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Stephen SchilterPSC 3325Dr. Kudelia12/8/15

Conflict Resolution in Eastern Ukraine:Partition or Frozen Conflict

Words: 3,318 (including works cited)

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Conflict Resolution in Eastern Ukraine

The people of Kiev took to the streets in large numbers after former Ukrainian President

Viktor Yanukovych refused sign the European Union association agreement in 2013. These mass

‘Euromaidan’ demonstrations would eventually result in outbursts of violence and clashes with

authorities. By early 2014 Yanukovych was forced from office and retreated to Russia. The

revolution resulted in new leaders that supported more western integration came to power. In

regions like Donbass and Crimea, the events in Kiev were seen as an illegal coup by militant

extremists. Before long, Russia managed to annex Crimea and armed pro-Russian separatist

groups formed to take advantage of the state’s weakness and declared independence form the

government in Kiev. The government responded by labeling the separatists as terrorists and sent

in the military to reestablish control over the territories. However, the pro-Russian separatists in

the Eastern parts of Donbass, mostly consolidated into the Donetsk and Luhansk People's

Republics and bolstered by foreign support, have been able to resist the Ukrainian army. Since

the fighting began in 2014, roughly 8,000 people have been killed in the conflict as of September

29, 2015 (Šimonović 2015). In this essay I will briefly explain the causes of the civil war in

Donbass using structuralist theory and Rodger Petersen’s model of group emotions. Next I will

apply the ideas of Fearon, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom to explain the duration of the conflict.

Then I will analyze the use of violence, drawing on Kalyvas and Balcells to explain the

“technology of rebellion” that has characterized the fighting. After that I will describe how the

goals of the various actors and other variables involved in shaping the barriers to conflict

resolution. Finally I will present a number of theoretical approaches to achieve successful peace

agreements and their relevance to the war in Donbass. I argue that the conflict will remained

limited in terms of duration and intensity, and that fighting will only really end with partition or

the granting of regional autonomy to the Donbass.

In order to fully understand some key variables in the resolution of the civil war in

Eastern Ukraine, it is important to analyze the broader geopolitical situation that is ultimately

responsible for sparking the conflict. Since the fall of the USSR, the European Union has

steadily expanded to encompass many former Soviet states in Eastern Europe. As the EU

expanded, NATO gain new members in the east. John Mearsheimer accuses these actions by

Europe and the US are the underlying cause of the crisis in Ukraine, pointing out that “the

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taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move

Ukraine out of Russia's orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU'S expansion

eastward and the West's backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with

the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too” Russian suspicions of the real

intentions behind NATO expansion are not a recent development. Shleifer and Treisman wrote

how “Clinton urged aides to help Yeltsin "absorb" or "internalize" NATO enlargement as an

unavoidable reality that he would "just have to get used to and learn to live with"” (Andrei

Shleifer and Daniel Treisman 2011). In 2008 Western leaders, despite protests by the French and

Germans, continued to ignore Russia’s security concerns regarding NATO expansion by

claiming that Ukraine would eventually be given membership. According to a Russian

newspaper, Putin "very transparently hinted that if Ukraine was accepted into NATO, it would

cease to exist" (Mearsheimer 2014). This issue would come to a head when former Ukrainian

President Yanukovych, bending to Russian pressure, refused to sign the EU Association

Agreement in favor of closer economic ties with the Russian Federation.

Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement led to massive protests in Kiev

and would eventually lead to the president being removed from office. The Euromaidan protests

and revolution proved to weaken the Ukrainian state. Shortly after the ousting of Yanukovych,

which Russian President Vladimir Putin saw is an illegal coup against a democratically elected

government, Russia annexed and occupied Crimea. This further demonstrated the weakness of

the Ukrainian state. For theorist James Fearon, low state capacity is the main cause of rebellion

or insurgency. He states that “weakness results from some kind of economic or political shock to

government capabilities, such as a sharp economic downturn, the cessation of foreign military or

development aid, or a political collapse at the center” (Fearon 2004). Serhiy Kudelia points other

structural causes of the civil war, namely that the state was fractured, seen as illegitimate, and

incapable of effective coercive force (Kudelia, Domestic Sources of the Donbas Insurgency

2014).

Kudelia also analyzes the situation in the Donbass using Roger Petersen’s theory on

group emotions. Kudelia focuses on the impact of the emotions of resentment and fear. He writes

that “Resentment emerges out of a perception that one’s group has been unfairly subordinated

and would remain in a politically inferior status unless force is used” (Kudelia, Domestic

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Sources of the Donbas Insurgency 2014). The population of the Donbass region is home to a

large number of ethnic Russians. They were also supporters of the deposed Yanukovych, whose

opposition now fully controlled the government in Kiev. The new government prosecuted former

members of Yanukovych’s party, revoked the law that made Russian an official regional

language, and threatened to cut off access to Russian media. For the population of Donbass, 82%

of whom claim Russian as their mother tongue, these policies produced a strong sense of

resentment. “Secession,” therefore, “was not only a path to protect one’s status but also one’s

human dignity” (Kudelia, Domestic Sources of the Donbas Insurgency 2014).

During the revolution in Kiev, the anti-government demonstrators proved their capacity

for violence. Militant ultra-nationalist groups like Right Sector instigated violent clashes with the

police and seized public buildings by force. The presence of these types of militants and the

apparent inability of the state to protect their safety resulted in the formation of “self-defense”

units in Donbass even before Yanukovych was removed from office. The significance of these

militias is reflected in the survey that showed up to 46% of the people in Donetsk and 33% in

Luhansk “viewed disarming illegal radical groups as the main step in maintaining the country’s

unity” (Kudelia, Domestic Sources of the Donbas Insurgency 2014). However, the government

in Kiev only exacerbated the sense of fear in the situation by allowing groups like Right Sector

to work with the military in its operations against separatists in Donbass (Kudelia, Domestic

Sources of the Donbas Insurgency 2014). The structural and emotional causes of the conflict

might also partly explain the duration of this particular civil war.

According to James Fearon, conflicts between the government and a secessionist or

autonomy-seeking rebel group, averaging 12.9 years, tend to last longer than coups targeting the

center. He also finds that wars in Eastern Europe tend to be an average of three times shorter

than in other parts of the world. The relationship between respective military capabilities of both

opposing forces and conflict duration depends on a number of other variables. A more balanced

distribution of power does seem to increase the likelihood of peace negotiations, but the support

of diasporas or foreign states cause wars to drag on longer. On the other hand, Collier and

Hoeffler argue that ethnic divisions cause longer wars while international intervention on the

side of the rebels leads to a shorter duration of the war (Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Måns

Söderbom 2014). They reason that rebels can simply take cover and hide if the enemy is

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overwhelming whereas the state cannot. Serhiy Kudelia cites a study by Balcells and Kalyvas to

highlight another possible explanation for why external support for the rebels could lead to a

shorter war, namely that a balance of power allows for the state of conventional warfare. Local

support for the separatists in Donbass is high enough that, if the anti-government forces were

pushed out of the cities, an irregular war, which last longer than conventional wars, could

develop (Kudelia, Will Eastern Ukraine turn into Northern Ireland? 2014). The war in Eastern

Ukraine is over a year old and as of now showing signs that a resolution might be reached soon.

However, there are several barriers to achieving a peaceful settlement in the Donbass.

These include issues regarding the security dilemma heightened by the ethnic nature of the

conflict, the goals of the warring parties, and the power-balancing role of external actors

preventing either side from achieving a decisive victory. Barbra Walter argues that the impact

security dilemma is more problematic for civil war resolution than it is for interstate wars. The

difference “is that adversaries in a civil war cannot retain separate, independent armed forces if

they agree to settle their differences.” When two states agree to end an armed struggle, they can

simply retreat to their own territory and retain their military capabilities. However, by definition,

there can only be one military force within the borders of a single state. Consequently one side

must disarm itself. This is problematic because “once they lay down their weapons and begin to

integrate their separate assets into a new united state, it becomes almost impossible to either

enforce future cooperation or survive attack” (Walter 1997). Unilateral disarmament removes

any grounds for cooperation because “it discredits any promise to abide by the terms of an

agreement even if offered in good faith, and, second, it increases groups’ anxiety about future

security and makes them hypersensitive to even the smallest treaty violation” (Walter 1997).

The issue of the security dilemma is made more significant in ethnic conflicts due to, as Chaim

Kaufmann explains, the “hardening of identities.” Kaufmann argues that “war hardens ethnic

identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals become futile, which means that victory

can be assured only by physical control over the territory in dispute. Ethnic wars also generate

intense security dilemmas, both because the escalation of each side's mobilization rhetoric

presents a real threat to the other” (Kaufmann 1996). The experience of both sides of the

Ukrainian civil war demonstrates how the security dilemma has driven citizens to violence.

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That Russia has a significant interest and substantial influence over Ukraine is no secret.

But after the signing of Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in 1994, Ukraine had

little to fear from any existential threats (Pifer 2014). The US, UK, and Russian Federation all

committed to respecting Ukrainian borders and sovereignty. However, recent events have given

Ukraine cause to worry about Russian aggression. While the some resented Russian influence

over Yanukovych, the annexation of Crimea presented the Ukrainians with a direct threat to their

national sovereignty. Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk claimed that men with “clear

Russian accents” were causing trouble at the behest of foreign intelligence services (Richard

Balmforth and Natalia Zinets 2014). Not only did Russia’s actions threaten Ukraine, it also

prevented a possibly decisive victory over the separatist forces. Additionally, the lack of decisive

intervention in line with the Budapest Memorandum has shaken their trust in relying on others

for defense. Even politicians like Oleh Lyashko personally take part in illegally hunting down

anti-government activists (Kudelia, Will Eastern Ukraine turn into Northern Ireland? 2014). The

view that Putin is plotting the destruction of their country by mobilizing ethnic Russians has

made Ukrainians more resistant to make any compromises with rebel groups. The security

dilemma also gave ethnic Russians in Ukraine reasons to fear. Militant groups like Right Sector

instigated violent action against those they perceived as pro-Russian. Pro-Ukrainian

demonstrations, as seen in Odessa, have resulted in indiscriminate violence. Rather than cracking

down on these paramilitary groups, the new government has incorporated them into their

operations in Donbass (Kudelia, Domestic Sources of the Donbas Insurgency 2014). This has

shown that the separatists cannot trust the government to uphold any agreement should they

disarm. Propaganda from both sides has further hardened ethnic identities. Both sides have also

violated several separate attempts to bring about a ceasefire.

Failure to bring about an end to the violence and restabilize the country has made

external mediation necessary. There were attempts by Poroshenko to open up a dialog with the

unarmed opposition forces, but they refused and the fighting continued. The first official meeting

of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine took place on June 8th 2014 (Daria Marchak, Daryna

Krasnolutska and Volodymyr Verbyany 2014). The group allowed for communication between

Russia, Ukraine and separatist leaders. The OSCE acted as mediators during the talks. Eventually

Poroshenko revealed his plan to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict. On June 20th, he

announced a ceasefire and hoped the rebels would abide (Laura Smith-Spark and Victoria

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Butenko 2014). But nevertheless, fighting continued and the ceasefire was violated. Further

meetings in Minsk worked to find agreement based on Poroshenko’s peace plan, which included

promises of constitutional reforms. These reforms would allow regions like Donbass to have a

larger degree of self-rule, but falls short of actually creating an autonomous region or

federalizing Ukraine. When fighting continued, a second meeting took place in Minsk. This time

the negotiations were conducted by the heads of Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine rather

than their representatives (Roth 2015). Fighting continued after the negotiations concluded, but

eventually declined after leaders pushed for a renewal of the ceasefire on September 1st, 2015

(Makhovsky 2015).

Wallensteen and Svensson reported that “facilitative and formulative strategies are more

useful in territorial (secessionist) wars.” The OSCE, primarily represented by German

Chancellor Angela Merkel, has played an important facilitative role in its mediation. The first

and second Minsk accords were based on President Poroshenko’s original peace plan. More

support for the OSCE’s facilitative role comes from Wallensteen and Svensson’s finding that

“that the most durable agreements may be those reached with as little outside help as possible.”

The OSCE has been accused of being too soft on Putin in an effort to protect their economic

interests in Russia at the expense of Ukrainian sovereignty. Some Ukrainians demand that the

OSCE send in military forces or at least supply the Ukrainian army to do the job (Goncharenko

2014). Jacob Bercovitch and Gerald Schneider reported that “intellectual dexterity and

persuasiveness in dealing with such problems as the transmission of information ... are apt to be

more important determinants of success than the possession of any instruments of physical

coercion'” (Jacob Bercovitch and Gerald Schneider 2000). Germany’s role as a lead mediator

makes sense in this sense, because German foreign policy has been based on successful

European integration and the refusal to use military force. The question of Germany’s actual bias

is an interesting one. Wallensteen and Svensson find “that biased mediators sometimes have

more leverage than other mediators” (Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson 2014). Germany

national interest was obviously a concern when violence intensified in the region. Although

previous German leaders had encouraged pro-Russian relations, Merkel came to power “having

no illusions about the character of the Russian regime, she clearly saw the necessity to push back

against a regime that was becoming increasingly aggressive” (Speck 2015). Germany has a

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relatively close relationship with and some economic leverage on Russia, but also opposes his

actions and supports Ukraine’s government.

However, the demands of the two sides and the ethnic nature of the conflict might prove to be

incompatible with the peaceful resolution as it exists now. After the Second Minsk Accords,

Poroshenko made it clear that “we did not agree to any mention of federalization either. There

will be no autonomy and no federalization” (Reuters 2015). While Poroshenko is demanding a

ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign fighters, he does not seem to call for immediate total

disarming of the rebels. Yet while the separatists demand partition or autonomy, Poroshenko is

refusing both. He plans to make decentralizing changes to the constitution and keep the unitary

state. According to both Downes and Kaufmann, this appears to be destined to fail. Downes

argues that “concern over the future intentions of former adversaries and the specific properties

of ethnic wars discourage solutions to ethnic wars short of military victory for one side or

partition, and undermine the success of negotiated settlements if implemented” (Downes 2004).

Uncertainty about future intentions is made worse by the intense violence and political dissent in

Kiev as the parliament passed laws granting more autonomy to the Donbass region (CNN 2015).

This also supports Kaufmann’s focus on hardened ethnic identities making it impossible for a

state to recover from ethnic war, concluding that “ethnic wars can end in only three ways: with

complete victory of one side; by temporary suppression of the conflict by third party military

occupation; or by self-governance of separate communities” (Kaufmann 1996).

So long as Poroshenko rejects regional autonomy and Russian forces continue to support

the separatists, it seems unlikely that fighting will come to an end. Foreign military intervention

might be necessary to force both sides to ceasefire and restabilize the country. However, without

securing more autonomy for the Donbass region, violence is likely to reignite, and maintaining a

frozen conflict in the country could be seen as favorable for Russian leaders.

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