Kase Fund

Investor Presentation

March 2014

Kase Capital Management Carnegie Hall Tower

152 West 57th Street, 46th Floor

New York, NY 10019

(212) 277-5606

WTilson@KaseCapital.com

This document is not a solicitation to invest in any investment product, nor is it intended to provide investment advice. It is intended for information purposes only and should be used by sophisticated investors who are knowledgeable of the risks involved. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Please refer to the relevant Confidential Private Placement Memorandum for full details on investment products and strategies.

Overview

OBJECTIVE Produce superior long-term absolute and relative returns over multiple market cycles. Long-term target: Net returns of 15%+ per annum. Short-term target: Exceed S&P 500 by 5-10 percentage points per annum.

STRATEGY We have a disciplined, long-term-oriented opportunistic value approach. We do

rigorous fundamental research and analysis to identify securities that we believe are trading far from their intrinsic value and that, in most cases, have a catalyst to realize that value.

PORTFOLIO We are long-biased, market-cap agnostic and run a concentrated portfolio. We

typically have 12-15 meaningful positions on the long side and a larger number of significantly smaller positions on the short side.

TRACK RECORD In 15+ years since inception on 1/1/99, the Kase Fund has appreciated by

162.1% (net to investors) vs. 100.2% for the S&P 500. ASSETS UNDER $77 million. MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT Kase Fund, commenced 1/1/99; Tilson Offshore Fund, VEHICLES commenced 12/1/02; Kase Qualified Fund, commenced 7/1/04. PRINCIPAL Whitney Tilson, Managing Partner and Portfolio Manager. ALIGNMENT OF The Principal has invested significant portions of his personal wealth, INTERESTS and that of his friends and family, in the firm and its investment funds and

strategies.

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Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14

(%)

Kase Fund S&P 500

Performance Since Inception

Kase Fund Total Net Return

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Total Since Inception

Kase Fund: 162.1%

S&P 500: 100.2%

Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Please refer to the relevant Confidential Private Placement Memorandum for full details on investment products and strategies.

Monthly Performance Since Inception

Kase Fund Net Return By Month

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Note: Returns in 2001, 2003, 2009 and 2013 reflect the benefit of the high-water mark, assuming an investor at inception.

Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Please refer to the relevant Confidential Private Placement Memorandum for full details on investment products and strategies.

Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P Kase S&P

Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500 Fund 500

January 7.8 4.1 -6.3 -5.0 4.4 3.6 -1.8 -1.5 -5.5 -2.6 4.7 1.8 1.1 -2.4 1.9 2.7 2.4 1.7 1.9 -5.9 -3.6 -8.4 -1.6 -3.6 -2.8 2.4 12.6 4.5 4.5 5.2 -1.9 -3.5

February -2.9 -3.1 6.2 -1.9 -0.6 -9.2 -1.1 -2.0 2.9 -1.6 7.0 1.5 2.1 2.0 -3.1 0.2 -3.3 -2.1 -6.9 -3.3 -8.9 -10.8 7.3 3.1 4.1 3.4 -0.8 4.3 0.8 1.4 9.2 4.6

March 4.1 4.0 10.3 9.8 -2.6 -6.4 3.0 3.7 1.4 0.9 3.9 -1.5 3.9 -1.7 3.9 1.3 -0.8 1.1 -2.3 -0.5 2.9 9.0 4.6 6.0 -4.1 0.0 10.9 3.3 1.3 3.8

April 2.1 3.7 -5.1 -3.0 5.1 7.8 -0.2 -6.0 10.5 8.2 2.4 -1.5 0.6 -1.9 2.2 1.4 4.4 4.6 -0.9 4.9 20.1 9.6 -2.1 1.6 1.9 3.0 1.3 -0.6 0.1 1.9

May -5.7 -2.5 -2.8 -2.0 1.8 0.6 0.0 -0.8 6.6 5.3 -1.4 1.4 -2.6 3.2 1.8 -2.9 2.5 3.3 7.9 1.2 8.1 5.5 -2.6 -8.0 -1.9 -1.1 -13.6 -6.0 2.8 2.3

June 2.2 5.8 4.1 2.4 4.6 -2.4 -7.3 -7.1 2.9 1.3 0.1 1.9 -3.1 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -3.0 -1.5 -1.2 -8.4 -5.0 0.2 4.5 -5.2 -2.4 -1.7 0.5 4.1 -1.0 -1.3

July -0.7 -3.2 -3.6 -1.6 -1.1 -1.0 -5.0 -7.9 2.3 1.7 4.6 -3.4 0.5 3.7 -0.9 0.7 -5.4 -3.0 -2.5 -0.9 6.8 7.6 3.5 7.0 -4.6 -2.0 0.2 1.4 -0.1 5.1

August 4.1 -0.4 5.4 6.1 2.5 -6.3 -4.3 0.5 0.4 1.9 -0.9 0.4 -3.2 -1.0 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.5 -3.3 1.3 6.3 3.6 -1.5 -4.5 -13.9 -5.4 -7.2 2.3 -5.8 -2.9

September -3.3 -2.7 -7.2 -5.3 -6.1 -8.1 -5.4 -10.9 1.7 -1.0 -1.6 1.1 -1.5 0.8 5.0 2.6 -1.1 3.6 15.9 -9.1 5.9 3.7 1.7 8.9 -9.3 -7.0 0.0 2.6 3.9 3.1

October 8.1 6.4 -4.5 -0.3 -0.8 1.9 2.8 8.8 6.2 5.6 -0.4 1.5 3.5 -1.6 6.3 3.5 8.2 1.7 -12.5 -16.8 -1.9 -1.8 -1.7 3.8 7.0 10.9 1.6 -1.9 5.6 4.6

November 2.8 2.0 -1.5 -7.9 2.3 7.6 4.1 5.8 2.2 0.8 0.8 4.0 3.1 3.7 1.9 1.7 -3.6 -4.2 -8.9 -7.1 -1.2 6.0 -1.9 0.0 -0.6 -0.2 -4.5 0.6 0.2 3.0

December 9.8 5.9 2.3 0.5 6.5 0.9 -7.4 -5.8 -0.4 5.3 -0.2 3.4 -1.3 0.0 1.4 1.4 -4.3 -0.7 -4.0 1.1 5.5 1.9 0.5 6.7 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.9 3.6 2.5

YTD

TOTAL31.0 21.0 -4.5 -9.1 16.5 -11.9 -22.2 -22.1 35.1 28.6 20.6 10.9 2.6 4.9 25.2 15.8 -3.2 5.5 -18.1 -37.0 37.1 26.5 10.5 15.1 -24.9 2.1 -1.7 16.0 16.6 32.4 6.8 1.0

2004 2006 2007 2008 20091999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20142013201220112005 2010

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Kase Capital Investment Team

Whitney Tilson Managing Partner & Portfolio Strategist

Professional Service Team

AUDITOR Rothstein, Kass & Company

BOOKKEEPER Cohen & Associates (domestic funds)

LEGAL COUNSEL Sadis & Goldberg LLC (domestic funds)

PRIME BROKER Goldman Sachs

OFFSHORE Fairview Investment Admin.

ADMINISTRATOR (Tilson Offshore Fund only)

OFFSHORE Walkers (Caymans)

LEGAL COUNSEL Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (U.S.)

Kelli Alires Office Manager & Investor Relations

Mr. Tilson’s

biography is

on page 14

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Opportunistic Value Investment Strategy

We believe that the market is mostly efficient most of the time, with a bias

toward overvaluation. • But in very rare, often temporary circumstances, extremely attractive investment

opportunities present themselves

Such opportunities are often driven by human irrationality, so we have studied

behavioral finance extensively.

Such opportunities can appear in any sector and type of stock, so we are

market cap agnostic and invest across many sectors that fall within our circle of

competence.

Such opportunities typically fall into three categories:

Unknown

5,000+ stocks with no

analyst coverage

Microcaps

Thinly traded stocks

Unloved

Missed earnings estimates

Sector is distressed/out of

favor

Tainted history

Restructurings/turnarounds

Declining businesses

Governance issues

Litigation issues

Financial distress

Special Situations

Spin-offs

Bankruptcies/

Post-bankruptcies

CIRCLE OF • Do we understand this company and its industry deeply? COMPETENCE • Can we make reasonable projections about the company’s future? • We try to keep it simple. Our best investment ideas can usually be

explained in a short paragraph. • We rarely invest in tech/biotech, emerging companies or technologies,

momentum stocks, etc. COMPANY & • Company evaluation: Is this a good business? Does it have INDUSTRY sustainable competitive advantages? High returns on capital? Solid,

steady growth? Healthy balance sheet? Strong free cash flow? • Often involves company visit, management and customer interviews. • Industry evaluation: Is this a good industry? Are the trends favorable?

What are the competitive dynamics? • We seek an informational edge, often via proprietary sources or

scuttlebutt research. MANAGEMENT • Are they good operators? • Are they good capital allocators? • Are they trustworthy and shareholder friendly? VALUATION • Is the stock really, really cheap? Why? • What is our variant perception?

Four-Step Company Evaluation Process

We seek to buy at highly attractive prices the stocks of good businesses that we

understand well, run by capable, honest and shareholder-friendly management. -7-

Buying and Selling Discipline

We invest infrequently, only after we

have done extensive analysis and

developed tremendous conviction.

We prefer to buy great companies at

good prices.

• But are willing to buy lower-quality

companies if the stock is cheap enough

Assuming our investment thesis and

estimate of intrinsic value are

unchanged, we view stock declines as

buying opportunities.

Buying Selling

We retest our investment theses

regularly and actively seek out

contrary data.

We sell:

If the stock reaches intrinsic value.

To reallocate the capital into other,

better investment opportunities.

To avoid too much concentration in

one stock or sector.

If the investment thesis changes.

• We seek to quickly identify and

acknowledge mistakes

We are often proactively inactive. While we constantly review current and

potential investments, when we like what we own and can’t find anything

that makes us tremendously enthusiastic buyers, we will make no

changes whatsoever to our portfolio for weeks, even months.

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Concentrated Portfolio Management

We do not believe in diluting our best ideas with inferior ones, so we invest in a

concentrated fashion.

The portfolio typically has 15-20 meaningful long positions and a somewhat

larger number of significantly smaller short positions.

• An initial long position is usually about 5%

• The largest long positions are typically 8-10% of capital

We short to make money.

• An initial short position is typically around 1%

“Investors have been so oversold on diversification that fear of having too

many eggs in one basket has caused them to put far too little into

companies they thoroughly know and far too much in others about which

they know nothing at all. It never seems to occur to them that buying a

company without having sufficient knowledge of it may be even more

dangerous than having inadequate diversification.”

-- Philip Fisher, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits

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Risk Management

We define risk as the permanent loss of capital. • We believe that buying with a large margin of safety is the best way to mitigate risk

• Only after we conclude that our downside is well protected do we consider the upside potential for most of our investments

We do not equate risk with the inevitable short-term fluctuations in the market quotes of our positions.

Within a concentrated portfolio, we seek significant diversification by type of investment, industry and market capitalization.

We typically use little or no leverage.

On the long side, we typically begin trimming positions in the 10-15% range. • We do not allow any position to exceed 25% of capital

We will typically begin covering a short position if it moves against us to the point that it becomes a 5% or larger position.

• A short-term catalyst is much more important on the short side than the long side

We establish initial price targets, update them regularly and adhere to them strictly.

“Price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor.

They provide him with an opportunity to buy wisely when prices fall sharply

and to sell wisely when they advance a great deal. At other times he will do

better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to…the

operating results of his companies.”

-- Ben Graham, The Intelligent Investor

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Risk Management – Portfolio Limits

Target Portfolio Limits

Maximum Typical Ranges

Gross exposure 200% 100%-150%

Long exposure 120% 90% - 100%

Short exposure 70% 15%-40%

Net long 100% 40% - 80%

Individual long position 25% 3% - 10%

Individual short position 5% 0.5% - 1.5%

Net industry exposure 50% 5% - 20%

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Reporting and Client Service

We want our partners to understand:

• How we think about investing

• Our current thinking and overall portfolio positioning

• The details regarding some of our positions

We communicate via letters to investors and conference calls every quarter.

• All letters since inception are available on our web site

The Principal is very accessible via phone and email.

Investors receive:

• Quarterly letters to investors

• Monthly statements from an independent bookkeeper

• Annual audited financial statements

• Web-based access to all historical investment letters, published articles, and writings

about current and past investments

We seek to treat our partners the way we would like

to be treated were our positions reversed

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Summary Terms of Investment

Kase Fund / Tilson Offshore Fund / Kase Qualified Fund

MANAGEMENT Quarterly fee of 3/8 of 1% (1.5% per annum) of opening capital. FEE

PERFORMANCE 20% profit participation to the general partner. ALLOCATION

MINIMUM $1 million for Kase Fund and Kase Qualified Fund. INVESTMENT $250,000 for Tilson Offshore Fund.

INVESTOR For Kase Fund and Tilson Offshore Fund: QUALIFICATIONS a) $2 million of net worth (excluding equity in one’s home) or a

$1 million investment in the Fund, and b) $1 million of net worth (excluding equity in one’s home) or $200,000 of annual income (or $300,000 with spouse) for each of the last two years and expected this year.

For Kase Qualified Fund: $5 million of investable assets.

ADDITIONS The funds accept capital from current or new investors on the first of every month.

WITHDRAWALS Two options: 1) Full redemption annually, on the anniversary date of the first investment, with 45 days notice; or

2) ¼ redemption quarterly, with 45 days notice.

HIGH WATER Yes. MARK

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Biography of Whitney Tilson

Whitney Tilson, Managing Partner

• Founded Kase Capital (formerly Tilson Capital Partners and T2 Partners LLC) in December 1998.

• Mr. Tilson has co-authored two books, The Art of Value Investing: How the World's Best Investors Beat the

Market (2013) and More Mortgage Meltdown: 6 Ways to Profit in These Bad Times (2009), was one of the

authors of Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the definitive book on Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman Charlie

Munger, and has written for Forbes, the Financial Times, Kiplinger’s, the Motley Fool and TheStreet.com.

He is a CNBC Contributor, was featured in a 60 Minutes segment in December 2008 about the housing

crisis that won an Emmy, was one of five investors included in SmartMoney’s 2006 Power 30, was named

by Institutional Investor in 2007 as one of 20 Rising Stars, has appeared dozens times on CNBC,

Bloomberg TV and Fox Business Network, was on the cover of the July 2007 Kiplinger’s, has been profiled

by the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post, and has spoken widely on value investing and

behavioral finance. He served for two years on the Board of Directors of Cutter & Buck, which designs and

markets upscale sportswear, until the company was sold in early 2007.

• Prior to launching his investment career in 1999, Mr. Tilson spent five years working with Harvard Business

School Professor Michael E. Porter studying the competitiveness of inner cities and inner-city-based

companies nationwide. Before business school, Mr. Tilson was a founding member of Teach for America,

and later spent two years as a consultant at The Boston Consulting Group.

• Mr. Tilson received an MBA with High Distinction from the Harvard Business School, where he was elected

a Baker Scholar (top 5% of class), and graduated from Harvard College, with a bachelor’s degree in

Government magna cum laude.

• Mr. Tilson spent much of his childhood in Tanzania and Nicaragua (his parents were among the first

couples to meet and marry in the Peace Corps). He is a member and past Chairman of the Manhattan

Chapter of the Young Presidents’ Organization, and serves on the board of the KIPP Academy charter

school in the South Bronx.

• Mr. Tilson lives in Manhattan with his wife and three daughters. -14-

Disclaimer

The T2 Accredited Fund, LP (dba the Kase Fund) (the “Fund”) commenced operations on January 1, 1999. The Fund’s investment objective is to achieve long-term after-tax capital appreciation commensurate with moderate risk, primarily by investing with a long-term perspective in a concentrated portfolio of U.S. stocks. In carrying out the Partnership’s investment objective, the Investment Manager, T2 Partners Management, LP (dba Kase Capital Management), seeks to buy stocks at a steep discount to intrinsic value such that there is low risk of capital loss and significant upside potential. The primary focus of the Investment Manager is on the long-term fortunes of the companies in the Partnership’s portfolio or which are otherwise followed by the Investment Manager, relative to the prices of their stocks.

Performance results shown are for the Kase Fund and are presented net of all fees, including management and incentive fees, brokerage commissions, administrative expenses, and other operating expenses of the Fund. Net performance includes the reinvestment of all dividends, interest, and capital gains. Past results are no guarantee of future results and no representation is made that an investor will or is likely to achieve results similar to those shown. All investments involve risk including the loss of principal.

The fee schedule for the Investment Manager includes a 1.5% annual management fee and a 20% incentive fee allocation. For periods prior to June 1, 2004 and after July 1, 2012, the Investment Manager’s fee schedule included a 1% annual management fee and a 20% incentive fee allocation. In practice, the incentive fee is “earned” on an annual, not monthly, basis or upon a withdrawal from the Fund. Because some investors may have different fee arrangements and depending on the timing of a specific investment, net performance for an individual investor may vary from the net performance as stated herein.

The return of the S&P 500 and other indices are included in the presentation. The volatility of these indices may be materially different from the volatility in the Fund. In addition, the Fund’s holdings differ significantly from the securities that comprise the indices. The indices have not been selected to represent appropriate benchmarks to compare an investor’s performance, but rather are disclosed to allow for comparison of the investor’s performance to that of certain well-known and widely recognized indices. You cannot invest directly in these indices.

This document is confidential and may not be distributed without the consent of the Investment Manager and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any security or investment product. Any such offer or solicitation may only be made by means of delivery of an approved confidential offering memorandum.

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