TheDevelopmentofKurdishNationalisminModernIraq:IsanIndependentKurdistanonthe

Horizon?

By:RavenelGodbold

Introduction

TheestablishmentofanautonomousKurdistaninnorthernIraqin1991

appearedtobeastepintherightdirectionfortheIraqiKurds.Withinthespanofa

century,theIraqiKurdshaveevolvedfromanOttomanminoritygroupwithout

nationalistgoalstocontrollinganautonomousregionwithsignificantpolitical

powerintheIraqistate.Sincethe2003overthrowofSaddamHussein,theIraqi

KurdshavemadeeffortstoremainapartoftheIraqistateaslongastheirdemands

aremet,butthequestionofanindependentIraqiKurdistanhasnotbeenremoved

fromthetable.Thefollowingpageswilladdressthefeasibilityofanindependent

KurdishstatebeginningwiththedevelopmentofKurdishnationalistsentimentand

participationintheIraqipoliticalarena.ThesectionsthatfollowexploretheIraqi

Kurdsandwhetherthelimitedautonomytheyenjoyisindicativeofafuture,

successfulsecessionfromtheIraqistateorisbetterusedasaneffectivebargaining

chip.

TheKurdsandKurdistan

Kurdayeti,orKurd,wasfirstusedinthe12thcenturytodescribenomadic

groupsresidinginthemountainousregionsofIraqandIranbutovertimehas

2

evolvedintoatermforidentifyingthefourthlargestethnicgrouporiginatingin

present-dayIraq,Iran,Syria,andTurkey.1TheIraqiKurdscomprise25%ofIraq’s

population,anestimated4.7millionpeople,makingthemthelargestminority

percentageofthehoststates.2Todaythereareanestimated20-30millionKurds,

withthemostsizeablecommunitiesintheUnitedStates,Germany,Russia,Israel,

Georgia,andCanada.3

TheKurdsutilizeseveralmythsoforigin,4butarelikelyaresultofIndo-

EuropeantribemigrationintotheZagrosregion.5Similartootherethnicgroups,the

KurdsarenotahomogeneouspeopleandwithintheKurdishcommunitythereare

linguistic,religious,andtribaldifferences.6Thereareanumberofdifferentdialects

withintheKurdishlanguage,influencedbytheofficiallanguagesofthecountriesin

whichtheyreside;themostwidelyspokendialectisKurmanjiandisusedbyKurds

inTurkey,Syria,northernIran,andtheportionofIraqnorthoftheGreaterZab

River,whileSorani/KurdiisspokensouthoftheGreaterZabinIraqandinthe

KordestanprovinceofIran.7ReligiouslytheKurdsarelessdiverse;themajorityof

KurdsareSunniMuslimsfollowingtheShafi’ischoolofjurisprudencealthough

thereareminoritiesfollowingSufism,Judaism,Christianity,Yarsanism,Yazidism,

1CraigDouglasAlbert,“AHistoryofViolence:EthnicGroupIdentityandtheIraqiKurds,”IranandtheCaucasus17(2013):223.22KeremYildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,(London:PlutoPress,2012)7.3JeremyJimenezandPeterKabachnik,“TheOtherIraq:ExploringIraqiKurdistan,”FOCUSonGeography55.2(Summer2012):31.4ThemajorityoftheKurds,accordingtoCraigDouglasAlbert,believetheyaredescendantsoftheMedianEmpirein6thcenturyPersia.Albert,224.5Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,5.6Albert,223.7Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,5.

3

andShi’ism.8Finally,therearetribaldifferencesbetweentheKurds.These

differenceswillbediscussedwhensummarizingthedevelopmentofKurdish

politicalparties.

ThemajorityofKurdsresideinIraq,Iran,Syria,andTurkey,aregion

referredtoasKurdistanbeginninginthe16thcentury.9Theregionwasruledbythe

OttomanandPersianempiresuntiltheearly20thcenturywhentheMiddleEastwas

divviedupintothepresentdaystates.Theareareceivesanadequateamountof

rainfall,creatingasuitableenvironmentforagriculture(primarilytobacco,cotton,

grains,fruits,andvegetables)andlivestockfarming,while10IraqiKurdistanisalso

richinoil,naturalgas,minerals(chrome,copper,iron,coal,lignite),andwater.11All

fourcountrieshavehadconflictswiththeKurdishpopulationsresidingwithintheir

borders,butthoseinIraqaretheonlyoneswhohavemanagedtoachieveautonomy

andhavetheirbordersrecognizedbybothdomesticandforeignentities.

DevelopingaNationalIdentity

TheOttomanEmpireandBritishControl

KurdslivingintheOttomanvilayetsofMosul,Baghdad,andBasradidnot

developastrongsenseofnationalidentityuntilthepost-WorldWarIperiod.While,

theOttomanPeriodwasnotabsentofKurdishdiscontent,12theOttomanshad

successfullyreducedthepowersofKurdishAmirswithoutfacingmuchopposition,

8Ibid,6andAlbert,227.9SeeAppendixA.10TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,7.11Ibid.TheeffectsofthesenaturalresourcesonthepoliticalsituationinIraqiKurdistanwillbediscussedmoreindepthinthefollowingpages.12SeeDavidMcDowall’sAModernHistoryoftheKurdsforanindepthhistoryofKurdishshaykhs,uprisings,andthreatstotheOttomanEmpire.

4

largelyduetotheuseofreligionasthemarkerofidentity;asMuslims,themajority

ofKurdswasstillanintegralpartoftheOttomansystemanddidnotfeeltheir

positionwasthreatenedbythepowerreductions.13WiththeoutbreakofWorldWar

I,theKurdsralliedaroundtheOttomanEmpirewhenitdeclaredwaronBritain,

France,andRussiain1914.14Unfortunately,fortheOttomans,theKurdishsupport

wasshortlivedandnationalistideasbegantodevelop;EdmundGhareebattributes

thebeginningsofKurdishnationalismtoanumberoffactorsincluding:poorsocial

andeconomicconditionsinKurdishareas,closertiesbetweenKurdishtribes,the

lackofinterestoftheYoungTurkmovementinminorities,andtheriseofstrong

nationalistmovementsinotherOttomansubjects(Greeks,Arabs,Armenians,

Bulgarians,andAlbanians).15

FollowingthecollapseoftheOttomanEmpire,itappearedaKurdishstate

wasonthehorizon.SignedonAugust10,1920bytheOttomanGovernmentand

AlliedPowers,theTreatyofSevresessentiallyredrewthemapoftheMiddleEast,

createdthenewstatesofTurkeyandIraq,anddissolvedtheOttomanEmpire.The

questionof“Kurdistan”wasalsoaddressed,16andthediscussioncontinuedatthe

1921CairoConferencewhendelegatesagreedaKurdishstateshouldactasabuffer

betweentheotherMiddleEasternstates.Duetounhappinesswithlanddivisions,

13PeterSluglett,“CommonSense,oraStepPregnantwithEnormousConsequences:SomeThoughtsonthePossibleSecessionofIraqiKurdistan,”SecessionasanInternationalPhenomenon:FromAmerica’sCivilWartoContemporarySeparatistMovements,Ed.DonHarrisonDoyle,(Athens:UniversityofGeorgia,2010)322.14Sluglett,323.15EdmundGhareeb,“TheKurdishIssue,”Iraq:ItsHistory,People,andPolitics,Ed.ShamiConstantineInati,(Amherst,NY:Humanity,2003)167.16MahirA.Aziz,TheKurdsofIraq:EthnonationalismandNationalIdentityinIraqKurdistan,(London:I.B.Tauris,2011)61.

5

theTreatyofSevreswasrejectedJuly24,1923andreplacedwiththeTreatyof

Lausanne,establishingthemodernTurkishstateandrejectedtheideaof

“Kurdistan”;theregionwasdividedbetweenIraq(Mosulwasincorporatedintothe

state),Turkey,Syria,andIranonJune5,1926,creatingthebordersandpopulations

ofthemodernMiddleEast.

Duringthissameperiod,Britishpolicyintheregionundertheircontrol

appearedsympathetictotheKurdishcauseandinsomewaysencouragedKurdish

nationalism,toyingwiththeestablishmentofaKurdishprovince.17The1921

provisionalconstitutiondeclaredIraqtobecomprisedoftwonationalgroups,the

ArabsandtheKurds.After1925,theKurdsweregivenmorelenienciesandallowed

toteachKurdishinschools,publishKurdishlanguagebooks,andrepresentthe

Kurdishmajorityregioninthegovernment.18ThesmallsuccessesfortheKurds

wereshortlived,andthe1930Anglo-IraqTreatyofAlliancedidnothingtopromote

Kurdishautonomyorbasicrights.19Twoyearslater,Iraqofficiallygained

independencefromtheBritish,althoughBritishinfluencewouldremainuntilthe

1958Revolution,andwasgrantedmembershipintotheLeagueofNations

conditionalontheprotectionofcivilandpoliticalrightsoftheKurdishpopulation.20

The1930sbegantheprocessofmajortransformationsintheformofrevolts,

developmentofArabnationalism,andpoliticalpartyformationintheIraqipolitical

sphere.ThemostnotablepartyestablishedinthisdecadewastheIraqiCommunist

Party(ICP)in1934,whichinitiallyattractedthesupportofurbanKurdsduetotheir17Aziz,60.18Aziz,68.19Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,11.20Ibid.

6

supportforminoritygroups,butthedevelopmentofKurdishpartiesbeginningin

the1940sledtoashiftinpoliticalalliances.21In1935MustafaBarzanibecamea

prominentfigureinKurdishnationalism,leadingarevoltofKurdishchiefsagainst

thegovernment’sfailuretoupholdthetermsofthedeclarationofindependence,

mostnotablytheofficialuseoftheKurdishlanguage,representationofKurdsinthe

NationalAssembly,andafairdivisionofresources.22Eventhoughtherevolt

ultimatelyfailed,MullaMustafa’sparticipationputhimandtheBarzanitribeonthe

politicalmap.

CentralIraqalsounderwentanumberofchangesduringthe1930s;Britain

refusedtorelinquishcontroloftheareaandafterthedeathsofKingFaysalIand

Ghazi,andtheweakruleofKingFaysalII,thefutureofIraqwasagaininquestion.23

Severalsucceedingcabinetswereunabletoeffectivelygovernduetofactionalism,

sectarianism,andgeneralincompetenceofpoliticalleadersinoffice.24

The1930salsosawtwodistinctformsofnationalismbegintodevelop

amongArabIraqis:qawmiyyah,anethnic,racialnationalism,andwataniyyah,a

territorialnationalism.Qawmiyyah,anethnicandracialnationalism,stemsfrom

qawm,whichhastakenontheEuropeanconnotationof“nation”althoughit

originallyreferredtobloodrelation,whilewataniyyah,aterritorialnationalism,

comesfromwatana,or“homeland”.25Iraqissubscribingtotheqawmiyyahtheory

21Aziz,66.22Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,12.23DeniseNatali,TheKurdsandtheState:EvolvingNationalIdentityinIraq,Turkey,andIran,(Syracuse,NY:SyracuseUP,2005)35.24DavidMcDowall,AModernHistoryoftheKurds,(London:I.B.Tauris,1996)287.25JohanFranzen,“TheProblemofIraqiNationalism,”NationalIdentities13.3(2011):220.

7

tendedtosupportPan-Arabism,astrainofnationalismthatalsodevelopedduring

the1930s,whileproponentsofwataniyyasupportedIraqipatriotism.26Perhaps

unsurprisinglymanyoftheBa’athists(IraqiRenaissanceSocialistParty)werealso

qawmiyyanationalists,supportinganArabIraqistateandclaimingsuchastatewas

theonlywaytoachieveunityovertheminorities.27Theimportanceofqawmiyyah

andtheBa’athpartywillcomeintoplayfollowingthe1968Ba’athRevolution.

TheBritish,Qasim,andtheFirstBa’athCoup

WithmuchofthewesternworldfocusedontheoutbreakofWorldWarII,

IraqfacedanewleaderastheresultofyetanothercouponApril3,1941,RashidAli

elGailani.28AlireachedouttotheAxispowersforsupport,promptingBritish

militaryinterventioninBasra,Baghdad,andHabbaniyawheretheymanagedto

defeatAli’smilitaryandsecuretheirholdonoilinterests.29Despitesuccessover

Ali’smilitarycoup,theBritishwerethenforcedtocontendwithaKurdishrevolt

from1943-1945undertheleadershipofMullaMustafaBarzani.Britishpressureon

BaghdadsecuredapardonforMullaMustafainNovember1943andattemptsto

negotiatebetweenMullaMustafaandBaghdadbegan.Negotiationsappearedto

succeed,butArabnationalistsrefusedtoimplementthechangesandMullaMustafa

begantestingthelimitswithnewfoundconfidencefromsupportinthenorth,

resultinginastalemate.30

26Natali,35.27Ibid.28KellyBell,“WorldWarII:AirWaroverIraq,”AviationHistoryMagazine,May2004,Available:http://www.historynet.com/world-war-ii-air-war-over-iraq.htm.29Ibid.30McDowall,291.

8

Thestalematecontinuedthroughthesummerof1944whenMullaMustafa

againrejectedamnestyfromBaghdadandIraqitroopsmarchedonMullaMustafa,

forcinghimonthedefensiveandcausinghimtofleetoMahabadprovinceinIran.31

WhileinMahabad,MullaMustafaparticipatedinthenationalistmovementand

defendedthefirstKurdishRepublicbeforeretreatingtotheSovietUnionin1947,

whereheresidedfor11yearsbeforereturningtoIraqonOctober6,1958.32

In1946,fourpoliticalgroupsunitedtoestablishoftheKurdishDemocratic

Party(KDP):Heva,Shoresh,Rizgari(Liberation),andtheIraqibranchoftheIranian

KDP.33TheKDPessentiallyrepresentedtheBarzanis,aKurmanjispeakingtribe

locatedinthenorthwestregionofIraqiKurdistan,andtosomeextent,thisremains

trueinthecurrentpartycomposition.34MullaMustafawaselected

president/chairman,HamzaAbdullahwasnamedsecretary-general,andShaikh

LatifandShaikhZiadAghazwerechosenasvicepresidents.35DuetoMulla

Mustafa’sexilesinIranandtheSovietUnion,theKDPplayedaminorroleinIraqi

politics.IbrahimAhmad,aKurdishnationalist,replacedAbdullahassecretary

generalin1953,hopingtocombineKurdishnationalismwithleftistnationalist

movements.36Abdullahregainedcontrolbrieflyin1959,buthisclosetieswiththe

ICPconcernedMullaMustafaandAhmadtookbackthepositionlaterthatyear.

ThesecompetinginterestswithintheKDPledtofactionalismandlaterthecreation

31McDowall,293.32Aziz,68.33MichaelM.Gunter,TheKurdsofIraq:TragedyandHope,(NewYork:St.Martin's,1992)22.34Sluglett,332.35Ibid.36Gunter,23.

9

ofnewparties,butforthenextdecadetheKDPremainedtheprimaryKurdishparty

inIraq.

Duringthisperiod,Britishpoliciesremainedineffect,anditwasnotuntilthe

July1958RevolutionthatBritishinfluencewasexpelledandanewpoliticalclass

emerged.AbdulKarimQasim,leaderoftheFreeOfficer’sMovement,cametopower

asnationalistmilitaryofficersandanewclassofintelligentsiawasthrustintothe

centerofBaghdadipolitics.37Qasimsupportedthewataniyyahstrandof

nationalism,pushingforaunifiedIraqstatewithArab-Kurdishsolidarity.38TheJuly

27,1958provisionalconstitutioncontainedcontradictoryarticles;ArticleThree

namedtheKurdsasanintegralpartoftheIraqistatewithguaranteedrightswhile

ArticleTwodeclaredIraqtobepartofanArabnation.39

InitiallyKurdswereallowedtobroadcast,publish,andeducateinKurdish,

theKurdishethnicidentitywasrecognized,40andaKurdwasappointedtothe

“sovereigntycouncil”.41QasimalsoattemptedtoallywithIraqicommunists,andin

1959theKurdishandcommunistalliessuppressedanti-QasimrevoltsinMosuland

Kirkuk.Unsurprisingly,Qasim’sallianceswithboththeKurdsandthecommunists

wereshort-lived;by1960,anyconcessionsgrantedduringthefirsttwoyearsofthe

governmentwerewithdrawnoutoffearthattheKurdswoulddemand

independence.KDPmemberssentdemandsregardingcultural,national,and

economicrecognitiontoBaghdadandweremetwithattacksbyQasimthrough

37Frazen,226.38Aziz,69.39Aziz,68.40Aziz,69.41Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,13.

10

enemiesoftheBarzanitribe.42TheKurdsansweredwitharevolt(March1961-

1963),withthegoalofobtainingautonomyandadvancingthesocialagenda.43

Duringthisperiod,therewerealsodebateswithintheKDP,mostnotablyJalal

Talabaniandhisfollowers,foreshadowingtheinevitablesplitwithintheKDPinthe

nextdecade.

OnFebruary8,1963,theBa’athPartysucceededinitsfirstrevolution,

overthrowingQasimandestablishinganewgovernment.Theirsuccesswasbrief,as

AbdelSalamArifoverthrewthepartyninemonthslaterandgovernedIraquntil

1966.UnderArif,theKurdswereunabletomakeprogressregardingtheirdemands

forautonomy;however,followingArif’sdeathin1966,hisbrother,Al-Bazzazzdrew

uptheJune1966Accord,alsoreferredtoastheAl-BazzazzDeclaration.The

declarationoutlined15pointsregardingtheKurdishdemandforautonomyand

nationalrecognitionfortheirrights,butNasserites,Ba’athists,andCommunists

crushedwhatwouldhavebeenapositivestepfortheKurds.44Twoyearslater,the

Ba’athPartyregainedpowerinthe1968bloodlesscoupandpowerdynamics

changedyetagain.

TheBa’athistsandtheKurds:InternalDiscord,Arabization,andAnfal

ThesecondBa’athcouptookplacefromJuly17-30,1968andbytheendof

thetwo-weekperiodGeneralAhmadHasanal-Bakr,arelativeofSaddamHussein’s

fromTikrit,tookpower.Shortlyafter,aKurdishrevolteruptedandtheBa’athparty,

havingfailedtocrushtherevolt,begannegotiationswiththeKurds.Theresultwas

42Aziz,70.43McDowall,313.44Aziz,71.

11

theMarch11,1970Agreement,offeredbytheRevolutionaryCommandCouncil

(RCC),whichdetailed13articlesgrantingKurdsasignificantamountofautonomy

whilekeepingtheregionpartoftheIraqistate.45Thearticlesincludedfull

recognitionoftheKurdishnationality,centralgovernmentpositionsforKurdish

politicians,autonomywithinfouryears,integrationofthepeshmergaintotheIraqi

army,andacensusandplebiscitetodeterminethestatusofKirkuk.Thissuccess,

likepreviousones,wassuperficialandfailedtoliveuptotheexpectations

promised;the1970agreementexperiencedpartialimplementationandby1974,

thenegotiationsculminatedinadeadlock.

The1970sprovedtobeadifficultdecadefortheKurds.The1974Autonomy

Law,theAlgiersAgreement,changesingovernmentpolicy,andinternalstrifedealt

Kurdishnationalismhardblows.TheAutonomyLaw,offeredtoBarzanibySaddam

Hussein,grantedtheKurdssignificantauthorityoverthesocialandeconomic

aspectsofwhatwouldbeaself-governingregion.Therewerecaveats,andBarzani

refusedtosignduetothelegallimitationsforautonomyandsignificantdecreasein

landarea.46Ayearlater,theAlgiersAgreementwassignedonMarch6,1975

betweenIraqandIran,resultinginthewithdrawalofIraniansupportfortheKurds.

OnMarch23,1975,BarzaniannounceddefeatandfledtoIranwithanestimated

100,000Kurds,leavingtheKDPinhisson’shands.

FollowingBarzani’sself-imposedexileinIran,JalalTalabaniandother

disgruntledKDPmembersbrokeawaytoformthePatrioticUnionofKurdistan

(PUK)party.ThemajorityofPUKmembersheraldedfromtheSurani-speaking45Aziz,72.46Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,19-20.

12

northeastregionofIraqiKurdistan,preferredamoreprogressivepolitical

approach,andhadopposedtheclosetiesbetweentheKDPandtheUnitedStates

duringthe1963Ba’athreign.47UnliketheKDP,thePUKwaslesstribalorientedbut

theTalabanitribe,oneofthelargestinIraqiKurdistan,wasimportantinensuring

loyaltytotheparty.48Splinterparties(KDP-PL,PASOK,KSPI,andKPDP)49also

formedduringthelate1970s,andinter-Kurdishskirmishesbecamecommonplace.

Inadditiontoexternalenemies,theKurdswerefightingamongstthemselves.

Duringthissameperiod,theBa’athpartyintroducedanewideologyto

replaceQasim’snationalistideology.NationalisminIraqshiftedfromwataniyyahto

qawmiyyah;Ba’athistsaimedtomakeIraqthecenteroftheArabworldand

Saddam’svisionoftheidealIraqiidentitywasbasedonSunniMuslim

characteristics.InordertoforcetheassimilationofIraqi’smultipleminoritygroups,

SaddamimplementedtheprocessofArabization.Inordertoalterthedemography,

tensofthousandsofIraqiArabswereresettledinKurdishareaswiththeguarantee

ofhousingandjobs.50Kurdishvillagesweredestroyedorrenamed,theKurdish

languagewasforbiddeninschools,andnationalandculturalKurdishactivitieswere

banned.51

TheArabizationprocesscontinuedaftertheoutbreakoftheIran-IraqWar

(1980-1988),andSaddamusedthisexternalthreattoinstigateadditionalviolence47Sluglett,333.48AnilHiraandKawaJabary,“TheKurdishMirage:ASuccessStoryinDoubt,”MiddleEastPolicy20.2(2013):100.49Aziz,76.50NouriTalabani,“EthnicCleansinginIraqiKurdistan,”KurdishIdentity:HumanRightsandPoliticalStatus.Ed.CharlesG.MacDonaldandCaroleO’Leary.(Gainesville:UniversityPressofFlorida,2007)145.51Aziz,75.

13

againsttheKurds.SomegroupsannouncedtheirsupportforIran52whileothers

sidedwithSaddaminexchangeforfinancialcompensation.53Itwasnotuntil1988

thatthePUKandKDPcametogether,alongwiththeKPDP,KSP,PASOK,ICP,KTP,

andADM,toformtheIraqiKurdistanFrontwiththegoaloftherightofself-

determinationanddemocracyforIraq.54Oneofthemaincatalystswasmostlikely

theAnfalcampaign,spearheadedbyAliHassanal-Majid,alsoknownas“Chemical

Ali”andthecousinofSaddam.AstheheadoftheIraqiStateSecurityServicesand

thechiefoftheBa’athParty’sBureauforNorthernAffairs,Alilaunchedmilitary

offensesagainstcivilianandmilitarytargetswithchemicalweapons;55theattacks

occurredinthreewaves,beginningwithBergalouandSergalou,followedby

Sewsenan,andconcludingwithvillagesontheGermianplane.56TheAnfal

campaignsdestroyedanestimated3,000villages,displaced1.5millionpeople,and

killed180,000.57Thosewhosurvivedtheattacksfaceddetainmentincamps.

Medicalstudiesshowedthephysiologicaleffectsofchemicalweaponslastedfor

yearsaftertheinitialattack.58ThewarendedafternearlyadecadeinAugust1988,

andamnestywasgrantedonSeptember6,1988.

52Albert,218.53Albert,231.54Aziz,79.55ResearchconductedbyDr.ChristineGodsdenofLiverpoolontheHalabjaattackrevealedtheuseofchemicalsincludedmustardgas,Saringas,Tabun,andVX(nerveagents).SeeYildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,27.56Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,22-25.TheattackatHalabjawasnotpartoftheAnfalcampaignbutwasthemostdevastatingintermsofdamages57Ibid.58Effectsincludedrespiratoryproblems,eyedisorders,skindiseases,cancers,congenitalabnormalities,infertility,miscarriages,stillbirths,andneonatal/infantdeath.SeeYildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,28.

14

Intifada,InternationalIntervention,andSemi-AutonomousRule:1991-200359

March1991Rebellion

The1990smarkedaturningpointfortheKurdsintheirstruggleagainstthe

centralIraqigovernment,butinternalconflictcontinuedtodividetheKurdish

parties.Iraq’sinvasionofKuwaitonAugust2,1990setthingsinmotionandon

March5,1991aspontaneousuprising,raparininKurdish,beganinIraqiKurdistan.

BeginninginRanya,theuprisingspreadtoErbil,Sulaimaniya,Dohuk,andZakho60

followingtheceasefiresignedbetweenIraqandNATOtroops.61Despiteclaimsof

U.S.andalliedincitement,theU.S.didnotsupporttherebellionforfearofaShi’ite

revolutioninthesouth,vestedinterestedinSaddam’sregime,andinorderto

preserveIraq’sterritorialintegrity.62Thepeshmergawasinundatedwithtroops63

andconfidence,attackingandoverthrowingmilitarybases,securityheadquarters,

andBa’athpartyoffices.64Saddam’sforceseasilysuppressedtherebellion,leading

totheexodusof2millionKurdstoTurkey(~500,000)andIran(~1.5million),the

detainmentof~100,000,andthedeathof~20,000.65TheKurdswhofledtoIran

wereaccepted,butthoseontheTurkishborderwerelessfortunateandmanydied

whilewaitingforrefuge.InKirkukanestimated30,000Kurdswerearrestedand59SeeAppendixB.60Aziz,82.61Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,29.62Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,31.63Anestimated50,000+troopsarethoughttohavedesertedtheIraqiarmyinthenorth.SeeYildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,30.64Aziz,82.65Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,31.

15

detainedwithoutfoodorwaterfordays,hundredsofhomeswererazed,andthose

whosurvivedwereforbiddenfromreturning.66

TheUnitedNationswastedlittletimeincondemningSaddam’sresponseto

theuprising;inameetingheldonApril5,1991,theUNSecurityCouncilissued

Resolution688despiteaformalprotestfromIraq,abstentionsfromChinaand

India,andvotesagainsttheresolutionbyCuba,Yemen,andZimbabwe.67The

controversialresolutioncondemnedIraq’srepressivetacticsanddemandedIraq

endtherepressionimmediately,aswellasallowaccesstohumanitarianaid

organizations.CoupledwiththeeconomicembargoplacedonIraqioilshortlyafter

invadingKuwait,Baghdadwasdispleasedwithinternationalintervention.OnApril

13,1991theGulfWarallieslaunchedOperationProvideComforttoprovide

humanitarianrelieffortheIraqiKurdishregion;theoperationeventuallysupplied

15,500tonsofsuppliesby20,000personnelfrom13countries.68

OperationSafeHavencommencedshortlyafteronApril16,1991inorderto

establishrefugeecampsforKurdsbetweentheTurkishandIranianborders;camps

beganatZakhoandeventuallyspreadeasttoAmadiyyaandsouthtoDohuk.69The

ideaof“Kurdishenclaves”,later“safehavens”,wasinitiallyproposedbyTurkish

PresidentOzalandadvocatedforbyBritishPrimeMinisterJohnMajor;theUnited

StatesandUNreversedtheirearlierpositionsandsupportedthesafehaven

system.70Alliedforcesestablisheda36-mileby36-mileno-flyzoneabovethe36th

66Talabani,146.67Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,33.68Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,34.69Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,35.70Gunter,56.

16

parallel,includingErbil,Mosul,Zakho,andDohuk,andKurdishrefugeesbeganto

returntotheirhomeswithinthezone.ByMay23,1991theUNannouncedan

agreementtostationamaximumof500UNguardsinfourprovinces,andonJune7,

1991theUNHCRtookoverthehumanitarianreliefeffortsinitiallyheadedbythe

UnitedStates.71

FoundingandFighting:TheEmergenceoftheKRG

Whileinternationalbodiesorganizedpreliminaryhumanitarianreliefefforts,

KurdishleadersbegannegotiationswiththeIraqigovernmentinApril1991;the

negotiationswentthroughtworounds,withonlyfourofthesevenIKFpartiesin

attendance(Talabaniattendingthefirstround(April18-24)andMassoudBarzani

attendingthesecond(May6-18)).72InJuneBarzanireturnedtotheKurdishregion

withclaimsofanautonomydealbasedontheconstitutionandtheMarch1970

Agreement,butinreturn,SaddamrequiredtheKurdscommittoanappendixtitled

“KurdistanFrontsCommitmentsTowardtheHomeland”,whichdetailedthe

disbandmentofthepeshmerga,surrenderofradiostations,immediateendoftalks

withinternationalbodies,commitmenttotheIraqistate,supportoftheBa’athparty

indealingwithnationalisticgroups,andtheimplementationofprogramsdrawnup

bythecentralgovernment.73TheIKFrespondedwithacounterproposalthatwas

notacceptedandinfall1991,thenegotiationsdisintegratedandclashesbrokeout

betweenKurdishandIraqiforces.

71Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:theIraqiDilemma,36.72Gunter,59.73Gunter,71.

17

BylateOctober1991,Saddamwithdrewalltroops,cutthesalariesof

Kurdishemployees,andimposedablockadeontheKurdishregion.TheKurdish

FrontrecognizedSaddam’sattempttoforcetheKurdsintosubmissionand

respondedwiththeannouncementofparliamentaryelectionstoreplacethe

LegislativeAssembly,aswellasgivetheFrontsomesemblanceoforder,tobeheld

onApril3,1992.74Theelectionswereheldamonthlate,May19,1992,inthethree

provincestheKurdscontrolledonthebasisofproportionalrepresentationwith7%

ofthevoterequiredtoqualifyforaseat.75Smallerpartiesparticipated,including

Islamic,AssyrianTurkmen,andleftistgroups,andsomecombinedinattemptsto

gainmorevotes;however,theresultsshowedtheKDPandPUKhadthemostloyal

followingastheonlytwopartiestomeetthe7%requirement,andBarzaniand

Talabaniagreedtoleadthefronttogether,splittingtheseats50-50betweenthetwo

groups.76

TheNationalAssemblymetforthefirsttimeonJune4,1991andtheKurdish

RegionalGovernment(KRG)wasestablishedamonthlater;77theKRGdeclared

KurdistanafederalIraqistateonOctober4,1992despiteprotestsfromIraq,Iran,

Syria,andTurkey.78RatherthancompletelyleavingtheIraqistate,theKurdsmade

itcleartheywereopentoreturning“tothefold,butonlyifthecentralgovernment

mademajorchangesintheformerIraqiconstitution.”79

74McDowall,379.75McDowall,380.76Ghareeb,179.77McDowall,382.78Aziz,85.79MohammedM.A.Ahmed,IraqiKurdsandNation-Building,(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2012)9.

18

A“unified”KRGwasunabletowithstandthepressuresoftheindividual

parties,andin1994,acivilwareruptedbetweentheKDPandthePUK,duetoalack

oftrust,lackoftransparency,anddisputesoverbordertariffs.80Alanddisputenear

QalaDizabetweenaKDPclaimantandPUKsupportingfarmersinMay1994

sparkedtensionsandbattleswerefoughtbetweenthetwopartiesintermittently

untilAugust1994,andagaininDecember1994.81Despiteattemptstomediateby

theIraqiNationalCongress,82ironicallyapredominantlyAraboppositionparty,

tensionscontinuedtoescalate.Anotherattempttomediate,theDroghedapeace

talks,tookplacein1995inIreland.BothpartiesagreedtodemilitarizeErbil,the

turnoverofKDPcustomsrevenuestoajointbankaccount,reconveningtheKRG,

andreassuringoutsidepartiesoftheirdedicationtoIraq’sintegrityandTurkey’s

interests.83

Unfortunately,thetalksfailedin1996whentheKDPallieditselfwiththe

Ba’athpartyinanattempttoretakeErbilandSulaimaniyaandfightingensued.84

Laterthatyear,thetwopartiesestablishedtheirnewheadquarters,thePUKin

SulaimaniyaandtheKDPinErbil;85untilthedétentewassignedin1998,thetwo

partiesoperatedastwoseparateadministrativeunits,makingprogressdifficultbut

notimpossible.TheKRGexperiencedlimitedsuccessesduringthisperiod,including

the1992elections,rebuildingofvillages,economicandcivilsocietygrowthand

80Ahmed,9.81McDowall,386.82McDowall,387.83KeremYildiz,TheKurdsinIraq:ThePast,PresentandFuture,(London:PlutoPress,2004)49.84Ibid.85HiraandJabary,102.

19

development,anddegreesofliberation,whichwillbediscussedinthefollowing

sectiondevotedtonon-governmentalandhumanitarianaidorganizations.86

Theceasefire,signedSeptember17,1998inWashingtonD.C.,stipulated

measuresforpowersharingbetweentheKDPandthePUK,andthetwogroups

coordinatedactivitiesbeginningin2000.87FollowingtheSeptember11,2001

attacksontheUnitedStates,theKurdsplayedanimportantroleinpreparationfor

theU.S.invasionin2003.TalabaniandBarzanirealizedthesurvivaloftheKRG

wouldbedependentontheU.S.afterSaddam’sfallandagreedtoassistinmilitary

andcounter-terrorismcapacitiesaslongastheirsafetywasguaranteed.88However,

itwasnotuntiltheconclusionoftheSecondGulfWarthattheKRGbegantoinvolve

itselfinBaghdad’spoliticalsphereandinfluencetheoutcomeofcentralgovernment

proceedings.

InternationalAidandRebuildingIraqiKurdistan:1992-2003

Theinternationalcommunityplayedamajorroleinthecreationofasemi-

autonomousKurdishstateinnorthernIraq,particularlyintheformoffinancialaid.

DeniseNatali,oneoftheforemostresearchersregardingtheKurdishquestionin

Iraq,Syria,Iran,andTurkey,dividedthedecadefrom1992-2003intotwoperiods:

NGODependency(1992-1996)andOilForFoodProgram(OFFP)(1996-2003).

FollowingtheFirstGulfWar,IraqiKurdistanexperiencedadoubleeconomic

embargobytheUNandthecentralIraqigovernment.TheUNembargoprevented86DavidRomano,“TheStruggleforAutonomyandDecentralization–IraqiKurdistan,”FromDesolationtoReconstruction:Iraq’sTroubledJourney,Ed.MokhtarLamaniandBessmaMomani,(Waterloo,Ontario:WilfridLaurierUniversityPress,2009)56-57.87Aziz,88.88Yildiz,TheKurdsinIraq:ThePast,PresentandFuture,103.

20

thesaleofoil,limitedfoodavailability,prohibitedexternaltradeandencouraged

inflation,whiletheIraqiembargoreinforcedthefoodshortagethrougharationing

system.89Duringthisperiod,themajorityofKurdistan’srevenuederivedfrom

tariffsimposedontrafficcrossingthebordersfromSyria,Turkey,andIran.90

ThefocusoffinancialaidduringtheNGODependencyperiodwason

immediatereliefratherthanlong-termdevelopment;assistancewasprovidedinthe

formoffoodandfuelhandoutsonthebasisofsix-monthcontingencyplansrather

thanlong-termmacroeconomicreform.91SomeorganizationschosetoaidIraqi

Kurdistanexclusively,ratherthanIraqasawholebasedonBaghdad’stendencyto

micromanaging,92andthefundingpaidteachingsalaries,implementedschool

feedingprograms,reconstructedvillages,resettledinternallydisplacedpersons,

rebuiltaccessroads,andbegantherevivaloftheagriculturalsector.93

WhiletheaidprogramssucceededininitiatingtherebuildingofIraqi

Kurdistan,theyfailedtoprovidethegroundworkforsustainable,long-termprojects

tokeeptheregionafloat.TheKurdsswitchedtheirdependencyfromBaghdadtothe

NGOs;bythemid-1990s,70%ofthepopulationwasdependentoninternational

reliefandthemostskilledworkerswenttoworkforNGO’sorU.S.-ledprojects.94

Thelackofdevelopmentledto“corruption,thedisparityofwealth,internalconflict

betweentheKDPandPUKoverresources,andthestagnationofsocio-political

89DeniseNatali,“TheSpoilsofPeaceinIraqiKurdistan,”ThirdWorldQuarterly,28.6(2007)1112.90Yildiz,TheKurdsinIraq:Past,PresentandFuture,67.91Natali,1113-1114.92Yildiz,TheKurdsinIraq:ThePast,PresentandFuture,75.93Natali,1113.94Natali,1114.

21

norms(lackofgrowthintheprivatesector,freetradedevelopment,andforeign

investment).”95

ThesecondphasedescribedbyNatali,theOilforFoodProgram(OFFP)

period,lastedfrom1996totheSecondGulfWar.TheOFFP,implementedbytheUN

underResolution986,passedbytheUNSecurityCouncil,shiftedthefocusfrom

relieftodevelopment,andallotted13%ofthetotalaidforIraqtobeusedinthe

north.TheUNOfficeoftheHumanitarianCoordinatorinIraq(UNOCHI)wastoact

onbehalfofthecentralgovernmentinordertoprocure,transport,anddeliveraid

toregion;theaidinitiallytotaled$29million,withanadditional$9.8billionin

interestoveroilsalefundsandcurrencyexchangegains.96Thefinancialaidwasto

bedistributedin13six-monthphases,butonly51%ofthefundswerereceived

duringtheperiod.97Evenwithoutthefullallotmentoffunding,Dohuk,Erbil,and

Sulaimaniyaexperiencedgrowthanddevelopment;factorieswerebuilt,theprivate

sectordeveloped,andfoodavailabilityandsocialconditionsimproved.98TheKRG

alsoexperiencedpositivegrowthduringtheOFFP;theUNincorporatedlocal

personnelintolegitimategoverningbodiesandessentiallygavelessonsingood

governingpolicies.99

Unfortunately,theOFFPperiodalsoperpetuatedthedependencyon

internationalinvestment.ImplementersoftheOFFPwantedtoavoidsteppingon

thetoesofBaghdadand,asaresult,didnotintroducemajoreconomicorsocial95Natali,1115-1116.96Natali,1116.97Ibid.Theremaining49%stayedinaFrenchbankforfiveyearswhileaccruinginteresttobenefitSaddam’sregime,theUN,andprivateinvestors.98Natali,1117.99Ibid.

22

reforminIraqiKurdistan.Thetrialrunperiodforthesemi-autonomousregion

illuminatedtheglaringeconomic,social,andpoliticalissuesfacingtheKRGforthe

future.ItwasnotuntiltheSecondGulfWarandpost-warperiodthatthearea

experiencedthedevelopmentsandchangesrequiredforanautonomousregionand

certainlyanindependentstate.

TheKurdsinPost-SaddamIraq:2003-2011

PoliticalChange:KurdishIntegrationintoBaghdad’sPoliticalSphere

OnMay6,2003,shortlyaftertheinvasionofIraq,theUnitedStates

establishedtheCoalitionProvisionalAuthority(CPA)headedbyPaulBremer,with

thegoalofadministeringtheexecutiveaspectsofIraq’sgovernment.100TheCPA

wasapprovedbytheUN,whichinturnadoptedResolution1483toformally

authorizetheCPA’sactivities.TheResolutionacknowledgedthecreationoftheIraq

GoverningCouncil(IGC),anIraqigoverningbodythatwouldnottakeoverthe

dutiesoftheCPAuntil“aninternationallyrecognizedrepresentativegovernment

wasformed.”101TheICGwascreatedonJuly13,2006despiteprotestsfromthe

sevenmajoroppositiongroups,andtheresultwasa25-membercouncil,fiveof

whomwereKurds.102TheIGCwasgrantedmoreauthoritythaninitiallydiscussed,

andonNovember15,2003,thecouncilannounceditsintentiontoacceleratethe

powertransfertoatransitionalgovernment.103

100Yildiz,TheKurdsinIraq:ThePast,PresentandFuture,117.101Ibid.102Yildiz,TheKurdsinIraq:ThePast,PresentandFuture,118.103Yildiz,TheKurdsinIraq:ThePast,PresentandFuture,119.

23

TheTransitionalAdministrativeLaw(TAL)wentintoeffectMarch8,2004as

aninterimconstitutionforafederal,democraticIraqistate104withthespecificgoals

of:restoringsovereigntytoIraqbyJuly1,2004,electinganIraq-wideassemblyby

January31,2005,anddraftingapermanentconstitutionbyAugust15,2005,its

ratificationpending“theapprovaloftheIraqimajorityandiftwo-thirdsofthe

votersinthreeormoregovernoratesdonotrejectit.”105TheTALacknowledgedthe

heterogeneousnatureofIraqisocietyandrecognizedthelegitimacyofArabs,Kurds,

Turkmen,Assyrians,andArmeniansasnationalitieswithintheIraqistate,even

thoughArabicandKurdisharetheonlytwoofficiallanguages.106The18

governoratesofSaddam’sregimewererecognizedasfederativeentities,and

Kurdistancontainedthreefullgovernorates,Dohuk,Erbil,andSuleimaniya,with

portionsofDiyalaandNineva.107Article56statedthefederalgovernmentwould

begindivvyingupresponsibilitiestolocal,governorate,andregional

administrations,grantingtheKurdistanregionmuchmorepowerthanitsawunder

Saddam’srule.ThelawalsoaddressedthestatusofKirkuk,oneofthedisputed

territoriesbetweentheKRGandBaghdad;Article58deferredresolutiononKirkuk

untilacensusdeterminedwhichindividualsremovedfromtheirhomesduring

Saddam’srulecouldreturnorbecompensated.

104Gunter,15.ThefulltextoftheTransitionalAdministrativeLawcanbefoundinAppendix2ofTheFutureofKurdistaninIraq,Ed.BrendanO'Leary,JohnMcGarry,andKhālidSālih.(Philadelphia:UofPennsylvania,2005)315-340.105BrendanO’Leary,“Power-sharing,PluralistFederation,andFederacy,”TheFutureofKurdistaninIraq.Ed.BrendanO'Leary,JohnMcGarry,andKhālidSālih,(Philadelphia:UofPennsylvania,2005)48.106O’Leary,49.107O’Leary,67.

24

TheTALmarkedthefirsttimetheKurdsweretrulyinvolvedinthedecision

makingprocessesinBaghdad,andthe2005Constitutionwasthelogicalnextstep

forinclusivity.The2005Constitutionwasdraftedbya55-personcommittee(28

Shi’acoalition,15Kurdishlist,eightIyadAlawi’sal-Iraqialist,oneChristian,one

Turkman,oneCommunist,andoneSunni,although14otherswereeventually

addedafterpressurefromtheSunnicommunity)asadecentralized,federal

constitution,andwasratifiedbya78.59%majorityonOctober15,2005.108The

2005ConstitutionwasabigwinfortheKRGsinceitrecognizedtheKurdsasan

Iraqiethnicgroup,acknowledgedKurdishautonomy,delineatedaplanfora

decentralizedIraq,andincludedprovisionsregardingthedisputedterritories,

primarilyKirkuk.109Article140addressedthequestionofthedisputedterritories

bypromisingacensus,normalization,andreferendumtodeterminethefinalstatus

byDecember31,2007.

Twomonthslater,thefirstgeneralelectionwasheldonDecember15,2005

inordertoelectthe275newmembersoftheIraqiNationalAssembly;ofthe275

seats,230weredividedbetweenthe18governoratesbasedonregisterednumbers

(including59forBaghdad),45compensatoryseatswerereservedforsmaller

politicalparties,while25%ofthetotalseatswereallottedtowomen.110Areported

79.6%,or11.9million,registeredvotersparticipatedintheelectionsatan

108SaadN.Jawad,“TheIraqiConstitution:StructuralFlawsandPoliticalImplications,”LSEMiddleEastCentrePaperSeries1(November2013)10.109DavidRomano,“IraqiKurdistan:ChallengesofAutonomyintheWakeofUSWithdrawal,”InternationalAffairs86.6(2010)1349-1350.110Yildiz,“TheKurdsinIraq”,39-40.

25

estimated31,000pollingstations.111The2005generalelectionresultedin54seats

fortheKurdishalliance112andthedesignationofNourial-Maliki,deputyleaderof

theDawaparty,asPrimeMinister;al-Maliki’s37membercabinetwasapproved

May20,2006andincludedmembersofallmajorpolitical,religious,andethnic

groups.113Overthecourseofal-Maliki’sfirstgovernment,hefocusedonthree

things:buildingarelationshipwiththeU.S.anditsallies,containinginsurgency

movements,andimplementingthe2005constitution.114

AsthecentralIraqigovernmentmovedoutofitsinfancy,theKRG

experienceddevelopmentsofitsown.ThePUKandKDPreconfirmedtheir

commitmenttoreunifyJanuary7,2006,inordertobringallthreeprovincesunder

oneadministration.115Theaccordestablishedtermsforpowersharingbetweenthe

PUKandKDPwhiledisenfranchisingsmallerparties.116Newpositionswithinthe

KRGwerecreatedforthePUK,oneforvicepresidentandanotherfordeputyprime

minister,andtheministriesoftheinterior,finance,peshmerga,andjusticewere

reunited.117

TheKurdsexperiencedlesspromisingdevelopmentsfrom2007to2010.

2007broughtanincreaseininsurgencymovements,althoughtheyweregenerally

relegatedtothesouthandwerenotaswidespreadintheKurdishregiondueto

cohesiveeffortsbetweenciviliansandsecurityforcesandahard-lineapproachby

111Yildiz,“TheKurdsinIraq”,40112TheKRGparticipatedinthe2005electionononelistandmixedthecabinet.113Yildiz,“TheKurdsinIraq”,41.114Yildiz,“TheKurdsinIraq”,45.115Ahmed,12.116Ahmed,Ibid.117Ahmed,14.

26

theKRG.118InAugust,thefiveremainingpartiesoftheal-Malikigovernmentformed

theModeratesFronts,anallianceholding130seatsandessentiallycreatinga

monopolyoftheparliament.119TheKurds’primarycauseforconcernof2007was

thefailuretoaddressthestatusofKirkuk;December31,2007cameandwent

withoutthepromisedcensus.

ThesituationinKurdistandeterioratedthroughout2008andinto2009.In

2008,al-Malikibeganconsolidatingpower,creatingtensionswithotherpartieswho

foundhismethodseerilysimilartothoseofSaddamandtheBa’athparty.The

January31,2009elections,heldunderanopenlistsystem,showedtheincreasein

interestinIraqiArabnationalistparties;al-Maliki’sStateofLawpartytriumphed

whiletheIslamicSupremeCouncilofIraqParty(ISCI)wasdefeated.120Thethree

KurdishgovernoratesandKirkukdidnotparticipateintheseelections,whichmay

havecontributedtothesuccessesofal-Malikiandhisparty.TheKRGexpressed

frustrationoveranumberofal-Maliki’smovesincludingtherecruitmentand

armingof“supportcouncils”inKurdishareas,thedeploymentofIraqitroopsto

disputedareas,thepassingofdeadlinesregardingdisputedterritories,andthe

questionofpowersharing.121

118Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:TheIraqiDilemma,55.Insurgencygroupsinclude:Ba’athists,IraqiNationalists,IraqiIslamists(primarilyMuslimBrotherhoodorSalafimovements),Shi’iteinsurgents,foreigngroups(e.g.Al-Qaeda),theIslamicStateofIraq,PartisansoftheSunnahArmy,theIslamicArmyinIraq;theIslamicFrontoftheIraqiResistance,theFirstFourCaliphsArmy,Mujahidin’sArmy,andMuhammad’sArmy.119Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:TheIraqiDilemma,43.120Romano,“TheStruggleforAutonomyandDecentralization–IraqiKurdistan,”58-59.121Romano,“TheStruggleforAutonomyandDecentralization–IraqiKurdistan,”60.

27

Unfortunately,al-Maliki’sgovernmentwasnottheonlyproblemforthe

Kurds.AnoffshootofthePUKformedduetointernalstrife,andonApril16,2009

NawshirwanMustafaannouncedtheestablishmentofGorran(ChangeMovement),

althoughitwasnotformallyrecognizedasapoliticalorganizationuntilMay1,2010.

GorrancriticizedthefailuresoftheKRGtobringaboutsignificantchangeinregards

tothestatusofKirkukandtheguaranteesofKurdishrights.Gorrancapturedthe

interestofvotersunhappywiththeKDPandPUK,andinthe2009elections,the

newpartytook25ofthe111seatsintheKurdistanRegionalParliament.122

TheKurdsdidnotfaremuchbetterin2010and2011.TheMarch7,2010

parliamentaryelectionsreflectedthecontinuedsupportforIraqinationalism,with

theIraqiNationalMovementcominginfirstandtheStateofLawCoalitionsecond,

eventhoughtheKurdishAllianceswonthelargestnumberofseats.123Inorderto

formagovernment,al-MalikimadepromisestotheKurdsregardingoilrevenues

andthestatusofKirkukinexchangefortheirsupport.124Threemonthslater,the

KRGattemptedtoaddressitsinternaldivisionsbyhavingtheKDPandPUKsigna

secondagreementregardingtheircommitmenttothefutureofKurdistanandits

bestinterests.

However,inJanuaryof2011,Kurdistanwasagainembroiledininternal

conflict.AJanuary27,2011meetingbetweenTalabaniandBarzaniresultedinacall

fortheimprovementoflivingstandards;inresponse,Gorranrequestednew

122Ahmed,20.123Yildiz,TheFutureofKurdistan:TheIraqiDilemma,47.124MichaelM.Gunter,“TheKurdishSpring,”ThirdWorldQuarterly34.3(2013)445.

28

elections,onethatwasrejectedbyTalabaniandBarzani.125TheeventsofJanuary

ledtodemonstrations,andonFebruary17,2011,3,000Kurdsgatheredin

Sulaimaniyatoprotestcorruption,nepotism,andthemonopolyofpoliticaland

economicpowerbytheKRG.126DespiteKRGattemptstocrackdownonprotestors,

demonstrationscontinued;asecondmajorprotestoccurredonFebruary24,2011

whentheself-proclaimed“PatrioticKurdishScholars”calledfortheeradicationof

KRGcorruption,unificationofpartymilitias,respectingfreedomsofexpressionand

women’srights,thecreationofjobs,thedeclarationofunilateralindependence,and

theclosingofTurkishandIranianoutposts.127Inanattempttoassuagediscontent,

theKRGproduceda17-point128plantoaddresstheissuesofdemonstratorsandby

March11,2011,themajorpartieshadreconciled.

Inadditiontointernaldiscord,theKRGfacedtheU.S.withdrawalandal-

Maliki’scontinuedattemptstoconsolidatehispowerinBaghdadin2011.Following

theU.S.withdrawal,al-Malikiincreasedhiscontroloverthecentralgovernment,a

processthathadbeenoccurringsince2008.Inadditiontofulfillingthepostof

PrimeMinister,al-MalikiactedasMinisterofDefense,MinisteroftheInterior,and

MinisterofStateforsupposednationalsecurityreasons.129Otheractsof

centralizationincluded:bureaucraticcleansingofKurdsandSunnipoliticians,130as

125Ahmed,27.126Ahmed,31.127Ahmed,34.128ThedetailsoftheKRG’s17-pointplancanbefoundonAhmed,31-34.129BurakBilgehanOzpek,“DemocracyorPartition:FutureScenariosfortheKurdsofIraq,”InsightTurkey14.3(2012)134.130Ibid.

29

wellasincreasingcontrolovertheintelligenceservice,thearmy,thepolice,

supremecourt,andthecentralbank.131

Socio-EconomicDevelopmentsandForeignInvolvement

Thesocio-economicdevelopmentsofIraqiKurdistanandforeign

involvementhavebeencloselylinkedsincetheestablishmentofthesemi-

autonomousregion.Manyoftheinternaldevelopmentswouldnothavebeen

possiblewithoutthebackingofforeignpowers.FinancialaidinIraqiKurdistan

evolvedintoprogramsfocusedonlong-termdevelopment,promotinggood

governance,andliberalizationbetween2003and2007.132Despitediminished

allocationstoKurdistanduetorelativestability,Kurdishnationalism,andgreater

needinthesouthernandcentralregionsofIraq,IraqiKurdistanexperienced

growthintheeconomicandsocialspheres.133Inadditiontothe17%allotment

(estimated13%aftertaxdeductions)ofIraq’stotalrevenues,134theKRGalsoenjoys

revenuesfrominternalgrowthandexternalfunding.

Throughouttheearly21stcentury,Kurdistanenjoyedthecreationofa

businessclass,thedevelopmentoffreemarketlaws,anincreaseinthetourism

industry,andthecreationofalargeinternationalmarketintheoilandnaturalgas

industry.Asaresultoftheincreasedrevenuesandtrafficintheregion,an

131WladimirvanWilgenburg,“BreakingfromBaghdad:KurdishAutonomyvs.Maliki’sManipulation,”WorldAffairs(November/December2012)51.132Natali,“TheSpoilsofPeaceinIraqiKurdistan,”1119.133Ibid.134Natali,TheKurdishQuasi-State:DevelopmentandDependencyinPost-GulfWarIraq,105.

30

internationalairport135wasbuiltinErbiltoaccommodateinvestors;travelersare

abletoflyfromErbildomestically(Basra,Baghdad,Najaf,orSulaimaniya),or

internationallytohubsintheMiddleEastandEurope.Thefinancialaidprovidedby

NGOsandhumanitarianorganizationsbetween1991-2003createdthenew

businessclass,whoinvestedinland,whichinturn,wastransformedfromfarms

intotouristandrecreationcenters.136Theseprojectsincreasedconcernsofthose

focusedonenvironmentalprotectionorfoodproduction,astourismcenterstook

awayresourcesforboth,andtheKRGeventuallycreatedincentivesforfarmers

willingtoworktheirland.137

Inordertoboosttheeconomy,theKRGpassedfreemarketlawsandcreated

incentivesinordertoattractinvestmentfromforeignpowers.Turkish,PersianGulf,

European,andAmericancompaniespreferredthe10yeartaxexemptionsandfree

landgrantswiththerighttotransferprofitsinternationallyinKurdistan,rather

thanattemptingtonegotiatewithBaghdad.138Thetourismindustrydidwellin

Kurdistan;especiallyduringthesummermonths,theregionbegantocompetewith

LebanonandSyriaforcentralandsouthernIraqiandGulfstatetourists.139Foreign

companiesfromLebanonandtheGulftooknoticeoftheriseintourists,butused

foreignratherthanKurdishworkers,sincethelocalpopulationwasgenerallyless

skilled.140

135TheErbilairportwasnotusedasacivilairportuntil2003;thelandwaspreviouslyusedforanairfieldandamilitarybasefortheBa’athpartyuntil1991.136Ahmed,70.137Ahmed,80.138Ahmed,70.139Ahmed,83.140Ibid.

31

TheoilandnaturalgasreservesinKurdistanarewithoutadoubtthe

greatestresourcetheIraqiKurdspossess.KRGterritorycomprisesanestimated8-

13%ofIraqioilreservesand17%ofIraqinaturalgasresourceswithanestimated

12billionbarrelsofoiland22trillioncubicfeedofnaturalgas.141In2004,following

thecollapseoftheBa’athregime,theKRGsigneditsfirstcontractwithDNO,and

productionbeganin2007.Frustratedbytherestrictionsofnationallaws,theKRG

passeditsownhydrocarbonlawin2007,allowingthemtheindependenceto

negotiatecontractswithinvestors.Asof2013,over41companiesareinvestedin

theoilandgasfieldsofKurdistan,allofwhichareownedbythePUKandKDP

respectively,ratherthantheKRG.142TheKRG’smostrecentprojecthasfocusedon

thenaturalgasresources,andrecentlyannounceda461millionsquarefootsitefor

theKurdistanGasCity,aswellas180kilometerpipelineprojectconnectingKhor

MorgasfieldtoSulaimaniyaandErbil.143Turkeyhasbeentheprimarybeneficiary

ofKurdishresources,buttheKRGhasrecentlynegotiatedproduction-sharing

contracts(PSCs)withAmerican,European,andSouthKoreancompanies,144

includingChevron,ExxonMobil,Total,andGazProm.145

Thesedevelopmentshavebeenoneofthesourcesofcontentionbetween

ErbilandBaghdadsince2003.Baghdadmaintainsithasthesolerighttonegotiate141YasarYakis,“TurkeyaftertheArabSpring:PolicyDilemmas,”MiddleEastPolicy21.1(2014)100-101.142HiraandJabary,106.143Ibid.144Natali,TheKurdishQuasiState:DevelopmentandDependencyinPost-GulfWarIraq,109.145BillPark,“Turkey’sMultipleKurdishDilemmas,”OrtadoğuEtütleri5.1(July2013):45-46.SeealsoMassimoMorelliandConstantinoPischedda,“TheTurkey-KRGEnergyPartnership:AssessingItsImplications,”MiddleEastPolicy21.1(2014)108-109.

32

withforeignpowersovernaturalresources,astheseresourcesarecommon

property,butErbilcontinuestonegotiatecontracts;therehavebeenseveral

proposedagreementsregardingtheexportofoilbutallhavebeenmarredby

Baghdad’sdelayedpaymentsortheKRG’snon-compliancewiththeterms.146The

October2011ExxonMobilagreement,the2012oilandgaspipelineswithTurkey,

andthe2012NaboccogaspipelineagreementwiththeUAE’sDanaGashaveall

exacerbatedtensions.147

Kurdishprogresswasnotwithoutsetbacks,andtherewereseveralmajor

issuesthataroseduringthepost-Saddamperiod.Corruptionhasbecomeoneofthe

primarypointsofcontentionfacingtheKRG.Ina2012reportpublishedbythe

KurdishRegionalReformCommission(KRRC),theKRGwasfoundtobeincredibly

corruptbasedon“poorgoverningperformance,partisanloyalty(primarily

providingjobsbasedonneedratherthanqualifications),andweakagendas.”148

DespiteprotestsfromlocalKurdsandattemptstorectifythesituation,significant

progresshasnotbeenmade.

LocalKurdsalsocontributedtoroadblocksinsocio-economicdevelopment.

Eventhougheconomicgrowthledtoincreasedstandardsofliving,theattitudesof

thelocalpopulationdidnotenjoythesameevolution.Traditionalvaluesclashed

withthenewdevelopmentsintheregion.DespitetheKRG’spromotionofschool

constructionwithinKurdishlocalities,somecontinuedtoopposeeducation.149The

146MorelliandPischedda,109.147Ahmed,75andOzpek,134-135.148JabaryandHira,108.149Natali,TheKurdishQuasi-State:DevelopmentandDependencyinPost-GulfWarIraq,115.

33

statusofwomenalsoexperiencedminimaldevelopmentduringthisperiod;high

ratesofteenagemarriage,polygamy,honorkillings,femalegenitalmutilation,and

divorceremainprevalent.150

CurrentDevelopments:2012-2015

Therearefewacademicsourcesregardingthepolitical,socio-economic,and

foreignpolicydevelopmentsinIraqinvolvingtheKurdsfrom2012-2015.Kurdish

politicalpartiescontinuetobattleforcontrolofBaghdadandwithintheKRGforthe

majorityofseatsinKurdishparliament.Barzaniextendedhispresidentialterman

additionaltwoyears,and2013parliamentaryelectionsresultedintheKDPholding

thelargestnumberofseats,followedbyGorranandthePUK.In2014thefocus

switchedfromindependencetofightingtheIslamicState;Barzani’sinitialcallfora

2014independencereferendumwasrevokedafteritwasdecidedtheIslamicState

wasamorepressingmatterthanKurdishindependence.Baghdadexperienceda

changeinpowerwhenHaideral-AbadiassumedtheroleofIraqiPrimeMinister,but

ErbilcontinuestorecognizeBarzaniaspresidentoftheKRGdespitepresidential

electionsbeingscheduledforAugust20,2015.

Analysis:LeverageorIndependence?

TheKurdshavedevelopedarelativelysuccessfulquasi-stateinnorthern

Iraq.Gunteraptlystatesthatwithapresident,primeminister,parliament,regional

elections,flag,nationalanthem,peshmerga,airport,Kurdisheducationsystem,and

passportstamps,Kurdistanhasthetrappingsofanindependentstate.151TheKRG

150Natali,TheKurdishQuasi-State:DevelopmentandDependencyinPost-GulfWarIraq,116.151Gunter,“TheKurdishState,”445.

34

hasdevelopedforeigncontacts,sendingdiplomaticrepresentativesabroadand

housingforeignconsulatesinErbil,152andutilizedtheirnaturalresourcesto

jumpstarttheeconomy.However,thesepositivedevelopmentsarenotsufficientfor

KurdishsecessionfromcentralIraq.

TheKRGcontinuestorelyheavilyonBaghdadforanumberofresources.The

17%cutoftotalIraqirevenuesisnecessarytokeeptheregionafloat,particularlyif

theKRG’sclaimofthisamountbeinginsufficientforKurdishneedsisaccurate,as

wellasthedependenceonthecentralgovernmentforthesalariesofministersand

judgeslinkedtotheCourtofCassation.153KurdistanisalsotiedtocentralIraq

throughcommercialbusinessventuresandculture.BusinessmentraveltoBaghdad

tosigncontractsregardingfoodandconstructionimports,andatraderelationship

isstillactiveregardingoilandgas,householdgoods,food,andautomobiles.154

Linguisticallythetwoareasarebound,aspolitical,religious,business,and

occasionallypersonalinteractionstakeplaceinArabic.155

ThesupportofcentralIraqandinternationalpartnersisalsoaroadblockto

thepotentialsecessionofKurdistan.Inordertokeeptheeconomyafloat,the

investmentofforeigncompanieswouldbeavitalcomponentofanindependent

Kurdistan,butanindependentKurdishstatewouldnotsitwellwiththemajorityof

theregion’sneighborsandcurrentpartners.TheKRG’sneighborsintheMiddleEast

wouldvehementlyopposethesecession.Baghdadwantstomaintainitsterritorial152Ahmed,205.153Natali,TheKurdishQuasiState:DevelopmentandDependencyinPost-GulfWarIraq,119.154Natali,“TheSpoilsofPeaceinIraqiKurdistan”,1124.155Natali,155Natali,TheKurdishQuasiState:DevelopmentandDependencyinPost-GulfWarIraq,122-123.

35

integrityandcontinuetoenjoythenaturalresourcesfromtheKurdishregion;

secessionwouldlikelyresultintheeliminationoffinancialaidtheKRGenjoysfrom

theIraqigovernment.Turkey’smajorqualmwithKurdishsecessionwouldbethe

threatofasimilaruprisingwithinitsownKurdishminority,andtheeconomyof

KurdistanfacespossiblecollapseifTurkeypulleditsfinancialinvestorsandcutoff

trade.

Conclusion

TheKurdsofIraqhavemadetremendousstridesintheirquestfor

recognitionandautonomysincetheemergenceofKurdishnationalismintheearly

20thcentury.AfteryearsofviolenceandpersecutionbytheBa’athregimeand

internaldiscordbetweenKurdishparties,the1990sand2000ssawthe

establishmentofasemi-autonomousregionthathasenjoyedincreasinginfluencein

BaghdadandtheMiddleEast.TheKRG’sdecisiontotableindependencediscussions

inlightofthecurrentIslamicStatecrisisisthebestmovefortheregion.Iraqi

Kurdistanfaredwellinthe2005IraqiConstitutionandbenefitsfromitssemi-

autonomousstatuswithoutthepressuresfacinganindependentstate.TheKRGis

abletousethethreatofsecessionasabargainingchipwithBaghdad,and

independencewouldleaveErbilwithoutmuchleverage.Fortheforeseeablefuture,

IraqiKurdistanshouldremainasemi-autonomousregioninnorthernIraqand

continuetodeveloppolitically,economically,andsocially.

36

AppendicesAppendixA156

156Yildiz,TheKurdsinIraq:ThePast,PresentandFuture,xi.

37

AppendixB157

157Ahmed,xix.

38

BibliographyAhmed,MohammedM.A.IraqiKurdsandNation-building.NewYork:Palgrave

Macmillan,2012.Web.

Albert,CraigDouglas.“AHistoryofViolence:EthnicGroupIdentityandtheIraqi

Kurds.”IranandtheCaucasus17(2013):215-234.

Aziz,MahirA.TheKurdsofIraq:EthnonationalismandNationalIdentityinIraq

Kurdistan.London:I.B.Tauris,2011.

Bangura,AbdulKarimandAliciaM.Micozzi.“ConstructingaNationalIdentityin

Post-SaddamHusseinIraq:TheCaseofIraq’sKurdishCommunity.”

InternationalJournalofDiversity3(2012):62-72.

Bell,Kelly.“WorldWarII:AirWaroverIraq.”AviationHistoryMagazine.(May

2004).Online.Internet.December13,2015.Available:

http://www.historynet.com/world-war-ii-air-war-over-iraq.htm.

Benard,AlexanderandJ.P.Schnapper-Casteras.“NorthernExposure:Kurdistanafter

theWithdrawal.”WorldAffairs(July/August2010):83-89.

Fantappie,Maria.“ArmedForcesBasedinIraqiKurdistan:ALenstoUnderstandthe

Post-SaddamEra.”FromDesolationtoReconstruction:Iraq’sTroubled

Journey.Ed.MokhtarLamaniandBessmaMomani.Waterloo,Ontario:Wilfrid

LaurierUniversityPress,2009.75-94.

Franzen,Johan.“TheProblemofIraqiNationalism.”NationalIdentities13.3(2011):

217-234.

Ghareeb,Edmund.TheKurdishQuestioninIraq.Syracuse,NY:SyracuseUP,1981.

Ghareeb,Edmund.“TheKurdishIssue.”Iraq:ItsHistory,People,andPolitics.Ed.ShamiConstantineInati.Amherst,NY:Humanity,2003.

39

Gunter,MichaelM.“TheKurdishSpring.”ThirdWorldQuarterly34.3(2013):441-

457.

Gunter,MichaelM.TheKurdsAscending:TheEvolvingSolutiontotheKurdish

ProbleminIraqandTurkey.NewYork,NY:PalgraveMacmillan,2007.

Gunter,MichaelM.TheKurdsofIraq:TragedyandHope.NewYork:St.Martin's,

1992.

Hira,AnilandKawaJabary.“TheKurdishMirage:ASuccessStoryinDoubt.”Middle

EastPolicy20.2(2013):99-112.

Jawad,SaadN.“TheIraqiConstitution:StructuralFlawsandPoliticalImplications,”

LSEMiddleEastCentrePaperSeries1.November2013.

Jimenez,JeremyandPeterKabachnik.“TheOtherIraq:ExploringIraqiKurdistan.”

FOCUSonGeography55.2(Summer2012):31-40.

Lamani,Mokhtar.“TheExtinctionofIraqiMinorities:ChallengeorCatastrophe?”

FromDesolationtoReconstruction:Iraq’sTroubledJourney.Ed.Mokhtar

LamaniandBessmaMomani.Waterloo,Ontario:WilfridLaurierUniversity

Press,2009.95-113.

Lawrence,Quil.InvisibleNation:HowtheKurds'QuestforStatehoodIsShapingIraq

andtheMiddleEast.NewYork:Walker,2008.Print.

Logan,DarrenL.“ThoughtsonIraqiKurdistan:PresentRealities,FutureHope.”Iran

andtheCaucasus13(2009):161-186.

Mansfield,Stephen.TheMiracleoftheKurds:ARemarkableStoryofHopeRebornin

NorthernIraq.Tennessee:WorthyPublishing,2014.

40

McDowall,David.AModernHistoryoftheKurds.London:I.B.Tauris,1996.

Morelli,MassimoandConstantinoPischedda.“TheTurkey-KRGEnergy

Partnership:AssessingItsImplications.”MiddleEastPolicy21.1(2014):107-

121.

Natali,Denise.TheKurdishQuasi-state:DevelopmentandDependencyinPost-Gulf

WarIraq.Syracuse,NY:SyracuseUP,2010.

Natali,Denise.TheKurdsandtheState:EvolvingNationalIdentityinIraq,Turkey,

andIran.Syracuse,NY:SyracuseUP,2005.

Natali,Denise.“TheSpoilsofPeaceinIraqiKurdistan.”ThirdWorldQuarterly28.6

(2007):1111-1129.

O'Leary,Brendan,JohnMcGarry,andKhālidSālih.TheFutureofKurdistaninIraq.

Philadelphia:UofPennsylvania,2005.

Ozpek,BurakBilgehan.“DemocracyorPartition:FutureScenariosfortheKurdsof

Iraq.”InsightTurkey14.3(2012):127-140.

Park,Bill.“Turkey’sMultipleKurdishDilemmas.”OrtadoğuEtütleri5.1(July2013):

41-63.

Romano,David.“IraqiKurdistan:ChallengesofAutonomyintheWakeofUS

Withdrawal.”InternationalAffairs86.6(2010):1345-1359.

Romano,David.“TheStruggleforAutonomyandDecentralization-IraqiKurdistan.”

FromDesolationtoReconstruction:Iraq’sTroubledJourney.Ed.Mokhtar

LamaniandBessmaMomani.Waterloo,Ontario:WilfridLaurierUniversity

Press,2009.53-73.

41

Sluglett,Peter.“CommonSense,oraStepPregnantwithEnormousConsequences:

SomeThoughtsonthePossibleSecessionofIraqiKurdistan.”Secessionasan

InternationalPhenomenon:FromAmerica’sCivilWartoContemporary

SeparatistMovements.Ed.DonHarrisonDoyle.Athens:UniversityofGeorgia

Press,2010.319-337.

Talabani,Nouri.“EthnicCleansinginIraqiKurdistan.”KurdishIdentity:Human

RightsandPoliticalStatus.Ed.CharlesG.MacDonaldandCaroleO’Leary.

Gainesville:UniversityPressofFlorida,2007.145-148.

VanWilgenburg,Wladimir.“BreakingfromBaghdad:KurdishAutonomyvs.Maliki’s

Manipulation.”WorldAffairs(November/December2012):47-53.

Yakis,Yasar.“TurkeyaftertheArabSpring:PolicyDilemmas.”MiddleEastPolicy

21.1(2014):98-106.

Yildiz,Kerim.TheFutureofKurdistan:TheIraqiDilemma.London:PlutoPress,2012

Yildiz,Kerim.TheKurdsinIraq:ThePast,PresentandFuture.London:PlutoPress,

2004.