However, if the NOR authorities really wish, as they claim it, that the Ingush citizens of Prigorodny Region considered themselves citizens of North Ossetia, then it should be done this way.

It is important to note, that criminal case was not instituted on the fact of a rocket shot at Mayskoye village, although materials from Ingushetia Procurator’s office has been sent there.26

One can insist, that on the territory of North Ossetia, in the village of Mayskoye, the Ingush actually try to create an unwaranted completely autonomous self-government.

At the same time this situation can quite well suit certain forces in North Ossetia. A number of politicians and public leaders (first of all members of such organizations, as «Styr Nyhas», «Zilakhar») insist, that all the Ingush, who were forced to leave North Ossetia in autumn 1992, are resettled in Mayskoye. In the opinion of authors of this more than doubtful idea, creation of such an Ingush «reservation» will make returning of displaced persons to places of their permanent residence unnecessary.

Hopes for a successful solution of Mayskoye village problems are inspired by the fact of holding a working meeting between the First Deputy of the NOR Government Chairmen G.S.Kozayev and the Chairman of the IR Council of Ministers M.I.Didigov with participation and throug the mediation of the Provisional Administration Chief. The situation, which developed in Mayskoye, was discussed at this meeting.

8.4. YEZMI

Administratively this village is a part of Vladikavkaz, although it is located in the mountains (Dzhairakh Ravine) at a considerable distance from this town. The border between North Ossetia and Ingushetia is practically along the outskirts of the village. The village itself adjoins a large Ingush mountain village Dzhairakh, located on the territory of Ingushetia.

About 300 Ingush live in the village.

The situation in Yezmi reminds of the situation in the village of Mayskoye in many relations. Although problems of Yezmi citizens are complicated by difficulties of transportation of food supplies to this alpine village.

The HRC «Memorial» representatives failed to visit Yezmi.

9. ARMED UNITS IN THE ZONE OF THE CONFLICT

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There are units of armed bandits on both sides. They regularly organize provocative acts, kill peaceful citizens and hold hostages. The authorities of both republics do not deny that such groups are present on the territories of their republics, but they insisit, that these groups are not controlled by the authorities, moreover, that authorities try and fight them.

By the decision of the authorities, large militerized units have been legalized and officially existed in this region up to May 1994, which is a direct violation of the Russian Federation legislation.

In such a way, in autumn of 1991, according to the decision of the Republican Supreme Soviet, a republican guard and a peoples’ voluntary corps have been formed in North Ossetia almost on a legal basis. These structures were armed not only with small arms, but also with armoured carriers. During the battles in autumn 1992, a large amount of automatic arms and armoured carriers has been additionally transferred there from the Ministry of the Interior supplies.

The leadership of the Republican Guard (by the events of autumn 1992 it numbered several hundred people) was entrusted to Kim Tsagolov (the Deputy Minister on Nationalities and Regional Policy of the Russian Federation).

The units of the peoples’ voluntary corps were formed in villages and enterprises.

Here is the description, given by B.Dzutsev, the commander of the peoples’ voluntary corps, in his interview to Vladikavkaz newspaper in March 1992, of how this military formation is organized:

«It was started earlier, illegally, so that we did not turn out being not ready to oppose the forces, which were trying to abolish civil rights in the republic, split the detachments and make it impossible to rule them. This was a reaction to the attempt of infringiement on the republic’s sovereignty». «That is why, when the danger of destabilization of the situation became real, our formations were legalized and made the basis of the republican voluntary corps.» 1 In 1994 he repeated the same to the «Pravda» correspondent.2

The NOR authorities explained the formation of militerized units by the fact, that the war in South Ossetia (Georgia) went on. In such a way, in connection with shooting at an Ossetian refugee column by Georgian armed unit’s members, a Decree has been adopted on May 21, 1992, by the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetia ASSR . We make a quotation from this Decree, which was signed by the Chairman of the NOASSR Military Council A.Galazov:"...5. Recruitment of the Republican Guard must be completed, also with the help of Cossack units, volunteers must be recruited for sending them to defend South Ossetia Republic... 7. An appeal should be made to the Russian Federation leadership with demand to provide the Republican guard, formed in North Ossetia, with a needed amount of arms, military equipment and property, and in case of refusal, the Rupublican Supreme Soviet reserves the right to nationalize it. 8. The Republican Committee for self-defense must speed up the production of fighting arms at the enterprises of the town of Vladikavkaz..." (Italicized by us — Authors)

Only in January 1993, after the tragic events in Prigorodny Region, the Federal powers showed a reaction to the fact of existence of illegal military formations in the NOR. The Presidium of RF MC qualified the decision to form a republican guard and a peoples’ voluntary corps in North Ossetia as a grave violation of the Constitution and the Russian Federation laws.

Three months after that the Council of Ministers adopted a decree, but it was not on disbandment of the peoples’ voluntary corps, it was on formation of the Management of National Economy

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Units (MNEU) on its basis. The republican guard was actually transformed into two regiments of Patrol and Point-duty service of the NOR Ministry of the Interior.

According to the data of the Provisional Administartion, the MNEU numbered up to three thousand people and they guarded 228 units of national economy. The MNEU was armed with 79 units of armored equipment (mostly, armoured cars), 2 howitzers D-30, 3 «Alazan» launchers, 1535 sub-machine guns, 150 optic sight carbines, 57 hand anti-tank grenade dischargers, 18 trucks and 14 cars. In summer 1993, 3 anti-aircraft launchers were brought to Vladikavkaz from Abkhazia. The MNEU had a chance to use 2 aircrafts AN-2 and 2 helicopters MI-2. The personnel was taken out to shooting-grounds for firing practice. The MNEU was formed up on a voluntary basis.

The fact of transformation of the peoples’ voluntary corps in to the MNEU actually did not change much — the fighting units remained fighting units. Many observers, the staff of the Provisional Administration including, note, that the majority of the MNEU was consisted of former criminals.

A commission was formed by the NOR Presidential Decree of 01.04.94, to transfer personnel, arms and equipment from the MNEU to the Republican system of Ministry of the Interior.

The MNEU members policy is characterized by the episodes, that were already mentioned in this report. They took place only within the last month of this Management’s existence. Thus, on May 10, this year, a group of the MNEU staff took an attempt to block and disarm a patrol detachment of the Russian MI, threatening to shoot them on the spot (see chapter 8.2). And 9 days later a scandalous case of holding 6 hostages took place (among them 17-year old girl, a woman and a 72-year old man), the responsibility for which, naturally, rests with the MNEU (see chapter 8.1). Two of the MNEU members, who witnessed, how hostages were held, managed to escape from law enforcement bodies.

On May 28, this year, the MNEU was abolished by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the NOR Government. Meanwhile, those of the Management staff, who passed qualification commission, must be employed by the Ministry of the Interior.

According to the information, received by the HRC «Memorial» from competent sources, the decree on disbandment of the MNEU and disarmament of its members is filfilled in a bad way and the disarmament is extremely slow. By the end of August, 15 units of armored equipment and over 190 units of rifled arms have been confiscated from the former MNEU.3

By October 1994, the proper disarmement did not take place.

On the whole, the NOR authorities do not deny, that civilian population has a large number of fire arms.

In case of mobilization, detachments of peoles’ voluntary corps with a total number of 18 thous. people4 (this figure is confirmed by the Provisional Administration staff) can be formed within two days on the basis of the regional MNEU departments. According to the information, received in the Representation of the Russian President in IR, this figure can be as large as 30 thous. people.

There were armed Ingush formations on the territory of the present-day Ingushetia Republic (up to December 1992), as well as in a number of North Ossetia populated areas (up to events of autumn 92), numbering from 20-30 up to several hundred people (there is information, that there

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were formations, numbering up to 5000 people on the territory of IR. However, there is no evidence about participation of such large detachments in the military conflict). They were armed with small arms (automatic including), grenade dischargers and machine-guns. According to some evidence, trucks protected with steel shields were used. After R.Aushev took up the duties of the President of Ingushetia Republic, these detachments were disbanded. However, all the arms remained in the hands of the population. Since then, no armed formations, besides IR MI structures do not operate legally on the republican territory. The IR leadership declared repeatedly in the public about its readiness to provide help for liquidation of any illegal armed group on the territory of IR.

On the whole, the civilian population in the IR accumulated an enormous amount of fire-arms, grenades, mines etc. This is recognized both by the authorities, and workers of law enforcement bodies and practically everybody, who we talked with in IR. These arms are brought without any obstacles into IR through the unguarded and «transparent» border with Chechnya, where these arms are openly sold. Sometimes local civilians consider the fact of registration of automatic arms in the Department of the Interior in Grozny (Chechnya) as a legal ground for keeping it on the territory of Ingushetia, and even demand the confiscated arms to be returned.

One can expect organization of Ingush formations with a total number reaching up to 12 thous. people in case of a repeated military conflict in the region, according to the information, provided to us at the IR Representation of the Russian President. Taking into consideration the general number of the population and displaced persons on the territory of IR, as well as the fact, that a large amount of arms is accumulated in the hands of the civilian population, this figure is actually expected to be higher.

There is information from different sources, that Ingush military units are based in special camps on the territories of Chechnya and Georgia. The IR authorities deny this statement outright.

According to the information, received by the HRC «Memorial» representatives from competent sources, the illegal armed units are based on the IR territory in the alpine Dzheirakh area. The workers of the IR DPS after work take part in some of these acts, organized by these formations.

In spite of the fact, that there are posts of the IR Ministry of the Interior in the mountainous regions of Ingushetia, along the North Ossetian border, they never detained members of Illegal Ingush formations, who managed to penetrate into the NOR territory, or shot at them. This fact allows us to assume, that actions of the IR MI workers and members of illegal Ingush formations are coordinated.

There are regiments of patrol and duty-point service (DPS) and battalions of «OMON» special purpose militsia detachments, which are formations capable of military action.

The IR Ministry of the Interior includes:

— 1 regiment DPS, numbering 975 people, which are armed with 3 armoured carriers (altogether IR MI has 5 armoured carriers). It consists of three battalions and a special purpose company, staffed with personnel, which has an experience of military action;

— «OMON» special purpose battalion — 98 people;

— a separate DPS battalion — 233 people.5

The NOR MI includes:

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— 2 DPS regiments with a total number of 1237 people, which are armed with 25 units of armoured carriers;

— a separate «OMON» special purpose militsia battalion with a total number of 200 people, which are armed with 9 armoured carriers.6

In fact, according to the information, received by the HRC «Memorial» from competent sources, there are more people serving in DPS subdivisions of both Republics, than it is forseen by the organizational chart and their arms exceed the number of arms allowed for the staff: grenade dischargers, anti-aircraft launchers and armored equipment. First of all, this refers to the NOR DPS subdivisions. The Russian Ministry of the Interior was supposed to confiscate the armoured equipment, which exceeds the arms for thestaff. However, by autumn 1994, this decision has not been fulfilled.

10. CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST PEOPLE AND OTHER VIOLATIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, COMMITTED DUE TO INTER-ETHNIC

ANIMOSITY

Acts of terrorism and subversion are continuously committed in the region under conflict. As a result of that, people are killed and get injuries and damage is inflicted upon the state and private property. The barbaric practice of holding people as hostages has not stopped. All these crimes are committed both on the territory of North Ossetia, and on the territory of Ingushetia. Among the victums are civilians of Ossetian, Ingush, Russian, Georgian and other nationalities, staff of the NOR and IR Ministries of the Interior, servicemen from the internal troops of the RF Ministry of the Interior, Russian Army servicemen and workers of the Russian Ministry of the Interior, sent on business into the region.

Besides that, mass acts (blockade of roads, attacks of auto columns) continue on the territory of North Ossetia at the connivance of the authoroties of this republic. These acts are aimed at peceful Ingush population, living on the NOR territory. These acts sharply destabilize the situation in the region and are a grave violation of the Emergency Status. Being faced with such crimes, the Provisional Administration has repeatedly demonstrated its complete helplessness.

Investigation of crimes, committed due to inter-ethnic animosity both during the armed conflict of autumn 1992, and later on, meets serious opposition on the part of the authorities of both republics and local population and is practically paralyzed.

In general, a grave criminal situation developed in the region. First of all, a large amount of arms in the hands of the civilian population contributes to this fact. One can hear bursts of sub-machine gun fire in Nazran in the evenings. According to the data of the IR MI most of everyday crimes are committed with the help of fire-arms.1

Forces, attached to the Provisional Administration, IR Ministry of the Interior, NOR MI find and confiscate arms from the population. Although, confiscated arms make only a small part of arms, accumulated in the area.

It should be pointed out that, analysis of the IR MI report for the period from January through May 1994, allows us to insist, that at least in 1994, the committed crimes were not specially aimed at the Russian population. This conclusion is confirmed by the conversations of the HRC «Memorial» with the Russian population of Troytskays stanitsa (during the last year and a half the situation there changed for the better) and also by personal observations.

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In North Ossetia during the first half year of 1994, the total number of committed crimes decreased in comparison with the same period last year, while the number of committed grave crimes increased.2 Among other reasons for criminal situation the Minister of the NOR MI, G.Kantemirov, names abuse of drugs, presence of refugees in Georgia and penetration into militsia of «people alien to our course».3 According to his words, «the tragic autumn of 1992 made us increase the militsia personnel for strategic purposes; naturally, we had no time for choosing the most worthy ones.»

It can be expected, that admittance into NOR MI of a large number of new staff members from the MNEU will lead to further lowering of the level of discipline and professionalism in the Republican bodies of the interior.

It should be noted as a remarkable positive fact, that at the given unfavourable background, the number of killed and wounded as a result of Ossetian-Ingush conflict on the territory of the Emegency Status in the first half of 1994, has considerably decreased in comparison with the same period last year.4

If during the first half of 1993, among the civilians, 21 Ossetian and 29 Ingush were killed in the zone of the Emergency Status, then in 1994 during the same period, 6 Ossetians and 3 Ingush were killed. In 1993 during the first half year, among the civilians 12 Ossetians and 4 Ingush were wounded, and in 1994, it was 5 Ossetians and 3 Ingush.

During the first half year of 1993, there were 4 killed and 11 wounded among the North Ossetia MI workers, during the same period in 1994, nobody was killed and only 2 people were wounded among them.5

In the first half of 1993, losses among Ingushetia MI workers in the zone of the Emergency Status came to 2 people in killed and 2 in wounded, and in 1994, within this period there were no killed and wounded in the Ingushetia MI in the zone of the Emergence Status.6

During the first half year of 1993, 8 people were killed and 19 wounded among the employees of the MI and MD of the Russian Federation, sent on mission into the ES zone. Within the first six months of 1994, losses came to 5 people in killed and 5 people in wounded.7

These data does not reflect the reality completely, as it does not record killed and wounded as a result of Ossetian-Ingush conflict beyond the ES zone.

10.1. RECORD OF CRIMES DURING THE FIRST SEVEN MONTHS OF 1994

Given below is the record of crimes during the first seven months of 1994. There are grounds to suppose, that they were committed as a result of Ossetian-Ingush conflict. Most of these crimes were committed in the Emergency Status zone.

From our point of view, bringing together the record of crimes, committed both against the Ingush, and against Ossetians, makes it very evident, how one crime causes another in responce, while peaceful citizens suffer most.

On January 14, 1994, an empty house, belonging to an Ingush family, was exploded at the village of Kartsa (North Ossetia).8

On the night from January 26 to 27, a point of servicemen near the village of Batakoyurt was subjected ti fire from automatic arms from the territory of Ingushetia.9

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On January 28, an Ingush, B.S.Gadaborshev, was captured by armed people of Ossetian nationality, on his train journey from Nalchik to Iingushetia Republic. He was freed by workers of an Amalgamated Investigation Group of the RF MI.10

On February 2, the militsia department at the village of Chermen was subjected to fire from a grenade launcher and automatic arms by a terrorist group.11

On February 15, a house, belonging to an Ingush family was exploded at Kartsa village (North Ossetia).12

On March 2, a house, belonging to an Ingush family, was exploded at Kartsa village.13

On March 4, three unidentified persons of Ingush nationality met three village civilians, who were collecting wild garlic in the forest, which is one and a half km away from the village of Verkhny Comgaron (North Ossetia). The criminals took the sack with wild garlic away from them and told them to go away and then opened fire at them from sub-machine guns. As a result, one of the three civilians from V.Comgaron village, A.G.Guchmazov, was killed.14

On March 5, M.I.Kyslyakova was killed in the yard of her house at «Budki» khutor, Comgaron village (North Ossetia).15

On March 6, fire was set to an Ingush house in Chermen village.

On March 9, an unidentified armoured carrier opened fire at Mayskoye village from a machine-gun from the side of Olginskoye village; there were no victims.

On March 19, 2 industrially produced anti-tank mines with clock mechanisms, that were wound, were detected in two places on gas pipeline supports, at Tarskoye Ravine (North Ossetia).16

On March 23, a tractor exploded on an anti-tank mine, planted on the field road at Chermen village. As a result, an Ossetian tractor-driver got seroius injuries.17

As a responce measure, on March 23, 24 and 25, large groups of Ossetians, mostly civilians of Chermen village, blocked the roads, leading to the village of Kartsa.

At night on March 24, a shot was fired from a grenade launcher from the Ingush part of Chermen village. As a result, a part of the living house of an Ossetian, V.S.Makiev, was destroyed.18

On the same night, the house, where an Ingush family of Isievs lives, was subjected to shooting from a grenade launcher. There were no victims. 19

On the night from March 28 to 29, fire was open at Mayskoye village from large-calibre machine guns and sub-machine guns from the side of Olginskoye village.

Starting from March 30, within two days, the gathered crowd interfered with the funeral of an old Ingush woman, who used to live at Kartsa. For that purpose the road to the cemetery from Kartsa village was blocked, stones were thrown at the relatives of the deceased woman and the

Provisional Administration workers, who accompanied them. As usual, the local militsia occupied a position of an outside observer. They succeeded to bury the woman only on the third day, in the hide, early in the morning, when the crowd did not have time to gather yet.20

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On March 30, in the area of a Russian troops post near Chermen village, Ossetians M.H.Khamitsiev, S.V.Byazrov and lieutenant-colonel of the NOR MI S.M.Tebyiev, were hold hostages. The came here to hand over a pawn of 20 mln.rbl. to the criminals, who had earlier held two Ossetians, H.D.Khamtsiev and T.A.Khetagurov as hostages at Stavropol area.21 According to the information of the Caucasian Inter-Regional Procurator’s office, a criminal group was exposed, which delt in holding hostages, and which kidnapped Khamitsiev, Byazrov and Tebiyev. One of the people, accused of this crime, is now arrested and in kept in the Isolation Investigation Department at Stavropol.

The given crime has sharply destabilized the situation in the region and caused a wave of illegal acts and crimes in responce, including holding of hostages.

On April 5, Ingush houses at Kartsa village were subjected to fire from grenade launchers and automatic arms. Two houses were badly damaged.

On April 7, civilians of Ali-Yourt village (Ingushetia), M.A.Ozdoyev, Y.B.Ospiyev and M.B.Gagiev, went to the forest, adjourning the village, to do some tractor works. On April 8, on the road, leading through the woods to Comgaron village, the corpse of M.A.Ozdroyev, with bullet wounds was found next to the broken tractor, while his companions were missing.22

On April 12, at the outskirts of Vladikavkaz, large groups of people of Ossetian nationality blocked the road and attacked an auto column, which consisted of Kartsa civilians (there was an ambulance car in it). The auto column was accompanied by an armoured carrier and servicemen from Russian Armed Forces. In front of the servicemen’s eyes, the crowd broke cars and buses, one Ingush man (Kh.Khamkhoyev) was kidnapped, there were numerous attempts to drag the ambulance car driver out of the car. The driver was also beaten. This went on for 5 hours, after this, Ingush women were taken out to the building of the Provisional Administration, and the men were taken to the bulding of «OMON», special purpose militsia, and then everybody was returned to Ingushetia. Due to energetic actions of the Provisional Administration, K.Khamhoyev was withdrawn from kidnappers.23

As a result of the attack, on April 12, the convoy of columns to Kartsa village was stopped and village civilians were subjected to almost a complete blockade till the end of May.

On April 13, village Ali-Yourt (Ingushetia) was subjected to fire from large-calibre machine-gun from the territory of North Ossetia.24

On April 14, a tank exploded on an anti-tank mine in the training centre of the Russian Army near Tarskoye village (North Ossetia). There were no victums. At the same place, one hour later a car exploded, as a result of which senior lieutenant of the Russian Army I.G.Debgalsky was mortally wounded.25

On April 16, in the Ravine of Sunja-Baso (North Ossetia), two GAZ-66 cars with eight Ossetians, who travelled to store up grafts, were subjected to fire from sub-machine guns and a grenade launcher. Return fire was open from smooth-bore rifles.One of the car passengers was wounded.26

While combing the terrain, an Ingushetian citizen, wounded into the head, was discovered. He had a grenade launcher and loaded magazine to a AK-74 sub-machine gun.27

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On April 20, in the woods, 6 km from Sundzha villlage (North Ossetia), corpses of citizens of this village, Ossetians M.S.Khugayev and B.E.Kabisov with fire wounds were found near the car. On April 19, these people went to the woods to store up firewood.28

On April 21, from the side of the village of Sundzha, a PDS post of the Ingushetia Republic Ministry of the Interior was subjected to fire from three armoured carriers near the village of Ali-Yourt (Ingushetia). The fire continued for an hour and a half. Two workers of the IR MI were wounded.29

On April 24, between the villages of Sundzha (North Ossetia) and Ali-Yourt (Ingushetia), while combing the woods in search for killers, sergeant A.A.Grishko was mortally wounded as a result of an armed conflict between a mobile group from the internal troops of the Russian MI with an armed group.30

On the same day, near Sundzha village (North Ossetia), an armoured carrier exploded on a mine. As a result, a serviceman of internal troops of the Russian MI, sergeant E.Melnikov, was heavily wounded. The wounded was evacuated to Moscow, but he died in hospital from his wounds.31

On April 27, an Ingush B.Z.Matsiev was wounded as a reuslt of fire at Chermen village.32

On May 1, a corpse of an Ossetian shephard V.S.Maldzighov with fire wounds was found at the edge of the wood near Old Batakoyurt village (North Ossetia).33

On May 10, a group of MNEU workers, tried to disarm a patrol from the Amalgamated Investigation Group of the Russian MI, threatening to shoot them.34

On May 16, civilians of Katyshevo village (Ingushetia) were subjected to fire from North Ossetia side. As a result, one person was wounded. 35

On the same day, a militsia lieutenant was held hostage in the village of Malgobek (Ingushetia). He belonged to the forces, attched to the Provisional Administration.36 Later on he was freed.

On May 19, lieutenant-colonel J.P.Goryn, in charge of the Provisional Administartion department, in violation of the established order, put 6 civilians of Kartsa, who neede urgently to go to Ingushetia, into his service car. On the way the car was blocked by four cars with sub-machine gunners and then brought to the headquarters of an illegal Ossetian armed formation MNEU (see above) in Vladikavkaz Leninsky Region. While the colonel tried to find out the reason for detention from the chief of the headquarters, the car together with passengers disappeared. Among the people, who were kidnapped, there were: I.M.Aldagonov, born in 1951; Y.M.Albagochiev, born in 1937; T.T.Bekova, born in 1934, A.S.Bogatyrev, born in 1970; M.A.Yevloyev, born in 1922; L.M.Khodziyeva, born in 1977. Since that time, the only thing, which is known about the kidnapped people, is that the kidnappers are ready to exchange them for Ossetian hostages M.Khamitsiev, S.V.Byazrov and lieutenant-colonel of the NOR MI S.M.Tebiyev, who were captured by an Ingush bandit formation on March 30, 1994. By the time, when this report was written, the Procurator’s Office and North Ossetia militsia workers could neither arrest the kidnappers, nor free the hostages.37

On the evening of the same day, a car, belonging to the IR MI, was subjected to fire in the region of Katyshevo village (Ingushetia) from the side of North Ossetia. A militsiamen was wounded.38

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On May 22, another citizen of Kartsa was wounded — an Ingush, Magomed Khamatkhanov — while he was visiting the grave of his parents at the cemetery. His corpse with a craniocerebral injury was found 3 days later.39

On the night of May, 23 to 24, a village civilian, Ossetian, Y.Z.Gutiyev was subjected to fire and wounded into the abdomen at Chermen.40

On May 25, on the road in the region of Tersk lime factory (North Ossetia), the car was subjected to fire. There were two workers of the MNEU, Tanduyev and Tsakoyev, in the car. Both were killed.41

On May 26, a group of criminals, armed with sub-machine guns, attacked workers, who were building the road, commissioned by the government of Ingushetia, from the valley into the mountainous part of the Republic. Seven workers were killed, one died in hospital. The attackers avoided pursuit and went into the direction of Tarskoye village (North Ossetia).42

On June 12, two workers of the Amalgamated Investigation Group of the Russian MI, who were sent here on business from Sverdlovsk Region, were killed at the bazaar in the town of Malgobek (Ingushetia). Doctor V.I.Moiseyev, a major of the MI, was killed by two shots into the back. The sergeant of militsia D.K.Baidashyev, tried to escape, after he was wounded 7 times, but one of the criminals caught up with him and finished him by a shot from his pistol. The bandits escaped in a car.43

In connection with this terrorist act, the President of Ingushetia Republic made «An Appeal to the Peoples of Ingushetia», where he expressed his mourning on occasion of death of the Russian MI workers and called the people, who committed the crime, «enemies of Ingush people» and «exiles» and said, that their quickest possible detention is the matter of honour for the authorities and people of Ingushetia.

On June 29, village civilians, who went to store up firewood, were subjected to fire 5 km from Tarskoye village (North Ossetia). As a result, an Ossetian V.G.Khubayev was killed.44

On June 30, a KAMAZ truck exploded on a mine on the road from the Tersk lime factory to the quarries. As a result, a Chechnya civilian U.Z.Baitimayev was killed and a passanger was shell-shocked. At the same time, a truck, that was nearby, was subjected to fire and a passanger in the truck was killed.45

On the roads in the region of the Tersk lime factory criminals regularly plant mines, open fire at cars and open fire at the factory (it is possibly connected with the fact, that the territory is surrounded by mountains, covered with woods and the traffic in the road is quite lively).

On the night from July 9 to 10, an empty half-destroyed Ingush house was exploded at Kartsa village.46

On July 16, an extension to the living house of an Ingush M.Kharsiev, was subjected to fire from a grenade launcher, as a result of which two of his daughter were shell-shocked.

On July 19, an armoured carrier of the North Ossetia MI DPS regiment was subjected to fire from grenade launchers and sub-machine guns from the side of the woods in the region of the Tersk lime factory. As a result, five members of the crew were wounded.47

Nobody was made resposible for the majority of the beforementioned crimes.

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10.2. INVESTIGATION OF CRIMES, COMMITTED DUE TO INTER-ETHNIC ANIMOSITY

In the numerous meetings and interviews, given to the HRC «Memorial» representatives by both common civilians and republican authorities from Ossetian, as well as Ingush side, stated, that punishment of those, who are guilty of committing crimes both in autumn of 1992, and later on, is an obligatory condition for the situation in the area to be normalized. However, with a very rare exception our interlocutors consider, that criminal from the «other side» should be punished first of all, while criminals on «our side» seem not to be criminals, but defenders, or unhappy people, embittered by crimes, committed against them. The exceptions from this rule were the President and the Vice-President of Ingushetia Republic, while in North Ossetia it was a number of liberal intelligentsia representatives from Vladikavkaz.

In the opinion of the HRC «Memorial» representatives, investigation of numerous grave crimes, committed due to inter-ethnic animosity and putiing on trial those people, in relation to which there are grounds to be accused of committing such crimes, is an obligatory condition for normalization of the situation in the region. According to the data of the RF Procurator’s Office, by autumn 1994, there was material for instituting criminal proceedings against at least 100 persons.

Although a positive result from persecution is possible only in the case, when the influence of political factors upon the conclusions of the investigation and trial will be reduced to the minimum.

To our opinion, only in this way, and in no other way the «legal assessment» of the events of autumn 1992, which is demanded by both sides to the conflict, should be done.

Meanwhile the proposition of the RF Procurator’s Office on granting partial amnesty to persons, who committed separate non-grave crimes within the period 31.10 — 06.11.1992, is justified by the fact, that during this time an extremely large number of NOR and IR civilians committed acts, which are classified by the Criminal Code of Russia as crimes: storage and carrying of arms, stealing of alien property etc. Granting such an amnesty would contribute to holding an inquiry in relation to the persons, which committed grave crimes.

Within a month and a half after the armed conflict of the end of October-beginning of November 1992, in the zone of ES, separate investigation groups of three departments were working: these were Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Security and Procurator’s Office. On December 16, 1992, an Amalgamated Investigation-Strategic Group (AISG), representing these three ministries, was set up for investigation of reasons and circumstances for the armed conflict and other disorders. However, setting-up of this group was delayed till February 1993.48

AISG members were involved in investigation of crimes, committed in the ES zone after autumn of 1992.

From the very beginning, AISG met opposition on the part of local authorities, and first of all, North Ossetia.

According to the information, provided to the HRC «Memorial» from competent sources, already by July 1993, the work of AISG actually began to be curtailed. Part of materials and investigators were relocated to Moscow, while a small group continued working in the region on rotation basis. By August 1993, only 12 AISG investigators remained in Vladikavkaz. The chief of AISG, A.V.Schukin retired from Procurator’s Office bodies. A number of investigators were

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transferred to do other work, for example the chief of the investigation management V.H.Fetkulin, was appointed in charge of the group on investigation of mass disorders in Moscow in autumn of 1993. The materials, which were partially kept in Vladikavkaz, and partially in Moscow, were not studied, and no analysis of the studied was done.

All this affected the results of AISG activity. The concrete organizers of the armed conflict have not been identified.49 Within 2 years only 13 criminal cases in relation to 15 people were sent to court. Verdicts of «guilty» were passed in 10 cases and they were sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment.50 It is clear, that we are not speaking about persons, which committed the most grave crimes.

In the opinion of the Procurator’s Office workers, such a poor state of affairs with investigation of reasons and circumstances of the autumn 1992 armed conflict was caused by the fact, that from the second half of 1993, the attention to it on the part of the General Procurator’s Office has remarkably lessened.

Within the course of investigation numerous violations of legal procedure were made, «which expressed itself in giving unfounded sanctions to arrest by order of art.90 of the RSFSR Criminal and Legal Procedure Code in relation to 21 suspects. Within a long period of time, sanctions were not fulfilled due to unsatisfactory search of suspects. However, no proper measures were taken to get additional evidence for bringing an accusation or cancelling the sanctions, which was a grave violation of citizens’ rights».51

According to the information from competent sources, starting from spring 1994, investigation of the given case has been reniewed.

In June 1994, the Caucasian Inter-Regional Procurator’s Office has been set up by the decision of the Deputy General Procurator. Its functions include coordination of NOR and IR Procurator’s Offices work, as well as direct investigation of the criminal case on crimes, committed in the zone of the ES. AISG and a special investigation brigade was strategically subordinated to it.

On June 1994, all the procurators of Ingush Republic have been dismissed by the decision of the Deputy General Procurator. The reason for it was corruption and bribery, which spread among the procurator apparatus.

In an interview on 29.07.94, to the HRC «Memorial», the Caucasian Inter-Regional Procurator V.S.Kaluykin said: «The Amalgamated Investigation Group feels strong pressure and oposition both from the authorities of both republics, and from the population itself. The stand of the population is not quite clear to me — on one hand, they accuse us, that we do not make answer the persons, which committed grave crimes, and on the other hand — I can name to you over a dozen of our attem.pts to detain, arrest, or make search, or any other investigation activity, when we met serious opposition. It came to situations, when the investigation group was surrounded by hundreds, thousands people and it could come to exchange of fire, to hell knows what incident. It did not happen due to calmness and wisdom of group leaders, who stopped investigation activities, not to create an even larger wave. As a result it ended in nothing.

Active opposition plus masses of passive counteraction, when they do not turn up for interrogation, or when they come for interrogation and don’t tell, what the have witnessed, — all these impedes with the work of the group in an enormous degree. This started from the very beginning of investigation."

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In confirmation to the the Procurator’s words and as an illustartion of such a counteraction to investigation, we shall give you just two vivid examples.

The first example is, that on September 6, in NOR Prigorodny Region, the AISG workers arrested A.V.Tsutsiev on accusation of committing especially dangerous crimes. On the same day, in a responce to this, the crowd hold hostages in the settlement of Octuabrsky, Prigorodny Region. These were officers of powers, attached to the Provisional Administration: commandant of Prigorodny Region, colonel A.A.Dremluga and his deputy A.I.Ryabov. The MI of North Osseta did not provide any help to the Provisional Administration in freeing the hostages. Thus demonstrating its helplessness for so many times, the Provisional Administration and the Caucasian Inter-Regional Procurator’s Office let free the arrested A.V.Tsutsiev.52

And the second example is, that the HRC «Memorial» representative received information from competent sources, that in the evening on August 30, a MI employee I.G.Albalakov was detained on suspicion of committing a grave crime by AISG workers on the territory of Ingushetia. The detained was put into Preliminary Detention Ward for the night in order that in the morning he was brought into Investigation Isolation Department of Nalchik. However, at night from August 30 to 31, the procurator from the Procurator’s Office, Dubayev, released Albalakov from custody, after which he escaped from investigation.

On September 1, in Moscow, an enlarged session of the board of the RF General Procurator’s Office took place. The work of law enforcement bodies on maintaining law and order in the ES zone, safety of civilians and returning displaced persons, as well as work of AISG have been subjected to sharp criticism there. As a result, the deputy General Procurator published an order, by which a number of Procurator’s Office employees were punished for discipline. The Procurator’s Office also demanded real help in investigation of crimes, search and detention of the suspects by the RF MI.

However, in the opinion of the HRC «Memorial», to overcome the paralysis of law enforcement bodies in the region og Ingush-Ossetian conflict, a complex of measures shoild be provided. This includes exerting effective pressure upon the leadership of both republics with purpose of stopping the opposition to the investigation of crimes and execution, as well as introduction of a more rigid regime in the ES zone, within the frameworks of the RF Law «On the Status of Emergency».

11. LOCAL PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE PART OF TERRITORIES OF NORTH OSSETIA REPUBLIC AND

INGUSHETIA REPUBLIC

On November 2, 1992, the Status of Emergency (SE) was introduced on the territories of North Ossetian SSR and Ingush Republic by the Decree of the RF President and the Provisional Administration was set up.

The Provisional Administration consists of its Chief, deputies, headquarters, which are subordinated to the Chief of managerial administrative structures. United forces of the Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, RF FSK and Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information under the RF President. The Provisional Administration Chief is appointed by the RF President and is subordinated directly to him. From autumn of 1992, 6 people were replaced in the post of the Provisional Administartion Chief (V.P.Polyanichko, who occupied this post in August 1993, was killed by terrorists).

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The Decree of November 2, in correspondence with chapter III («Forms of State Management, Introduced for the Period of the State of Emergency») of the RF Law «On the State of Emergency» has completely transferred administrative and executive authorities of the state power bodies on the Territory of the SE to the Provisional Administartion.

However, already one day later (November 4) upon request of the North Ossetian SSR Military Council, a new Decree was published by the RF President, which limited the Provisional Administartion in its authority. According to the new Decree, bodies of state power and local self-government continued to control the SE territory. Meanwhile, executive power bodies were to be subordinated to the Provisional Administration.

The situation, which developed as a result, was that the local executive bodies of power, which have to fulfil the orders of the Provisional Administration, at the same time have to fulfil the Republican laws, orders of both republican powers and bodies of self-government. Consequently, armed formations, legalized by local power, could be present in the zone of SE, for example, republican guard and NOR people’s voluntary corps.

The federal bodies of power could not and did not wish to display firmness in their relations with republican powers, needed for protection of their citizens’ rights.

Naturally, it was difficult for the Provisional Administartion to exercise the SE regime on the territory, where actually civil war has recently taken place.

Only gradually, within 1993-94, the authority of the ProvisionalAdministration was somehow widened.

On November 30, 1993, the RF Presidential Decree sanctioned «The Regulation on the Provisional Administration on the Territories of Mozdok Area, Prigorodny Region and Adjoining NOR and IR Malgobek and Nazran Districts.» This regulation sanctioned, besides other things, that the Provisional Administartion guides the activities of executive power bodies on the SE territory, and its Chief is authorized to remove leaders and other executive power officials in case of their violation of RF laws, Presidential decrees and SE regime, or in case they do not fulfil the orders of the Provisional Administration Chief.

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However, if these authorities have proven to be insufficient to eliminate the real dual power in the SE zone, which was described before.

For example, the publication in the «Herald of the Provisional Administration» #26-27 of June 11, 1994, speaks for complete helplessness of the Provisional Administration. This publication said, that on July 17, 1993, by the Order of the Provisional Administration Chief, a «Safety Zone», from 2 to 8 km wide, was established inside the SE region along North Ossetian and Ingushetian border. Further we provide a citation: « Actions of power units, attached to the Provisional Administration, as well as village militsia departments are allowed within the limits of populated areas in this zone. It is categorically prohibited for illegal armed formations of North Ossetia Republic and Ingushetia Republic to be present in the Safety Zone».Thus, it is allowed for illegal armed units (!!!) to be present on the remaining part of SE zone. It is clear, that the Provisional Administration means «legal» North Ossetian formations, which it has no power either to disband or prohibit.

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The fact, which testifies to helplessnes of the Provisional Administration, is that in spite of its orders, besides regular village militsia departments, units of Patrol and Duty-point Service of the NOR MI, continue operating in the Safety Zone.

Only in April 1994, the Decree of the RF President «On Making Additions to the Regulations on the Provisional Administartion...» and the RF Presidential Decree «On Broadening the Authority of the Provisional Administration Chief...». These documents have empowered the Provisional Administration Chief to suspend the action of statements of republican power and local self-government bodies, as well as of territorial bodies of executive power, in case, when these statements contradict Russian legislation, RF Presidential Decrees and RF governmental resolutions. The orders of the Provisional Administration Chief became obligatory for execution by the republican bodies of power and local self-government bodies.

But the Provisional Administration practically does not use its rights. It is possible, that its unwillingness to decisively stop violations of Russian laws in the SE zone is caused by fear to make the situation even more complicated and make the relations with the local authorities worse, but sometimes it looks like they are shutting their eyes to criminals.

For example, when on April 12, at the suburbs of Vladikavkaz, large groups of people of Ossetian nationality attacked an auto column with Kartsa civilians, the servicemen from powers, attached to the Provisional Administration, displayed surprising passiveness. In front of their eyes on eman was taken away by force, the second one, who was an ambulance car driver, was beaten up by the attackers, they tried to drag him out of the car, taking the windscreen out before that. However, the column guard did not take any actions to stop these crimes. The Provisional Administration Chief V.D.Lozovoy limited himself to persuading people. The crowd’s outrages went on for over five hours, the ambulance car driver was not kidnapped, just because the women, who were sitting inside of his car, grasped at him and would not allow to drag him out of the car. As far as we know, none of the organizers of these outrages was punished. It is not surprizing, that after these events and with an attitude of the Provisional Administration, convoying of columns to Kartsa village had to be stopped for a month and a half.

Another vivid example of unwillingness to use the empowered rights is, that the administration head of Chermen village kept his position after he tried, together with other MNEU workers to disarm the patrol of Russian MI on May 1994 (see p...).

On the whole, practically all cases of mass disorders in the SE zone, which happen at connivance of local authorities, do not have any consequences for its organizers and participants.

Vladikavkaz is chosen for the Provisional Government Cheif, headquarters and the majority of its employees as the place for permanent stay. It goes without saying, that this city has a number of advantages over Nazran, which has no proper rooms for allocation of a large number of the Provisional Administration staff and investigators of the Amalgamated Investigation Group for a prolonged period of time. At the same time, permanent stay of the majority of leading workers of the Provisional Administration in the capital of one of opposing republics, can not help influencing the work of this body of power and the relation to it by the Ingush side. Even more so, there are too many people among workers of the Provisional Government, who are permanently resident in Vladikavkaz. Naturally, these people are concerned about their future and they can not take any decisive steps, which are contrary to the stand of North Ossetia leadership. Possibly these are the reasons, explaining the passiveness of the Provisional Administration.

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In connection with the beforementioned, the HRC «Memorial» suggests that, in order to maintain the capability of the Provisional Administration to function, it is not recruited from permanent citizens of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, and its headquarters is transferred (possibly, for some time) into the zone of the State of Emergency, preferably to Chermen village. This measure could contribute to the solution of the question on returning of dispaced persons into 4 villages in the shortest possible time.

The fact, that in 1993, the leadership of the Provisional Administration allowed the servicemen of the attached forces to receive premiums from NOR authorities, has undermined the trust to it as to the neutral force.

Cases of lack of discipline and drunkenness among servicemen have been reported, which sometimes leads to grave consequences. Thus, in March 1993, while armoured vehicles column was passing through the territory of Ingushetia, an armoured carrier from military unit 3402, due to the fault of its driver, crushed a «Niva» car, and the car driver wad killed. According to the evidence of witnesses, this armoured carrier was driven by a drunken major.1 A similar case took place in Vladikavkaz on July 9, 1994, when an armoured carrier of the Russian armed forces, driven by a crew, which was not sober, damaged a «Zhiguli» car. A fight took place between the militaryman, who got out of the armoured carrier and gathered passers-by, as a result of which two servicemen got physical injuries and were placed in hospital. During the fight the armoured carrier was stolen and one day later it was found in Prigorodny Region, but already two machine-guns, a sub-machine gun and a radio station were missing.2

On April 7, 1994 a crew of a Russian armed forces armoured carrier, subordinated to lieutenant Lukianenko, together with a militsiaman from Chermen department in North Ossetia, opened fire on the territory of Ingushetia at «Kamaz» truck. During this incident, the driver was wounded. Fire for effect was open before the driver managed to fulfil the order to stop. Then, capturing the wounded man and the car, the servicemen and the worker of the NOR MI tried to escape to NOR territory, but were detained by servicemen from the Amalgamated Investigation Group of Russian MI.3

On August 13, 1993, after the Chief of the Provisional Administration V.P.Polyanichko was killed by terrorists, a number of villages in mountainous Ingushetia were searched by units of Russian troops, in the framework of measures for searching killers. According to the statements of village civilians and village administration, actions of servicemen were accompanied by outrages, beating, damage and appropriation of property. This attitude of Russian soldiers reminds of the behaviour of Soviet soldiers, when analogous operations were condicted in Nagorny Karabakh in 1990-92.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that on the whole, in 1994, the number of registered and precisely known cases of actions, contadicting law and order, by servicemen of forces, attached to the Provisional Administration in the SE zone, is not large. The main claims about extortions and misappropriation of other people’s property are addressed by both NOR, and IR local civilians to the militiamen, sent into the ES zone from different regions of Russia.

Reduction in the first half of 1994, of the number of killed and wounded due to inter-ethnic animosity in the SE zone, should be merited to the Provisional Administration. During the first half year of 1994, the forces, attched to the Provisional Administration, examined over 300 thousand cars and 4 thous. trains, 260 units of stolen auto transport were detained, 194 units of rifled barrel firearms, 59 of smooth bore and 210 cold arms, over 250 mines, shells and explosive charges, 13 thous. ammunition, as well as an attempt to transport 3 thous. «Makarov» pistols into the SE zone was stopped.4

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The operations on examination of transport continued also in the second half of the year. In such a way, for example, during one month (middle of August — middle of September, 1994) 460 passenger trains and about 90 thous. cars were examined. During these operations, 23 units of stolen cars, 15 units of rifled barrel firearms, 23 of smooth bore and 43 cold arms, 25 pistols, 13 grenades and explosive charges we detained and 8 thous. ammunition were confiscated.

In spite of the impression of cited figures, one can surely insist, that the majority of arms, which were confiscated, were stored illegally and found during examinations by chance. The main part of it is still in the hands of civilians. Besides, at least by beginning of autumn 1994, the real and complete disarmament of the biggest illegal formation in the region, which is former MNEU of North Ossetia, did not take place.

On September 14, a large-scale successful operation on search and confiscation of big batches of illegally stored arms was conducted by forces, attached to the Provisional Administration, for the first time during the recent year. On this day, in the village of Stary Batakouyrt (North Ossetia), a large amount of firearms was detected and confiscated. Besides that, batches of anti-tank mines of the latest construction and non-controlled rocket charges, a self-made launcher, grenade launchers and a twin mount aviation gun were detected.5 At the same time, the leadership of North Ossetia expressed its protest in connection with cases, which seemed to have taken place, when servicemen misappropriated other people’s property (HRC «Memorial» can not confirm or refute the given statement) and grave cases, when the NOR Interior Minister was not admitted into the place, where search is conducted.

Earlier, on September 8, the forces, attached to the Provisional Administration, conducted an operation on confiscation of illegally stored arms in Beshti village (Ingushetia). During the operation, the strategic group helicopter was blocked by a duty-point, consisting of several dozens of Patrol and Duty-point Service servicemen of Ingushetia Republic MI, who demanded, that the confiscated arms should be handed in. Arrival of additional forces, attached to the Provisional Administration, allowed to deblock the helicopter.6

Ingushetia civilians have repeatedly spoken out their claims to the HRC «Memorial» representatives, that during examination of cars on the roads, servicemen and militsiamen, sent from Russia, exceed their power, and their ready use of arms is unjustified. During the first half of 1994, during such examinations, 2 Ingush were killed and 2 wounded. However, the Provisional Administration insists, and this is confirmed by records of IR MI, that arms are used only in the case of nonsubordination, like when they are ordered to stop and they did not..

The Provisional Administration together with border-guards, set border-cordons, posts and control and check points etc in order to close possible ways of penetration of arms and fighting units’ groups across mountain ranges from contiguous states.

In summer of 1994, additional posts started to be set up at the villages in Prigorodny Region, which were named among the first for returning Ingush displaced persons. This caused protest on the part of Ossetian population, as it was perceived as preparation for returning of the Ingush. Thus, on July 18, a meeting of protest took place in Dongaron village against setting up a post and a commandant’s office, during which threats were heard, to use armed force in case of returning displaced persons. On the same day, in Dachnoye village, this time directly on the initiative of local administration, present-day village civilians, mainly Ossetian refugees from Georgia, who occupied multi-apartment houses in this village, hold a meeting, demanding the post of Russian troops removed from Dachnoye. Next night, after a post of Russian MI internal troops was set up at Kurtat village (North Ossetia), fire from automatic arms was open over the soldiers’ heads. In the beginning of September, the sentry-box was torn down by the local

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Ossetian population, while servicemen offered no resistance. After that the Provisional Administration decided to remove this post from the village.

12. INITIATION OF ORGANIZED RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS. ESCALATION OF THE SITUATION BY THE END OF AUGUST THROUGH

THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER 19941

In August-September, the Provisional Administration tried to fulfil the Presidential Decree on returning dislaced persons into 4 villages of the NOR Prigorodny Region, which was based on the schedule of returning refugees, signed in Nalchik in August 1994 (although not recognized by the NOR authorities).

In the opinion of the Provisional Administration workers, consideration of lists of people, who are supposed to come back, by reconciliation commissions, is far too slow. Within 44 days from July 21, the reconciliation commission of Chermen has adopted 10 protocols, later on used as grounds for returning 56 families. As for the other populated areas, the lists of returning people have not been considered yet. In correspondence to the schedule of returning displaced persons, 938 Ingush families were supposed to return into 4 villages by September 15. Besides, decisions of these commissions, which had a character of recommendations, according to Beslan Agreement,were considered by the Ossetian side as a final verdict.

On August 8, first 9 Ingush families were brought to Chermen. They were accompanied by armoured carriers. Ingush part of the village had a celebration on this occasion. It should be mentioned, that some of these 9 families were brought in without any decision of the reconciliation commission.

In responce, next day, Ossetian civilians of Chermen started a meeting of protest.

On August 12, the First Deputy of NOR Government Head G.S.Kozayev made an address on the TV. He accused the Provisional Administration of returning Ingush displaced persons by forced tempo, and not taking into consideration either NOR Government, or people’s opinion. In responce to that, the press-centre of the Provisional Administration made a Statement, which ran:

«NOR leadership refused to sign this schedule (read the schedule of returning displaced persons.— Comp.), and submitted their variant, agreed at the republican government session, only on July 14, and it was only Chermen village that was mentioned.

According to the schedule, suggested by NOR government, by August 12, 55 Ossetian and 37 Ingush families were suposed to return to intact houses at Chermen village. During this period, the reconciliation commissions provided lists only for 18 Ingush families. But actually only 10 Ingush families returned to their houses. As far as Ossetian refugees and displaced persons are concerned, no information on their return is provided from NOR governmental commission.

It will be lawful to ask in connection with this: what kind of «forced tempos» are ment? And whose «uncoordinated actions» violate the agreements, that were reached?..

The agreements on unhindered admittance of people, who underwent check, for inspection of houses and determination of volumes of reconstruction work are violated all the time...

During the first days of returning, organizational discrepancies and lack of coordination took place — the Provisional Administration Chief has apologized for it. But this noncoordination could be avoided, if more mutual interest was shown."

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On the whole, during August-September, the Provisional Administration brought to Chermen 56 families of Ingush displaced persons, in relation to majotity of which a positive verdict was passed by the reconciliation commission. Besides, 43 families came on their own, as it was done before. The Ossetian side is strongly against such an independant arrival.

Repair works were started in the village shop and an Ingush school was repaired. The reconstruction of 44 Ingush and 44 Ossetian houses started. Practically all the intact houses are already occupied. Documents are compiled for reconstruction of 40 Ingush and 40 Ossetian houses. The money for provision of these works come from the Provisional Administration’s account. Ingush construction brigades are set up for reconstruction of Ingush houses. 18 vagonchiki-caravans were brought into the village for temporary allocation of displaced persons. By September 10, 213 Ingush families visited Chermen for inspection of their destroyed houses.

However, the process of returning displaced persons, which has started, costantly meets opposition by force. By the end of August, the situation in the zone of the Status of Emergency has sharpened to the extreme.

In such a way, at night from August 19 to 20, fire was set to the house of the Ingush family of Nalgievs. When on August 23, this family, among others, was brought into Chermen by the Provisional Administration, a large group (several hundred people) of Ossetian civilians had a demonstartion, and then set the house and the garage of the Nalgievs on fire. The forces of the Provisional Administration brought the Nalgievs into the commandant’s office, and from there — back to Ingushetia. The Ossetian side explains these actions by the fact, that one member of this family has stolen a collective farm car and went to Ingushetia during the autumn events of 1992, and that is why the Ossetian part of the reconciliation commission was against returning the Nalgievs into Chermen. The Procurator’s Office did not institute criminal proceedings against Nalgiev.

A similar case happened to the Timurzievs, the only difference is that this family has been allowed by the reconciliation commission to return to Chermen. When on August 30, this family was brought together with a vagonchik-caravan to the ruins of their house, about a hudred people stormed into their yard and started beating the head of the family A.J.Timurziev, his wife and his brother, set their vagonchik on fire and stole their private car. The beating happened in front of Russian servicemen’s eyes, who could not protect those, who were beaten. General-major N.A.Gaiduk, department head of the Provisional Administration on returning refugees, who managed to come on time, failed to protect them either. Only due to the help of OMON, they managed to rescue the Timurzievs, put them into an armoured carrier and took them back to Ingushetia. Soon the stolen car was found and returned to their owners, it was partially disassembled and the things, which were put in it, were missing.

As an explanation of this act of violence, members of the Osetian part of reconciliation commission give two mutually exclusive explanations: the Timurziev, who came back, was not actually the one, who was allowed to come back (although both brothers were in thelist of those, who were alowed to come back); another explanation is that new circumstances have turned up. While the Ingush part explains this case by the fact, that the house of Timurzievs has the nearest location of all the occupied Ingush houses to the Ossetian part of the village, and this is, where the opponents to returning the Ingush do not want to admit them.

On August 25, an inspection of the destroyed house, belonging to A.Darsigov, was wrecked — stones were thrown at people. On the same day, the crowd blocked a bus Chermen-Nazran on the road. One could hear threats, addressed to the passengers and also windows in the bus were broken.

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After the case with Timurzievs, the Ossetian part of the reconciliation commission crossed out 5 more families out of the list, which was already approven. Out of the list of 17 families, submitted on September 2, the same commission allowed only 4 families to return into the village.

At night from August 25 to 26, the house of Ingush Y.M.Gazdiev was subjected to fire from a grenade launcher.

However, if the process of returning displaced persons has moved from a standstill, then in Dongaron, Dachnoye and Kurtat this process is blocked completely.

In such a way, on August 16, the Provisional Administration sent a letter to the First Deputy Chairman of the NOR Government G.S.Kozayev (the HRC «Memorial» has a copy at its disposal), where a list of 23 Ingush families was atttached. The letter said, that these people had a propiska registration in Dongaron village, no one from them was brought to trial, and that is why, in correspondence with «The Procedure for Returning and Resettlement of Refugees and Displaced Persons...» the Provisional Administration asked the reconciliation commission of Dongaron to consider the submitted lists, and in case of necessity, to conduct a reconciliation procedure. Even in September the Provisional Administration was still waiting for an answer to this letter.

After no answer was received within a week’s time, the Provisional Administration Chief decided to take an action. A new letter was sent to the NOR authorities with a notification, that if they do not give any answer, then the Provisional Administration starts to act by itself, in correspondence with the schedule of returning displaced persons.

On August 25, the houseowners were taken to Dongaron — this time, only for inspection of their destroyed houses, in order that documents for their reconstruction can be compiled. But both on this day, and next day, the bus with people was stopped by the crowd at the approaches to Dongaron.

On August 29, the bus with representatives of 11 Ingush families went to Dongaron, this time guarded by armoured carriers. But even in spite of the fact, that OMON servicemen with shields and truncheons took part in the operation, the procedure of inspection was actually wrecked up. A large crowd, armed with stones and sticks, again blocked the highway on the approach to the village. The NOR MI servicemen, dressed in uniform and in civilian clothes, were present here, Deputy Minister Sikoyev including. The crowd was in fact guided by militsiamen, who used portable radios for this purpose. Thus, when an auto column tried to get to Dongaron from the other side, the crowd could also block that direction, in a quick and organized way. It were one and the same people, who were constantly inflaming passions. Moreover, there were 17 militsiamen nearby with sub-machine-guns, ready to open fire and 2 snipers.2

The given case has become an object of a trial at the Provisional Administration session, investigation was conducted, and as usually the case, nobody was called to account for what has happened.

As usual, the Ossetian leadership shares two processes: reconstruction of houses, communications, units of social and cultural everyday life and retutning displaced people. It demands money from the Provisional Administration (from those, which were purposedly allocated for returning displaced persons) for doing reconstruction and construction works in Dongaron, Dachnoye and Kurtat, and it does not give any guarantees and it does not name any dates for returning Ingush displaced persons there. And this is right, a boiler-room in the

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Ossetian school at Dongaron needs an urgent repair. During the events of 1992, 24 Ossetian houses were destroyed and 2 half-destroyed in these villages (see table). Anyhow, the stand of the Provisional Administration is the following: to provide the money for reconstruction work only, when Ingush units are reconstructed in parallel (which is fair, in the opinion of the HRC «Memorial»). This is what is happening at Chermen.

As a result, complaints about the Provisional Administration are sent from Vladikavkaz to Moscow federal bodies of power, that «in violation of Beslan Agreement, it adopted the decision to reconstruct social sphere and communal purpose units only at Chermen village, prohibiting construction works and not opening the financing for the villages of Dongaron, Dachnoye and Kurtat.»3

It got clear by mid September, that the schedule of returning displaced persons would not be fulfilled and the majority of displaced persons, including civilians of four villages, would spend even the third winter in exile.

On September 13, the President of Ingushetia Republic, Ruslan Aushev made a statement. In this statement he accused the Provisional Administration of the present-day situation, because it does exercise its activity and does not influence the situation in correspondence with the RF Law «On the Status of Emergency». He put the responsibility for the tragic consequences upon the authorities of Russia.

On September 15, a letter was sent to the Provisional Administration Chief. It was signed by by the Chairman of the IR State Committee on the Affairs of Refugees M.Uzhakov. It informed, that « For execution of the Decree of the Russian President... according to the request of the deported population, returning of refugees and displaced persons into the populated areas of Chermen, Dongaron, Dachnoye and Kurtat will take place from September 23 through 26, according to the attached lists of civilians, whose propiska registration was officially confirmed, and whose participation in the conflict of October-November 1992 was not registered». Further on, the letter put forward a request to provide places for temporary residence to the people, who have no vagonchiki, as well as to provide safety and unhindered passage of columns.

Formally, the decision about a mass march of displaced persons to places of their permanent residence was adopted by displaced persons themselves, but in fact, it was Ingushetia leadership, who was behind it.

North Ossetia leadership showed an extremely negative reaction to the news about planned peaceful march of the Ingush. On order of the authorities, for a long distance at Chermen area, artificial obstacles, consisting of ditches over 2 m deep and an embankment were built. Meetings of protest started at Vladikavkaz, where demands were spoken out, that returning of the Ingush into places of their residence in North Ossetia were inadmissable.

In case, if such a march in the region was really conducted, there was a great degree of assurence, that a new mass bloodshed could have taken place. Any provocative shooting at the column could have lead to such an outcome.

During the night on September 20 to 21, a secret NOR MI post, at alpine part of North Ossetia, on the border with Ingushetia, was subjected to fire. As a result of this, one MI serviceman got killed and another one was wounded. This crime contributed to further escalation of tension.

The Provisional Administration concentrated considerable forces at Chermen Region. The Provisional Administration Chief told IR President, that he invited into the zone of SE mediators

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from Dagestan and Stavropol area to eliminate the opposition to the process of returning of displaced persons and suggested to consider this question with the RF President. In his letter to the IR President he voiced an opinion, that the IR leadership should take urgent measures to prevent the mass march.

Between September 15 and 23, the RF Minister on Nationalities and Regional Policy, N.Egorov, the Chairman of Commission on Human Rights under Russian President, S.Kovalyev, and other officials met the IR leadership.

On September 21, the Provisional Administration Chief adressed citizens of NOR and IR on the TV. He cited the telegram of the Chairman of the RF Government, V.Tchernomyrdin to the leaders of both Republics and to the Provisional Administration, where the march of displaced persons was called «a detonator of violence across the North Caucasus». V.Lozovoy, in his turn, warned, that he would not allow the procession. Meanwhile he demanded, that North Ossetia authorities strictly fulfilled the schedule of returning displaced persons, and that Ingushetia authorities «stopped unilaterally giving legal and political evaluation to the events of 19924 and express territorial and other claims»; and that both republics established permanent contacts on the level of permanent representations.

Probably, IR President was given guarantees about returning displaced persons into their homes by the representatives of the Russian Federal authorities.

As a result the march of September, 23-26 did not take place.

13. DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1994, «ON INTRODUCTION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN PART OF TERRITORIES OF NORTH OSSETIA

REPUBLIC AND INGUSHETIA REPUBLIC

The regime of the SE, introduced by the Decree of the Russian President of July 25, 1994, in the zone of Ingush-Ossetian conflict, has expired on September 30.

Only on October 3, the President signed the next Decree, introducing the SE regime for the following three months. In such a way, fron legal point of view, the regime of SE has been cancelled in the region under conflict for two days.

Such a strange delay, concerning extension of the regime of SE, fraught with grave consequences, was probably caused by struggle in the higher echelons of power about the new text of the Decree.

According to the information, which is at the disposal of theHRC «Memorial», the draft of the new Decree, presented to the President for signing, had a number of novelties, only part of which was included into the text of the signed Decree.

The most important was, that the Provisional Administration was relocated from Vladikavkaz to Chermen, — although this measure, in the opinion of the HRC «Memorial», created certain difficulties for the Provisional Administration employees (some of them had to travel to work from Vladikavkaz to Chermen), but it allowed to solve the question on returning displaced persons into 4 villages in the shortest possible time.

At the same time the paragraph, concerning relocation of the Provisional Administration, was taken out of the text, which has already been signed.

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2 new regulations, which are absent in the previous similar Decrees, appeared in the Decree, signed by the RF President on October 3:

— on subordination to the Chief of the Provisional Administration of bodies of executive power of both Republics and bodies of local self-government on the questions of returning displaced persons and the regime of the SE;

— that the decision of all the bodies of state power and local self-government on the same questions have no legal force, if they are not coordinated with the Provisional Administration Chief.

However, essentially, it did not give any additional authority to the Provisional Administration, as it just confirmed the rights, empowered to it before (see chapter 11).

Moreover, while confirming this authority, the authors of this Decree for some reason did not confirm the right, already empowered to the Provisional Administration, which is to remove executive power leaders and officials (see chapter 11), and thus put the Provisional Administration into an ambiguous situation.

It is interesting, that the previous similar Decree of July 25, contained a paragraph, which ordered that the RF Government paid attention to the execution of decisions on disarmament of illegal armed formations. The new Decree does not contain such a paragraph. It follows, that the Russian President thinks, that such formations in the zone of the conflict are already disarmed.

On the whole, one can state, that the given Decree does not only maintain the present-day unsatisfactory situation, but also lays foundation for new negative processes in the region.

14. ROLE OF INTELLIGENTSIA AND MASS MEDIA IN INSTIGATING INTER-ETHNIC ANIMOSITY

In most aspects the development and course of this conflict are similar to the development and course of international conflicts in other «hot spots». For all this, national intelligentsia is often playing the part of nationalistic passions’ instigator.

There are exceptions, of course. One can name, as an example, the group of Vladikavkaz intelligentsia, united into «Grazhdanskaya pazitzia» («Civil Stand») organization.

On the whole, in the recent years, it is characteritic for the Caucasian Region, that history, archeology and ethnography are used by politicians, state or pseudo-state formations as grounds for their claims for this or that territory.

Articles, dedicated to the questions of ancient history and history of middle ages, are published in the mass media of North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Their task is to show, that it were «our» ancestors, that have conquered (settled in) the definite territory, and what is more, that they existed here «from time immemorial». The discussion about the history of the Alan is characteristic in this context. An interesting scientific question about cultural and ethnical heritage of these people, about temporal and territorial boarders of Alan state (ancient times and middle ages) has acquired a purely political character. Proceeding from whether the Alans are direct ancestors of this or that people, attempts are being made to prove the «native» status of their people.

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Such an approach is especially widely spread in North Ossetia, where corresponding brochures are being published.

The situation, which developed, is fraught with extremely negative consequences for the future of the humanitarian sciencies in both Republics.

Actually, a point of view, proceeding from different historical prerequisites, is cultivated in the region about an exclusive right of this or that ethnic community, to create state formations on definite territories. From the point of view of the HRC «Memorial», such an approach directly contradicts the basic principles of democrasy and concept of human rights.

Books, albums, brochures, dedicated to Ossetian-Ingush conflict are being written and published in both Republics. The majority of these works are intended, first of all, «for internal use» in the republic. Practically, in these editions there is complete absence of information from the other side. The tone and style of presentation of the material, the unwillingness of the authors to mention crimes, committed by «their» fighting units, make share propaganda out of them. Such editions, which in fact perform nothing like an informational or analytical function, but are a propaganda, and which fully justify the actions of «their» side and are quite an efficient means of further instigation of the conflict in the region.

Often such books and brochures reproduce and by doing this, consolidate in the public conscience «legends» (exaggerated, strongly distorted information about enemy’s atrocities, about his actions and motives for actions), which always arise in the «hot spots». Such «legends» usually present the enemy in an extremely horrifying and demonic image. Along with that, there are enough real facts of violence and autrocities in the region as it is, and if such distorted «documentally» registered information will be widely instilled into the minds of civilians, then it practically excludes any possibility of reconciliation with the enemy in future. And it is extremely dangerous, that such editions identify and consolidate the image of the enemy with whole ethnic communities.

At the same time, it should be pointed out, that mass media on both sides, that have been printing materials in 1992-93, which are absolutely unacceptable in a civilized society and which are a direct insult to the national dignity of other peoples.

From the point of view of the HRC «Memorial», under the situation, which developed at present, the materials, which objectively depict positions and actions of both sides, including crimes, committed by fighting units of both Ingush, and Ossetian nationality, could play a positive role in the region and can be used for fighting with circulating rumours and myths. Any attempts of censorship in this respect would be extremely unreasonable.

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