Welcome to Kampfgruppe von Luck the second Pint-Sized Campaign for Chain of Command and the second set in Normandy around D-Day. This time, we look towards the British sector and the events to the East of the Orne River on the 6th of June. Our protagonists are 21 Panzer Division, in particular the forces under the command of Major Hans von Luck, and 12 Parachute Battalion, one of the British airborne units deployed to form part of the bridgehead East of the Orne, protecting Pegasus Bridge from a counter-attack. Putting together the firepower of a Panzer Grenadier force with the professionalism and tactical finesse of the Paras is sure to cause fireworks. What I enjoyed most about this campaign was the hard-fought nature of the actions, as two of the toughest forces in Chain of Command met on the battlefield. What my coleague Richard has done, taking just the brief period of one day in June 1944, is to show how flexible At the Sharp End is. This campaign introduces some additional considerations, such as the importance of managing limited assets to achieve your goal which really enhances the game experience further and highlights how a campaign adds so much to gaming enjoyment. The invasion of Normandy on June the 6th was an operation meticulously planned. However, as von Moltke stated, no plan will survive contact with the enemy, and in this case the outcome was by no means certain. As we saw in 29 Let’s Go!, the margin between complete success and abject failure is a thin line and, on the morning of the 6th of June, the lightly equipped airborne forces in the bridgehead were ill-equipped to deal with an aggressive counter-attack supported by armour. For a fleeting few hours, the Germans had an opportunity to destroy the bridgehead and to

threaten the invasion beaches. It is on these critical few hours that we will focus. One of the keys to making any campaign viable is keeping things simple and brief. Our At the Sharp End campaign handbook provides the key to unlocking this campaign. Using the rules in At the Sharp End you’ll be able to run this campaign very easily and quickly, straight from the box. The fact that the support lists are specific to this campaign also means that collecting the forces required is also very achievable. Once you are ready to begin, the campaign will provide between four and eight games in total by which point it will have reached a measurable conclusion. You’ll have a winner and a loser, all in the type of time-frame which is ideal as a club project or for a couple of friends gaming over a month or two. Perfect, we think, for a fast, fun and fundamentally enjoyable campaign experience. As a bonus, these Pint-Sized Campaigns come with a pint-sized price tag. Literally! The price of each one will be the same as a pint of my favourite tipple in my local pub. We hope you enjoy Kampfgruppe von Luck. Richard Clarke Lard Island, January 2015

Whilst Operation Overlord as a whole requires no introduction, the British Airborne Operation to secure the Eastern flank of the invasion, Operation Tonga, is less well known and bears some discussion as an introduction to our campaign. Undoubtedly the most famous aspect of Tonga, thanks largely to the film The Longest Day, was the capture of the twin bridges across the Orne River and Canal, Pegasus Bridge and Horsa Bridge. However, Tonga was far more than simply an audacious coup de main to seize a couple of bridges. In fact a total of six bridges were targeted, largely along the River Dives further to the East. These were to be demolished to ensure that there was no German interference from that quarter. Planning for Operation Overlord had begun in May 1943 when Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan was appointed as Chief of Staff to an as yet un-appointed Supreme Commander. From its inception the plan included the use of airborne forces and, as detail was added, their roles as flank guards were confirmed. The US airborne forces falling to the West, the British 6th Airborne to the East.

Specifically, Major General Richard Gale was tasked with three tasks. Firstly was the capture of the Orne bridges at Benouville. Second was the neutralisation of the German coastal battery at Merville where, it was thought, a battery of 150mm guns were located which could fire directly onto the invasion beaches. Finally, the bridges across the Dives and its tributary, the Divette, at Varaville, Robhomme, Bures and Troan were to be destroyed. This area had already been inundated by the Germans as part of their anti-invasion measures, so destroying the bridges would seal off this flank almost completely.

With these tasks then completed, the Division was to defend its bridgehead, holding a continuous defensive line between the Orne and the Dives, until relieved by the general Allied advance. The capture of the Orne bridges was the responsibility of a reinforced Company of the Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry under Major John Howard. These were to land at LZ X and Y. After seizing the bridges this coup de main force was to hold their position with 5 Parachute Brigade dropping on DZ N to provide them with relief and protection. 7 Para were to move into Benouville and Le Port to the West of the river and 12 and 13 Para were to occupy Ranville and Le Bas de Ranville, forming a defensive perimeter there. To the North, 9 Para and the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion were to drop on DZ V, tasked with destroying the Merville battery, the Dives bridges and clearing the DZ for the arrival of Divisional HQ at 0330 in 68 gliders. Finally, 8 Para were to land at DZ K from where they were to destroy the bridges at Bures and Troarn before withdrawing northwards to assume their place in the perimeter at Le Mesnil. On the evening of D-Day, a second wave of gliders would deliver the 6th Airlanding Brigade made up of the 12th Devons, the 2nd Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and the 1st Royal Ulster Rifles. Additionally, Lord Lovat’s 1st Special Service Brigade would cross the Orne bridges as rapidly as possible before turning North and clearing the coastal zone of any isolated German forces in the area of Sallenelles, Franceville Plage and Cabourg to the East. For 6th Airborne Division, the greatest threat was a strong German counter-attack before the evening airlift consolidated the position. Until then, a dozen 6 pounder anti-tank guns were the limit of their support weapons. It promised to be a long day and, as Brigadier Hill of the 3rd Para Brigade warned his officers

on the 5th of June, “Do not be daunted if chaos reigns. It undoubtedly will.” 21 Panzer Division The 21st Panzer Division had an illustrious history, making its name as part of the Afrika Korps under Erwin Rommel. However, that Division had been destroyed in Tunisia and the name had been allocated to a fresh Division raised in 1943. On paper this was a fresh Panzer Division, in reality it had scarcely completed re-equipping and retraining. Its commander, Generalmajor Edgar Feuchtinger, was an artilleryman by background and a man with friends in the regime. Before the war, he had been involved in organising the Heer’s contributions to Party rallies and was not a man afraid to use the contacts he had developed in the Nazi Party to advance his career. Inexperienced in armoured warfare, Feuchtinger attempted to surround himself with men who knew their trade. He used his influence in the Spring of 1944 to secure the appointment of Major Hans von Luck to his Division as opposed to Panzer Lehr, to where von Luck had been posted. It was to be a fortuitous appointment as von Luck was an experienced commander. Such postings allowed the General to spend as much time as possible in Paris where he had established a “Special Headquarters” that was more to his liking than the provinces. The Division was made up of one Panzer Regiment, the 22nd, with two battalions. These had only just been equipped with Panzer Mark IVs and a minority of these were the old short barrelled versions of early war vintage. Additionally, two Panzergrenadier Regiments, the 125th and 192nd, were both made up of two battalions, one in armoured half-tracks, the other lorried. However, these vehicles were not standard German equipment but, rather, were French Army surplus which had been ingeniously converted for the purpose by the talented Engineer, Major Alfred Becker.

Becker was an Engineer by profession, but had served as an artillery officer in the Great War. Taking control of the Hotchkiss plant near Paris, he converted literally hundreds of French vehicles to equip the new Division. It was a Herculean task, but the result was impressive and by June 1944 the Division was well equipped by German standards. Supporting the main combat elements of the Division were the 155th Panzerartillerie Regiment with three Abteilung, each of three batteries. One Abteilung was towed, but Becker had mounted the rest on French tank chassis. The 21st Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung was a battalion strength reconnaissance formation equipped with German armoured cars and half-tracks in contrast with Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200 which fielded exclusively French tanks with added superstructure mounting German guns. Panzerjäger Abteilung 200 combined the Pak 43 anti-tank gun with French softskin vehicles as tows. Finally, the Division enjoyed the usual complement of Flak, an important arm with the Allies dominating the skies, signals and Engineers, with one Battalion of each. In principle, 21 Panzer Division was a unit held in reserve under the control of Army Group B. In practice, as with all units deployed in the coastal area, they provided certain components which were firmly locked into

the immediate defence network if an invasion were to occur. To describe the German chain of command as complex is to understate the matter. Rommel’s Army Group B shared responsibility for the defence of France with von Rundstedt’s Oberbefehlshaber West. Their difference of opinion as to how an invasion should be countered is well known. Rommel believed that an immediate counter-attack, destroying the enemy on the beaches was the only hope, and it was to that end

he littered the coast of France with obstacles, all designed to delay an invader attempting to move inland. Rundstedt held the contrary belief that a major co-ordinated counter attack delivered once the enemy was ashore and out of range of supporting naval gunfire was the key to success. It was a debate which was never resolved and, as a result, the deployment of the German armoured formations was an uncomfortable compromise designed to appease both parties as opposed to being part of a coherent defensive strategy. Below them 7 Armee was responsible for the defence of the French coast from Caen to Nantes in the Loire, with Erich Marck’s LXXXIV Armee Korps being specifically responsible for the Coetentin and Basse-Normandie. To the East of the Orne, 15 Armee became responsible for the coastal defences, all the way to the Dutch border with the LXXXI Armee Korps deployed in Haute-Normandie. Even ignoring Hitler and Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, something not easy to do, the responsibility for the defence of Normandy involved many, often conflicting, potential points of command; something which was to play a major part on D-Day and the German ability to respond to the landings. The Prelude to D-Day One of the striking features of 6th Airborne’s plans was their coherence and simplicity.

These were superbly trained men, but largely lacking in combat experience. As such, selecting a limited number of key tasks and allocating them clearly to individual units meant that if things went wrong, even small groups of isolated men could continue to work towards their own specific objective. On the other side of the fence, the German defenders were lacking that same degree of unity of purpose. Supposedly held in reserve, 21 Panzer found itself with conflicting roles for many of its component parts. The Division's Headquarters, of which we will hear more, was based at St Pierre-sur-Dives, 22 miles to the South East of Caen. Its forces were deployed on both sides of the Orne; a factor which would significantly influence events on D-Day. To the West of the Orne, the main fighting body was Panzergrenadier Regiment 192 under Oberst Rauch. In fact its headquarters was just on the Eastern bank of the Orne at Thury-Harcourt, some 19 miles South of Caen, but its two component Battalions were firmly to the West of the river. The 1st Battalion with its headquarters at Verson, just to the South of Carpiquet airfield, had its four Companies clustered in the villages around it. The 2nd Battalion was based at Le Mesnil, just to the South of Mathieu which lay six miles inland from Luc-sur-Mer at the Western end of Sword Beach. Again, its component four companies were deployed locally in Epron,

Buron, Periers-sur-le-Dan and Cairon, all names which will be familiar to students of D-Day as they lay firmly in the way of the British and Canadian troops invading in that sector and would feature in the battle for Caen itself. The 192nd Regiment’s support companies, the 9th Infantry Gun Company and the 10th Nebelwerfer Company were near the Regimental HQ in Thury-Harcourt. Panzerjäger Abteilung 200 under Major von Lynker, with its three

batteries of 8.8cm anti-tank guns, was deployed with two batteries five miles inland behind Juno Beach and with the third battery in reserve on the Caen to Bayeaux Highway, roughly half way between the two. Panzerartillerie Regiment 155 has its three towed batteries deployed to the North of Caen as part of the coastal defences with the rest of its guns, the self-propelled element of the 2nd and 3rd Abteilung, in reserve six miles to the South of Caen. Finally, one battery of Major Becker’s Sturmgeschütz Abteiluing 200 was at Epron. Almost all of these troops, deployed as they were in the coastal zone, could not avoid becoming involved in the fighting were the invasion to occur in this area. To suggest that these units were somehow in reserve is delusional, especially when we consider how physically divorced they are from the main combat elements of the Division. By far the most significant part of the Division was deployed to the East of the Orne, in particular all of Panzerregiment 22 under Oberst von Oppeln-Bronikowski whose headquarters was at Aubigny, just outside Falaise and twenty miles due South of Caen. His two tank battalions were at Jort and Fresné-la-Mère a few miles to the West. This force, in accordance with the conflicting plans from Army Group B and OKW, was held back from the immediate possible landing beaches but, Rommel hoped, sufficiently close so that

it could intervene decisively on day one of any invasion. With the Panzer element thus held back, Panzergrenadier Regiment 125 under Oberstleutnant Hans von Luck was deployed further forward on the East of the river. His headquarters was at Bellengreville, just to the West of Vimont, a position central to his two Battalions. The 1st Battalion under Major Freiherr Schenk du Schweinsburg had its headquarters at Fierville-la-Campagne, some sixteen miles to the South-East of Caen and five miles South of von Luck’s headquarters. Three of its companies were clustered close by, with the 4th, the heavy Kompanie, forward in Vimont with the Regimental headquarters. The 2nd Battalion was to the North and more scattered as it formed part of the network of Company positions which provided depth to the beach defences. Hauptmann Kuron had his command post at Colombelles with his 5th Kompanie in Troan. On the night of the 5th and 6th of June this company was undertaking anti-airborne invasion exercises in the area; perfect timing one may think, apart from the fact that they were equipped only with blank cartridges carried for training purposes. The 6th Kompanie were at Banneville, the 7th in Ranville and the 8th, heavy Kompanie, in Collombelles with the battalion HQ. To the South of von Luck’s command were three batteries of Major Becker’s Sturmgeschütz Abteiluing 200 deployed around Cagny, another location soon to become famous, just three miles to the North West of von Luck’s headquarters on the main N13 to Caen. Further away, indeed an unlikely distance further away, was Panzer-Aufklarungs Abteilung 21, the Division’s reconnaissance element, which was South of Condé-sur-Noireau, some forty miles to the South West of Caen. In summary, the armoured and reconnaissance elements were being held a significant distance to the rear, with the former thirty-five miles from the coast and the latter forty-five miles. Short distances in a tourist’s car in 2015, but a hard march in

daylight in a tracked vehicle when the skies above are full of enemy ground-attack aircraft. Other elements were already part of the network of defences in the coastal zone. The following map shows the forces to the East of the Orne which could be committed immediately to action against the British Airborne forces landing in that area. German forces are marked in green whilst we have shown the main British drop-zones in red. For the most part we have concentrated on elements of 21 Panzer Division and ignored any other German units in the area. Ostbattailon 642, for example, had its headquarters to the North of DZ N but, as it had no influence on the action we are focussing on, we have ignored it. The one exception is a platoon of Pioneers from the 1st Company of the Pioneers Battalion of the 716th Division which was located in Herouvillette at the time of the landings and who put up stiff resistance before being overcome. A Command Vacuum What is just as crucial in understanding the events of D-Day is the command structure of 21 Panzer Division and how these key players were placed on D-Day. With the German meteorologists declaring the period of the 4th to the 6th of June as being poor weather, unsuitable for any invasion, Generalmajor Edgar Feuchtinger and Oberstleautnant von Berlichingen, his Chief of Operations, left the coast and went to Paris to enjoy the pleasures of the French capital. Of the remaining officers, the Chief logistics officer, Major Scharnhorst had joined the Division on the 1st of June, just a few days after Major Wagner, an officer who had been attached to the Division as part of his staff officer training. When news of the invasion came Oberleutnant Messner, an ordnance officer, was Duty Officer with one Feldwebel to assist him. At the critical moment, the Division was effectively commanded by a senior Leiutenant supported by officers who had barely had a chance to unpack their kit, let alone familiarise themselves with their

new command. It was a recipe for disaster and one only worsened by Rommel’s own much discussed absence from Army Group B, his having returned to Germany for his wife’s birthday. For good measure we should note that Genenral Erich Marcks, commanding LXXXI Armee Korps in Basse-Normandie was away at Rennes where a 7th Armee kriegsspiel was taking place anticipating precisely the events which were about to happen in reality. Long Moustaches, Ham and Jam At 2215 hours all of the German coastal defenders were put onto a high state of alert. An intercepted message from Radio Londres, a Free French radio station broadcasting messages to agents in France, had used a code already anticipated by German Intelligence: “Jean a de longues moustaches”. In LXXXI Armee Korps area the 711th Infantry Division to the East of the Orne received the message. Unfortunately for the Germans, 7 Armee was somehow overlooked when the message was sent. At 0015 Major John Howard’s party of the Ox & Bucks landed around the Orne bridges and routed the handful of men there, securing both bridges by 0024 and transmitting their coded message, “Ham and Jam” to indicate the capture of both bridges. D-Day had begun and the clock was ticking for both attackers and defenders. Whoever could now act decisively and promptly would hold the initiative for the day. At 0025 the 22nd Independent Parachute Company acting as Pathfinders dropped in order to set up their beacons and lights. The drop was badly dispersed and the men struggled to reach the Drop Zones in time to guide 6th Airborne’s first lift onto its targets. The result was chaos, as predicted by Brigadier Hill. Five minutes later, at 0030, the headquarters of 125 Panzergrenadier Regiment was contacted by their 5th Kompanie. They reported contact with British airborne troops around Troan. They had withdrawn, unable to resist as they were equipped only with the

blank training ammunition they had been carrying for their exercise. According to the British schedule, the first lift was to drop at 0050 onto well marked Drop Zones. In truth the drop was a matter of luck as much as judgement, as men were dropped without the pilots being able to properly identify their targets. On DZ N, the pilots transporting 12 and 13 Para were able to navitage using the silvery glean of the Orne River and Canal and both were able to advance on their objectives with around 60% strength. Unfortunately 7 Para were badly dispersed and men from that battalion, much needed in Benouville, would turn up in small groups throughout the early hours. One of the first to arrive, guided by Major Howard blowing “Victory-V” in morse on his police whistle, was Brigadier Poet, commander of 5 Brigade. If the Germans had been unaware of what was happening before, the aerial flares, parachutists and tracer arching up to meet them from the defenders on the ground, soon made the situation clear. Responding, von Luck ordered 3 Kompanie to advance towards Troan, supported by “several StuGs from Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200”. 8 Kompanie in Colombelles was also ordered to conduct a reconnaissance thrust towars Ranville from where the 7th Kompanie of 125 Panzergrenadier was calling for defensive artillery fire around their positions. The rest of the 1st Battalion is stood to, ready for action, just off the N13 around Regimental HQ. At 0100, LXXXIV Korps in St Lô were alerted to airborne landings, both east of the Orne and around Ste-Mere-Elgise. In Ranville and Le Base de Ranville 12 and 13 Para were engaging the enemy and fighting their way onto their objectives while at 0120 8 Para, also badly dispersed in their drop, were only just beginning to assemble on DZ K while 9 Para, under Lieutenant Colonel Otway, were so dispersed that they were unable to even consider attacking their target until more stragglers had come in to make up the numbers.

At 0142 the German 711th Infantry Division, holding the ground towards Le Havre, requested that 21 Panzer Division be released fronm the reserve and assigned to their command. Landings of dummy parachutists in their area had served to confuse and worry the defenders in that sector. Their request was refused. At around 0200 Generalleutnant Speidel, Rommel’s Chief of Operations at Army Group B, contacted 21 Panzer to speak to Feuchtinger. To his horror, he discovered that both the General and his Chief of Operations were in Paris. He ordered the Division to assume Alert Level II, with troops to be ready to move in 90 minutes. However, he failed to order one of the more experienced subordinate commanders, such as Oppeln-Bronikowski or von Luck, to assume command. At this stage Army Group B were still convinced that what was happening in Normandy was a diversion and that Calais would be the Allies’ objective. Contacted by his headquarters, General Feuchtinger in Paris telephoned Oberst von Oppeln-Bronikowski, commander of 22 Panzer Regiment to make him aware of the landings, and informed him that both he and von Berlichingen were returning, a journey of three hours at best. While Feuchtinger was still on the phone, elements of 716th Infantry Division began counter attacking at Benouville against 7 Para which was still desperately short of men. An hour later, only 40% of the battalion would have made it to their planned positions. Fortunately the German attacks were weak at this stage and German movement of troops to Benouville was hampered further when at 0220 the RAF began an air raid on Caen with a view to disrupting traffic through that key nodal point in the road network. Despite all this, Generalleutnant Speidel continued to insist that the Pays du Calais would be the main target for the invasion. But whilst he was not prepared to release any of his reserve, he did recognise the local

reality and, at 0245, placed the battalion of 192nd Panzergrenadier Regiment under the command of the 716th Division so that they could assist in the counter-attack at Benouville. At 0230 von Rundstedt entered the fray. To the East of the landing zone, 15th Armee requested that 12 SS Hitlerjugend Division be placed under their command. The Field Marshall refused. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, and whilst we can see that calls from the 15th Armee and 711 Division were in danger of dragging much needed reserves from the area where they were most needed, and that the airborne landings were clearly the precursor to landings on the beaches, this was by no means clear at the time. It was only after 0400 that German E-Boats were sent out from Le Havre to see if any Allied naval forces were off-shore. In truth, what might now appear to be a prescient and well timed reaction could well have been jumping the gun. To deploy the limited and valuable assets the Germans possessed against what could be a relatively small but broadly spread deployment of parachutists could have well been playing into the hands of the Allies who were about to land somewhere else entirely. In fact what the German command, both at Army group B and Oberbefehlshaber West, ended up doing was possibly even worse. They began to deploy their reserve in penny packets and often with conflicting orders, adding to the confusion which already existed. At 0425 von Rundstedt released a kampfgruppe from 12 SS to support 711 Infantry Division in its sector to the East of the Invasion zone, towards Le Havre. Forty minutes later he released the whole of 12 SS to Army Group B. Around 05.20 General Feuchtinger arrived at 21 Division headquarters. He immediately telephoned 7 Armee HQ and received a briefing which served only to tell him what he had been told in Paris hours before: Nobody knew what was happening. If Feuchtinger had

been lax in allowing both himself and his Chief of Operations to be absent, he now attempted to right the wrongs and made a crucial decision. Without authorisation he ordered 21 Panzer to concentrate at Bellengreville and Chicheboville, around von Luck’s Regimental HQ. Once assembled they were to launch an attack to the East of the Orne and crush the British airborne bridgehead there. It was a decision which would have severely troubled Richard Gale at 6th Airborne Division HQ who had arrived by glider at 0320 with just a dozen 6 pounder anti-tank guns to prop up his whole front, a front which was only beginning to form up and could scarcely stand against a whole Panzer Division. By now Ranville and Le Bas de Ranville were in British hands, the German defenders from 7 Kompanie having withdrawn to the South at around 0400. 8 Para had now confirmed that the bridges at Troarn and Bures had been destroyed and Varaville had just fallen to the Canadians. At 0430, Otway’s 9 Para had stormed the Merville battery and the Canadian Paras, using whatever explosives they could find, had weakened the bridge at Robhomme and were holding that until some Sappers could be found to finish the job. At this point, the men of 7 Para were arriving in greater numbers and, whilst being pushed hard by 8 Kompanie of 192nd Panzergrenadier Regiment attacking from Caen, it was holding firm. It was clear that a viable bridgehead had been established. What was also clear was that no more support was scheduled to arrive until that evening when the third lift would deliver the 6th Airlanding Brigade and more support weapons. It was going to be a long day. Day break, and the reports of the naval armada off the coast, changed everything. Whilst Feuchtinger and von Berlichingen were in contact with Army Group B, arguing the case for their planned counter-attack, the commander of LXXXIV Armee Korps was pressing 7 Armee to allow the attack to go in,

thereby crushing the Airborne forces. At 0645 Army Group B released 21 Panzer and assigned it to 7th Armee. Just fifteen minutes later 7 Armee informed LXXXIV Armee Korps that 21 Panzer Division was to be concentrated before making a Divisional strength attack to the East of the Orne, confirming Feuchtinger’s plan. Between 0800 and 0830 21 Panzer Division’s Panzer elements began their march to the jump-off points for this planned attack. However, many of the Division’s units deployed to the East of the Orne were already heavily engaged in combat, attempting to stop the breakout from the British and Canadian beaches, and could not be withdrawn. This includes all of Panzergrenadier Regiment 192, the 1st Artillery Abteilung and the Panzerjäger Abteilung. What was more, Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200 was ordered to move to the West of the Orne to support 192 Panzergrenadier Regiment’s attacks on Benouville which, thus far, had failed to make headway against 7 Para. It was now clear that the time lost in the hours of darkness could not be made up. With Allied planes controlling the skies and banks of RAF Typhoons lining up to attack ground targets, the armoured elements were obliged to advance in tactical bounds, from cover to cover, rather than using the main roads freely. As 21 Panzer attempted to manoeuvre into a position to launch its attach, Erich Marcks watched the tableau of battle from his command post at WN17, what the British called Position Hillman, overlooking the coast. It is a position which offers an excellent vantage point and what he could see, backed up by reports of coastal positions being overrun or by-passed, told the General that nothing could stop the British taking Caen other than an armoured counter-attack. At 1035 he issued orders for a change of plan. 21 Panzer Division were now to move to the northern suburbs of Caen, from where they

would attack towards Sword and Juno beaches. Recognising the importance of the Airborne bridgehead, Marcks ordered the creation of a kampfgruppe under Major von Luck, issuing the following orders:

“You will attack with your II Battalion, reinforced by Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 21 and Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200 (Major Becker) and a platoon of 8.8cm anti-tank guns East of the Orne. Your task is to crush the 6th Airborne bridgehead, recapture the two Orne bridges at Benouville and establish contact with the coastal units. Elements of artillery will support you. Start of attack: as soon as all elements reach you.”

It was a desperate measure. Marcks knew as well as anybody that traversing Caen, still burning from the bombing raids, constantly under naval gun fire and already with traffic jamming the streets, was going to be a slow business. However, the fall of Caen would turn a lodgement into a bridgehead and provide the Allies with a major victory. For von Luck, readying himself for a major offensive, the news demanded a change of plan. Aware that his kampfgruppe was currently spread across half of Normandy, and that allowing the British time to consolidate would only make them stronger he made his decision. As he wrote in his memoirs, “So, I had to start without them”. With just the 2nd battalion of 125 Panzergrenadier Regiment assembled, he set about pushing North against the Airborne bridgehead. His plan was two-fold, with 8 Kompanie, the 2nd battalion's heavy company, forming the main force for the attack on Le Bas de Ranville and Ranville itself. To the East, Escoville and Herouvilette, where a platoon of German Pioneers was still resisting, were to be captured. With these villages secured, they could be used as jump-off points, once the armoured elements of the kampfgruppe arrived, from which to attack and retake the Orne bridges.

At 1100 the attack on Le Bas de Ranville began, with the Germans advancing with infantry supported by self-propelled guns, pushing in the British outposts before engaging in a fierce fight in the village. It was only at 1300 hours that von Luck called off this attack as casualties were mounting alarmingly. After an afternoon of minor skirmishing, at 1700 Oberleutnant Hoffmann and 4 Kompanie, Panzerregiment 22 arrived and immediately formed up in the fields between Demouville and Curvervill before attacking towards Escoville. Soon afterwards, Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 21 arrived and were committed to support the same attack, deploying into action straight off their line of march. Together with Hoffmann’s Panzers the attack on Escoville gained ground, but eventually was repulsed by naval and air bombardment. As night fell, they dug in to the South of Escoville, surrendering the village to the Paras but intent on stopping any further advance South. Overnight, the rest of the kampfgruppe would assemble and plan for further offensive action. What von Luck could not know was that at 2100 the remainder of 6th Airborne Division would arrive by glider, reinforcing the bridgehead with ample anti-tank guns and light airborne tanks. The opportunity for a swift and aggressive counter-attack to the East of the Orne had passed. To the West of the river the story is well known. At 1620, 21 Panzer Division began their armoured attack from Hérouville with the Periers ridge as their target but were rebuffed by British armour concentrations. A second attack was made and this succeeded in reaching the coast between Juno and Sword beaches, but in reality these were mere spoiling attacks, ordered by General Marcks, in order to save Caen. In that respect they succeeded, with the British and Canadians halting their attack to adopt a defensive stance in order to see off the armoured attacks.

The failure to take Caen on D-Day was to prove costly, but ultimately it did not derail the overall Allied plan. The failure of the Germans to react quickly and decisively in response to the landings was to cost them the war. Whilst Feuchtinger responded with energy once he returned to his headquarters at just before half past five, one can easily compare and contrast the state of 21 Panzer with 12 SS Hitlerjugend on that same morning. At his post, Hubert Meyer, Chief of Operations, spent the early hours of the 6th of June contacting neighbouring formations in order to form an impression of what was happening. As early as 0130 12 SS were ready to move and by 0230 the whole Division had been reorganised so that it was ready to deploy immediately into combat. Kurt Meyer, the reknowned “Panzermeyer” commanding one of the Panzergrenadier Regiments of the Division personally conducted a reconnaissance of the roads into Caen to facilitate a speedy deployment when the order came. 21 Panzer Division, on the other hand, found itself with its reconnaissance battalion furthest from the battlefield when the orders came to move. Unsurprisingly, in this comedy of errors, its commander was away on leave! The Divisional headquarters was paralysed and inactive and, when called upon to act decisively, it took them over six hours to move any of their armoured elements to the front line. Has the roles of 12 SS and 21 Panzer been reversed, it is difficult to envisage the same result. Sadly, the truth is that in 21 Panzer Division there are no clear consciences. Even men like Hans von Luck who had already established their reputations, and who would go on to do so again, displayed a paralysis which allowed their more audacious opponents to capitalise on the hours of inactivity gifted to them. At every level of command, from Hitler down to the individual Regiments and Battalions, the inertia created by precise and proper attention to the letter of the law, in this case in the form of orders, whilst entirely ignoring the realities of the immediate situation was

inexcusable. At Army level and beyond one can accept that fact that the enemy's true intentions were not instantly discernable. But at lower levels, particularly in the case of commanders like von Luck who were within a few miles of the enemy and fully aware of what was happening, no such excuses can be allowed. Of course the lesson was not lost on those who were there, nor were the consequences of their inaction. Allowing Hans von Luck the last word, he wrote:

“At the same time it was also clear to the last man that the invasion had succeeded, that it could now be only a matter of days or weeks before the Allies would have landed sufficient forces to be able to mount an attack on Paris, and finally on the German Reich”.

Now we have seen the background to the campaign, let’s look at how we can put this onto the wargames table as a gameable proposition. Any number of campaign options could be selected here; the attacks by Kampfgruppe von Luck over the ensuing days, beginning properly on the 7th of June, are attractive, but ultimately there is a futility about them once the beaches are secure and the initial airborne bridgehead reinforced. Where the fate of the Orne bridges was really in the balance was on D-Day itself, prior to the 6th Airlanding Brigade arriving in the evening. With news that 21 Panzer was to focus its schwerpunkt on the West side of the Orne, Major von Luck was left with the immediate cold comfort of promised reinforcements and almost half of his Regiment diverted elsewhere. Nevertheless, von Luck immediately began putting pressure on the British Airborne perimeter with a view to creating a situation which his attached armour could exploit once they arrived. Attacking at two points, Escoville and Le Bas de Ranville, the objective was to clear a route through to the bridges. The most direct of the two routes was from Colombelles against Le Bas de Ranville, using 8 Kompanie as a core and supported by the remnants of 7 Kompanie which had withdrawn from Ranville before first light. This force was faced with a weakened 12 Para who, as yet, were not fully assembled after their drop. Had the Germans been successful here, the shortest route to the bridges would have been opened up. On their arrival, 4 Kompanie of 22 Panzer Regiment, supported by Panzer-Aufklarungs Abteilung 21, could have rolled over Drop Zone N, wrecking plans for the third and final

(not to mention crucial) airborne lift. However, it played out, a victory at Le Bas de Ranville would have sent shock waves through the Allied command. It is this campaign that we present here. The following campaign has been designed to run with At the Sharp End, the campaign supplement for Chain of Command. As such, not all of the campaign rules are duplicated here. Rather all of the rules within At the Sharp End are applied unless otherwise stated here. Kampfgruppe von Luck is an Abbreviated Full Map Campaign which uses five rungs. The Germans are attacking, with 12 Para simply intent on holding their ground rather than pushing southwards. Consequently, this campaign centres on the attempts of the German 125th Panzergrenadier Regiment to push into Le Bas de Ranville; thereby capturing the jump-off point for 22 Panzer when they arrive. Below is the master campaign map, taken from a 1944 1:25,000 General Staff map. The five battlefields are shown marked in red and with numbers to indicate the order in which the actions take place. These maps, as well as aerial photographs taken by the Royal Air Force, have been used in order to construct all of the tabletop maps which will follow, whilst at the same time consulting modern 1:25,000 maps to ensure that the survey data used is correct. As can be seen, the campaign takes up very little actual ground, less than two kilometres in length and one in width to reflect the tight schwerpunkt the Germans were using in order to achieve the best penetration of the British positions. "Pont Tournant" marked on the map was then

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THE CAMPAIGN LADDER The master map shows the five “rungs” of the campaign. These are as follows:

Rung Name Scenario 1 Patrol on the ring contour 1 2 Probe among the

hedgerows 2

3 Attacking the corridor of death

3

4 The Church on the flank 3 5 Delaying Action at the

Chateau 4

SETTING UP THE CAMPAIGN Expanding on the ideas in At the Sharp End, Kampfgruppe von Luck focuses on two units, 12 Para defending Le Bas de Ranville and the 2nd Battalion of the 125th Panzergrenadier Regiment. However, at all times we will be focussing on the platoon sized units which are at the heart of the action. On the German side, the emphasis must be on keeping their force strong enough to keep pushing forward in a series of "leap-frog" actions. In total, they have three platoons of infantry available in order to achieve their objective. Only one platoon may be committed to attack in each campaign turn. No platoon may attack in consecutive turns; however, a platoon may defend in any number of consecutive turns. At the outset of the campaign, the 1st platoon attacking in Game One will then be replaced by the 2nd platoon in Game Two. After which the player will be able to choose whether he attacks with the 1st platoon again in Game Three, or whether the fresh 3rd platoon is committed. This continues through the campaign with the player choosing which of his platoons attacks in each campaign turn. The German player receives no reinforcements or replacements during the campaign. He may elect to amalgamate two platoons at the end of any game in the campaign. However, this amalgamated unit may never be larger or better equipped than a

full-strength platoon as listed in the Army List, nor may an amalgamated platoon attack in a campaign turn if any element of it was committed to the attack in the previous turn. After two platoons are amalgamated, any "spare" men over and above a full strength platoon may be kept at Company HQ to be used as replacements in subsequent turns, or may be attached to another under-strength platoon. On the British side, 12 Para begin the campaign only partially assembled. As the campaign progresses, more men will arrive. Additionally, the British player may request reinforcements in the shape of a fresh platoon at any time from the start of Game Three onwards. At that point the original platoon will be removed from the game.

INITIATIVE The campaign will begin with the German player holding the initiative and attacking in Scenario One, Patrol on the Ring Contour. After that, who holds the initiative at the beginning of each campaign turn will depend on the result of the previous game. At any point in the campaign where they hold the initiative, the British may launch a localised counter-attack. As covered in At the Sharp End, this would involve playing the scenario as it is indicated on the ladder or, possibly more advantageously, as an Attack & Defend scenario. If they take either option, the British will select support from, or to the value of, List Ten. The German player will select from the support points value he had when attacking for that scenario.

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PARATROOP PLATOON This force is used for all the scenarios in this campaign. It is well trained and led and is rated as Elite. Command Dice: 5

PLATOON HEADQUARTERS Lieutenant, Senior Leader armed with a Sten Platoon Sergeant, Senior Leader armed with a Sten PIAT Team, 2 men 2" mortar Team, 2 men Sniper Team

SECTIONS ONE TO TWO Sergeant, Junior Leader, armed with Sten

LMG TEAM RIFLE TEAM Bren gun Three crew

Five riflemen One Sten

SECTION THREE Sergeant, Junior Leader, armed with Sten

LMG TEAM LMG TEAM Bren gun Three crew One Sten

Bren gun Three crew One Sten

Sniper Team National Characteristics are the same as those listed in the main rule book for a British force: Five Rounds Rapid! and Concentrated Fire. SUPPORT OPTIONS The following support list is used for this campaign, representing, as it does, the limited assets available for the British Airborne forces operating in this area on D-Day. Where a support option is shown in red, only one may be selected for any scenario. It may be selected multiple times throughout the campaign.

The options in blue may only be selected once for each scenario. If both are selected they form one section rather than two separate Teams and gain a Junior Leader armed with a Sten.

BRITISH AIRBORNE SUPPORT LIST

LIST ONE Gammon Bombs Medical Orderly Adjutant Car Entrenchments for one Team

LIST TWO Roadblock PIAT Team, 2 men 2" mortar Team, 2 men Bren Team of three men Rifle Team of five rifles and one Sten*

LIST THREE Engineer Flamethrower Team, three men Sniper Team

LIST FOUR Forward Observer and 3" mortar section Vickers MMG on tripod mount, 5 crew

LIST FIVE 6 pounder anti-tank gun with five crew and Junior Leader Naval bombardment The support list options listed are the same as those in the main Chain of Command rule book, with the same specific rules applying. However, the following options are unique to this campaign. Gammon Bombs The British player may equip one section with three Gammon bombs OR every section with one Gammon bomb. Car The British captured a number of small German military vehicles in Ranville. One of these may be pressed into service. It may carry one Team.

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The scenarios contained in this supplement are not designed to present perfectly balanced forces on both sides; however, the campaign is balanced in such a fashion that it can be won by either side. We do not quote Platoon Force Ratings for each scenario in this supplement, but we have used these to determine the level of support available. For the following scenarios we have provided the players with a total of the support points which they may select from the campaign specific lists. General Terrain Notes We have provided specific terrain notes for each scenario; however, some general remarks are worthwhile on the terrain in this area of Normandy. Firstly, this is not bocage country, so hedges are not impenetrable. However, this is a very rural area and hedges do block line of sight. Troops within 2" of a hedge may be seen through it, but further away they are invisible and may not be targeted. Moving through such hedges counts as a Medium Obstacle. Most of the roads in this campaign are dirt tracks, these being shown in tan. Cobbled or metalled roads are shown in grey. At this time of year it makes little practical difference as the ground is hard. Metalled or cobbled roads can take up to two halftracks abreast but other AFVs are too wide to pass each other. The lesser roads, shown in tan, are just wide enough for a single AFV or carrier. Two cars may pass each other. Wheat is around 3' high at this time. Stationary troops will count as being in light cover due to their location being masked. Moving troops count as being in the open. Orchards make up all of the woodland shown. Where planted in regular pattern, the visibility

rules for orchards in the main rules apply. Where these are more randomly distributed, treat them as woods. Norman buildings tend to be well built of stone and, as such, should be treated as hard cover. Walls are either shown in a dark tan colour, these being medium obstacles, or a light tan, these being major obstacles, typically high walls around 8' to 10' in height. None of the vehicles present in this campaign are sufficiently heavy to breach walls by driving through them. All of the scenarios have been designed with a minimum of notes. The campaign backdrop should set the scene for each game. Just one sheet is required to be printed for each scenario, showing the map and the support list options for each player. On each map, the deployment areas for the Patrol Markers are indicated. In some cases this is a single point, shown by one Patrol Marker. In such cases all of that nation’s Patrol Markers begin at that point. Where a table edge is shown by an arrow extending along that edge, or where the arrow or boxed area indicate a general area, the Patrol Makers show which side begins in which location, not the precise location of the actual Patrol Markers which may be deployed as the player wishes in, or along, the area indicated. We have attempted to use the scenarios here “straight from the box”, so that they match up with the ones in the main rule book. As a result there are no additional umpire's notes required for this campaign Below are the briefings which may be cut out and handed to the relevant players.

Scenario One PATROL ON THE RING CONTOUR

Background In the early hours of the 6th of June, 12 Para pushed its outposts onto the high ground towards Longueval marked on their maps as a ring contour The Germans sent out patrols to identify the British positions and drive them in.

Patrol Phase Deployment The British defender may deploy three or four Patrol Markers on the table, as per Scenario One in the main rules. The limit of their initial set up is indicated by the dotted line on the map. The German player’s Patrol Markers begin the game anywhere on their table edge, as shown. He may elect to use three or four Patrol Markers. All aspects of the scenario set-up and objectives for victory are as indicated for Scenario One in the main rules.

German Forces The German player fields one platoon of Panzer Grenadiers with a total of five support points available for the first time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, increase the amount of support available by one point each time.

British Forces The British player has no support points available whenever this scenario is played. The British player should dice for the strength of his platoon at the start of this game, as noted above.

Scenario Two PROBE AMONG THE HEDGEROWS

Background Having cleared the ring contour, the Germans are now pushing against the British forward positions on the southern outskirts of Le Bas de Ranville. Their attack involves advancing along a sunken lane set amid orchards in order to get into the village itself.

Patrol Phase Deployment This is Scenario Two in the main rule book and all deployment is precisely as stated there. The German and British initial Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above. From the track junction to the buildings, the road runs through a high-banked sunken lane.

German Forces The German player has a total of thirteen support points available each time this scenario is played.

British Forces The British player has a total of four support points available whenever this scenario is played.

Scenario Three ATTACKING THE CORRIDOR OF DEATH

Background Pushing into Le Bas de Ranville the Germans are obliged to fight their way down streets with high walls and stone houses, each one a potential British strongpoint.

Patrol Phase Deployment This is Scenario Three, Attack & Defend, in the main rule book and all deployment is precisely as stated there. The German and British initial Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above.

German Forces The German player has with a total of 19 support points available when this scenario is played.

British Forces The British player has seven points of support for this scenario.

Scenario Four THE CHURCH ON THE FLANK

Background With Le Bas de Ranville largely under German control, the next objective is to attack to the east to seize the Church at Ranville. This position will serve to block any counter-attack from that direction, allowing access to the Orne bridges with that flank secure.

Patrol Phase Deployment This is Scenario Three, Attack & Defend, in the main rule book and all deployment is precisely as stated there. The German and British initial Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above.

German Forces The Germans attack here with a total of 13 points of support.

British Forces The British deploy a fresh platoon here, representing elements of 13 Para in Ranville. They may select three points of support.

Scenario Five DELAYING ACTION AT THE CHATEAU

Background The British in Le Bas de Ranville are holding on to their last bastion, the chateau, now being used as a field hospital. They must hold their ground here in order to stop the Germans from having a clear route to the Orne bridges.

Patrol Phase Deployment This is Scenario Five in the main rule book and all deployment is as stated there. The German and British initial Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above. The woods in the chateau grounds are woodland rather than orchards.

German Forces The German player has a total of twenty support points available for this scenario the first time it is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, reduce the amount of support available by four points each time.

British Forces The British player has a total of 8 support points available the first time it is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, increase the amount of support by two points.

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