SEMBLANTE v. CAG.R. No.196426, August 15, 2011FACTS:Petitioners Marticio Semblante (Semblante) and Dubrick Pilar (Pilar) assert that they were hired by respondents-spouses Vicente and Maria Luisa Loot, the owners ofGallera de Mandaue(the cockpit), as the officialmasiadorandsentenciador, respectively, of the cockpit sometime in 1993.As themasiador, Semblante calls and takes the bets from the gamecock owners and other bettors and orders the start of the cockfight. He also distributes the winnings after deducting thearriba, or the commission for the cockpit. Meanwhile, as thesentenciador, Pilar oversees the proper gaffing of fighting cocks, determines the fighting cocks physical condition and capabilities to continue the cockfight, and eventually declares the result of the cockfight.For their services asmasiadorandsentenciador,Semblante receives PhP 8,000 per month, while Pilar gets 14,000 per month. Their working days start at 1:00 p.m. and last until 12:00 midnight, or until the early hours of the morning depending on the needs of the cockpit. Petitioners had both been issued employees identification cardthat they wear every time they report for duty. On November 14, 2003, however, petitioners were denied entry into the cockpit upon the instructions of respondents, and were informed of the termination of their services effective that date. This prompted petitioners to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents.Respondents denied that petitioners were their employees and alleged that they were associates of respondents independent contractor, Tomas Vega. Respondents claimed that petitioners have no regular working time or day and they are free to decide for themselves whether to report for work or not on any cockfighting day.(LA) In a Decision dated June 16, 2004, Labor Arbiter Julie C. Rendoque found petitioners to be regular employees of respondents as they performed work that was necessary and indispensable to the usual trade or business of respondents for a number of years. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that petitioners were illegally dismissed, and so ordered respondents to pay petitioners their backwages and separation pay.(NLRC) On appeal to the NLRC, it held in its Resolution of October 18, 2006 that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and respondents, respondents having no part in the selection and engagement of petitioners, and that no separate individual contract with respondents was ever executed by petitioners.(CA) The appellate court found for respondents, noting that referees and bet-takers in a cockfight need to have the kind of expertise that is characteristic of the game to interpret messages conveyed by mere gestures. Hence, petitioners are akin to independent contractors who possess unique skills, expertise, and talent to distinguish them from ordinary employees. Further, respondents did not supply petitioners with the tools and instrumentalities they needed to perform work. Petitioners only needed their unique skills and talents to perform their job asmasiadorandsentenciador.

ISSUE:Whether or not Semblante and Pilar may be considered as employees.

HELD:While respondents had failed to post their bond within the 10-day period provided above, it is evident, on the other hand, that petitioners are NOT employees of respondents, since their relationship fails to pass muster the four-fold test of employment We have repeatedly mentioned in countless decisions: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct, which is the most important element.As found by both the NLRC and the CA, respondents had no part in petitioners selection and management;[19]petitioners compensation was paid out of thearriba(which is a percentage deducted from the total bets), not by petitioners;[20]andpetitioners performed their functions asmasiadorandsentenciadorfree from the direction and control of respondents.[21]In the conduct of their work, petitioners relied mainly on their expertise that is characteristic of the cockfight gambling,[22]and were never given by respondents any tool needed for the performance of their work.[23]Respondents, not being petitioners employers, could never have dismissed, legally or illegally, petitioners, since respondents were without power or prerogative to do so in the first place. WHEREFORE, WeDENYthis petition andAFFIRMthe May 29, 2009 Decision and February 23, 2010 Resolution of the CA, and the October 18, 2006 Resolution of the NLRC.

AVON v. LUNAG.R. No. 153674, December 20, 2006FACTS:A complaint dated 1 December 1988 was filed by herein respondent Luna alleging,inter alia that she began working for Beautifont, Inc. in 1972, first as a franchise dealer and then a year later, as a Supervisor.Sometime in 1978, Avon Cosmetics, Inc. (Avon), herein petitioner, acquired and took over the management and operations of Beautifont, Inc. Nonetheless, respondent Luna continued working for said successor company.In 1985, petitioner Avon and respondent Luna entered into an agreement, entitledSupervisors Agreement, whereby said parties contracted in the manner quoted below:The Company and the Supervisor mutually agree:x x x x5) That the Supervisor shall sell or offer to sell, display or promote only and exclusively products sold by the Company.6) Either party may terminate this agreement at will, with or without cause, at any time upon notice to the other.x x x x. By virtue of the execution of the aforequotedSupervisors Agreement, respondent Luna became part of the independent sales force of petitioner Avon.Sometime in the latter part of 1988, respondent Luna was invited by a former Avon employee who was then currently a Sales Manager of Sandr Philippines, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in direct selling of vitamins and other food supplements, to sell said products. Respondent Luna apparently accepted the invitation as she then became a Group Franchise Director of Sandr Philippines, Inc. concurrently with being a Group Supervisor of petitioner AvonIn a letterdated 11 October 1988, petitioner Avon, through its President and General Manager, Jose Mari Franco, notified respondent Luna of the termination or cancellation of her Supervisors Agreement with petitioner Avon (Allegedly because of violation of paragraph 5 pursuant to paragraph 6 of the same Agreement).Aggrieved, respondent Luna filed a complaint for damages before the RTC which rendered judgment in favor of respondent Luna.The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision which AFFIRMED RTCs decisionin totoISSUE:a) Whether or not paragraph 5 of the Supervisors Agreement is void for being violative of law and public policy; andb) Whether or not paragraph 6 of the Supervisors Agreement which authorizes petitioner Avon to terminate or cancel the agreement at will is void for being contrary to law and public policy.

HELD:1. Thisexclusivityclause is more often the subject of critical scrutiny when it is perceived to collide with the Constitutional proscription against "reasonable restraint of trade or occupation." Thus, restrictions upon trade may be upheld when not contrary to public welfare and not greater than is necessary to afford a fair and reasonable protection to the party in whose favor it is imposed.Even contracts which prohibit an employee from engaging in business in competition with the employer are not necessarily void for being in restraint of trade.In sum, contracts requiring exclusivity are notper sevoid. Each contract must be viewedvis--visall the circumstances surrounding such agreement in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.Authorities are one in declaring that a restraint in trade is unreasonable when it is contrary to public policy or public welfare. Plainly put, public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. Applying the preceding principles to the case at bar, there is nothing invalid or contrary to public policy either in the objectives sought to be attained by paragraph 5,i.e., theexclusivity clause, in prohibiting respondent Luna, and all other Avon supervisors, from selling products other than those manufactured by petitioner Avon. Such prohibition is neither directed to eliminate the competition like Sandr Phils., Inc. nor foreclose new entrants to the market. It was not by chance that Sandr Philippines, Inc. made respondent Luna one of its Group Franchise Directors. It doesnt take a genius to realize that by making her an important part of its distribution arm, Sandr Philippines, Inc., a newly formed direct-selling business, would be saving time, effort and money as it will no longer have to recruit, train and motivate supervisors and dealers. Theexclusivity clausedoes not in any way limit its selling opportunities, just the undue use of the resources of petitioner Avon.The foregoing premises noted, the Court of Appeals, therefore, committed reversible error in interpreting the subjectexclusivity clauseto apply merely to those products in direct competition to those manufactured and sold by petitioner Avon.

1. Having held that the "exclusivity clause" as embodied in paragraph 5 of the Supervisors Agreement is valid and not against public policy, we now pass to a consideration of respondent Lunas objections to the validity of her termination as provided for under paragraph 6("termination clause") of the Supervisors Agreement giving petitioner Avon the right to terminate or cancel such contract. Worth stressing is that the right to unilaterally terminate or cancel the Supervisors Agreement with or without cause is equally available to respondent Luna, subject to the same notice requirement. Obviously, no advantage is taken against each other by the contracting parties.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition isGRANTED. TheDecisiondated 20 May 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52550, affirming the judgment of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Case No. 88-2595, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let a new one be entered dismissing the complaint for damages. Costs against respondent Leticia Luna.

COCOMANGAS HOTEL BEACH RESORT v. VISCAG.R. No. 167045 August 29, 2008FACTS:The present controversy stemmed from five individual complaints3for illegaldismissal filed on June 15, 1999 by Federico F. Visca (Visca), Johnny G. Barredo, Ronald Q. Tibus, Richard G. Visca and Raffie G. Visca (respondents) against Cocomangas Hotel Beach Resort and/or its owner-manager, Susan Munro (petitioners) before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Kalibo, Aklan.Respondents alleged that: they were regular employees of petitioners tasked with the maintenance and repair of the resort facilities; on May 8, 1999,they were informed not to report for work since the ongoing constructions and repairs would be temporarily suspended because they caused irritation and annoyance to the resort's guests; when not less than ten workers were subsequently hired by petitioners to do repairs in two cottages of the resort and two workers were retained after the completion without respondents being allowed to resume work, they filed their individual complaints for illegal dismissal. In their Position Paper,petitioners denied any employer-employee relationship with respondents and countered that respondent Visca was an independent contractor who was called upon from time to time when some repairs in the resort facilities were needed and the other respondents were selected and hired by him.The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed their complaint, holding that respondent Visca was an independent contractor and the other respondents were hired by him to help him with his contracted works at the resort; that there was no illegal dismissal but completion of projects; that respondents were project workers, not regular employees.Initially, the NLRC rendered a Decision setting aside the Decision of the LA. The NLRC held that respondents were regular employees of petitioners since all the factors determinative of employer-employee relationship were present and the work done by respondents was clearly related to petitioners' resort business. But on February 27, 2003, the NLRC made a complete turnabout from its original decision and issued a Resolution13dismissing the complaint, holding that respondents were not regular employees but project employees, hired for a short period of time to do some repair jobs in petitioners' resort business. The CA reversed the NLRCs Resolution and reinstated the NLRCs Decision. It held respondents were regular employees, not project workers, since in the years that petitioners repeatedly hired respondents' services, the former failed to set, even once, specific periods when the employment relationship would be terminated; that the repeated hiring of respondents established that the services rendered by them were necessary and desirable to petitioners' resort business; at the least, respondents were regular seasonal employees, hired depending on the tourist season and when the need arose in maintaining petitioners' resort for the benefit of guests.ISSUE:Whether respondents are regular or project employees.HELD:The Court is constrained to resolve the issue of whether respondents are regular or permanent employees due to the conflicting findings of fact of the LA, the NLRC and the CA, thus, necessitating a review of the evidence on record.The petitioners were ambivalent in categorizing respondents. In their Position Paperfiled before the LA, petitioners classified respondent Visca as an independent contractor and the other respondents as his employees; while in their Motion for Reconsideration31before the NLRC, petitioners treated respondents as project employees. At any rate, after a careful examination of the records, the Court finds that the CA did not err in finding that respondents were regular employees, not project employees. A project employee is one whose "employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season."Before an employee hired on a per-project basis can be dismissed, a report must be made to the nearest employment office, of the termination of the services of the workers every time completes a project, pursuant to Policy Instruction No. 20.In the present case, respondents cannot be classified as project employees, since they worked continuously for petitioners from three to twelve years without any mention of a "project" to which they were specifically assigned. While they had designations as "foreman," "carpenter" and "mason," they performed work other than carpentry or masonry.More importantly, there is no evidence that petitioners reported the termination of respondents' supposed project employment to the DOLE as project employees. Department Order No. 19, as well as the old Policy Instructions No. 20, requires employers to submit a report of an employees termination to the nearest public employment office every time his employment is terminated due to a completion of a project. Petitioners' failure to file termination reports is an indication that the respondents were not project employees but regular employees.The Court is not persuaded by petitioners' submission that respondents' services are not necessary or desirable to the usual trade or business of the resort. The repeated and continuing need for their services is sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability, of their services to petitioners' resort business.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 30, 2004 and Resolution dated February 2, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78620 areAFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATIONthat the award for backwages should be computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.

ENTITLEMENT OF MONTHLY PAID WORKERS 89. ELIAS VILLUGA, RENATO ABISTADO, JILL MENDOZA, ANDRES ABAD, BENJAMIN BRIZUELA, NORLITO LADIA, MARCELO AGUILAN, DAVID ORO, NELIA BRIZUELA, FLORA ESCOBIDO, JUSTILITA CABANIG, and DOMINGO SAGUIT vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) and BROAD STREET TAILORING and/or RODOLFO ZAPANTA, G.R. No. L-75038, August 23, 1993FACTS: Petitioner Elias Villuga was employed as cutter in the tailoring shop owned by private respondent Rodolfo Zapanta and known as Broad Street Tailoring located at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. As cutter, he was paid a fixed monthly salary of P840.00 and a monthly transportation allowance of P40.00. In addition to his work as cutter, Villuga was assigned the chore of distributing work to the shop's tailors or sewers when both the shop's manager and assistant manager would be absent. He saw to it that their work conformed with the pattern he had prepared and if not, he had them redone, repaired or resewn.The other petitioners were either ironers, repairmen and sewers. They were paid a fixed amount for every item ironed, repaired or sewn, regardless of the time consumed in accomplishing the task. Petitioners did not fill up any time record since they did not observe regular or fixed hours of work. They were allowed to perform their work at home especially when the volume of work, which depended on the number of job orders, could no longer be coped up with.From February 17 to 22, 1978, petitioner Villuga failed to report for work allegedly due to illness. For not properly notifying his employer, he was considered to have abandoned his work.In a complaint dated March 27, 1978, filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor, Villuga claimed that he was refused admittance when he reported for work after his absence, allegedly due to his active participation in the union organized by private respondent's tailors. He further claimed that he was not paid overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for work done on rest days and holidays, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.Petitioners Renato Abistado, Jill Mendoza, Benjamin Brizuela and David Oro also claimed that they were dismissed from their employment because they joined the Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU). Petitioners Andres Abad, Norlito Ladia, Marcelo Aguilan, Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita Cabaneg and Domingo Saguit claimed that they stopped working because private respondents gave them few pieces of work to do after learning of their membership with PSSLU. All the petitioners laid claims under the different labor standard laws which private respondent allegedly violated.On May 28, 1979, Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Pealosa rendered a decision ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal and other money claims except petitioner Villuga's claim for 13th month pay for the years 1976, 1977 and 1980. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the questioned decision in a resolution.ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the NLRC abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioner/complainant, Elias Villuga falls within the category of a managerial employee; 2. Whether or not petitioner Elias Villuga is entitled to overtime pay and services for Sundays and Legal Holidays;3. Whether or not the NLRC abused its discretion when it ruled that the herein petitioners were not dismissed by reason of their union activities;4. Whether or not the NLRC abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioners Andres Abad, Benjamin Brizuela, Norlito Ladia, Marcelo Aguilan, David Oro, Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita Cabaneg and Domingo Saguit were not employees of private respondents but were contractors.5. Whether or not the NLRC abused its discretion when it failed to grant petitioners their respective claims under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 925, 1123 and 851.RULING: 1. YES. Under Rule 1, Section 2(c), Book III of the Implementing Rules of Labor Code, to be a member of a managerial staff, the following elements must concur or co-exist, to wit: (1) that his primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies; (2) that he customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of his functions; (3) that he regularly and directly assists in the management of the establishment; and (4) that he does not devote his twenty per cent of his time to work other than those described above.Applying the above criteria to petitioner Elias Villuga's case, it is undisputed that his primary work or duty is to cut or prepare patterns for items to be sewn, not to lay down or implement any of the management policies, as there is a manager and an assistant manager who perform said functions. It is true that in the absence of the manager the assistant manager, he distributes and assigns work to employees but such duty, though involving discretion, is occasional and not regular or customary. He had also the authority to order the repair or resewing of defective item but such authority is part and parcel of his function as cutter to see to it that the items cut are sewn correctly lest the defective nature of the workmanship be attributed to his "poor cutting." Elias Villuga does not participate in policy-making. Rather, the functions of his position involve execution of approved and established policies. InFranklin Baker Company of the Philippines v.Trajano,it was held that employees who do not participate in policy-making but are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe are not managerial employees. The test of "supervisory or managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses authority that is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but one that requires use of independent judgment. In other words, the functions of the position are not managerial in nature if they only execute approved and established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement said policies or not.2. YES. Consequently, the exclusion of Villuga from the benefits claimed under Article 87 (overtime pay and premium pay for holiday and rest day work), Article 94, (holiday pay), and Article 95 (service incentive leave pay) of the Labor Code, on the ground that he is a managerial employee is unwarranted. He is definitely a rank and file employee hired to perform the work of the cutter and not hired to perform supervisory or managerial functions. The fact that he is uniformly paid by the month does not exclude him from the benefits of holiday pay as held in the case ofInsular Bank of America Employees Union v.Inciong.He should therefore be paid in addition to the 13th month pay, his overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and service incentive leave pay.3. As to the dismissal of the charge for unfair labor practices of private respondent consisting of termination of employment of petitioners and acts of discrimination against members of the labor union, the respondent Commission correctly held the absence of evidence that Mr. Zapanta was aware of petitioners' alleged union membership on February 22, 1978 as the notice of union existence in the establishment with proposal for recognition and collective bargaining negotiation was received by management only an March 3, 1978. Indeed, self-serving allegations without concrete proof that the private respondent knew of their membership in the union and accordingly reacted against their membership do not suffice.Nor is private respondent's claim that petitioner Villuga abandoned his work acceptable. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, there must be a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence is not sufficient, it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.At any rate, dismissal of an employee due to his prolonged absence without leave by reason of illness duly established by the presentation of a medical certificate is not justified.In the case at bar, however, considering that petitioner Villuga absented himself for four (4) days without leave and without submitting a medical certificate to support his claim of illness, the imposition of a sanction is justified, but surely, not dismissal, in the light of the fact that this is petitioner's first offense. In lieu of reinstatement, petitioner Villuga should be paid separation pay where reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or because of the realities of the situation.But petitioner should not be granted backwages in addition to reinstatement as the same is not just and equitable under the circumstances considering that he was not entirely free from blame.4. YES. As to the other eleven petitioners, there is no clear showing that they were dismissed because the circumstances surrounding their dismissal were not even alleged. However, we disagree with the finding of respondent Commission that the eleven petitioners are independent contractors.For an employer-employee relationship to exist, the following elements are generally considered: "(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;(2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct."Noting that the herein petitioners were oftentimes allowed to perform their work at home and were paid wages on a piece-rate basis, the respondent Commission apparently found the second and fourth elements lacking and ruled that "there is no employer-employee relationship, for it is clear that respondents are interested only in the result and not in the means and manner and how the result is obtained."Respondent Commission is in error. The mere fact that petitioners were paid on a piece-rate basis is no argument that herein petitioners were not employees. The term "wage" has been broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commissionbasis. . . ." The facts of this case indicate that payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of therelation.The petitioners were allowed to perform their work at home does not likewise imply absence of control and supervision. The control test calls merely for the existence of a right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right.In determining whether the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent contractor, "each case must be determined on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered."Considering that petitioners who are either sewers, repairmen or ironer, have been in the employ of private respondent as early as 1972 or at the latest in 1976, faithfully rendering services which are desirable or necessary for the business of private respondent, and observing management's approved standards set for their respective lines of work as well as the customers' specifications, petitioners should be considered employees, not independent contractors.Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods and without being subjected to control of their employer except as to the result of their work. By the nature of the different phases of work in a tailoring shop where the customers' specifications must be followed to the letter, it is inconceivable that the workers therein would not be subjected to control.5. InRosario Brothers, Inc.v.Ople,this Court ruled that tailors and similar workers hired in the tailoring department, although paid weekly wages on piece work basis, are employees not independent contractors. Accordingly, as regular employees, paid on a piece-rate basis, petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday/rest day and service incentive leave pay. Their claim for separation pay should also be defined for lack of evidence that they were in fact dismissed by private respondent. They should be paid, however, their 13th month pay under P.D. 851, since they are employees not independent contractors.The case is hereby REMANDED to the National Labor Relations Commission for the computation of the claims herein-above mentioned.

Abanilla vs COAFrom 1983 to 1986, the MCWD Board of Directors issued several resolutions giving the mentioned benefits and privileges to its personnel including monetization of leave credits, hospitalization privileges, Christmas bonuses and longevity allowance. In 1989, the MCWD and MCWD Employees Union executed a CBA providing for the continuous grant of these benefits. On January 1, 1992, the parties renewed their CBA. On November 13, 1995, an audit team headed by Bernardita Jabines of the COA-7, one of the respondents, audited the accounts and transactions of MCWD. As a result, the Regional Director of COA 7, also a respondent, sent MCWD several notices disallowing the amount of P12,221,120.86 representing hospitalization benefits, mid-year bonus, 13th month pay, Christmas bonus and longevity pay. MCWD general manager Dulce Abanilla interposed an appeal to respondent COA at Quezon City citing a COA Memorandum Circular No. 002-94 providing that "all benefits provided under the duly existing CBAs entered into prior to March 12, 1992, the date of official entry of judgment of the Supreme Court ruling in Davao City Water District, et al. vs. CSC and COA, shall continue up to the respective expiry dates of the benefits or CBA whichever comes earlier." Then, on December 3, 1998, COA denied the petitioner's appeal saying as far as the CBA is concerned the critical moment is the date of the promulgation itself. Any transaction concluded after this date in violation of existing laws and regulations applicable to government entities is void and of no effect, conferring no demandable right, and creating no enforceable obligation. Abanilla then moved for the reconsideration of the case but was denied by COA in a Resolution dated February 15, 2000, prompting her to file her petition before the SC. She contended that COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the above benefits and privileges and contravened the Labor Code provision on non-diminution of benefits. But the Solicitor General said in his comment that "COA did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's appeal considering that the terms and conditions of employment, such as the entitlement of government personnel, like the affected MCWD employees, to privileges and benefits are governed by the Civil Service Law, the General Appropriations Act and applicable issuances of the Department of Budget and Management, not by the Labor Code.SC ruled that for those who had already received their benefits, they need not refund the received benefits and privileges as "they acted in good faith under the honest belief that the CBA authorized such payment.

UE DEAN Eleanor Javier vs PepianoThe petitioners, UE professors Analiza Pepanio and Mariti Bueno, who were hired in 2000 and 1997, respectively, filed a labor case against then UE dean Eleanor Javier, contesting the schools policy that obligated them to acquire masters degrees as a condition for tenureship.

Pepanio and Bueno said the 1994-1999 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between UE management and its faculty provided that the school shall extend semester-to-semester appointments to college faculty staff like themselves who did not possess the minimum qualifications such as a masters degree.

In 2001, the new CBA extended probationary full-time appointments to full-time faculty members who did not yet have the required postgraduate degrees provided that the latter complied with the requirement within their probationary period.

In 2003, Javier reminded Pepanio and Bueno of the expiration of their probationary status. The two, however, demanded that they be placed on regular status given the years of service they had rendered.

The labor arbiter, in 2004, ruled in favor of the professors and ordered their reinstatement. UE, however, appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the arbiters decision in 2006.

The professors ran to the Court of Appeals and in 2010 secured a reversal of the NLRC decision. The UE management then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the policy of CHED and stated that The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as a prerequisite to employment.

Echeverria vs Venutek Medica

Teofilo Cesar N. Echeverria (petitioner) was an employee of Venutek Medika, Inc. (respondent), a corporation engaged in the business of trade and distribution of hospital supplies and equipment and an affiliate of the Dispophil Group of Companies (Dispophil Group). At the time of his termination from employment which is the subject of the present petition, he held the position of assistant marketing manager with a salary of P23,150 a month.As a matter of policy, the marketing personnel of the various companies in the Dispophil Group hold a joint marketing cut-off monthly meeting to review the sales and marketing performance of the companies and discuss ways and means to improve them. Sheila Vinuya (Sheila), an assistant regional sales manager, is in charge of conducting the monthly meetings.Prior to the meeting scheduled on May 2, 2002, petitioner approached Sheila and asked her if he could join the meeting so he could give a short discussion of his vision of corporate "oneness" which he believed would help the Dispophil Group generate sales. And he also asked Sheila if he could invite other division heads. Finding the request reasonable, Sheila agreed to let petitioner speak after the meeting.Petitioner thereupon requested Lemford Suarez (Suarez), a product assistant, to invite all product assistants to attend the May 2, 2002 meeting, informing him that plans and programs to improve collection and product segmentationwould be discussed.1avvphi1.netDuring the meeting, Sheila, noting the presence of other product assistants and the absence of division heads, went to petitioners office to inform him thereof. Petitioner readily admitted that he no longer invited the division heads.Out of courtesy to petitioner who gave the impression that his discussion of his vision on corporate "oneness" was sanctioned by the president and chairman of the Dispophil Group, Sheila allowed him to speak at the beginning of the meeting.Petitioner was well-prepared for his discussion, bringing with him slides and other paraphernalia.In the course of his discussion, it became apparent that his "vision and mission" differed from that of respondent. Moreover, he made disparaging remarks about one of the senior officers of respondent, Assistant Vice President Marlene Orozco (Marlene), criticizing her character, competency and performance,prompting one of the marketing managers to question his authority to "preside" over the meeting.After the meeting, he was given an order to submit an explanation in writing why he must not be subjected to a disciplinary action. Petioner failed to defend his actions and he was terminated by the respondent for his misconduct during the said meeting.

The SC decided against petitioner held that Misconduct has been defined as an improper or wrong conduct, and to be categorized as serious, it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant.

ALIVIADO vs. PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILIPPINES INC.FACTS:Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G from various dates. They all individually signed employment contracts with either Promm-Gem or SAPS for periods of more or less five months at a time. They were assigned at different outlets, supermarkets and stores where they handled all the products of P&G.They received their wages from Promm-Gem or SAPS.P&G is principally engaged in the manufacture and production of different consumer and health products, which it sells on a wholesale basis to various supermarkets and distributors.To enhance consumer awareness and acceptance of the products, P&G entered into contracts with Promm-Gem and SAPS for the promotion and merchandising of its products.Petitioners filed a complaint against P&G for regularization, service incentive leave pay and other benefits with damages.The complaint was later amended to include charges of illegal dismissalThe Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and P&G.He found that the selection and engagement of the petitioners, the payment of their wages, the power of dismissal and control with respect to the means and methods by which their work was accomplished, were all done and exercised by Promm-Gem/SAPS.He further found that Promm-Gem and SAPS were legitimate independent job contractors.On Appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Motion for reconsideration motion was denied.CA: affirmed the NLRCs decision with modification. Respondent Procter & Gamble Phils., Inc. is ordered to pay service incentive leave pay to petitioners. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.ISSUE:Whether or not contracting out of a companys core activities is allowed under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

RULING: YES.

The law and its implementing rules allow contracting arrangements for the performance of specific jobs, works or services.Indeed, it is management prerogative to farm out any of its activities, regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or core in nature.However, in order for such outsourcing to be valid, it must be made to anindependent contractorbecause the current labor rules expressly prohibit labor-only contracting.To emphasize, there is labor-only contracting when the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal and anyof the following elements are present:i)The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performedandthe employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal;orii)The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of thecontractualemployee. (Underscoring supplied)In the instant case,thefinancialstatementsof Promm-Gem show that ithas authorized capital stock ofP1 million and a paid-in capital, or capital available for operations, ofP500,000.00 as of 1990.It also has long term assets worthP432,895.28 and current assets ofP719,042.32.Promm-Gem has also proven that it maintained its own warehouse and office space with a floor area of 870 square meters.It also had under its name three registered vehicles which were used for its promotional/merchandising business. Promm-Gem also has other clientsaside from P&G. Under the circumstances, we find that Promm-Gem has substantial investment which relates to the work to be performed.These factors negate the existence of the element specified in Section 5(i) of DOLE Department Order No. 18-02.The records also show that Promm-Gem supplied its complainant-workers with the relevant materials, such as markers, tapes, liners and cutters, necessary for them to perform their work.Promm-Gem also issued uniforms to them. It is also relevant to mention that Promm-Gem already considered the complainants working under it as its regular, not merely contractual or project, employees. This circumstance negates the existence of element (ii) as stated in Section 5 of DOLE Department Order No. 18-02, which speaks ofcontractualemployees. This, furthermore, negates on the part of Promm-Gem bad faith and intent to circumvent labor laws which factors have often been tipping points that lead the Court to strike down the employment practice or agreement concerned as contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or public order. Under the circumstances, Promm-Gem cannot be considered as a labor-only contractor.We find that it is a legitimate independent contractor.On the other hand, the Articles of Incorporation of SAPS shows that it has a paid-in capital of onlyP31,250.00.There is no other evidence presented to show how much its working capital and assets are.Furthermore, there is no showing of substantial investment in tools, equipment or other assets. Considering that SAPS has no substantial capital or investment and the workers it recruited are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of P&G, we find that the former is engaged in labor-only contracting.

GEORGE ANDERSON,petitioner, vs.THE LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PACIFIC BUSINESS VENTURES INC. and KAMAL AL BITAR, respondents.

FACTS:Petitioner was recruited by respondent Pacific Business Ventures, Inc. to work as foreman of the Fiberglass Division of the Bitar Metal Fabrication Factory in Damman,Kingdomof Saudi Arabia. The period of employment was two (2) years. After nine (9) months on the job, petitioner was told by the proprietor and general manager, respondent Kamal Al Bitar, that his services were being terminated. Four days after his lay off, petitioner returned to thePhilippines.Petitioner filed with the POEA a complaint for illegal dismissal, recovery of salary differential, vacation leave pay, refund of transportation expenses and recruitment violations.Private respondents denied petitioners allegations. They alleged that petitioner had been dismissed for loss of confidence. In a supplemental position paper filed by them, private respondents claimed that petitioner lacked the leadership and motivation required of the head of the fiberglass division. After due hearing, the POEA found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and, for this reason, ordered private respondents to pay the balance of petitioners salary for two years and salary differential.On Appeal, the NLRC set aside the decision of the POEA and dismissed petitioners complaint. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but his motion was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.

RULING: YES.There is no dispute that loss of confidence constitutes a just cause for terminating an employer-employee relationship. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not even required to terminate employment on this ground.But the loss of confidence cited in this case to justify the dismissal of petitioner is not based on any act of dishonesty or disloyaltyon the part of petitioner but on alleged lack of leadership, and technical know-how and on the allegation that worse, he exhibited a negative attitude toward his work.Kamal Al Bitars affidavit cites no specific acts or omissions constituting unsatisfactory performance by petitioner of his work.What qualities of leadership and technical knowledge petitioner was required to possess as supervisor of a fiberglass company has not been specified. On the contrary, what is established is that before petitioner was hired, Kamal Al Bitar required him to demonstrate his knowledge and skill and it was only after he had done so was he hired for the job of supervisor of the fiberglass division. In fact petitioner had already been on the job for nine months when Kamal Al Bitar terminated petitioners employment. On the other hand, what negative attitude petitioner had shown toward his work is anybodys guess. There are no specific instances cited to show petitioners negative attitude toward his work.Indeed, Kamal Al Bitars affidavit contained nothing but general, vague and amorphous allegations of petitioners unfitness for the job. The NLRC, while citing the affidavit, did not specify why in its opinion petitioners dismissal was justified. Instead it stressed petitioners failure to answer the affidavit. The NLRC did not consider the affidavit by evaluating its merit.It is true that in the casescited by private respondents this Court upheld the power of the NLRC to admit on appeal additional evidence to show just cause for dismissal. In those cases, however, the delay in the submission of the additional evidence was explained. What is more, the additional evidenceclearlyproved the employers allegation of just causefor dismissing the employee.But in the case at bar, not only was the delay in the submission of Kamal Al Bitars affidavit not explained but the affidavit belatedly submitted does not show that petitioners dismissal was indeed for a just cause. To repeat, the only reason the NLRC had for reversing the decision of the POEA is the fact that petitioner failed to answer the affidavit. But there was a reason for petitioners failure to do so. It was because a copy of the affidavit was served on him instead of his counsel. Unaided by counsel, he was unable to refute the allegations in the affidavit. The service of the affidavit was contrary to the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which require that if a party is represented by counsel or an authorized representative, service must be made on his counsel or representative.Petitioner complains that he was dismissed without being informed of: the cause of his dismissal and without being given prior notice as required by the Contract of Employment.On the other hand, private respondents reply that while no prior notice was given to petitioner the latter was given separation pay equivalent to one months pay which he accepted.Private respondents contention is well taken. The employment contract clearly states that in lieu of prior notice the employee may be given termination pay equal to thirty days pay for every year of service. This is in addition to the payment to him of his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract.The rule is that an employee cannot be dismissed except for cause as provided by law(i.e.,Labor Code, Arts. 282-283) and only after due notice and hearing. If an employee is dismissed without cause, he has a right to be reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to be paid full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits.If he is dismissed without notice and hearing, although for a just cause, he will be entitled to the payment of indemnity. If the contract is for a fixed term and the employee is dismissed without just cause, he is entitled to the payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. In this case, as petitioners contract was for two years and his dismissal was not for a just cause, he is entitled to be paid his salary for 15 months corresponding the balance of the contract. The grant to him of a termination pay under his employment contract may be considered indemnity for his dismissal without prior notice and hearing.

BPI VS. BPI Employees Union-Metro Manila

FACTS: BPI-Employees Union Metro Manila, the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner have an existing CBA which provides for loan benefits and relatively low interests rates.

Thereafter, the petitioner issued a No Negative data Bank Policy for the implementation/availment of the loan which the respondent objected to, thus, resulting into labor management dialogues. The issue, not having been resolved, the parties raised it to Voluntary Arbitration. The Voluntary Arbitration found merit on respondents cause. CA, also affirmed the decision of VA.

ISSUE: WON the No Negative Data Bank Policy is valid and does not violate the CBA.

HELD: NO. The Collective Bargaining Agreements refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit, including mandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration machineries. As in all other contracts, there must be clear indications that the parties reached meeting of the minds. Therefore, the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties.

The CBA in this case does not contain a provision on No Negative Data Bank Policy as a prerequisite in the entitlement of the benefits it set forth on the employees. Although it can be ruled that the petitioner can is authorize to issue rules and regulations pertinent to the availment and administration of the loans under the CBA, the additional rules and regulations must not impose new conditions which are not contemplated in the CBA and should be within the realm of reasonableness.

Art. 1702 of the Ne Civil Code stated that; In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer.

CIELO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONG.R. No. 78693 January 28, 1991 CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner is a truck driver who claims he was illegally dismissed by the private respondent, the Henry Lei Trucking Company. An agreement was entered into by the parties. The agreement specifically declared that there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties. The agreement commenced on June 30, 1984, and to end on December 31, 1984. On December 22, 1984, however, the petitioner was formally notified by the private respondent of the termination of his services on the ground of expiration of their contract. Petitioner claimed he started working for the private respondent on June 16, 1984, and having done so for more than six months had acquired the status of a regular employee. As such, he could no longer be dismissed except for lawful cause. He also contended that he had been removed because of his refusal to sign, as required by the private respondent, an affidavit that he received his salary and allowances and have no more claim against the company.The private respondent maintains that the labor laws are not applicable because the relations of the parties are governed by their voluntary stipulations. The contract having expired, it was the prerogative of the trucking company to renew it or not as it saw fit. According to its position paper, the petitioner's refusal to sign the affidavit constituted disrespect or insubordination, which had "some bearing on the renewal of his contract of employment with the respondent."

HELD: Petitioner was a regular employee.

Under the arrangement, the private respondent hoped to be able to terminate the service of the driver without the inhibitions of the Labor Code. All it had to do was refuse to renew the agreements, which, significantly, were uniformly limited to a six-month period. No cause had to be established because such renewal was subject to the discretion of the parties. In fact, the private respondent did not even have to wait for the expiration of the contract as it was there provided that it could be "earlier terminated at the option of either party."

By this clever scheme, the private respondent could also prevent the drivers from becoming regular employees and thus be entitled to security of tenure and other benefits.

In Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, the Court affirmed the general principle that "where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc." Such circumstances have been sufficiently established in the case at bar and justify application of the following conclusions:

Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure.

The agreement in question had such a purpose and so was null and void ab initio.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., VS. DELA CRUZFacts:Respondents Ricky E. Dela Cruz, Rolando M. Guasis, Manny C. Pugal, Ronnie L. Hermo, Rolando C. Somero, Jr., Dibson D. Diocares, and Ian Ichapare (respondents) filed two separate complaintsfor regularization with money claims against Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (petitioner or the company). The complaints were consolidated and subsequently amended to implead Peerless Integrated Service, Inc. (Peerless) as a party-respondent.Before the Labor Arbiter, the respondents alleged that they are route helpers assigned to work in the petitioner's trucks. They go from the Coca - Cola sales offices or plants to customer outlets such as sari-sari stores, restaurants, groceries, supermarkets and similar establishments; they were hired either directly by the petitioner or by its contractors, but they do not enjoy the full remuneration, benefits and privileges granted to the petitioner's regular sales force. They argued that the services they render are necessary and desirable in the regular business of the petitioner. In defense, the petitioner contended that it entered into contracts of services with Peerlessand Excellent Partners Cooperative, Inc. (Excellent)to provide allied services; under these contracts, Peerless and Excellent retained the right to select, hire, dismiss, supervise, control and discipline and pay the salaries of all personnel they assign to the petitioner; in return for these services, Peerless and Excellent were paid a stipulated fee. The petitioner posited that there is no employer-employee relationship between the company and the respondents and the complaints should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Peerless did not file a position paper, although nothing on record indicates that it was ever notified of the amended complaint.In reply, the respondents countered that they worked under the control and supervision of the company's supervisors who prepared their work schedules and assignments. Peerless and Excellent, too, did not have sufficient capital or investment to provide services to the petitioner. The respondents thus argued that the petitioner's contracts of services with Peerless and Excellent are in the nature of "labor-only" contracts prohibited by law. In rebuttal, the petitioner belied the respondents' submission that their jobs are usually necessary and desirable in its main business. It claimed that its main business is softdrinks manufacturing and the respondents' tasks of handling, loading and unloading of the manufactured softdrinks are not part of the manufacturing process. It stressed that its only interest in the respondents is in the result of their work, and left to them the means and the methods of achieving this result. It thus argued that there is no basis for the respondents' claim that without them, there would be over-production in the company and its operations would come to a halt.The petitioner lastly argued that in any case, the respondents did not present evidence in support of their claims of company control and supervision so that these claims cannot be considered and given weight. Labor Arbiter Lustria dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondents were the employees of either Peerless or Excellent and not of the petitioner. On appeal, the CA found that Peerless and Excellent were engaged in labor-only contracting, a prohibited undertaking.

Issue:

Whether Excellent and Peerless were independent contractors or "labor-only" contractors

Ruling:

The CA concluded that other than the petitioners bare allegation, there is no indication in the records that Peerless and Excellent had substantial capital, tools or investment used directly in providing the contracted services to the petitioner. Thus, in the handling and delivery of company products, the contracted personnel used company trucks and equipment in an operation where company sales personnel primarily handled sales and distribution, merely utilizing the contracted personnel as sales route helpers.In plainer terms, the contracted personnel (acting as sales route helpers) were only engaged in the marginal work of helping in the sale and distribution of company products; they only provided the muscle work that sale and distribution required and were thus necessarily under the companys control and supervision in doing these tasks.Still another way of putting it is that the contractors were not independently selling and distributing company products, using their own equipment, means and methods of selling and distribution; they only supplied the manpower that helped the company in the handing of products for sale and distribution.In the context of D.O. 18-02, the contracting for sale and distribution as an independent and self-contained operation is a legitimate contract, but the pure supply of manpower with the task of assisting in sales and distribution controlled by a principal falls within prohibited labor-only contracting.

Following the lead we gave inMagsalin, the CA concluded that the contracted personnel who served as route helpers were really engaged in functions directly related to the overall business of the petitioner. This led to the further CA conclusion that the contracted personnel were under the companys supervision and control since sales and distribution were in fact not the purported contractors independent, discrete and separable activities, but were component parts of sales and distribution operations that the company controlled in its softdrinks business.Based on these considerations, we fully agree with the CA that Peerless and Excellent were mere suppliers of labor who had no sufficient capitalization and equipment to undertake sales and distribution of softdrinks as independent activities separate from the manufacture of softdrinks, and who had no control and supervision over the contracted personnel.They are therefore labor-only contractors.Consequently, the contracted personnel, engaged in component functions in the main business of the company under the latters supervision and control, cannot but be regular company employees.In these lights, the petition is totally without merit and hence must be denied.

DATOR VS. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

Facts:

Petitioner Roque D.A. Dator was hired by respondent University of Santo Tomas (UST) in June 1983 as Instructor I of theInstituteofReligionwith a maximum teaching load of 24 units.OnDecember 15, 1995, petitioner was also hired as Graft Investigation Officer II with the Office of the Ombudsman but he failed to disclose such other employment to respondents, who discovered the same only during the first semester of School Year 2000-2001.Thus, on 2000, petitioner was informed that his teaching load would be reduced to 12 hours per week, pursuant to Section 5, Article III of the UST Faculty Code which states that faculty members who have a full time outside employment other than teaching may not be given a teaching load in excess of 12 hours per week.Petitioner asked for reconsideration of the reduction in his teaching load which was granted.He was given an additional load of three teaching hours. Petitioner again requested for an additional load of three units but his request was denied by respondent Rev. Fr. Aligan.Petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit to the Chairperson of the Grievance Committee, Dr. Gil Gamila, President of theUniversityofSto. Tomas Faculty Union, but the complaint was dismissed.Petitioner appealed to respondent Rev. Fr. Tamerlane Lana, Rector of respondent UST but the appeal was denied.Petitioner thus filed a complaint for Illegal Reduction of Teaching Load and Illegal Change of Employment Status, Damages, Unpaid Benefits and Attorneys Fees and illegal constructive dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.Petitioner claimed that his arbitrary demotion from full-time to part-time faculty member violated the provisions of the CBA, as well as his right to security of tenure.Likewise, he argued that the UST Faculty Code which respondents relied upon to reduce his teaching load has been superseded by the CBA.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents holding that the situation contemplated in Section 5, Article III of the Faculty Code, when evaluated together with the provisions of the CBA, constitutes a ground for teaching load reduction. On appeal, the NLRC ordered the restoration of petitioners faculty member status to full-time.Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied.Petitioners partial motion for reconsideration with regard to the award for backwages and damages was likewise denied. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which reversed the NLRC decision and sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the reduction of petitioners teaching load is justified1. whether petitioner was denied due process

Ruling:

1. We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that while the CBA provides grounds for reduction of teaching load, the question of whether a faculty member is considered full-time or part-time is addressed by the Faculty Code which provides that where the full-time faculty member is at the same time working as a full-time employee elsewhere, the faculty member is considered part-time and a 12-hour teaching load limitation is imposed.There is no dispute that petitioner was holding a full-time position with the Office of the Ombudsman while working as a faculty member in UST.Accordingly, Section 5, Article III of the Faculty Code applies.

While the NLRC correctly viewed the CBA as the primary instrument that governs the relationship between UST and its unionized faculty members, it disregarded Article XX of this CBA which reconciles the CBA with the Faculty Code.Article XX states:ARTICLE XXFACULTY CODEThe provisions of the Faculty Code of 1981, as amended, which are not otherwise incorporated in the CBA and which are not in conflict with any provisions of the latter shall remain in full force and effect.In the event of conflict between a faculty code provision and the CBA, the provision of the latter shall prevail.(Emphasis supplied)Thus, contrary to the NLRCs conclusion, the UST Faculty Code continues to exist and to apply to UST faculty members, but must give way if its terms are in conflict with what the CBA provides.The standard in determining the applicable rule and the one that the NLRC completely missed is whether a conflict exists between the provisions the parties cited.

1. Moreover, we find that petitioner was not denied due process.It is settled that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.In this case, respondents informed petitioner that his teaching load would be reduced as he was working full-time with the Office of the Ombudsman.Petitioner asked for reconsideration twice.His first request was granted and he was given an additional load of three units for School Year 2000-2001.For School Year 2001-2002, petitioner again requested an additional load of three units but was denied.

Upon denial of his second request, petitioner availed of the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. Yet again, after his complaint was dismissed, petitioner appealed directly to respondent Fr. Lana.As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner exhausted the internal mechanism of seeking redress within USTs administrative machinery. Contrary to petitioners claims, he was accorded due process.

AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE, PARAAQUE VS. AUSTRIA

Facts:

PetitionerAMAComputerCollege,Paraaque(AMA) is an educational institution duly organized under the laws of thePhilippines. The rest of the petitioners are principal officers of AMA. Respondent Rolando A. Austria(respondent) was hired by AMA on probationary employment as a college dean onApril 24, 2000.OnAugust 22, 2000, respondents appointment as dean was confirmed by AMAs Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Academic Affairs, in his Memorandum,which reads:After a thorough evaluation of the performance of Mr. RolandoAustriaas Dean, we are happy to inform you that he is hereby officially confirmed as Dean of AMA College Paraaque effective April 17, 2000toSeptember 17, 2000.In view of this, he will be entitled to a transportation allowance of One Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Pesos (P1,560.00).In the event that Mr. Austria gives up the Dean position or fails to meet the standards of the (sic) based on the evaluation of his immediate superior, he shall be considered for a faculty position and the appointee agrees that he shall lose the transportation allowance he enjoys as Dean and be entitled to his faculty rate.Sometime in August 2000, respondent was charged with violating AMAs Employees Conduct and Discipline provided in its Orientation Handbook (Handbook),as follows:1)leaking of test questions;2)failure to monitor general requirements vital to the operations of thecompany; and3)gross inefficiency.Eventually, onSeptember 29, 2000, respondent was informed of his dismissal. Respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal, Illegal Suspension, Non-Payment of Salary and 13thMonth Pay with prayer for Damages and Attorney's Fees against AMA and the rest of the petitioners.

Labor Arbiter held that respondent substantially refuted the charges of gross inefficiency, incompetence, and leaking of test questions filed against him. But since respondent can no longer be reinstated beyond September 17, 2000 as his designation as college dean was only until such date. On appeal, while the NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter's finding that petitioners failed to establish the grounds for respondent's dismissal, it held that the Labor Arbiter erred in declaring that respondent's appointment was only from April 24 toSeptember 17, 2000.Accordingly, the NLRC declared that respondent was a regular employee and that he was illegally dismissed.

Petitioners went to the CA via Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65. CA held that based on the Handbook and on respondent's appointment, it can be inferred that respondent was a regular employee, and as such, his employment can only be terminated for any of the causes provided under Article 282of the Labor Code and after observance of the requirements of due process.

Issue:

Whether the nature of respondents employment is that of regular employment?

Ruling:

We held that Article 280 of the Labor Code does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period. Even if the duties of the employee consist of activities necessary or desirable in the usual businessoftheemployer, theparties arefreetoagreeonafixed period of time for the performance ofsuchactivities. Thereisnothingessentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of the employees duties.The instant case involves respondent's position as dean, and comes within the purview of theBrentSchooldoctrine.First. The letter of appointment was clear. Respondent was confirmed as Dean of AMA College,Paraaque,effective fromApril 17, 2000toSeptember 17, 2000. In numerous cases decided by this Court, we had taken notice, that by way of practice and tradition, the position of dean is normally an employment for a fixed term.[36]Although it does not appear on record and neither was it alleged by any of the parties that respondent, other than holding the position of dean, concurrently occupied a teaching position, it can be deduced from the last paragraph of said letter that the respondent shall be considered for a faculty position in the event he gives up his deanship or fails to meet AMA's standards. Such provision reasonably serves the intention set forth inBrentSchoolthat the deanship may be rotated among the other members of the faculty.Second. The fact that respondent did not sign the letter of appointment is of no moment.

The fact that respondent voluntarily accepted the employment, assumed the position, and performed the functions of dean is clear indication that he knowingly and voluntarily consented to the terms and conditions of the appointment, including the fixed period of his deanship. Other than the handwritten notes made in the letter of appointment, no evidence was ever presented to show that respondents consent was vitiated, or that respondent objected to the said appointment or to any of its conditions. Furthermore, in his status as dean, there can be no valid inference that he was shackled by any form of moral dominance exercised by AMA and the rest of the petitioners.

ROBERTO T. DOMONDON vs. NLRC, VAN MELLE PHILS., INC. and NIELS H.B. HAVEFACTS: VMPI, a manufacturing company engaged in the production and distribution of confectionaries and related products, hired petitioner RobertoDomondon on January 8, 1997 as Materials Manager through its then President and General Manager Victor M. Endaya. Petitioner claimed that things worked out well for him in the beginning until Endaya was transferred to China and was replaced by private respondent Have, a Dutch national. According to petitioner, private respondent Have immediately set a one-on-one meeting with him and requested his courtesy resignation. Alleging that the decision came from the Asia Regional Office, private respondent Have wanted to reorganize and put his people in management. Petitioner refused to resign and life got difficult for him. His decisions were always questioned by private respondent Have. He was subjected to verbal abuse. His competence was undermined by baseless and derogatory memos, which lay the bases for his removal from the company. He also did not receive his 14thmonth pay.Petitioner alleges that private respondent Have informed petitioner that things would get more difficult for him if he does not resign. Private respondent Have threw a veiled threat at petitioner to the effect that a dignified resignation would be infinitely better than being fired for a fabricated lawful cause. Private respondent Have offered financial assistance if petitioner would leave peacefully but the offer must be accepted immediately or it would be withdrawn. Thus, petitioner signed a ready-made resignation letter without deliberation and evaluation of the consequences. On their part, private respondents maintained that with his educational and professional background, petitioner could not have been coerced and intimidated into resigning from the company. Instead, they claimed that he voluntarily resigned to embark on management consultancy in the field of strategic planning and import/export.They stated that petitioner informed them about his intention to resign and requested a soft landing financial support in the amount of three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos on top of accrued benefits due him upon resignation. Private respondents granted the request. Subsequently, however, petitioner proposed the transfer of ownership of the car assigned to him in lieu of the financial assistance from the company. Since company policy prohibits disposition of assets without valuable consideration, the parties agreed that petitioner shall pay for the car with theP300, 000.00 soft landing financial assistance from private respondent VMPI.Private respondents averred that petitioner, who was then in charge of the disposition of the assets of the company, effected the registration of the car in his name. P300,000.00 was credited to petitioners payroll accountbut he did not use it to pay for the car as agreed upon. Repeated demands for payment were unheeded. Private respondent VMPI gave petitioner an option to apply theP169,368.32 total cash conversion of his sick and vacation leave credits, 13thand 14thmonths pay less taxes as partialpayment for the car and pay the balance ofP130,631.68, orreturn the car to the company.Petitioner did not exercise either option. Instead, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondents.ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the question on the transfer of ownership of the car assigned to petitioner.RULING: This is not an issue of first impression. The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is provided underArticle 217(a)of theLabor Code. In all those instances, the matrix is the existence of an employer-employee relationship. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner is an employee of the respondents. Petitioner claims illegal dismissal and prays for reinstatement, payment of full backwages inclusive of allowances, 14thmonth pay, sick and vacation leaves, share in the profits, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. These causes of action clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, specifically under paragraphs 2,3 and 4 of Article 217(a). On the other hand, private respondents made a counterclaim involving the transfer of ownership of a company car to petitioner. They maintain that he failed to pay for the car in accordance with their agreement. The issue is whether this claim of private respondents arose from the employer-employee relationship of the parties pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article 217(a) under the general clause as quoted above.The records show that the initial agreement of the parties was that petitioner would be extended a soft-landing financial assistance in the amount ofP300,000.00 on top of his accrued benefits at the time of the effectivity of his resignation. However, petitioner later changed his mind. He requested that he be allowed to keep the car assigned to him in lieu of the financial assistance. However, company policy prohibits transfer of ownership of property without valuable consideration. Thus, the parties agreed that petitioner shall still be extended theP300,000.00 financial support, which he shall use to pay for the subject car. On July 30, 1998, private respondent VMPI deposited the agreed amount in petitioners account.Despite having registered the car in his name and repeated demands from private respondents, petitioner failed to pay for it as agreed upon. Petitioner did not also return the car. Without doubt, the transfer of the ownership of the company car to petitioner is connected with his resignation and arose out of the parties employer-employee relations. Accordingly, private respondents claim for damages falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON,petitioners,vs.GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC.,Respondent.

FACTS:Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative.Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area. Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid. Aggrieved, Tecson filed aPetition for Reviewwith the Court of Appeals assailing the NCMBDecision. The Court of Appeals denied thePetition for Review. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid.

RULING: YES.Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority.Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.The only exception occurs when the statein any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct.Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms part of respondents Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith." He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy.

G.R. No. 170054 : January 21, 2013GOYA, INC.,Petitioner,v.GOYA, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW,Respondent.Facts:Goya, Inc. hired contractual employees from PESO Resources Development Corporation (PESO) to perform temporary and occasional services in its factory. This prompted Goya, Inc. Employees Union-FFW (Union) to request for a grievance conference on the ground that the contractual workers do not belong to the categories of employees stipulated in the existing CBA.When the matter remained unresolved, the grievance was referred to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for voluntary arbitration.The Union asserted that the hiring of contractual employees from PESO is not a management prerogative and in gross violation of the CBA tantamount to ULP. It noted that the contractual workers engaged have been assigned to work in positions previously handled by regular workers and Union members, in effect violating Section 4, Article I of the CBA, which provides for three categories of employees in the Company. The categories of employees under the said provision of the CBA are: (a) Probationary Employee; (b) Regular Employee; and (c) Casual Employee. With the hiring of contractual employees, the Union contended that it would no longer have probationary and casual employees from which it could obtain additional Union members.In countering the Unions allegations, the Company argued, among others, that Section 4, Article I of the CBA merely provides for the definition of the categories of employees and does not put a limitation on the Companys right to engage the services of job contractors or its management prerogative to address temporary/occasional needs in its operation.VA Laguesma dismissed the Unions charge of ULP for being purely speculative and for lacking in factual basis, but the Company was directed to observe and comply with its commitment under the CBA. While the Union moved for partial reconsideration of the VA Decision, the Company immediately filed a petition for review before the CA to set aside the directive to observe and comply with the CBA commitment pertaining to the hiring of casual employees when necessitated by business circumstances. The CA dismissed the petition. Issue: WON Goya contract out from PESO in the exercise of its management prerogative despite the agreement in the CBA.Ruling:The CA did not commit serious error when it sustained the ruling that the hiring of contractual employees from PESO was not in keeping with the intent and spirit of the CBA. The Company kept on harping that both the VA and the CA conceded that its engagement of contractual workers from PESO was a valid exercise of management prerogative. It is confused. To emphasize, declaring that a particular act falls within the concept of management prerogative is significantly different from acknowledging that such act is a valid exercise thereof. What the VA and the CA correctly ruled was that the Companys act of contracting out/outsourcing is within the purview of management prerogative. Both did not say, however, that such act is a valid exercise thereof. Obviously, this is due to the recognition that the CBA provisions agreed upon by the Company and the Union delimit the free exercise of management prerogative pertaining to the hiring of contractual employees. Indeed, the VA opined that "the right of the management to outsource parts of its operations is not totally eliminated but is merely limited by the CBA," while the CA held that "this management prerogative of contracting out services, however, is not without limitation. x x x These categories of employees particularly with respect to casual employees serve as limitation to the Companys prerogative to outsource parts of its operations especially when hiring contractual employees."

Moreno vs San Sebastian CollegeFacts:SSC-R employed Moreno as a teaching fellow.In 2000,Morenowas appointed as a full-time college faculty member. Later on, she became a permanent faculty member. She was also offered the chairmanshipof the Business Finance and Accountancy Department of her college. However, it was later on discovered that Moreno had unauthorized teaching assignments at the CEU during the 1st sem of SY 2002-2003 and at the College of the Holy Spirit, Manila during SY 2000-2001 and SY 2001-2002 as well as during the 1st sem of SY 2002-2003. Said activities were violative of SSC-Rs Faculty Manual and were punishable by suspension or dismissal.Morenoreceived a memorandumfrom the Dean. In reply, she admitted her failure to secure any written permission before she taught in other schools. Morenofurther stated that it was never her intention to jeopardize her work in SSC-R and that she merely wanted to improve her familys poor financial conditions. A Special Grievance Committee was then formed which unanimously found that Moreno violated the prohibition against a full-time faculty having an unauthorized external teaching load. The majority of the grievance committee members recommendedMorenos dismissal from employment in accordance with the school manual, but Dean Espejo dissented and called only for a suspension for one semester. SSC-R adopted the findings and recommendations of the grievance committee and so, her employment was terminated.Morenothus instituted with the NLRC a complaint for illegal termination. LA dismissedMorenos complaint. NLRC reversed the rulings of the LA. However, the CA annulled the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the LA.Issue: WON Morenos termination is proper by strictly applying the provision of the Faculty Manual. Ruling:Even if dismissal for cause is the prescribed penalty for the misconduct herein committed, in accordance with the SSC-RFaculty ManualandMorenos employment contract, the Court finds the same to be disproportionate to the offense. Time and again, we have ruled that while an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees, those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction.Special circumstances were present in the case at bar which should have been properly taken into account in the imposition of the appropriate penalty.Moreno, in this case, had readily admitted her misconduct, which was undisputedly the first she has ever committed against the school.Her teaching abilities and administrative skills remained apparently unaffected by her external teaching engagements, as she was found by the grievance committee to be one of the better professors in the Accounting Departmentand she was even offered the Chairmanship of her college. Also, the fact thatMorenomerely wanted to alleviate her familys poor financial conditions is a justification that SSC-R failed to refute.SSC-R likewise failed to prove any resulting material damage or prejudice on its part as a consequence ofMorenos misconduct.The claim by SSC-R that the imposition of a lesser penalty would set a bad precedent for the other faculty members who comply with the school policies is too speculative for this Court to even consider. Finally, the Court notes that in Morenos contract of employment,one of the provisions therein categorically stated that should a violation of any of the terms and conditions thereof be committed, the penalty that will be imposed would either besuspension or dismissalfrom employment.Thus, contrary to its position from the beginning, SSC-R clearly had the discretion to impose a lighter penalty of suspension and was not at all compelled to dismissMorenounder the circumstances, just because theFaculty Manualsaid so.

Viernes vs NLRCFacts:Complainants services as meter readers were contracted for hardly a months duration, or from October 8 to 31, 1990.The said term notwithstanding, the complainants were allowed to work beyond October 31, 1990, or until January 2, 1991.On January 3, 1991, they were each served their identical notices of termination dated December 29, 1990. On the same date, the complainants filed separate complaints for ill