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Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989Author(s): Timur KuranSource: World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Oct., 1991), pp. 7-48Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010422

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NOW OUT OF NEVER

The Element f Surprisen theEast

EuropeanRevolution f 1989By TIMUR KURAN*

I. UNITED IN AMAZEMENT

UR jaws cannot drop any lower," exclaimed Radio Free Eu-

rope one day in late 1989. t was commenting n the electrify-ing collapseofEasternEurope's communist egimes.'The political and-scape of the entireregionchanged suddenly, stonishing ven themostseasoned political observers. n a matterof weeks entrenched eaderswere overthrown,he communistmonopolyon powerwas abrogated none country fter nother, nd persecuted ritics f the communist ys-temwere catapulted ntohighoffice.

In the West theranksofthestunned ncludedchampionsof theview

thatcommunist otalitarianisms substantiallymore stablethanordinaryauthoritarianism.2It has tobe conceded,"wrotea leading proponent fthisview in early 1990,"that thoseof us who distinguishbetween thetwo non-democratic ypesof governmentunderestimated he decay ofCommunistcountries nd expectedthecollapseof totalitarianismotakelongerthanhas actuallyturnedout to be thecase."3Anotheracknowl-edged herbewilderment hrough he titleof a new book: The WitheringAwayoftheTotalitarian tate. . . AndOther urprises.4

* This researchwas supported ythe National Science Foundationundergrantno. SES-880803 . A segment f thepaperwas drafted uring sabbatical, inanced artly ya fellow-shipfrom he National Endowmentfor he Humanities, t the nstitute orAdvancedStudyin Princeton. am indebted oWolfgangFach,Helena Flam, JackGoldstone,Kenneth Ko-ford,Pavel Pelikan,Jean-Philippe latteau,WolfgangSeibel,Ulrich Witt, nd three non-ymousreadersforhelpful omments.

1 BernardGwertzman nd Michael T. Kaufman, ds.,TheCollapse f Communism,ytheCorrespondentsf "The New YorkTimes" New York: Times Books, 1990),vii.

2 For an early tatementfthisthesis, ee Hannah Arendt,The Origins f Totalitarianism,2d ed. (1951; reprint,New York: World Publishing,1958),pt. 3. Arendtsuggested that

communismweakens interpersonal onds rooted n family, ommunity, eligion, nd pro-fession, situation hatmakes ndividuals erriblyependent n thegoodwillof the state ndthusblocksthemobilization f an anticommunistevolt.

' Richard Pipes, "Gorbachev'sRussia: Breakdownor Crackdown?" Commentary, arch1990,p. 16.

4Jeane J.Kirkpatrick, he Witheringwayofthe Totalitarian tate .. AndOther urprises(Washington,D.C.: AEI Press, 1990).A decade earlierKirkpatrick ad articulated variantof Arendt's thesis, nsisting hat thecommunist ystems incapableof self-propelledvolu-

World olitics 4 (October1991),7-48



8 WORLD POLITICS

Even scholarswho had rejected he conceptofa frozen nd immobileregion were amazed by the eventsof 1989. n 1987 the American Acad-emy of Arts and Sciences invited a dozen specialists,ncludingseveral

living in Eastern Europe, to prepare interpretivessayson East Euro-pean developments.As the Daedalus issuefeaturing heseessays went topress, heuprisings ookoff, romptingmany authorsto change"wholesentencesand paragraphs n what were once thoughtto be completedessays."Daedalus editorStephenGraubardremarks n hisprefaceto theissue: "A quarterly ournal has been obliged to adapt, inconveniently,but in some measure necessarily, he techniquesof a weeklyor even adaily newspaper."5Graubard proudly pointsout that even before the

last-minute evisions heessaysoffered emarkable nsights nto the in-tellectual, ocial, and political stirrings hat were transforminghe re-gion. But he concedesthatneitherhe nor hisessayists oresawwhat wasto happen. Recalling thatin a planningsessionhe had asked whetheranythingcould be done to avoid publishing"an issue that will seem'dated' threeyearsafterpublication,"he continues:"Was thispassage apremonition f all thatwas to follow? One wishes that one could claimsuchextraordinary rescience.Regrettably,tdid notreally xist."6

Wise statesmen, iscerning iplomats, nd gifted ournalistswere alsocaught offguard. So too were futurologists. ohnNaisbitt's celebratedMegatrends, hich sold eightmillioncopies in theearly 1980s,does notpredictthe fallof communism.7As the Economist bserved even beforethe East European Revolutionhad run itscourse,1989turned out to bea yearwhen "the mostquixoticoptimists"were repeatedly proved toocautious."8

Within Eastern Europe itself he revolution ame as a surpriseevento leading "dissidents." n a 1979essay,"The Power ofthe Powerless,"VaiclavHavel recognizedthattheregimesofEastern Europe were any-thingbut nvincible.They mightbe toppled,hewrote,bya "socialmove-ment, an "explosionofcivil unrest," r a "sharp conflict nsidean ap-

tion.See Kirkpatrick,Dictatorshipsnd Double Standards,"Commentary,ovember 1979,pp. 34-45.

5 Graubard, "Preface to the Issue 'EasternEurope ... Central Europe ... Europe,'

Daedalus 119 Winter1990),vi.6 Ibid., ii.7 Naisbitt,Megatrends: en New Directions ransformingur Lives (New York: Warner

Books, 1982).The monthsfollowing he East European Revolution aw the appearanceofJohnNaisbittand PatriciaAburdene,Megatrends000: Ten New Directionsor the1990's(New York: WilliamMorrow, 1990).This sequel characterizes he East European develop-ments of the late 1980sas an unforeseen political earthquake" and thenpredicts hat the1990swillwitness hefurtherrosionof communismchap. 3).

8 Economist, ovember 18, 1989,p. 13.



SURPRISE IN THE EAST EUROPEAN REVOLUTION 9

parentlymonolithic power structure," mong other possibilities.9 hisessay is at once a brilliantprobe into the communistsystem's tabilityand a penetrating rognosisof itsultimatedemise. Yet it steersclear of

speculationon the timingof the collapse. It is repletewith statementssuch as "we must see the hopelessness ftrying o make long-rangepre-dictions"and "far-reaching oliticalchange s utterly nforeseeable," l-thoughit ends on a cautiouslyoptimisticnote: "What if [the brighterfuture']has been herefora long time already, nd onlyour own blind-ness and weaknesshas prevented s from eeing taroundus and withinus,and keptus fromdeveloping t?."10

Eight yearslater Havel himselfwould exhibit "blindness" to events

that were ushering n a "brighter uture."Less thanthreeyearsbeforethe revolutionhe commentedas follows on therousingwelcome givenbya Prague crowdtovisiting oviet eaderMikhailGorbachev:

I feelsad; this nationof ours never earns. How manytimes has it put allits faith n some externalforcewhich,it believed,would solve its prob-lems? . . . And yethere we are again, making exactlythe same mistake.They seem to thinkthat Gorbachev has come to liberatethem from Hu-sa~k!

In late 1988,with ess than a yeartogo,Havel was stillunsure about thedirection fevents:

Maybe [theMovementforCivil Liberties]will quicklybecome an integralfeatureof our country's ife, lbeit one not particularly eloved of the re-gime. . . . Perhaps it will remain forthe time being merelythe seed ofsomethingthatwill bear fruit n the dim and distant future. t is equallypossiblethattheentire matter"will be stampedon hard.'2

Other Czechoslovak dissidentswere just as unpreparedforthe revo-lution. n November 1989JanUrban suggestedthattheoppositioncon-testthenational elections cheduled forJune 1991-only tobe ridiculedbyhis friends ormakinga hopelessly topian proposal."3Within a mat-ter of days, theywere all celebrating he fall of Czechoslovakia's com-munistdictatorship.

9Havel, "The Power of the Powerless" 1979), nHavel etal., ThePowerof thePowerless:

Citizens gainst he State n Central-Easternurope,ed. JohnKeane and trans.Paul Wilson(Armonk,N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1985),42.10 bid., 87, 89,96.11Havel, "Meeting Gorbachev" (1987), in William M. Brinton nd Alan Rinzler,eds.,

Without orceor Lies: Voicesrom heRevolutionfCentral urope n1989-90 San Francisco:MercuryHouse, 1990),266.

12 Havel, "Cards on theTable" (1988), nBrinton nd Rinzler fn. 11), 270-71.13 SidneyTarrow, " 'Aimingat a MovingTarget': Social Science and theRecentRebel-

lions n EasternEurope,"PS: Political cience ndPolitics 4 (March 1991), 12.



10 WORLD POLITICS

A few monthsbeforethe revolution,n neighboringPoland negotia-tionswere underway between the communist egime nd Solidarity, hetrade union that for years had been demanding political pluralism.To

the surprise falmosteveryone, he regime greed inApril 1989 to holdopen elections for a pluralistic parliament. n elections scheduled forJuneall 100 Senate seats and 161 of the 460 Assembly seats would becontestable.Exceeding the wildest expectations, olidaritywon all butone of the Senate seats in addition to all of theAssemblyseats it wasallowed to contest.Stunned by the enormity f this success, Solidarityofficialsworried that the electoratehad gone too far, hatvictorywouldforceSolidarity ntomakingbold politicalmovessimply osatisfy aised

hopes. They fearedthat uch moves would provokea communist rack-down. The significant oint s thatneither hegovernment orSolidaritywas preparedforsuch a lopsided result.The April accord was designedtogive Solidarity voiceinParliament,not to substantiate nd legitimateits claim to beingthevoice ofthePolishpeople.14

We will neverknow how manyEast Europeans foresaw he eventsof1989-or at least the impending changesin theirown countries.But ateach step, ournalistic ccounts nvariably ainteda pictureof a stunnedpublic.For example,twodaysafter hebreaching f theBerlinWall, theNew YorkTimescarriedan article n which an East German remarks:"It's unfathomable. f you had told me that one week ago, I wouldn'thave believed t.Mentally, still an't. t will take a fewdaysbeforewhatthis means sinks n.""5

I know ofonlyone systematic tudyof relevance.Four monthsafterthe fallof communism n East Germany, he Allensbach nstitute sked

a broad sample of East Germans: "A year ago did you expect such apeaceful revolution?"Only 5 percentanswered in the affirmative,l-though 18 percentanswered "yes,but not that fast."Fully 76 percentindicatedthat therevolutionhad totally urprised hem.16These figuresare all the more remarkablegiven the "I knew it would happen" fal-

14 On the elections nd thereactions hey enerated,ee thereports fJohn aglibue,NewYorkTimes,June -6, 1989. The events eadingup to theAprilaccordhave beenchronicledand interpreted yTimothy Garton Ash, "Refolution:The Springtime f Two Nations,"

New YorkReviewofBooks,June15, 1989,pp.3-10. He observed: "Almost no one imagined

that the greatgulf between the power' and 'the society,' etweenJaruzelski nd Walesa,could be so swiftly ridged" (p. 6). For another nformativeccountof Poland's politicaltransformation,ee Elie Abel, The Shattered loc: BehindtheUpheaval n EasternEurope(Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 990), hap.4.

15 New YorkTimes,November12, 1989,p. 1.16 Question36 on the East German Surveyof the Institut urDemoskopie Allensbach,

February17-March15, 1990, Archiveno. 4195 GEW. I am indebtedto ElisabethNoelle-Neumann,director fthe nstitute,or greeing o insert hisquestion nto a broader urveyon East Germanpolitical pinions.




lacy-the human tendency oexaggerateforeknowledge."7ven trainedhistorians uccumb to thisfallacy, ortraying nanticipated ventsas in-evitable,foreseeable, nd actuallyforeseen."8n view of thisfallacy, f

East Germans had been asked a year before the revolution, Do youexpecta revolution n a year'stime?" thepercentage funqualifiedneg-ative answerswould undoubtedlyhave been even higher.

The events that sealed the fateof East Germany's communistregimetook off n thefinaldays of summer,when thousandsof East Germanvacationers n Hungary took advantage of relaxed border controlstoturntheir rips ntopermanentdepartures orWestGermany.The EastGermangovernment espondedbyrestrictingts citizens'access to Hun-

gary, only to see thousandsshow up at the West German embassy inPrague. In theensuing daysitacceded toa seriesofface-saving rrange-mentsbywhich the vacationers oulddepartfortheWest,butonly afterfirst eturninghome. Each new concessionprompted furtherwaves ofemigrants, owever, onfuting hegovernment's xpectation hatthe ex-odus would taperoff uickly.19 he governmentwas not alone in failingtoanticipatewhere eventswere headed. Thousands of East German cit-izens rushed to join the exodus precisely ecause theyfelttheirchancesof reachingthe West would neveragain be so good. Had theyknownthat the BerlinWall was about to come down, few would have left nsuch haste, leaving behind almost all theirpossessions, ncluding theircars.

It mightbe said that some veryknowledgeableobservers f thecom-munist bloc had predicted tsdisintegration eforethecenturywas out.As earlyas 1969,for nstance, heSoviet dissidentAndreiAmalrik wrote

that the Russian Empirewould

break upwithin a

decade anda half.

Althoughit is tempting o credit Amalrikwithexemplaryforesight,rereadingof his famousessayshows thathe expectedtheSoviet Empireto meet its end following protracted nd devastatingwar withChina,not througha stringof popular upheavals. In fact,he explicitly tatedthatthe Soviet system f governmenthad leftpeople too demoralized

17 Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight * Foresight:The Effect f Outcome Knowledge onJudgment nder Uncertainty," ournal f Experimental sychology: uman Perception ndPerformance (August 1975), 288-99; and Baruch Fischhoff nd Ruth Beyth, 'I Knew ItWould Happen'-Remembered Probabilities f Once-FutureThings,"Organizational e-havior ndHumanPerformance3 February1975),1-16.

18 David HackettFischer,Historians' allacies: Toward Logic ofHistoricalThought Lon-don: Routledge nd Kegan Paul, 1971), haps.6-8.

19For a compilation fpertinent eports rom heNew YorkTimes, ee GwertzmanandKaufman (fn. 1), 153-84. Superb eyewitness ccounts ncludeTimothy GartonAsh, "TheGermanRevolution,"New YorkReviewofBooks,December21, 1989,pp. 14-19; and GeorgePaul Csicsery, The Siege ofNogradi Street,Budapest, 1989," n Brinton nd Rinzler(fn.11),289-302.



12 WORLD POLITICS

and too dependenton authority o participate n a spontaneousupris-20ing. So Amalrikdid notreallyforesee heevents f 1989.Like a broken

watchthattellsthecorrect imeevery welvehours,he got thetimingof

the first rack in theempireessentially ight, ut on thebasis of a spu-riousforecast f events.

This is not to suggestthattheEast European explosioncame as totalsurpriseto everyone.Though mostwere astonishedwhen ithappened,and thoughfew who saw itcoming expected ttobe so peaceful, smallnumberof commentatorshad prophesiedthat therevolutionwould beswiftand remarkablybloodless. Havel, despite his above-quoted re-marks, s one ofthese.And VladimirTismaneanu, a Romanian emigreliving nthe UnitedStates, ame closetopredictingmajorchange.Abouta year beforethe collapse of the Romanian regime,he depicted it as"probablythemostvulnerable" n EasternEurope. Sensingan "all-per-vasivediscontent," e observedthat theBrasov riots nNovember 1987,when thousandsof citizens took to the streets, hantedanti-Ceausescuslogans and burned the dictator'sportraits, epresent n unmistakablesignal for Moscow thatuncontrollableviolencemay flareup in Roma-

nia."21Tismaneanu failed to place theRomanianuprising n thecontextof an upheaval spanningall of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies.Nor did he predictthatRomania would be the last Soviet satellitetooverthrow ts government. t is remarkablenonethelessthat he diag-nosed the Romanian regime'svulnerability. ike Havel, he succeededwheremanyWesternobservers ailed,because he understood heweak-nessesthatunderlay heapparent tabilityf the communist ystem. hisunderstandingprepared him for the typeof explosion thateventually

occurred, lthough,as discussedfurthern, it did notendow himwiththeability o predictwhen the revolutionwould breakout.

While thecollapseofthepost-WorldWar II politicalorderofEasternEurope stunned the world, in retrospectit appears as the inevitable con-

sequence of a multitude ffactors.n each of thesixcountries he lead-ershipwas generallydespised, ofty conomicpromisesremained unful-filled, nd freedoms aken forgrantedelsewhereexistedonlyon paper.But if the revolutionwas indeed inevitable,whywas it not foreseen?

Whydid people overlooksignsthat re clearlyvisible fter he fact?Oneof the centralargumentsof thisessayis precisely hat nteractingocialand psychological actorsmake it inherently ifficulto predicttheout-

20 Amalrik,Willthe ovietUnion urvive ntil 984? 1969) New York: Harper and Row,1970), sp. 36-44.

21 Tismaneanu, "Personal Power and PoliticalCrisis in Romania," Governmentnd Op-position 4 (Spring 1989), 193-94.




come ofpoliticalcompetition. shallarguethatthe East European Rev-olution was by no means inevitable. What was inevitableis that wewould be astoundedifand when it arrived.

"The victim of todayis thevictorof tomorrow, And out of NevergrowsNow!"22 Brecht'scouplet capturesperfectly ur centralparadox:seeminglyunshakable regimessaw public sentiment urnagainst themwithastonishing apidity,s tiny ppositionsmushroomed ntocrushingmajorities.Currentlypopular theoriesof revolutionoffer ittle nsightinto this stunningpace; nor for thatmatterdo theyshed lighton theelementof surprise n previousrevolutions.All lay claim to predictivepower,yetnone has a track recordat veritableprediction.The next sec-

tionbriefly ritiquesthepertinent cholarly iterature.Withoutdenyingthe usefulness f some received theories t explainingrevolutions fthepast, I go on to presenta theorythat illuminates both the process ofrevolutionarymobilization and the imits f our ability opredictwhereand when mobilizations will occur. Subsequent sectionsapply this ar-gumentto the case at hand.

The termrevolutions used here in a narrowsenseto denotea mass-supportedseizure of politicalpower that aims to transform he socialorder.Bythisdefinitiont s immaterialwhether heaccomplishedtrans-ferof power bringsabout significantocial change.With regardto theEast European Revolution, t is too earlyto tell whether hepostrevolu-tionary egimeswill succeed in reshaping heeconomy, he egal system,international elations, nd individualrights-to mention ust some ofthe domains on the reformistgenda. But even iftheongoing reformsall end in failure, heupheavalsof 1989 can continuetobe characterized

as a regionwiderevolution.

II. RECEIVED THEORIES OF REVOLUTION AND THEIR PREDICTIVE

WEAKNESSES

In her acclaimedbook States nd SocialRevolutions,heda Skocpol treatssocial revolutionsas the product of structural nd situationalcondi-tions.23pecifically,he arguesthata revolution ccurswhen two condi-

tionscoalesce: (1) a state'sevolvingrelationswithotherstatesand localclasses weaken its abilityto maintain aw and order,and (2) the elitesharmedbythis situation re powerlessto restore he statusquo anteyet

22 BertoltBrecht, Lob derDialectic" In praiseofdialectics, 933), nGedichteFrankfurt:Suhrkamp Verlag, 1961),3:73; poemtranslated yEdithAnderson.

23 Skocpol,States nd Social Revolutions: Comparative nalysis fFrance,Russia, ndChina(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity ress, 1979).



14 WORLD POLITICS

strong nough to paralyze thegovernment. hrough theirobstruction-ismtheelitesgenerate burst fantielite entiment, hich sets nmotionan uprising imed at transforminghe social order.The appeal ofSkoc-

pol's theory ies in its invocationofstructural auses to explain shifts nthe structure fpolitical power. It does notdepend on such "subjective"factorsas beliefs, expectations, ttitudes,preferences,ntentions, ndgoals, althoughthese do creep into structuralist ase studies, ncludingthoseofSkocpol herself.

Tracking emotions nd mental states s a treacherous usiness,whichis why the structuralistchool considers t a virtue to refrainfromap-pealing to them. Social structuresre ostensiblyasier to identify, hichwould seemto endow the structuralistheorywithpredictive uperiorityover "voluntarist" heoriesbased on "rationalchoice." Theories that fallunder the rubric of rational choice have certainly een unsuccessful tpredictingmass upheavals.What they xplainwell is therarity fpop-ular uprisings.24he crucial insight fthe rational-choice chool is thatan individualopposed to the ncumbent egime s unlikely oparticipatein effortso remove t,since thepersonalriskof joininga revolutionary

movementcould outweighthepersonalbenefit hat would accrue werethemovementa success. It is generally n a person'sself-interesto letothersmake the sacrifices equiredto secure theregime'sdownfall,fora revolution constitutes "collective good" -a good he can enjoywhetheror not he has contributed o its realization.With most of theregime's opponents choosingto freeride,an upheaval mayfail tomate-rialize even ifthe potentialrevolutionaries onstitute substantialma-jority.Yet from ime to time revolution oes break out, and thispresents

a puzzle that the standardtheory f rational choice cannot solve. Thestandard theory implyfails to make sense of why the firstpeople tochallengetheregimechoose selflesslyogamblewiththeir ives.25

With respect o theEast European Revolution n particular, he stan-dard theory lluminateswhy,for all theirgrievances, henations of theregionwere remarkably uiescentfor o many years. t does not explainwhy n 1989 theirdocility uddenlygavewayto an explosivedemand forchange. For itspart,thestructuralistheory lucidateswhythe revolu-tion broke out at a timewhen theSovietUnionwas emitting ncreasinglyconvincing ignalsthat twould not use force o try o preserve heEast

24 The seminalcontributions MancurOlson,TheLogicofCollective ction: ublic Goodsand theTheory fGroups 1965; rev.ed.,Cambridge:HarvardUniversity ress, 1971).

25 This point s developed byMichaelTaylor,"Rationalitynd Revolutionary ction," nTaylor, ed.,RationalityndRcvolutionCambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress,1988),63-97. Tayloralso offers n illuminating ritique fstructuralism.




European statusquo. But itexplainsneitherwhythe old ordercollapsedso suddenly n severalcountries t once nor whythe eventsof 1989out-distancedall expectations.

Neitherschoolhas come to termswith ts predictiveweaknesses.Thatgranted,can the deficienciesn question be overcomeby incorporatingadditionalrelationshipsnto these theories? t would seem,on the basisofreasonsdevelopedbelow, thatperfect redictabilitys an unachievableobjective.The theorydeveloped hereaccommodatessome of the majorfeatures nd implicationsof thesetwo theories,with the added virtue,however,of illuminatingwhy major revolutions ome as a surprise ndwhy,even so, they re quite easily explainedafter he act.

Like all unanticipatedrevolutions, he East European Revolution isgeneratingmultitudesof retrospectivexplanationsthatdraw attentiontoits diversecausesand warning igns.To cite ustone example,an essaywritten hortly fterthe fall of the East German regimebeginswith aflashback oApril 1989:twopassengers n an EastGermantrain,mutualstrangers,hare witheach othertheirnegativefeelings bout theregime,within earshot of others-a highlyuncommon event,because of the

ubiquityof nformants. his openinggivesthe mpression hatEast Ger-manywas obviously eaching tsboiling point,althoughthe rest of theessay makes clear that the East German uprisingwas in factscarcelyanticipated.26 ike so much else now rollingoffthe presses,this essayleaves unexplained why events seen in retrospect s harbingersof animminentupheaval were not seenas such before he actual revolution.

Not that signsnoticedin retrospectre necessarily abrications. heavailability euristic,mentalshortcutwe use tocompensateforour cog-

nitive imitations, ighlightsnformation onsistentwith actualevents ttheexpenseofinformationnconsistent iththem.27 ccordingly,ventsconsideredinsignificantwhile the regimelooked stablemay suddenlygain enormous significancefter t falls.Among all the eventsthat areconsistentwitha particular utcome, hosethatfit nto the models at our

disposalwill be theones thatattract ttention. hus, a structuralist illbe predisposedto treat s significanthe structural ignsof thecomingrevolution.These signsneed not be imaginary, ut there s nothing n

26 Edith Anderson,"Town Mice and CountryMice: The East German Revolution," nBrinton nd Rinzler fn.11),170-92.

27 On theavailabilityheuristic,ee Amos Tversky nd Daniel Kahneman, "Availability:A Heuristic forJudgingFrequencyand Probability," ognitive sychology (September1973),207-32. The biases that this heuristicmparts o the use ofhistorical nowledgearediscussedbyShelleyE. Taylor,"The Availability ias in Social Perception nd Interaction,"in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic,and Amos Tversky,eds., Judgmentnder Uncertainty:HeuristicsndBiases Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress,1982), 190-200.



16 WORLD POLITICS

the structuralist heory-or, forthatmatter, n the standardtheoryofrationalchoice-that explains why t sbetter t explanationthanat pre-diction.This paradox is seldomappreciated,partlybecause the authors

of retrospective ccounts do not always concede their wn bafflement.They generallywriteas though theirfavored theory hows the revolu-tion tohave been inevitable, eldompausingtoexplain why, f this s so,they hemselveshad not offered nambiguous,unequivocal forecasts.

If one bete noire of the structuralistchool is the rational-choice p-proach to the studyof revolutions, notheris the relative-deprivationapproach. Accordingto thisthird pproachrevolutions re propelled byeconomicdisappointments,hat s, byoutcomes that fall shortofexpec-

tations. ftheconsequentdiscontent ecomessufficiently idespread,theresult s a revolt.28Withrespect o themajor revolutions he investigates,Skocpol correctly bserves thattheybegan at timeswhen levels of dis-contentwere byhistorical tandardsnot unusual. More evidenceagainsttherelative-deprivationheory omesfromCharles Tilly and his associ-ates, who find that in France the level of collective violence has beenuncorrelatedwith the degree of mass discontent.29hus, the relative-deprivation theoryneitherpredictsnor explains.The reason is simple.While relativedeprivation s doubtless a factor n everyrevolution nhistory,t is too common in politically table societies o providea com-plete explanationforeveryobserved nstability. y implication, o treatrelativedeprivation s an unmistakable ignof impending revolution sto subjectoneselfto a continuous tring falarms,mostlyfalse.

III. PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION AND REVOLUTIONARY BANDWAGONS

So mass discontentdoes not necessarilygenerate a popular uprisingagainstthepoliticalstatusquo. To understandwhen itdoes,we need toidentifyhe conditionsunder which individualswill display antagonismtoward theregimeunder whichthey ive. After ll, a mass uprising re-sults frommultitudes findividual choices toparticipaten a movementforchange; there s no actornamed "the crowd" or "the opposition."

28 For two of themajor contributionso thisapproach,see JamesC. Davies, "Toward aTheory ofRevolution,"American ociologicalReview 27 (February1962), 5-19; and Ted R.Gurr,WhyMen Rebel Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1970).

29 David Snyder nd CharlesTilly,"Hardship and CollectiveViolence in France, 1830 to1960," American ociologicalReview37 (October 1972), 520-32; and Charles Tilly, LouiseTilly, nd RichardTilly,The Rebellious entury:830-1930 Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1975). For much additional evidenceagainstthe theory f relativedeprivation, eeStevenE. Finkel and JamesB. Rule, "RelativeDeprivation nd RelatedPsychological he-ories of Civil Violence:A CriticalReview," n Louis Kriesberg, d.,ResearchnSocialMove-ments, onflictsndChange Greenwich,Conn.: JAIPress, 1986),9:47-69.




The model presentedhere is in agreementwith the rational-choiceschool on thisbasic methodologicalpoint, lthough tdeparts n impor-tant waysfrom hestandardfare n rational-choicemodeling.

Consider a societywhose members re indexedby . Each individualmember must choose whetherto supportthe government n public oroppose it; depending on his public acts and statements,ach person isperceivedas either friend fthegovernment r an enemy,forthepo-litical statusquo or against. n private, fcourse, person mayfeel tornbetween thegovernmentnd theopposition, eeingbothadvantagesanddisadvantagesto theexistingregime. am thusdistinguishing etweenan individual'sprivate referencendpublicpreference.he former s ef-

fectivelyixed t any given nstant, he atter variableunder hiscontrol.Insofar s his twopreferences iffer-that s,thepreference e expressesin public diverges fromthathe holds in private-the individual is en-gaged inpreferencealsification.

Let S represent he size of thepublic opposition, xpressedas a per-centageof thepopulation. nitially t s near0, implying hatthegovern-ment commands almost unanimous public support.A revolution, s amass-supported eizure of political power, may be treatedas an enor-mous jump inS.

Now take a citizen who wants the governmentoverthrown. Thelikely mpactof his own public preferencen thefateofthegovernmentis negligible: t is unlikely o be a decisive factor n whether hegovern-mentstands or falls.But itmay bringhimpersonalrewardsand imposeon him personalpunishments.f he choosesto oppose thegovernment,for instance,he is likelyto face persecution, hough in the event the

government allshisoutspokennessmaybe rewardedhandsomely.Doesthis mean that our individual will base his public preference olelyonthe potential rewards and punishmentsflowingfrom the two rivalcamps? Will his private ntipathy o theregimeplayno rolewhatsoeverin his decision?This does notseemreasonable,forhistory ffers ount-less examples of brave individualswho stoodup fora cause in thefaceoftheseverestpressures, ncludingtorture.

On what, then,will ourdisaffectedndividual's choicedepend? I sub-

mitthat twill depend on a trade-off etween twopayoffs, ne externaland the other nternal.30

The externalpayoff o sidingwiththeoppositionconsists fthe just-discussedpersonalrewardsand punishments.n netterms, hispayoffsapt to become increasingly avorable or increasinglyess unfavorable)

30 For a detailedanalysisofthis trade-off,ee Timur Kuran, "Privateand Public Prefer-ences,"EconomicsndPhilosophy (April 1990),1-26.



18 WORLD POLITICS

with S. The largerS, the smaller the individual dissenter's hances ofbeing persecutedforhis identification iththeopposition nd the fewerhostile supporters f thegovernment e has to face. The latterrelation-

ship reflects he fact that government upporters, ven ones privatelysympathetic o theopposition,participaten thepersecution f thegov-ernment'sopponents,as part of theirpersonalefforts o establishcon-vincingprogovernmentredentials.This relationshipmplies that a risein S leaves fewerpeople seekingto penalize membersof thepublic op-position.

The internalpayoff s rooted in thepsychological ost of preferencefalsification. he suppressionof one's wants entails a loss of personal

autonomy, sacrifice fpersonal ntegrity.t thusgenerates asting dis-comfort, he more so thegreaterthe lie. This relationshipmay be cap-turedby postulating hatpersoni's internalpayoffforsupportingtheoppositionvariespositivelywith hisprivatepreference,A. he higherxi,the more costlyhe finds tto suppresshisantigovernmenteelings.

So i's publicpreference ependson S and xi. As thepublicoppositiongrows, withhis privatepreference onstant, herecomes a pointwherehis externalcost of joining theoppositionfallsbelow his internal ost ofpreference alsification. his switchingpointmay be called his revolu-tionaryhreshold,. Since a threshold epresents value ofS, it s a num-ber between0 and 100.

Ifxishould rise,7 will fall. n otherwords, fthe ndividualbecomesmore sympathetico theopposition, t will take a smallerpublicopposi-tion tomake him take a standagainstthegovernment. he samewill betrue fthegovernment ecomes less efficient,r theoppositionbecomes

more efficient,t rewarding ts supporters nd punishing ts rivals. Infact, nything hat ffects herelationship etweenS and the ndividual'sexternalpayoff or upporting heoppositionwill changehisrevolution-arythreshold. inally,P will fall f developsa greaterneed to standupand be counted,fortheinternal ostofpreference alsification ill thencome to dominate the externalbenefit t a lowerS.31

This simple framework ffers reasonwhya personmay choose tovoice a demand forchange even when thepriceofdissent s very high

and the chances of a successfuluprisingvery ow. If his privateopposi-

31 The theory utlined n this section s developedmorefully n Timur Kuran, "Sparksand PrairieFires: A TheoryofUnanticipated oliticalRevolution," ublic Choice61 (April1989),41-74. A summary f thepresent ormulation as delivered t theannual conventionofthe AmericanEconomicAssociation,Washington, .C., December28-30,1990.This pre-sentation ppearedunder the title The East European Revolution f 1989: Is It SurprisingThat We WereSurprised?" ntheAmerican conomicReview, apers ndProceedings1 (May1991),121-25.




tion to theexisting rder s intense nd/orhisneed for ntegritys quitestrong, he suffering e incurs fordissentmay be outweighed by thesatisfaction e derivesfrombeing true to himself. n every society, f

course,there repeoplewhogo againstthe social orderoftheday. JosephSchumpeteronce observedthat n capitalist ocieties hisgroup is domi-nated by intellectuals.Their positionas "onlookers" and "outsiders"with much time fordeep reflection auses themto develop a "criticalattitude"toward the statusquo. And because of thehighvalue they t-tach to self-expression, heyare relatively nsusceptible o social pres-sures.32 he same argumentapplies to noncapitalist ocieties.As a caseinpoint, disproportionatelyargeshareof the East European dissidents

were intellectuals.Returning o thegeneral model,we can observe that ndividualswith

different rivate preferences nd psychological onstitutionswill havedifferent evolutionaryhresholds.magine a ten-person ocietyfeatur-ing thethresholdequence

A = {0, 20, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 100}.

Person 1 (T1 = 0) supportstheoppositionregardlessof its size, just asperson10 (T10 = 100) always supports hegovernment. he remainingeight people's preferencesre sensitive oS: dependingon its evel, theyoptforone camp ortheother.For instance, erson5 (P = 40) supportsthegovernmentf 0 < S < 40 but oins theopposition f 40 ' S ' 100.Let us assume thattheoppositionconsists nitially f a single person,or10percent fthepopulation, o S = 10. Because the nine other ndivid-uals have thresholds bove 10,thisS is self-sustaining;hat s, it consti-

tutes n equilibrium.This equilibrium happens to be vulnerable to a minorchange inA.Suppose thatperson2 has an unpleasantencounter t somegovernmentministry.Her alienation from the regime rises, pushingher thresholddown from20 to 10. The new threshold equence is

A' = {0, 10,20,30,40, 50, 60,70, 80, 100}.

Person 2's new thresholdhappens to equal the existing of 10, so she

switches ides,and S becomes 20. Her move intotheopposition akestheformof tossingan egg at the country's ong-standing eader during agovernment-organized ally.The new S of 20 is not self-sustainingutself-augmenting,s it drivesperson3 intotheopposition.The higherSof 30 thentriggers fourthdefection, aisingS to 40, and thisprocess

32 Schumpeter,Capitalism, ocialism nd Democracy, d ed. (1950; reprint,New York:Harper Torchbooks, 1962), hap. 13.



20 WORLD POLITICS

continues until S reaches 90-a new equilibrium. Now the firstnineindividuals are in opposition,with only thetenth upporting he govern-ment. A slightshift n one individual'sthresholdhas thus generateda

revolutionaryandwagon, n explosivegrowth n public opposition.33Now consider the sequence

B = {0, 20, 30, 30, 40, 50, 60,70, 80, 100},

which differs romA onlyin its thirdelement: 30 as opposed to 20. Asin the previous illustration,et 1 fallfrom20 to 10. The resulting e-quence is

B' = {0, 10, 30, 30, 40, 50, 60,70, 80, 100}.

Once again, the incumbentequilibriumof 10 becomes unsustainable,and S rises to 20. But theopposition'sgrowth tops there,forthenew Sis self-sustaining.ome government upporters rivately njoythesightof the eader's egg-splattered ace,but none followstheegg thrower ntopublic opposition.We see that minorvariation n thresholdsmaydras-tically ltertheeffect f a given perturbation. nd inparticular,n event

that causes a revolutionn one settingmayin a slightly ifferentettingproduce onlya minor decline n thegovernment's opularity.

Neither private preferencesnor the correspondingthresholds arecommonknowledge. So a society an come to the brinkofa revolutionwithoutanyoneknowing this,noteven those withthepowerto unleashit. In sequenceA, for nstance,person2 need notrecognizethatshe hasthe abilityto set off revolutionary andwagon. Even if she sensesthecommonnessofpreference alsification,hesimply annotknowwhether

the actual threshold equence is A orB. Social psychologistsse the termpluralistic gnorance o describemisperceptions oncerningdistributionsof individual characteristics.34n principle,pluralistic gnorancecan bemitigated hroughpolls that ccordindividuals nonymity. ut itis eas-iertooffer eople anonymityhan to convincethem thatthepreferencestheyrevealwill remainanonymousand never be used againstthem. nany case, an outwardlypopular government hat knows preference al-sification o be pervasivehas no interest n publicizingthe implied fra-

33Lucid analysesofbandwagon processes ncludeMarkGranovetter,ThresholdModelsofCollective Behavior,"American ournal f Sociology 3 (May 1978), 1420-43;and ThomasC. Schelling,MicromotivesndMacrobehaviorNew York: W. W. Norton, 1978).

34 Under theterm mpressionf universality,heconceptwas introduced y FloydH. All-port, ocial PsychologyBoston: Houghton, Mifflin, 924),305-9. The term luralistic gno-rancewas first sed byRichard L. Schanck,"A Studyofa Community nd Its Groups andInstitutions onceived of as BehaviorofIndividuals,"Psychological onographs 3-2 (1932),101.




gilityof its support,because thismight nspirethe disaffected o bringtheir antigovernment eelings nto theopen. It has an incentive o dis-courage independentpollingand discredit urveys hat reveal unflatter-

ing information.We have already seen that the threshold equence is not fixed. Any-

thingthat affects he distributionfprivatepreferencesmayalter t,forinstance, n economic recession, ontactswith othersocieties,or inter-generational replacement.But whatever theunderlying eason, privatepreferences nd, hence, the threshold equence can move dramaticallyagainstthegovernmentwithout riggering revolution. n thesequence

C = {0, 20, 20,20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 60, 100}the average threshold s 30, possiblybecause most people sympathizewith the opposition.Yet S = 10 remains an equilibrium.It is true,ofcourse,that revolution s morelikelyunder C than underA. C featuresseven individuals with thresholds f 20,A onlyone. A ten-unitfall inanyone oftheseven thresholdswould trigger revolution.

The pointremainsthatwidespread disapprovalofthegovernment snot sufficient o mobilize largenumbersforrevolutionaryction. Anti-government eelings an certainly ring revolutionwithinthe realm ofpossibility, ut other conditionsmust come together o set it off.By thesame token, revolutionmaybreak out in a societywhereprivatepref-erences, nd thereforendividualthresholds, end to be relatively nfa-vorable to theopposition.Reconsider hesequence A', where theaveragethreshold s 46, as opposed to 30 in C. Under A' public opposition dartsfrom10 to 90,whereasunderC it remains tuckat 10. This simple com-

parisonshows

whythe

relative-deprivationheoryfrevolutionhas notheld up underempiricaltesting.By treating he ikelihood ofrevolution

as the sumof the ndividual evels ofdiscontent,herelative-deprivationtheory verlooksthesignificancef thedistribution fdiscontent.As ourcomparisonbetweenA' and C indicates, ne sufficientlyisaffected er-son with a thresholdof 10 may do more for a revolutionthan sevenindividualswiththresholds f20.

Imagine now that a superpower ong committed o keeping the local

governmentnpower suddenlyrescinds his ommitment, eclaringthatit will cease meddling in the internal ffairs f othercountries.This ispreciselythe typeof change to which the structuralistheory ccordsrevolutionary ignificance.n thepresent ramework,uch a changewillnot necessarily gnitea revolution.The outcome depends on both thepreexisting istribution f thresholds nd theconsequent hifts. ince thepostulated change in international elations s likelyto lower the ex-



22 WORLD POLITICS

pectedcost of oiningtheopposition, eople'sthresholds re likely ofall.Let us say that everythresholdbetween10 and 90 dropsby 10 units. fthe preexisting hreshold equence wereA, B, or C, theresultwould be

an explosion nS from10to 90. But supposethat t wereD = {0, 30,30, 30,30,30,30,30, 30, 100}.

The structural hock turns hissequence into

DI = {0, 20, 20, 20,20,20, 20,20, 20, 100}.

Fully four-fifthsf thepopulation is now willingto switch over to theoppositionbutonly f omeone lsegoesfirst. o one does, leavingS at 10.

Structural actors re thus partofthestory, etbyno means the wholestory.While theycertainlyffect he likelihoodof revolution, heycan-not possiblydeliverinfalliblepredictions.A single person'sreactiontoan event of global importancemay make all the difference etween amassiveuprising nd a latent andwagon hatnever takesoff.So to sug-gest,as thestructuralistso, that revolutions re brought bout bydeephistoricalforceswith individuals simplythe passive bearers of theseforces is to overlook the potentially rucial importanceof individual

characteristicsf littlesignificancen and of themselves. t is always aconjunctionoffactors,manyof them ntrinsicallynimportant nd thusunobserved, fnot unobservable, hatdetermines he flow of events.Amajor global event can produce drasticallydifferentutcomes in twosettings hatdifferrivially.tructuralismnd individualism re not rivaland mutually incompatibleapproaches to the studyof revolution, sSkocpol would have it.They are essential omponents f a singlestory.

We can now turnto thequestionofwhywithhindsight n unantici-patedrevolutionmay appearas the nevitable onsequenceof monumen-tal forcesforchange.A successful evolutionbrings nto theopen long-repressedgrievances.Moreover,peoplewhowererelativelyontentwiththe old regimeembrace the new regime,and theyare apt to attributetheirformer ublicpreferencesofears fpersecution.

Reconsiderthethreshold equence

A' = {0, 10, 20,30, 40, 50,60, 70, 80, 100}.

The relatively ighthresholds n A' are likelyto be associated withpri-vate preferencesmore favorableto thegovernment han to theopposi-tion.35 erson 9 (T9 = 80) is muchmore satisfiedwith thegovernmentthan, ay,person3 (T3 = 20). As suchshe has little esireto oina move-

35 Relativelyhighthresholdsmayalso be associatedwithrelatively reatvulnerabilityosocialpressure.




ment aimed at toppling t.Rememberthatpublicopposition ettles t 90,she beingthe astto jump on therevolutionary andwagon. The impor-tantpointis this:person9 changesherpublic preference nlyafter he

oppositionsnowballs into a crushingmajority,making it imprudenttoremaina government upporter.

Having made theswitch, he has every eason tofeign long-standingantipathy o thetoppled government. he will not admitthat she yearnsfor the statusquo ante,because this would contradicther new publicpreference.Nor will she say thatherchangeof heartfollowed thegov-ernment's ollapse,because thismightrenderherdeclaredsympathy ortherevolution nconvincing. he will claim that hehas longhad serious

misgivings bout the old order and has sympathizedwiththe objectivesof the opposition.An unintendedeffect f this distortion s to make itseem as thoughthetoppled government njoyedeven lessgenuine sup-portthan itactuallydid.

This illusion s rooted n theveryphenomenonresponsible ormakingtherevolution surprise:preference alsification. aving misledevery-one into seeing a revolution s highlyunlikely,preference alsificationnow conceals the forces hat wereworkingagainst t. One oftheconse-quences ofpostrevolutionaryreference alsificationsthusto make evenlesscomprehensiblewhythe revolutionwas unforeseen.

The historiansof a revolutionmay appreciatethe biases that afflictpeople's postrevolutionaryccounts of theirprerevolutionary isposi-tionswithoutbeingable to measure thesignificancefthesebiases.Con-sider thesequence

C' = {0, 10, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20,60, 100}.

Like A', thissequence drivesS from10 to 90, implying hat nine out often individuals have an incentive o saythattheydespised theprerevo-lutionary egime. fthresholds elow 50 reflect rivate upportfor rev-olution, nd those above 50 private atisfaction iththestatusquo, eightof the nine would be tellingthe truth, he one liar being person 9(T9 = 60). It follows fromthe same assumptionthatfourof the ninewould be lying fthe threshold equence wereA'. But once again, be-

cause thresholds re notpublic knowledge,historiansmayhave difficultydeterminingwhether heprerevolutionaryequence wasA or C-or forthatmatter,whether hepostrevolutionaryequence is A' or C'.

Beforemovingto the East European Revolution, tmaybe useful tocommenton how theforegoing rgument elates othree ources ofcon-troversyn the literature n revolutions: hecontinuityfsocial change,thepowerofthe ndividual, nd thesignificancefunorganizedcrowds.



24 WORLD POLITICS

The proposed theory reats ontinuous nd discontinuous hange as asingle,unifiedprocess.Privatepreferencesnd thecorresponding hresh-olds may change graduallyover a long period duringwhichpublic op-

position s more or less stable. f thecumulativemovement stablisheslatentbandwagon, a minor eventmay thenprecipitate n abrupt andsharpbreak in the size of thepublic opposition.This is not to say thatprivatepreferences hange only nsmall increments. major blunder onthe part of the government may suddenly turn private preferencesagainst it.

Such a shift ould also occur in response o an initial,possiblymodest,increase n public opposition.The underlying ogicwas expressedbeau-

tifully yAlexis de Tocqueville: "Patiently nduredso long as itseemedbeyond redress, grievancecomes to appear intolerable nce thepossi-bilityof removingit crosses men's minds."36 n terms of our model,Tocqueville suggeststhat the threshold equence is itselfdependentonthe size of thepublic opposition. f so, a revolutionary andwagon maycome about as the joint outcomeof two mutuallyreinforcing rends:afall in thresholds nd a rise in public opposition. magine thatpublicoppositionrises ufficientlyo convince hoseprivately ympathetico thegovernment hata revolutionmightbe in themaking.This realizationinducesmanyof them to think about possiblealternatives o the statusquo. Their thinking tarts chain reaction hroughwhichprivatepref-erences shift wiftlynd dramatically gainstthegovernment. he con-sequent changesin the threshold equencecause therevolutionaryand-wagon to accelerate.

The theorydepictsthe individual as both powerlessand potentially

verypowerful.The individual s powerlessbecause a revolution equiresthe mobilizationof large numbers,but he is also potentially ery pow-erfulbecause under theright ircumstances e maysetoff chain reac-tion thatgeneratesthe necessarymobilization.Not thatthe individualcan know preciselywhen his own choice can make a difference.Al-thoughhemaysense thathischancesofsparking wildfire reunusuallygreat,he can never be certain bout theconsequencesof his own oppo-sition.What is certain s thatthe ncumbent egimewill remain n place

unlesssomeonetakesthe ead inmoving nto theopposition.As we saw in the previous section,the standardtheoryof rationalchoicedepictsthepotentialrevolutionarys paralyzed bytherealizationof his powerlessness.Many social thinkerswho, like thepresent uthor,accept the logic of collective ction have struggledwiththe task of ex-plaininghow massmobilizationsgetstarted.One oftheproposed expla-

36 Tocqueville, The Old Regimeand the FrenchRevolution1856), trans. Stuart Gilbert(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955),177.




nationsrests n a cognitive llusion:the ndividualoverestimates is per-sonal political influence.Another invokes an ethicalcommitment: heindividual feelscompelled to do his fair share for the attainment f a

jointlydesired outcome.37 he approach used here,which is not incom-patiblewith theseexplanations, laces the burdenof sparkingthemobi-lization processon the individual'sneed to be trueto himself.This ap-proach is consistentwith the factthat revolutionaryeaders tend to besurprisedwhen theirgoals materialize.The cognitive-illusion xplana-tionis not: people who challenge the government ut of an overestima-tion of theirpersonal abilityto direct the course of historywill not besurprisedwhen theirwishes cometrue.The approachof thisessay s also

consistentwith the factthat somepeople risk their ives for revolutioneven as the vast majority f thepotential eneficiaries efrain romdoingtheirown fair hare.

Finally, the outlined theory ccords organized pressure groups andunorganizedcrowdscomplementary oles in the overthrow fthegov-ernment.Organized oppositionsenhance theexternalpayoff o dissent,bothby providingtheindividualdissenterwith a supportnetworkandby raising he ikelihoodof a successful evolution. heyalso helpshatter

the appearance of the invulnerabilityf the statusquo, and throughpropaganda, theyshiftpeople's private preferencesn favorof change.Charles Tilly is therefore ightto draw attention o the structural ndsituationalfactors hatgoverna society'spatternof politicalorganiza-tion.38 ut as Pamela Oliver warns,we mustguard againstoverempha-sizing therole oforganizationat theexpenseof therole of theunorga-nized crowd. A small difference n the resources t the disposal of anorganized oppositionmayhave a tremendousmpacton the outcome ofits efforts.39his observationmakes perfect ense in the contextof thetheorydeveloped here. Where a small pressuregroup fails to push abandwagon into motion a slightly etter rganizedor slightlyargeronemight.

IV.EAST EUROPEANCOMMUNISMANDTHE WELLSPRINGOF ITS STABILITY

Communistparties ame topowerinRussia,and then nEasternEuropeand elsewhere,with the promisethat "scientific ocialism" would pio-

37 Each of these s developedbyStevenE. Finkel, Edward N. Muller,and Karl-DieterOpp, "Personal nfluence, ollectiveRationality,nd Mass PoliticalAction,"American olit-ical ScienceReview83 (September1989),885-903.

38 Tilly,FromMobilizationo RevolutionReading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 978).39 Oliver, "Bringingthe Crowd Back In: The NonorganizationalElements of Social

Movements," n Louis Kriesberg, d., Researchn Social Movements, onflictnd Change(Greenwich,Conn.: JAIPress,1989): 11:1-30.



26 WORLD POLITICS

neer new dimensionsof freedom, liminateexploitation,vest politicalpower in themasses,eradicate nationalism, nd raise standardsoflivingto unprecedentedheights-all this,while thestate was withering way.

They did not deliveron anyof thesepromises.Under their tewardship,communism came to symbolize repression, ensorship, thnic chauvin-ism, militarism, edtape,and economic backwardness.

The failuresof communismprompteda tinynumberof Soviet andEast European citizensto criticizeofficial oliciesand established nsti-tutions.Such dissidents xpressedtheirfrustrationshrough landestineself-publicationssamizdat) nd writingspublishedin the West (tamiz-dat). Given the chasm between the rhetoric of communism and its

achievements, he existenceof an opposition s easilyunderstood.Lesscomprehensibles therarity fpublic opposition-prior, that s,to 1989.The few uprisingsthatwere crushed-notably, East Berlin in 1953,Hungary in 1956,and Czechoslovakia in 1968-are theexceptionsthatprove the rule. For most of severaldecades, mostEast Europeans dis-played a remarkable tolerancefortyranny nd inefficiency. hey re-mained docile, submissive, nd even outwardly upportive f the status

quo.This subservience s attributable artly o punishmentsmeted out bythe communist establishment o itsactual and imagined opponents. ntheheydayof communisma person speakingout againsttheleadershipor in favorof some reform ould expectto sufferharassment, ose hisjob, and face imprisonment-in short,he could expectto be denied theopportunity o lead a decent life. Even worse horrorsbefellmillions ofsuspected opponents.Just hinkof theforced-labor amps of the Gulag

Archipelagoand of the iquidationscarriedoutunderthepretext f his-toricalnecessity. We can onlybe rightwith and bytheParty,"wrote aleading theoretician f communism, forhistory as providedno otherwayofbeing n theright."40uch thinking ould,and did,serveto ustifyhorrible rimes gainstnonconformists.

Yet official epression s onlyone factorn theendurance of commu-nism. The systemwas sustainedbya general willingness o support t inpublic: people routinely pplauded speakers whose message they dis-liked, oined organizationswhose missiontheyopposed,and signed de-famatory etters gainst people they admired,among othermanifesta-tions of consent and accommodation. "The lie," wrote the Russiannovelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn n theearly 1970s, "has been incorpo-ratedinto the statesystem s the vital inkholding everything ogether,

40 The words of Leon Trotsky, ited by Arendt fn.2), 307.




with billionsof tiny fasteners, everal dozen to each man."'41 If peoplestopped ying,he asserted, ommunist ule would break down instantly.He then asked rhetorically, What does it mean, not to lie?" It means

"not sayingwhat you don't think, nd that ncludes not whispering,notopening your mouth,not raising your hand, not casting your vote, notfeigning smile, not lending your presence,not standing up, and notcheering.42

In "The Power of the Powerless," Havel speaks of a greengrocerwhoplaces in hiswindow, among the onions and carrots, heslogan "Work-ers of the World, Unite!" Whydoes thegreengrocer o this,Havel won-ders.

Is he genuinelynthusiasticbout he dea ofunity mong heworkers ftheworld? s hisenthusiasmogreat hat efeels nirrepressiblempulseto acquaintthepublicwithhis ideals? Has he really ivenmorethanamoment's hought o how sucha unification ight ccur and whatitwould mean?

Havel's answeris worthquotingat length:

The overwhelming ajorityfshopkeepersever hinkbout he logans

they ut ntheirwindows, ordo they se them oexpressheir ealopin-ions. That posterwas delivered o ourgreengrocerrom heenterpriseheadquarterslongwith heonions nd carrots. e putthem ll into hewindow imply ecause thasbeendonethatwayforyears, ecause very-onedoesit, ndbecause hat s theway t has to be. Ifheweretorefuse,there ould be trouble. e could be reproachedornothaving heproper"decoration"nhiswindow; omeonemightven ccusehimofdisloyalty.He does t because hese hingsmustbedone fone stogetalong nlife.It soneofthe housandsfdetails hat uarantee im relativelyranquil

life n"harmony ith ociety,"s they ay.43So our greengrocer uts up theassigned slogantocommunicatenota

social ideal but hispreparedness o conform.And thereasonthedisplayconveys messageof submission s that very ubmissive reengrocer asexhibitedthe same sloganforyears.By removing heposter-or worse,replacing twith one thatreads "Workers of theWorld,Eat Onions andCarrots!"-our greengrocerwould exposehimself o thechargeof sub-version.He therefore isplaysthe required slogan faithfullynd fendsofftrouble.In the process,he reinforces he perceptionthat society ssolidlybehindtheParty.His own prudencethus becomesa factor n thewillingnessof othergreengrocers o promotethe unityof the world's

41 Solzhenitsyn,The Smatterers"1974), nSolzhenitsynt l.,From ndertheRubble,rans.A. M. Brocket al. (Boston: Little,Brown, 1975),275.

42 Ibid., 276; emphasis n original.43 Havel (fn.9), 27-28.



28 WORLD POLITICS

workers. Moreover, it pressures farmers,miners,bus drivers,artists,journalists, nd bureaucrats o continuedoing and sayingthe things x-pected of them.

Efforts o prove one's loyaltyto the political status quo oftentookmore tragic forms han a greengrocer's isplayof a well-wornMarxistslogan. People tattledon each other. And theyostracized and vilifiednonconformists ho weresayingordoingthings hat hey dmired.TheRomanian dissidentNorman Manea writesof authorswho "persecutedtheir olleagueson the blacklist'withtireless, iabolicalenergy."44 n thesame vein,the Polish dissidentPiotrWierzbicki writes bout a famouscomposerwho went out of his way to alert thegovernment o an anti-

Soviet insinuation n the sleeveof a recordbya Pole livingabroad. Thesquealing composerknew thatthis nformationwas likelyto block thelocal performance f his fellow Pole's music. He did it to provehis loy-altyto theregime-to earn,as itwere,a certificatefnormalcy.45

In 1977 a group of Czechoslovak intellectuals stablisheda loose as-sociation,Charter77, dedicated to the basic human rights hat Czecho-slovakiaagreed to respectby signing he Helsinki accords of 1975.46 hegovernmentrespondedby detainingthe spokesmenof Charter77 andlaunchinga nationwidecampaign againsttheassociation.47n the courseof thiscampaignmillionsofordinary itizensexpressedtheiroppositionto Charter77 bysigningstatements fcondemnation, endinghate let-terstonewspapers, nd ostracizing tssignatories.Many an opponentofCharter77 did so in betrayal f his conscience.

It is trueof coursethat some who participated n thiscampaign sawCharter77 as a menacing organizationbenton tarnishing zechoslova-

kia's image abroad. And thetale-bearing olishcomposermaywell havehad motives otherthan a desire to please theregime,for nstance, eal-ousy or professionalcompetition.But East Europeans turned againsteach otherroutinely ven in the absence of such motives.

Let us return o thestory f thegreengrocer. avel asks us to "imag-ine thatone daysomethingnourgreengrocer napsand he stopsputtingup the slogans." The greengrocer lso "stops voting in elections heknows are a farce";he "begins to saywhat he reallythinks t political

meetings";and he "even finds hestrengthn himself oexpresssolidar-

44 Manea, "Romania: Three Lines withCommentary,"n Brinton nd Rinzler (fn. 11),327.

45 Wierzbicki, A Treatise on Ticks" (1979), n AbrahamBrumberg, d., Poland: Genesisof RevolutionNew York: RandomHouse, 1983),205.

46 The Charter77 declaration s reproduced nHavel et al. (fn.9), 217-21.47 See Timothy Garton Ash, The Usesof Adversity:ssayson theFate of CentralEurope

(1983-89) (New York: RandomHouse, 1989), sp.61-70.




itywith thosewhom his conscience ommandshim tosupport." n short,he makes "an attempt olivewithin he ruth."48 ere are thelikelycon-sequences of thisrevolt:

[The greengrocer]ill be relieved fhis post s manager f the hop ndtransferredo the warehouse.His paywill be reduced.His hopesforholiday n Bulgariawill evaporate. is children's ccess o higher duca-tionwillbe threatened.is superiors illharasshim nd hisfellowwork-erswill wonder bouthim.Mostofthosewhoapply hese anctions, ow-ever,will notdo so from ny uthenticnner onvictionut imply nderpressure rom onditions, he sameconditions hatonce pressured hegreengrocero display heofficiallogans. heywillpersecutehegreen-grocerither ecause t sexpectedfthem,rto demonstrateheiroyalty,

orsimplys part fthegeneral anorama,owhichbelongsn awarenessthat his s how situationsfthis ort re dealtwith, hat his,n fact,showthings re alwaysdone,particularlyf one is not to become uspectoneself.49

The brilliance fthisvignetteies in its nsightsnto thepressures hatkept East Europeans outwardly oyal to their nefficient,yrannical e-gimes.Officialrepressionmet with theapprovalofordinary itizens ndindeedwas predicated n their omplicity. y falsifyingheirpreferences

and helpingto disciplinedissenters, itizens ointly ustaineda systemthatmanyconsidered bominable.AccordingtoHavel, the crucial "lineofconflict" an not between theParty nd thepeople but"througheachperson,"for n one way or anothereveryonewas "both a victim and asupporter f thesystem."50

The same idea found vivid expression n a bannerhung above thealtar in an East German church:"I am Cain and Abel.""5The impliedintrapersonal onflict s rooted of course in theclash between the indi-vidual's drive to exerciseautonomyand his need for social acceptance.Until 1989 most East Europeans tendedto resolve this chronic clash infavorof social acceptance. By thusavoiding an open battle with com-munism, theyacquiesced to battlesilentlywith themselves. n thepro-cess,most achieveda measureofoutersecurity, hough t theexpenseofinnerpeace.

Not that communistrule managed to do away altogetherwith the

human propensity o protest.As Wierzbicki points out, newspapersre-ceived letters fcomplaint n abundance-about shabbyhousing, he ne-glected graveof some poetor other, nd thesloppilypaintedfenceof a

48 Havel (fn.9), 39; emphasis noriginal.49 Ibid., 39.50 Ibid., 37.51 Timothy Garton Ash, "Eastern Europe: The Year of Truth," New York Review of

Books,February15, 1990,p. 18; emphasis noriginal.



30 WORLD POLITICS

children'splayground.Yet protesters ended to staywithin a Party-de-fined zone ofacceptability: heyrefrained romprobing too deeplyintoissues and avoided challenging ommunism tself.A schoolteacherwrit-

ing furious etters bout a defective ppliancewould notbringherself oblame thesystem hatproduces uselessappliances.Nor would she signaletterexpressing olidaritywithdissidentsor join a demonstration orfreedomofspeech.52

The typical East European feignedopposition to the fewdissidents,thoughin privatehe applauded theirmission.Havel suggeststhatthisadmirationwas coupledwitha resentment: eoplewho lacked the cour-age to be true to themselvesfeltthreatenedbydisplaysof integrityn

thepartof others.They thustreatedopen defiance "as an abnormality,as arrogance,as an attackon themselves, s a formof dropping out ofsociety."53f it is true that the "iron in the soul" ofanother remindedaconformist f the lack of iron in his own, thiswould have servedas anadditional obstacle toovertopposition.54

Another such obstacle was pluralistic gnorance: people alienatedfrom the communistregimedid notknow how widelytheiralienationwas shared.They could sensetherepresseddiscontent f their onform-ist relativesand close friends;theycould observe the hardships n thelives of their fellowcitizens; and theycould intuit thatpast uprisingswould not have occurred n the absence of substantialdiscontent. till,they acked reliable,current nformation n how manyof their fellowcitizens favored a change in regime.The government-controlledressexploitedthis gnorancebystressing he"unityof socialistsociety"andits"solidarity n supporting heParty." nsofaras such propaganda led

potentialrevolutionaries o underestimate he prevalenceof discontent,it weakened their ncentives o join theminusculeopposition.Governments hroughouthistory ave recognizedthesignificance f

preference alsificationnd out of self-interest ave tried to keep them-selves nformed bout theprivatepreferencesftheir onstituents.ouisXIV told his heirthat "the art ofgoverning"consists n "knowing thereal thoughts fall theprinces n Europe,knowingeverything hatpeo-ple tryto conceal fromus, theirsecrets, nd keeping close watch over

them."55 o it is that the communistgovernments f Eastern Europeconducted numeroussurveys o findout the truethoughts nd feelings

52 Wierzbicki fn.45),206-7.53 Havel (fn.9),37.54 The metaphorbelongsto BarringtonMoore,Jr.,njustice:The SocialBasesofObedience

andRevolt WhitePlains,N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1978).55 Cited by NorbertElias,Power nd Civility1939),trans.Edmund JephcottNew York:

Pantheon,1982), 197.




of their subjects. f thefact that theykept the results ecret s any indi-cation,thesewerenotentirely latteringo themor theirpolicies. nfor-mationforpublication "was checked beforehand nd given the appro-

priate nterpretation,"o keep it from mboldening he regime'sdeclaredand potentialopponents.56

It would be an exaggerationto suggest that all East European sup-portersof communist rule were privately pposed to the status quo.Some benefitedhandsomelyfromthesystem,nd othersfelt hreatenedby major reform.Nor did those who became conscious ofthe failures fcommunismnecessarily ose faith n official deals. Even leading dissi-dents remainedsympatheticocentralplanning nd collective wnership

and eversuspiciousof thefree-enterpriseystem.57yand large,theyfeltthatcommunism was betrayed by self-servingeaders,not that it wasinherently nworkable.

These observations re consistentwithopinion polls ofEast Europe-ans traveling broad conductedbyWesternorganizations n the 1970sand early 1980s.With remarkableconsistencynd foreach nation, thedata showed that in free electionsoffering full spectrumof choices,including a Democratic Socialist Party and a Christian DemocraticParty, he CommunistPartywould receive at mosta tenthof thevote,and thesocialistswould invariably e the winners.58

Furthersystematic vidence is contained n surveys onductedfrom1970onward forthebenefit fthe eadershipbythe Central nstitute orYouth Development in Leipzig. Now being declassified, hese surveyssuggest hatuntilthemid-1980smost East Germansacceptedthe officialgoals ofsocialism. n 1983,46 percent f a sampleof trade schoolstudents

endorsed the statement I am a devoted citizen of the German Demo-craticRepublic," whereas 45 percent ndorsed it withreservations ndonly9 percentrejected t. And in 1984,50 percent greedthat "socialismwill triumph throughout he world," whereas 42 percent agreed withreservationsnd 8 percentdisagreed.Between1970and 1985,theresultsshowed littlevariation.59 hey may, of course,have been based on a

56 JifiOtava, "Public Opinion Research n Czechoslovakia,"Social Research 5 (Spring-Summer 1988),249.Every ssueofthe Czechoslovakgovernment's fficial ulletin n public

opinionstated:"We remind all researchershat this bulletin s not meant for the public,which means noteven foryourfriends nd acquaintances, utserves xclusively s internalmaterialforpoll-takersnd thosewho collaboratewithus" (p. 251 n. 2).

57 See VladimirTismaneanu,The Crisis fMarxistdeologynEastern urope:ThePovertyof Utopia London: Routledge,1988), sp. chap.4.

58 Henry0. Hart, "The Tables Turned: IfEast EuropeansCould Vote,"PublicOpinion6 (October-November1983),53-57. The surveys eportedbyHart coverCzechoslovakia,Hungary,Poland,Romania,and Bulgaria.

59 "Daten des ZentralinstitutsurJugendforshungeipzig" (Mimeograph),Tables 1 and2. These tableswerecompiled byWalterFriedrich, he director f the nstitute,nd distrib-



32 WORLD POLITICS

flawed methodology, s was muchpublic opinion researchdone in East-ern Europe. But, as we shall see later, t is highly ignificant hat after1985 this same methodology egistered sustained deterioration oth in

the citizenry's ttachment o theregime nd in its faith n socialism.It thus appears that while the East Europeans overwhelmingly is-

liked the regimesunder which theywere living, theywere much lesstroubledbytheprinciples f socialism-at least until themid-1980s.Tomake sense of this finding,we need to touch on thecognitive mplica-tionsofpreference alsification. isaffected itizenschoosingto conformto the regime'sdemands typically aid lip serviceto official oals, usedMarxist jargon, and made excuses forcommunism'sshortcomingsby

pointingto the ostensiblyworse failuresof capitalism. n the process,they unavoidably kept theirfellow citizensuninformed bout those oftheirprivatebeliefs thatwere inimical to the statusquo. Worse, theyknowingly xposedone another o falsefacts nd misleading rguments.In short, theydistortedpublic discourse.Since public discourse influ-enceswhat is noticedand how events re interpreted,hisdistortion n-doubtedlyaffected he evolutionof East European private preferences.East Europeans subjectedfrom arlychildhood topredictions fthe im-minentdemise of capitalismand to theories f the incontrovertibleu-periority f communismmusthave become more or less conditionedtothink n Marxistterms,developingsome mental resistance o the fun-damentalflawsof their ocial order.60

If thisreasoning s correct,Marxistdiscoursewould also have bluntedtheability fEast Europeans to articulate n alternative conomicorder.Vladimir Shlapentokh points to a paradox here. The socialist worker

mistrusts he marketorder,even thoughhe obtains his treasured bluejeans throughthe only freemarket to which he has access-the blackmarket. Likewise, the enterprisemanager who turnsregularlyto theunderground economyforvitalspare partsdreads economic liberaliza-tion.Shlapentokhascribessuch inconsistencies o a disjunctionbetweenthe "pragmatic" and "theoretical" layers of the individual mind.61

uted to the participants t a conferenceheld in Ladenburg in February 1991, under theauspices of the GottliebDaimler and Karl Benz Foundation.ElisabethNoelle-Neumann

brought he document omy attention; ohnAhouse translated t ntoEnglish.60 For a fuller rgument n howpreference alsificationistorts ublicdiscourse nd how,inturn, hisdistortionwarpstheevolution fpeople's private references,ee Timur Kuran,"The Role ofDeception inPoliticalCompetition,"n AlbertBreton tal., eds., The Compet-itive tate Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 990),71-95.

61 Though Shlapentokh evelopsthe rgumentwithrespect o theSovietUnion, tappliesalso to EasternEurope. See Shlapentokh, ovietPublicOpinion nd Ideology:MythologyndPragmatismn nteractionNew York: Praeger,1986);and idem,PublicandPrivate ifeoftheSoviet People: ChangingValues n Post-Stalin ussia (New York: Oxford University ress,1989).




Known in cognitivepsychology s mental artitioning,hisphenomenonis an inevitable onsequence of the mind's limitationsn receiving, tor-ing, retrieving,nd processing nformation. eople are simplyunable to

incorporate nto a single, comprehensivemodel the multitudesof vari-ables and relationships hatbear on theirhappiness; theythus ignoremany interconnections nd treatcloselyrelated phenomena as unre-lated.62

For our purposes, he mportant mplication s this:an East Europeanconfronted ailywithcommunism's hortcomings ould notnecessarilyhave takenthem as a signoftheunworkability f thesystem.He couldeasilyhave turnedagainstindividual functionarieswithout osing faith

in thesystemn whichthey perated.Some East Europeansdid ofcourserecognize that specific hortcomingswere part of a general patternoffailure.Many were intellectualswithmuch time to thinkand thus tomake the mental connectionsnecessary or dentifyinghesystem's un-damental flaws.Butmanyothersdid not make theseconnections, artlybecause theprevailingpublicdiscourseprovidedno help.

So processesrooted n preference alsificationept privateoppositionto communismfar fromunanimous. This does notnegatethe fact thatvast numbersremainedoutwardly oyalto communist uleprimarily utof fear.But forwidespread preference alsification,he communistre-gimes of Eastern Europe would have faced severepublic opposition,verypossiblycollapsingbefore 1989. In view of itsprofound mpacton bothprivateand public sentiment, reference alsificationmay be character-ized as thewellspring fthe communist ystem's tability.

V. THE REVOLUTION

The foregoing rgumenthas two immediate mplications. irst,the re-gimes of Eastern Europe were substantiallymore vulnerable than thesubservience nd quiescenceof theirpopulationsmade them seem. Mil-lionswere preparedto standup in defiance f everthey ensed thatthiswas sufficientlyafe. The people's solidaritywith their eaders wouldthen have been exposed as illusory, tripping he veneer of legitimacy

from the communistmonopolyon power. Second, even the support ofthosegenuinely ympathetico thestatusquo was rather hin.Thoughmanysaw no alternative osocialism, heirmany grievancespredisposedthem to the promise of fundamentalchange. Were public discourse

62 See JohnH. Holland et al., Induction: rocesses f Inference,earning, nd Discovery(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986); and Amos Tversky nd Daniel Kahneman,"The FramingofDecisionsand theRationalityfChoice,"Science211 (January 981),453-58.



34 WORLD POLITICS

somehow to turnagainstsocialism, heywould probably waken to the

possibility hat their ivescould be improved.But what would catalyze the processof revolutionarymobilization?

With hindsight t appears thatthepushcame from heSovietUnion. Inthemid-1980sfesteringconomicproblems,untilthenofficially enied,

convincedthetop Soviet leadershipto call for erestroikarestructuring)

and glasnostpublic openness).Repressedgrievancesburst ntotheopen,

includingdissatisfactionwith communistrule itself.And withMikhail

Gorbachev's rise to the helm in 1985,the Soviet Union abandoned its

long-standing olicyofconfrontation iththeWest,to seek accommo-

dationand cooperation.63n EasternEurope thesechangeskindledhopes

ofgreater ndependence nd meaningful ocial reform.Lest it appear thatthese developmentsprovideda clear signal of the

coming revolution,rememberthat Havel dismissed a Czechoslovak

crowd's jubilationover Gorbachev as a signof naivete.He was hardly

alone in his pessimism.Even ifGorbachevwanted to liberateEastern

Europe, a popular argumentwent, t was anythingbut obvious that he

could. Surely,themilitary nd hard-line conservativeswould insist on

retaining he SovietUnion's strategic uffer gainstan attackfromtheWest.Nor was thisthe onlyobstacleto liberation. conomic and ethnicten-

sionswithinthe SovietUnion could providethepretext ora conserva-

tive coup. There was always the precedentof Khrushchev,toppled in

1964. About the time thatHavel was exuding pessimism, joke was

making the rounds in Prague: "What is the difference etween Gor-

bachev and Dubcek [the deposed leader of the 1968 Prague Spring]?"

The answer: "None--except Gorbachevdoesn'tknow ityet."64 ignifi-cantly,n thefall of 1989Moscow was rifewith rumors f an impendingcoup.65 ome observers xpectedGorbachev to survive but only by re-

versingcourse and becoming increasingly epressive.66 n old Soviet

joke expressesthe underlyingthinking.Stalin leaves his heirs in the

Party two envelopes. One is labeled, "In case of trouble, open this."

Trouble arisesand theenvelope is opened ceremoniously: Blame me."

63

For details, eeRobertC. Tucker,PoliticalCulturendLeadershipn SovietRussia:FromLeninto GorbachevNew York: W. W. Norton,1987), hap. 7.64Economist, uly 8, 1987,p. 45.65 Z [anonymous],To theStalinMausoleum,"Daedalus 119 Winter1990),332.66With therevolution,henotion hatGorbachevwould turn othe army nd theKGB in

a bidto stay npower ostplausibility.t regainedplausibilitynlate1990with heresignationofhis foreignminister, duard Shevardnadze,who publicly ccusedGorbachevofplottingwithhard-linersocreate repressive ictatorship.




The otherenvelope s labeled,"In case of more trouble, pen this."Moretroublecomes and the secondenvelopeis opened: "Do as I did."67

In supportof theirpredictionthat the conservative lementsin the

leadershipwould prevail sooner or later,pessimists requentlynvokedthe conservatism f theSovietpeople. In a widelydiscussed 1988article,for nstance, Russian social scientist rgued thatsevendecades of bu-reaucraticregimentation ad suppressed ndividualcreativity,eorient-ing the"Soviet value system way fromrevolutionaryransformationoconservativemmobility."Communism had quashed the very personalqualities on which thereformists ere counting.68n June1989anotherSoviet observerwould confess: For threeyears have tried to findout

whether r not there s mass supportfor erestroika,nd now I feel canconclude that t does not exist."He blamed notonlytheindividual citi-zen's fear of changebutalso the Sovietethicthat dentifies ocial justicewith economic equality.69 he upshotof suchcomments, owhichscoresmore fromdiverse sources could be added, was that Soviet citizenstended to be deeply suspiciousof Gorbachev's intentions.Many com-mentators nferred hat Gorbachev's reformswere doomed, reasoningthathe could notrely n themassesforprotectiongainsta conservativechallenger.

As Gorbachevwas trying o restructureheSovietUnion, Poland wastesting he limitsof itsfreedomfromMoscow. The struggle o legalizeSolidarityhad already given thecountry tasteof pluralism, nd gov-ernmentcensorshipwas being relaxed in fits nd starts.Everyone rec-ognized thatthis softening njoyedGorbachev'sapproval. Yet few in-formed people put much faith in Gorbachev's ability to push the

liberation fEasternEurope substantiallyorward,nd once again it wasnot clear thathe intended otry. Dissidentsthroughout urope," wrotethe Economist n mid-1987,sound "sceptical"when talkingabout Gor-bachev."This is not because they uestion his] reformingeal. It is sim-plythatmanythinkingpeople in EasternEurope have come to believethat real change in Communist countries annot be imposed from thetop-or from utside-but mustemergefrombelow."70 lenty feventslent credencetothisreasoning.For instance,Gorbachevdid notprevent

67 Recorded byDaniel Bell,"As We Go intothe Nineties: Some Outlines of theTwenty-first entury," issent 7 (Spring1990),173.

68 IgorKon, "The Psychology f Social Inertia" 1988),Social Sciences 0, no. 1 1989),60-74.

69 Gennadii Batyagin, ASS, June 8, 1989, uotedbyElizabethTeague, "Perestroika ndthe Soviet Worker,"GovernmentndOpposition5 (Spring 1990),192.

70 Economist, uly 8, 1987,p. 45.



36 WORLD POLITICS

theEast Germanregimefrom alsifyinghe results f ocal electionsheldin the springof 1989or from ndorsingChina's massacreat TiananmenSquare that summer.Nor did he keep the East German regimefrom

usingforce o dispersesmalldemonstrationsgainstthese twoacts.7"In sum, priorto the actual revolution t was not at all clear thatthe

Soviet Union would sit back ifitssix Warsaw Pact allies triedto over-throwtheir communistregimes.Statements, vents, nd trends that nretrospect ppear as unmistakablesignsof an explosionin themakingcoexistedwith manysigns that pointed in the directionof inertiaandcontinuedstability. ome of Gorbachev'sactionsdid indeed suggestthathe wantedto institute undamental eformsnmanyareas, ncludingthe

Soviet Union's relationshipwith its East European satellites.But thereweremanyreasonsto expecthis efforts o end in failure.

Yet sincetherevolution thas seemedas thoughGorbachevengineeredtheliberation f EasternEurope. In fact,he was a master t putting hebestface on events that had pushed past him. In the fallof 1989 therewere many reports hateventswere going much further nd/or fasterthanGorbachevwanted.He was reportedlywillingtopermitmoves to-ward democracy, provided the communistswere not humiliated and

EasternEurope's military iesto theSoviet Union were preserved.Andlike leaders nWashington,Paris,Bonn,and elsewhere,he was reluctantto supportanything hat might disturbEurope's hard-wonpeace. Butwhen thepeoplesof EasternEurope grabbedpoliticalpower,pushed thecommunists side, and proclaimedtheir ntention o leave theWarsawPact,Gorbachev ustacceptedreality nd gave hisblessing oeventsgen-erated by forcesbeyondhis control.One is remindedof the horsemanwho, thrownfromhis horse, explains with a smile that he has "dis-

mounted."The pointremainsthat the Soviet reformmovementfueledexpecta-

tionsofa freerEasternEurope, reducingforgrowingnumberstheper-ceivedriskofchallenging he status uo. In terms f the model describedin Section III, the movement owered the revolutionary hresholdsofEast Europeans, making it increasingly asy to set in motion a revolu-tionarybandwagon. But no one could see thata revolutionwas in the

making,noteven theSoviet leader whose moveswere helpingto estab-lishthestill-latent andwagon.

Recall that revolutionary hresholds re influenced lso by people'sprivatepreferences. ince privatepreferencesre governedto a consid-erableextentbypublicdiscourse, he dissentgeneratedbySovietglasnost

71 TimothyGartonAsh, "GermanyUnbound,"New YorkReviewofBooks,November 22,1990,p. 12.




probablypushed theprivatepreferencesfEast Europeans againstcom-munismand communist ule.The East German surveys iscussed aboveprovide dramatic evidence to thiseffect. hey show thatafter1985East

German attachment o socialismsteadilydeteriorated.By October 1989only15percent f thesurveyed radeschool students ndorsedthestate-ment "I am a devoted citizen of the German Democratic Republic,"down from46 percent n 1983.Fully 60 percent ndorseditwithreser-vationsand 25 percentrejected t. n thesamemonth s fewas 3 percentcontinued o believe that socialismwilltriumph hroughout heworld,"down from50 percent n 1984. Just 7 percent greedwithreservationsand a whopping70 percentdisagreed.72 he contrast etween thefigures

for 1989 and thosefor 1983-84 is striking.t pointsto a massive riseindiscontentnthe secondhalfof thedecade,a rise thatmust have loweredtherevolutionaryhresholds f millionsof individualEast Germans.

What specific vents et therevolutionary andwagon inmotion? Onemustrecognizethatattempting o answer thisquestionis akin to tryingto identify he spark that gniteda forest ireor the cough responsiblefor fluepidemic.There weremanyturning oints ntheEast European

Revolution, nyone ofwhichmighthave derailed it.One turning ointcame inearlyOctober,whenEast Germanofficialsrefused o carry ut Party eader Honecker's ordertoopen fire n streetdemonstrators. n October 7 Gorbachevwas in Berlinforcelebrationsmarkingthe fortiethnniversary f the German Democratic Republic.With scoresof foreign eportersooking on, crowds took to thestreets,chanting, Gorby! Gorby!" And thepoliceclubs wentinto action.WestGerman television mmediatelyplayed theseevents back to the rest of

East Germany.The scenes alerteddisgruntled itizens nevery ornerofthe country o the pervasiveness f discontent,while thegovernment'sweak responserevealed tsvulnerability. peaceful protest rokeout inLeipzig on October9. Honecker ordered theregional Party ecretary oblock the demonstration,by force if necessary.But bloodshed wasavertedwhen Egon Krenz, a Politburo memberin chargeof security,flew to Leipzig and encouraged the securityforces to show restraint.Local leaders-some of whom had already appealed forrestraint-ac-

cepted this contravention f Honecker's order,and tens of thousandsmarchedwithout nterference.ensingtheshifting oliticalwinds, moreand moreEast Germansthroughout hecountry ookto thestreets. heEast Germanuprisingwas now infull wing.As theregime ried o stemthe tide througha stringof concessions, he swelling crowds began to

72 "Daten des Zentralinstitutsuir ugendforschungeipzig" (fn.59),Tables 1 and 2.



38 WORLD POLITICS

make increasinglybold demands. Within a month the Berlin Wallwould be breached, nd in less thana yeartheGermanDemocratic Re-public would become part of a unified, emocraticGermany.73

Another turningpointcame on October25, duringGorbachev'sstatevisitto Finland. Two months arliera Solidarity fficalhad formedPo-land's firstnoncommunistgovernment ince the 1940s, following theCommunist Party's stunningdefeat at thepolls.A legislativedeputy toGorbachev had declined detailed commenton thegroundsthat the de-velopments were a domesticmatter for the Poles.74The communistswere in retreat n Hungary,too. In meetingswith dissidentgroups theHungarian CommunistPartyhad endorsedfreeparliamentarylections.

Then, in the belief that ts candidateswould do poorlyrunning underthe banner ofcommunism, t had transformedtselfntothe HungarianSocialist Party.75 his was thefirst ime thata rulingcommunistpartyhad formallyabandoned communism. With the world wonderingwhether the Soviet Union had reached the limitsof its tolerance,Gor-bachev declared in Finland that his countryhad no moral or politicalright o interferen theaffairs f its East European neighbors.Definingthispositionas "the Sinatradoctrine,"hisspokesman okingly sked re-

porterswhethertheyknew the Frank Sinatrasong "I Did It My Way."He went on to say that"Hungary and Poland are doing it theirway."Using the Westernterm for thepreviousSovietpolicyof armed inter-vention to keep the governments f the Warsaw Pact in communisthands,he added, "I think theBrezhnev doctrine s dead."76Coming onthe heels of major communistretreats n Poland and Hungary, thesecommentsofferedyetanother ndicationthat Gorbachev would not tryto silenceEast European dissent.

Ifone effect fthis ignalwas toemboldentheoppositionmovementsof Eastern Europe, another must have been to discouragethe govern-mentsofEasternEurope fromresortingoviolenceunilaterally. his isnot tosaythatGorbachevenunciatedhis Sinatra doctrinewiththe nten-tionof encouragingEast European oppositionsto grab forpower. Noris it to say that therevolutionwould have peteredout in theabsence ofthismove. Bythe time Gorbachev renouncedtheSovietUnion's right o

intervene, ppositionmovements n Poland, East Germany,and Hun-gary alreadycommanded mass support, nd it is unlikelythatanything

73 This account drawson Ash (fn. 19); Anderson fn.26); and theNew YorkTimesreportscompiled nGwertzman nd Kaufman fn. 1), 158-60, 166-84,216-22.

74 New YorkTimes,August 18, 1989,p. 1.75 Ibid., October 8, 1989,p. 1.For a fuller ccountof the transformation,ee Abel (fn. 14),

chap. 2.76 New YorkTimes,October 26, 1989,p. 1.




shortof massivebrutalitywould have broken theirmomentumand re-stored the status quo ante. Nonetheless,some incumbentcommunistleaders were seriouslyconsidering military olution,and the procla-

mation oftheSinatra doctrinemaywell have tippedthebalance againstthe use of force.Had even one East European government esortedtoforce t thisstage,the resultmaywell have been a seriesofbloodyandprotracted ivilwars.

Just s we cannotbe certain hat delay nannouncingthenew Sovietdoctrine would have altered thecourseof history,we will neverknowwhether he contravention fHonecker'sorder to shoothad a significantimpact on the subsequentflow of events.What can be said is this: had

Honecker's subordinates nforcedhis order,thegrowthof the opposi-tion would have slowed, and laterdemonstrationswould probablynothave stayed peaceful.The same historical ignificance an be attributedtotherestraint hownbythe ndividualsoldiers n dutyduringthe dem-onstration nd bythe ndividualdemonstrators.n thetenseatmosphereof the demonstration shot fired n panic or a stonethrown n excite-ment could have sparkeda violent onfrontation.t was an extraordinary

conjunction of individualdecisions thatkept theuprisingpeacefulandprevented herevolution rombeingsidetracked.The success of antigovernment emonstrationsn one country n-

spireddemonstrations lsewhere. n earlyNovember,Sofiawas shakenbyits first emonstrationnfourdecades as severalthousandBulgariansmarched on the National Assembly.Within a week, on the very daythrongs rokethrough he BerlinWall, Todor Zhivkov'sthirty-five-yearleadershipcame to an end, and his successorbegan talkingof radical

reforms.Up to thattimeCzechoslovakia's communist overnment ad yielded

little o its own opposition.Conscious ofdevelopments lsewhere, thadsimply promised economic reforms nd made minor concessions ontraveland religion.77hese retreats ncouragedthe swelling crowds toask for more. On November 24, just hours afterAlexanderDubvek ad-dressed a crowd of350,000 nhis first ublic speechsince1968,theCom-munistPartydeclared a shake-upin the eadership, nlytoface a muchlargerrallyofpeople shouting, Shame! Shame! Shame!" The new gov-ernment ried oplacatethedemonstratorsyvowingtopunishthecom-mandant of the paramilitary orces thathad roughed up protestorsweek earlier.Unimpressed, heopposition eaders abeled theannouncedchanges"cosmetic"and promisedto redouble theirpressure.The success

77 Ibid., November 16, 1989,p. 1.



40 WORLD POLITICS

of the general strikethey called for November 27 led the CommunistPartyto capitulatewithina matterof hours to theirmajor demands,including an end to itsmonopoly on politicalpower.78 Not since the

Paris crowddiscoveredthat thedreaded Bastillecontainedonlya hand-fulofprisoners nd a fewterrifiedoldiershas a citadel fallenwithsuchease," wrotetheEconomist fewdays ater. They just had tosay boo."79

This bringsus back, forone last time,toHavel's brilliant1979essay.He predicted therethat when the greengrocers ecided they had hadenough,communism would fall like a house ofcards. So it turnedout:when themasses took to the streets, he support for the Czechoslovakgovernment ust vanished. The mobilizationprocess followed the pat-

terns of East Germanyand Bulgaria. Emboldened by signalsfrom theSoviet Union and thesuccessesofoppositionmovements n neighboringcountries, few thousandpeople stoodup in defiance, oining the tinycore oflong-persecutedctivists. n so doing they ncouraged additionalcitizens to drop theirmasks,which then impelled more onlookers tojump in. Before ong fearchanged sides: wherepeople had been afraidtooppose theregime, hey ame to fearbeingcaughtdefending t.Partymembers rushed to burntheir

cards,asserting heyhad

always been re-formists t heart.Top officials,ensingthattheymightbe made to payforstanding n theway of changeand foranyviolence,hastened to ac-cept the opposition'sdemands, onlyto be confrontedwithbolder onesyet.

Had the civilian leadershipor the top brass attemptedto resisttheopposition, he transfer fpowerwould not have been so swift, nd cer-tainlynot so peaceful.One of the mostremarkableaspectsof the East

European Revolution s that,with thepartialexceptionofRomania, thesecurity orces nd thebureaucracy ustmelted way inthefaceofgrow-ing public opposition.Not onlydid stateofficialshyaway fromputtingup a fight, utmanycrossedover to theopposition s a transferfpowerappeared increasinglyikely.This is highlysignificant,ora defectionfromthe innerestablishment s an unusually good indicatorofthepre-vailingpoliticalwinds.A Politburomemberdistancinghimself rom heParty eader does more toexposetheregime'svulnerabilityhana green-

grocerwho stops displayingthe obligatoryMarxistslogan. In turn,adefiantgreengrocer oes more harmto theregime's mage thandoes anobstreperous risoner n solitary onfinement.

78 For an eyewitnessccount of theseevents, ee TimothyGartonAsh, "The Revolutionof theMagic Lantern,"New YorkReview fBooks,January 8, 1990, 2-51. See also Abel (fn.14),chap. 3.

79Economist, ecember2, 1989,p. 55.




In thesimple model ofSection II the perceived trengthf the publicopposition s measured byS, the share of societypublicly n opposition.This variable treatsall individualsequally: with ten individuals,each

individualcarries weightof 10 percent.But in reality, s I have argued,membersof society iffern their ontributions othe perceived trengthof the opposition. So a more realisticmeasure of perceived strengthwould be some unequallyweightedndicator fpublicopposition,wheretheweightscorrelatewith levels of relative nfluence. uch a weightedmeasure would assign a Politburomember more weight than a green-grocer, nd the attermore weightthan a namelessprisoner.Were we tointroducethis refinementnto our model, the centralargument would

remain unaffected:with public preferences till interdependent, herewould remainthe possibility f a latent,unobserved bandwagon.80Myreason for abstracting rom thisrefinementn Section III was to keepthe presentation imple.

Some of the officialswho distancedthemselves rom hePartyor evenmoved into the oppositionas the uprisings ook offmay at heart havedislikedthe communist ocial order.Manyothersundoubtedly cted for

opportunistic easonsratherthan out of conviction. ensing the immi-nentcollapse of the old order, they bandoned it in hopes of findingplace in the order about to be born.A fewchose to resist, ut thespeedof the anticommunistmobilizationleftmost of themwith insufficienttimeto plan and execute a coordinatedresponse.Had themobilizationbeen slower, theymightwell have managed to mount a credible, ffec-tiveresponse.8"

TimothyGartonAsh,an eyewitness o the mobilizations nHungary,

Poland, East Germany, nd Czechoslovakia,characterizes1989as East-ern Europe's "yearof truth."82his designation s accurate nsofar s itcapturesthe end offeigned upportforcommunism.But it conceals the

push therevolution otfrompreference alsificationn thepartofthosewho sympathizedwiththestatus uo. As noncommunistshrew ff heirmasks in joy and relief,many genuinecommunists lippedon masks oftheirown-masks depictingthem as thehelplessfunctionaries f a re-pressive system, s formerpreference alsifiershrilledto be speakingtheirmindsafteryearsof silentresentment. et Ash's label ismeaningfulin another sense as well. The flowering fanticommunist iscourse has

80 For a demonstration,ee Kuran (fn.31).81 The pace of events was undoubtedly keyfactor lso in the failureof conservative

groups n theSovietUnionto block EasternEurope'sliberation.Had eventsproceededmoreslowly, heymighthave had timeto oust Gorbachev nd order theRed Army ntoaction.

82 Ash (fn.51).



42 WORLD POLITICS

exposed the official deologymore clearlythan everbefore s a heap ofsophistry, istortion, nd myth. t has awakened millions of dormantminds, confrontingitizensresignedto the statusquo withtheconflicts

between thepragmaticand theoreticalayersof theirbeliefs.This is tosay neither hat the thoughts feveryEast European are now internallyconsistentnor that Marxistthinkinghas ceased. Rather, t is to suggestthatthetransformationfpublicdiscoursehas opened manyto new pos-sibilities.

In the days following he fall of Czechoslovakia's communistregime,a banner nPrague read: "Poland-10 years,Hungary-10 months, astGermany-10 weeks, Czechoslovakia-10 days."83The implied accel-

eration reflects he fact that each successful hallenge to communismlowered the perceivedriskof dissent n the countries till under com-munistrule. n terms f ourmodel,as revolutionaryhresholdsnneigh-boringcountriesfell, herevolution ecame increasingly ontagious.

Had thisbannerbeenprepared fewweekslater, tmighthave added"Romania-10 hours."As the Czechoslovak uprisingneared itsclimax,the executive committeeof theRomanian CommunistPartywas busy

reelectingNicolae Ceauaescu as president nd interrupting is accep-tance speech with standingovations.Three weeks laterprotestsbrokeout in the westernprovinces,but theywere brutallyput down by thesecurity orces.Confidentofhis ability o prevent replayof theeventsthathad broughtdown other communistregimes,Ceauaescu leftfor astatevisit to Iran,but theprotestsntensified. pon his returnhe orga-nized a rally to denounce the "counterrevolutionaries,"ut when hestarted o speak hewas booed. Television broadcastthe ook of shockon

his face, and the Romanian revolt was on. The consequent change ofregimeturnedout to be bloodier than theprevious five,because the se-curity orcesresponsibleforthe earlier massacre resisted herevolution.They caused hundredsof deaths beforetheywere beatenby the army.Ceauaescu tried to escape but he was caughtand summarily xecuted.84

Yet again, the world watcheda nation ump with ittlewarning fromquiescence and subservienceto turbulence and defiance.As the yearwent out, commentatorswere stillmarvelingat the speed with which

thepolitical andscapeof EasternEurope had changed. Long-persecuteddissidentsnow occupied high government ositions. n Czechoslovakia,for nstance,Havel was president, ubcek, chairmanof theFederal As-

83 "Czechoslovakia:The Velvet Revolution,"UncaptiveMinds3 (January-February990),

84 For theNew YorkTimesreports f these events, ee Gwertzmanand Kaufman (fn. 1),332-39.




sembly, nd Jirv ienstbier a Charter77 signatoryerving ime as a coalstoker),foreignminister.All sixcountriesbegan planning freeelectionsand committed hemselves o economic iberalization. ome even moved

to withdraw from he Warsaw Pact.

VI. THE PREDICTABILITY OF UNPREDICTABILITY

Unexpected as theywere,thesedevelopmentsnow seem as though theycould easilyhave been predicted.Was it not obvious that theeconomicfailuresof communism had sown the seeds of a massiverevolt?Was itnot self-evidenthat the East Europeanswere justwaitingfor n oppor-

tunity o topple theirdespised dictators?Did not the severe domesticproblems of the Soviet Union necessitate tswithdrawal from EasternEurope, to concentrate ts resources n economic reforms?Retrospectiveaccounts of 1989offer panoplyof such reasonswhythe East EuropeanRevolutionwas inevitable. "It is no accident that Mikhail Gorbachevdeclined to intervene,"writes one commentator85-this,n a volumepepperedwith comments n how 1989surprised ne and all.

This essay has shown that the warning signs of the revolutionre-mained cloudy until it was all over. Moreover,the unobservability fprivate preferences nd revolutionary hresholdsconcealed the latentbandwagons in formation nd also made it difficult o appreciate thesignificance f events that were pushingthese intomotion. The expla-nationforthispredictive ailure ranscends heparticularitiesfEasternEurope: this s after ll hardlythefirst imea major social uprisinghascome as a big surprise.

The French Revolution of 1789shocked notonlyLouis XVI and hiscourtiersbut also outside observers nd therioterswho helped end hisreign.Yet it had many deep causes-all expounded at great length nliterally housandsofvolumes.This paradox is one of thecentral hemesofTocqueville's Old Rigimeand the FrenchRevolution. Chance playedno part whatever in the outbreak of the revolution,"he observes."Though it took the world by surprise,twas the inevitable utcome ofa long periodofgestation, heabrupt nd violent onclusionofa process

in which sixgenerationsplayedan intermittentart."86In thiscentury he Nazi takeoverofGermanytookplace with aston-

ishingspeed.Within a fewmonths ntrenched olitical nstitutions ereturnedupside down, all democraticoppositionwas destroyed, nd a la-

85William M. Brinton,Gorbachev nd the Revolution f 1989-90," nBrinton nd Rinz-ler fn. 11),373.

86 Tocqueville (fn.36),20.



44 WORLD POLITICS

bor movement with millions of memberswas driven underground.87Though it was not foreseen, here s no shortageofexplanationsfortherise of Nazism. The Iranian Revolution of 1979-80 offersyet another

example of an unanticipateduprising.There now existsa panoply ofcompetingexplanations, ncludingones that nvokeclass conflicts, ail-ures of governance,foreign xploitation, conomicreversals, he disaf-fectionsof bazaar merchants, nd Islamic ideology.88 et for all theirdifferences,tudentsof this revolution gree that t stunnedalmost ev-eryone-the Shah and the AyatollahKhomeini, the CIA and the KGB,

statesmen, iplomats, cademics,and journalists.The veryrevolution hatpreparedthegroundforthefirst ommunist

regimein historywas an unforeseen vent. Weeks before the RussianRevolutionofFebruary1917 Lenin told an audience inSwitzerlandthatRussia's great explosion ay in thedistantfuture nd thatolder men likehimselfwould not live to see it.89And with ustdaysto go, foreign b-servers n Petrogradwere advisingtheir apitalsthatthemonarchywasstable and secure.90 ut the tsarfell, nd beforetheyearwas over thecommunistshad gained fullcontrol f thegovernment.t has since been

recognizedthatMarxist scholarshipdid not prepareus for theworld'sfirst uccessful ommunist revolutionoccurring n, of all places, back-ward,semifeudalRussia.91

Nor did Marxistscholarship-or for thatmatter,non-Marxist chol-arship-anticipate themidcentury prisings n thecommunist tatesofEasternEurope. "The Hungarian uprisingof October 1956 was a dra-matic,sudden explosion, pparentlynotorganized beforehandby a rev-olutionary enter;neither utsidersnor theparticipants ad anticipated

anything ike the irresistible evolutionary ynamism hatwould sweepthecountry."Thus beginsThe Unexpected evolution, monograph onthis failed attemptto overthrow ommunism that is repletewith evi-

87 Detlev J.K. Peukert,nsideNazi Germany: onformity,pposition,ndRacism nEvery-day Life, trans.Richard Deveson (New Haven: Yale University ress,1987),27-28 and pas-sim.

88 For a sampleofexplanations,eeHamid Algar,The slamicRevolutionn ran London:Muslim Institute, 980); Said AmirArjomand,"Iran's Islamic Revolution n ComparativePerspective,"World olitics 8 (April 1986),383-414; Shaul Bakhash,TheState nd Revolu-tion n Iran (London: CroomHelm, 1984);Nikki R. Keddie,Roots fRevolutionNew Ha-ven: Yale University ress, 1981);and RobertLooney,EconomicOrigins fthe ranian Revo-lution Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1982).

89 Leonard Schapiro,The RussianRevolutionsf1917: TheOrigins fModernCommunism(New York: Basic Books, 1984),19.

90William H. Chamberlin,The RussianRevolution, 917-1921 (New York: Macmillan,1935), 1:73-76.

91Further vidence oncerningheelement fsurprisentheFrench,Russian, nd Iranianrevolutionsmaybe found n Kuran (fn.31), secs.2, 6-7.




dence of widespread preference alsification ightup to the uprising.92Prior to October 1956 writerswho were to play leading roles gave notthe slightest ign of oppositionto thepolitical status quo. For another

example, clerical employeesremained docile and submissiveuntil theuprising n which theyparticipated, ftenhidingtheirgrievancesevenfromfamilymembers.93

The Prague Springof 1968offers notherexample of an unforeseenattemptto crack the wall of communism. n a retrospectiveccount,Havel writesthat n 1967 the entirenationwas behaving ike theGoodSoldier Svejk, accommodatingitself to the regime's demands. "Whowould have believed . . . that a year later this recentlyapathetic, skepti-

cal, and demoralized societywould standup withsuchcourage and in-telligenceto a foreignpower!" "And," he continues, who would havesuspectedthat, fter carcely yearhad gone by,this ame societywould,as swiftlys thewind blows, apse back intoa stateofdeep demoraliza-tion far worse than its original one!"94

This tallyofunanticipated prisings ould be expanded,butthepointhas been made: the revolution f 1989was not thefirst o surprise us.Time and again entrenched uthority as vanishedsuddenly, eavingthevictors stonished t their riumph nd thevanquished,at theirdefeat.

Should we conclude,along withJohnDunn, thatrevolutions re in-eluctable "factsof nature,"eventsthatfail"to suggestthedominanceofhuman reason in anyform"?95n otherwords, s theculprithuman ir-rationality? he argumentdevelopedin thispaper does not point n thisdirection. t suggests, n thecontrary,hatpredictivefailure s entirelyconsistentwithcalculated,purposefulhuman action.Underlying n ex-

plosiveshiftn publicsentimentremultitudes f ndividualdecisionstoswitchpolitical allegiance,each undertaken n responseto changing n-centives.So just as a failureto predict rainstorm oes not imply thatthe clouds obey no physical aws, a failureto predictsome revolutiondoes notimply ndividual rrationality.

Dunn also suggeststhatrevolutionshave too manydeterminants omake them amenable to a grand, comprehensive heory. hunning thefutileexerciseof constructing theorywithuniversalapplicability,we

oughttofocus,he says,on theparticularitiesf each situation.Although

92 Paul Kecskemeti,The Unexpected evolution: ocial Forces n theHungarian Uprising(Stanford, alif.:StanfordUniversity ress, 1961),1.

93 Ibid., 60, 84-85.9Havel, DisturbinghePeace:A Conversation ithKarelHvz~dala (1986), trans.Paul Wil-

son (New York: AlfredA. Knopf, 1990),109.95 Dunn, ModernRevolutions: n Introductiono theAnalysis fa PoliticalPhenomenon, d

ed. (New York: Cambridge University ress, 1989), -3.



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I agree that revolutions re complexeventsbroughton bya symphonyof nteracting ariables, departfromDunn on the usefulness fgeneraltheorizing: bstacles o forecasting articular evolutions o not preclude

useful insights nto theprocess f revolution.Even if we cannot predictthe time and place of the nextbig uprising,we may prepare ourselvesmentallyfor the mass mobilizationthatwill bring tabout. Equally im-portant,we can understandwhy it may surpriseus. There are otherspheresofknowledgewherehighlyusefultheories reclude reliablepre-dictions of specific utcomes. The Darwinian theory f biological evo-lution illuminates the processwhereby species evolve but withouten-abling us to predictthe futureevolution of the gazelle. Sophisticated

theoriesof theweatherelucidate why t is in perpetualfluxbutwithoutmaking it possibleto saywith much confidencewhether t will rain inRome a week fromnextTuesday.

Such general theorieshave a common virtue: heyreveal thesource oftheirpredictive imitations. he reason theycannotpredict nfallibly snot simplythattheycontain argenumbersofvariables. n each theoryvariables are related to one anothernonlinearly;hatis, a small pertur-bation in one variable,whichnormallyproduces mall changes in othervariables, may under the rightset of circumstanceshave large conse-quences. Consider the theory f climaticturbulencedeveloped by Ed-ward Lorenz. It showsthat sparrowflapping tswings n Istanbul-anintrinsicallynsignificantvent-can generate hurricane n the Gulf ofMexico. This is because the weather t any given ocation s related to itsdeterminantsnonlinearly. n otherwords, its sensitivityo other vari-ables, and their ensitivities o one another, re themselves ariable.Ac-

cordingly,ariable x

maybe

imperviouso a

jumpin

yfrom20 to

200,yetexhibithypersensitivityfy rises bithigher, ay,to202. It maythenstartto grow explosively, ffectively eedingon itself.The notion thatsmall eventsmay unleash huge forcesgoes againstmuch of twentieth-century ocial thought,with its emphasis on linearity, ontinuity,ndgradualism. But in contexts s different s technologicaldiffusion ndcognitivedevelopment t is thekeytounderstanding hostofotherwiseinexplicablephenomena.

What endows intrinsicallynsignificantventswithpotentially xplo-sive power in the contextof politicalchange is thatpublic preferencesare interdependent.Because of this interdependence, he equilibriumlevels of the public oppositionare related to theunderlying ndividualcharacteristicsonlinearly.A massivechangein privatepreferencesmayleave the incumbent quilibriumundisturbed, nlyto be followedbyatiny change thatdestroys he statusquo, settingoffa bandwagon thatwill culminate n a verydifferentquilibrium.Partlybecause ofprefer-




ence falsification,henatureof the nterdependence s imperfectlybserv-able. This is whya massiverise n public oppositionmaycatcheveryoneby surprise.

Because preference alsificationfflicts olitics n every ociety,majorrevolutions re likelyto come again and again as a surprise.This is notto assert the impossibilityf accurateprediction. f we possessed a reli-able technique for measuring people's revolutionary hresholds,wewould see what it would take to get a revolutionstarted. And if weunderstoodthe determinants fthesethresholds,we would know whentherequiredconditionswere about to be met. For all practicalpurposes,however,such informations available onlyin highly ncompleteform.

In any case, there s an irremovablepoliticalobstacleto becomingsuffi-cientlyknowledgeable:vulnerableregimes an block theproduction nddissemination f information otentially armful o theirown survival.Censorship and the regulationof opinion surveys-both widely prac-ticed in prerevolutionaryasternEurope-are two of the policies thatserve theseobjectives.

I have deliberately haracterized he sourceofunpredictabilitys im-perfect bservability,s opposed tounobservability.he degreeof mper-fectionobviouslyconstitutes continuum.Societies with strongdemo-cratictraditions xhibit ess imperfectionhanones withnonexistent rfragiledemocraticfreedoms.This is because there s less preference al-sificationn the former roup,at leastwithrespect o thepolitical ystemitself.Accordingly, ne can track the course ofantigovernmentr anti-regimesentimentmoreconfidentlyorNorway, Switzerland,or FrancethanforPakistan,Brazil,or Ghana. This is why developments n Paki-stanare more likelyto catchthe world off

guardthanare

developmentsin Norway; by implication,Norway's politicalfuture an be predictedwithgreater onfidence hancan thatof Pakistan.Most countries f theworld lie closer to Pakistan than to Norway as regardsthesignificanceofpreference alsificationn sustaining heirpolitical regimes.

This emphasison unpredictabilityhould not be consideredoffensiveto the scientificpirit:acceptingthe limitsofwhat we can expectfromscience s notan admissionofdefeat.On thecontrary, stablishing hese

limitsofknowledge is itself contributiono thepool of useful knowl-edge. It is also a necessary step toward chartinga realisticscientificagenda. "To act as if we possessedscientific nowledge enabling us totranscend the absolute obstacles to the predictionof specific vents],"wroteFriedrichHayek in his Nobel Memorial Lecture, "may itselfbe-come a serious obstacleto the advance ofthehuman intellect."96

96 Hayek, "The Pretence fKnowledge" (1974),American conomicReview79 (December1989),6.



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The prediction funpredictabilitys not to be confusedwiththeun-falsifiabilityf theunderlying heory. he theory eveloped in thisessayis fullyfalsifiable. t implies thatpoliticalrevolutionswill continueto

surpriseus, so a string fsuccessful redictionswould render t suspect.Simplyput, it can be falsified ydeveloping some theory f revolutionthatforecasts ccurately. n principle, f not in practice, he presentedtheory an also be falsified y showing thatpreference alsification asnot a factor n unanticipated evolutions fthepast.

kuran - out of never - world politics 1991

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