language and nonlinguistic thinking

of 34 Language and non-linguistic thinking

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The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary PhenomenologyDan Zahavi

Print publication date: Jan 2013Print ISBN-13: 9780199594900Published to Oxford Handbooks Online: Jan-13Subject: Philosophy, Philosophy of LanguageDOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.001.0001

Language and non-linguistic thinking

Dieter Lohmar

DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.013.0019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter, which establishes the concept of a ‘system of symbolicrepresentation’, investigates Edmund Husserl's theory of meaning, whichis based largely on his analyses of categorial intuition. Human thinkingdepends on conceptual language. The argument presented in the chapterrelies on Husserl's conception of cognition as an independent act of intuition.In Husserl's theory of cognition, categorial intuition is the source of theintuitiveness of categorial intentions. Language is a useable carrier ofcognitive meaning that makes thinking and also public communicationpossible. The importance of language for human thinking is defined in aclear way. It is observed that the use of the ‘arch language’ of hands-and-feet communication will change very quickly to a usual, normal, and codifiedlanguage with partly artificial semantic rules.

theory of meaning, Edmund Husserl, categorial intuition, human thinking, conceptuallanguage, cognition, arch language

In this chapter I will try to establish the concept of a ‘system of symbolicrepresentation’—a term which denotes a general idea of a type ofperformance of which our language is only a single case. Nevertheless,this general idea is best explained with the case of language. A system ofsymbolic representation should enable us to form an idea of a state of affairsor of an event without having the appropriate intuition of them. Usually thisthinking occurs through the means of linguistic expression. But language isonly one system of symbolic representation, and we can in principle conceive

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of other symbolic systems of representation that have the same or nearly thesame performance.

I will argue for this claim by examining Husserl's theory of meaning which isbased largely on his analyses of categorial intuition—that is, of the complexacts that fulfil the specific intentions of cognition. In my view, Husserl'sphenomenology offers a refined theory of meaning that serves as a basis forunderstanding thinking, both that which is based on language and that whichis not. In other words, this theory of meaning leaves open the possibility ofsystems of representation for cognitive contents which employ means otherthan language.1 But first we must show that humans are capable of bothmodes of thinking.

It is easy to see that most humans are able to think in language. Language isa system of symbolic representation that enables us to conceive of objects,states of affairs, probabilities, and their consequences. But we are not soeasily convinced that a non-linguistic system of symbolic representation forcognitive contents is also functioning in our consciousness. In my view, inour everyday thinking we simultaneously use different systems of symbolicrepresentation, among which are language, gestures, feelings, andscenic images.2 I will argue for this by providing a phenomenological analysisof the non-linguistic systems functioning in our consciousness. It is especiallyfruitful to investigate the scenic mode of thinking we usually identify withdaydreaming which is a central form of the non-linguistic mode of thinking.This will turn out to be a phylogenetically old mode of non-linguistic thinkingthat is still operative in our consciousness.

We might immediately note one possible consequence of this lastsuggestion. It is highly probable that the non-human members of theprimate group are able to think using the same non-linguistic systemsof representation that we use. We might also gain some insight into theperformative limits of non-linguistic modes of thinking by taking into accountthe cases of thinking available both to humans and to animals. But in myinvestigation this is only a secondary theme; primarily, I am interested in themode(s) of human thinking.

1 Cognition, thinking, and meaning

Human thinking seems to rely on conceptual language. There are somevery useful phenomenological descriptions of how we think with the helpof concepts. Most basic in this regard is the insight into the function of actsthat are dedicated to become the ground for intuitive evidence of states of




affairs. Husserl names the intuitive ground(s) of cognition categorial acts(I will need to return to the details of these categorial acts later). There areother, further acts that serve to connect this intuition with elements of arepresentational system such as language. Categorial intuition is the sourceof meaning, and its meaning is transferred on a symbolic intention in whatHusserl names meaning-bestowing acts (bedeutungsgebende Akte). This isalready an important starting point, since it suggests that language by itselfis not knowledge, and that knowledge does not have a linguistic characterfrom the very beginning.

In explaining this claim we might begin with the better-known case ofusing linguistic expressions to express insights. In the complex interplay ofmeaning-bestowing and intuitive acts providing the evidence for categorialobjects, the usual first problem is to adjust the expression to the intuition—that is, to find the right expression, the expression that ‘fits’. Only thecorrect expression will later allow others to know what state of affairs one isintuiting.3 Often we simply know how to express our insights, but this is notthe result of following a clear-cut procedure or being guided by rules. Intrying to adjust the expression to better fit the intuition we have had, weoften only feel that one expression is closer to ‘what I had in mind’. Weusually learn about the use of words and phrases in the everyday contexts ofour community, and therefore we often are unable to say exactly—that is, ina rule-governed or systematic way—why one wording better fits our intendedmeaning than another.4

Let us take a look at the expressive use of language. We are able to interpretthe language used by others as words and sentences that point to theintuition usually connected with the sentences used. Through this processwe can usually gain a clear idea of the state of affairs at which the wordsand judgements aim. We do not take this state of affairs for granted fromthe beginning, but we know from our own experience what we will haveto do to gain the requisite intuition concerning these intentions. But thisalso suggests that language and the intuition of states of affairs are notinseparable. Language is a certain system for representation of statesof affairs. This means that we are able to create—based on the rules oflanguage use—a representation of the cognitive intention that can be usedin our own further thinking about the situation as well as become the basisfor a quite reliable communication with others regarding the same state ofaffairs. But a commonly shared intention is not yet intuition of the speaker'sintended state of affairs. Categorial intuition is, in contrast to linguisticrepresentation, more basic, originary, and independent. With the help of




language we are able to conceive a state of affairs of which we have had aprevious intuition, and in thinking this is possible even in the absence of apresent intuition. This revitalization of cognitive intentions (together with theoption to modify the intended state of affairs and its context) is, generallyspeaking, the basic function of a system of representation. If a system ofrepresentation also allows for communication—like language does—thisis an additional feature in comparison to the system's basic function.5 Weshould thus address systems of representation at their basic level—thatis, on the level of solitary thinkers—without directing our attention to thecommunicative function.

In opposition to the widespread opinion that thinking is closely boundto language, I would like to show that Husserl's analyses of the relationof intuition in knowledge (categorial intuition) and the connected act ofmeaning-bestowing (and eventually also the use of language based onmeaning-bestowing acts) leaves room for alternative conceptions. In suchcases I will speak of non-linguistic systems of symbolic representation.

My argument relies on Husserl's conception of cognition as an independentact of intuition (categorial intuition). Under normal circumstances, meaning-bestowing acts are closely connected to these acts of categorial intuition.However, in Husserl's view, meaning-bestowing acts are not a necessaryelement of cognition understood as an independent intuition. Thus thereremains a difference, a gap, between categorial intuition and meaning-bestowing acts—and this applies even to the case of the use of language.This difference allows for the possibility of meaning-bestowing actsperformed in other symbolic mediums of expression.

An easy way to indicate a state of affairs in a symbolic way is to intend itwith the help of pictorial intentions.6 For example, my favourite soccer clubwins a game and I simply pictorially recall the decisive goal, the triumphantlook of the winning team and the disappointment of the others. These arenot only pictures of memory, which may also show up without our willingthem and without the intention of the decisive victory; we can also use themas symbols to carry a particular meaning. We do not have to use pictorialelements merely as pictures of things roughly informing us about someof their essential features. We can also use them—in a way that exceedstheir pictorial representation of simple objects of perception in favour of asymbolic representation—as symbols of state of affairs: I see the captainof the team carrying the trophy, and at the same time I have the feeling ofa triumph. In this pictorially-based intention we are intending not only the




depicted man and the trophy (this might also be possible for a fan of theother team, but accompanied with very different feelings). The symbolicmeaning goes beyond the depicted contents. It is a pictorial symbol of myteam's victory.

In Husserl's theory of cognition, categorial intuition is the source of theintuitiveness of categorial intentions. Categorial intuition is a fulfilledintention of states of affairs, of relations, of insights into the causal effectsof events, or of the value of an object (or its use). This intuitive intention ofcognitive contents entails two functions: The ability to intend a cognitivecontent and to have the same content intuitively. This characterizes thinkingin the broadest sense—the sense in which I will be using the term for theremainder of this essay.

Let me shortly characterize Husserl's theory of categorial intuition asit is worked out as part of his theory of knowledge in the Sixth LogicalInvestigation. Husserl's account of categorial intuition clarifies how higher-order intentions—for example, of states of affairs—are fulfilled.7 There aredifferent forms of categorial intuition, each of which hasits particular type of synthetic fulfilment.8 Husserl's analysis is based onthe difference between simple acts, such as a perception of a book, andthe complex founded categorical acts that we find in all forms of cognition.According to Husserl, the respective ways of fulfilment of simple and complexacts are also different. We might see a green book and have evident intuitionof this simple object of perception (‘I see the green book’). Yet this intuitioncannot be identified with the higher-order intention ‘I see that this book isgreen’. To gain categorial intuition of this state of affairs calls for a series offounding acts, which Husserl describes in Paragraph 48 of the Sixth LogicalInvestigation.

We have to start with the simple perception of the green book, and thenconcentrate on the green colour of the book. In the transition from the first tothe second intention, a registered coincidence occurs between the respectivecontents of these intentions. The more implicit intending of the green colourin the case of the simple perception coincides in intention and in the aspectof sensual fulfilment with the concentrated intending of the colour in thesecond act. On this actively constituted basis—a basis that is not onlysensual but rather is a synthesis of coincidence of intentional contents offounding acts—we are able to perform a new and intuitive intention of thebook being green. This is the third decisive step of the process of categorialintuition (for more details, difficulties, and possible misunderstandings of the




theory of categorial intuition, see Lohmar (2002)). Thus sense perceptioncan contribute to the fulfilment of categorial intentions—at least in themost simple cases—yet it does not have to, because the decisive basis forintuitivity lies in the actively produced synthesis of coincidence betweenintentional contents of the founding, simpler acts. Thus many objects offulfilled categorial intuition may have only a very loose connection withsense perception, as is the case in propositions in pure mathematics andalgebra.

In the most common cases of thinking we have a categorial intuition alreadyconnected with a meaning-bestowing act and mostly also with an act ofexpression: that is, both are closely connected—one may even say ‘meldedtogether’. But this statistically normal connection of categorial intuition witha meaning-bestowing act using language does not imply the necessity ofsuch a connection. Besides, language need not be the representing mediumused in meaning-bestowing acts. Just as we may use a language other thanour mother tongue for this function, so we can also use another symbolicmedium entirely.

Thus, for Husserl, the relation of categorial intuition to meaning-bestowingacts is characterized by the difference between the intuition of states ofaffairs and empty intentions (in humans, mostly with the help of words, butpossibly also with scenic phantasma).9 Clearly, these two types of intentionare not the same, which means thatlanguage should only be a true and faithful expression of categorialintentions (‘treuer Ausdruck’, Husserl 1984: 313). But already, the factthat I have to interpret this relation as a norm or a rule reveals that suchtruthfulness and faithfulness is not guaranteed in every case. Sometimeswe distinctively realize the difficulty of adjusting judgements regardinglanguage use to the evidence in intuition. Husserl coins a special conceptof truth for exactly this relation between expression and intuition. We arestriving towards rightness (‘Richtigkeit‘), which means appropriatenessbetween categorial intuition and expression. Thus rightness designates thedegree of appropriateness of an expression to the intuitively given cognition.(As a consequence we find a crucial difference from the prevalent way ofconsidering such issues in analytical philosophy10: Cognition is here muchmore closely bound to intuition in the special form of categorial intuition thanto the propositional forms characteristic of linguistic expression.) The aim ofrightness of expression is a one-way striving: The expression should be madeappropriate to the intuitively given cognition. This intuition is the guidingprinciple for my striving to rightness (see Husserl 1969: §46). In contrast to




the dependent appropriate expression, categorial intuition is a primary andindependent givenness.

The norm of rightness for expressions of intuitive cognition serves toguarantee the most important function of expression in my own thinking: Therightness of the appropriate symbolic expression of intuitive cognition shouldallow me to think about exactly the same insight on another occasion (andthis time not intuitively but in the form of an empty intention). In regardsto external and public communication, this norm demands that the rightexternal expression would allow another person to emptily think exactlythe same what I intuitively thought earlier. And most importantly, this normnot only holds for language but for every medium of expression.11

In regard to this last insight we seem to be allowed to make anotherstep in generalizing the function of a true and faithful reestablishment ofthe cognition intended in all its single elements and traits. The symbolicexpression of a cognition should allow one to once again think the sameinsight—either only by me in solitary thinking or, in the case of publiccommunication, also by others. This quite general description of a principalfunction cannot determine whether it is language or another symbolicmedium that has to be used to reach this aim. This allows us to recognizevery clearly the basic, primary, and independent performance of categorialintuition.12 Thus it turns out to be a question of second order, whichparticular symbolic medium is used to fulfil the demands for the function ofthinking.

The expression of categorial intuition can use different means. I will addressthree types in terms of their function and their characteristic limitations. Thislist does not claim completeness.

1. Language and codified gesture languages (ASL . . .).2. Non-codified gestures together with mimics and pantomimics—akind of hands-and-feet communication system to which I will returnsoon.

These first two modes can be employed in communication as well as insolitary thinking.

3. Scenic phantasma of past and future events combined withfeelings. These are suitable for the representation in solitarythinking, but they cannot be used for public communication.

Scenic phantasma are found in our nightly dreams as well as in daydreams(see Lohmar 2008a: chapters 9 and 12). In daydreams, as they occur in




relaxed situations, scenic phantasma emerge like short video clips that giverise to feelings and co-feelings connecting short scenes in a kind of story.A close analysis will reveal that they are part of the non-linguistic systemof symbolic representation still operative in humans. The emergence ofscenic phantasma may be only momentary, like single views of somethingmeaningful, but even then phantasma have narrative elements. They arescenic images or ‘characteristic scenes’ that are enriched by emotionsand valuations; they entail intentions of co-present other persons, theirvaluations, and co-feelings of their emotions. For example, I may beimmersed in my everyday activities with self-confident optimism andsuddenly notice a phantasmatic appearance of my friend, looking at meskepticallyas if he is going to say: ‘this is not a good way to act; think it over.’ Co-performing his emotional valuing, I correct my naively optimistic view ofmy inconsiderate plans and change my course of action. Scenic phantasmaare not to be thought of as though they were objects of their own throughwhich other objects are depicted; they are more like experiential scenes thatappear in the same way as when the person is really looking at me. Thus—somehow—I am also there, right in the scene, but as the spectator whois incorporated, perhaps only implicitly, in his special perspective on thatscene. Most scenic phantasma are not voluntary, as is easily seen whenvisual images suddenly impose themselves upon us.

Before I go into the details of non-linguistic systems of representation I wouldlike to summarize what we know about the relation between the intuition ofstates of affairs and the different modes of symbolic representation which wemight use to think about them.

Generally, the connection between language and thinking is not as strictand inflexible as we tend to believe. Not only can we express our insights indifferent languages while still thinking in the medium of our mother tongue,but we can also think in a language other than our mother tongue. Most ofus are familiar with the following experience. After spending some days in aforeign country, where a foreign language is spoken with which we are wellfamiliar, our thinking takes the form of this other language. This examplesuggests that the level of language is quite on the surface of the wholephenomenon of thinking, symbolic representation, and expression. This is inaccordance with what we already know from the phenomenological analysisof cognition. The most basic level of cognition is intuition, and on the nextlevel there are the meaning-bestowing acts and expressions.




Regarding the loose connection between thinking about cognitive contentsand language, we might ask ourselves, counterfactually, that perhapscategorial intuition is primary and independent to such an extent that thereis no real need for a symbolic medium to represent the information and toenable the hypothetical manipulation of intuitive cognition. But this is notthe case. In fact, we can hold on to the intuition of states of affairs only fora short time. After this time we must have a symbolic medium to hold onto the contents of our cognition. In using a symbolic medium, the intuitiontransforms itself either into a firm conviction (which also obtains a symbolicform) that this state of affairs is the case, or into a modal modification of thisconviction.13 This is just as true for the hypothetical manipulation of futurestates of affairs, which we embark upon while thinking through our options.This characterizes the narrow sense of thinking.

We have seen that a symbolic carrier of a conviction is the presuppositionfor the three essential performances of thinking in this narrow sense: (1) theability to awaken and to retain in mind the same object of cognition, (2) theability to engender further cognitions stemming from this one, (3) the abilityto manipulate our future possibilities (and also ponder different hypothesesconcerning the course of history in the past). Thesecentral performances allow me to manipulate the possible future of anobject or event in different situations, to ponder possible consequences of,and obstacles and solutions to, problems. Essentially, thinking is an activetreatment of the contents of our cognition.

This requires that thinking has a medium of symbolic representation. Thelatter, however, need not be language. Yet language gives us a hint at themost important feature of such a system of symbolic representation. I mustbe able to produce the material carriers of symbols at any time: for example,I must be able to produce spoken or written words at any time either inpublic speech or in inner speech. I am only able to think if the symboliccarrier is ready at hand at all times. This carrier must achieve its meaningin a meaning-bestowing act based on the intuitive cognition. This is true forlanguage as for all other non-linguistic systems of representation. In thisregard also the use of non-linguistic symbols follows the pattern presented inHusserl's theory of meaning.

Thus we may conclude what we already know. Language is a useable carrierof cognitive meaning. It makes thinking and also public communicationpossible, because I can speak aloud (or write) at any time. And in regard toinner thinking, I can let my inner voice function as the carrier of thought. But




our conclusions can also go beyond this trivial insight, because we now knowat least one general feature of symbolic systems used in thinking. I must beable to produce the carrier of symbols at any time—either in inner or in outersensibility. Thus there can also be internal carriers of meaning that allow forthinking but usually do not allow for public communication.14 And there mayalso be symbolic carriers that allow for both, such as language, gestures,and pantomime. But it is obvious that language need not be the carrier in allthese cases; there are always alternatives.15

2 A phenomenological access to non-linguistic systems of representation

What alternative symbolic carriers of meaning do we have? Our non-complete list was: codified gesture-language, non-codified gestures togetherwith pantomime and onomatopoeisis (the hands-and-feet system ofcommunication already mentioned), andscenic phantasma together with emotions. In the following I will concentrateon the last two systems, and end by working out some striking similaritiesbetween them.

Let us start with the hands-and-feet system of communication. A simpleexample will show us that we usually underestimate our ability tocommunicate with gestures and pantomime. Imagine being in a foreigncountry, not being able to speak the local language, and having to go tothe airport. I meet a taxi driver whom I need to inform about my urgentwish, but without the use of the local language. In a situation like this one,I immediately start communicating my wishes with the help of gestures,onomatopoetic means, and pantomime. I point to the driver and mimicturning the steering wheel, I imitate the sound of the car, and then, afterpointing to myself, I pantomime running with luggage, and finally make thegesture and imitate the sound of a starting plane.16

This behaviour is quite revealing of our non-linguistic systems ofrepresentation. We start without any hesitation, literally without furtherthinking, and we are very certain about our attempt to communicate inthis way. This unreflected certainty reveals that this non-linguistic mode ofcommunication is all the time alive while we use language, for we do nothave to wonder about the ‘how’ of this gestic–pantomimic–onomatopoeticcommunication.17 We do not question whether it will work; we simplyuse it. Somehow we are behaving as if we have tacitly used this kind ofcommunication all along. It works with people of other cultures, of higheror lower degree of development, and it can easily be corrected and refinedbecause we are already in a context of common actions, which allows for




an ongoing mutual correction. To understand our trust in our non-linguisticabilities of communication we might also think about the situation in whichethnologists meet a tribe that speaks an unknown language. In such asituation we begin with common human practices such as eating, drinking,and sleeping, allowing for mutual correction in such a way that there will benot much concern about the meaning of ‘gavagai’.

Such non-conventionalized forms of preliminary communication are alwaysexceptional and transitory; usually a codified system of communication willbe established quite soon in common practice. Either gestures or elements ofboth languages will be used and mutually accepted, and thereby a new andconnecting convention established. This is part of universal anthropology.Rules for everything are established spontaneously through communicationin every community. Thus the non-conventionalized ‘beginning’ forms ofcommunication quickly put an end to themselves. We will return to thistheme later.

But this is only an example of a non-linguistic system of representation usedfor public communication. Now I would like to turn to non-linguistic modes ofinternal thinking that are only useful for solitary thinkers and that can unfoldin the absence of any communication.

It seems to us that in daydreaming we are using scenic phantasmaas expressions of our wishes and fears, and that they function asrepresentations of cognitive contents. It is always a state of affairs that wewish for or are in fear of. But we do not simply express our preferences, oururgent wishes, and our views of the state of affairs by this means alone. Itwill turn out that daydreaming is also a kind of response to this problem,a mental action, a mental manipulation of the problematic situation thatmight lead to a solution until now unthought. In my view, daydreamingis a phylogenetically old mode of thinking which is still operative in ourconsciousness.

To work out this hypothesis we will have to ignore for a while numeroustheories about the status of phantasy in daydreaming. We might object tothis very reasonable interpretation of daydreaming from different pointsof view. From a liberal-phantasy point of view our phantasy is usuallycompletely free in the formation of daydreams, and therefore cannot be ofany use when it comes to the serious and important problems of everydaylife. But some sobre reflection and self-observation will convince us thatwe are not completely free in the formation of our daydreams. From apsychoanalytic point of view we might suppose that all the contents of our




daydreams are closely bound to our individual experiences and passions, justas our nightly dreams are passively bound to them. From a part–part pointof view we might suspect that we are free in the formation of our positiveand pleasurable daydreams, but passive in the formation of our daydreamsabout lasting fears. This is not the case either: in both cases we experienceourselves as bound.

In daydreams we are playing out possible solutions to a problem—that is,we are mentally testing our options, their usefulness for a solution, and theirrespective consequences. This life of scenic phantasma constitutes a greatand important part of our conscious life, no matter how rarely we reflect onthis fact. Here are a few examples known to everyone. Worries about urgentchallenges or uncertainties arising in the form of worrisome scenes thatmake us sleepless at night. There are many phantasies of having success.I would also like to mention empirical–psychological research that suggeststhat most adult males periodically think of sex, and the mode of this thinkingis definitely not conceptual. In these scenic episodes of our conscious life,the linguistic expressions fade into the background in favour of pictorialelements.18 I am not denying that we can also think about our wishes andproblems with the help of language and that in daydreams the linguisticand non-linguistic elements are often merged, but I want to stress that indaydreaming we are also using non-linguistic systems of representation.

We also know that most more highly developed mammals can dream. Theyshow first signs of an attempt to act and of emotions in the phases of theirsleep which we interpretas dreamed episodes prolonging wakeful states of action and aims. Highercerebralized mammals are also capable of daydreaming: they can identifyevents with relative precision and often visually replay difficult situationsthey were confronted with or they expect to be confronted with again inthe future. But these theses need to be corroborated by empirical research,and I have to confess that I did not think it likely that there were seriousresearchers in neurology interested in the daydreams of animals. I wassurprised to find out that in the last few years there has been some intensiveresearch in this field, although daydreams have not been the explicit subjectmatter of this research from the very beginning. We might nonetheless takea look at recent research in the so-called replay events in the hippocampusof mammals (mostly rats) with the method of single neuron tracing. In thebeginning, these investigations revolved around the hypothesis that short-term memory is somehow fixated or consolidated in long-term memory withthe help of these replays in the hippocampus. But we will see that these




experiments also allow for an interpretation of such replays in terms ofdaydreams and their careful modifications useful for planning future action.

The method of these experiments is single neuron tracing, which allowsfor a statistically reliable identification of some quite simple contents ofconscious ideas. In most studies the neuronal activity in small regions ofthe hippocampus of rats seeking to orient themselves in different kindsof mazes is analyzed, for example, in simple mazes that have only fewcharacteristic regions: A, B, C, and D. The first results emphasized thatthe factually experienced course of events is replayed in rats not only indream states (Wilson and McNaughton 1994; Skaggs and McNaughton1996), but also in relaxed wakeful states (Foster and Wilson 2006). Thesituation in which replay events occur was shown to be widely independentof the original occasion (Davidson et. al. 2009; Karlsson and Frank 2009).Further findings suggest that there is a synchronous parallel activity invisual centres, so that we might interpret the replays as a kind of visualreplay activity (Ji and Wilson 2007)—a kind of daydreaming. More refinedexperimental arrangements show that the order of wakefully replayed eventsis not fixed; it can occur in the form of forward as well as backward replays(Foster and Wilson 2006; Diba and Buzsáki 2007; Davidson et. al. 2009).Thus a modification of such allegedly only reproductive ‘replays’ is possible(in my understanding this is something we have to expect from daydreamsthat are useful for planning). If the design of the maze was changed into acombination of two mazes overlapping in part, it was even possible to find(re-)plays (I think it is reasonable to avoid the reproductive implications of‘replay’ from this point on) that referred to an alternative paths throughthe maze, and there were even (re-)plays of routes that the animals hadnever experienced before (Gupta et al. 2010; Derdikmann and Moser 2010).All of this is not a proof for the hypothesis that animals are using scenicvisualization for thinking about and planning activities, but it does encouragethis hypothesis, and offers a point of access for further research that mightexplore this question more closely.

We might therefore claim that a system of representation combined withscenic phantasma, and with feelings, is operative in dreams and wakefulstates in higher cerebralized mammals up to primates in the same way as inhumans. This claim, however, is onlyan important consequence of my investigations into the different systemsof representation in humans. But nevertheless, this hypothesis aboutanimal thinking is not mere fancy or an arbitrary phantasy, because, as thephenomenological analysis reveals, it characterizes an important dimension




of our own thinking. Therefore, through these analyses we might find outin which ways we are still thinking like animals. In the present analysis Iwill not concentrate further on the theme of animal thinking. The evidencefor such hypotheses stems not only from the phenomenology of humanconsciousness but also from other methods and other sciences.

We might also ask ourselves: is it still phenomenology? It might appear thatwe have strayed too far from the centre of phenomenological research. Buta glimpse at Husserl's theory of pre-predicative experience makes it clearthat we have not; one of the reasons why such experience is named pre-predicative is that we can have it without language (for a discussion of pre-predicative experience, see Lohmar 1998: pp. 6, 7).

Another important element of non-linguistic systems of representation arefeelings, functioning, for example, in the framework of scenic phantasma.In my view we cannot interpret emotions as an independent system ofrepresentation, because we always have to presuppose another kind ofrepresentation in which we have in mind the things or (possible) events thatare the object of feelings. Emotions can easily satisfy the most importantrequirements for a system of representation, for we can have them in anactual situation and we can also ‘produce’ them (although not arbitrarily)in the absence of the intuitive situation—that is, through the imaginationalone. For example, the feeling of fury might move me violently in a certainsituation; yet the same feeling can also reappear in my mere thinking ofthe same situation later on. In both cases the feeling ‘tells’ me somethingabout the value of the event; it is a part of my inner ‘expression’, which hasa certain meaning. In thinking about a nice experience, the pleasant feeling‘means’ the desirable quality of the event.19

Let us take a short look at animals in this regard. Most animals have feelingsas part of their systems of representation. Therefore, we might suppose thatit makes no sense to have objects and properties of these objects if you donot have feelings with which to evaluate these objects and events, becausethis is the way to actively make use of your experiences with them. Thelimbic system which—as far as we know—processes most of our feelingslies in a layer between cerebellum and cerebrum. Thus from a speculativepoint of view inspired by brain physiology, we might suspect that feelingis part of the most basic system of representation—and that it is definitelyphylogenetically more basic than language. But now back to humans.

Daydreams perform, in their own way, a consistent representation of oureveryday longings, wishes, and fears. They somehow mirror our personal




ordering of significance on the continuum between those events that shouldnever happen and those that should happen at any cost. And they do notrequire a refined psychoanalytical hermeneutics.Daydreams differ strongly from nightly dreams, in that they respectcausality, the identity of objects, and their order in time. Also, from thispoint of view, they can be accepted as a ‘reasonable’ activity of thinking,dedicated to serious problems of past, present, and future reality.

The framework of our order of relevance for possible events also helps usto better understand why certain daydreams must be experienced overand over again as long as the urgent needs, tasks, and oppressing fearsthey reflect remain the same and unaltered. But daydreams do not repeateverything unaltered; we have to be attentive to small modifications in theserepetitions that represent real options in real action.

To give an example: had I been pressed hard by an impertinent andaggressive person, and had I given way to his demands due to thecircumstances, this annoying situation would re-emerge in my daydreamsmany times. But this repetition of daydreams is not always identical.Sober reflective self-observation makes me realize small variations of mybehaviour, and quite slowly, with further replays, it can lead me to the rightsolution to get rid of his aggressive demands. This would have been the rightreaction; had I done this, it would have stopped him! Although this insightis irreal, accompanied by a regretful feeling, and it cannot change the past,it nevertheless is a kind of action on future reality. It enables me in a similarsituation, if it were to recur, to act appropriately and to resist the unjustdemands.20 The same is true for events that I am anxiously expecting.

Therefore, the scenic-phantasmatic mode of daydreams allows for aninterpretation of daydreaming as a phylogenetically old but still operativemode of thinking. If I am worried in the mode of daydreaming, then thingsand persons are occurring in pictorial representations, and language isshifting into the background. The content of my worries is represented inscenic phantasma, but every time with small modifications. And in thesemodifications we sometimes realize successful solutions to our problems.For example, winning a lottery will easily solve pressing financial concerns—but it is unlikely to happen, and does not give me a feeling of confidence.Working hard or suffering for some time from some privations will workas well, and this idea gives me much more confidence in its success. Thisclearly shows the function of daydreaming as a non-linguistic mode ofthinking that can, so to speak, lead to solutions for everyday problems.




Additionally, it points out that daydreaming should not be identified with anevasive regression to a childish mode of handling problems.21

Despite my insistence on the reasonable character of non-linguistic modes ofthinking, I do not deny that we, humans, in turning back from our inner life ofscenic phantasma to other members of our group, immediately switch to alinguistic mode of communication. This shift, however, only expresses whatwas already found at the level of non-linguistic thinking.

Seen from a systematic point of view, there is only a limited set of themesthat a given community—for example, primates living in groups—has to beable to think about. This list includes: 1) objects, their present and futurestates and use (for example as tools), as well as their value in my personalestimation and their value in the view of the community—that is, culturalvalue; 2) events in present, past, and future, their felt value, and theirprobable consequences; 3) other persons with their sensations, feelings,and convictions, and their practical intentions related to myself and othermembers of the group. I hope that I can leave it to you to find examples forthe first two themes so that I can concentrate on the last group: that of theintentions of other persons.

It seems difficult to imagine a scenic image of a person's character andof his or her probable behaviour towards me, especially within complexconstellations involving others. But scenic phantasma offer a simple solutionto this apparent difficulty. In remembering a brutal former classmate, Isee his face looking at me with evil eyes, with clenched fists, and ready togive me a beating. But this ‘image’ is not simply an image of him; it is acharacteristic scene within which I am present, writhing with pain from hisbeating and in fear of his further beatings, and in the presence of a groupof friends in the background not helping me. This scene presents centralaspects both of his character and of his future behaviour within a socialcontext.

Scenic presentation of the attitude and behaviour of a person need not be soone-dimensional as in the case mentioned, since normally there are multiplefacets of the character of other persons that we are able to present. Thusthe question arises: how can I think a multitude of (changing) attitudes in ascenic mode? Think of a colleague with whom you work together successfullyin most cases, but who occasionally appears with an air of high-nosedarrogance. Both ‘faces’—both aspects of his character—may be representedin a scenic phantasma, one after the other, or even as mixed in a changingway, which results in an uncertain basis for your plan-making. The modal




character of possibility and uncertainty is thus present in the changing andmerging faces of your colleague. We might interpret this changing imageas a non-linguistic form of the logical ‘or’. The colleague's attitude towardsother persons and his options in a changing situation may be represented ina short but eloquent side-view to others, and so on.

Since the value and the usefulness of objects can change, this may also bereflected in characteristic scenes. For instance, if I own a car that usuallybreaks down and thus has to be towed away and repaired, the characteristicscene within which I am positively excited about my car is modified, andconverted to one that is negative. The emotional aspects of this badexperience are especially mirrored in the scene characterizing the object: Ino longer imagine the car with the joyful expectation of reliable use, but withthe cheerless expectation of future harm, expense, and inconvenience. Inthis way, the variations of characteristic scenes—that is, characterizingpersons, objects, or events—unfold by means of similar representations.22

So far I have discussed scenic phantasma in daydreams as a special systemof representation and modification, characterizing this process as a still-functioning ‘phylogenetically old mode of thinking’ employed by humans andprobably also by mammals up to primates. As a phenomenologist I cannotgo further, for the empirical proof that primates are thinking in the modeof scenic phantasma must be provided by other sciences—for example, byexperimental psychology or neuroscience.

Through our analyses the significance of language for human thinkingis delimited in a clear way. Language is far from being the only possiblemeans of thinking, and, moreover, it is not the only system of representationoperative in human consciousness. It seems probable that the most basicperformances of cognition and our conception of reality are based onsimpler, non-linguistic systems of representation that are still operative inour minds. Public language and the concepts it uses turn out to be only avery superficial layer of the whole performance of thinking.

3 On similarity semantics in non-linguistic systems of representation

Allow me to add some further remarks to my theses concerning scenic-phantasmatic modes of thinking.

In this essay I have concentrated on establishing the idea of non-linguisticthinking in humans. But remember our other example—that of non-linguistichands-and-feet communication using non-codified gestures, mimics,




pantomime, onomatopoeisis, and other means such as hand-theatre. I wouldsuggest that all humans are able to use these non-linguistic systems ofrepresentation. But then we may ask: is there a special way in which humanslearn how to use these two non-linguistic systems of representation (thatis, hands-and-feet communication and the scenic-phantasmatic system), orare these abilities somehow ‘innate’? Faced with the difficulties posed bythese alternatives, it seems worthwhile to reflect on the common characterof these two non-linguistic systems.

To start with, let us take a step back and try to find the common structureof these two systems of representation. We recognize that both ways ofrepresenting ideas have one important element in common: both use asimilarity semantics. That is, all means of representation, all symbols in thesetwo non-linguistic systems of representation, are somehow ‘similar’ to theobjects they represent.

It is important to stress that not all non-linguistic systems of representationwork on the basis of similarity semantics. There are also non-linguisticsystems with a semantics based on conventions. From the age of a fewweeks up to one year, human infants are starting to communicate intensivelywith the persons to whom they relate most closely—usually the mother.Daniel Stern has carried out some intriguing investigations into the modeof this early mother–child communication—that which serves as a base forall later forms of social interaction (see Stern 1977, and Stern 1990). Duringthis early phase, mother and child are intensively engaged in simple socialgames such as peek-a-boo or tickling-the-belly-with-announcement andthe like. Through this practice they are developing the basic patterns ofcommunication which later will enable the child to initiate social interaction,to maintain it, and to modify it, but also to end it and to avoid it. The mostimportant aspect of this form of communication is the extensive lookingat each other. With the help of extensive mimicking, the modulation of thevoice, and body movements, forms and contents of communication arelearned: the invitation for play, the wish for prolongation, pretended surpriseas a means to initiate a social interaction, affirmation, critique, scepticism,love, or a sorrowful frowning together with a turning away of the head thatserves to end the interaction. In intimate mother–child communication,humans learn how to understand and how to use this pre-linguistic languageof the look.

In later phases, after the first sixth months, this intimate interaction betweenmother and child will be extended to include more elements—mostly objects.




The child looks at an object—for example, a hot flat-iron—which appearsto him to be an attractive new toy, and then looks back to his mother toensure that she is looking at and attending to this toy as well. In this secondlook (ensuring the shared attention on the object) the child can learn fromthe mother's facial expression about her attitude toward the object. Herlook from the toy back to the baby may signal fear and concern, but if it isa harmless toy perhaps also encouragement to use the toy. If the mother iscontracting her eyebrows and her nostrils are contracted, this signalizes thatthis object is dangerous. But perhaps she draws up her eyebrows and opensher mouth in pleased astonishment: You should try it!

We see that this object-directed communication entails a kind oftriangularization between the child, the common object, and the mother.In this central mode of early communication on objects, new elements ofmeaning are first encountered. Most importantly, there are also valuations onthe basis of the mother's own experiences, and there are also incorporatedvaluations stemming from the community. For example, if the mothernervously checks whether someone else is observing the behaviour ofher child, this gives the clear message that this is not accepted by theothers. Triangularization and the valuation of actions may rest upon on thesemantics of earlylook-communication, but this ability is also a result of extensive training—ofshared intentionality in the early forms of social interaction between motherand child.23

But let us now return to the two systems of representation based onsimilarity semantics, the scenic-phantasmatic system and the hands-and-feetsystem of communication. Admittedly, this is quite an unusual characteristicof semantics, which introduces an important difference that separates it fromthe semantics of natural languages. To clarify this point, I will turn to the verybasics of semantics of usual languages. This characterization does not entailanything new.

In the normal semantics of national languages it takes a long time to learnthe connection of a language sign and its meaning so as to be able tounderstand and to speak the language. Learning the normal semanticsof usual languages rests on the relation of contiguity. As Hume puts it,contiguity is a relation established on several equal occasions where oneobject occurs together with another object in close temporal and/or spatialrelations. This process might also be enforced by normative activities of asocial group or a single person within this group. These normative activities




are usually very simple. For instance, they correspond with the strong wish ofa child to learn and adjust to the communication used by adults. As the childis learning the use of language, there may be several instances of seeingan object, upon each of which the parents name the object ‘cow’. Perhapsthey also correct the child for wrongly addressing the cow as a ‘bow-wow’.Thus, normal semantics is always related to a community that agrees inconventions and acts in a normative way such that meanings are reliablyconnected with expressions. This convention-and-contiguity semantics,resting on agreement and conventions, is always to a certain extent artificial.It differs from neighbouring national (that is, related to the birthplace and thecommunity) languages because of regional circumstances and also becauseit is part of our identity—that is, it is not only a distinct sign of my belongingto a particular community, but also indicates the difference of mine from theother communities. We have to learn all the semantic rules by heart beforewe are able to understand a particular language, and no single person couldever discover, in isolation, the concrete connections that bind words andobjects.

By contrast, the similarity semantics of non-linguistic systems ofrepresentation neither rests on agreement nor on rules accepted by acommunicating community.24 In thisregard it is much more ‘natural’: it is based on the similarity of the sign tothe object it designates.

Let us examine the hands-and-feet system of communication. If I imitatecarrying a briefcase and running, it looks similar to the corresponding realevent. If I imitate the sound and the movement of an aircraft it is similarto the sound and appearance of this event. This is the reason why I do notneed to be trained in hands-and-feet communication. It rests on a naturalsimilarity semantics, and not on an artificial convention-and-contiguitysemantics.25

Let us now consider the system of scenic phantasma in thinking. We can seethat the scenic-phantasmatic system of representation in solitary thinking(daydreaming) also uses natural similarity semantics. As we have alreadyseen, this kind of thinking has either no, or only a few, linguistic elements,and is capable of directly (re)presenting its meaning. My daydreams imitatethe actual event I am thinking of, as the following examples suggest.

The President of the Nobel Prize committee is approaching me,congratulating me, and handing over the award, and all of my colleagues areapplauding and cheering (the last part, at least, will definitely never happen).




But what about kissing Claudia Schiffer? I can almost feel her body, and evensmell the new Lagerfeld fragrance in her hair—at least, it is quite similar. Butnow let us desist with the nice examples and come back to our systematicconsiderations.

Perhaps we should also take a look at the syntax side of these two non-linguistic systems of representation. For this task, the earlier example withthe cab-driver may to be too simple. We should at least expect hands-and-feet communication to be able to tell a story of the past or future, ofsomeone who is acting and another who is suffering. We can also indicatethis in the hands-and-feet system. Think of a communication of two humanhunters in the old days before the emergence of language—a classical genreeven in our times. In this situation I may use my hands for pointing at thesun, to indicate to the other my hunting success in the early morning. I canindicate the time by moving my pointing hand from the present locationof the sun backwards to the point where it rises in the morning. I can alsouse my hands as a kind of hand-puppets, indicating the rabbits I saw; and Ican also pantomime my seeing the rabbits and the triumph of successfullyshooting them with my bow, and so on.

This small piece of pantomime, onomatopoetics, mimics, and hand-puppettheatre will inform others very precisely about what has happened in themorning, whathappened yesterday, or what will happen tomorrow. The function of syntaxin a system of representation is to inform us about such issues as whothe acting person is, on which object he is acting, who suffers from whichaction, when the action has happened or will happen, and so on. All thesequestions can be answered by means of non-linguistic hands-and-feetcommunication, on the basis of similarity semantics (and the same is truefor the phantasmatic system of thinking to oneself). I can ‘see’ who is actingon what, even if this is mediated by similarity semantics. Moreover, as far asthe dimension of time is concerned, we find a narrative structure capable ofindicating the internal order of the phantasmatic scenes.26 Thus the task ofsyntax is also fulfilled. And all these performances can occur on the basis of aquite simple similarity semantics.

We are always able to start communicating by means of hands-and-feet communication, because it does not rest on an artificial contiguitysemantics. But—as already mentioned—we never remain in the transitorystate of a beginning communication system, otherwise it would be difficultto understand why such a system has not been long established as a




widespread and long-lasting, quite basic, but nevertheless universal,system of communication. What is the reason for this? The reason is simplythe fact that communicating communities are always living in a realmof norms and values—that is, they strive to establish rules for all kindsof activities—including communication. Therefore, if communication isestablished in the mode of hands-and-feet communication (or in anotherway), then there will be conventions and rules established for it, enforcedand conserved by tradition. That means that it will be transformed into aregional gesture language only understood here in this community, with amixture of conventional signs and several elements that mirror its offspringin similarity semantics. This is the state of today's gesture languages. Thus,the use of the ‘arch language’ of hands-and-feet communication will changevery quickly to a usual, normal, and codified language with partly artificialsemantic rules. This is an unavoidable fate of hands-and-feet ‘arch language’based on similarity semantics.

But now we have to solve another puzzle. If the ‘arch language’ of similaritysemantics will always be overwritten in public communication and slowlychange into a system of representation with a normal but artificial contiguitysemantics, how could it have survived in humans at all? The answer is againquite simple: because our most basic form of non-linguistic thinking in themode of scenic phantasmata uses this same kind of semantics. And nowwe might take a speculative step and argue that because the non-linguisticsystem of scenic phantasma survives (in the face of so many differentartificial semantics we are also able to use), this fact alone proves that non-linguistic systems of representation are definitely much more basic than allkinds of linguistic systems.

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Notes:

(1) I would like to thank Dan Zahavi for critical remarks on a former versionof this chapter, and Saulius Genusias and Jacob Rump for their effortsin improving my English text. I would also like to thank an anonymousreferee at Oxford University Press for many hints concerning flaws in mypresentation, and also for some very useful suggestions for clarifying myargument.

(2) We might tend to interpret usual gestural languages as a form oflanguage, which is quite appropriate for the forms of national gesturallanguage that are highly conventionalized, such as ASL, and so on. But thereare also elementary, non-conventionalized forms of gestural communicationusing only body-related gestures, onomatopoetics, pantomimics, andpictorial symbols based on similarity semantics. I will discuss this later ashands-and-feet communication.

(3) For Husserl's theory of meaning see the I. and VI. Logical Investigation,Husserl (2001), and concerning its connection to the present theme Lohmar(2008b). For the theory of categorial intuition see chapter 6 of the VI. LogicalInvestigation, Husserl (2001), and Lohmar (2002).

(4) I will come back to this theme of ‘rightness’ of appropriate expression.As the sign-meaning relation is based on association (as well as the relationAnzeichen–Angezeigtes), the meaning is associated with the sign used forexpression, and the connection is intuitively felt; see Husserl (2001, §4).The orientation of this process of adjusting language expression to intuition


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of states of affairs is easily grasped in the corrections of our languageexpressions in cases where they do not exactly fit what we mean.

(5) To give a first motivation for the claim that thinking and languageare separable (I will argue for in the whole article), let me mention fourconnected arguments: Phenomenological analysis points out that the basicperformance of cognition (categorial intuition) is functioning independentof language-based thinking. Therefore, cognition without language ispossible. Today we know that many animals have the ability for complexcognitive performances, and as reductive explanation for this ability followingMorgan's canon often turns out to be much more complicated and burdenmore assumptions than accepting animals ‘lonesome’, non-communicativethinkers, there must be thinking without language in animals. In the followingI will show with phenomenological means that there is a non-linguisticsystem of representation for cognitive contents still working in humanconsciousness. Thus humans are able to think without language, and theystill do so. This claim should also not deny that in humans there is usually astrong influence of communication on the forms of cognition and thinking.From a developmental point of view in humans, the communicative precedesthe cognitive and shapes much of it, but this does not imply that non-language thinking is impossible without this communicative influence.

(6) For this suggestion, see Section 3 on similarity semantics.

(7) The most important sources on the theme of categorial intuition inHusserl are Tugendhat 1970: 111–36; Sokolowski 1981: 127–41; Lohmar1989: 44–69; Seebohm 1990: 9–47; Cobb-Stevens 1990: 43–66; Lohmar1998: 178–273, and Lohmar 2002: 125–45.

(8) In the 6. Logical Investigation Husserl analyzes only some basic forms ofcategorial intuition (identification, relations, collections, eidetic abstraction)to show that the concept of categorial intuition is justified, and that theseforms can serve as a pattern for analyzing the other forms (see Husserl2001: §§47–52).

(9) Empty intentions of states of affairs are intentions that we can have onlyby understanding what precisely is meant by propositions—for example,when someone utters a sentence such as ‘I see a pink elephant flying bythe window.’ A scenic image of a pink elephant may intend this object ofperception emptily, for it is only a phantasma and not perception.












(10) An important exception is the impressive book of Bermudez (2008),which begins with the insight that there must be ways of representingcognitive contents in non-linguistic creatures. However, Bermudez's detailedtheories of thinking in non-linguistic animals call for a more extendeddiscussion, which I cannot provide in the present context (I have to referto my forthcoming monograph Denken ohne Sprache). Here I will mentiononly a single item. Some of his theses about the principal limitations of non-linguistic thought seem to me not to be acceptable. He denies that theremight be meta-representational thought in non-linguistic animals, because inhis view there is no possible working alternative to symbolically represent it(no vehicle). The only alternatives he discusses are pictorial representationsthat revolve around the idea of analogical representation of states of affairsin something like mental models and mental maps (Bermudez 2008: 160–3).His interpretation of such pictorially-based alternatives for the representationof cognitive contents understands them as a covered version of linguisticmetarepresentation—that is, he thinks the structure of this model is derivedfrom linguistic thinking (Bermudez 2008: 163). His conclusion is thatmetarepresentation can be performed only by creatures who use language.This claim calls for the support of empirical evidence, suggesting thatmetarepresentation is possible for some animals (see Hampton 2001; Smith,Shields, and Washburn 2003; Smith 2009; and Hampton 2009).

Besides, the models for pictorial representation which Bermudez isdiscussing are too simple. The representation of cognitive contents cannotbe done in single pictures, but asks for complex scenic phantasma, like videoclips. The reason for this seems to me to lie in the complex structure ofcategorial intuition, which requires a series of different intentions. Anotherobjection is that if you take feelings to be within the realm of possiblesymbolic functions, then the feeling of certainty/uncertainty accompanying ascenic-phantasmatic representation of a state of affairs can easily function asmeta-cognition.

(11) This is also the case for other ways of expression. What is presupposedis a mutual interest in the communication of contents. Both sides must beoriented to such social norms, otherwise it will not work (see also Tomasello2008).

(12) We might suppose that at least in the second step of a categorialintuition—for example, focusing on the colour of an object—the necessaryfunction of language is already involved. This may often be the case withlanguage-using subjects, but ‘it ain’t neccessarily so’. I tend to believe that









the phenomenological analysis of categorial intuition is useful with humansand with non-linguistic creatures alike, in realizing, for example, that a fruithas a certain colour indicating that it is ripe and tasty.

(13) Remember that both need not to have a linguistic form. A pictorialsymbol combined with a feeling would work just as well.

(14) We might suspect that sometimes this kind of internal phantasma mayalso allow for public forms of communication by allowing for the creation of afilm, a picture, or a sculpture with this pictorial message.

(15) At other places I have discussed arguments supporting the idea thatthere must be necessarily non-linguistic systems of representation in humansand also in higher primates. The arguments go back to human evolutionand dual-process theories designed to better understand the remarkablemental abilities of primates. This supports the hypothesis that humans andprimates share a common low-level mode of thinking. Thus we feel thedemand to make clear why humans have highly-developed culture, science,techniques, and computers, while primates do have cultures but no suchrefined techniques (see Lohmar 2010).

(16) The functioning of these natural gestures presupposes a big realm ofcommonly shared knowledge about our life-world. Tomasello (2008) givesa comprehensive overview of the rich functions and meanings of humannatural gestures on the background of the human tendency to cooperate,and the framework of social norms that develops from this constellation.

(17) At this place it might be reasonable to draw a distinction betweennon-linguistic systems of representation for thinking and such systems forcommunication, but later we will see that they share a common similaritysemantics. Moreover, if we inquire into the relation between them it seemslikely that the more basic system is the scenic-phantasmatic system forsolitary thinking, enabling us to use iconic gesturing and pantomimics forcommunication.

(18) See Cameron and Biber (1973); Hicks and Leitenberg 2001. The shiftingbackground of language is also to be found in nightly dreams (see Symons1993).

(19) We should keep in mind that there is another aspect that can be partlyexpressed by feeling: the dimension of time. Fearing an event points to thefuture character of an event, regret to the past character.








(20) The result of this active manipulation of the future is a kind ofideal picture of the solution of problems such as this one under givencircumstances. Nevertheless, the result of the sucessful manipulation of aflop (reframing) is often communicated afterwards untruly as a story to covermy failure to stand the unjust criticism of my boss, a confrontation in traffic,and so on.

(21) We might also stress that non-linguistic modes of thinking in the scenic-phantasmatic system are not as quick and effective as linguistic modesof thinking; it will always take some repetitions to find a way to solve theproblem, even if the scenic representation of an event is running in acompressed speed-mode.

(22) Besides my emotional valuing of objects and events, I can also have ascenic phantasma which entails valuing reactions of others to my plannedfuture actions. If I am pondering problematic plans for my future behaviour,suddenly close friends or relatives may show up in the characteristic scene,somehow looking sorrowfully at me, but also perhaps with sympathy.Through this, the valuation of my planned actions in the view of thecommunity is articulated. This means that even persons sympathizing withme have serious considerations. Their expressions of sympathy and worryat the same time give me an important hint about the valuing and probablereactions of others with regard to my plans.

(23) Michael Tomasello has done much comparative research on theability of joint attention in young humans and in primates (see Tomasello1995; Tomasello et al. 2005; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007). The centralcharacteristic of joint attention is that two persons are directed to an objector event and are informing one another about this object, and trying to besure that the other is directed to the same object and is aware the otheris aware of the object too. Tomasello wants to find a principal differencein the abilities of humans and primates, and what becomes obvious in hisexperimental research on joint attention is that this ability is very strong inhuman children—starting around the age of 9 months to a year—and quiteweak in primates. But if we look at this difference from the point of view ofDaniel Stern, this big difference may be more due to the fact that younghuman children have just undergone nearly one-year intensive training injoint attention.

(24) The relation of similarity seems to be very easy. We tend to believethat we are able to simply ‘perceive’ similarities—for example, betweenfather and son, trees and sheep, and so on. As phenomenologists we are







also convinced that this ability is the basic performance which establishesthe intuition of common traces in a certain type of thing, as in trees(Wesensschau). But this does not imply that the facility of recognizingsimilarity is itself already established in children of the earliest age. Thiswould also be a theme worth investigating in developmental psychology,which I cannot do here. My opinion in this regard is the following. We are ableto establish our facilities to recognize and to actively use similarity throughexperience. That means that we can learn about similarity relations becausewe have some basic ability to recognize similar elements in different objects.But we do not have to learn from others how to use this ability.

(25) I agree that in this situation there is also presupposed a basic similarityof our life-worlds: for example, that there are airports, cabs, drivers, and soon. But I do not consider this to be problematic.

(26) In regard to more distant events we have to take seriously intoconsideration the indication of time by the means of emotions. Forexample: if I am thinking of an event with deep regret, this emotion clearlyindicates a value, but it also indicates that this event happened in the past.Phantasmatic pleasure, pre-pleasure, and anxiety point to the future, shameand past fury indicate the past, and so on.


language and nonlinguistic thinking

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