kom meeting 09 oct 06 kick-off-meeting of efda tw6-tsl-002 contracts 06-1412, 06-1413, 06-1414,...
TRANSCRIPT
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
Kick-off-meeting of Kick-off-meeting of
EFDA EFDA TW6-TSL-002TW6-TSL-002 contracts 06-1412, 06-1413, 06-1414, 06-1415contracts 06-1412, 06-1413, 06-1414, 06-1415
Safety assessment for EU TBM to support
ITER Licensing Process
09 Oct 2006 09 Oct 2006
S.Ciattaglia
EU safety contact person
EFDA CSU Garching
Background
•Status of DDD
•Status of safety analysis
•FMEA few results
Aim of the task TSL-002
Summary
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
Status of DDDStatus of DDD
• No modification from the versions of beginning 2006, in particular of the section 3.6No modification from the versions of beginning 2006, in particular of the section 3.6 “Safety “Safety
analysis” that reports the safety analysis performed by the Designers:analysis” that reports the safety analysis performed by the Designers:
– Source terms
– Thermo-mechanical and thermo-hydraulic analysis
The Chapters will be updated/completed with the outputs of the on going safety tasks
Need to define SIC classification for TBM systems and components (request from
Designers)
• a lot of TBM pipes will cross through the closure plate of the Port Plug,a lot of TBM pipes will cross through the closure plate of the Port Plug,
• a lot of TBM pipes will be located in the Port Cell, along with some equipments (e.g. PIC),a lot of TBM pipes will be located in the Port Cell, along with some equipments (e.g. PIC),
Designers would like to better understandDesigners would like to better understand
• what are the implication from the Licensing point of view (those pipes/equipments constitutes a prolongation of what are the implication from the Licensing point of view (those pipes/equipments constitutes a prolongation of
the VV primary boundary). the VV primary boundary).
• Will they be safety-classified? Will they be safety-classified?
• What could be the implication? (double containment, qualification in procurement, etc..).What could be the implication? (double containment, qualification in procurement, etc..).
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
Safety analysis scheme
P IE Initiating EventsAS Accident SequencesFMEA Functional Failure Mode and Effect AnalysisPST Process Source TermEST Environmental Source TermDCF Dose Conversion Factor
SOURCE TERMS
ASSESSMENT
Normal working conditions Occupational dose
IEAS
Thermodynamic transients Aerosols and H3 transport
Containments Release from the plant DCF
Overall Plant AnalysisFFMEA
Radioactive waste Operational&Decomm wasteIdentification&classification
Management•On-site•Recycling•Final disosal
Effluents
PST
PST EST
DCF
man*Sv/y
dose/sequence to MEI
frequency*dose
Quantity and waste categories
mSv/y
SOURCE TERMS
ASSESSMENT
Normal working conditions Occupational dose
PIEAS
Thermodynamic transients Aerosols and H3 transport
Containments Release from the plant DCF
Overall Plant Safety AnalysisFMEA
Radioactive waste Operational&Decomm wasteIdentification&classification
Management•On-site•Recycling•Final disosal
Effluents
PST
PST EST
DCF
man*Sv/y
dose/sequence to Public
frequency*dose
Quantity and waste categories
mSv/y
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
Status of safety analysisStatus of safety analysis
EU safety analysis aimEU safety analysis aim• bring TBM safety analysis to similar maturity level of other SIC systems bring TBM safety analysis to similar maturity level of other SIC systems
as requested by French regulations, considering also the as requested by French regulations, considering also the recommendations made by NSA as output of DOS analysisrecommendations made by NSA as output of DOS analysis
• point out open issues and a relevant credible R&D programmepoint out open issues and a relevant credible R&D programme
Significant safety analysis have been already done by the EU TBM Designers Significant safety analysis have been already done by the EU TBM Designers
Safety analysis missing/to be rewievedSafety analysis missing/to be rewieved• Neutronic review: Neutronic review: report ready for HCLL, by Dec for HCPB report ready for HCLL, by Dec for HCPB • FMEA: FMEA: almost concluded for HCPB, just started for HCLLalmost concluded for HCPB, just started for HCLL• Most severe accidents: Most severe accidents: KoM todayKoM today • ORE: ORE: KoM todayKoM today • Waste review: Waste review: KoM todayKoM today
• R&D and further analysis definition: R&D and further analysis definition: mid 2007mid 2007
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
Component
Operation States
Failure Modes
Causes
Preventive Action on Causes
Consequences
Corrective/Preventive Action on Consequences
PIEs
Comments
FMEA Table (columns)
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis Garching – 28 September 2006
Normal Operation = Burning & Dwell
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
HCPB Components (~ 140)- Component -- Component - DescriptionDescription CommentComment
TBMTBM Test Blanket ModuleTest Blanket Module
TBM-FSWTBM-FSW TBM-First-Side wallTBM-First-Side wall 42 channels (14 of 2-sweep-channels), 42 channels (14 of 2-sweep-channels), ~~1.7 m each1.7 m each
TBM-CapTBM-Cap TBM-CapsTBM-Caps 2 caps. Each cap 2 caps. Each cap ~~25 channels of about 1.6 m25 channels of about 1.6 m
TBM-GridTBM-Grid TBM-GridTBM-Grid
TBM-Grid-CoolChTBM-Grid-CoolCh TBM - Grid - Cooling ChannelTBM - Grid - Cooling Channel
TBM-Grid-CapWeldTBM-Grid-CapWeld TBM - Grid - Welds to assemble the Grid to CapsTBM - Grid - Welds to assemble the Grid to Caps
TBM-Grid-FSWWeldTBM-Grid-FSWWeld TBM - Grid - Welds to assemble the Grid to FSWTBM - Grid - Welds to assemble the Grid to FSW
TBM-Grid-BUWeldTBM-Grid-BUWeld TBM - Grid - Welds to assemble the BU to GridTBM - Grid - Welds to assemble the BU to Grid
TBM-BUTBM-BU TBM-Breeder UnitTBM-Breeder Unit PI-TBM foreseen for the high-duty D-T-phase of ITER-PI-TBM foreseen for the high-duty D-T-phase of ITER-FEATFEAT
TBM-BottPMsTBM-BottPMs TBM - Bottom Plate ManifoldsTBM - Bottom Plate Manifolds
TBM-BPMTBM-BPM TBM-Back Plate/ManifoldTBM-Back Plate/Manifold
TBM-PP-ISTBM-PP-IS TBM-Port Plug Interface SystemTBM-Port Plug Interface System
PPPP Port PlugPort Plug
IPCEIPCE Inter-space and Port Cell EquipmentInter-space and Port Cell Equipment
HCSHCS Helium Cooling SystemHelium Cooling System
TESTES Tritium Extraction SystemTritium Extraction System
CPSCPS Coolant Purification SystemCoolant Purification System
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 28 September 2006
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
Sample of FMEA Table
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis Garching – September 2006
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
Postulated Initiating Events Identified by the FMEA for HCPB
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis Garching – September 2006
- PIEs - DescriptionFB1 Loss of flow in a TBM cooling circuit because of circulator/pump seizureFB2 Partial flow blockage in a TBM cooling circuit because filter cloggingHB1 Loss of heat sink in TBM cooling circuitLBB1 Loss of TBM cooling circuit inside breeder blanket box: Rupture of a sealing weldLBB2 Loss of TBM cooling circuit inside breeder blanket box: Leak of a sealing weldLBO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of TBM cooling circuit pipe inside TWCS RoomLBO2 LOCA Out-VV because small rupture of TBM cooling circuit pipe inside TWCS RoomLBO3 LOCA Out-VV because rupture of tubes in a primary TBM-HCS HXLBP1 LOCA Out-VV because rupture of a TBM cooling circuit pipe inside Port CellLBP2 LOCA Out-VV because small rupture of TBM cooling circuit pipe inside Port CellLBV1 Loss of TBM cooling circuit inside VV: Rupture of TBM-FSWLBV2 Loss of TBM cooling circuit inside VV: Leak from TBM-FSWLFP2 LOCA Out-VV because small rupture of PFW/BLK cooling circuit pipe inside Port CellLFV2 Small PFW/BLK in vessel LOCA. Equivalent break size: a few cm2LVP2 Small rupture of VV cooling circuit pipe inside Port CellLVV2 Small rupture in the internal VV shell - equivalent break size: a few cm2TBP2 Leak inside Port Cell from TBM purge gas circuit (i.e.: from TES)VBG1 Loss of vaccum in VV: break inside the VV of TBM purge gas systemVBG2 Loss of vaccum in VV: leak inside VV from TBM purge gas systemVVA2 Ingress of air in the VV - small leakage
N/S Not Safety Relevant
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
AIM of the Task TSL-002AIM of the Task TSL-002
• Deterministic analysis of the most severe accident sequences for each Deterministic analysis of the most severe accident sequences for each of the two EU TBM concepts of the two EU TBM concepts Occupational Radiation Exposure (ORE) assessment considering the Occupational Radiation Exposure (ORE) assessment considering the new designs of the two EU TBM modelsnew designs of the two EU TBM modelsWaste assessment for both TBM concept considering the new Waste assessment for both TBM concept considering the new neutronic calculationsneutronic calculations
The analysis will take advantage of the work already done inside the The analysis will take advantage of the work already done inside the Design TeamsDesign Teams
A technical co-ordination is foreseen focused on addressing, A technical co-ordination is foreseen focused on addressing, supporting and reviewing the safety analysis with particular reference supporting and reviewing the safety analysis with particular reference to the deterministic analysis, the relevant modelisation of circuits and to the deterministic analysis, the relevant modelisation of circuits and volumes, the codes and the assumptions with reference to the last volumes, the codes and the assumptions with reference to the last updated design documents and the technical content description of updated design documents and the technical content description of TBM preliminary safety analysis report. TBM preliminary safety analysis report.
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
EU TBM safety analysis planEU TBM safety analysis plan
• Neutronic analysisNeutronic analysis April - July (April - July (Oct-DecOct-Dec) 06) 06
• FMEA: PIEsFMEA: PIEs June - Oct 06June - Oct 06
• Accident sequences: DBA and BDBA Accident sequences: DBA and BDBA July (July (SeptSept) 06 - Feb 07) 06 - Feb 07
• Revision of ORE and WasteRevision of ORE and Waste July (July (NovNov) 06 - Feb 07) 06 - Feb 07
• Final ReportFinal Report March 06March 06
• R&D for TBM safety open issues (if any) R&D for TBM safety open issues (if any) by Mid 07by Mid 07
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
SummarySummary
A systematic approach has been launched on EU TBM safety analysis A systematic approach has been launched on EU TBM safety analysis – FMEA and PIE-PIT– Review of neutronics, ORE, Wastes– Accident sequences analysis
Some delay in Neutronic analysis, slightly in FMEA (it will be ready by Oct)Some delay in Neutronic analysis, slightly in FMEA (it will be ready by Oct)• PlanningPlanning
– by March 2007 all the analysis missing (most severe accidents, ORE, Wastes)– in 2007, safety review of Final Design and definition of R&D for the safety open
issues, if any
Quality of analysis and computer codesQuality of analysis and computer codes
Need to define SIC classification for TBM systems and componentsNeed to define SIC classification for TBM systems and components
18 Dec 06 next ITER TBM safety meeting: check the progress of TBM safety 18 Dec 06 next ITER TBM safety meeting: check the progress of TBM safety analysis in all Parties analysis in all Parties
KoM meeting 09 Oct 06
09:00 Introduction-status of EU TBM design and plan Y. Po itevin
9.15 Aim of the task TSL-002 S.Ciattaglia
9.30 Overview of the task and coordination: refined
description of the accident sequences, reference data
(AAS), work plan
MT Porfiri
10.30 Coffee break
10.45 Dominant accident analysis for HCPB: detailed
description, work already done during the design that
can be utilised, tools used in the analysis
L.Boccaccini/Jin
11.15 Dominant accident analysis for HCLL: detailed
description, work already done during the design that
can be utilised, tools used in the analysis
LL Sponton
11.45 ORE assessment: work detailed description O.Gastaldi
12.00
Wastes quantification-classification: work detailed description
LL Sponton
12.15 Lunc h
13.15 Disc uss ion All
14.00 Actions, minutes All (MT Porf iri)
AGENDA