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Membership Participation and Parliamentary Representation: How Representative Are UK Parties?

Anika Gauja Department of Politics University of Cambridge

ag457@cam.ac.uk

ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 2007 Partisanship in Europe: Members, Activists and Identifiers

This paper presents research from the United Kingdom on the extent to which three political parties (Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party) operate as both forums for participation and representation in linking citizens with the state. I explore these functions through the prism of policy development, ascertaining the degree to which policy formulation processes enable the involvement of party members, and whether the parliamentary party is in fact responsive to party policy. In doing so, the paper critically evaluates the basic model of party organisation originally derived from the mass party model, but which is now widespread: party policy is ‘owned’ and formulated by the membership, adopted by the parliamentary party and applied to debate in the legislature to shape government policy. My findings indicate that although party type and size do make a difference to the formal participatory opportunities on offer, there is a basic trend amongst all parties that the transmission of policy from members to parliamentarians is disjointed, disrupting the linkage between participation and representation. This occurs for two main reasons: either that members do not participate in policy development in the first instance, and that party policy is in fact formulated by the party leadership and parliamentary party; or that ‘official’ party policy bears little relevance to the everyday work of the party’s elected representatives.

The analysis of political parties as representative and participatory institutions has taken a

pessimistic turn. Fuelled by widespread evidence of citizen disaffection and withdrawal

from parties, political scientists have questioned the ability of these organisations to

perform their function as mechanisms of ‘linkage’ between citizens and the state. Recent

studies suggest that political parties are no longer fulfilling their traditional roles as

vehicles for citizen participation and partisan representation, but rather are focussing their

efforts on the task of governance (Mair and van Biezen 2001; Mair 2005). What is

particularly interesting is that this view prevails despite parties’ efforts to democratise

their decision­making processes and to open up policy development to increasing

participation from the membership and the general public to achieve these two objectives:

to make parties more participatory and to ensure that their policies reflect the views of

their supporters.

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This paper presents research from the United Kingdom on the extent to which three

political parties (Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party) operate as both

forums for participation and representation. In particular, I explore these functions

through the prism of policy development, ascertaining the degree to which policy

formulation processes enable the involvement of party members, and whether the

parliamentary party is in fact responsive to party policy. In doing so, the paper critically

evaluates the basic model of party organisation originally derived from the mass party

model, but which is now widespread: party policy is ‘owned’ and formulated by the

membership, adopted by the parliamentary party and applied to debate in the legislature

to shape government policy. These three parties have been chosen because they ascribe to

this model of policy development – at least in their rules and rhetoric. However, their

diverse ideologies, size and legislative importance 1 provide three interesting variables for

comparison.

The research is predominantly qualitative ­ data and case studies have been collated from

a systematic analysis of party documents, biographies, commentaries and in­depth

interviews with party members, activists and elected representatives. After a brief

theoretical introduction, the paper analyses the participatory nature of party policy

development, contrasting formal structures with actual political practice. The

consequences of low rates of membership participation and the move to ‘outsourcing’

policy development are explored. Finally, I examine factors influencing the adoption of

party policy by the parliamentary party and its transferral to the legislature. My findings

indicate that although party type and size do make a difference to the formal participatory

opportunities on offer, there is a basic trend amongst all parties that the transmission of

policy from members to parliamentarians is disjointed, disrupting the linkage between

participation and representation. This occurs for two main reasons: either that members

do not participate in policy development in the first instance, and that party policy is in

1 Labour is currently the party of government; the Liberal Democrats are in opposition and are regarded as the ‘third party’ behind the Conservatives; the Greens are not represented in the House of Commons, although they are represented in local government and the European Parliament.

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fact formulated by the party leadership and parliamentary party; or that ‘official’ party

policy bears little relevance to the everyday work of the party’s elected representatives.

Political parties as participatory and representative institutions

Within modern representative democracies, political parties are a primary vehicle linking

citizens and the state. Although the concept of ‘linkage’ has been used in various ways by

political scientists, it can be most broadly conceived in Key’s (1967: 411) terms as ‘the

interplay…between mass opinion and government’ or as Wright (1971: 26) suggests,

playing the role ‘as intermediaries linking citizens with government’. Linkage is not a

function vested exclusively in parties, and organisations such as environmental groups

and community associations also actively assume this role. However, unlike such

associations that must rely on ‘external’ political strategies such as protest and lobbying

parliamentarians, a political party is the only organisation that can create an entire linkage

chain: from constituents and party members to candidates, elected representatives and to

government officials.

Linkage involves both the participation of citizens in politics and their representation by

political elites, but rather than treat these two concepts as distinct processes, Lawson

(1988: 14) argues that ‘it would make better sense, of course, to treat both participation

and representation as subsumed under “linkage” – links have two ends – and then to

explore the nature of the connection between the two’. This conception of linkage varies

significantly from that employed by Eulau and Prewitt (1973) in their study of the

relationship between local councillors and their constituents, in which linkage refers only

to acts of citizen participation in that relationship. Theoretically, participation occurs in

isolation, and is more or less divorced from the elite response to this participation, which

is provided by ‘representation’ (see Lawson 1988: 14). However, like Lawson, I argue

that it is crucial to explore the interplay between participation and representation in the

linkage chain. If citizen participation and elite representation are disconnected within the

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practices of parties, the link between citizens and the state is significantly weakened, if

not broken.

The concept can be usefully applied to the process of policy development and application

within political parties. In what Judge (1999: 71) refers to as an ‘idealised view of

responsible government’, membership participation should be translated into policy

outcomes in the following sequence: first, a party formulates a manifesto and/or policies

to present to voters at a general election with the maximum possible citizen/membership

participation; second, voters choose between parties on the basis of their manifestoes and

policies; and third, parties seek to translate their policies and platforms into policy

outcomes once they have gained parliamentary representation. This conception of

representation remains influential throughout the twentieth century, although it originated

from the mass­party phase that characterised electoral politics from the late nineteenth

century to the mid­twentieth century. In this model, political conflict occurs between

distinct social groups, each represented by a party with a clear and coherent ideological

programme. Elected politicians are bound to adhere to the party’s policies and

programme. In contrast to the freedom granted to (and expected from) parliamentarians

under a Burkean (trustee) model of representation, party discipline is regarded not only as

legitimate, but essential (Judge 1999: 71; Birch 1971: 97). As Katz and Mair (1995: 7)

note, the legitimacy of party discipline

Depends, in turn, on direct popular involvement in the formulation of the party programme

and, from an organizational perspective, this implies the need for an extensive membership

organization of branches or cells in order to provide for mass input into the party’s policy

making process, as well as for the supremacy of the extra­parliamentary party, particularly as

embodied in the party congress.

However, the transformation of party organisations from mass­parties to catch­all parties

(Kirchheimer 1966), to electoral­professional to cartel parties has, in the theoretical

literature, significantly altered this balance of representation. With the rise of

campaigning technologies and the decline of traditional social cleavages with their

polarising effect, elections are now contests between party leaders rather than between

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party programmes satisfying distinct social interests. Policy formulation has thus

increasingly become the task of the party leadership rather than that of the party’s

members, significantly challenging popular notions of the role of parties in contemporary

democracies.

The rhetoric and reality of membership participation

Regardless of this theoretical trajectory of change and adaptation, many parties still claim

to be organised in a manner consistent with the representative model of the mass party, in

that they provide a voice to the membership and the opportunity to influence policy. This

continues to be the case within social democratic parties that originated from this era (see

Labour’s Partnership in Power 2006; Campbell and Zeichner 2001; Hain 2004: 23). It is

also a basic feature of the organisation of green parties and liberal democratic parties that

they allow members to shape party policy, and to differing degrees, demand party

discipline and adherence to policy from their elected representatives.

Despite their diverse histories and ideologies, all the parties surveyed in this paper are

united by their common claim to foster membership participation in intra­party political

processes and to adhere to democratic decision­making within their organisations. New

Labour claims that ‘all members, local parties, affiliates as well as other party

stakeholders have the right to a direct say in the party’s policy development’ (Labour

Party 2007). In 1997 the party undertook significant organisational reforms designed to

‘democratise’ the party’s decision­making and policy formulation process. Since the

implementation of internal policy document Partnership in Power, the influence of the

party’s constituent unions has been downgraded and replaced by a policy process

‘designed to involve all party stakeholders (including members, local parties, trade

unions, socialist societies and Labour representatives) as well as the wider community’

(Labour Party 2006). Within this framework, members have unprecedented opportunities

‘to get involved in the party processes and debates…through a more deliberative and

extended procedure’ (Labour Party 1997).

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The Greens aspiration to grassroots democracy and the party’s emphasis on membership

participation, power sharing and consensus decision­making is a product of its broader

ideology. The party’s Statement of Core Principles declares that the Greens ‘emphasise

democratic participation and accountability by ensuring that decisions are taken at the

closest practical level to those affected by them’ (Principle 6). Direct participation is

regarded as ‘the highest form of democracy…All the major political decisions which

affect out lives should ideally be made with our active participation’ (Principles of

Government 102). Although the Greens do not exert significant electoral influence in

England, they claim that unlike the mainstream parties all motions adopted at party

conference with the direct participation of members become party policy (Faucher­King

2005: 20).

Finally, the Liberal Democrats have been regarded by party analysts as the most

democratic of the mainstream UK parties – offering significant opportunities for

membership participation when contrasted with Labour and the Conservatives (Webb

2000: 209; Ingle 1996: 130). All Liberal Democrat interviewees stressed the paramount

importance of the party conference (and thus the membership) as the sovereign policy­

making body in the party. The preamble to the party’s constitution reaffirms this

commitment: ‘we believe that people should be involved in running their communities.

We are determined to strengthen the democratic process’.

Forms of participation: a critical analysis

Notwithstanding the official rhetoric of the parties, in evaluating participation it is

necessary to ascertain who participates in the policy formulation process (for example

party members, members of the public, party elites etc.), the extent to which they

participate, and the effectiveness of that participation. As Cross (2004: 7) notes, a

consideration of participation should focus on the ‘quality of participatory opportunities

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and the connection between citizens’ participation and outcomes. Even fully inclusive

participation is meaningless if it has no identifiable effect on outcomes’.

The policy­making process of all the parties in this study tends to follow a typical model:

policy is developed over a number of months by working groups or commissions with the

input of members and interested parties before being voted on at party conference for

inclusion as ‘official’ party policy. Hence, membership participation can occur in two

main arenas: during the development process by being a member of or consulting with a

working group; or voting attendance at conference. However, as this section illustrates,

there are significant variations in the level of ‘direct’ involvement that party members can

actually have in these processes.

Involvement in policy oversight / representative bodies and working groups

Akin to the policy working groups of the Green Party and the Liberal Democrats, policy

formulation in the New Labour is driven by a series of policy commissions, overseen by

two bodies – the National Policy Forum (NPF) and the Joint Policy Committee (JPC).

The JPC is the chief political organ supervising policy­making in the party and is

designed to provide ‘a link with all sections of the party, steering the NPF’s work and

setting priorities and debates’ (Labour Party 2006: 4). It is chaired by the Prime Minister

and comprises primarily party elites (the leadership, government representatives and

members of the party executive). There are only very limited places available to members

(less than 25%), who are appointed only after being elected to the NPF. The NPF is the

representative body that oversees the policy process and that draws together the

documents produced by the policy commissions and consultations for conference. The

NPF consists of 184 representatives elected from various sections of the party, each

section being given a set number of places on the NPF. Members of constituency parties

account for 55 places (30%) and are elected to the NPF by delegates at Annual

Conference, although ‘many obstacles face ordinary members trying to get elected to the

forum’, for example, campaigns run by the party leadership for the election of particular

‘endorsed’ candidates at conferences (NEC/NPF member).

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Given the composition of these supervisory bodies and the limited number of places

given to the membership, direct participation is very limited. The situation is similar

within individual policy commissions, which are composed of 16­20 people also

recruited from the government, the NEC and the NPF. Thus, the legitimacy of these

bodies rests on their representative nature rather than the opportunities they offer to

members for direct involvement. However, the sheer size of the NPF coupled with the

fact that it only meets twice a year, poses a challenge to its ability to act as an effective

coordinator of policy, highlighting one of the important tensions faced by parties in trying

to balance membership influence with the need for an effective, responsive and efficient

policy development process.

There are greater formal opportunities for direct membership participation within the

Liberal Democrats. Although the agenda of the Liberal Democrat conference is tightly

controlled by the conference organisers, members have the option of submitting policy

motions and amendments direct to conference provided they have the approval of a

minimum of ten signatories. Members with a particular interest in a specific area of

policy may apply to join a policy working group (similar to Labour’s policy

commissions), a body that under the remit of the Federal Policy Committee (FPC)

undertakes a consultative process and drafts a policy paper to be presented at conference.

Membership of these working groups is approximately 10­12 people who are all

appointed by the FPC. They will usually comprise members of the party, one FPC

representative, two MPs and will occasionally include ‘interested others’ – those who are

experts in a particular field but are not members of the Liberal Democrats or any other

political party.

There is the potential that selection to a working group could become an arbitrary process

with the FPC exercising a significant amount of power by vetting the composition of

these groups. However, according to those involved in the FPC, the selection process is

not designed to be exclusionary but aims to achieve a representative group with a balance

of expertise, gender, race and region. In previous years there has been a distinct emphasis

on obtaining expertise within the working groups, and this is a move that is also being

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advocated within the Labour Party (see Hain 2004: 29­30). However, this has caused

difficulties for the Liberal Democrats in that policy discussion and consultation

documents have a tendency to become technical rather than political, often

incomprehensible to the ordinary member and voter.

The significant factor guiding the pattern of formal participation in these parties is the

size of the membership that must be accommodated. In theory, it is far easier to facilitate

greater membership participation in parties with fewer members (Barber 1984: 151;

Sartori 1987: 113). This is illustrated by the formal policy process of the Green Party of

England and Wales, which has a much smaller membership compared to Labour and the

Liberal Democrats – the Greens have only 6,000 members at present whereas Labour

have approximately 200,000 and the Liberal Democrats have 72,000 2 . Again the policy

process follows a similar pattern to the other parties, being formulated by policy working

groups in consultation with members and interested parties, before being approved at

conference. However, the key difference here is that the composition of these working

groups is entirely ‘self­selecting’: they must simply be composed of four members of the

party and the general practice is that a group interested in a particular policy area will

form of its own volition. Besides the work of policy groups, members may submit policy

motions direct to conference with the support of four signatories.

Members may also participate directly in the adoption of policy by conference. Unlike

the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats, whose conference delegates must be elected,

participation in conference votes is open to any Green Party member who simply shows

up. One executive member described this as ‘a simple process for a conference; it means

that people who listen to the debates are voting…It stops a certain kind of politicking

which is the kind of politicking where people go to the conference with large numbers of

votes in their pockets’. However, the process is also rather exclusionary: ‘if you think

about it, it’s not very democratic. Those who are voting are those with all the time,

money and energy to go to conference’.

2 Approximate membership numbers were obtained from interviews.

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Policy Consultations

Membership participation in the formal policy process of the Labour Party is restricted

mainly to policy consultations, which the party believes have generally been well

received by its members: ‘nearly 4,000 submissions from local parties (including two

thirds of all constituency parties), affiliates and community groups were made in the last

round of policy making with many thousands of party members taking part’ (Labour

2006: 2). Consultation with the membership and wider community consists of ‘“Big

Conversation” style events, holding phone conferences with members of the policy

commissions and those party units making policy submissions, sending regular email

updates and hosting web chats’ (Labour 2006: 3). The party also stages local and regional

policy forums, where members are invited to attend and contribute to discussion with a

view to making a policy submission to one of the policy commissions.

Despite academic commentary questioning the true inclusiveness of New Labour’s policy

processes and their contribution to the centralisation of the party organisation (Shaw

2004: 58; Webb 2000: 201), Labour parliamentarians have generally looked upon the

policy process as ‘encouraging participation, high­quality discussion and robust policy’

(Faucher­King 2006: 9; Cook 2001, cited in Shaw 2004). Whilst these forums and groups

may allow more opportunities for those who wish to participate, their legitimacy as a

means by which to aggregate the members’ views and the range of opinions within the

party is undercut by low rates of participation (see discussion below).

The main criticism of these processes from party members has been the lack of

acknowledgement (or even certainty) that their views have been heard and taken into

account. As one member argued, ‘what we say has to have an effect or we’re just

whistling in the dark. We need to be convinced that some difference will be made in

major policy decisions’ (quoted in Campbell and Zeichner 2001: 17). Another

commented that the policy process ‘is not particularly transparent from a member’s point

of view. It would be nice to say that this particular element of the final document is a

result of something which we said at this policy forum. That would actually do an awful

lot to build confidence in the whole process’ (quoted in Hain 2004: 31).

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The problem is due, in part, to a lack of resources – the party simply does not have

enough staff to monitor the progress of each individual submission. More fundamentally,

it is a question of how to and who decides which submissions and comments should be

included in consultation documents and debates. Currently this task is undertaken by

Policy Unit staff. Individual members of policy commissions have admitted that it is a

problem with no easy answer; there is a real danger that the process of selection can fall

under the control of ministerial members of the commissions who have the staff and

resources to draft policy papers, with the task of non­government members ‘just to

comment on and approve these drafts’ (Russell 2005: 148).

Party conference

Over the years, party conferences have become significant media events and the

centrepiece of many party calendars. They are now events where public exposure and

press coverage have become just as important, if not more important than policy debate.

Nonetheless, a great deal of emphasis continues to be placed on the ‘sovereignty’ of the

party conference as the owner of party policy. This section of the paper briefly evaluates

just how participatory and representative party conferences are, with particular focus on

the Liberal Democrats.

The formal process of policy­making as outlined in the party’s constitution establishes a

representative democratic link between the final policy adopted and the party’s

membership, primarily through the mechanism of the party conference (Articles 5.8, 6.7).

Each local party elects representatives (based on their membership size) to attend

conference on their behalf (Article 6.3). This figure typically represents around 2­4% of

the local party’s members (Article 6.2). In this sense conference can be described as

representative. If a local party is unhappy with its elected conference representative, they

can simply refuse to endorse him/her at the next conference.

However, there are several elements of actual political practice that complicate this

representative relationship. Although representatives are formally accountable to their

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local parties through having to be endorsed to attend conference, in reality very few

members actually want to take on the responsibility of conference representative and in

relatively few local parties are these positions seriously contested. Again, it is a symptom

of low rates of participation in intra­party activities that a core group of activists

undertake most of the functions in a local party. Whilst attendance at Liberal Democrat

conferences has risen to about 5,000, only 1,600­1,900 of these places are filled by voting

delegates (a large number of registrations are accounted for by media organisations and

external observers). On average, there are about 900 voting representative places that are

not filled.

It is usual practice for policy papers to be circulated to local groups and members in the

months leading up to the conference (Liberal Democrats 2006: 10­11). In theory

conference delegates are then supposed to ‘debate the issues coming up on the conference

agenda within their local parties over the months running up to the conference’

(Hargreaves 2004: 26). However, ‘delegates actively holding discussion meetings with

others in their local party to discuss the agenda before the conference is also something

which does not happen in practice as often as in principle it might…Reading policy

papers properly is, shall we say, a practice honoured more in the breach than in the

observance’ (Hargreaves 2004: 27­8). Those representatives who actually read the policy

papers in detail before conference are a minority.

The lack of debate and preparation for conference has the potential to undermine the

event as the supreme forum for policy­making, particularly if the conference

representatives lack the necessary information for making an informed choice on policy.

In this case, much rests on the quality of conference debates and speakers, which varies

from topic to topic and conference to conference. Given that the average debate at

conference lasts 2­3 hours, it would be difficult to imagine that conference could achieve

anything more substantial than a ratification or rejection of a policy motion or

amendment. It is also important to note that Liberal Democrat conference representatives

are representative in a Burkean sense; they are not delegates of local parties and cannot

be mandated to vote in any particular way.

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Although it is theoretically open to members to submit policy motions and amendments

to party conferences, this mechanism of participation is subject to a vigorous vetting

process given the very limited time period of each party conference, which typically lasts

from three to six days. For example, the Liberal Democrats usually have nine days of

conference per year; during which time a maximum of 21­25 policy motions and

amendments can workably be debated and voted on. The bulk of available time and space

is devoted to the discussion of policy papers formulated by the Federal Policy

Committee, leaving space for only 14­16 motions submitted by members to be debated

and voted on. As one party staffer explained, ‘you only really have time for one big row’,

which is in practice typically decided by the Federal Conference Committee (an arm of

the party’s executive).

Levels of Membership Participation

Whilst party size may have an impact on the extent of the formal participatory

opportunities available, there is less difference in the degree of participation that actually

occurs. The general trend across all party types surveyed is that no matter how easy it is

for members to participate in the policy process of their respective parties, only a small

percentage of the membership actually become actively involved. The table below (Table

1) presents an amalgam of the published findings of several surveys of party members in

the UK conducted between 1993 and 2003 on the level of membership activity and

attendance at party meetings.

Even though slightly different measures of party activity were used in the survey of

Green Party members (and consequently there is not an exact correspondence in the data)

the table nonetheless reveals several important trends common to all parties. First, those

members who are active within the parties (with the exception of the Greens) constitute a

minority. In particular, those who are very active and are therefore most likely to have the

greatest direct input into policy development only constitute on average about 9 per cent

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of the membership. The fact that there is a ‘core’ group of activists in each party who

basically run the party organisation on an everyday basis is supported by comments from

interviewees, although there was a general consensus that the figure may even be lower

(5­7 per cent).

Table 1: Comparative Membership Participation in UK Parties (Greens, Liberal Democrats, Labour) 1990­2003

Greens 2002­03

Lib Dems 1993

Lib Dems 1999

Labour 1990

Labour 1997

Labour 1999

Party Activity Members hold function 18 Very active 9 26 10 8 8 Fairly active 29 20 19 17 Somewhat active 34 Not very active 32 41 42 35 Not active 40 Not at all active 13 29 31 40 Frequently attend party meetings

19 37 20 30 19 18

Occasionally attend party meetings

11 11 20 10 12

Rarely attend party meetings

24 17 14 16 9

Do not attend party meetings

29 53 36 54 61

Sources: European Green Parties Membership Survey 2002­03 (coordinated by Wolfgang Rüdig); van Schuur (2005: 12); Vromen (2006); Bennie et al (1996); Whiteley et al (2006: 44); Seyd and Whiteley (2002: 79, 88).

If we include the Greens’ members who hold a function within the party, the rate of

active participation rises significantly in contrast to the other two parties. This may, in

part, be explained by green ideology, which encourages power­sharing amongst the

membership. However, it may also be due to the party’s relatively small size and lack of

financial resources, which means that direct participation is not only easier, but that

members continue to be employed as a labour resource more so than in Labour and the

Liberal Democrats.

The number of members attending party meetings has dropped for both the Liberal

Democrats and Labour and now frequent attendance is now roughly the same for all three

parties (19%). Unless members are now electing to participate individually rather than

through their constituency party, their contribution to and engagement with the policy­

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making process will also have declined. In both the Liberal Democrats and Labour the

constituency branch is still a key organisational unit in policy development: submissions

to working groups come from branches, and it is this unit of organisation that elects

representatives to party conference. Hence, notwithstanding the implications of May’s

law, the fundamental problem posed by low attendance and rates of participation, from a

democratic perspective, is that only a very small pool of interests are actually heard and

taken into account in the policy development process.

Also concerning is the significant downward trend in membership activity within both the

Liberal Democrats the Labour Party, even after the latter modernised and democratised

its party processes in 1997. As a consequence of this decline, both parties have turned to

online technologies to encourage participation from members, in addition to opening up

policy development to input from the broader public (see below). Several local parties

also have in place initiatives such as guest speakers and politics and pizza nights,

designed to encourage greater participation in party meetings and activities.

The pattern of inactivity is reiterated in a survey of party members recently conducted as

part of an internal commission on Labour democracy. 3 It revealed that despite the

opportunities available to them, almost half the current members had never participated

in the party’s policy­making forums (see Table 2). When ordinary members did

participate, it tended to take place at the local level. Whilst 44% of members had attended

a local policy forum, only 4% had attended a meeting of the National Policy Forum. The

absence of members from this forum in addition to the lack of transparency in policy

consultations adds weight to the allegation that policy is formulated behind ‘closed

doors’.

3 The survey was conducted on a sample of 670 current Labour Party members and 704 former party members by the polling organization YouGov between June 1 and 6, 2006. Results of the poll can be accessed online at http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/MBC060101003_2.pdf.

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Table 2: Labour Party members’ participation in policy­making forums June 2006 Policy forum Percentage of members participating Local policy forum 44 Annual, national or regional party conference 28 Regional policy forum 20 National policy forum 4 None of these 47 Source: YouGov (2006).

Members’ attitudes towards inclusiveness in Labour policy­making indicated a strong

belief that the process had become more centralised, and that the ‘real’ power lay within

Downing Street. Although members did participate in local forums, this participation

does not seem to be regarded by the membership as effective, as 56% of current members

still felt that Labour’s election manifesto policies were essentially decided by the Prime

Minister and his allies, with some input from policy committees. Whilst 96% of current

members felt that local party members should have either some or a great deal of

influence over policy, 64% of current members and 81% of former members surveyed

believed that the party leadership did not trust members sufficiently to involve them fully

in party decision and policy making.

The low rate of participation in party policy­making activities is not just limited to the

membership – it also extends to a party’s elected representatives. One reason for this may

simply be the pressures of time – parliamentary duties do not leave much opportunity to

feed into the party’s formal policy processes. However, Labour MP Tom Watson is much

more critical of the muted participation of elected representatives to the party’s National

Policy Forum. Commenting on the most recently scheduled meeting, he argued:

Less than 75 members and only a couple of cabinet ministers attended this weekend’s policy

forum. The National Policy Forum was meant to bring senior ministers and party

representatives together to discuss policy on a very detailed level. With nearly half the

members and more than three quarters of the Cabinet not turning up, it suggests very strongly

that something is not working (Watson 2007).

Indeed, given that the NPF is designed to be the representative body overseeing Labour’s

policy process, low participation questions the legitimacy of this body and undermines

the democratic nature of the policy process. It also creates opportunities for policy

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formulation to be dominated by a small, active section of each party. As one Liberal

Democrat staffer tellingly suggested: ‘so much in politics is done by those who just show

up’.

Outsourcing policy development

Given the low rates of participation in traditional forums for policy debate, all major UK

parties have turned to the Internet as a means by which to engage party members.

However, there has also been a trend to open up policy consultations to the wider

community, thereby removing (in part) what was once the privilege of party members

and which signals a key tension inherent in internally democratic parties between

balancing the views of party members with that of party voters and the wider

‘community’. Rather than acting as partisan institutions representing a particular section

of the electorate (or relying on their members to represent the views of their supporters),

political parties are now increasingly seen as organisations trying to capture the ‘median

voter’ – appealing to as much of the electorate as possible.

Liberal Democrats leader, Sir Menzies Campbell, introduced the Liberal Democrats

public consultation as demonstrating the party’s commitment to, and regard for, the

broader British public:

Politics in Britain has got to change. We’ve got to get rid of this feeling that somehow

politicians and the public are miles apart. And one of the best ways of doing that is by

allowing the public, who may not necessarily be members of our party, to take part in a

policy consultation, to express their views, to disagree with the views of others so that we can

demonstrate that as a party we are open­minded and we’re accessible. Politics is too

important to be left to the politicians (Liberal Democrats 2006: online video stream).

Launching the Labour Party’s latest consultation initiative, ‘Let’s Talk’, Prime Minister

Tony Blair called for policy debate to be ‘open, frank and engage public as well as party.

The most effective politics today is not tribal. It is issues based’ (The Guardian 15 May

18

2006). Blair has called on the party ‘to accept new forms of delivery, and to embrace and

harness ideas from outside opinion­formers and “stakeholders”’ (The Guardian 15 May

2006). It is a move that has widely been supported by the Parliamentary Labour Party as

an ‘opportunity not just of addressing the party – important though that is – but of

engaging with the wider public (MPs Alan Milburn and Charles Clarke; The Guardian

Wednesday 28 February 2007, p. 2). It is less certain whether the move to open up

consultation is supported by Labour’s grassroots. Party activists have argued that the

measures are a further attempt to marginalise the views of the membership and reduce the

power of the party Conference. ‘Stakeholders’ included in the current round of policy

discussions include Microsoft, the Red Cross, the National Consumer Council and the

Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Associations. Members of the general

public are also invited to contribute to policy discussions in an online forum on the

party’s website (http://www.labour.org.uk/letstalk). The response to this online initiative

has been lukewarm: in the first four months of the site’s operation only 343 blogs had

been posted by the public for issues open to debate. 4 Further, opportunities for

participation are rather limited as comments are restricted to answering set questions on

pre­defined policy areas. The site’s effectiveness is compromised by the fact that

discussion is initiated and controlled by the party organisation. For example, during the

lifetime of ‘The Big Conversation’ website (Let’s Talk’s predecessor) no comments

appeared on the government’s involvement in the Iraq war, despite numerous attempts by

citizens to post them online or text message them for inclusion (The Guardian 18

November 2006).

In addition to its broader consultation programme, Labour recently initiated a focus group

of around 60 citizens to elicit public opinion on the provision of public services. Former

advisor to Tony Blair, Mathew Taylor, described the consultative processes as ‘at the

cutting edge of genuine public engagement’ (The Guardian 3 March 2007, p. 32). In a

statement emphasising the transparency of the focus groups, Taylor argued that the

participants were not ‘a hand­picked group of cheerleaders for New Labour reform but a

4 The online response rate was as follows: family matters (102 comments), public health (142 comments), cycling (99 comments).

19

genuine cross­section of the population…If the participants disagree with public policy, it

will happen in public’ (The Guardian 3 March 2007, p. 32). To the end that such

consultations encourage a wider and more representative linkage with society, they may

contribute positively to democratic debate in the UK. The process is also designed to be

reciprocal: rather than ministers simply listening to (or being seen to listen to) the views

of citizens; the consultation is intended to give the public a greater idea of the difficulties

and complexities faced by government decision­makers. Tony Blair has argued that too

many people thought government said ‘no to people for completely perverse reasons, just

trying to make a hash of things for the sake of it, which is almost the way I think that the

public debate, certainly media debate, tends to go at times’ (The Guardian Sat 3 March

2007, p. 15).

Nonetheless, in by­passing the usual avenues for party policy consultation, the move to

individual participation through focus groups reduces the influence of the membership

and may act to concentrate power in the hands of the party in public office (Katz & Mair

2002), as focus group findings (taken to be representative of public opinion) are fed

straight through to the party leadership. Consultations such as this also tend to blur the

distinction in policy­making between parties and governments. Labour’s experience

suggests that once a party assumes a position of government, it is easier for the leadership

to argue that policies are formulated and executed for the population as a whole; rather

than as a function of partisan representation. Signalling the potential for policy

disagreement within the party, Partnership in Power draws a specific distinction between

the activities of New Labour as a political party, and New Labour as a party of

government. Debate within the party ‘needs to rest on a clear understanding, and

acceptance, of the respective roles and responsibilities of the party on one hand and of the

government on the other’ (Labour Party 1997). This distinction is important as it carries a

strong implication that the objectives and priorities of the Labour Party diverge from that

of the Labour government.

20

Transferring Party Policy to the Legislative Arena

Evaluating the extent to which groups and individuals are able to influence a party’s

internal policy and decision making processes is a good indicator of the responsiveness

and in turn representativeness of a political party, assuming one crucial factor: that the

political direction and policy determined by the party is actually translated into legislative

outcomes. It is in this context that the role of the party in public office is paramount: what

good is party policy that has been formulated with the maximum participation of party

members and/or citizens if it is not applied within the parliamentary arena? In this section

of the paper I examine several factors that impact upon this transmission: the

involvement of MPs in the formal policy­making process of the party, the representative

attitudes of parliamentarians and the everyday working mode of the parliamentary party.

The involvement of a party’s elected representatives in the formal policy­making process

is essential in developing a good working relationship between the membership and the

party in public office. Nonetheless, parties need to strike a balance: too much

involvement leaves the party open to criticism that its policies are simply formulated by

the leadership rather than the membership. Too little involvement can produce a policy

that is politically naive, and can create tensions between the two arms of the party if MPs

feel they are being mandated by the extra­parliamentary organisation.

For example, the formal structure of the Liberal Democrats policy process suggests that

policy­making within the party is largely controlled by the party organisation, with the

two most influential groups being the FPC and the FCC. The party’s constitution does not

codify the parliamentary party’s involvement in the process, which may result in

difficulties if MPs become too far removed from policy formulation. Nonetheless, the

actual working culture of the party has sought to include MPs in policy development in

several ways. First, it is routine for MPs to be included as members of the FPC and the

party’s policy working groups. Generally, a working group will include the relevant

parliamentary spokesperson for that particular area of policy. If the parliamentarian is not

directly involved in the group, they will at the very least be copied into all

21

correspondence and his/her researchers are likely to be active members of the group

(Interview with FPC member). During the period of policy development where the

working group collects evidence and undertakes consultations, members of the

parliamentary party are expected to feed into the discussion and present their views.

However, the level of input from MPs will vary considerably depending on how

committed each individual member is to his/her portfolio (Interview with FPC member).

Once a policy paper has been produced by a working group, it goes to the Parliamentary

Party and the Shadow Cabinet for discussion before it is finally adopted by the FPC as

the policy that will go to conference. Although the party describes the role of MPs here as

one of providing ‘comment’ (Liberal Democrats 2006: 10), in reality this is more of a

veto power:

The policy process is theoretically the prerogative of the party policy committee out of the

conference. But in fact, it is negotiated between the parliamentarians and the policy

committee. At the end of the day, the policy committee have the say, but there’s an intent to

make sure that the MPs are in accord. We’re the people that are going to have to deliver the

message and if we don’t believe it’s credible, then it’s wrong (Liberal Democrat MP; quoted

in Russell and Fieldhouse 2005: 65).

Thus the transition of policy from party to parliament is likely to be ‘smoother’ if MPs

are actively involved. To the extent that there is congruity between party policy and that

advocated by the party’s MPs in Westminster, it may in part be explained by the

relatively high level of control that the parliamentary party exercises in policy­making.

However, the reverse situation can also cause tensions within the party if MPs are seen to

control policy­making by default. There are inevitably some areas of policy where it is

unrealistic for parties in public office to consult their membership, for example, responses

to terrorism and national security. Political parties, whether in government or opposition,

must also respond quickly to topical debates in the legislature and due to the cumbersome

nature of internally democratic policy­making, official policy processes are often side­

stepped by the parliamentary party. Furthermore, most MPs, regardless of whether they

22

are Labour, Liberal Democrat or Conservative members, share a common conception of

their roles as ‘independent’ legislators. As Burnell argues (1980: 14, cited in Judge 1999:

65), ‘they see themselves as representatives very much as defined by Burke: they claim

the right to exercise their individual judgement, and on that basis to treat the Party’s

Election Manifesto and Programme as little more than advisory’.

However, in contrast to this Burkean ideal of parliamentary representation, Labour

parliamentarians are expected to vote under the guidance of the party whip. The

discipline expected of MPs was made perfectly clear by Tony Blair in the first meeting of

his Parliamentary Labour Party: ‘by all means, speak your mind but remember what you

were sent here to do’ (quoted in Cowley et. al. 2001: 92). According to the Labour model

of representation, MPs primarily act as representatives of the party. Yet, despite the

party’s claim to being internally democratic, this does not necessarily mean that MPs are

representative of the party on the ground as party policy is heavily influenced by the

party leadership. For example, a YouGov poll of Labour members during the 2006

education debate revealed that rebel MPs positions on the legislation were actually closer

to the views of the membership than the Labour frontbench (UK Polling Report 13 March

2006).

Who then, are the represented? Essentially, it is those citizens that the Labour leadership

deems it necessary to represent. To the extent that parliamentarians are agents of the

electorate as a whole, this is not determined by their own voices, but by the PM and

Cabinet. Despite the Burkean ideals of representative democracy and the democratic

rhetoric of the Labour party, this model of representation most closely resembles the

conception of democracy articulated by (Schattschneider 1942: 59) as competition

between alliances of leaders rather than organizations of citizens or trustees of the

electorate.

Former Chairman of the NPF and Labour MP, Peter Hain, has suggested that ‘current

government policy­making is poorly integrated with the party’s own deliberations’ (2004:

26). Indeed, since New Labour came to power there have been several instances where

23

the government has proposed policy not previously approved by the membership. The

debate surrounding foundation hospitals and Labour’s health policy during 2002 and

tuition fees provide excellent examples (see Campbell and Zeichner 2001). As Hain

(2004: 25) notes, ‘the fact that the policy had not received prior endorsement from the

party exacerbated the resulting controversy. Only belatedly was the policy explained with

reference to core Labour values…following widespread disquiet among the membership’.

Although this situation might arise more often when a party is in government rather than

opposition, the Liberal Democrats have experienced similar problems when the

parliamentary party has been required to respond to issues on which party policy is

outdated (for example post office reform). One party staffer argued that although the

‘parliamentary party should always be taking decisions that are consistent with our

principles’, arguments about detail necessarily ensue and party activists get ‘very

frustrated’ when ‘the party announces a whole load of policies as if they’ve been passed

by the conference’. Nonetheless, many interviewees were hard pressed to think of

specific situations where the parliamentary party’s stance on a particular issue caused

significant conflict with the membership.

Rather than downplay its existence, the Liberal Democrats recognise the informal role

MPs play in policy development through encouraging what it terms ‘initiatives of the

parliamentary party’. Although not regarded as official policy, these documents are

accorded a semi­official status within the party – their purpose is to ‘flesh out the fine

detail of policy, to present existing policy in a new context or to stimulate new ideas for

debate within and outside the party’ (Liberal Democrats 2006: 6). For example,

parliamentarians can publish what are referred to as ‘topical papers’ or ‘spokesperson’s

papers’. Although they must be in line with existing Lib Dem principles, the papers are

essentially the property of MPs, and are drawn up using the parliamentarian’s own

resources and not in consultation with the FPC. The responsible MP should discuss and

give advance notice of the paper to the Policy Research Unit to ensure that such papers

‘are not proposing substantially altered policy in such a way that it may be taken as

official party policy’ (Liberal Democrats 2006: 6).

24

Even the Green Party, which is significantly smaller and does not have representation in

the House of Commons, is not immune to these pressures although the extent to which it

attracts the negative attention of the media may be less. As the party’s Policy

Development Coordinator commented,

We have this great book of policy, but our elected representatives and our press officers have

to react to what’s going on today. And that’s rather different from picking stuff out of a book.

Now quite often it is obvious how you should respond – we’ve got a broad line mapped out –

but sometimes things are a bit more difficult and a bit more problematic.

To deal with these situations, the party has informally created a body, the ‘political

committee’, consisting of the party’s elites and senior elected local and regional

representatives. This committee will ‘bat it about, often by email, just to deal with the

stuff that’s around at the time’, and consequently develop what is called within the party

‘secondary policy’.

Therefore, we can discern from actual political practice that there are typically two

streams of policy­making in political parties. A formal process led by the party

organisation and ‘owned’ by the membership, and a second more ad­hoc process led by

the parliamentary party. Clearly this practice raises questions over the mechanism of

linkage between citizens and elites and the representative nature of the party’s internal

policy process if policy decisions are ultimately taken ‘on the run’ by the parliamentary

party.

Conclusion

Do the parties surveyed in this paper fulfil their functions as vehicles for participation and

representation, providing a link between citizens and the state? Labour, the Liberal

Democrats and the Greens maintain a strong formal commitment to membership

participation and influence in the development of party policy and follow a basic model

25

whereby members can get involved in the drafting of policy and its adoption at party

conferences. However, upon closer analysis the opportunities for participation vary

significantly between the parties surveyed. The size of a party in an important factor – in

a large party such as Labour, direct participation is very limited and members must rely

on providing input through policy consultations. Within a small party (the Greens), policy

is basically developed and determined by those members who simply show up.

However, no matter the size of the party, the legitimacy of these participatory processes

is plagued by the low rates of turnout and participation that actually occur. Very few

party members attend party meetings and only a minority are active within each party –

leaving the policy process vulnerable to ‘over­represent’ the interests of those who

actually do take part. This trend also accentuates the influence of the bodies responsible

for overseeing the policy process, which are composed primarily of party elites. The lack

of participation also carries through to party conferences, as the Liberal Democrat case

illustrates. A significant proportion of local party representatives do not attend, and those

who do are often not well informed. Membership involvement in policy development

through conference therefore comes down to either rejecting or adopting pre­determined

policy papers after two to three hours of speeches and debates.

To encourage greater participation in policy processes, New Labour and the Liberal

Democrats have turned to wider public consultations, utilising online technologies.

Although it is a relatively recent practice and thus the full effects are difficult to predict

and analyse, this trend to outsourcing participation marks an interesting departure from

the tradition of keeping policy formulation primarily within the party. The advantage of

the process is the inclusion and aggregation of a greater range of interests in the absence

of active membership participation. However, consultation processes have been met with

criticism from Labour activists who believe they are being used to replace the input from

party members. So we see that representation has shifted from a function of partisanship,

to a more electorally inclusive strategy. Finally, the link between participation and

representation in political parties needs to be reconsidered to accommodate the

independence of the parliamentary party and its centrality in policy­making. Where there

26

is congruity between party policy and legislative behaviour it is achieved either because

the policy development process of a given party is dominated by the party leadership, or

that the body of policy developed by the membership bears limited relevance to the

specifics of what is actually being debated in parliament. In this situation, the

parliamentary party relies on its own ad hoc policy­making, and in most cases any

potential conflict between party policy and legislative behaviour is therefore eliminated.

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