kada, naoko - the role of investigative committees in the presidential impeachment

8/13/2019 Kada, Naoko - The Role of Investigative Committees in the Presidential Impeachment

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The Role of Investigative Committees in the Presidential Impeachment Processes in Brazil andColombiaAuthor(s): Naoko KadaReviewed work(s):

Source: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 29-54Published by: Comparative Legislative Research CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598580.

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NAOKO KADASan Diego State University

h e R o l e o Investigative ommitteesn t h Presidential mpeachmentProcesses n r a z i l a n d o l o m b i a

One of the most importantpolitical debates today regards how to designinstitutions o ensuretheaccountabilityof publicofficials. The impeachmentprocessis one mechanismof accountabilitycheck available to legislatures.It is, however,susceptibleto misuse. What determineshow the impeachmentprocess functions?Inthispaper,I arguethat controlof informationby congressional nvestigationcommit-tees is a crucial factorin deciding the outcome of the impeachmentprocess. I showhow the differencein informationcontrolby the investigativecommitteesin BrazilandColombiacontributedo the removalof apresident nonecountryandapresident'sacquittal n the other.

IntroductionOne of the mostimportantebateson institutionalngineeringtodayconcerns ow todesign nstitutionso ensureheaccountabilityofpublicofficials.Althoughlections regenerallyiewedastheprin-cipalmechanismwith whichto hold electedofficialsaccountable,1

electionshappenonly everyso manyyearsand,in somecountries,reelections prohibited.nthe absenceof electoralaccountability,legislatorrpresidentmaybetemptedo maximize ersonalainwhileinoffice,withnoregardorreelection rknowingt tobeprohibitedylaw.Furthermore,otersmaynotnecessarily unisha corruptfficialif theirbenefitsrom hecorruptctsoutweighhecosts.Forexample,suppose legislatorucceedsnpassing billto buildabridgenhisorherdistrict.Even f that egislator eceiveskickbacksromconstruc-tioncompaniesnd hus hepublicmustpaymore hanwhat hebridgereallycosts,andevenif the kickback ecomespublicknowledge,hevotersmayreelect heir egislator ecausehe or she didgetthebridgebuiltn theirdistrict.When lectoralccountabilitys noteffective, emovalromofficeis theonly egitimatemethod fpunishing residentsrlegislatorsorLEGISLATIVESTUDIES QUARTERLY,XXVIII, 1,February2003 29


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Naoko Kadaabuse of powerwhile in office since, in most countries,officialsenjoyimmunity romprosecutionduring heir erms.Onlyafteraccusedoffi-cialsareremoved romoffice are hey subject o criminalustice.Withoutthe provisionandthreatof removal,officials protectedby immunityfrom prosecutionmay abuse power freely. With the possibility ofremoval,officialsare ess likelyto be so abusive,and f theyarecorruptnonetheless, heywill bepunished,provided hat heremovalprocess scarriedoutas it shouldbe, without nterferenceof personalorpoliticalinterests.

Unfortunately,the removal process is not always carriedoutappropriately.tis inevitablypoliticalas longaspoliticiansare nvolvedin the process, as the founders of the United Statesrecognizedover200 years ago (Hamilton[1788] 1961,No. 65). Too oftentheprocessstops far short of punishingthe abuse of power. In othercases, theprocessis usedby rivalingpoliticalforcesin anattempt o inflict dam-ageon one another.What, hen,is the bestwayto minimizethepoliticalinfluence on the removal process? What explains the difference inhow removalprocessesculminate n differentcountries?Inthispaper,I argue hatcongressional nvestigativecommitteesare a key element in the removalprocess. In the particular ases ofpresidentialmpeachmentanalyzedhere,an importantdeterminant fthe fate of the president s whether or not the president'sallies in thecommittee were able to monopolize the flow of information o andfrom the committee. The existenceof suchan informationmonopoly,inturn,dependsonhowthe committee s structured,meaning he com-positionof the committee and the allocationof investigativeauthoritywithin the committee.Drawing upon existingworkson congressionalcommittees CoxandMcCubbins1993;Krehbiel1991;Str0m1990),Idemonstratehow the party system affects committee structureandhow investigative committees handle informationdifferentlyunderdifferent committee structures.

Impeachment as a Legislative Process:The Research DesignThe legislature is often the majorplayer in the impeachmentprocess.Yet little work has been done on impeachmentas a politicalprocess takingplace in the legislature.One importantcomponentofthe impeachmentprocess is the investigativecommittee.Using casestudiesof Brazil andColombia,Iwill show thatthedifference ninfor-mationcontrolby investigativecommittees,which reflects the natureof the party system, leads to very different results: in Brazil, the

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcessescommittee's investigation fueled public outrage, which led to theimpeachmentof the president; n Colombia,the committee foundthepresidentnotguiltyandpermanentlyhelvedthecase,preventingutureinvestigationby theprosecutor'soffice.Case Selection

I selected these two cases for two reasons.First,the impeach-mentprocedures n the two countriesare,on paper,very similar(seeChart 1). The two countries share the legislature-dominanteature:i.e., there is no direct nvolvementof thejudiciary n theimpeachmentprocess.2In neither of the two countriesdoes impeachmentrequireany validationby thejudicial branch; he lower chamber mpeaches,and the Senate tries (and, by the super-majority ote, confirms)theimpeachment. nbothBrazilandColombia, helegislature, hroughaninvestigative ommittee, onductsnvestigations f legislatorsandpresi-dents.In bothcountries, hepresident s suspendedafter mpeachmentand is succeededby the vice president.Tobe sure,the impeachmentproceduresare not identical.Morevotes are needed in Brazil thanin Colombia,especially in the lowerhouse's decision to impeach.In both ColombiaandBrazil,however,the accusedpresidentreturns o office if not convictedby the Senate.The differencenthevotingruleforthe Senate'sdecision s quitesmall-two-thirdsof senators n Brazilversustwo-thirdsof senatorspresentinColombia.On decisionssuchas theremovalof thepresident, ew (ifany)senatorswould choose to be absent.Takinghese facts ntoaccount,we seethat he differencenthevotingrequirementsf thetwocountries,althoughvery important,does not impedethecomparisonof the two.The second reason I compare these two countries is that aninvestigation nvolvingthepresidentoccurred n bothcountries n the1990s. InBrazil,the investigativecommitteeoriginally nvestigatedafriendof thepresident orallegedextortion rombusinesseswishingtowin governmentcontracts.The committee's final report,however,suggested hat hepresidentwas also involved. Thepresidentwas even-tuallyremoved from office. InColombia,the investigativecommitteewas chargedwithdeterminingwhetherornotthepresidentknowinglyacceptedcontributions rom a drugcartel.Despitemountingevidence,the committeedismissedtheaccusationandrecommended hecase bepermanentlyhelved,thusimpedinganyfurthernvestigation.Whydidthe investigationslead to such different outcomes? Answering thisquestion will provide some insights into how best to design theimpeachmentprocess.

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Naoko KadaCHART 1

Impeachment Procedure in Brazil and Colombia(italicshows thevoting quotaneededfor theprocess to move orward)BrazilRequest to form a parliamentaryinvestigative committee (CPI)1/3 members of Congressa

Approval of the CPI report bythe members of the CPI1/2 members of CPI

Request for impeachmentpresented to the HouseHouse Speaker

Special Committee onImpeachment (House)recommends impeachment1/2 members of the committee

House approves the report bythe committee on impeachment2/3 members of the House

The accused is temporarilysuspended from officeb

Impeachment trialin the Senate2/3 members of the Senate

The accused is convicted andremoved from office. His orher political rights are suspendedfor 8 years.

ColombiaRequest for investigation sent to theChamber's Committee on Investigationand Accusation (CoIA) any individual

Approval of the ColA report bythe members of the CoIA1/2 members of CoIA

Request for impeachmentpresented to the HouseHouse Speaker

IvHouse approves the reportby the CoIA1/2 present members of the House

The accused is temporarilysuspended from officeb

Impeachment trialin the Senate2/3 present members of the Senate

The accused is convicted. He or she maybe removed from office, or temporarilyconfined, or his or her politicalrights may be absolutely taken away.aA CPI can be requested (and formed) in the House of Representatives or in the Senateseparately, although it is commonly requested (and installed) jointly. In the case of ajoint CPI, supporting votes of one-third of the members of both chambers is necessaryo install it.To be precise, the accused is not removed until the accusation s formallyacknowledgedbythe Senate. Since the communication rom the House to the Senate takes such a shorttime,however, the difference between the vote of impeachmentand the formal acknowledgmentis minimal, unless the Senate Speaker fails to acknowledge the House's communication.Given the highly publicized natureof impeachmentvote, however, this is highly unlikely.

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcessesThe CommonAnswer and an Alternative Explanation

When we askwhy some presidentsareimpeachedand removedbut others are not, a common answeris that a minority presidentismorelikely to be impeachedand removedthan a presidentwitha firmbacking in the legislature(see, for example, Perez-Linan2000 andWeyland1993). This explanationseems self-evident: ceterisparibus,thelarger hepresident'sallies' shareof votes, the less likelythepresi-dent is to be impeachedand removed.For example, if impeachmentrequires wo-thirdsof the votes in the lowerhouse,then a president sfarless likely to be impeached f he commands he supportof one-halfof the members han if he commandsonly one-third.Thisexplanation, owever,promptshequestion,Whatdeterminescongressionalsupport or apresident?Whengraveaccusationsagainstthe presidentare presentedand informationsupportingsuch accusa-tions is revealed,congressionalsupport s likely to waver. Even if thepresidenthadthelegislative majority's upportprior otheaccusations,this majoritymightmelt in the face of incriminating vidence, espe-cially in countrieswith weakly disciplinedparties,such as Colombiaand Brazil. Some supportersof the presidentmay deserthim out ofpersonalmoral ndignation, ndotherswill do so if constituentpressuregrows strong.Inotherwords,a legislative majoritycanshift from onein favor of the president to one in favor of impeachment as theimpeachmentprocessunfolds.Legislative upports conditional n whatkindandvolumeof infor-mation s revealedhroughnvestigation.3itizens nd egislatorslikemaketheirudgments f thepresident asedonthis informationndactaccord-ingly.Becausecongressionalnvestigative ommitteesnvestigate nd, fthey choose to, disseminate nformation, focus on these committees.

An Informational Theory of Investigative CommitteesHow aninvestigativecommitteehandlesthe flow of informationinto and out of the committeedepends on how it is structured.By

structure, meanthecompositionwhenandhowcommitteemembersare selected) and the allocation of investigative authority(how theinvestigativeagenda s controlled bythecommitteechair,bytheprin-cipal investigator,or both). The committee structuredeterminestheavailabilityof credible nformationo thepublicandto legislators,andthat availabilityin turnaffects legislators' decisions on whethertoimpeachthe presidentor not (see Chart2). Of course, factors otherthan nformation, uch aspublic opinion,presidentialpower,andparty

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Naoko KadaCHART2

InformationalModelof ImpeachmentElectorallectoral ---- Party SystemSystemProceduralRules Rue

Investigative > availabilityof legislators'decisionCommittee information on impeachmentpresidential PublicOpinion presidentialpowers powers

discipline,will alsoinfluence egislators'decisions. These latter actorshave been extensively studied, but how information for legislativedecisionmakingis producedandtransmitted as not.Strom(1990) studies committees n multiparty ystemsand ana-lyzes how differentstructuraleaturesof committees create differentstructural pportunities or oppositional nfluence (72). Stromusesthe conceptof structural pportunity or oppositional nfluence as anexplanatoryvariablefor occurrenceof minority government.I applythisconcept o investigative ommittees: he informationalerformanceof the investigativecommittee is determinedby whether or not thecommittee structure llows committee membersfromoppositionpar-ties to participate ctivelyandeffectively in investigation.Krehbiel(1991) and others who have studied the informationalroleof committeeshave raised another mportantpoint,one regardingthestrategicuseofprivate nformation y individualegislators.A com-mittee membermight skillfullyuseprivate nformation o convince hisor herparty hathis orherpreferred ourse of action serves theparty'sinterest.In the contextof an investigativecommittee,strategicuse ofprivate nformation ouldconvinceenough egislators opunishthe ac-cusedpolitician;conversely,hidinginformation romlegislators-the

strategic non)useof private nformation-can helptheaccusedpoliti-cian stay in office. Whether ndividualcommittee memberswill haveanyopportunityor suchstrategicuse or nonusedepends,once again,on the committee structuren place.What, hen,determines ommittee tructure?Committee tructureis shaped by the procedural ules andpartysystem. In a studyof theU.S. House,Cox andMcCubbins 1993) argue hatprocedural ulesinthe House are set accordingto the majorityparty'sinterestsand that

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcessespartyleaders,as agentsof the partymembers,handlethe nominationto committeesto furtherpartygoals.Moregenerally, heirargumentsthatthepartysystemaffectshow rulesare set in the legislature.Intheparticularase of the U.S. House,thistheorymeansthat hemajoritarianpartysystem leads to a committee structuredesigned to further hemajority arty'sgoalsand nterests.n amultiparty etting,wherepower-sharingarrangementsrecommon,one can expectmuchless predomi-nanceby one party.Thus,unlikein a majoritarian arty system,someimportant ostsincommitteesmay go to oppositionparties, ndcommit-teesmaynotalways unctiono furtherhegoverning oalition'snterests.The hypothesis to be tested here is that the difference in thecommittee structure,which reflects difference in the party systemsandproceduralules n BrazilandColombia,produced ommitteeswithdifferentways and extents to which they could control information.The structural ifferencebetweentheinvestigative ommittees n Braziland those in Colombiais depictedin Table 1. The table also containspredictionsabout nformation ontroland how the difference n infor-mation controlis likely to affectthe impeachmentprocess.I give specialattention o the chair and theprincipal nvestigatorbecausethey arethe key membersof any investigativecommittee.InBrazil,the investigativecommitteecan heartestimonyonly if both thechairandtheprincipal nvestigatorarepresent.The committeechair nBrazil andthe principal investigator n Colombia set the agendaforinvestigation,andthey decide whomto summonfortestimony.Whilethe committeechairexercises control over the choice of testimonies,the principal nvestigator s free to ask any and all questionsand willwrite a reportbasedon his or herinterpretationf the testimoniesandevidence.The othermemberscanonly vote for or againstthereport.Inow explainthe tablein moredetail.The Installation Rules

These rules affect how strategicallycommitteememberscan bechosenandin which chamberor chambers he committeeoperates.InBrazil,thecongressional nvestigationcommittee s calledaComissaoParlamentar e Inquerito CPI). CPIs arenot permanentcommittees:theyareformedwhenevermorethan one-thirdof legislatorsof one ofthe two (orboth)chambersdemand t. CPIs can be formed ndividuallyin each chamberor formedjointly, with representativesfrom bothchambers. Since a CPI is formedupon accusationagainstthe presi-dent, both the president'ssupportersand opponentsstrive to selectmembersbelieved to servethe party's nterestsmost faithfully.

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Naoko KadaTABLE 1

Differencesin CommitteeStructureandInformationControl,Braziland ColombiaCommittee Structure Brazil ColombiaInstallation Rules

Selection RulesCommittee members

ad hoc committee in the Senate, permanent committeethe House, or both (joint) (four years) in the House

PR (under multiparty system, PR (under quasi-two-partyno one party controls majority) system, one-party majority)

Committee chair

Principal investigator

Participation Rules

INFORMATION CONTROL

PREDICTED IMPACTON IMPEACHMENTPROCESS

selection by party leaders ofthe (second) largest party,with prior negotiation withother parties in Congress

selected by party leaders ofthe (second) largest party,with prior negotiation withother parties in Congress

all committee membersparticipate, often usingsubcommittees

decentralized; no single partycontrols information flow toor from committee

when lacking coordination,information is likelyto be scarce or unreliable,especially with president'sattempt to buy support

selection by committeemembers (given themajoritarianism,the chairwill come from themajority party)selected by the committeechair (or the chair decidesthe method of selection)

investigation by theprincipal investigator, onlysometimes with assistancefrom subinvestigators

centralized in the hands ofinvestigator, who is likely tobe from the majority party

when the accused is frommajority party, highlyunlikely to provideinformation leading toimpeachment, especiallywith the president'sattempt to buy support

when coordinated,highlikelihood of providingcredible and rich informationthat may lead to proof ofcriminal activities

may be effective in leadingto impeachment if theaccused is from opposition

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcessesThe Colombian nvestigativecommittee s called the Committee

of Investigationand Accusation(CoIA)and is apermanent ommittee.Since its membersare selectedprior o the scandal nvolvingthepresi-dent,the member selectioncannot be as strategicas in Brazil'sCPIs.Perhaps more important, any attempt to change the committee'scompositionafter the scandaleruptsis likely to face stiff oppositionfrom either the president's supportersor his opponentsand thus isunlikelyto succeed.The Selection Rule

Committeemembersareselectedusingproportional epresenta-tioninboth countries.Theproportional epresentationn a fragmentedparty system such as Brazil's produces a very differentcommitteefrom that of a quasi-two-partysystemsuch as Colombia's.InBrazil,no onepartycontrols hemajority;nColombia,aone-partymajoritysthe norm. Thewrittenrulefor the selectionof the committeechairandthe principal investigator s the same in both countries:the chair isselectedby the committee membersandthe investigator s namedbythe committeechair. npractice nBrazil,however,theparty eadersofthe two largestpartiesnamethe chair and the investigator.Rules on Investigative Authority

These rules define who participatesn investigationsand deter-mines theconcentrationor decentralization) f investigativeauthoritywithin thecommittee.InBrazil,all membersof the committeepartici-pate ninvestigations, ftencreating ubcommittees eadedbymembersfrom smallerparties.InColombia,on the otherhand,theinvestigativeauthoritys exclusivelygivento theprincipal nvestigator.Theregularmembers'participations requiredonly when voting to approvethereportprepared y theprincipal nvestigator.Theprincipalnvestigatorcan have regularmembersserve as subinvestigators,but, as with thenominationof theprincipal nvestigator, hecommitteechairholdsthenominatingpower.Thepower-sharing rrangementbserved nBrazil,whichallowsthe two largestpartiesto hold the two most importantposts, is a com-mon featureof whatLijphart 1999) calls consensualdemocracies.Brazil s notincludednLijphart's tudybutexhibitsahighlyconsensualdemocracywhen measuredby Lijphart'scriteria.4Power sharingisalsoobserved nthedecentralization f investigativeactivities nBrazil,whereregularmembersareassigned operform mportantnvestigative

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Naoko Kadatasks.Colombia, n theotherhand, scategorized saweaklymajoritariandemocracynLijphart'study.Themajoritarianendencies remore trikingwhenonelooksexclusivelyattheperiodafter heNationalFrontendedand the informalpower-sharingules lost their effects. In light of themajoritarianendenciesof Colombia, he dominanceof oneparty ntheinvestigativecommittee s a logical consequence.Predictions about Information Control

The specificationof the committee structure eads to the nextitem in Table1, thepredictionregarding he committee'sinformationcontrol.InBrazil,a fragmentedpartysystemandformaland informalrules of power sharingwill lead to a more decentralizedcommitteestructure, nd information low to and fromthecommittee s thereforeunlikelyto be controlledby a singleparty.In Colombia,with its two-party system andmajoritarianules,the committeechair,who comesfromthemajorityparty,will beabletomonopolize he informationlowintoand out of the investigativecommittee.

These differences n information ontrolallowpredictionsabouthow information ontrolwill affect theimpeachment rocess.InBrazil,if a large enoughmajorityof partiescoordinates n the committeetoproduceinformation, hen the committee is highly likely to produceinformationhat is bothcredibleand substantial. f, on the otherhand,there is lack of coordination, hen information s likely to be scarceorunreliable. nColombia,thepresidentwill be shieldedfromdamagingpublicityif he or she comes from the majorityparty.If, on the otherhand,thepresidentcomes fromtheminorityparty, henthe committeemaynottryto shieldthepresident rom mpeachment nd nsteadmighteven move to impeach.Thefollowingaccountof two cases of impeachmentwill demon-strate heexplanatory owerof the informationalheoryandthevalidityof itspredictions.Case 1: Brazil

CommitteeStructureand Its Role in ImpeachmentBrazil'sfragmentedpartysystem, especiallywiththepresidentialelectionbeingnonconcurrentwith congressionalelectionsuntil 1990,made thighly likelythatapresidentwould faceatough,orevenhostile,investigative committee. It has been shown both theoretically andempirically hatelectoralsystemslikeBrazil's,which combinepropor-tionalrepresentation ndlargedistrictmagnitudes, end to increase he

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcessesnumberof parties represented n the legislature(see Duverger1954,Lijphart 999,andTaageperandShugart1989;foranalysisof Brazil nparticular,ee Nicolau1996).Additionally, hugartndCarey1992)dem-onstratedhatelectoral ystems hatmandate residentiallectionsbeheldin a differentyear fromcongressionalones tendto producea highernumber fpartieshan hosewithconcurrentlections. nfact,since1990,the effectivenumber f partiesn Congresshas neverbeen less than ive.Brazilianparties,exceptfor the leftistparties,aregenerallycon-sidered o lackcohesionanddiscipline.Mostparties' ackof disciplinarymeasuresagainst ndividualmembersmakesit possiblefor individualcommitteemembers o defytheparty ine withoutbeing punished.Partyleadersmusttakethispossibility nto accountwhenmaking heirnomi-nation decisions. It is also possible, however,for an influentialpartyleaderto use his or her nominationauthorityo furtherpersonalgoals.Although a party leaderwould not keep his or her position if suchabuse of power persisted, an occasional personaluse of committeenominationpowermightbe toleratedbytheparty, specially f thecom-mittee were regardedas unimportant.TheBrazilian nvestigativecommittees, heCPIs,wereregardedas ineffectivewhen the CPIthatI discuss herewas formed.Inaddition,CPIs are not formallya partof the impeachmentprocess.Neverthe-less, CPIs can be an importantfactor in the impeachmentprocessagainst the president.The Brazilianconstitutionprovides a way toimpeachapresident or the crimeof responsibility, part rom mpeach-ment for common crimes.A presidentis impeachedfor a crime ofresponsibilityin, roughly speaking,three steps. First, a request forimpeachment s presentedto the House. Any citizen can make thisrequest,but the CPI'sreportcondemningthe presidentandapprovedby the CPI as a whole would serve as the basis for the request.TheHouse Speaker decides, unilaterally,whether or not to accept therequest.Hereagain,the CPI'sapprovedreport s key, for it would bedifficult for the Speakerto dismiss a requestfounded on the highlyvisible andwidely supportedworkof acongressionalcommittee.Oncethe Speakerdecides to accept the request,the impeachmentprocessbegins, as detailed in Chart1.Investigative Committee n Action: CPI of PC Farias

The CPI we examinehere was instituted n May 1992 to verifytheaccusation,madeby thebrotherof then-presidentFernandoCollorde Melo, thatthe president'sfriend PC Farias(or PC) was operatingan extortionscheme with the president'sknowledge.The opposition

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40 Naoko Kadaparties, edby the Workers'Party PT),collectedenoughsignatures oguarantee hepassageof therequestfor the installationof ajoint CPI.Accordingto Vejamagazine,5unwillingto face a CPIproposedexclu-sively by theopposition,the governingcoalition concededto installaCPI,on thecondition hat tdid notinvestigate hepresident.This con-ditionfailedto shieldthepresidentrom nvestigation,however,as I willexplain.The CPI of PC was differentfrompast CPIs in some importantrespects.First,thecommitteechairusuallywent to the largestparty nthe legislature,butin thisCPIit went to the secondlargest, he LiberalFrontParty (PFL), which supported he government.Insteadof thechair,the BrazilianDemocraticMovementParty(PMDB, which wasin oppositionand the largestpartyin Congress)received the post ofprincipal nvestigator.Giving the chair to the PFL was consideredamajorconcession by the opposition,for, as discussedpreviously,thechair'spower in a CPI is quiteextensive. Since the president'spartywas very small (a mere 8% of seats in the House and 4% in the Senate),it was not given the crucialpost of committeechair.Second, the PT was given a disproportionatelyarge share ofseats for its size in Congress.It had only one senator(1.2%)and 35deputies(7%)at the time. Yet the partyobtaineda seat in the CPI aswell as one seat for asuplente,a substitutemember.6The CPImembersfrom the PT turned out to be those most often highlightedin news-papers, for their investigative efforts led, if not forced, the CPI toinvestigatethe activitiesof PC Farias n greatdetail.Third, heoppositionhada majorityn theCPIof PC.A leaderofa pro-governmentpartyinadvertently hiftedthe compositionof theCPIin favor of the opposition.In a move thatsurprised veryone,thissenatorgave the party'sseat to an oppositionsenator.The governingcoalitionprotestedand triedto nullifythenomination,butthe Speakerof the House,who was from the PMDB, upheldthe nomination.Despiteall thepoliticssurroundingheCPI,themajorityof politi-cians andmajornewspapersat the time didnot considerthe CPI sig-nificant; mpeachmentwas thoughta remotepossibilityat best.Majornewspapers, except the Folha de Sao Paulo, argued that the CPImight bringa crisis rather han a solution to the country.At the sametime, however, two major magazines, Vejaand IstoE, competed todisclose new revelationsabout the scandalfromtheirown investiga-tions,oftenproviding nformationo the CPIthat he committeehadnotyet obtained.7By the end of July, the CPI had gatheredsufficientevidence thatthepresident'ssecretarywas receivingchecksissuedbyallegedly ghost companiesassociatedwith PC.


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PresidentialImpeachmentProcessesBy August, public opinion had begun to shift in support of

impeachmentof the president,butthe presidentseemed not to noticethe change. This failureis understandableo some extent-in a pollconductedin early July by IBOPE,a well-respected polling agency,67%of thosepolledsaidtheywereagainst mpeachment. utonAugust13,Collorgaveaspeechcalling or hepopulaceo wearyellowandgreen,the national olors, nhissupport.On thefollowingSunday, ugecrowdswearingblack marchedn many largecities.Withsucha clearmessagefrom hepublicagainstCollor,tbecamedifficulto dismiss hepossibility fimpeachment.n addition, hreedaysbeforethe CPI'sfinalreportwasdue,a shocking indingwas madepublic-the president'secretary ndPCFariaswithdrewargesumsof money ustbefore hefreezingof bankaccountsin 1990 and thus were unaffectedby the freeze.8The freezewas widely publicizedas one of the key measuresin the president'seconomicplanto control nflation,and the nation'slargest-circulatingnewspaper,O Globo, hadjust reportedon August 12 thatthe frozensavings mayhave lostupto 50%of theirvalue.It was notclearwhetherthepresidenthadknown about(or ordered)his secretary'swithdrawal,butthenews angeredmanyBrazilians, ncluding egislators.9TheCPI'sfinalreportwas readto themembersof the committeeon August 24. It describedin detail what came to be called the PCscheme, a well-organizedmethodfor extortion,and indicated Presi-dentCollor's involvement.Oppositionpartiesstarted o forman alli-anceto acquireenoughvotes in theHouse to initiatethe impeachmentprocess,anddissidencewithinpro-governmentartiesgrew.Thereportwas approvedby theCPIon August26 in a landslide(16 to 5) victoryfor the opposition.The huge vote marginwas suggestive of the out-come of the impeachmentprocess, which began swiftly after theapprovalof the report.The formalrequestfor impeachmentwas pre-sented to the Chamberon September1. The Speakerof the Houseacceptedthe requestand set the date for the impeachmentvote to beSeptember29.10Municipalelectionswere to takeplace on October3;the impeachmentvoting was expectedto affect the elections.The Chamberdecidedby a vote of 441 to 38 (with23 absenteesand 1 abstention) o impeachthe president.Against repeatedsugges-tionsby manyof his allies to resign,Collorrefused o do so. His effortsto delay the senatorial rialdidnot succeed,and the trial was initiatedon December29. Onlythendid Collordecidetoresign,hoping oescapethepunishmenthataccompaniesmpeachment:ightyears' suspensionof politicalrights, makinghim ineligible for any electoraloffice. TheSenate, however,voted with a largemajority 73 to 8) to continuethetrial andby 76 to 3 voted to convict Collor.1

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Naoko KadaCase II: Colombia

CommitteeStructureand Its Role in ImpeachmentColombia'sConstitutionof 1991 explicitlystatesthat the Houseof Representatives s the organthat investigatesaccusationsagainstpublicofficialsand,if necessary,reports o the Senatewith the recom-mendationfor a trial.The investigativecommittee(CoIA) thereforeexistsonlyinthe House.Ithas beenoneofthe less importantommittees,and the leaders of the two major parties, the LiberalPartyand theConservativeParty,have handlednomination.12Since 1974,the LiberalPartyhas held a majority n both houses and,as a result,a majority nthe CoIA since its compositionreflects that of the House as a whole.The dominanceof the Liberalparty n the CoIA would guarantee hatthe party'spreferenceswould prevailin CoIA's decisions (made by asimple majority),as long as Liberal egislators n the committeevotedalongtheparty ine.Whether rnotlegislatorswouldvotealongtheparty inedependedon if thepartycouldeffectively discipline ts members.TheColombianelectoralsystemhas exactly the contraryeffect. The members of theHouseareelectedfrompersonalrather hanparty ists becausepartieshave no control over the use of partynames as long as candidatesmeet the minimumrequirementor registration.Accordingto ArcherandShugart 1997, 133), Invirtuallyevery district n every election,morethan one list representing ach of the two majorpartieshasbeenrun. Furthermore,oliticiansrelyon local andregionalclientelistic ies

to advancetheircareers,not on the nationalparty organization.Theimplication s thatthepresidentcannotexpecta lenient com-mitteesimplybecause his orherpartyholdsa majority n thecommit-tee. It also means,however,thatcommitteemembersmightbe boughtout if the presidenthanded out attractivepatronage.The Colombianpresident is well equipped for this purpose, with vast powers ofappointment ranging from selection of ministers to medium-levelemployees of the executive branch o the directorsof state-ownedorstate-controlled nstitutions ArcherandShugart,118-19). Thepresi-dentalso has extensive control over fiscal policy because the cabinetprepares he nationalbudgetandany increaserequestedby Congressmust be approvedby the president.'3Althoughthe CoIA is not directlymentioned in the Colombianconstitutionas an element in the impeachmentprocess,no impeach-mentprocess can be initiatedwithout the committee'sreportrecom-mending impeachment.The internalregulationsof Congress(Article

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcesses343) stipulatethat if the committeereportconcludes that the publicofficial in question is innocent,then the reportdoes not need to beapprovedby the House of Representativesas a whole. If the reportconcludes that the individual is guilty, then the House votes onimpeachment.Therest of the procedure s described n Chart 1.The Investigative Committeeand theAccusation against President Samper

When the House of Representativesappointedthe membersoftheCoIAin 1994,few representativesxpectedthe committee o cometo the attentionof the public. Even thoughthe accusationthatPresi-dentSamperhadknowinglyreceivedcontributionsrom the Calidrugcartel began to circulate immediately after the presidentialrunoffelection, the accusationwas investigatedby the ProsecutorGeneralanddeclaredwithoutgroundswithina month. The presidentwas noteasilyletgo,however.The ProsecutorGeneralwho absolvedhimretired,and he new ProsecutorGeneralbegananinvestigationntotheallegationof illegal politicaldonations romtheCali cartel.Sevenlegislators romthepresident'sLiberalPartywereamongthesubjectsof investigation.Withdoubtsgrowingover the involvementof thepresidentntheillegaldonations, he CoIAbeganits work on the case in August 1995.Theinvestigationwas conductedbythechairof theCoIA,HeyneMogollon.AlthoughMogollonwas authorizedo choose theinvestiga-tor, he choice wasapparentlymade nadrawing romwhichheemergedas the investigator.Some legislatorsbelieved thatMogollonhad ben-efited from the drug cartel's contributionto the Samper campaign(Betancourt1996, 39). Some members of the president'srivalparty,the ConservativeParty,recommendeda multipartyadvisoryteam toassist the CoIA,but the call did notproduce any changein the CoIA.Thefinalreport oncludedhat herewas insufficient vidence o warranta continued nvestigationof thepresident.On December14, 1995,thereportwas approvedby a vote of 14 to 1 in the committee,and thecase was shelved for the time being.

It seemed as if the scandalwas over for the president,but thefollowingJanuary hockingrevelationsbrought he case backintothepublic eye. Theex-campaignmanager orthepresidentconfessedthatthepresidentwas fully aware of the donations rom the drugcartel.Inaddition,a senatorgave TV interviews in Spain and Colombiaandclaimedthatthepresident ookpersonal nitiative n distributingdrug-relatedcontributions.On February14, the ProsecutorGeneralpre-sentedhis accusationagainstthe presidentto the CoIA, arguingthat

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Naoko Kadathere was sufficient evidence to merit another nvestigationinto thecampaignfinancesof the president.The prospectfor a vigorous investigation n the CoIA was dim,for Mogollon would once again head the investigation. Initially,thedrawingproduceda differentinvestigator,anotherPL memberandaloyal supporter f thepresident.After four hours of conversationwithMogollonbehind he closeddoors,however,henewinvestigatoreclinedto acceptthepost, giving it instead o Mogollon.In an effort to show its responsivenessto the criticism that thecommittee was ineffective, the CoIA decided to have two sub-investigators,but the move didnot changehow the investigationwasactuallyconducted.As the committeechair,Mogollonhad the powerto choose the two subinvestigators.He delayednominationuntilearlyApril, leavinglittle timeforthesubinvestigatorso engagein investiga-tive activities.Manymembersof theColA, and thecommitteechair nparticular,were accused of receivingorbeing promisedadministrativepositionsandfundingfor theirconstituentsn exchangeforsupportingthe president.14Unphasedby criticism,theprincipal nvestigator ssued a reportrepeatingthe same findinghe presented ess thansix months earlier:the presidentwas innocentand the processshould not go further.Thecommitteevoted, 10 to 3, to accepthis report.Thistime, however,thereportwas sentto the floor of the House of Representativeso decidewhether or not to shelve the case permanently.On June 12, 1996, theHousemet and,by a vote of 111to 43, it voted to approve he CoIA'sreportandsuggestionto shelve the case permanently.Nine membersof thepresident'sparty, ncluding he HouseSpeaker,votedagainst heCoIA's report.15The president survived without facing a formalimpeachmentprocess,althoughhis leadershipwas weakened and theU.S. governmentremainedcritical of him.16

The Role of Investigative Committeesin Impeachment ProcessesThe aboveaccountof two investigativecommitteespointsto theimportanceof information ontrolby thecommittee.InBrazil,despitethewide-ranging ormalpowersof thecommitteechair,he was unableto control he flow of information nto andout of thecommitteebecausethe investigationwas conductedby the whole committee(insteadofbeing delegatedto one member),and the oppositionmembersin thecommitteekept a keen eye on the committeechair's conduct.Anytime the opposition members suspected the committee chair of

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcessesconcealing nformation rdelaying nformationlow intothecommittee,they took their accusationto the media. Wheneverthey obtainednewinformation hatsuggestedthe presidentwas involvedin orbenefitedfromhis friend'sallegedlycriminalactivities, heythemselvesconveyedthe information o the media.'7In sum, the committeechair and thepresident'sallies in the committeewere unableto control the flow ofinformation o andfromthe committee,andthe revealed informationwas sufficient to mobilize many Brazilians to march in supportofimpeachment, s well as to convinceenough legislatorsof the need forimpeachment.Incontrast, n Colombia,the committeechairwas ableto controlthe flow of information o and from the committee. The chair alsochose which information o use in the finalcommitteereport.Althoughsome shockinginformationwas revealedby the ProsecutorGeneral'sinvestigationandthrough he massmedia,the committeechairdid notprovide any corroborating information that would have put thepresident's nnocence in more doubt. The investigationand the finalreportwere criticizedby both the judicial authoritiesandby citizengroups ornotincorporatingriticalevidencethathadbeen obtainedbythe ProsecutorGeneral's office. The congressionalinvestigationdidnotproducehe same evelof publicoutrage bservednBrazil,nordid itproduce reporthatwouldquestionhepresident'snnocencenanyway.The Brazilianinvestigativecommittee'sperformanceconformsto Str0mand Krehbiel'snotionsthat information anbe used strategi-callyby oppositionpartiesand individual egislators.Infact,thestrate-gic use of informationby oppositionmembers n the Brazilian nvesti-gative committeewas one of the key determinants f the outcome oftheimpeachmentprocessin Brazil. Theoppositionmemberswere alsosuccessfulatpreventingthe president'sallies fromusing informationstrategically,by notlettingthemconcealordelaythedeliveryof infor-mationto the committee.In Colombia, on the other hand, Cox and McCubbins'smainargument,hatcommitteesfunction o further he causeof themajorityparty,seems to hold true. The president,the congressional majority,andthe committeechair were all from the sameparty.As mentionedearlier,Colombianpartiesareknownforlackof discipline,andPresidentSamper'spartydid not offerhim unifiedsupport.Nevertheless,severalfactors avored he maintenance f a legislative majority hatsupportedthe president.One factor was thatmany legislatorsfrom the LiberalParty, ncludingthe committeechair,were believed to have benefitedfromthe contributionsromthedrugcartel.Second,a large segmentofthe ConservativePartyremainedsupportiveof the president.Third,

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Naoko Kadathepresident uccessfullysecuredsupportof someimportantmembersof the CoIA and Congress by ensuringsufficientpork for their dis-tricts.Last butnotleast,the committee'smajoritariantructure nabledthe committee chair to monopolizethe information low to Congressandthepublic.Thecommitteechairdutifullychose toprovide nforma-tion thatonly benefited the president(andhis allies) to Congressandthe public, and he chose to ignoreinformation hatmay have put thepresident n dangerof impeachment.It is importanto stressthat in neitherBrazilnor Colombia wasthe legislative majority nterested n impeachmentat thebeginningofthe process. The difference between the two cases is that Brazil'slegislative majority forvotingon impeachment) hiftedas more infor-mationbecame available.InColombia,therewas no suchopportunityfor ashifting egislativemajoritybecauseof the committeechair'stotalcontrolof the investigativecommittee.Inotherwords,theColombianinvestigativecommittee,and the committeechair n particular, elpedmaintainalegislativemajorityn thepresident'savorbycontrollingheinvestigation n sucha way as to protectthepresident.This analysisdemonstrates hat the causalrelationshipbetweeninformation ontrol and the outcomeof the impeachmentprocesswasaspredicted nTable1 s lasttworows.InBrazil,theoppositionpartiescoordinated heirinvestigativeeffortsandprovidedcredibleandrichinformation bout hepresident'swrongdoing.InColombia, heinves-tigationwas controlledby a supporterof the presidentandprotectedthepresidentromrigorousnvestigation.Whatremains o bevalidatedsthe causalrelationship etweenthe committee tructure ndinformationcontrol. will discuss he threesetsof rulesas describedn Table1.Installation Rules

The fixed term of the committee n Colombiaworked n favorofthepresident. ncontrast,hestrategic election of committeemembersby theoppositionparties n Brazilproduceda highlyactivecommitteethatbroughtmore and moreinformationagainstthepresident o light.The Colombiancommitteechair,Mogollon,wasbelieved to havebenefited from the drug money, as were nine (out of fifteen) othermembersof the CoIA. It is doubtfulthatMogollonwould have beenselected to chair the committee if the committee had been formedexclusively to investigatethis particular ase of drugcorruption, orsuch selectionwould immediatelysignal thatCongresswas not seri-ously performing ts duty of investigation.Yet because Colombia'sinvestigativecommitteeshave fixedterms,andthe chair s selectedfor

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcessesa one-yearterm at the startof each legislative year,therewas no roomfor theoppositionto influencethecompositionof the committeeor thechoice of thechairby the time his allegedties withdrugmoneybecamepublicknowledge.In Brazil,since investigativecommittees are ad hoc committeescreated o investigateaparticular ase,party eaderscandecide whomto nominateto a CPIaccordingto whetheror not the CPI is likely tohave grave consequencesfor the party.In the case of the CPI of PCFarias,it seems some of the opposition partiessaw the CPI as a realopportunityo uncovercorruptionn government.The Workers'Partysenttwo membersalreadyknownfortheir nvestigativeeffortsagainstcorrupt oliticians.Theprincipalnvestigator, lsofromtheopposition,won thenomination y emphasizinghis investigative kills andcommit-ment to conducta serious nvestigation.18 Thegoverningcoalition sentsome loyal supportersof the president,but theirpresencecould notstop the oppositionmembers from carryingout an investigationthatwent further hanthegoverningcoalition wouldhave liked.Rules on Selection

In both countries,proportional epresentationof congressionalpartiesis the rule for member selection. Because the party systemsdiffer,however, this same rule led to quite different committees:inColombia,a singleparty, hatof thepresident,heldmajority;nBrazil,because of the fragmentedparty system, no partyheld a majorityofseatsin the committee.Infact,in Brazil thegoverningcoalition endedup havingfewer seats thanthe opposition.Thefragmentation y itself does notnecessarilyproducea toughinvestigativecommitteeagainst hepresident. f, forexample, hepresi-dent can easily buy committee members by offering attractiverewards,then he need not fear the committee. In Brazil, however,leftistpartiesareknownfor cohesionanddiscipline(Mainwaring1995,376-82). If a president'spolicy runs counterto these leftist parties'preferences,andif the leftistpartiescanplay an important ole in theinvestigativecommittees,then the presidentmay be in trouble. Thisscenario,in fact, seems to have broughtPresidentCollordown. Themost prominentcommitteemembersof the CPIof PC Fariasturnedout to be fromthe leftistparties.Therules onthe selectionof the committeechairandtheprincipalinvestigator n Colombialed the investigativecommitteeto be firmlycontrolledbythepresident'sallies;in Braziltheunwritten uleof powersharing ed the committee o be decentralized. nColombia, he chair s

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Naoko Kadaselected by committeemembers. The committee'smajorityin 1995was composedof legislatorssuspectedof benefitingfromdrugmoney,and they chose the chair from one of theirranks. The chair did notdirectlynominate heprincipal nvestigator,as he had thepowerto do,but in the second,more criticalinvestigation,he virtuallynominatedhimself to be theprincipal nvestigator.nBrazil,on the otherhand, heselectionof the committeechairandtheprincipal nvestigatorwas notin the handsof a single party.Given the fragmentednatureof its partysystem, the oppositionhas a good chance of grabbingone of the twoimportantpositions.In the case analyzedhere, the largest oppositionparty, hePMDB,chosetheprincipalnvestigator.The committeechairwas from the governingcoalition,but, because the president'spartywas so small, the post went to the largestcoalitionpartner, he PFL.AlthoughPFLleadershadno intentionof impeaching hepresident, tspoliticalmotivationswere notexactlythe same as thepresident's.Somelocal journalists argue that the powerful leader of the PFL soughtleverageover thepresidentbymanipulatingheinvestigation Krieger,Novaes, and Faria 1992, 176-77). Whether or not this argument strue,the PFL leader did choose his trustedprotegeto head the CPI.Withaprincipal nvestigatorromtheoppositionanda committeechairwho was loyal notto thepresidentbut to the PFLleader, hepresidenthadlittle,if any,room forinfluencing he committee's nvestigation.Rules on Investigative Authority

Thescope andnatureof the investigationdependson how muchcontrolthe committee chair and theprincipal nvestigatorexercise onthe information low.Ifregularmembersof the committeecanactivelyparticipatentheinvestigation,hen heymightbringevidenceor demandtestimoniesthatthecommitteechair, heprincipal nvestigator,or bothmight otherwise fail to provide. Such informationcan attractmediaattention, speciallyif committeemembersoffersurprising rshockingrevelations.If theregularmemberskeep feedingthe media new infor-mation,thenthepublicwill stayinformedand is likelyto remain nter-ested in the investigation,even if the committeechairor investigator(orthepair)does notprovide nformation. nvestigativecommittees nBrazil are indeed structured o allow active participationof regularmembers. nthecase studiedabove, he committee's ppositionmemberswere able to supplyinformation o the media and to thepublicbecausethe investigationwas carriedoutjointly by the whole committee.Thestrategicuse of informationwas alsoeffectiveinconstrainingthecommitteechair'sabilityto control nformationlow. Forexample,

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcesseswhen the committee chair did not sign the letters fromCPIrequestingcritical information rom the CentralBank,the othermembers of theCPI complainedto the media thatthe committeechairwas tryingtoslow down the investigation.The letterwas soon signedand the infor-mation was sent to the CPI.If, on the otherhand, he committeechairor theprincipal nvesti-gator s given such broaddiscretion hathe or she canvirtuallybartheregularmembersof the committeefrominvestigating,orputa limitonthescopeof theinvestigation, hentheinvestigationmaynot be carriedout to its fullpotentialormaybe conducted o suit thepoliticalinterestsof the committeechairorprincipal nvestigator.TheColombian nves-tigative committeefalls into this category;Colombiancongressionalrulesrequireonlythepresenceof theprincipal nvestigator orinvesti-gation.And, since the committee chairhas thepowerto nominatetheprincipal nvestigator, heirpoliticalinterestsare bound to be aligned.Whenthe shared interestis not to investigate,there is no hope for arigorous nvestigation.TheColombiannvestigativecommitteeheadedby Mogollonillustrateshispoint.Even evidenceprovidedbyrespectedjudicialbodies such as the ProsecutorGeneral'soffice was dismissedby the principal nvestigatorwithout serious consideration.The mostthe other members of the committee could do was vote againstthereport.The decentralizationof investigativeauthority n Brazil,wherethe principal nvestigatorand the committeechairdo not come fromthe sameparty,can lead to a conflict of interestsbetween the two. Inthe case studiedabove, the committee chair made some unsuccessfulattempts o shield thepresident rom nvestigation.Theprincipalnves-tigator,beingfromtheopposition,madeno suchattempt.Manyrepre-sentatives,includingsome membersof his own party,pressured heinvestigatornot to mention hepresident nthefinalreportof the inves-tigativecommittee,but he did notgive in.19After thereportwas read nCongress, support for impeachmentgrew even more. In sum, theoppositionmembers f thecommittee,ncludingheprincipalnvestigator,puttheir nvestigativeauthorityandparticipatory ightsto fulluse, andby doingsothey kept he committee hair's nformationontroln check.The causalrelationshipbetween the committee structure nd theinformationcontrolthat the informational heorypredictedhas nowbeendemonstratednboth cases. Inthefollowingsection,I discussthefactorsIhave excludedfrommyanalysis.I also offer somesuggestionsformaking nvestigativecommitteesmore credible o thelegislatureasa whole and to the voters who are interestedmore in justice than inpoliticalmanipulation f impeachmentprocesses.

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Naoko KadaConclusion

Numerous factorsoutside this paper's focus contributed o theoutcome of the impeachmentprocessin the two countriesstudied,buttheunfoldingof thecongressional nvestigationaffectedmanyof theseotherfactorsas well. Oneexampleis popularpressure.No one doubtsthatpopularpressureplayedan important ole in the impeachmentofPresident Collor. The popularpressuredid not, however, amount tomuchbefore thecongressionalnvestigation evealed hat hepresidentwas indeedbenefiting romhis friend'sextortion cheme.InColombia,popularpressure ailed to buildup at leastpartlybecausethe congres-sionalinvestigation ed nowhere.Theangerandfrustrationwas mostlydirectedat the CoIA committee chairinsteadof the president.20The role of the media is anotherexample.Inbothcountries, hemedia was a crucialsourceof new information hatcast doubton eachpresident's nnocence.The differencebetween the two countrieswasthat hemedia'scontributionnColombiastoppedshortof beingincor-poratedinto the formalinvestigation,whereas the CPI in Brazil notonly benefited from the media's revelations but also fed the mediamore nformationhat he committeehadgathered.Thecomplementaryrelationshipbetween the media and the congressionalcommitteeinBrazilenabled heinvestigationogather noughevidenceand ncreasedthe level of attentiongiven to the investigationto such an extent thatimpeachmentbecameviable (andeventuallyalmostinevitable).Finally,readersmaypointto the fact thatPresidentCollor was aminoritypresident,whereasSamperwas not,anduse thisdifference oexplain impeachmentof the former and absolution of the latter.ButCollorreshuffledhis cabinet nApril1992 to broadenhis supportbase,andthegoverningcoalitionheld themajorityntheHouse. Thegovern-ing coalition(andeven some opposition members)tried to shield thepresident from investigation, just as in Colombia. Conversely, theapparent ne-partymajority n Colombiawas notunifiedin its supportfor the president:some importantLiberalmembersopenly criticizedthewayCoIAwasconductingts investigationandvotednot toapproveits finalreportabsolvingthe president.Thus,a legislativemajority nbothcountriessupportedhepresidentwhen thecongressional nvesti-gationstarted,but the supportwas not solid. In both countries,therewas a very smallprobability hatthe majoritywould shift in favor ofimpeachment.The fact thatthis shiftbecame a reality nBrazilbut notin Colombia has to do not with the party system per se but with thedifferentperformancef theinvestigative ommittees.Theparty ystemis not irrelevant-on the contrary, he party system determined o a

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcessesgreatextentwhether heinvestigativecommitteewould indeed nvesti-gateornot since it affectedprocedural ules and theirapplicationnthecommittees.

Althoughno singlesetof institutional ules canguaranteehat heinvestigativeommitteewill function roperly ndeffectively,hefindingsof this papersuggest that investigativecommitteeswhose structurestendto produceaninformationmonopolyareproblematic.Threeareaswhere the investigativecommittee can be reformedto decrease suchmonopolistictendenciesare in the selection of committeemembers,the distributionof the investigativeauthority,andthe selection of theprincipalnvestigator.Whenconductingan investigationwith a potentiallysignificantimpacton thepoliticalarena,suchas aninvestigationagainst hepresi-dent,it maybe advisableto forma specialcommitteededicatedsolelyto this purpose,wherein the president'sopponentswould have equalparticipationas the president'sallies. The ColombiancommitteethatinvestigatedPresidentSamper ackedcredibility n the eyes of manycitizensandgovernmentsbecauseits majority,as well as theprincipalinvestigator,was suspectedof being guilty of the same crime as thepresident.If the president'sopponentshad had equalparticipationnthecommittee, hen thecredibilityproblemwould have ceasedto existbecausethe committee'sreportwould have had to obtainat least oneoppositionmember'svote in order o be approved.Equalparticipation y theoppositiondoes not lead to a vigorousinvestigation,however, f one individualdominates heinvestigation-as evidencedby the dominanceof theprincipal nvestigatorn Colom-bia. Since the burdenof investigationfalls entirelyon the principalinvestigator,his arrangements unlikelyto lead to a thorough nvesti-gationand is highlylikelyto puttheinvestigatorunderenormouspres-surefrom the accusedindividual.In a collective investigation,on thecontrary,manyvenuesof investigationarelikelyto be explored,andatleast someoppositionmemberswill pursue nvestigation.The selectionof theprincipalnvestigator,ubinvestigators,r bothby the committeechairis another nstitutional eaturethat increasesthe concentration f powerin fewerhandsand thusmakesinformationcontrolby one extremeof thepoliticalspectrummorelikely.Creatingsubcommittees hat are not headedby the president'smost loyal sup-porters would decrease the severity of information monopoly.Nominationof the principalinvestigatorby a super-majority f thecommitteemembersmightalso workto reducethe severity,as long asthe oppositionmemberscan effectively keep the loyal supportersofthepresident rombecomingthe sole investigators.

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Naoko KadaIn the case studied, the rules on the committee structure in

Colombiaworkedin favor of the president.If, however,the presidentand the legislativemajoritycome from differentparties, henthe sameinstitutionalrules are most likely to producea hostile committee thatmight attempt o accuse (andimpeach)the presidenteven when thereis insufficient vidence.Inshort, he Colombiannvestigative ommittee,aslongasitis formedaccordingo theexistingrules, sprone oproducingabiasedreport r,atleast,cannotescapebeingcriticizedas suchbecauseof thepossibilityof dominancebyasingleindividual, .e., thecommitteechair.As long as theserules serve themajorityparty's nterest, heyareunlikelyto be changedbecause suchchangesrequirea majorityvote.In fact, a reformproposal in Colombia that would have shifted theresponsibilityfor investigatingthe presidentfrom the investigativecommittee to thejudiciary perished n the face of resistancefrom theHouse of Representatives.Still, it is hopedthatthose individualswhowish toincrease heaccountabilityfpublicofficialswilltake hefindingsof thispaper ntoconsiderationntheireffortto designor reform nves-tigativecommittees,apotentialaccountabilitymechanism.Naoko Kada is a visitinglecturerat SanDiego State Universityand a ResearchFellow at the InternationalCommunityFoundation,9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, California 92093-0521.

NOTESTheSocialScienceResearchCounciland he Center orIberian ndLatinAmericanStudies at the Universityof California,San Diego, generouslyprovided fundingforfield research ormy dissertation,romwhich thispaperderives. I would like to thankStephanHaggardand MatthewShugart,Paul Drake,Peter Smith, Chris Woodruff,AnthonyWesterling, nd theeditorsandthetwo anonymous eviewersatLSQfor theircomments.1. See Persson,Tabellini,and Trebbi2000, Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin1999, and Shugart,Moreno,and Crisp2000 for discussion of electoralsystems andaccountability f publicofficials.2. Elsewhere Kada2002), I discuss the legislature-dominantnd thejudiciary-dominantpatternsof impeachmentprocesses.3. I have identifiedfour factors thataffect legislativesupport or the president(orforimpeachment): valuationof thecharges,constituentpressure,partydiscipline,andpresidentialpower(Kada2002).4. Lijphart 1999) examinespower sharing n the executive branch.Using hisvariables, haveidentifiedBrazil as a highlyconsensualdemocracy Kada2000).5. Dopanicoa paz, Veja,3 June 1992,p. 22.

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PresidentialImpeachmentProcesses6. Accordingto SenatorEduardoSuplicy (PT-SP),the PMDB decided to giveone of itspostsforsuplente o PT inrecognitionof the PT's centralrolein installing heCPI.Author nterview,June7, 2000, Brasilia.7. The most important evelations came from an interviewgiven by ElibertoFranca, he driverfor the president'sprivate secretary.His statementswere crucial nestablishing inancial inksbetweenthepresidentand PC Farias.8. The freeze was imposed on bank accountswith more than Cr$50,000 insavings for one and a half years.Accordingto the president,only about 10%of thesavingsaccounts were affected. JamesBrooke, BrazilLeader'sInflationPlan WinsHimHighCreditRating, New YorkTimes,20 March1990,A2.9. Many legislatorsreferred o this new findingwhen local newspapersaskedwhy they werevoting for impeachment.See, for example: Goverador do PA ap6iaimpeachment, olha de Sao Paulo 25 August 1992, 1-14; and JiniaMarise: Estoutotalmenteestarrecida, 'OGlobo30 August 1992, 0 Pais 3.10. After the Speakerof the Houseaccepted herequest,a SpecialCommitteenthe House debatedwhether or not to approvethe request.Althoughthis committeecould have stoppedthe impeachmentprocess,it did not becausethe oppositionhadamajority n the committee.11. Collor challengedthe Senate's decision as unconstitutional, ut the Courtupheldthe Senate's decision.12. The two parties ogetherheld over 70%of seats in the House in the period1974-1994. Fordetails about committeeselection,see Betancourt1996 (36). An au-thor interviewwithJaimeArias(Bogota,October3, 2001) confirms heparty eaders'control over nomination o the investigativecommittees.13.Congresscould,however,reduce hebudgetwithout hepresident's onsent.14. See Vargas,Lesmes,andT6llez1996(451-52), as well as LUna efensaconcargoal Presupuesto? El Tiempo,10 March1996, section 8A and ElCongresohatenido 'cuotas'siempre:Samper, El Tiempo,25 March1996, section6A. Gaceta delCongreso(22 February1996),which containsrecordof a House session on February

7, also refersto the allegedfavors receivedby committeemembers.15. The 80 remainingLiberalpartymembers,alongwith the Conservative arty's22 membersand9 otherlegislators,voted to approve he report.16. TheU.S. government ven revoked hepresident's ntryvisa to thecountry.17. In fact, because Brazilian laws allow any legislatorto observe the CPI'sinvestigation,nonmembersof the committeeoften leaked crucialinformation o themedia,despitecriticismof such a practiceby the president'sallies.18. Author nterviewwith SenatorAmirLando,June1, 2000, Brasilia.19.Author nterviewwith SenatorAmirLando,June 1, 2000, Brasilia.20. Protestersoften threwmogollo,a kind of bread,at Mogoll6nas he enteredthecongressionalbuilding.

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kada, naoko - the role of investigative committees in the presidential impeachment

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